Procedure

Beckles v. United States

Issues

Does the Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), apply retroactively to the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines?

The Supreme Court will decide whether the holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), makes the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines void for vagueness and, if so, whether this new rule gives relief to Petitioner Travis Beckles by retroactively applying to collateral cases challenging federal sentences under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Beckles argues that § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is void for vagueness under Johnson because the residual clauses in both cases are identical, and the Court held that the clause in Johnson was void for vagueness. Beckles also asserts that this new rule applies retroactively under the Court’s test in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Respondent the United States argues, however, that Beckles’s new rule would not apply retroactively because it is a procedural rather than a substantive rule, and thus the Court should reject his request at this threshold. The United States further argues that if the Court does reach the merits, § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness with respect to those applications expressly specified in the commentary to § 4B1.2(a)(2) because this commentary clarifies the otherwise vague guideline. This case will address whether retroactive resentencing for “career offenders” will burden the federal system and will clarify the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines in terms of due process concerns.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), deemed unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining "violent felony"). The residual clause invalidated in Johnson is identical to the residual clause in the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining "crime of violence").

The questions presented are:

  1. Whether Johnson applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)?
  2. Whether Johnson's constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2), thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review?
  3. Whether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a "crime of violence" only in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a "crime of violence" after Johnson?

In 2007, police arrested Travis Beckles after recovering a sawed-off shotgun in his residence. See United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 837–38 (11th Cir. 2009). At trial, the jury found Beckles guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

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CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited v. Antrix Corp. Ltd.

Issues

When seeking to enforce an international arbitration award in U.S. court, must parties show a sufficient connection with the United States?

This case asks whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Antrix, which is an Indian state-owned corporation, repudiated its contract with Devas, which is a private Indian corporation. Devas argues that federal courts in the United States can exercise personal jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award Devas had won. Antrix counters that because their dispute lacks minimum contact with the United States, federal courts in the United States lack personal jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award. The outcome of this case has significant implications for international relations and post-judgment asset discovery. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Petitioner Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. (“Devas”) is a private Indian corporation. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. at 3. Respondent Antrix Corp. Ltd. (“Antrix”) is a corporation owned by the Government of India.

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Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski

Issues

Is a district court deprived of jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal when a non-frivolous appeal is filed in response to a denial of a motion to compel arbitration?  

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration automatically strips the district court of its jurisdiction to continue the litigation on the merits of the case pending the results of the appeal. The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have all held that district courts are deprived of jurisdiction in this situation, while the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held the opposite. Coinbase, Inc. argues that the “Divestiture Rule” applies here—the district court is divested of jurisdiction pending an appeal of a motion to compel arbitration. Abraham Bielski counters that the traditional discretionary test applies, which grants the district court the discretion to grant or deny a stay of the proceedings until the appeal is resolved. This case touches on important questions regarding judicial economy, economic efficiency, and the treatment of arbitration agreements in relation to other contracts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration ousts a district court’s jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal.

Coinbase, Inc. (“Coinbase”) is a cryptocurrency exchange platform, which stores cryptocurrency for account holders in digital wallets. Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc. at 1. Abraham Bielski (“Bielski”) created an account with Coinbase and set up a digital wallet on the platform in 2021. Id. at 2.

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Comcast Corp. v. Behrend

Respondent Caroline Behrend et al., cable television subscribers, brought an antitrust class action against Petitioner Comcast Corporation alleging anticompetitive activity. In order to be certified as a class, Respondents had to present evidence that they suffered damages on a class-wide basis. The evidence they submitted consisted of a damages model prepared by their expert witness. Comcast challenges the District Court’s reliance upon that evidence, claiming that it is inadmissible under standards set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). In this case, the Supreme Court will address whether evidence presented in support of class certification must be admissible under those standards. The decision will likely significantly impact the ability of plaintiffs to certify as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and it may also affect underlying commercial conduct, such as the future use of territory-swapping and clustering agreements. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a district court certify a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence to show that they may be awarded damages on a class-wide basis?

Issue

May a district court certify a class action without resolving “merits arguments” that bear on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s prerequisites for certification, including whether purportedly common issues predominate over individual ones under Rule 23(b)(3)?

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Currier v. Virginia

Issues

Whether a criminal defendant with multiple charges on the same set of facts may be found guilty of a second charge when the second charge is severed from the first and the defendant is acquitted on the first charge?

Petitioner Michael Currier was charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Currier and the prosecution agreed to sever the charges. At the first trial, a jury acquitted Currier of burglary and grand larceny. At the second trial, in which the prosecution introduced many of the same facts, the jury convicted Currier of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Michael Currier argues that issue preclusion bars the state from re-litigating an issue upon which the jury acquitted him in the first trial. Virginia contends that the defendant waived his right to issue preclusion when he consented to severing the criminal charges into successive trials. The Court’s determination on the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause will have significant consequences for defendants charged with counts requiring evidence of prior criminal records and, more broadly, for national criminal procedure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant who consents to severance of multiple charges into sequential trials loses his right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal.

In March 2012, a large gun safe, containing cash, personal papers, and twenty firearms, was stolen from a home in Virginia. Currier v. Commonwealth at 1. A neighbor reported hearing loud noises coming from inside the home, and seeing an old, white pickup truck with an orange strip and at least two individuals inside leaving the driveway. Id. at 2. The neighbor identified one of these individuals as the Petitioner, Michael Currier.

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Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk

Issues

Does a purported collective action become moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff in the case receives a complete offer of judgment from the defendants and all other potential plaintiffs have not yet joined the case?

 

In a putative collective action, Laura Symczyk alleged that Genesis HealthCare Corporation violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by automatically deducting break time from her and other employees’ pay, regardless of whether they performed compensable work during their breaks. Before any other plaintiffs joined the action, Genesis made an offer of judgment for full relief of Symczyk’s claims. Symczyk did not accept the offer, but the district court dismissed the case because the offer of judgment left Symczyk without a personal stake in the litigation. Symczyk argues that she continues to have a personal stake and that the interests of plaintiffs yet to join the action creates jurisdiction. Genesis argues that a complete offer to satisfy a lone plaintiff’s claim renders the case moot. In resolving the question presented, the Supreme Court will decide whether an unaccepted offer of judgment can render a case moot and whether courts may consider the interests of unnamed, hypothetical parties in determining whether the parties have a personal stake in the litigation. The decision will affect collective-action trial practices for both plaintiffs and defendants, including plaintiffs’ use of the discovery process to join class members and defendants’ use of individual offers of judgment to forestall or avoid collective actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff’s claims.

Between April and December 2007, Laura Symczyk worked as a Registered Nurse at a healthcare facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. See Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 190 (3d Cir.

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Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services Of Chicago

Issues

Is Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) jurisdictional in nature or is it instead a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule?

The issue in this case involves whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is a jurisdictional rule or a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule. Hamer argues that the Rule is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule because it has no statutory basis, while Neighborhood Housing Services argues that the Rule is a jurisdictional rule because it prescribes the types of cases over which a court has adjudicatory authority and has a statutory basis. The case is significant from a legal perspective because it will determine whether a violation of Rule 4(a)(5)(C) strips a court of appeals of its jurisdiction to hear a case on the merits, or whether the court may still consider the case on the merits based on equitable considerations or if a party waived or forfeited its right to seek dismissal under the Rule. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because its outcome will affect the judicial system’s interest in finality and because a decision affirming the Seventh Circuit would caution against relying on the legal accuracy of orders from district court judges regarding appeals. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) can deprive a court of appeals of jurisdiction over an appeal that is statutorily timely, or whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is instead a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule because it is not derived from a statute, and therefore subject to forfeiture or waiver by an appellee, or subject to equitable considerations such as the unique-circumstances doctrine.

Petitioner Charmaine Hamer (“Hamer”) worked as an Intake Specialist for the Respondents, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae’s Mortgage Help Center (“Housing Services”), for several years. Brief for Respondents, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae at 3. Hamer applied for promotions during her time there but never received any.

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Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis

Issues

May a federal court certify a class action that includes members who lack Article III standing? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow courts to certify a class in a class action where some members lack Article III standing. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require commonality of questions and predominance of similar injuries to allow certification, and lower courts certified Davis and other blind plaintiffs as a class of all legally blind individuals unable to use Labcorp self-check-in kiosks due to their disability. Labcorp contends that was error because the class contains some members who never experienced any harm from Labcorp and therefore lack Article III standing. Davis counters that all class members within the certified class suffered an injury; but, even if they did not, Article III does not require an injury for all unnamed class members at the class-certification stage. The outcome of this case has implications for settlement frequency and cost and the accuracy of certified classes. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury.

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a mechanism for class action lawsuits allowing plaintiffs to file a lawsuit on behalf of a larger group, who can also benefit from any judgment.

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Peña Rodriguez v. Colorado

Issues

Does a rule that prohibits using evidence of a juror’s racial bias violate the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury?

After being convicted of unlawful sexual contact and harassment, Miguel Angel Peña Rodriguez obtained juror affidavits stating that, during jury deliberations, one juror made several racially-charged comments that evidenced a personal bias against Hispanics. The court denied Peña Rodriguez’s motion for a new trial and held that the affidavits were inadmissible under Colorado’s “no impeachment” rule, Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b). Peña Rodriguez claims that allowing the no-impeachment rule to ban evidence of racial bias violates his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The State of Colorado contends that Rule 606(b) is constitutional because other procedures adequately protect Peña Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. This case allows the Supreme Court to reexamine the reach of Tanner v. United States and Warger v. Shauers, and could have significant consequences on monitoring the effects of racial bias throughout the trial process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a no-impeachment rule constitutionally bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury?

Miguel Angel Peña Rodriguez worked as a horse keeper at a horse-racing track. See Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 2015 CO 31, ¶3 (2015); Brief for Respondent, State of Colorado at 4.

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Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association (13-1041); Nickols v. Mortgage Bankers Association

Issues

Is a federal agency required to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking before it can alter an interpretive rule that articulates an interpretation of the agency’s regulation?

The Supreme Court will consider whether a significant change in an interpretive rule issued by the Department of Labor (“Department”) requires the Department to undergo the notice-and-comment process. The Department, Secretary of Labor Perez, and Nickols argue that the APA explicitly exempts interpretative rules from the notice-and-comment process. However, the Mortgage Bankers Association (“MBA”) argues that when an agency issues new interpretation that substantially changes a prior definitive interpretation and has the force of law, the agency has in fact engaged in substantive or legislative rulemaking and must undergo the notice-and-comment. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case may affect the extent to which agencies are held accountable for significant changes in their policy interpretations and the agencies’ power to amend rules that are ineffective or reflect an outdated view of the agency. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., generally provides that “notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,” 5 U.S.C. 553(b), and, if such notice is required, the rulemaking agency must give interested persons an opportunity to submit written comments, 5 U.S.C. 553(c). The APA further provides that its notice-and comment requirement “does not apply * * * to interpretative rules,” unless notice is otherwise required by statute. 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (A). No other statute requires notice in this case. The question presented is:

Whether a federal agency must engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking before it can significantly alter an interpretive rule that articulates an interpretation of an agency regulation.

Nickols v. Mortgage Banker Assn.

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, “established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). Section 553 of the Act sets forth notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, but exempts “interpretative rules,” among others, from the notice-and-comment requirement. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). The D.C. Circuit, in a line of cases descending from Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), has created a per se rule holding that although an agency may issue an initial interpretative rule without going through notice and comment, “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment rulemaking.” Id. at 586. In this case, the D.C. Circuit invoked the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine-which is contrary to the plain text of the Act, numerous decisions of this Court, and the opinions of the majority of circuit courts-to invalidate a Department of Labor interpretation concluding that mortgage loan officers do not qualify for the administrative exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The question presented is: 

Whether agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure Act are categorically prohibited from revising their interpretative rules unless such revisions are made through notice-and- comment rulemaking.

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Congress established federal overtime guarantees for employees who work more than forty hours per week. See Mortgage Bankers Association v. Harris (“Harris”), 720 F.3d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2013). At the same time, the FLSA exempts certain employees from its overtime requirements, including those “employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity[,] . . .

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Cynthia Farina of Cornell Law School for her helpful insight into the issues of this case.

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