Women and Justice: Keywords

Sections 113-118 of the Employment (Amendment) Act pertain to the rights of women to maternity leave from their employers. The amendment compels employers to pay employees on maternity leave not less than 50% of their salary, establishes the right to maternity allowance unaffected by notice of termination of contract of employment, and prohibits serving notice of termination of contract of employment during maternity leave. It establishes in Section 117 that female employees are entitled to only one maternity allowance per woman. Section 118 mandates that an employer permit a female employee for a half hour twice a day to “suckle her child or otherwise feed him herself” for “six months immediately after her return to work.”

Pregnant employees are prohibited from working during the eight-week period prior to giving birth and the eight-week period after giving birth. During this period, the mother is entitled to receive maternity pay, which is calculated as the employee’s average earnings during the three calendar months prior to the prohibition of work. After the prohibition period, women may take an additional period of parental leave (Karenz) until the child reaches the age of two. During this period, a mother (or father, if he has taken paternity leave, although both parents may not take leave concurrently) will not receive remuneration through her (or his) employer, although the parent taking leave may receive a child allowance through social insurance during this time. Pregnant employees and parents on parental leave may not be terminated from employment during that time and for a period of four weeks after returning to work. The Act also provides regulations for permissible types of work for pregnant women, women who are breastfeeding, and women who have recently given birth (i.e., prohibition of certain physical work and manual labor, handling of chemicals, work where the woman must sit or stand for long periods with no break, etc.) and regulations regarding the times pregnant and breastfeeding employees may work (i.e., must not work between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m., nor Sundays or public holidays).

Schwangeren Angestellten ist das Arbeiten während eines Acht-Wochen-Zeitraums vor der Kindesgeburt und nach der Kindesgeburt untersagt. Während des Zeitraums hat die Mutter einen Anspruch auf das sog. Wochengeld. Die Höhe dessen richtet sich nach dem Durchschnittsgehalt der Angestellten innerhalb der letzten drei Kalendermonate, bevor der Arbeitsuntersagung. Nach dem Zeitraum, in dem die Mutter nicht arbeiten darf, kann sie optional noch weitere Elternzeit, sog. Karenz, in Anspruch nehmen, bis das Kind ein Alter von zwei Jahren erreicht. In der Karenzzeit können Mutter oder Vater, je nachdem wer die Karenz in Anspruch genommen hat (niemals beide gleichzeitig), keine Vergütung von ihrem Arbeitnehmer verlangen, sie erhalten allerdings einen Kindesunterhalt von der Sozialversicherung. Schwangere Angestellte und Eltern in Elternzeit können während dieser Zeit und bis zu vier Wochen nach ihrer Rückkehr nicht gekündigt werden. Das MuSchG enthält darüber hinaus auch Regeln bezüglich der Arbeit, die schwangeren, stillenden und Frauen, die kürzlich gebärt haben, gestattet ist – insbesondere verboten: körperlich besonders anstrengende Arbeit, der Umgang mit Chemikalien, Arbeit, bei der die Frau ohne Pause lange sitzen oder stehen muss, etc. Außerdem enthält das MuSchG Regeln zur Arbeitszeit, die schwangeren und stillenden Angestellten gestattet ist – nicht zwischen 20 Uhr und 6 Uhr; nicht an Sonntagen und staatlichen Feiertagen.

This legislative decree protects maternity and paternity, and prohibits discrimination on the basis of either. It regulates parental leave, leave for the illness of a child, rest, and the treatment of pregnant workers to protect their health. (Note: PDF is the consolidated text only. Follow the external link for the entire text of the decree.)

Il presente decreto legislativo tutela la maternità e la paternità e proibisce le discriminazioni basate su di esse. Il decreto disciplina i congedi parentali, i congedi per la malattia dei figli, i riposi e la tutela delle lavoratrici incinta. (Nota: il PDF è il solo testo consolidato. Seguire il link esterno per l’intero testo del decreto).

Chapter 1 of Cuba’s Labor Code sets forth the basic principles of the Labor Code, with specific reference to providing women with positions that are compatible with their physical and physiological characteristics and allowing women to incorporate themselves in the workforce, and entitlements to maternity leave for women, before and after childbirth, including medical services, free of cost, required by maternity. Additionally, Chapter 8 of the Labor Code is devoted to promoting policies conducive to women’s labor, including requirements that (1) the workplace create and maintain labor and sanitary conditions that are adequate for the participation of women in the labor process (Section 2); (2) labor conditions are consistent with the physical and physiological characteristics of women, taking into account, inter alia, women’s elevated functions as mothers (Section 4); and (3) single mothers be provided with stipends to help them care for their children until they return to work (Section 4).

El Capítulo 1 del Código de Trabajo de Cuba establece los principios básicos del Código de Trabajo y hace referencia específica los temas: brindar a las mujeres puestos que sean compatibles con sus características físicas y fisiológicas, permitir que las mujeres se incorporen a la fuerza laboral, y el derecho a la licencia de maternidad para las mujeres antes y después del parto, incluidos los servicios médicos, gratuitos, exigidos por la maternidad. Además, el Capítulo 8 del Código Laboral está dedicado a promover políticas que favorezcan el trabajo de la mujer, incluyendo requisitos que (1) el lugar de trabajo cree y mantenga condiciones laborales y sanitarias adecuadas para la participación de la mujer en el proceso laboral (Artículo 2); (2) las condiciones laborales sean compatibles con las características físicas y fisiológicas de la mujer, teniendo en cuenta, entre otras cosas, las funciones elevadas de la mujer como madre (Sección 4); y (3) las madres solteras recibirán estipendios para ayudarlas a cuidar a sus hijos hasta que regresen al trabajo (Sección 4).

Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution provides that all international treaties ratified by Ethiopia are integral parts of the law of the land. Similarly, Article 13.2 provides that fundamental rights and freedoms shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has ratified many of these treaties including ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW. Article 35 of the FDRE Constitution pertains to the Rights of Women. The article provides for equal rights under the constitution, equal rights with men in marriage, entitlement to affirmative measures, protection from harmful traditional practices, the right to maternity pay, the right to consultation, property rights (including acquiring and controlling and transferring property), employment rights, and access to family planning education. It is worth noting that this article explicitly imposes an obligation and accountability on the state to protect women from violence at Article 35.4: “The State shall enforce the right of women to eliminate the influences of harmful customs. Laws, customs and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women are prohibited.”

The Court of Appeal of Turin upheld the lower court’s judgment deeming a clause of a collective agreement negotiated at the enterprise level to be discriminatory because it infringed on Articles 3 and 37 of the Constitution, Article 25, para 2bis, of Decree No. 198/2006 and Article 3 of Decree No. 151/2001. Under the relevant clause the “real presence at work” was as an eligibility criterion to receive an additional remuneration, it being understood that any family-related leave, including any compulsory maternity leave, parental leave, and/or leave for illness, could affect the employees’ level of performance in that respect. The Court maintained that even though the criterion was formally neutral, it resulted in an indirect pay discrimination since female workers usually take more family-related leave than male workers. Moreover, during the trial, the company failed to provide a permissible justification regarding the requirement of “real presence at work.” Therefore, the employer was ordered to (1) cease the discrimination by computing leave as actual time worked for the purposes of achieving the real presence requirement and becoming eligible for the additional remuneration, (2) to pay the additional remuneration incentive to the plaintiffs, and (3) to enhance a plan to remove the discrimination by avoiding the inclusion of the above criterion in any future collective bargaining at the enterprise level. The latter was promoted by the intervention of the Regional Equality Adviser as a case of collective discrimination.

La Corte d’Appello di Torino ha confermato la sentenza del Tribunale di primo grado che considerava discriminatoria una clausola di un contratto collettivo negoziato a livello di impresa in quanto contraria agli articoli 3 e 37 della Costituzione, all’articolo 25, paragrafo 2 bis, del decreto n. 198/2006 e all’articolo 3 del decreto n. 151/2001. Ai sensi della clausola rilevane, l’“effettiva presenza in servizio” era un criterio di ammissibilità per ricevere una retribuzione aggiuntiva, fermo restando che qualsiasi congedo per motivi familiari, compresi i congedi di maternità obbligatori e i congedi parentali e/o congedi per malattia, avrebbero potuto influire sul livello di prestazioni dei dipendenti a tale riguardo. La Corte ha sostenuto che, pur essendo la clausola formalmente neutrale, il criterio comportava una discriminazione retributiva indiretta, in quanto le lavoratrici prendono generalmente un numero di congedi familiari superiore a quello dei lavoratori di sesso maschile. Inoltre, durante il processo, l’azienda non aveva fornito una giustificazione ammissibile per quanto riguarda il requisito dell’“effettiva presenza in servizio”. Pertanto, al datore di lavoro è stato ordinato di (1) cessare la discriminazione calcolando il congedo come tempo effettivo di lavoro ai fini del raggiungimento del requisito di presenza effettiva in servizio e quindi di poter essere ammessi al percepimento della remunerazione aggiuntiva, (2) versare l’incentivo retributivo supplementare ai ricorrenti, e (3) implementare un piano per rimuovere le discriminazioni evitando l’inclusione della clausola di cui sopra in qualsiasi futura contrattazione collettiva a livello di impresa. Quest’ultimo obiettivo è stato promosso dall’intervento del Consigliere regionale di Parità al fine di far cassare un caso di discriminazione collettiva.

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) reviewed the constitutionality of the 1998 Amendment 20 of the Federal Social Security Law. The amendment imposed a maximum value on the amount of social security benefits that could be paid to a beneficiary under the general social security system at R$1,200 per month. On its face, the R$1,200 maximum applied equally to a number of eligible benefit categories, including maternity or pregnancy-related leave. The amendment was challenged on the grounds that, when read together with Article 7, Section XVIII, of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the amendment had a discriminatory effect on women. This provision essentially guarantees that an employee is paid her full salary during maternity leave. By imposing a cap on social security coverage during maternity leave, Amendment 20 would require the employer to cover the difference between the R$1,200 cap and the employee’s full pay. The party challenging the amendment argued that this created a negative incentive to employers who would discriminate in hiring women or in setting women’s salary by paying women less in order to stay under the R$1,200 cap. The Court agreed that Amendment 20 was discriminatory in its effect. In a unanimous decision, the STF held that the effect of Amendment 20 conflicted with the Brazilian Constitution’s equal protection provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court therefore ordered that Amendment 20 be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Article 7 of the Constitution such that implementation of the social security cap does not extend to maternity and pregnancy-related leave.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, ao analisar a constitucionalidade da Emenda Constitucional n. 20/1998 que modificou as regras da previdência social brasileira. Referida Emenda Constitucional estabeleceu um limite máximo para os benefícios da previdência social em R$ 1.200,00 por mês. Nesse sentido, o teto de R$ 1.200,00 se aplicava igualmente a várias categorias de benefícios elegíveis, incluindo licença maternidade ou relacionadas à gravidez. A emenda foi contestada com base no fato de que, lida em conjunto com o artigo 7, inciso XVIII, da Constituição Brasileira de 1988, a emenda teve um efeito discriminatório sobre as mulheres. Esta disposição garante essencialmente que uma funcionária receba seu salário integral durante a licença-maternidade. Ao impor um teto à cobertura da seguridade social durante a licença-maternidade, a Emenda 20/98 exigiria que o empregador cobrisse a diferença entre o teto de R$ 1.200 e o salário integral da empregada. A parte que contesta a emenda argumentou que isto criou um incentivo negativo para empregadores que discriminariam na contratação de mulheres ou na fixação do salário das mulheres, pagando às mulheres menos para permanecerem abaixo do teto de R$ 1.200. O Tribunal concordou que a Emenda 20/98 era discriminatória em seu efeito. Em uma decisão unânime, o STF considerou que o efeito da Emenda 20/98 conflitava com as disposições de proteção igualitária da Constituição brasileira, que proíbe a discriminação com base no gênero. Portanto, o STF determinou que a Emenda 20/98 fosse interpretada de forma coerente com o artigo 7 da Constituição, de modo que a imposição do teto da previdência social não se estendesse à licença maternidade e à licença relacionada à gravidez.