VOTER FRAUD

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee

Issues

Do Arizona’s voting policies that impact minorities and limit otherwise legal in-person and early voting violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the scope of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), which provides relief against voting policies that result in discrimination against minority populations. The state of Arizona enacted two voting policies that limit the scope of both in-person and mail-in voting. Arizona’s laws allowed it to discard any ballots cast in the wrong precinct on Election Day and criminalized collecting ballots for mailing purposes. Petitioners Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich and the state of Arizona  (“Arizona”) argue that these policies are racially neutral and do not discriminate against Black, Hispanic, and Indigenous communities. Respondent Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) contends that these laws disproportionately impacted or—in the case of the prohibition on ballot collection—targeted minority communities, and therefore violated the VRA. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the extent of the protections granted by the VRA against discrimination as well as the validity of state laws seeking to address voter fraud.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy, which does not count provisional ballots cast in person on Election Day outside of the voter’s designated precinct, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and (2) whether Arizona’s ballot-collection law, which permits only certain persons (i.e., family and household members, caregivers, mail carriers and elections officials) to handle another person’s completed early ballot, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the 15th Amendment.

The state of Arizona permits both in-person voting at designated voting centers or precincts, and “early voting,” in which voters can either mail in a ballot or drop off ballots at designated locations. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Husted v. Randolph Institute

Issues

Does Ohio’s voter list-maintenance process violate the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002?

This case will help decide the bounds of the voter list-maintenance processes allowed under 52 U.S.C. § 20507. Petitioner Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted argues that Ohio’s “Supplemental Process” for removing voters from its lists, which addresses voters who have not been active in the last two years, is authorized under § 20507 because it does not use the failure to vote as the only basis for removal. In contrast, Respondents A. Philip Randolph Institute, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, and Larry Harmon (collectively “Randolph”) argue that Ohio’s Supplemental Process violates §20507 because it uses the failure to vote to initiate the removal process. The decision in this case has far-reaching implications for voter engagement and participation. Husted contends that the Supplemental Process is an important tool in fighting voter fraud, whereas Randolph maintains that the Process may disenfranchise minority voters and eligible voters who decide not to vote, harming the perceived integrity of the democratic process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does 52 U.S.C. § 20507 permit Ohio’s list-maintenance process, which uses a registered voter’s voter inactivity as a reason to send a confirmation notice to that voter under the NVRA and HAVA?

Ohio uses two methods for removing individuals who are no longer eligible to vote. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 838 F.3d 699, 702 (2016). The first method is the National Change of Address (“NCOA”) database, which Ohio’s Secretary of State uses to keep track of address changes. Id.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to VOTER FRAUD