Syllabus | Opinion [ Ginsburg ] | Dissent [ Scalia ] | Dissent [ Thomas ] |
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WESLEY AARON SHAFER, Jr., PETITIONER
v. SOUTH CAROLINA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
SOUTH CAROLINA
[March 20, 2001]
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
For better or, as I believe, worse, the majoritys decision in this case is the logical next step after Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). Now, whenever future dangerousness is placed at issue and the jurys potential sentencing choice is between life without parole and death, the trial court must instruct the jury on the impossibility of release even if there is an alternative sentence available to the court under which the defendant could be released. However, even accepting that sentencing courts in South Carolina must now permit the jury to learn about the impossibility of parole when life imprisonment is a sentencing possibility, I believe that the courts instructions and the arguments made by counsel in Shafers case were sufficient to inform the jury of what life imprisonment meant for Shafer. I therefore respectfully dissent.
In Simmons, a majority of this Court was concerned that the jury in Simmons trial reasonably could have believed that, if he were sentenced to life, he would be eligible for parole. See id., at 161 (plurality opinion); id., at 177178 (OConnor, J., concurring in judgment). Therefore, Simmons defense to future dangerousnessthat because he sexually assaulted only elderly women, he would pose no danger to fellow inmates, see id., at 157 (plurality opinion)would not have been effective. To correct the jurys possible misunderstanding of the availability of parole, Simmons requested several jury instructions, including one that would explain that, if he were sentenced to life imprisonment,
In this case, by contrast, the judge repeatedly explained that
Given these explanations of what life imprisonment means, which left no room for speculation by the jury, I can only infer that the jurys questions regarding parole referred not to Shafers parole eligibility in the event the jury sentenced Shafer to life, but rather to his parole eligibility in the event it did not sentence him at all. In fact, both of the jurys questions referred only to parole eligibility of someone
The majority appears to believe that it could develop jury instructions that are more precise than those offered to Shafers jury. It may well be right. But it is not this Courts role to micromanage state sentencing proceedings or to develop model jury instructions. I would decline to interfere further with matters that the Constitution leaves to the States.