Issues
Did the Missouri Court of Appeals err by ignoring federal law and finding that the causation standard for employee contributory negligence under FELA is governed by Missouri-specific rules that impose a lower burden of proof on the railroad employee?
Timothy Sorrell, a railroad employee, suffered injuries while working for his employer, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) and sued, seeking damages for his injuries, under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”). FELA is the federal statute governing railroad workplace injuries. After determining and apportioning negligence among the parties, the Missouri circuit court found for Sorrell, awarding him $1.5 million for his injuries. At issue in this case is the standard of negligence used to determine liability under FELA between plaintiff employee and defendant railroad. In conflict with the United States Supreme Court and several federal courts of appeals, the Missouri circuit court used a different standard to determine plaintiff and defendant liability. Traditionally, federal courts had used proximate cause to determine the liability of both parties. The Missouri circuit court, however, applied Missouri-specific rules that lower the employee’s burden to prove railroad negligence and that keep the railroad’s burden to prove contributory negligence by the employee the same. Given that FELA is the exclusive remedy for railroad employees injured on the job, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in this case will have a significant impact on all workplace injury cases involving railroads. The Supreme Court’s decision will reflect its view on the balance that courts should strike when considering negligence in FELA cases and will ultimately affect the outcome of all FELA cases by either maintaining the status quo or making it easier for plaintiff employees to emerge victorious.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether the court below erred in determining – in conflict with this Court and multiple courts of appeals – that the causation standard for employee contributory negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) differs from the causation standard for railroad negligence.
Facts
Timothy Sorrell, Respondent, was employed as a trackman by Norfolk Southern Railway Company. Brief for Petitioner Norfolk Southern at 5. As a trackman for the railway company, Sorrell was classified as a “general laborer.” Id. at 5. As such, he performed various jobs for Norfolk Southern, including some jobs that related to track maintenance. Id.
On November 1, 1999, Sorrell was performing work related to track maintenance. Id. He was driving a Norfolk Southern dump truck loaded with asphalt to be used to repair rail crossings near Kendallville, Indiana. Id. at 5. According to Sorrell, he unloaded some of the asphalt at the first assigned rail crossing and was driving on a gravel road toward the next rail crossing when another vehicle approached him. Id.
The vehicle approaching Sorrell’s truck was another Norfolk Southern truck, driven by Norfolk Southern employee Keith Woodin. Id. According to Sorrell, he slowed down and pulled far to the right because he did not believe the two trucks could pass one another on the gravel road. Id. As they tried to pass each other, Sorrell explained that his front tire dropped into a four-foot ditch on the side of the road, and that the truck tipped over onto its side. Id. As a result of the accident, Sorrell said he suffered various problems with his neck, back, right wrist, and right shoulder. Id. at 5-6.
Woodin, the other Norfolk Southern driver, provided a different account of the accident. Id. at 6. He testified that when he saw Sorrell approaching, he pulled his truck off the road and almost came to a complete stop. Id. In contrast to Sorrell, Woodin testified that Sorrell pulled his truck off the road when the two trucks were still 400-500 feet apart, and that was when the wheel of Sorrell’s truck fell into the roadside ditch. Id. When he saw that happen, Woodin claims that he drove towards Sorrell in order to assist him in getting the truck’s wheel out of the ditch. Id. Woodin said Sorrel’s truck rolled over at about the time that his truck reached the site where Sorrell’s truck had fallen into the roadside ditch. Id.
Sorrell sued Norfolk Southern seeking compensation for his alleged injuries under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”). At trial, Norfolk Southern argued that FELA required that the same standard of negligence apply to both parties in its comparative system, rather than a separate standard for the employee and another for the railroad. Thus, argued Norfolk Southern, Sorrell’s judgment should be reduced by the amount of damages caused by Sorrell’s own negligence.
The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, however, followed the Missouri Approved Instructions, which hold the defendant (railroad) liable for any negligence that contributed to the result in whole or in part, but only reduce the damages amount by the plaintiff’s negligence that directly caused the damage (proximate cause standard). The circuit court found for Sorrell and awarded him $1.5 million in damages. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, upheld the verdict, and the Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
Analysis
Congress enacted FELA “to provide a[n exclusive] federal remedy for railroad workers who suffer personal injuries as a result of the negligence of their employer or their fellow employees.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561 (1987). Due to FELA’s existence, there is no worker’s compensation program for railroad employees that is comparable to programs in other industries. Brief for Petitioner Norfolk Southern at 2. Furthermore, FELA broadly preempts state tort statutes that would otherwise apply to such injuries occurring at a railroad site. Id.
Norfolk Southern’s Defense of A Proximate Cause Standard
Norfolk Southern, argues that, under FELA, “[t]he rights and obligations of the petitioner depend upon that Act and applicable principles of common law as interpreted by the federal courts.” Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587, 590 (1929). The federal common law that governs FELA, argues Norfolk Southern, is derived from prevailing common law principles, except where Congress explicitly departed from those traditional rules. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 182 (1949) (“the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is founded on common-law concepts of negligence and injury, subject to such qualifications as Congress has imported into those terms”).
When Congress enacted FELA in 1908, Congress expressly overruled several established common law doctrines. Brief for Petitioner Norfolk Southern at 2. The doctrine that concerns this case deals with the contributory negligence of a railroad employee. Petitioner explains that in section 53 of FELA, Congress rejected contributory negligence on the part of the railroad employee as an absolute defense to liability; instead, Congress created a comparative negligence system, determining that that the damages awarded to the employee should be diminished by the jury “in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee.” FELA § 53; see Id. at 3.
However, contends Petitioner, Congress never modified the traditional, common law causation standards that apply to negligence claims at the time of FELA’s enactment. Brief for Petitioner Norfolk Southern at 3. Given that Congress never expressly changed the causation standards, the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s contributory negligence should be analyzed using the same commonly recognized negligence standard – to justify (or prevent) recovery, the negligence (or contributory negligence) must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 3-4.
The Missouri Approved Instructions, promulgated by the Missouri Supreme Court, take a slightly different approach, but one that can have a significant impact. Under the Missouri rules, in order to recover damages from the defendant railroad, a plaintiff employee must establish that the railroad’s negligence resulted in whole or in part in injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 4. To diminish the plaintiff’s recovery, the railroad must prove that the plaintiff’s contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 5. Thus, the Missouri courts impose a different and heavier burden on the defendants in FELA cases. Id.
Norfolk Southern argues that Missouri’s rule that a jury should be instructed to apply different negligence causation standards to railroad negligence and to employee contributory negligence is an untenable interpretation of FELA. Id. at 7. Norfolk Southern contends that the statutory language does not suggest that result, and that, in FELA, Congress is presumed to have adopted the common law rule absent an explicit departure from that rule. Id. The well-established common-law rule in 1908, says Norfolk Southern, was that defendant negligence and plaintiff contributory negligence were measured by the same standard: proximate cause. Id.
Missouri’s rule of differing causation standards is based on the claim that in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957), the United States Supreme Court held that FELA expressly overruled the common law rule of proximate cause, making any defendant liable if its negligence was the “slightest” cause of injury. Brief for Petitioner Norfolk Southern at 8-9. On Norfolk Southern's view, that is a misreading of Rogers. It notes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the federal standard for railroad negligence under FELA embodies proximate cause. Id. at 9. Section 51’s requirement that a railroad is liable if the injury “result[ed] in whole or in part” from its negligence “is an elaboration of the common law rule of proximate cause, not an abrogation of it.” Id. “At the time of FELA’s enactment, numerous common-law courts used that very formulation to clarify that proximate causation could be found even if there were multiple causes of injury.” Id. at 9.
Furthermore, adds Norfolk Southern, the Missouri rule of divergent negligence causation standards is also inconsistent with the operation of the FELA comparative negligence provisions. Id. at 7-8. Congress directed that contributory negligence should not bar a recovery, but that the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence that can be attributed to the railroad employee. Id. at 8. The purpose is to make each party responsible for his own negligence. Id. According to Petitioner, “by imposing a higher causation standard in order for a jury to find contributory negligence by the employee, the Missouri rule impermissibly makes the division of damages turn on relative causation rather than relative fault.” Id.
Sorrell’s “No Meaningful Difference” Argument
Sorrell, Respondent, argues that that the divergence in railroad negligence standards, between Missouri’s standard and the federal standard, is of little importance. Brief for Respondent Sorrell at 3. This irrelevance, contends Sorrell, is evidenced by the fact that the issue surfaces in case law once every decade or two. Id. Further, the difference in standards is of little practical importance, since it is doubtful that a jury would find any practical difference between the state standard and the federal standard. Id. at 3-4.
Moreover, says Sorrell, even if the difference in the negligence standard is significant in most cases, it is not significant in this case because Sorrell and Woodin gave such different accounts of the accident. Id. at 4. Under either measure of negligence – “in whole or in part” or “proximate cause” – the jury was forced to side entirely with Sorrell or entirely with Woodin based on the facts before it. Id. “There was little room under either side’s version of the facts to allow for its own negligence, regardless of the negligence standard used.” Id.
In contrast to Norfolk Southern, Sorrell argues that the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision is consistent with all decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the plain language of FELA. Id. According to Sorrell, although the United States Supreme Court has held that a relaxed causation standard, rather than the traditional common-law standard, applies to defendants under FELA § 51, it has never said that the same causation standard applies to FELA plaintiffs’ contributory negligence under FELA § 53. Id. at 5-6.
Thus, continues Sorrell, in Rogers, the Supreme Court held that section 51 of FELA expressly overrules the traditional common-law causation standard for the employer’s primary negligence through its use of the words “in whole or in part.” See Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506-10. But neither the purpose nor plain language of FELA section 53 demands the same conclusion for the employee's contributory negligence. On the contrary, the fact that section 53 of FELA contains no specific language regarding the employee’s causation standard compels the conclusion that in the absence of express statutory direction, the default common-law standard applies. Brief for Respondent Sorrell at 5-6.
Finally, argues Sorrell, the unequal negligence standards are not incompatible with FELA. Id. at 7. “Rather than creating two incommensurate scales that make the comparison of fault impossible, the different causation standards simply act as gatekeepers, or thresholds, that determine which acts or omissions can be included in the computation of fault.” Id. Once the boundaries are drawn, the plaintiff’s and defendant’s acts or omissions that have now been made part of the equation are weighed just as they would be in any other analysis of comparative fault. Id. At this stage, the jury compares plaintiff’s contributory negligence with the defendant’s negligence and reduces the amount plaintiff is awarded in damages in proportion with plaintiff’s fault. Id.
Discussion
Because the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) is the exclusive remedial scheme for practically all railroad workplace injuries, the causation standards debated in this case implicate nearly every case involving an employee’s injury while employed by a railroad. Brief for Petitioner. Thus, this case has the potential for wide-reaching impact.
According to Petitioner, FELA is not, and was never meant to be, a no-fault worker’s compensation system that is common in other industries. Id. at 1-2. Unlike worker’s compensation laws, FELA requires a plaintiff (railroad employee) to prove common law negligence (rather than imposing no-fault liability on the employer railroad), and permits a plaintiff to recover tort damages (rather than scheduled benefits). Id. at 2.
Under FELA, state courts have jurisdiction over personal injury claims brought by railroad employees against their employer, but those state courts must apply the common law as established and applied in the federal courts. Id. Here, the Missouri circuit court followed the Missouri Approved Instructions, approved jury instructions promulgated by the Missouri Supreme Court, rather than following federal precedent.
Federal precedent, and the well-established common-law rule, says Norfolk Southern, was that defendant negligence and plaintiff contributory negligence were measured by the same standard: proximate cause. Id. at 7. The Missouri Approved Instructions, binding on the lower Missouri courts, on the other hand, permit the jury to employ different causation standards for negligence and contributory negligence under FELA. Id. at 4. This does away with equal burden that was the standard under federal common law and places a heavier burden on the defendant railroad. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court must determine whether Missouri’s decision to allow for two separate causation standards – one for the plaintiff and another for the defendant – is permitted under FELA.
Clearly, the outcome of this case will have a strong influence on the interpretation of FELA going forward, and thus will have a great impact on railroads and railroad employees nationwide. Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Railroads at 2. A decision in favor of petitioner Norfolk Southern will help curtail the potential for an expansive reading of FELA. Id. An expansive reading of FELA, such as that implicitly proposed by Missouri, would allow for almost certain recovery for all rail employees injured on the job. Id. Together with the application of uncapped tort damages, such expansive liability will present a significant financial burden on railroads nationwide who would have to pay damages to an increasing number of winning plaintiffs (employees). Id. at 17-18.
A decision in favor of respondent Sorrell will affect railroads and railroad employees in a different way. A favorable decision for Sorrell would be based on an expansive reading of FELA, which would be beneficial for the employees of railroads commencing claims against their railroad employers for workplace injuries. The benefit would come from the unequal negligence causation standards employed by the Missouri court. The differing standards – a lower burden on the plaintiff to prove railroad negligence – give railroad employees the advantage in the courtroom and would turn FELA litigation into almost a sure win against a particular railroad defendant. This would be a very significant legal and financial boost for railroad employees nationwide that are injured on the job and have to bring suit under FELA.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in this case will have a significant impact on FELA litigation by determining the exact balance courts should strike when deciding cases that involve railroad workplace injuries. A decision for Petitioner Norfolk Southern will favor defendant railroads in FELA cases by maintaining the status quo, which favors current federal precedent that uses the same negligence causation standard – proximate cause – to find railroad negligence and contributory negligence by the railroad employee. Alternatively, if the Supreme Court affirms the lower court’s decision, railroad employees will reap the benefits of a lower causation standard for railroad negligence – in whole or in part – which would increase the likelihood of employee victories in FELA cases.
Written by: Miguel Loza