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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Takings Clause allows a person whose property is taken without compensation to seek redress in court even if the legislature has not provided them with a cause of action. The Petitioners Devillier, et al. argue that the Takings Clause permits individuals to seek redress in court, as the Constitution implicitly bestows the procedural right when granting the substantive right to just compensation. The Petitioners further argue that both the constitutional text and the historical context of the just-compensation right support the recognition of such a right. On the other hand, Respondent State of Texas contends that the Takings Clause on its own does not establish a cause of action, asserting that Congress must provide such authorization before individuals can seek relief in court. The Respondent also argues that neither the text nor the historical background of the just-compensation right indicates an implied cause of action, pointing out that properties have historically been compensated through direct intervention by Congress for over a century. The outcome of this case has significant ramifications for the balance between state and federal court power, judicial and legislative power, and the substantive rights of property owners against the states.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State employs an expert who uses another expert’s notes as the basis of their own opinion. Jason Smith argues that the Confrontation Clause forbids the introduction of testimonial statements for their truth from expert witnesses whom a defendant has not had the opportunity to cross-examine, and that the testifying expert’s testimony in his case relied on the nontestifying expert’s testimonial notes and conclusions. Arizona argues that the Confrontation Clause allows experts to testify using facts that are not otherwise admissible when the facts are not submitted for their truth, and that the nontestifying expert’s notes in Smith’s case were not testimonial because they were not created for the purpose of testifying and lacked formality. The outcome of this case has serious implications for defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights and prosecutors’ ability to pursue cases that require forensics.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether El Dorado County’s Traffic Impact Mitigation Fee Program (“TIM Program”) is an unconstitutional taking under the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause prohibits the government from taking individual property without just compensation. For a conditional development fee to be constitutional under the Takings Clause, the Nollan and Dolan standard requires the government to show an essential nexus and rough proportionality between the conditional permit’s fee and the permit’s negative public impacts. George Sheetz argues that the TIM Program’s flat fee to all residential homes within his zone is an unconstitutional taking as it is an exaction that is unrelated to traffic impact and makes no individual determinations. County of El Dorado, California argues that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to legislatively mandated development fees that broadly apply to a class of permit applicants. This case has significant implications for regulating development fees in the legislature and for individuals seeking to construct new properties.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the proper remedy for bankruptcy debtors who were treated differently, paying higher fees under a statute enacted by Congress without constitutional authority. John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts entities filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 2016 and paid $2.5 million higher fees than debtors in some federal districts, before the Judiciary and Congress resolved the disparate treatment. The U.S. Trustee argues that prospective equality in fees is a sufficient remedy, but if a retrospective remedy is required, the Court should extend the higher fees to debtors previously exempt from it. Hammons argues that the only proper remedy for fees paid under an unconstitutional statute is to refund them and that the remedies the U.S. Trustee proposes violate due process. The outcome of this case will affect how the bankruptcy system is funded—by debtors or taxpayers—and the remedial schemes for debtors who received unequal treatment.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Yonas Fikre’s (“Fikre”) removal from the No Fly List in 2016, alongside a sworn declaration indicating he would not be placed back on it “based on the currently available information,” makes moot his case against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) regarding his placement on the No Fly List. Fikre argues that although the FBI removed him from its No Fly List in 2016, the government’s guarantees are insufficient to show that he will not be put back on the list for the original reasons, and as such his claim is still valid until the government voluntarily acquiesces to his requests or repudiates its inclusion of him on the list. The FBI counters by indicating that its sworn declaration would necessarily include all information which resulted in Fikre’s inclusion on the No Fly List in 2010 and his removal from it in 2016. Therefore, the FBI argues it is sufficient to prove Fikre would not be relisted for the same reasons as before, and to demand any more would require a showing of bad faith on the part of the government and unnecessarily endanger national security. The outcome of this case has serious implications for national security and the transparency of classified government programs like the No Fly List.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government complies with the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)) (“INA”) when it provides notice of deportation proceedings in a separate document from their date and time. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), the government must provide “written notice” to undocumented immigrants who are subject to deportation. This “written notice” is provided in a document called a “notice to appear” (“NTA”) and must include the “time and place” of the proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). However, the government routinely sends two documents: one NTA to alert the immigrant about the removal proceedings, and another Notice of Hearing (“NOH”) to communicate the time and place of the hearing. Campos-Chaves argues that this scheme violates the INA because the statute requires this information to be provided in one document. The United States argues that it complies with the INA because its disjunctive language permits dual-document notice and because a curative NOH overcomes a defective NTA. This case touches on important questions regarding fair notice to immigrants in deportation proceedings and judicial economy.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an employer’s decision to transfer an employee, motivated by discrimination but without a judicial finding of substantial detriment to the employee, contravenes Title VII. Petitioner Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow argues that her employer, the City of St. Louis Police Department, made a sex-based decision to reassign her from the police intelligence unit to a more peripheral position and thus violated Title VII, regardless of any judicial assessment of significant disadvantage. Respondent the City of St. Louis counters that Muldrow’s transfer was routine, and that a Title VII claim of discrimination requires demonstrable harm. The Court's decision in this matter will likely influence the scope of Title VII protections against workplace discrimination, thus distinctly affecting employment practices and operational efficiency. The Court’s decision will also impact the number of actionable employment decisions and potential lawsuits.  

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a taxpayer must realize income under the Sixteenth Amendment before the federal government can tax it without apportionment among the states. In 2017, as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congress enacted a new, one-time Mandatory Repatriation Tax on taxpayers based on their ownership stake in a controlled foreign corporation. The tax applied retroactively on all income earned by the corporation after 1986, regardless of whether the corporation distributed its earnings to its shareholders. Charles and Kathleen Moore argue that the Mandatory Repatriation Tax, which they were forced to pay, is unconstitutional because the Sixteenth Amendment imposes a realization requirement on income for the federal government to tax it without apportionment. The United States contends that no such realization requirement exists, and that Congress has long taxed individuals based on their share of undistributed corporate earnings without constitutional challenge. The outcome of this case has important ramifications for Congress’s power to impose income taxes and on the complexity and certainty of tax planning.

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This case concerns the interpretation of a bankruptcy court’s power under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide for release from claims by tort victims against non-debtors. OxyContin producer Purdue Pharma––owned by the Sackler Family––filed for bankruptcy in September 2019.  The bankruptcy plan provided for the Sackler Family to be released from all civil claims by third parties resulting from the acts or omissions of Purdue in exchange for the Sackler Family providing around $5.5 billion to satisfy bankruptcy claims. William K. Harrington, United States Trustee for Region 2, argues that the Code limits the bankruptcy court’s authority to manage debtor-creditor relationships. Purdue Pharma, its creditors, and the Sackler Family argue that the court’s power is limited only by “inconsisten[cy]” with the Code––which doesn’t expressly prohibit these kinds of releases. The case has significant implications for the handling of mass tort claims and potential relief for victims of the opioid crisis.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine when the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) (“ACCA”) applies to a defendant with prior state drug offenses who is facing sentencing for a Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) (“GCA”) violation. The ACCA is a “three–strikes” law which imposes a 15–year mandatory minimum imprisonment term on defendants convicted of violating the GCA and at least three prior violent felonies or “serious drug offenses.” However, a prior state drug offense only counts as a “strike” under the ACCA if the relevant state drug prohibition categorically matches its federal counterpart. Brown argues that federal and state laws must match at the time of sentencing for the GCA violation. Brown claims that his interpretation most closely aligns with the ACCA’s plain meaning and serves judicial efficiency because compliance is easier. The United States argues that federal and state laws must match at the time of the prior state drug offense. The United States claims that its interpretation most aligns with the ACCA’s legislative intent and promotes consistency in the criminal justice system. This case touches on important questions regarding fair notice to criminal defendants as well as federal controlled–substances schedules’ responsiveness to scientific and social developments.

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