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Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project

Issues

Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits providing certain types of aid to known terrorist organizations, violates the First and Fifth Amendments by restricting political speech and including overly vague provisions?

 

It is illegal to provide material support and resources to groups that the government has determined are foreign terrorist organizations. The Humanitarian Law Project argues that this prohibition violates First and Fifth Amendment rights of those individuals or groups that wish to provide resources to the humanitarian arms of foreign terrorist organizations. The government contends that the law is not unconstitutionally vague and that these provisions are necessary to effectively combat terrorism. In addition to determining the scope of the First and Fifth Amendments with respect to this aspect of anti-terrorism efforts, the case will also affect how a variety of groups engage in humanitarian campaigns abroad.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the knowing provision of “any . . . service, . . . training, [or] expert advice or assistance,” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(l), to a designated foreign terrorist organization, is unconstitutionally vague.

2. Whether the criminal prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) on provision of “expert advice or assistance” “derived from scientific [or] technical . . . knowledge” and “personnel” are unconstitutional with respect to speech that furthers only lawful, nonviolent activities of proscribed organizations.

In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA permits the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a “foreign terrorist organization.” See 8 U.S.C.

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Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project

Issues

Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits providing certain types of aid to known terrorist organizations, violates the First and Fifth Amendments by restricting political speech and including overly vague provisions?

 

It is illegal to provide material support and resources to groups that the government has determined are foreign terrorist organizations. The Humanitarian Law Project argues that this prohibition violates First and Fifth Amendment rights of those individuals or groups that wish to provide resources to the humanitarian arms of foreign terrorist organizations. The government contends that the law is not unconstitutionally vague and that these provisions are necessary to effectively combat terrorism. In addition to determining the scope of the First and Fifth Amendments with respect to this aspect of anti-terrorism efforts, the case will also affect how a variety of groups engage in humanitarian campaigns abroad.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the knowing provision of “any . . . service, . . . training, [or] expert advice or assistance,” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(l), to a designated foreign terrorist organization, is unconstitutionally vague.

2. Whether the criminal prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) on provision of “expert advice or assistance” “derived from scientific [or] technical . . . knowledge” and “personnel” are unconstitutional with respect to speech that furthers only lawful, nonviolent activities of proscribed organizations.

In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA permits the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a “foreign terrorist organization.” See 8 U.S.C.

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Johnson v. United States

Issues

Is the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague?

(Note: this preview is for re-argument of Johnson v. United States. For the earlier arguments, see the preview for Johnson v. United States - Nov. 2014.)

The Supreme Court will hear rearguments in this case to determine whether the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) is unconstitutionally vague. The original issue on appeal urged the Court to consider whether possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony under the ACCA, but after oral arguments, the Court ordered a rehearing to determine whether the ACCA’s residual clause itself is unconstitutionally vague. The Petitioner, Samuel Johnson, argues that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process. In opposition, the Respondent, the United States, contends that the clause is not unconstitutionally vague and successfully provides direction to judges and citizens when determining how to conform their actions to the law. The outcome of this case may effect the role of judges in interpreting the residual clause of the ACCA, the uniformity of sentencing across different states, and the level of notice people have regarding whether a crime is a violent felony under the ACCA. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation started investigating Samuel James Johnson’s participation in the Aryan Liberation Movement (“Movement”) in 2010. See United States v. Johnson, No. 12-3123, 2013 WL 3924353, at *1 (8th Cir. 2013). Johnson intended to counterfeit United States currency in order to support the activities of the Movement.

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Additional Resources

Lyle Denniston: Court Orders New Look at Armed Criminal Law, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 9, 2015). 

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Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky

Issues

Does Minnesota Statute Section 211B.11(1), which prohibits individuals from wearing “political badges, political buttons, or political insignia” in the polling place, violate the First Amendment?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Minnesota’s Statute section 211B.11(1) political-apparel ban at polling sites violates the First Amendment. Petitioners Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al. (“MVA”) contend that the statute jeopardizes the right of voters to peacefully express themselves. According to MVA, the statute’s vague use of the word “political” allows poll workers to arbitrarily discriminate against voters wearing anything arguably political. MVA contends, under a strict-scrutiny analysis, that the ban on speech is not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in promoting voting decorum and that there is no government interest that justifies a ban on all political apparel. Respondents Joe Mansky, et al. (“Mansky”) counter that the statute and its application have only prohibited political apparel that, from the perspective of a reasonable person, is related to ballot issues on election day in order to ensure that Minnesotans have the right to vote freely, without undue influence. Mansky maintains that the non-public forum analysis is the proper test to determine the statute’s constitutionality, and that the statute is reasonable and viewpoint neutral in light of the government’s goal to have polling sites focus on voting. This case will clarify the scope of the right to vote versus the right to self-expression, as well as analyze the rights of individuals when participating in democratic deliberation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is Minnesota Statute Section 211B.11(1), which broadly bans all political apparel at the polling place, facially overbroad under the First Amendment?

Section 211B.11, entitled “Election Day Prohibitions,” of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act regulates behavior “near polling places.” Minn. Stat.

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