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REVIEW

McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation

Issues

Is the district court in this case required to accept the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act without reviewing the validity of the interpretation?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a district court is required to defer to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) without reviewing the validity of the interpretation. Petitioner, McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. (“McLaughlin”), argues that the Hobbs Act does not prevent district courts from interpreting the TCPA in private litigation. Respondents, McKesson Corporation and McKesson Technologies, Inc. (collectively “McKesson”), counter that FCC orders are binding and can only be reviewed by a court of appeals. McLaughlin asserts that FCC orders do not bind courts because they are interpretive rules. The outcome of this case will have major implications for the authority of federal administrative agencies. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the Federal Communications Commission’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, makes it unlawful for any person to send unsolicited advertisements to a recipient’s telephone facsimile, or fax machine. 

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U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge

Issues

What is the appropriate standard of review in determining non-statutory insider status under the Bankruptcy Code? 

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a lower court’s determination of an individual’s non-statutory insider status during a bankruptcy proceedings should be reviewed using the de novo standard or the clearly erroneous standard. The designation of insider status matters because, under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10), an insider—both as officially defined by the statute and as defined by the more expansive case law (a non-statutory insider)— is not permitted to vote during the consideration of a debt restructuring plan, even if his debt interests are harmed by the plan. U.S. Bank National Association argues that when a party appeals its designation as a non-statutory insider, courts should apply a de novo standard of review to such analysis, because it is either a pure question of law or at least a mixed question of law and fact. In contrast, Village at Lakeridge contends that courts should apply a clear error standard to this question because it involves pure fact. U.S. Bank National Association argues that de novo review prevents forum shopping and promotes judicial uniformity. Village at Lakeridge counters that de novo review undermines judicial economy and wastes party resources. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously applied a clear error standard of review for determining non-statutory insider status under the Bankruptcy Code where the material facts were undisputed, rather than a de novo standard of review applied by the majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue. 

U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) is a creditor of Village at Lakeridge, LLC (“Lakeridge”) for a $10 million secured claim. U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, 814 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir.

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