supplemental jurisdiction

Artis v. District of Columbia

Issues

In a case involving both federal- and state-law claims, if a federal court dismisses a plaintiff’s federal claim and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, does the tolling provision in § 1367(d) suspend the limitations period for the plaintiff’s state-law claim while the claim is pending and for an additional thirty days after the claim is dismissed, or does the tolling provision simply provide an additional thirty days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to re-file without suspending the limitations period?

The court will decide whether the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)—which addresses cases involving both federal- and state-law claims suspends the limitations period for a state-law claim while the federal claim is pending and provides an additional thirty days after the federal claim is dismissed, or whether it simply provides thirty days beyond the dismissal of the claim to re-file in state court. Stephanie Artis argues that § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for state-law claims while the federal claims are pending and provides an additional thirty days in which to re-file after claims are dismissed. On the other hand, the District of Columbia argues that the approach taken by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which only provides an additional thirty days after a state-claim is dismissed, is the appropriate standard. This issue arises in every case in which a district court ultimately declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the case will impact the way in which plaintiffs bring state-law claims in federal courts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 1367 of Title 28 authorizes federal district courts in certain circumstances to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under State law. Section 1367 further provides that “[t]he period of limitations for any [such] claim … shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of thirty days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The question presented is whether the tolling provision in § 1367(d) suspends the limitations period for the state-law claim while the federal suit is pending and for thirty days after the claim is dismissed, or whether the tolling provision does not suspend the limitations period but merely provides thirty days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to refile.

Beginning in August 2007, Petitioner Stephanie C. Artis was employed, under temporary status, as a Department of Health inspector. Artis v. District of Columbia, 135 A.3d 334, 335 (D.C. 2016). During her employment, Artis had a combative relationship with her supervisor, Gerard Brown. Id. Artis contends that Brown constantly treated her unfairly in the workplace.

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Carlsbad Technology, Inc. V. HIF Bio, Inc.

Issues

Whether a district court's order to remand a case to state court after declining supplemental jurisdiction is properly considered a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c), therefore preventing a court of appeals from reviewing the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

 

Respondents HIF Bio, Inc. and BizBiotech Company, Ltd. sued petitioners Carlsbad Technology, Inc. ("CTI") and others in state court. CTI removed the case to a federal district court, which soon after granted a motion to dismiss a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim. The district court then remanded the case back to state court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining  state law  claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to review the matter, asserting it lacked jurisdiction to do so. In this case, the United States Supreme Court considers whether a district court's order to remand a case to state court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), thus barring the order from appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). This case will address a procedural issue that the Supreme Court's decisions in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988) and Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2007) left open to conflicting interpretations by the courts of appeals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988), this Court held that district courts could remand removed claims upon deciding not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). However, in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2007), the Court stated that "it is far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental jurisdiction is declined the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d)" and noted that "[w]e have never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional for purposes of post-1988 versions § 1447(c) and § 1447(d)." Construing Powerex as leaving the question open, the Federal Circuit held that a remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction can be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thus disagreeing with the nine other federal courts of appeals that have construed Cohill as distinguishing between remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remands based on declining to exercise subject matter jurisdiction that already exists. Thus, this petition presents the question posed but left unanswered in Powerex that is now the subject of a direct conflict among the circuits:

1. Whether a district court's order remanding a case to state court following its discretionary decision to decline to exercise the supplemental jurisdiction accorded to federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is properly held to be a remand for a "lack of subject matter jurisdiction" under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) so that such remand order is barred from any appellate review by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

From 1999 to 2001, Korean researchers Jong-Wan Park ("Park") and Yang-Sook Chun ("Chun") studied a potential cancer-fighting chemical compound. See HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co., Ltd. et al., 508 F.3d 659, 660-61 (Fed. Cir.

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Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger

Issues

Does amending a complaint to omit a federal question after removal to federal court defeat federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331? Does a post-removal amendment restrict a federal district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the post-removal amendment of a complaint can defeat federal-question subject matter jurisdiction and preclude a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. On one hand, Royal Canin and Purina argue both that federal-question jurisdiction cannot be extinguished by amending a complaint and also that a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction even after the resolution of all federal claims. On the other hand, Anna Wullschleger and Gerald Brewer contend that the amended complaint determines federal-question jurisdiction, and a federal district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when no federal claim remains in the lawsuit. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for forum manipulation and federalism.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a post-removal amendment of a complaint to omit federal questions defeats federal-question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) whether such a post-removal amendment of a complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Anastasia Wullschleger and Geraldine Brewer purchased prescription pet food from Royal Canin and Purina under the impression that the companies formulated the food to treat their pets’ health and disease problems. Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Anastasia Wullschleger at 4.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Maggie Gardner for her guidance and insights into this case.

Additional Resources

  • Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Dog Food Suit Location Dispute to Get US Supreme Court Review, Bloomberg (April 29, 2024).
  • Richard S. Davis, Master of Its Choice of Forum?: Supreme Court to Decide if a Plaintiff May Compel Remand of a Removed Case by Voluntarily Dismissing Its Federal Claims, Foley & Lardner, LLP (May 22, 2024).

 

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