Women and Justice: Keywords

The law includes a set of preventative measures aimed at preventing domestic violence among others crimes and administrative offenses. Art. 1 defines domestic violence as the intentional actions of a physical, psychological, or sexual nature against a family member that violate his or her rights, freedoms, or legitimate interests causing physical and/or mental suffering. Art. 1 further defines family members to include relatives, dependents and other persons that live together in a common household. Art. 5 defines the “actors of prevention,” which include various State agencies and Non-Governmental Agencies. The “actors of prevention” must annually develop and approve comprehensive regional programs for crime prevention, including programs to prevent domestic violence in accordance with Art. 11. Art. 17 provides the basic preventative measures against domestic violence, including identification and elimination of causes of domestic violence, educational and informational work to prevent domestic violence, record-keeping of domestic violence instances, provision of temporary shelters to victims of domestic violence, among others. Finally, Art. 31 allows the issuance of a protective order against a person who has committed domestic violence. A protective order can compel the offender temporarily to leave the premises jointly occupied with the victim and prohibit disposition of joint property.

The law decrees that a judge shall determine, for a defined period of time, the inclusion of the woman in a situation of domestic and family violence in the registry of assistance programs of the federal, state and municipal government. (Article 9). Article 10-A sets guidelines on how the victim's assistance will be handled by the police authority and guarantees specialized police and forensic care to be provided by previously trained officers - preferably female. If there is a current or imminent risk to the life or physical integrity of a woman in a situation of domestic or family violence, or to her dependents, the aggressor must be immediately removed from the home, residence, or place where the victim lives with him/her (Article 12-C). The law prohibits the imposition of pecuniary sentences against the aggressor. (Article 17).

O juiz determinará, por prazo certo, a inclusão da mulher em situação de violência doméstica e familiar no cadastro de programas assistenciais do governo federal, estadual e municipal (Artigo 9º). O artigo 10-A estabelece os procedimentos que deverão ser seguidos pela autoridade policial quando do atendimento das mulheres vítimas de violência doméstica, dentre os quais a garantia de polícia e perícia especializada e treinad e atendimento realizado preferencialmente por mulheres. Na existência de risco atual ou iminente à vida ou à integridade física da mulher em situação de violência doméstica e familiar, ou de seus dependentes, o agressor será imediatamente afastado do lar, domicílio ou local de convivência com a ofendida (artigo 12-C). A LMP ainda proíbe a imposição exclusiva de pena pecuniária contra o agressor (artigo 17).

The purpose of this law is to prevent and suppress domestic violence and to remove circumstances that encourage and stimulate repeated violence in the family. The law contains provisions regarding protective measures against family violence (e.g., by the use of protection orders), and sanctions for perpetrators of violent actions. Protective measures may be issued at the request of a victim or their attorney, police, prosecutors, the centre for social work, government, non-governmental organizations, or ex officio. Protective measures are issued by the court, depending on the residence or domicile of the victims of domestic violence. They are: (1) removal from the apartment, house or other dwelling and prohibition from returning to that apartment, house or dwelling; (2) a restraining order; (3) the protection of the victim of domestic violence; (4) prohibition from harassment and stalking; (5) mandatory psycho-social treatment; or (6) mandatory rehabilitation. Non-compliance with a protective measure is sanctioned by a fine of KM 2,000 to KM 10,000. There is also a penalty for an official person who fails to report to the police an act of domestic violence, which is a pecuniary fine in the amount of KM 1,000 to 5,000 or a prison term of no less than 50 days. English translation available in addition to original Bosnian through RefWorld External URL.

The Family Violence Protection Act aims to maximise safety for children and adults who have experienced family violence, and to prevent and reduce family violence to the greatest extent possible. It also aims to promote accountability for those who perpetrate family violence. The Act provides for police protection before court, family violence intervention orders (and their enforcement), and counselling orders.

Article 10 both prohibits domestic violence and states that “everyone has the right to protection form domestic violence in accordance with the law.” The definition of family members is wider than under the Criminal Code as it includes former spouses and “persons who have been or still are in a mutual emotional or sexual relation…although they have never lived in the same family household.” The Family Law Act also included new protection measures for those victims of domestic violence including the right to file a civil lawsuit for restraining orders and eviction powers. Family members, the public prosecution service, and social workers are also empowered by the Family Law Act to file for protective orders on behalf of the victims. Greater protections include the right to evict perpetrators from the family home and restraining orders. (External link redirects to automatic download. Unofficial English version available here.)

The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act of 2004 was enacted to protect victims of crime and specifically domestic violence. It amends non-molestation orders under Family Law Act 1996 to provide a criminal sanction for non-compliance, with a maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment and fines. See Section 1. It amends the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to allow restraining orders to be imposed upon even acquitted defendants, if the court “considers it necessary to do so to protect a person from harassment by the defendant.”

The Domestic Violence Act sets forth the procedures for granting protection orders in situations involving domestic violence. Under Part III of the Act, once a protection order has been granted, a police officer can, without a warrant, enter any premises “if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that a protection order is being violated.” Section 42 of Part IV of the Act provides that, once a police officer has intervened in a case of domestic violence, “the police officer shall as soon as possible take all reasonable measures within his power to prevent the victim of domestic violence from being abused again.”

The Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance superseded the earlier Domestic Violence Ordinance. It extends protections beyond married couples to both opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants. One type of relief it offers is an injunction from the District Court or the Court of First Instance, which restrains the offender from using violence against the applicant or excludes the offender from the shared home or from other specified area.

The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (the “DVPA”) was established in order to prevent acts of domestic violence and to protect the interests of victims. The DVPA defines domestic violence offenses and the family members who might be implicated, specifies the responsibilities and tasks of the various competent authorities, and governs issues such as civil protection orders, criminal procedure, the interests of any minors involved, protection of and support for victims, and educational and prevention measures. Breaches of the DVPA will result in the imposition of a fine or imprisonment.

家庭暴力防治法（即「DVPA」）的制定是為了防範家庭暴力行為並保護被害者的利益。家庭暴力防治法定義了何謂家庭暴力侵犯和可能受牽連的家庭成員，規定各主管機關的職責，並對如民事保護令、刑事訴訟、任何涉及未成年人利益、被害者保護及協助，以及教育和預防措施等議題作出規定。違反家庭暴力防治法的行為將被處以罰金或有期徒刑。

The Domestic Violence Act (“DVA”), originally enacted in 1996 and amended in 2004, aims to provide protections for women and children domestic violence situations. It gives courts the power to grant protection and occupation orders. Applications for such orders can be brought by the victim or, in the case of a child, a parent, guardian, constable, or social worker can bring an application on the child’s behalf. The DVA sets forth the limitations imposed by protective orders, and it states courts can grant such an order if “it is satisfied that” the individual against whom the order is sought used or threatened to use violence, mental or physical, against the person seeking the order. Even without that showing, the court can grant a protective order if it finds the order necessary for the protection of the person “having regard to all circumstances.” The court can grant protection and occupation orders on an ex parte basis if the court deems it necessary. Punishment for violating an order is a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of six months, or both.

This statute provides for Protection From Abuse Orders (“PFA Orders”). These PFA Orders act as a safeguard to victims and their children from a family/household member who is abusing them. The Protection from Abuse Act also provides for absolute confidentiality between a victim and a domestic violence counselor/advocate to encourage open and honest dialogue.

Belize enacted the Domestic Violence Act #19 in 2000 to provide greater protection and assistance to domestic violence victims. It was enacted in recognition of the pervasive nature of domestic violence in Belize society in order to increase the resources available to deal with domestic violence cases. The Domestic Violence Act defines domestic violence and governs protective orders, occupation orders, tenancy orders, other orders relating to counselling, the use of furniture and household effects, payment of rent, mortgage, utilities and compensation for any monetary loss due to domestic violence. Where a protective order or interim protective order is violated, the individual violating the order may be liable to a fine of up to $5,000 or to imprisonment for up to six months. (Section 21)

An interim protection order (IPO) protects survivors during police investigation, while a protection order (PO) protects survivors during criminal court proceedings. The amendments specify when an IPO ends, and when a PO begins, so survivors won’t be left without protection between police investigations and court proceeding. Pursuant to the amendments, an IPO can include additional safeguards, like prohibiting an abuser from coming near a survivor so police can intervene before further violence happens. The expanded definition of domestic violence will protect against: misappropriating property, which causes distress; threatening, which causes distress or fear for safety; or communicating (including electronically) with the survivor to insult modesty. A court can no longer order a survivor to attend reconciliatory counseling with the abuser, which could put the survivor in danger. Instead, the abuser can be ordered to complete a rehabilitation program. If a court grants a survivor occupancy of a shared residence, it must grant the survivor exclusive occupancy rather than just a specified part of the residence. The police officer must keep survivors informed on the status of investigation, status of IPO and PO, and important court dates. The amendments also create the Emergency Protection Order (EPO), which helps survivors get protection faster. EPOs are issued by social welfare officers who are easily accessible. Survivors no longer have to make a police report to get an EPO, which is valid for seven days.

The deceased victim D.K. met her partner A.J. in secondary school, formed a union with him, and gave birth to a daughter. D.K. subsequently filed a claim to dissolve the union and for child custody at the Municipal Court because of a deterioration in her relationship with A.J. She also took their daughter to live with her parents. Following continuous threats by A.J., D.K. submitted a request to the Municipal Court for an emergency protection order under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence. The court did not act within the statutorily mandated 24 hours of the request, and A.J. shot and killed D.K. several weeks later. The Kosovo Judicial Council (“KLJ”, the body which administers the judiciary) disciplinary committee issued a decision to discipline the responsible Municipal Court judge in response to a request by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel, but D.K.’s parents were not party to the disciplinary proceedings. D.K.’s parents submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging the Municipal Court by its inaction violated D.K.’s rights under the Constitution of Kosovo, including Article 25 (Right to Life), Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies), and Article 54 (Judicial Protection of Rights), as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), including Article 2 (Right to Life) and Article 13 (Right to Effective Remedy). The Constitutional Court observed that ECHR caselaw stresses that it is the duty of state authorities to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This includes a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to (i) protect one whose life is at risk from another, (ii) where the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from a criminal offense, but (iii) failed to take measures which reasonably might have been expected to avoid the risk. The court found the Municipal Court ought to have known about the real risk in existence when D.K. requested the emergency protection order since she had explained the deterioration of her relationship with A.J., specifically his death threats and her reports to the police. Furthermore, the Municipal Court was handling D.K.’s case for the dissolution of union and child custody. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that the Municipal Court was responsible for acting under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and that its inaction was a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the ECHR. The court also found that the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and the statute governing the judiciary do not offer effective legal remedies for the protection of the applicants’ rights, because the former does not contain measures for addressing court inaction, and the latter does not allow the applicants to participate in any disciplinary investigation or procedure. Thus, the inaction of the Municipal Court and the KJC’s practice of not addressing judicial inaction violated the deceased’s and applicants’ right under Articles 32 and 54 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the ECHR. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

In a pending divorce case, the trial court entered an order for the parties to “refrain from molesting, harassing, besetting, intimidating and/or threatening and carrying out physical or other abuse of the other.” The wife subsequently accused the husband of sexual molestation and violating the court’s order. The court explained that “an allegation of sexual molestation in any form is very serious and the onus is on the wife to prove to the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the husband breached the Order by committing the acts of sexual molestation as alleged.” The court held that the “wife has failed to discharge this burden” because: (i) there was no evidence from any corroborating witness; (ii) there was no corroborating evidence from the doctor who examined the wife; (iii) both parties chose not to cross-examine the deponents who swore to the affidavits in the committal application; and (iv) “the husband’s version of the events on 5th March is equally plausible as the wife’s” version of events.

Mientras un caso de divorcio estaba pendiente, el tribunal de primera instancia emitió una orden para que las partes "se abstengan de molestar, acosar, acosar, intimidar y / o amenazar y llevar a cabo abuso físico o de otro tipo del otro." Posteriormente, la esposa acusó al marido de abuso sexual y de violar la orden del tribunal. El tribunal explicó que “una acusación de abuso sexual en cualquier forma es muy grave y la esposa tiene la responsabilidad de demostrarle al tribunal más allá de toda duda razonable que el esposo violó la Orden al cometer los actos de abuso sexual como se alega.” El tribunal sostuvo que la “esposa no había cumplido con esta carga” porque: (i) no hubo evidencia de ningún testigo que lo corrobore; (ii) no hubo evidencia que corrobore por parte del médico que examinó a la esposa; (iii) ambas partes optaron por no contrainterrogar a los declarantes que habían jurado las declaraciones en la solicitud inicial; y (iv) "la versión del marido de los hechos del 5 de marzo era igualmente plausible que la versión de la esposa" donde lo acusaba de los hechos.

The plaintiff was a police officer with the Humboldt Police Department. While off duty, she ran into an ex-boyfriend against whom she had a protective order. Based on this encounter, she filed a criminal charge against him for violating the order. The chief of police commenced an internal affairs investigation into her charges, and her ex-boyfriend filed a criminal charge against her for filing a false charge. While both charges were pending, the plaintiff informed the chief of police that she was pregnant. Once the internal affairs investigation was completed, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated. She filed suit in the Gibson County Circuit Court for discrimination based on gender and pregnancy in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that she was treated differently than similarly situated male police officers.

The appellant and respondent are divorced parents of three children. At the time of the divorce, custody of the children was awarded to the respondent. The appellant then moved for an interim protection order, claiming that the respondent physically abused their minor children. A court granted the interim protection order on October 3, 2011, and awarded the appellant interim custody of the children, subject to visitation by the respondent, and ordered respondent to cease abusing the children. The Magistrate’s Court subsequently discharged the interim order on October 24, 2011, based on Section 12 of the Combating of Domestic Violence Act 4 of 2003, reasoning that the beatings were an isolated incident and were only meant to punish the children for bad behavior. The appellant challenged the discharge. The appellate court agreed with appellant and granted a final protection order effective through July 2013, which awarded the appellant custody of the children with visitation for the respondent on alternate weekends and holidays. In its decision, the appellate court stated the importance of rooting out the “evil that is domestic violence in order to give effect to the protection of the constitutional value of human dignity.”

The applicant, Ms. Kaya, applied to the Office of Public Prosecutor (the “OPP”), claiming that she had been the victim of domestic violence. After investigating, the OPP charged the applicant’s husband with domestic violence and went to trial. However, during the trial, the applicant withdrew her claim and said that the bruises she had submitted as evidence were actually the result of an accident at the couple’s home. The OPP dropped the charges against the applicant’s husband. Two years later, the applicant filed another claim with the OPP alleging that her husband stole her jewellery and again subjected her to domestic violence. The OPP notified the proper Court of First Instance for Family Affairs (the “Court of First Instance”). The Court issued a restraining order against the husband that prevented him from approaching the applicant and ordered that he pay alimony to her for four months. The government offered the applicant state housing for the victims of domestic violence, but she rejected the offer. The applicant was subjected to several more incidents of domestic violence. During that time, the OPP requested the Court of First Instance to issue a warrant for the arrest of the applicant’s husband. The Court of First Instance rejected the OPP’s request. The applicant appealed, but her appeal was dismissed because Ms. Kaya’s statements alone were not adequate evidence of domestic abuse. After Ms. Kaya appealed, the Constitutional Court ruled that Turkey had a duty to take affirmative steps to prevent further acts of domestic violence against the appellant and effectively investigate her claims in this case. However, after applying the legal framework addressing victims of domestic violence, the Constitutional Court ruled that Ms. Kaya’s fundamental rights under the framework had not been infringed. This decision is important because it demonstrates that even though there is a legal framework available for women affected by domestic violence, claims against state officials for failing to act on their duties under that framework need to be specific and supported by substantial evidence.

M.P.B. suffered repeated domestic violence and abuse at the hands of her husband R.A.G. In civil suit, M.P.B. was granted exclusive control of the spousal home and custody of her children. The court imposed a restraining order on R.A.G.; he was unable to go within 300 meters of the family home, his wife’s work, or the 9 and 12 year-old children’s school. This case is fairly punitive toward the father by Argentinean standards. The judge cited both Argentinean statutes and international human rights law in arriving at her decision.

M.P.B. sufrió repetida violencia doméstica y abuso a manos de su esposo R.A.G. En una demanda civil, a M.P.B. se le otorgó el control exclusivo de la casa del cónyuge y la custodia de sus hijos. El tribunal impuso una orden de restricción a R.A.G: no podía ir a menos de 300 metros del hogar familiar, del trabajo de su esposa o de la escuela de niños de 9 y 12 años. Este caso es bastante punitivo hacia el padre para los estándares argentinos. El juez citó tanto los estatutos argentinos como el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos al llegar a su decisión.

Maria Elena Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) filed for a temporary restraining order against her former partner, Maurelio Francisco Munoz (“Munoz”). She complained that Munoz violently attacked her on numerous occasions including burning her with hot grease, choking and beating her, and abusing her three-year-old daughter Flor. The trial court granted a temporary ex-parte restraining order to keep Munoz from Gonzalez and Flor. The court also issued personal conduct and stay-away orders, and granted physical and legal custody of Flor to Gonzalez with no visitation rights for Munoz. At a subsequent hearing regarding the orders, Gonzalez and Munoz both appeared without counsel and spoke through an interpreter. At the beginning of the hearing, the court told the parties it would make some “temporary orders under certain circumstances regarding custody and visitation” but could not make a paternity judgment. The court advised Gonzalez and Munoz that they would need to file a separate paternity suit to resolve issues related to custody and visitation of Flor. Munoz indicated he was not Flor’s parent but requested “reasonable visitation” on weekends. The court issued a restraining order that excluded Flor and extended for one year the portion of the prior restraining order that kept Munoz away from Gonzalez. But it did not address custody or visitation. Gonzalez then asked the court about child support, an indication she did not understand the discussion about a separate paternity proceeding. In a subsequent hearing a judge granted Munoz weekly supervised visits with Flor despite the abuse allegations. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and found it erred and violated Section 6340 of the California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act (the “Act”) when it failed to issue permanent custody of Flor to Gonzalez. The Act directs the court when applying the Act to “consider whether failure to make any of these orders may jeopardize the safety of the petitioner and the children for whom the custody or visitation orders are sought.” The Court of Appeal noted that, given Flor’s potential exposure to violence from Munoz, the trial court was charged with eliciting evidence about Flor’s parentage and whether the earlier custody and visitation orders needed to be modified or extended to “ensure the mutual safety of Gonzalez and Flor.” Also, because Munoz failed to show or to claim a parent-child relationship with Flor, the trial court should have extended the restraining order to cover Flor and entered the permanent custody order Gonzalez requested. The Court of Appeal admonished bench officers to play a “far more active role in developing the facts,” even at the expense of a particular court’s procedures, to avoid the high potential for danger to the Act’s target population—“largely unrepresented women and their minor children.” It noted the “special burden” on bench officers who “cannot rely on the propria persona litigants to know each of the procedural steps, to raise objections, and to otherwise protect their due process rights.”

An army officer was convicted for breaching an interdict issued by a magistrate ordering him not to assault his wife or prevent her or their child from leaving their home. He appealed to the Transvaal High Court which declared that Section 3(5) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it placed the burden on him to disprove his guilt. The Constitutional Court overturned the High Court's judgment, finding that the purpose of an interdict was to protect the victim of domestic violence and indicate that society would not stand by in the face of spousal abuse. As such, fairness to the complainant required that the enquiry proceedings be speedy and dispense with the normal process of charge and plea, but in fairness to the accused, the presumption of innocence would still apply to the summary enquiry.

'n Weermag beampte is skuldig bevind aan die oortreding van 'n interdik wat deur 'n landdros uitgereik is, wat hom beveel het om nie sy vrou aan te val of te verhoed dat sy of hul kind hul huis verlaat nie. Hy het appèl aangeteken by die Transvaal se Hooggeregshof wat verklaar het dat artikel 3(5) van die Wet op die Voorkoming van Gesinsgeweld ongrondwetlik was in die mate dat dit die las op hom geplaas het om sy skuld te weerlê. Die Konstitusionele Hof het die uitspraak van die Hooggeregshof omgekeer en gevind dat die doel van 'n interdik was om die slagoffer van huishoudelike geweld te beskerm en te kenne te gee dat die samelewing nie die mishandeling van ‘n huweliksmaat sou bystaan nie. As sodanig het billikheid teenoor die klaer vereis dat die ondersoekverrigtinge vinnig moes verloop en met die normale proses van aanklag en pleit afgehandel word, maar in billikheid teenoor die beskuldigde, sal die vermoede van onskuld steeds van toepassing wees op die ondersoek.