negligence

Air and Liquid System Corp. v. Devries

Issues

Does a bare-metal manufacturer have a duty to warn users of asbestos-related hazards where a third party added asbestos-containing components to the manufacturer’s product?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a manufacturer may be held liable under maritime law for injuries caused by third-party products that were added to the manufacturer’s product. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. argues that a manufacturer has no duty to warn against the asbestos-related dangers of third-party products. Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee, whose husbands died of asbestos-related illnesses, counter that imposing a duty to warn is reasonable because bare-metal manufacturers should reasonably foresee that their products will be used with asbestos-containing products. Because the injured parties were U.S. Navy sailors, this case also asks the Supreme Court to consider principles of maritime law. The outcome will determine the contours of recovery in the admiralty context.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether products-liability defendants can be held liable under maritime law for injuries caused by products that they did not make, sell, or distribute.

Respondents Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee (“Devries and McAfee”) separately filed suit in Pennsylvania state court, alleging that their deceased husbands, John B. Devries and Kenneth McAfee, had contracted cancer after being exposed to asbestos in the United States Navy. In re: Asbestos Product Liability Litigation (No. VI) at 5.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian

Issues

Can an individual sue for inaccurate or missing disclosure statements in a firm’s tender offer under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and, is an alleged violation of Section 14(e) subject to a negligence or scienter standard of proof?

This case asks the Supreme Court to define the private right of action under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Gary Varjabedian and other Emulex Corporation shareholders contend that they have a right to file a private action against Emulex under Section 14(e). Emulex Corporation and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc. counter that Section 14(e) does not allow a private cause of action based on negligence, and that a higher scienter standard should apply instead. The Supreme Court’s ruling will have significant implications for shareholders’ interests in the event of a merger.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held, in express disagreement with five other courts of appeals, that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on the negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer.

In February 2015, the technology companies Emulex Corporation (“Emulex”) and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc. (“Avago”) announced that they would be merging. Varjabedian v.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell

Issues

Did the Missouri Court of Appeals err by ignoring federal law and finding that the causation standard for employee contributory negligence under FELA is governed by Missouri-specific rules that impose a lower burden of proof on the railroad employee?

 

Timothy Sorrell, a railroad employee, suffered injuries while working for his employer, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) and sued, seeking damages for his injuries, under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”). FELA is the federal statute governing railroad workplace injuries. After determining and apportioning negligence among the parties, the Missouri circuit court found for Sorrell, awarding him $1.5 million for his injuries. At issue in this case is the standard of negligence used to determine liability under FELA between plaintiff employee and defendant railroad. In conflict with the United States Supreme Court and several federal courts of appeals, the Missouri circuit court used a different standard to determine plaintiff and defendant liability. Traditionally, federal courts had used proximate cause to determine the liability of both parties. The Missouri circuit court, however, applied Missouri-specific rules that lower the employee’s burden to prove railroad negligence and that keep the railroad’s burden to prove contributory negligence by the employee the same. Given that FELA is the exclusive remedy for railroad employees injured on the job, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in this case will have a significant impact on all workplace injury cases involving railroads. The Supreme Court’s decision will reflect its view on the balance that courts should strike when considering negligence in FELA cases and will ultimately affect the outcome of all FELA cases by either maintaining the status quo or making it easier for plaintiff employees to emerge victorious.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court below erred in determining – in conflict with this Court and multiple courts of appeals – that the causation standard for employee contributory negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) differs from the causation standard for railroad negligence.

Timothy Sorrell, Respondent, was employed as a trackman by Norfolk Southern Railway Company. Brief for Petitioner Norfolk Southern at 5. As a trackman for the railway company, Sorrell was classified as a “general laborer.” Id. at 5.

Submit for publication
0

Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams

Issues

1. Whether, when the Supreme Court remands a case and instructs a state court to apply a constitutional standard, the state court can then decide the case using a procedural rule not previously mentioned in litigation.

2. Whether punitive damages 97 times greater than compensatory damages can be awarded based on the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct rather than the harm actually suffered by the plaintiff.

Court below

 

In 1997, Mayola Williams’s husband Jesse Williams died from lung cancer as a result of smoking cigarettes manufactured and marketed by Philip Morris USA Inc. Mayola Williams sued Philip Morris alleging negligence, strict product liability, and fraud. At trial, the court rejected Philip Morris’s request for a jury instruction on punitive damages which stated that Philip Morris could not be punished for harms suffered by nonparties. The jury awarded Williams $79.5 million dollars in punitive damages. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams (“Williams II”), the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court upholding this award and instructed the lower court to apply its standard of prohibiting punishment of a defendant for damage to nonparties. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld its decision, finding that a state procedural law not previously addressed justified the trial judge’s denial of the requested instruction. In this case, the Court will decide whether a lower court can decline to apply a standard that the Court has articulated and instead uphold its ruling on state procedural law grounds. This decision will affect the Supreme Court’s institutional supremacy and state courts’ treatment of punitive damages awards.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When this case was last before it, this Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and held that due process precludes a jury from imposing punitive damages to punish for alleged injuries to persons other than the plaintiff. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). This Court then remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court with directions to “apply the [constitutional] standard we have set forth.” Ibid. On remand, however, the Oregon Supreme Court refused to follow this Court’s directive. Instead, the Oregon court “adhered to” the judgment that this Court had vacated because it found that Philip Morris had procedurally defaulted under state law and thereby forfeited its claim of federal constitutional error. App., infra, 22a.

The questions presented—the second of which was accepted for review but not reached when this case was last before the Court—are:

1. Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to “apply” the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose—for the first time in the litigation—a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.

2. Whether a punitive damages award that is 97 times the compensatory damages may be upheld on the ground that the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct can “override” the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the plaintiffs harm.

In 1950, Jesse Williams began smoking cigarettes and eventually smoked three packs a day of Marlboros, which are manufactured and marketed by Philip Morris USA Inc. (“Philip Morris”). See Brief for Petitioner, Philip Morris USA Inc.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

products liability

Overview

Products liability refers to the liability of any or all parties along the chain of manufacture of any product for damage caused by that product. This includes the manufacturer of component parts (at the top of the chain), an assembling manufacturer, the wholesaler, and the retail store owner (at the bottom of the chain). Products containing inherent defects that cause harm to a consumer (or someone to whom the product was loaned, given, etc.) of the product would be the subjects of products liability suits.

U.S. Constitution and Federal Statutes

State Material

Uniform Laws

State Statutes

Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, LTD

Issues

Whether a party can be awarded court costs for costs incurred in translating written documents.

 

After falling through a deck on property owned by Respondent Kan Pacific Saipan, LTD, Petitioner Kouichi Taniguchi filed suit against the company for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in Kan Pacific’s favor, and also awarded the company costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6); the award included costs incurred in translating various documents from Japanese to English. The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision, holding that the phrase “compensation of interpreters” in § 1920(6) applies to written translations, in addition to verbal interpretations. Taniguchi now appeals, arguing that the statute’s plain meaning, structure, and legislative history indicate that the term “interpreters” should be limited to oral translators of spoken language. The Supreme Court will decide whether litigants can recover for non-verbal translation costs; this decision has the potential to increase recoverable court costs, and to deter meritorious litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 1920 of 28 U.S.C. sets out the categories of costs that may be awarded to the prevailing party in a federal lawsuit. One of the listed categories is “compensation of interpreters.” § 1920(6).

The question presented is whether costs incurred in translating written documents are “compensation of interpreters” for purposes of section 1920(6).

Petitioner Kouichi Taniguchi, a professional baseball player in Japan, dropped through a wooden deck during a tour of property belonging to Respondent Kan Pacific Saipan, LTD. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, LTD, 633 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to negligence