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Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.

At the end of 2011, 34 million people were living with HIV, according to the World Health Organization, and AIDS took the lives of 1.7 million people that same year. In 2003, Congress took action to prevent the spread of infectious diseases worldwide by passing the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act or Act). The Act designates federal funds to non-governmental organizations that fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS so long as the organization also opposes prostitution and sex trafficking. Petitioner United States Agency for International Development (USAID) argues that this policy requirement targets prostitution and sex trafficking as significant contributors to the spread of HIV/AIDS while minimally impacting, if at all, the speech of a federally funded organization. In contrast, respondent Alliance for Open Society International (AOSI) argues that the policy requirement violates the protections of the First Amendment by forcing a federally funded organization to adopt a viewpoint that may not only be insensitive to localized concerns regarding the trust of victims but also may distort public debate by inhibiting field research.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the United States Leadership Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. 7631(f), which requires an organization to have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking in order to receive federal funding to provide HIV and AIDS programs overseas, violates the First Amendment.

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Issue

Does the government violate the First Amendment by funding organizations to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS only if they also oppose prostitution and sex trafficking?

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Forest Grove School District v. T. A.

Issues

Whether a school district is liable for the expenses that a disabled student incurred by pursuing private education when that student did not first attempt to seek help in a public school facility, as mandated by statute.

 

In 2000, T.A.'s parents realized that their son was a troubled teenager, and though it was suspected that he might have a learning disability, his school district determined that he was not disabled and therefore not entitled to special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. T.A.'s problems continued and in 2003 his parents placed him in a private school. In 2004, a hearing officer determined that T.A. was disabled, and that because Forest Grove School District had failed to offer him free appropriate public education, the district had to reimburse T.A.'s parents for the cost of the private school. The school district appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that damages were not required because T.A.'s parents removed him unilaterally, without his ever having received special education services from a public agency. In this case, the Court will determine whether parents can unilaterally make this decision and then expect the school district to reimburse them, or if they must wait for action by the school district.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act permits a tuition reimbursement award against a school district and in favor of parents who unilaterally place their child in private school, where the child had not previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.

After years spent in the Forest Grove School District, T.A. left in the middle of his junior year of high school, when his parents decided to put him in a private school. See Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). T.A.

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Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic

Issues

Does the Medicaid Act’s any-qualified-provider provision give Medicaid beneficiaries a private right to choose their provider?

This case asks the Court to determine when an individual, private right is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. South Carolina’s executive order deems abortion clinics enrolled in the Medicaid program as unqualified to provide family planning services. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic and its patient, Julie Edwards, contend that the executive order violates Ms. Edwards’s right to choose a qualified provider under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23), the any-qualified-provider provision. South Carolina counters that the any-qualified-provider fails to create a private right of action enforceable through § 1983 because Congress did not use unambiguously clear rights-creating language. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for Medicaid beneficiaries and providers, the implementation of state and federal healthcare policy goals, and the litigation of private rights. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Medicaid Act’s any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.

The Medicaid Act provides medical assistance to certain individuals and families who cannot cover the cost of necessary medical services due to insufficient income and resources. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Medina, 95 F.4th 152 at 156 (4th Cir.

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Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights

Issues

Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the Solomon Amendment's equal access condition on federal funding violates the First Amendment based on the fact that the Solomon Amendment burdens the right of educational institutions to engage in expressive association and forces law schools to propagate a message of discrimination against homosexuals with which they disagree?

 

Under the Solomon Amendment, law schools that receive federal funding are forced to provide the same access to career placement services to military recruiters that they provide to other employers. This requirement conflicts with most law schools' policies of non-discrimination that withhold career placement services from employers who exclude employees on the basis of race, gender, religion or sexual orientation. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (“FAIR”) has challenged the Solomon Amendment on two grounds. First, they argue that the Amendment is an unconstitutional condition that infringes their freedom of speech. Second, FAIR argues that law schools are “expressive associations” whose right to free speech and dissemination of a chosen message is impaired by the forced accommodation of military recruiters on campus. The Court of Appeals, in ruling for FAIR, held that the Solomon Amendment unconstitutionally impairs expressive conduct and that the Government has not shown a compelling interest that justifies denying this freedom. The case is significant because it will determine whether, specifically, law schools are able to bar military recruiters from campus without losing federal funding, and, more broadly, whether certain associations may qualify for federal funding but remain constitutionally protected from disseminating a message with which they do not agree.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds specified federal funds from institutions of higher education that deny military recruiters the same access to campuses and students that they provide to other employers. The question presented is whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the Solomon Amendment's equal access condition on federal funding likely violates the First Amendment to the Constitution and in directing a preliminary injunction to be issued against its enforcement.

Since 1990, the American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”) has required its members to withhold placement assistance or use of the schools' facilities from employers who discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. AALS believes that the military violates this policy as a result of the military's “don't ask, don't tell” policy. See 10 U.S.C. § 654. As a result, some law schools refused to provide access to their facilities and assistance to military recruiters.

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