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ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In its administration of the voting rights statute for the past quarter century, the Department of Justice has consistently employed a construction of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 contrary to that imposed upon the Act by the Court today. Apart from the deference such constructions are always afforded, the Departments reading points
us directly to the necessary starting point of any exercise in statutory interpretationthe plain language of the statute.
It is not impossible that language alone would lead one to think that the phrase will not have the effect, includes some temporal measure; the noun effect, and the verb tense will have could imaginably give rise to a reading that requires a comparison between what is and what will be. But there is simply nothing in the word purpose or the entire phrase does not have the purpose that would lead anyone to think that Congress had anything in mind but a present-tense, intentional effort to den[y] or abridg[e] the right to vote on account of race. See, e.g., Websters Third New International Dictionary 1847 (1966). Ergo, if a municipality intends to deny or abridge voting rights because of race, it may not obtain preclearance.
Like
Accordingly, for these reasons and for those stated at greater length by