Assault is generally defined as an intentional act that puts another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. No physical injury is required, but the actor must have intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the victim and the victim must have thereby been put in immediate apprehension of such a contact.
Steven A. Levin sued his military doctor and the United States for medical malpractice and medical battery for a procedure performed at the United States Naval Hospital in Guam. The United States substituted itself for the military doctor and claimed that they had sovereign immunity which barred the claim under the Gonzalez Act. Levin argues that the Gonzalez Act only removes liability from armed services medical personnel and does not create an immunity that would remove any possibility for recovery in medical battery suits against armed forces medical personnel. The United States contends that no waiver of sovereign immunity exists unless a statute’s explicit language creates a waiver. The lower courts dismissed Levin's case by stating that the United States' sovereign immunity did apply under the Gonzalez Act, therefore barring this case from continuing. Levin contends that to bar his claim because of sovereign immunity would be to prevent patients injured by military medical personnel from having an opportunity to recover for the pain and suffering caused by the medical mistake. The United States argues that to find an implied waiver of sovereign immunity in the Gonzalez Act would overturn the Supreme Court's long-standing precedent regarding waivers of sovereign immunity and create questions about when sovereign immunity is waived.
10 U.S.C. § 1089 concerns the defense of military medical personnel against claims for tortuous acts committed in the scope of employment. It directs that suits may be brought only against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (h) of the FTCA excludes some suits, including battery, from its waiver. Subsection 1089(e) states, "For purposes of this section, the provisions of section 2680 (h) ... shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a ... wrongful act ... in the performance of medical ... functions ...."
The particular question presented is whether suit may be brought against the United States for battery committed to a civilian by military medical personnel acting within the scope of employment.
The broader question raises the same issue for the same and other claims against groups of government employees whose defense would fall under similarly worded statutes.
This Court has never addressed these issues.
Did the Gonzalez Act waive sovereign immunity for medical battery claims, thus allowing suits directly against the United States for medical battery by military doctors immune from suit under the Gonzalez Act?
Does a lawsuit against a tribal employee for an act he committed within the scope of his employment by the tribe violate tribal sovereign immunity?
With Lewis and Clarke, the Supreme Court will venture into the relatively unfamiliar legal territory of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals employed by Indian tribes. The case arises out of an automobile accident between Brian and Michelle Lewis and William Clarke, an employee of the Mohegan Sun Casino, which is owned by the Mohegan tribe. In a lawsuit brought by the Lewises, Clarke successfully convinced the Connecticut Supreme Court that he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The Lewises argue that sovereign immunity does not apply when a tribal employee is sued in his individual capacity because the finances of the tribe are not formally at risk. Clarke counters that the finances of the tribe are at risk in this suit, and thus, the sovereign immunity of the tribe should extend to him because he was acting within the scope of his tribal employment. To some, the voyage of Lewis and Clarke into the obscure realm of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals imperils tribal coffers; to others, the regulatory power of the states is at stake.
Whether the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the scope of their employment.
Lewis and Clarke’s five-year voyage to the Supreme Court began on October 22, 2011 with the chance encounter of Brian and Michelle Lewis (“Lewis”) and William Clarke (“Clarke”) in Norwalk, Connecticut. See Lewis v. Clarke, 135 A.3d 677, 679 (Conn. 2016). At the time, Clarke was an employee of the Mohegan tribe and was responsible for transporting patrons of the Mohegan Sun Casino in a limousine to their homes.
When is an entity an “agent” of a “foreign state” for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; and, what degree of commercial activity within the United States is sufficient to trigger an exception to immunity for personal injury liability under that Act?
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) limits the ability of U.S. citizens to bring causes of action against foreign states and their agents in U.S. courts. See Brief for Petitioner, OBB Personenverkehr AG at 25. But the FSIA contains a commercial activity exception, which allows a U.S. court to hear suits involving a foreign state when the action is “based upon” the state’s commercial activity in the United States. See id. In this case, the Supreme Court will consider how to define when an entity is an agent of a foreign state, and the scope of the commercial activity exception’s “based upon” requirement. See id. at i. OBB Personenverkehr AG (“OBB”), a state-run Austrian passenger railway, argues that foreign states are “presumptively immune” from U.S. jurisdiction under the FSIA unless an exception applies. See id. at 25 (internal quotation omitted). OBB contends that injured Americans like Carol Sachs cannot satisfy “the based upon” requirement for claims arising from harm incurred on foreign soil. See id. at 28. Sachs argues that a sale of a ticket in the United States constitutes commercial activity and thus satisfies that requirement. See Brief for Respondent, Carol P. Sachs at 23–24. In the alternative, OBB argues that the FSIA clearly defines who can be an “agent” of the state, and that the Ninth Circuit erred in relying on common-law agency principles to find that a third-party’s ticket seller was an agent of OBB. See Brief for Petitioner at 43–46. Sachs counters that common-law agency principles should apply notwithstanding the language of the FSIA. See Brief for Respondent at 20–21. This case may affect the balance of international litigation and may result in a shift from the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See Brief of Amici Curiae Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation, in Support of Petitioner at 26, 34. This case may also result in changes to how agents of a foreign state engage in business with the United States over the Internet. See Brief of NML Capital, LTD, in Support of Respondent at 16; Brief of Amici Curiae International Rail Transport Committee, in Support of Petitioner at 14.
In March 2007, Carol Sachs purchased a four-day Eurail pass for travel in Austria and the Czech Republic from Rail Pass Experts (“RPE”), a Massachusetts company. See Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir.
In [wex: tort] law, a defense that can be used against charges of [wex: trespass] where a defendant interferes with a plaintiff's property in an emergency situation to protect the community or society as a whole from a greater harm that would have occurred if the defendant had not committed [wex: trespass]. Public necessity serves as an absolute defense, and a defendant is not liable for any damages caused by his trespass. Contrast with [wex:private necessity]. See also [wex:necessity defense].
Can the Mexican government hold U.S. firearm manufacturers legally responsible for cartel violence injuries in Mexico based on claims of proximate cause and of aiding and abetting illegal trafficking?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Mexican government has sufficiently justified its lawsuit against U.S. firearm manufacturers based on Mexican cartel violence. Smith & Wesson argues that proximate cause necessitates a direct cause, and that Mexico’s injuries are too attenuated to satisfy proximate cause. The Mexican government claims that Smith & Wesson can be held liable for aiding and abetting illegal firearm sales under the predicate exception to the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. The outcome of this case has significant implications for corporate liability under tort law and the legal standard of plausibility pleading.
(1) Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the proximate cause of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico; and (2) whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to “aiding and abetting” illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.
Despite Mexico’s strict firearm laws, Mexico has the third-most firearm-related deaths in the world. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. (“First Circuit”) at 516. From 2003 to 2019, the number of firearm deaths increased from 2,500 to 23,000. Id. The increase in firearm-related violence in Mexico coincided with a growth in firearm production in the United States.
The authors would like to thank Professor Heise for his insights into this case.
If a manufacturer has installed one of two seatbelt options permitted under federal motor vehicle safety standards, can a citizen sue the manufacturer in state court for damages resulting from failure to install the other restraint option, or is the claim preempted by the federal law?
Delbert Williamson sued Mazda Motor of America after his wife died in a car accident while she was riding in their Mazda MPV minivan. Williamson claimed that Mazda was liable under state tort law for installing lap-only seatbelts, as opposed to lap-and-shoulder seatbelts, in the rear aisle seat where his wife sat during the crash. Mazda argues that Williamson’s state law claim is preempted by a federal regulation granting manufacturers the choice between lap-only and lap-and-shoulder seatbelts in rear aisle seats. The California Court of Appeal sided with Mazda and held that federal vehicle safety regulations preempted Williamson’s claim because the regulations conflicted with his state law claim. Williamson, however, contends that the Court should allow his state claim because it does not conflict with federal regulations, but rather furthers federal objectives of vehicle safety. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will address the extent of preemption of state law claims by on-point federal regulations and in turn affect manufacturer liability under state tort claims.
Where Congress has provided that compliance with a federal motor vehicle safety standard "does not exempt a person from liability at common law," 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e), does a federal minimum safety standard allowing vehicle manufacturers to install either lap-only or lap/shoulder seatbelts in certain seating positions impliedly preempt a state common-law claim alleging that the manufacturer should have installed a lap/shoulder belt in one of those seating positions?
On August 14, 2002 the Williamsons were driving in a 1993 Mazda MPV minivan through Utah. See Brief for Petitioners, Delbert Williamson, et al.
· Bloomberg Businessweek, Greg Stohr: Mazda Passenger Seatbelt Suit Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review (May 24, 2010)
· Torts Prof Blog, Catherine Sharkey: The Politics of Preemption: NHTSA, State Tort Law & Automobile Safety (Oct. 4, 2010)
· University of Denver Law Review, Andrea Ahn: Wyeth v. Levine: Moving Away from the Geier Trend
