Wilson v. Sellers

THE RICHTER CASE AND THE “REASONABLE BASIS” STANDARD

Wilson argues that when a federal court reviews a state court habeas decision for an unreasonable determination of law or fact under § 2254(d), Supreme Court precedent suggests that the review should focus on what the reviewing state court “knew and did.” Wilson contends that the best way in this case to know what the reviewing state court knew and did is to look through the habeas denial and consider the reasoned decision of the lower court. Under AEDPA, Wilson maintains, a federal court must review the reasonableness of both the outcome and the underlying findings and determinations yielding that outcome. Wilson notes that the Supreme Court has followed the “what the state court knew and did” approach in every § 2254(d) case except one—Harrington v. Richter. Wilson contends that this approach respects principles of federalism and comity, as well as the state court’s resources. Wilson asserts that Richter is a unique case because the state appellate court issued a summary decision without explanation after no other state court issued a full opinion on the merits. According to Wilson, in unique cases like Richter where no reasoned merits decision exists, a federal court may only “imagine . . . what ‘could have supported’ the [state court’s] decision” in a § 2254 analysis. Wilson argues, then, that Richter did not contravene the approach directing courts to evaluate “what the state court knew and did” for federal habeas proceedings.

On the other hand, Respondent Eric Sellers, Warden of the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, argues that in Richter the Court held that § 2254’s deference applies to the last state court merits decision regardless of whether the decision included the court’s reasoning for denying relief. Thus, according to Sellers, when the last state court’s merits decision includes no explanation, the petitioner must meet the burden of showing that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Sellers also asserts that Richter instructs courts to identify any possible arguments that could have yielded the state court’s decision and then determine whether any of those arguments provide a reasonable basis for the decision. Sellers notes that, in the past, federal appeals courts reviewed § 2254 cases and state court merit decisions using this approach and Richter merely confirmed the approach. Sellers argues that the Richter approach is superior because it does not automatically assume that the state appellate court has adopted unreasonable lower court opinions, even if the state appellate court does not issue a supporting opinion or explanation. To hold otherwise, according to Sellers, would reinstate the pre-AEDPA “grading papers” regime in which federal courts essentially reviewed state court merit decisions concerning § 2254 de novo. Sellers further contends that this “reasonable basis” standard protects the “integrity” of state case law and respects principles of federalism and comity by not requiring the state court to issue a written opinion.

THE YLST CASE AND THE “LOOK THROUGH” METHOD

Wilson argues that the Supreme Court stated in Ylst v. Nunnemaker that “silence implies consent, not the opposite,” here meaning that when a state appellate court summarily affirms the decision of a lower court to reject a claim, the court does so based upon the same reasoning provided by the lower court. Wilson contends that the federal courts, then, must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision as the best evidence for deciding cases concerning § 2254. Although the Ylst case dealt with a different issue within federal habeas review, Wilson asserts that federal courts find the Ylst presumption appealing when applying § 2254 because the presumption is easy to apply and is consistent with AEDPA. Wilson notes that historically every Circuit Court of Appeals to consider the issue—with the exception of the court below—has “look[ed] through” to the last reasoned state court decision when applying § 2254. Even the Supreme Court, according to Wilson, adopted the “look through” method when applying § 2254 in post-Richter cases. Thus, Wilson argues that federal courts should apply the Ylst “look through” method to federal habeas review as the appropriate method for evaluating summary state appellate court decisions pursuant to § 2254. Furthermore, adopting Sellers’s and the Eleventh Circuit’s expansive reading of Richter, Wilson maintains, would effectively “abandon[]” the precedent set forth by the Supreme Court in Ylst.

In opposition, Sellers emphasizes that § 2254 mandates only that the federal court afford deference to the state court’s “decision” and not the state court’s “reasoning” or “opinion.” Thus, Sellers contends, a federal court may review only the last state court merits decision, and not a lower court’s explanatory opinion. Sellers asserts that in reviewing an appellate summary denial, the court must find only that the decision is based in reasonable conclusions of law and fact. Furthermore, Sellers argues that although these reasonable conclusions need not be stated in the appellate decision, the reviewing court may look to the lower court’s opinion for potential supporting conclusions. If the federal court finds that a lower state court’s opinion provides the last state court with a reasonable basis that could support its summary merits decision, Sellers maintains that the inquiry is over. If, on the other hand, the federal court finds that the lower state court’s opinion resulted from an unreasonable conclusion, Sellers contends, the court must look beyond the opinion for other possible reasonable supporting conclusions for the last state court merits decision.

GEORGIA’S HABEAS PROCEDURES AND TWO-TIERED SYSTEMS OF REVIEW

Wilson argues that, given Georgia’s two-tiered habeas review system, “look[ing] through” to a reasoned decision by a Georgia state court is the best approach to determine “what the state court knew and did.” Georgia’s legislature has designed and implemented a habeas review system, according to Wilson, that invests extensive resources and responsibility in lower state courts to hear evidence and produce reasoned decisions. Therefore, Wilson contends, applying Richter’s “could have supported” approach in a system like Georgia’s, rather than looking to the reasons laid out in the lower court opinion, makes little sense because it often precludes an examination of “what the state court knew and did.” Wilson asserts that adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s expansive reading of Richter would effectively bar federal courts from considering a Georgia state denial’s underlying legal or factual reasoning. This, Wilson argues, would provide federal courts with a “blank canvas” on which to impose their own “hypothetical reasoning” to state court denials and would reinstate the pre-AEDPA regime.

Sellers argues that a broad application of Richter and § 2254 to the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary decision is consistent with principles of federalism and comity. Sellers contends that federal courts will pay due respect to both tiers of Georgia’s habeas review system under Richter’s “reasonable basis” standard. Sellers asserts that Wilson’s proposed approach, on the other hand, would compel a federal court to discount a state appellate court’s merit decision in favor of a lower state court’s decision. In other words, according to Sellers, Wilson’s approach would incorrectly allow federal courts to disregard the second tier of Georgia’s system and only look to the first tier. Sellers further argues that the Georgia Supreme Court makes a denial decision only after “fully considering the complete record and transcript” and that to discount this decision disrespects the Georgia legislature’s decision to create a two-tiered system. Therefore, Sellers contends that when the Georgia Supreme Court issues an unexplained merits decision, the federal courts must review that decision and apply the “reasonable basis” standard.