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Internal Revenue Service

CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service

Issues

Does the Anti-Injunction Act bar pre-enforcement challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act to newly promulgated agency guidelines that include discretionary tax-penalty enforcement provisions, or is the act narrowly confined to direct tax assessments and collections?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the Anti-Injunction Act and to determine whether it bars pre-enforcement legal challenges to agency guidelines and regulations that incorporate a tax-penalty enforcement mechanism into the framework. CIC Services argues that the Supreme Court should construe the Administrative Procedure Act’s review provisions broadly enough and the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibitory provisions narrowly enough to provide material tax advisors relief from the Internal Revenue Service’s new interpretative guidelines concerning reportable transactions. The Internal Revenue Service counters that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to CIC’s challenge so the lawsuit is barred and that none of the available exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act’s provisions apply to CIC’s sought injunction. This case has important implications for corporations whose business involves reporting earnings to the Internal Revenue Service, as well as for federal agencies’ abilities to avoid lawsuits by tying in certain tax-penalty provisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes also bars challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates issued by administrative agencies that are not taxes.

The Internal Revenue Service has the authority to require taxpayers and some third parties to submit certain records about “reportable transactions.” CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv. at 249. The Internal Revenue Service also defines what constitutes a reportable transaction.

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch

Issues

Does a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation hearing on an IRS proposed tax levy become moot if disputes about the underlying levy no longer exist?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a proceeding about an IRS proposed levy to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a dispute regarding the proposed levy. Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no longer a live dispute and the petitioner lacked any cognizable interest in the case. Zuch argues that the Tax Court retained jurisdiction because the parties continued to have an interest in the case since the Tax Court could determine petitioner’s right to a refund. The outcome of this case affects the scope of Tax Court proceedings under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 and impacts taxpayers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

In 1993, Jennifer Zuch married Patrick Gennardo. Zuch v.

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EC Term of Years Trust v. United States

Issues

Whether 26 U.S.C. § 7426, which is designed specifically for wrongful levy actions and has a shorter statute of limitations, is the exclusive remedy for an individual seeking a refund after a wrongful levy assessed by the IRS.

 

Elmer and Dorothy Cullers created the EC Term of Years Trust (“the Trust”) to reduce the impact of federal taxes on their estate. When the IRS claimed the Cullers had transferred property to the Trust to avoid paying taxes, the Trust opened a bank account to pay the back-taxes. The IRS levied on the account.  Afterwards , the Trust sought to recover the funds under 26 U.S.C. § 7426 (wrongful levy statute) and 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (tax refund statute). At  issue in this case  is whether 26 U.S.C. § 7426, with its shorter statute of limitations, is the exclusive remedy for wrongful levy actions by third parties, or whether third parties may alternatively seek relief under the more general tax refund provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which has a longer statute of limitations. The Court’s  decision in this case  will determine whether wrongful levy claimants will have this longer statutory period during which to bring suit against the U.S. The Court’s decision will also implicitly give weight to particular methods of statutory interpretation and ways of determining congressional intent.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a person who is not the assessed taxpayer utilize 28 U.S.C. § 1346 to seek a refund when its funds were seized through a wrongful levy and it had an opportunity to utilize the wrongful levy procedure under 26 U.S.C. § 7426?

Elmer and Dorothy Cullers created the EC Term of Years Trust (“the Trust”), the Petitioner, in 1991 to reduce the impact of federal taxes on their estate. Brief for Petitioner at 3.

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Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Issues

Does the Internal Revenue Code allow trusts and estates to make full deductions on Federal Income tax returns for investment management advisory service fees?

 

Michael Knight, trustee of the Rudkin Testamentary Trust, petitioned the United States Tax Court to dispute the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") assessment that the Trust owed taxes for investment-advisory expenses Knight had deducted in full. The Internal Revenue Code contains a 2% floor on all itemized deductions. The IRS assessed that Knight failed to recognize this floor, significantly lowering the deduction amount. Knight argued these expenses should be exempt because they were necessary for Knight to fulfill his fiduciary duties as a trustee. The Tax Court stated that, to be exempt, Knight needed to show these expenses would not have been incurred if the assets were not held in trust. The Tax Court found Knight failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the expenses were unique to trusts and decided in favor of the IRS. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between a holding by the Sixth Circuit and those of the Second, Fourth, and Federal Circuits. As trustees spend billions of dollars yearly on management advice, this case will have wide-reaching consequences. A decision for the IRS will result in the same level of taxation on investment-management expenses for individuals and trusts and more taxes to the IRS tempered by decreased use of management services by trustees. A decision for Knight would lower the taxes of trustees and encourage trustees to use investment-management services.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 26 U.S.C. § 67(e) permits a full deduction for costs and fees for investment management and advisory services provided to trusts and estates.

In the late 1930s, entrepreneur Margaret Rudkin founded a small business that ultimately developed into 

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Robert Green and Emily Sherwin and for their insights on trusts in the United States.

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Marinello v. United States

Issues

Does a conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of the Tax Code require proof that the defendant knew of a pending IRS investigation?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine what mental state an individual must possess to be guilty of obstructing an IRS investigation. The case arises out of business owner Carlo J. Marinello’s decisions to avoid paying taxes, destroy business records, and pay his employees under the table. The IRS charged Marinello for these business practices, claiming they obstructed the due administration of the Tax Code. Marinello argues, however, that an individual is guilty of obstructing the IRS only if the IRS can show that the individual knew of an ongoing IRS investigation; Marinello analogizes to other criminal statutes and cites court precedent and later statutory amendments to argue that the government’s contrary conclusion is unconstitutional. The government counters that the ordinary meaning of the relevant statutory clause is unambiguous––due administration of the Tax Code includes all IRS duties––and it is therefore unnecessary to draw analogies or look to legislative history to interpret the clause. Marinello claims that if the government prevails, then the IRS could recast innocent tax planning as a felony and give prosecutors impermissibly broad discretion in charging taxpayers with crimes—a claim the government vehemently denies. Thus, the scope of liability for tax crimes is at stake.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 7212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code includes the following provision:

Whoever corruptly or by force … endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer … of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force … endeavors to obstruct or impede[] the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both ….

26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (emphasis added).

The question presented is whether § 7212(a)’s residual clause, italicized above, requires that there was a pending IRS action or proceeding, such as an investigation or audit, of which the defendant was aware when he engaged in the purportedly obstructive conduct.

Between 1992 and 2010, Carlo J. Marinello operated a freight service, Express Courier, in western New York and chose to destroy business records, avoid keeping books, pay his employees in cash, use business income for personal expenses, and avoid filing personal or corporate income tax returns. See United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 211–13 (2d Cir. 2016).

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United States v. Clarke

Issues

Should a court grant an evidentiary hearing to a party summoned by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), where the party alleges that the summons was issued for an improper purpose and seeks to question IRS officials about the reasons for issuing the summons?

The IRS investigated the tax returns of Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership, and in 2010, notified the partnership of deficiencies in its tax returns. The IRS issued summonses to third parties associated with DHLP, including the chief financial officer of the partnership, Respondent Michael Clarke. None of the parties responded to the summonses. DHLP challenged the IRS’s determination in tax court, and in April 2011, the IRS sought enforcement of the unanswered summonses in federal district court. DHLP and Clarke argued that the summonses failed to properly serve an investigative purpose and that the IRS issued them with retaliatory motives. The United States argues that the summonses should be enforced without an evidentiary hearing because the IRS has broad authority to issue summonses, and the evidence fails to show that the IRS had issued the summonses for an improper purpose. Clarke argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he sufficiently alleged and demonstrated evidence to show that the IRS issued the summonses to gain an unfair litigation advantage, which is an abuse of the IRS’s power to issue summonses. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an unsupported allegation that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a summons for an improper purpose entitles an opponent of the summons to an evidentiary hearing to question IRS officials about their reasons for issuing the summons.

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Facts

This case centers on whether a party accusing the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) of issuing a summons for an improper purpose is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Petition For A Writ of Certiorari at I.

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United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC

Issues

Whether the Internal Revenue Service may benefit from an extended six year statute of limitations, provided for in cases of income omissions under 26 U.S.C. 6501(e)(1)(A), to assess additional taxes when the taxpayer reports understated income due to inflation of basis from a property transaction.

 

In 2006, the IRS adjusted Respondent Home Concrete’s 1999 tax return, claiming that Home Concrete overstated its basis in sold assets. The Fourth Circuit found that this adjustment was untimely under the general three year statute of limitations for IRS actions, concluding that overstatements of basis are not omissions that would trigger an extended six year statute of limitations. Petitioner, the United States, argues that the language and purpose behind the statute clarify that overstating a sold asset’s basis triggers the extended period, and that the Fourth Circuit should have deferred to the IRS's statutory interpretation contained within a Treasury Department regulation finalized during the appeal. Home Concrete argues that Supreme Court precedent applies here, eliminating ambiguity in the statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court’s decision will resolve a circuit split over the proper limitations period; the decision will also address the degree of deference due to a Treasury regulation that may be interpreted as conflicting with Supreme Court precedent, and that may be viewed as applying retroactively. The Court’s decision may affect the IRS’s timeframe to detect certain complex tax schemes, and the time period within which taxpayers are subject to audits.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a). That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer "omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the [taxpayer's] return." 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A). The questions presented are as follows:

1. Whether an understatement of gross income attributable to an overstatement of basis in sold property is an "omi[ssion] from gross income" that can trigger the extended six-year assessment period.

2. Whether a final regulation promulgated by the Department of the Treasury, which reflects the IRS's view that an understatement of gross income attributable to an overstatement of basis can trigger the extended six-year assessment period, is entitled to judicial deference.

n 1999, Respondent Robert Pierce sought to sell his ownership in the Home Oil and Coal Company (“Home Oil”). See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC et. al. v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir.

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