certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

No. 90-68. Argued March 19, 1991 -- Decided June 24, 1991

Following his California murder conviction, respondent raised a Miranda claim for the first time on direct appeal, in violation of a state procedural rule. In affirming the conviction, the State Court of Appeal rejected the claim on the sole basis of the procedural bar. After successive peti- tions for collateral relief were denied without opinion by the State Supe- rior Court and Court of Appeal, respondent filed a habeas petition in the State Supreme Court, which denied relief without opinion or explana- tion, citing its decisions in In re Swain and In re Waltreus. When the State Supreme Court denied, without opinion or citation, a second ha- beas petition to it, respondent filed a habeas petition raising the Mir anda claim in Federal District Court. That court found that the state procedural default barred federal review, but the Court of Appeals re- versed this determination. Relying on this Court's statement in Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, that state procedural default bars federal review only when the state court clearly and expressly states its reliance on that ground, the court held that the State Supreme Court's "silent denial" of respondent's second state habeas petition lifted the procedural bar imposed on direct review.

Held: A state court's unexplained denial of a habeas petition raising fed- eral claims is not sufficient, for purposes of federal review, to lift a proce- dural bar imposed on direct appeal. Pp. 3-8.

(a) The Court of Appeals erred in applying a presumption that when a state court denies a federal claim without explicit reliance on state grounds, the merits of the federal claim are the basis for the judgment. The Harris presumption in favor of federal review is to be applied only after it has been determined that "the relevant state court decision . . . fairly appear[s] to rest primarily on federal law or [is] interwoven with federal law." Coleman v. Thompson, ante, at ---. P. 4.

(b) With respect to unexplained state-court judgments, federal habeas courts should apply the following presumption: where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained or- ders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion "fairly appear[s] to rest primarily upon federal law," it should be presumed that no procedural default has been invoked by a subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judg- ment or its consequences in place. Similarly, where the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, it should be presumed that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disre- gard the bar and consider the merits. This "look-through" presumption may be rebutted by strong evidence to the contrary. Pp. 5-6.

(c) The last explained state-court judgment on respondent's Miranda claim was that of the Court of Appeal on direct review, which unequivo- cally rested upon a state procedural default. None of the later judg- ments or orders was informative on the reason for denying the Miranda claim, nor has respondent adduced strong evidence that one of them reached the merits of that claim. Thus, federal-court review is barred unless respondent can establish "cause and prejudice" for his default, see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 493, 495-496. On remand, the Court of Appeals must determine whether he has done so. Pp. 7-8.

904 F. 2d 473, reversed and remanded.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a concurring opinion. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Stevens, JJ., joined.