SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Fischer v. United States

Issues

Can individuals be found guilty of obstructing an official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) when the proceeding did not involve investigations or evidence? 

This case asks the Court to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act covers obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that are unrelated to investigations and evidence. Petitioner argues that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as only covering obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that involve investigations and evidence, and points to textual analysis, principles of statutory construction, and the Court’s interpretations of similar statutes in Yates v. United States and Begay v. United States for support. Respondent counters that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as a catch-all provision covering all obstructive conduct and rejects the textual analysis and principles of statutory construction argued by the petitioner while pointing to 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for support. This case touches on important questions regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the usage of § 1512(c)(2) to cover rioters’ conduct during the January 6 Capitol Building storming, such as sentencing fairness and providing notice to parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit erred in construing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, to include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence.

On January 6, 2021, Joseph Fischer participated in the “Stop the Steal” rally in Washington, D.C. Brief for Petitioner at 3. Fischer also allegedly participated in the mob that entered the Capitol Building and forced Congress to halt its certification of the 2020 presidential election results.

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Yates v. United States

Issues

Does the term “tangible objects” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 encompass all physical objects, including fish, or only those objects that are meant to preserve information?

In this case the Supreme Court will address whether the term “tangible objects” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 encompasses more than objects that preserve information—specifically whether it includes fish. Section 1519 criminalizes destroying or concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a government investigation. While Yates encourages the Court to look at the statutory language surrounding “tangible objects” and argues that fish are not “tangible objects” within the meaning of the statute, the government contends that “tangible objects” is an unambiguous term that applies to all objects, including fish. The Court’s ruling will implicate the reach of federal law, statutory interpretation, and the notice requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the wake of the criminal charges filed against Enron's corporate officers, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Known as the “anti-shredding provision” of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 makes it a crime for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object’ with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (emphasis supplied). John L. Yates, a commercial fisherman, was charged and convicted under this anti-shredding criminal statute for destroying purportedly undersized, harvested fish from the Gulf of Mexico after a federally-deputized officer had issued him a civil citation and instructed him to bring them back to port.

This petition presents the important question of whether the reach of section 1519 extends to the construction of anything meeting the dictionary definition of “tangible objects,” or instead is limited to the destruction of tangible objects related to record-keeping as follows:

Whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose?

On August 23, 2007, Petitioner John Yates and his crew were actively engaged in fishing aboard their vessel when Officer John Jones (“Officer Jones”) of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission approached for an inspection. See United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 2013).

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