Marinello v. United States

TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY OF 26 U.S.C. § 7212(A)

Marinello argues that the text, structure, and legislative history of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (“7212”) show that Congress meant for § 7212’s clause to apply only to conduct undertaken with intent to obstruct or impede a known pending IRS proceeding. First, Marinello asserts that in United States v. Aguilar the Supreme Court interpreted “due administration” of government functions in 18 U.S.C. § 1503’s clause to mean intentional obstruction of known government proceedings. Marinello contends that, because Congress is presumed to know judicial interpretations of existing law when it enacts legislation, Congress’s decision to repeat this language from § 1503’s clause in § 7212’s clause shows intent to incorporate that interpretation into the latter statute.

Marinello next contends that the structure of § 7212 shows that Congress intended § 7212’s clause to be limited to obstruction of a known IRS proceeding. Marinello argues that the Court looks to the structure of statutes to avoid giving statutes unintended breadth and to avoid making other terms superfluous. Because § 7212’s clause follows one criminalizing intentional “corrupt” or “forcible” acts against “any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity,” Marinello asserts that § 7212’s clause likewise requires proof that the defendant knew he was impeding an IRS agent in the course of his duties. Marinello further argues that applying § 7212’s clause to every act or omission that could hinder the IRS would render the first part of the statute unnecessary. Marinello draws a comparison to § 1503’s clause, arguing that “obstruct” and “impede,” taken from § 1503’s clause, are limited to proceedings, and that the repetition of “impede” in both clauses of § 7212 indicates that § 7212’s clause is also limited in this way.

Marinello then argues that the legislative history of the 1954 revision to the Internal Revenue Code (the “Tax Code”) shows that Congress understood and intended the residual clause to be only a slight expansion of existing law, meant to combat corruption and other obstruction of IRS officers. Marinello explains that before the revision, tax obstruction statutes prohibited only “forcible” interference with IRS officers. Marinello maintains that the only legislative history directly referring to the new “due administration” provision explains that the new § 7212 provision was to be a “similar and amplified” version of the old law, meant to better protect officers by covering interferences other than force. According to Marinello, if Congress also intended the new provision to reach otherwise lawful conduct, it would have said so.

In response, the government contends that the ordinary meaning of “due administration of this title” applies to all IRS rights and responsibilities in administering the Tax Code. The government argues that when interpreting statutes, the Court first looks to the language’s ordinary meaning and, if it is plain and unambiguous, the Court adopts the plain meaning. The government asserts that the ordinary meaning of the language in question is unambiguous: “due” means “rightful, proper, or just” and “administration” means “act or process of administering [and] perform[ing] executive duties.” Because many IRS administrative actions occur regularly and apply broadly, the government maintains that this ordinary meaning supports the contention that this language was meant to unambiguously indicate that the statute applies to all IRS actions, not only pending proceedings. In addition, the government argues that Marinello’s analogy to § 1503’s clause is flawed because that clause applies to “due administration of justice,” which arises only when triggered by specific actions (e.g. judicial proceedings); whereas, “due administration of [the Tax Code]” occurs independent of any action.

In response to Marinello’s structural argument, the government contends that § 7212’s structure reinforces the conclusion that the statute applies to all IRS actions. First, the government argues that nothing in the first clause of § 7212 indicates that it applies only to pending IRS proceedings; thus, it applies to all acts or omissions obstructing or impeding IRS employees in the exercise of their duties, without limitation to known, pending proceedings. Second, the government asserts that even if the first clause applied only to pending proceedings, courts extend meaning from one clause to the next only when doing so is necessary to preserve the meaning of unambiguous terms in relation to ambiguous ones where the terms are grouped in a way showing they should be given related meaning. The government argues that Marinello has not identified any ambiguities in the ordinary meaning of § 7212 that support the need to apply this method of interpretation. Finally, the government contends that Marinello’s analogy to the structure of § 1503’s clause is flawed because administrations of justice are discrete events, of which a defendant must be aware in order to culpably impede; whereas, the Tax Code is known to be administered in a constant, general manner and, thus, any act or omission impeding these general functions may be corrupt.

In response to Marinello’s history argument, the government contends that the language of § 7212 provides a clear answer to the meaning of § 7212’s clause, and resorting to legislative history is thus unnecessary. Even if the court assessed the history of statute, the government asserts, the history provides no support for Marinello’s argument because the House and Senate reports only mention § 7212’s clause to say that acts falling within the meaning of the first clause also come within the meaning of the second. The government further contends that the history of § 1503 demonstrates why § 7212’s legislative history does not support Marinello’s interpretation. The government explains that § 1503’s original residual clause made obstruction of justice a crime only when it was directed at the “due administration of justice” in a “court of the United States.” According to the government, this residual clause was amended in 1909 to include language specifying that obstruction of justice included attempts to influence or impede jurors or witnesses in proceedings. Unlike § 1503’s clause, the government argues, § 7212’s clause has no similar history connecting “due administration of this title” to a pending IRS proceeding.

DOES THE TAX CODE AS A WHOLE DEMONSTRATE HOW 26 U.S.C. § 7212(A) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED?

Marinello argues that the government’s interpretation of § 7212’s clause violates the mandate that statutes should be read to avoid superfluity and conflict between provisions. Marinello asserts that the government’s interpretation of § 7212’s clause would cause the clause to swallow other Tax Code provisions, transforming misdemeanors into felonies and eliminating elements of crimes. Marinello contends that the Court has repeatedly refused to interpret the Tax Code in a way that creates overlap between provisions. Marinello warns that under the government’s interpretation, actions that constitute misdemeanors, such as failure to make a return or to keep required records, may amount to felony impediment of the Tax Code. Marinello contends that this is because applying § 7212’s clause to all IRS actions effectively blends the difference between the “willful” mens rea of misdemeanors (requiring proof that the law imposed a duty that the defendant knew of and voluntarily or intentionally violated) with the “corrupt” mens rea of felony provisions (requiring proof of intent to secure an unlawful advantage or benefit).

In response to Marinello’s argument that a statute should be read to avoid conflict between provisions, the government argues that overlap in the scope or elements of criminal statutes is common, especially in the Tax Code, and that this does not warrant limiting prosecution to less serious offenses. In support of this contention, the government asserts that the Court has held that overlap between the Tax Code’s misdemeanor and felony provisions does not pose a prosecutorial issue. The government further contends that Marinello’s argument that applying § 7212’s clause to all IRS proceedings blends the “willful” and “corrupt” mens rea overlooks the fact that the meaning of “corrupt” is more demanding than that of “willful.” The government argues that not all willful conduct necessarily involves a corrupt endeavor to intentionally obstruct the IRS’s ability to administer the Tax Code with intent to gain an unlawful advantage. This heightened requirement of the “corrupt” mens rea, the government contends, ensures that § 7212’s clause is not a trap for the unaware.

SHOULD THE RULE OF LENITY APPLY?

Marinello asserts that to the extent the Court finds § 7212’s clause ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires reversal. Marinello argues that, when a court interprets ambiguous criminal statutes, the court cannot choose the harsher interpretation unless Congress provides clear and definite clarification. Thus, Marinello contends, the Court should require Congress to speak more clearly about the meaning of § 7212’s clause before assuming Congress intended to make a felony out of a broad swath of tax-related conduct.

The government counters that the rule of lenity does not apply because the meaning of § 7212’s clause is clear. The government contends that the rule of lenity applies only when a criminal statute contains a grievous ambiguity and only if, after evaluating everything aiding in the interpretation, the Court can merely guess Congress’s intent. The government asserts that because the text of § 7212 is straightforward and nothing in the structure or history overcome this meaning, the rule of lenity does not apply.