state sovereignty

Alabama v. North Carolina

Issues

Whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission, jointly with four compacting States, from asserting claims in a Supreme Court original action, that North Carolina has violated the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact and is subject to the Commission’s sanctions order.

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Original Jurisdiction

 

Original Jurisdiction: On Motion of North Carolina to Dismiss Claims of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission

This case involves a lawsuit brought by several states and the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission against the State of North Carolina for its alleged breach of contract under the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact to license a waste disposal facility. In June 2002, the member states of the Compact and the Commission filed a Bill of Complaint, which the Supreme Court granted. The Special Master then filed his Preliminary and Second Reports with this Court on April 2, 2009. The Supreme Court subsequently received these Reports and ordered them filed. This case is now before the Supreme Court as both an original and exclusive jurisdiction case; it also addresses issues of contract law. The Supreme Court’s decision in Alabama v. North Carolina may have significant effects on constitutional law, most notably on the extent of the Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction over a judicial case or controversy between States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Plaintiffs except to the following conclusions of the Special Master:

1.     Article 79F) of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (the “Compact”), which states that the Commission may “sanction[]” “[a]ny party state which fails to comply with the provisions . . . or . . . fulfill the obligations” of “this compact,” does not give the Commission the authority to level monetary sanctions against a party State when it fails to comply with the Compact. Preliminary Report 15–25.

2.     Even if North Carolina violated the Compact, it was not subject to the sanctions authority of the Commission because it withdrew from the Compact before sanctions were imposed. Preliminary Report 25–29.

3.     North Carolina did not waive its right to contest the legality of the sanctions proceedings even though it attended and refused to participate in the hearing. Preliminary Report 29–30.

4.     Even though the Compact expressly provides that the Commission is “the judge of the [party States’] compliance with the conditions and requirements of this compact,” Art. 7(C), the Commission’s determination that North Carolina breached the Compact is neither conclusive nor entitled to any deference from the Court. Second Report 1920.

5.     While it is undisputed that North Carolina ceased taking any steps to license a facility in December 1997, more than 18 months before it withdrew from the Compact, North Carolina, as a matter of law, did not breach its duty under the Compact to “take appropriate steps to ensure that an application for a license to construct and operate a facility . . . is filed.” Art. 5 (C). Second Report 10?24.

6.     The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to interstate compacts and North Carolina did not withdraw from the Compact in bad faith. Second Report 29–35.

7.     North Carolina did not repudiate the Compact when it informed the Commission that it would take no further steps to license a facility. Second Report 24–28.

The State of North Carolina takes exception to the following conclusions of the Special Master:

1.     The recommended denial of North Carolina’s motion to dismiss all claims brought by plaintiff Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission. Under both the Eleventh Amendment and common-law sovereign immunity principles, only the United States or a sister State may sue a non-consenting State in federal court, absent a valid congressional abrogation of the State’s sovereign immunity. Because North Carolina has not waived, and Congress has not abrogated, North Carolina’s sovereign immunity from suit by the Commission, the Commission’s claims cannot proceed in this Court. In this case, this Court has jurisdiction to the Special Master’s recommendation, North Carolina’s motion to dismiss the Commission’s claims should be granted.

2.     The failure to recommend granting North Carolina’s motion for summary judgment on the quasi-contract claims asserted in Counts III, IV, and V of the Bill of Complaint. It is a settled common-law rule that where the parties’ relationship concerning a given subject matter is governed by the terms of an express contract, no equitable claim will lie in addition to a claim for breach of contract. The Special Master declined to address North Carolina’s motion at this stage in the proceedings, but the motion is legally and factually ripe for adjudication, and should be granted.

This is an original jurisdiction case brought by the States of Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia, joined by the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission (the "Commission") (collectively "petitioners") seeking remedy for the State of North Carolina's alleged breach of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (the "Compact").

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Bond v. United States

Issues

Do the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, read in connection with the treaty power, allow a statute that was enacted by Congress to enforce a treaty to serve as a valid basis for prosecuting a criminal defendant in Federal District Court?

Petitioner Carol Anne Bond was arrested in 2007 for attempts to poison a romantic rival, which culminated in a minor burn to the rival’s thumb. A federal district court sentenced Bond to six years in prison and five years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay a fine and make restitution, under the authority of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. Congress passed that statute to implement an international arms-control agreement to prohibit chemical warfare. Bond challenged her conviction, claiming the statute’s application to her domestic conduct exceeded Congress’ limited and enumerated powers. In reviewing her challenge, the Third Circuit held that Congress’ power to implement treaties validated the statute and Bond’s conviction. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will affect not only how broadly federal criminal statutes apply, but also the scope of Congress’ authority to implement treaties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations; and
  2. whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229, can be interpreted not to reach ordinary poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities since the Framing, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional questions involving the scope of and continuing vitality of this Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

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Facts

In 2006, Carol Anne Bond discovered that her friend, Myrlinda Haynes, was pregnant from an affair with Bond’s husband. See United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir.

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Central Virginia Community College v. Katz

Issues

In accordance with the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause, must states and state government units surrender the sovereign immunity granted to them under the Eleventh Amendment for the purpose of establishing and maintaining uniform Bankruptcy laws?

 

After filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy, Wallace's Bookstores, Inc., formerly a national, private supplier of college books, filed complaints against four public higher education institutions in Virginia. As Wallace's court appointed  a liquidator , Mr. Katz sought to recover money owed by the Virginia Institutions. The Virginia Institutions argue that as a private party, Mr. Katz cannot sue the state or "arms of the state" without abrogating the states' sovereign immunity guaranteed under  the Eleventh Amendment. They maintain that without consent, states cannot be sued by private parties. Mr. Katz denies being classified as a private party and argues that Article I's provisions and purpose of uniform bankruptcy laws across states are an exception. This case raises numerous public policy issues relating to funding of public, higher education institutions and debtor/creditor relationships.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May Congress use the Article I Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 4, to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity?

The petitioners, Central Virginia Community College, Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), New River Community College, and Blue Ridge Community College ("the Virginia Institutions") are public, higher education institutions partially funded by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Brief of Respondent at 1.

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Gonzales v. Oregon (formerly Oregon v. Ashcroft)

Issues

Whether the Controlled Substance Act authorizes the Attorney General to decide that physician-assisted suicide does not serve a "legitimate medical purpose," thereby nullifying an Oregon statute permitting this particular practice in some circumstances.

 

Congress enacted the Controlled Substance Act ("CSA") in 1970 as part of a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate and control certain drugs and other substances. A 1984 Amendment to the Act authorized the Attorney General to prohibit medical practitioners' use of a controlled substance if that use was "inconsistent with the public interest." 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4). In 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft determined that Oregon physicians' use of a federally registered controlled substance to facilitate physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose, despite an Oregon statute which authorized such use. In Oregon's suit, brought to enjoin Ashcroft from giving any legal effect to his directive, the District Court ruled for Oregon and issued a permanent injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Oregon argues that since states traditionally regulate medical practices, Gonzales (the new Attorney General, replacing Ashcroft) must show that Congress expressly intended to authorize the Attorney General to make such a determination. Gonzales argues that the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation of a federal regulation is entitled to deference, even without a clear statement of legislative intent, and that Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA is reasonable. In the alternative, Gonzales argues that Ashcroft's interpretation is consistent with Congress's intent in passing the CSA and the 1984 Amendment. This case will decide the fate the Oregon statute by either expanding or limiting the federal government's authority over traditionally state-regulated medical practices. This case also has far-reaching moral and ethical implications that go beyond the scope of states' rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Attorney General has permissibly construed the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and its implementing regulations to prohibit the distribution of federally controlled substances for the purpose of facilitating an individual's suicide, regardless of state law purporting to authorize such distribution.

In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act ("CSA") as part of a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate and control certain drugs and other substances. Under the CSA, physicians who prescribe controlled substances are considered "practitioners" who "dispense" controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) and (21). In order to obtain authorization to dispense such controlled substances, practitioners must register with the Attorney General and obtain a Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") certificate of registration.

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Guam v. United States

Issues

Can a settlement that is not under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) or a settlement that does not explicitly resolve a party’s liability trigger a contribution claim under CERCLA Section 113(f)(3)(B)?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine how two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) allocate responsibility for cleaning up environmental sites. CERCLA Section 107 allows a party to recover direct costs of cleaning up a site from responsible parties, while Section 113 allows a party who has already settled its own responsibility to recover “contribution” from other responsible parties. The territory of Guam, which owns a toxic waste dump, sued the United States to help fund the dump cleanup under both Sections 107 and 113. However, the lower court found that the availability of Section 113 barred Guam’s Section 107 claim based on a previous settlement between Guam and the federal government unrelated to CERCLA. Petitioner Guam argues that a settlement that does not mention CERCLA and disclaims any liability determination cannot force a party to bring a Section 113 claim instead of a Section 107 claim. Respondent United States counters that Section 113 broadly encompasses settlements that resolve liability under other laws besides CERCLA. This case has implications for prompt cleanups of environmental hazards across the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a settlement that is not under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act can trigger a contribution claim under CERCLA Section 113(f)(3)(B); and
(2) whether a settlement that expressly disclaims any liability determination and leaves the settling party exposed to future liability can trigger a contribution claim under CERCLA Section 113(f)(3)(B).

In the 1940s, the United States Navy constructed a landfill, the Ordot Dump, on the island of Guam. Gov’t of Guam v. United States at 106–07.

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Herrera v. Wyoming

Issues

Do members of the Crow Tribe of Indians retain the right to hunt outside of the Crow Reservation as established in an 1868 federal treaty, or was that right terminated through the establishment of either the Bighorn National Forest or the state of Wyoming?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether members of the Crow Tribe of Indians retain a right to hunt outside of the Crow Reservation on “unoccupied lands of the United States,” a right which was originally established in an 1868 federal treaty. Clayvin Herrera argues that because Congress has not specifically abrogated this hunting right and because Bighorn National Forest qualifies as unoccupied land which once belonged to the Crow Tribe, the treaty-based hunting right should be upheld. Wyoming, on the other hand, asserts that the establishment of Wyoming as a state and the creation of the Bighorn National Forest extinguished this off-reservation hunting right. The outcome in this case will determine the scope of the 1868 treaty and will clarify the hunting rights afforded to present-day Crow tribal members.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Wyoming's admission to the Union or the establishment of the Bighorn National Forest abrogated the Crow Tribe of Indians’ 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States,” thereby permitting the present-day criminal conviction of a Crow member who engaged in subsistence hunting for his family.

Petitioner Clayvin Herrera is a member of the Crow Tribe of Indians and lives on the Crow Reservation in St. Xavier, Montana. Clayvin Herrera v. Wyoming at 2.  In January 2014, Herrera was hunting elk on Crow Reservation.

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Mississippi v. Tennessee

Issues

Can the state of Mississippi obtain damages or injunctive relief without an equitable apportionment of groundwater from the Middle Claiborne Aquifer, which Mississippi claims was stolen by the state of Tennessee through Tennessee’s pumping operations in Shelby County?

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if groundwater should be classified as an interstate resource and fall within federal common law equitable apportionment jurisprudence. The Special Master determined that the Middle Claiborne Aquifer is an interstate resource and that the Supreme Court should allow Mississippi to amend its complaint to include an equitable apportionment claim. Mississippi disputes the Special Master’s conclusions and argues that groundwater naturally flows from its territorial boundaries. Mississippi asserts that Tennessee's underground pumping violates Mississippi’s territorial sovereignty by disrupting the groundwater’s natural flow within Mississippi’s borders. Tennessee argues that the Special Master is correct in identifying the aquifer as an interstate resource, but that the Supreme Court should not allow Mississippi to amend its complaint because any amendment would create additional costly and time-consuming litigation. The outcome of this case has serious implications for interstate water rights and the apportionment of belowground natural resources.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Court will grant Mississippi leave to file an original action to seek relief from respondents’ use of a pumping operation to take approximately 252 billion gallons of high-quality groundwater; (2) whether Mississippi has sole sovereign authority over and control of groundwater naturally stored within its borders, including in sandstone within Mississippi’s borders; and (3) whether Mississippi is entitled to damages, injunctive, and other equitable relief for the Mississippi intrastate groundwater intentionally and forcibly taken by respondents.

The Middle Claiborne Aquifer is a “hydrogeological unit” that extends through Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama and consists of the “Sparta Sand” in the South and the “Memphis Sand” in the North. Report of the Special Master, Eugene E. Siler, Jr.

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Moyle v. United States

Issues

Does the federal government have authority under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, which requires hospitals to provide stabilizing care to patients, to preempt Idaho’s Defense of Life Act by requiring Idaho to perform abortions under certain circumstances?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret whether the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”), which requires hospitals to provide stabilizing care to patients, can preempt state abortion regulations. Idaho’s Defense of Life Act prohibits hospitals from performing abortion unless it is necessary to protect the pregnant mother from death. EMTALA states that it preempts any state law which directly conflicts with its requirements, which includes providing stabilizing care to patients.  Idaho and its House speaker Mike Moyle argue that EMTALA cannot preempt Idaho state law because preemption would violate state sovereignty where there is no conflict between the two laws. The United States counters that EMTALA imposes a broader standard than Idaho law, and the executive and legislature can preempt state law under EMTALA via the Supremacy Clause. The outcome of this case has important implications for abortion rights, separation of powers, and sovereignty of states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should stay the order by the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho enjoining the enforcement of Idaho’s Defense of Life Act, which prohibits abortions unless necessary to save the life of the mother, on the ground that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempts it.

Idaho’s 2022 Defense of Life Act, enacted in the wake of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, criminalizes the performance of abortions.

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Reed v. Goertz

Issues

Does the statute of limitations for a federal law allowing prisoners the right to challenge a state’s post-conviction DNA testing regime begin to run as soon as the state trial court denies DNA testing or at the end of the state-court litigation, including all appeals?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split and decide when the statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for post-conviction DNA testing begin to run. Rodney Reed argues that the statute of limitations for his § 1983 claim for DNA testing should begin after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied rehearing because this is the point at which he exhausted his state court options. Bryan Goertz counters that the statute of limitations should begin after the trial court denied Reed’s DNA testing request because this is when Reed first became aware that his right to DNA testing was allegedly being violated. The outcome of this case has significant implications for federalism, inmate rights, and the accuracy of the justice system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begins to run at the end of state-court litigation denying DNA testing, including any appeals (as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has held), or whether it begins to run at the moment the state trial court denies DNA testing, despite any subsequent appeal (as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, joining the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, held below).

In 1996, 19-year-old Stacey Stites’ body was found on the side of a country road in Bastrop County, Texas. Reed v. Goertz, at 2. The medical examiner determined that Stites was strangled to death with her belt. Id.

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