jurisdiction

Abouammo v. United States

Issues

Can a criminal defendant be tried in a district where no criminal acts occurred but where the defendant intended the crime to have an effect?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Constitution permits prosecution in districts where only effects of criminal conduct occurred or whether criminal prosecutions must occur in locations where the defendant’s actual conduct took place. In this case, the government prosecuted Abouammo, who allegedly falsified documents in order to obstruct a federal investigation, in the Northern District of California even though the conduct he was charged for occurred in the Western District of Washington. Abouammo argues that venue is only proper where an “essential conduct element” occurred, not where the effects of that conduct occurred. The United States argues that venue is proper where the intended effects of a defendant’s conduct took place, especially in inchoate offenses where an express intent element is essential to the crime. The outcome of this case could impact traditional venue protections, forum selection, and prosecutorial discretion.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there.

Ahmad Abouammo began his role as a Media Partnerships Manager for the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) region at Twitter in 2013. Ahmad Abouammo v.

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Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County

Issues

Does a court have the power to adjudicate a case when the case is not causally connected to a defendant’s in-state conduct?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether courts have specific jurisdiction over defendants only when the case arises out of conduct that is causally connected to a defendant’s in-state conduct. The case comes before the Supreme Court after Bristol-Myers Squibb was sued in California for manufacturing a defective anticoagulant, despite having manufactured the anticoagulant in New Jersey and having only a transient connection with California. Bristol-Myers Squibb argues that the California court lacks power to adjudicate this case, because the company’s conduct in California is not causally connected to the plaintiffs’ injuries. California Superior Court, on the other hand, argues that specific jurisdiction does not require proof of causation. Much is at stake in this action: some assert that California’s victory would result in gross injustice to defendants; others claim that BMS’s victory would cause judicial resources to be squandered with duplicative litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a plaintiff ’s claims arise out of or re-late to a defendant’s forum activities when there is no causal link between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff ’s claims—that is, where the plaintiff ’s claims would be exactly the same even if the defendant had no forum contacts?

Defendant Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”) manufactures anticoagulants—drugs meant to inhibit blood clotting. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco Cty., S221038, at 2 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2016).

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Carpenter v. Murphy

Issues

Do the reservation borders of the Creek Nation Indian Tribe drawn in Oklahoma in 1866 constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)?

After was Convicted of a murder that occurred on disputed tribal land, Patrick Murphy asks the Supreme Court to determine if the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation tribal land are still in effect today. If the boundaries are in effect, Murphy asserts that his murder conviction must be overturned because it was committed within the Creek Nation boundaries, meaning the Oklahoma state court that convicted him did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.  Oklahoma State Penitentiary Interim Warden Mark Carpenter counters that the Creek Nation reservation has been disestablished and is no longer in effect, arguing that Oklahoma state courts indeed had jurisdiction to prosecute Murphy for the murder. Carpenter contends that giving effect to the territorial boundaries would create taxation and regulatory problems, while Murphy counters that acknowledging the tribal land boundaries would lead to mutually profitable tax agreements and other community benefits such as increased job opportunities and more effective law enforcement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).

Respondent Patrick Dwayne Murphy is a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Indian tribe. Carpenter v. Murphy (“Carpenter”) at 7. In August 1999, Murphy murdered an acquaintance on disputed tribal land. Id. He was arrested and tried in Oklahoma state’s trial court.

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Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation

Issues

Must a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules or federal common law to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a federal court should apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules or federal common law in cases brought against a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Petitioner David Cassirer contends that the forum state's choice-of-law rules should apply, arguing that Congress intends state law to apply so that results in cases against a foreign national and against a foreign state are the same. Thus, Cassirer argues that, in this case, California substantive law should apply. In response, Respondent Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (“TBCF”) contends that federal common law should apply because jurisdiction under FSIA is more analogous to federal question jurisdiction rather than diversity jurisdiction. In this case, TBCF argues that Spanish law should govern. This case has important policy implications for foreign relations, international justice, and the separation of powers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act must apply the forum state’s choice of law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.

In Nazi Germany, in 1939, Lilly Neubauer—David Cassirer’s great-grandmother—was forced to “sell” a Pissarro painting to a Berlin art dealer. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation  at 6. The Nazi government demanded that Lilly sell the painting under threat of imprisoning her in Germany. Id. Both parties and the district court have concluded that the painting was forcibly taken from Lilly.

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch

Issues

Does a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation hearing on an IRS proposed tax levy become moot if disputes about the underlying levy no longer exist?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a proceeding about an IRS proposed levy to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a dispute regarding the proposed levy. Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no longer a live dispute and the petitioner lacked any cognizable interest in the case. Zuch argues that the Tax Court retained jurisdiction because the parties continued to have an interest in the case since the Tax Court could determine petitioner’s right to a refund. The outcome of this case affects the scope of Tax Court proceedings under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 and impacts taxpayers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

In 1993, Jennifer Zuch married Patrick Gennardo. Zuch v.

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Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton

Issues

Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) create any time limit to dismiss a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) may impose a time limit on motions to set aside a default judgment that is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Petitioner Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. (“Coney Island”) contends that Rule 60(c)(1) was intended to govern only voidable judgments, not those that were void from the beginning of the judgment, or ab initio. Coney Island argues that enforcing a judgment void from the outset from lack of personal jurisdiction necessarily violates the fundamental principles of due process, as no court lacking jurisdiction ever has lawful authority to adjudicate a defendant’s rights. Respondent, Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, Jeanne Ann Burton (“Burton”), maintains that the drafters of Rule 60(c)(1) intended the rule to apply to all void judgments regardless of whether they were void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Burton argues that even if the rule is enforced, defendants still have avenues to raise the fact that their original judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction through other procedural means if the judgment is referenced later on. Additionally, Burton argues that the reasonable-time restriction in Rule 60(b)(4) correctly balances the public policy goals. Burton states that the Rule encourages finality in judgments to prevent excess litigation while also allowing for defendants to bring motions, within reasonable limits, when they believe their rights are being violated by the enforcement of a judgment lacking personal jurisdiction. The outcome of this case has implications for the behavior of parties in a suit and the fairness of notice requirements.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4) permits substantive relief from a judgment that is void, including when a court rules it lacked personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont for his guidance and insights into this case. 

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Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

Issues

Can a federal district court use its equitable powers to set aside the thirty-day time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for defendants removing a case to federal court?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a federal district court can set aside the thirty-day time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for removing a case from state court to federal court. Enbridge Energy, LP, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (“Enbridge”) contend that the law is non-jurisdictional, and therefore, courts may set the time limit aside. Additionally, Enbridge argues that when the statute was enacted, Congress did not rebut the general presumption in favor of equitable tolling. The Attorney General of Michigan (“the Attorney General”) asserts that the time limit is mandatory. The Attorney General further argues that Congress did rebut the presumption of equitable tolling through the law’s text, the broader statutory scheme, and legislative history. This case directly impacts fairness to litigants across the United States as well as institutional stability in foreign affairs.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

Enbridge Energy, LP, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (“Enbridge”) collectively are an energy company responsible for transporting petroleum to oil refineries throughout the United States and Canada. Nessel v.

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Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison

Issues

Does Article III of the Constitution permit bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in “core” proceedings as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)? If not, can bankruptcy courts exercise jurisdiction over litigants through their “implied consent”?

In 2011, the Supreme Court held in Stern v. Marshall that bankruptcy courts are constitutionally barred from granting final judgments on certain “core” state law claims. Since then, lower courts have tried to determine the scope of the holding, which addresses bankruptcy courts’ ability, as non-Article III courts, to preside over issues traditionally considered to be core bankruptcy issues. Petitioner, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, (“EBIA”) was a third party to a bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor in the proceeding had fraudulently transferred $373,291.28 to EBIA before filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee, Arkison, sued EBIA to recover those funds, and the bankruptcy court granted a judgment against EBIA. EBIA appealed and invoked Stern v. Marshall, claiming that the bankruptcy court could not enter a final judgment on a fraudulent transfer claim. The district court and Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court, reasoning that EBIA had impliedly consented to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will clarify the limits of Stern v. Marshall and define “core” bankruptcy proceeding. The Court will also determine what kind of consent is necessary for bankruptcy courts to have jurisdiction over claims requiring adjudication by Article III judges. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), this Court held that Article III of the United States Constitution precludes Congress from assigning certain “core” bankruptcy proceedings involving private state law rights to adjudication by non-Article III bankruptcy judges. Applying Stern, the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a fraudulent conveyance action is subject to Article III. The court further held, in conflict with the Sixth Circuit, that the Article III problem had been waived by petitioner’s litigation conduct, which the court of appeals construed as implied consent to entry of final judgment by the bankruptcy court. The court of appeals also held, in conflict with the Seventh Circuit, that a bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject to a district court’s de novo review, in “core” bankruptcy proceedings where Article III precludes the bankruptcy court from entering final judgment. The court of appeals’ decision presents the following questions, about which there is considerable confusion in the lower courts in the wake of Stern: 

  1. Whether Article III permits the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant consent, and, if so, whether “implied consent” based on a litigant’s conduct, where the statutory scheme provides the litigant no notice that its consent is required, is sufficient to satisfy Article III.
  2. Whether a bankruptcy judge may submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a district court in a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 157(b). 

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Facts

Nicholas Paleveda and Marjorie Ewing, a married couple, operated a series of companies, including Aegis Retirement Income Services, Inc. (“ARIS”) and the Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (“BIA”). See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (“EBIA”), 702 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir.

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Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.

 
In 1980, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and the Exxon (now Exxon Mobil Corp.) subsidiaries, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc (ECAI) and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company (Yanbu) created two joint venture entities: Yanpet and Kemya. SABIC entered into sublicensing agreements with the two entities under which both were to pay royalties for use of an exclusive gas-phase process to manufacture polyethylene. Nearly twenty years later, Exxon Mobil, Yanbu, and ECAI claimed that SABIC actually charged Yanpet and Kemya more than the amount of royalties actually agreed upon.
 
In 2000, SABIC sued Yanbu and ECAI in the Delaware Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the joint venture agreements had not been violated and that the royalty charges were correct. Exxon Mobil, Yanbu, and ECAI countersued in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking the converse declaratory judgment. In 2003, the Delaware Superior Court returned a verdict against SABIC. SABIC has appealed the verdict, which is currently pending. Prior to the state court trial, SABIC moved to dismiss Exxon Mobil's federal court action claiming foreign sovereign immunity. The motion was denied and SABIC then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The federal appeals court did not address the sovereign immunity issue but vacated the District Court's orders with instructions for dismissal, finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of Exxon and its subsidiaries because such was previously decided in the state court case. The Supreme Court faces the issue of whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from conducting de facto appellate review of decisions by state courts, may be interpreted to incorporate preclusion principles and deny jurisdiction to federal courts because a pending state-court proceeding presents identical issues, notwithstanding the long-established system of dual federal and state jurisdiction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from conducting de facto appellate review of decisions by state courts, may be expansively interpreted to incorporate preclusion principles and divest federal courts of jurisdiction solely because a pending state-court proceeding presents identical issues, notwithstanding the long-established system of dual federal and state jurisdiction.
In 1980, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and the Exxon (now Exxon Mobil Corp.) subsidiaries, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc (ECAI) and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company (Yanbu) created two joint venture entities: Yanpet and Kemya. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 103 (3d. Cir. 2004). Yanpet was the joint venture between SABIC and Yanbu, and Kemya was the joint venture between SABIC and ECAI. Id. Both of these entities are limited liability partnerships engaged in the manufacturing of polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v.
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