Timbs v. Indiana

APPLYING THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE AGAINST THE STATES THROUGH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Tyson Timbs contends that the Excessive Fines Clause, which prohibits the government from imposing excessive fines on criminal offenders, applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. According to Timbs, the Excessive Fines Clause applies against the states because it is fundamental and “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.” Timbs argues that the freedom from excessive fines enshrined in the clause has been closely linked to securing life, liberty, and property in both American jurisprudence and other countries’ legal systems that predated it. Timbs asserts that concerns about excessive fines date back to as early as the Magna Carta (1215), which imposed a check on the King’s power to fine subjects. Timbs notes that four-hundred years later, English kings used fines to attack critics and outsourced fining power to allies of the crown. Timbs states that Parliament responded to these tactics by devoting a portion of the English Bill of Rights (1688) to abusive fines. Timbs argues that England’s history with abusive fines also shaped the American colonists’ view of freedom from excessive fines as a fundamental right. Timbs contends that the historical mistrust of the government’s power to punish prompted multiple states to include protections against excessive fines in their constitutions and inspired ratification of the Eighth Amendment in 1791. Timbs adds that the Excessive Fines Clause in particular was designed to limit the sovereign’s power to collect fines for improper ends.

Additionally, Timbs contends that the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 reaffirmed the significance of freedom from excessive fines in America’s legal system. Timbs points out that fines and forfeitures were a prominent feature of the “Black Codes,” which were used to subjugate African Americans in Southern states; the majority of these states also allowed the hiring-out of individuals who were unable to pay their fines. Timbs states that members of Congress viewed such economic sanctions as a serious threat to personal liberty when they were debating the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Timbs further notes that all but two states had an Excessive Fines Clause in their constitutions by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Timbs argues that the history of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments demonstrates that freedom from excessive fines is fundamental to the American legal system.

Timbs also argues that freedom from excessive fines remains fundamental today because excessive fines continue to threaten personal liberty and are sometimes abused by the government. Moreover, Timbs contends that fines are uniquely prone to abuse since, unlike other methods of punishment, they raise revenue and the government often uses them unfairly to that end. Timbs also notes that Indiana is the only state that allows state prosecutors to outsource civil forfeiture cases to private lawyers, who in turn collect a percentage of the revenue from the forfeited property. Timbs says that this system amplifies the risk of abuse by incentivizing private lawyers to perpetuate the system of civil forfeitures.

The State of Indiana counters that the issue is not whether the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment as a general matter, but rather whether the clause requires that a civil forfeiture be proportional to the conduct authorizing it. Accordingly, Indiana contends that the Court should look at the history of in rem forfeitures specifically to determine whether it is a fundamental right because that is the precise right being asserted. Indiana therefore argues that Timbs errs by presenting almost exclusively historical evidence relating to criminal fines rather than in rem forfeitures. Indiana continues that protection from disproportionate in rem forfeitures through the Excessive Fines Clause is not fundamental or deeply rooted in the American tradition. Indiana notes that no court even suggested a proportionality requirement for in rem forfeitures until the late twentieth century, despite other constitutional challenges brought against in rem forfeitures and the invocation of the proportionality requirement against in personam fines during the same period.

Indiana continues that no court held that an in rem forfeiture was subject to a proportionality requirement by a federal or state Excessive Fines Clause until the late twentieth century; the five state courts to consider the argument ultimately dismissed it. Indiana argues that the dearth of proportionality challenges to in rem proceedings is surprising given that litigants had many opportunities to raise such challenges and consequently demonstrates a widespread understanding that the Excessive Fines Clause does not impose a proportionality requirement on in rem forfeitures. Indiana asserts that the absence of such challenges weighs heavily against a finding that the proportionality requirement is fundamental because there were no significant political concerns pressuring judges, lawmakers, or litigants to ignore the right. According to Indiana, the proportionality protection was rarely invoked because it was not understood as a fundamental right. Indiana maintains that disproportionate in rem forfeitures do not violate Due Process, and therefore a protection against disproportionate in rem forfeitures is not applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

However, Indiana also contends that, even if the Court decides to evaluate whether the Excessive Fines Clause as a whole applies to the states, the Court should still take into account the history of all of the Clause’s protections, including the protection against disproportionate in rem forfeitures. . Indiana notes that the Clause does not apply against the states merely because its restriction against disproportionate criminal penalties is fundamental. Instead, Indiana says that there is no precedent for applying a clause from the Bill of Rights against the states unless all of the protections in that clause have a fundamental grounding in American history and jurisprudence. Accordingly, Indiana claims that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply against the states because in rem forfeitures have been common throughout American history, and courts have not recognized a proportionality requirement for state in rem forfeitures until the end of the twentieth century.

APPLYING THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE AGAINST THE STATES THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

Timbs argues that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, which protects citizens’ fundamental rights, provides an alternative framework for applying the Excessive Fines Clause against the states. Timbs notes that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was understood at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification to apply fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution against the states. Timbs contends that freedom from excessive fines fits within the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it is enumerated in the Constitution and was regarded as fundamental long before the Constitution’s ratification.

In contrast, Indiana maintains that the Court should not consider whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause because the Court has long used the Due Process framework to decide whether certain rights and protections were incorporated against the states. Indiana notes that the analysis under the Privileges and Immunities Clause would largely be the same—namely, analyzing the historical evidence to determine whether the right at issue is fundamental and deeply rooted in the American legal system. Indiana also points out that changing the doctrinal basis of applying constitutional rights against the states would create unpredictable consequences and confuse lower courts and state and local governments. For example, Indiana emphasizes that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects “citizens of the United States”, while the Due Process Clause applies to “any person”. Indiana contends that changing the doctrinal basis of incorporation from the Due Process Clause to the Privileges and Immunities Clause would lead people to wonder which constitutional rights apply only to citizens.