federalism

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles

Starting in 2008, one of the busiest ports in the United States, the Port of Los Angeles (POLA), entered into “concession agreements” with motor carriers doing business at the port. POLA enforced the agreements through a system of tariffs levied against noncompliant carriers and remedial provisions that empowered it to revoke noncompliant carriers’ access to the port. The American Trucking Association (ATA) sued POLA, arguing that the agreements were barred under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. The Central District of California and Ninth Circuit found that multiple provisions of the concession agreements were exempted from the FAAAA’s preemption clause under the market-participant doctrine and held that Castle did not bar suspension of carriers’ port access because of the FAAAA’s express safety exemption. In resolving the questions presented, the Supreme Court will determine the scope of the market-participant exemption to FAAAA preemption and whether Castle bars POLA from enforcing its concession agreements through revocation or suspension of port access. The case directly affects local and state governments’ power to regulate and contract under the FAAAA and similar Congressional legislation and has broad regulatory implications for motor carriers and other regulated actors in interstate commerce.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Title 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), originally enacted as a provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, provides that “a State [or] political subdivision . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property.” It contains an exception providing that the express preemption clause “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A). The questions presented are:

  1. Whether an unexpressed “market participant” exception exists in Section 14501(c)(1) and permits a municipal governmental entity to take action that conflicts with the express preemption clause, occurs in a market in which the municipal entity does not participate, and is unconnected with any interest in the efficient procurement of services.
  2. Whether permitting a municipal governmental entity to bar federally licensed motor carriers from access to a port operates as a partial suspension of the motor carriers’ federal registration, in violation of Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954).

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Issue

Does federal law prevent enforcement of certain aspects of motor carrier-related contracts used by the Port of Los Angeles?

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Arizona v. United States

Issues

Can Arizona engage in cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws and create state offenses for violations of federal immigration regulations?

 

In 2010, Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, which creates state immigration offenses and expands local police officers’ immigration law enforcement authority. The United States sued Arizona in federal district court, arguing the state law was preempted by federal law, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state law from taking effect. The district court granted a preliminary injunction with respect to four provisions of the Arizona law and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Petitioners, the State of Arizona and the Governor of Arizona, Janice K. Brewer, argue that federal law does not preempt its statute because Arizona’s statute merely creates a formal cooperative relationship between federal and state officers to implement federal laws. Respondent, the United States, asserts that implementation of the statute would infringe upon the Executive Branch’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration, and is therefore invalid.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070) to address the illegal immigration crisis in the State. The four provisions of S.B. 1070 enjoined by the courts below authorize and direct state law-enforcement officers to cooperate and communicate with federal officials regarding the enforcement of federal immigration law and impose penalties under state law for non-compliance with federal immigration requirements.

The question presented is whether the federal immigration laws preclude Arizona's efforts at cooperative law enforcement and impliedly preempt these four provisions of S.B. 1070 on their face.

The state of Arizona maintains that it faced rampant illegal immigration, which increased crime and harmed Arizona’s economy. See Brief for Petitioners, State of Arizona and Janice K.

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Robert Barnes, The Washington Post: Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to Arizona’s Immigration Law (Dec. 12, 2011)

Adam Liptak, N.Y. Times: Court to Weigh Arizona Statute on Immigration (Dec. 12, 2011)

Constitutional Law Prof Blog: Supreme Court to Hear Arizona S.B. 1070 on Preemption Issue (Dec. 12, 2011)

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Bond v. United States

Issues

Do the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, read in connection with the treaty power, allow a statute that was enacted by Congress to enforce a treaty to serve as a valid basis for prosecuting a criminal defendant in Federal District Court?

Petitioner Carol Anne Bond was arrested in 2007 for attempts to poison a romantic rival, which culminated in a minor burn to the rival’s thumb. A federal district court sentenced Bond to six years in prison and five years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay a fine and make restitution, under the authority of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. Congress passed that statute to implement an international arms-control agreement to prohibit chemical warfare. Bond challenged her conviction, claiming the statute’s application to her domestic conduct exceeded Congress’ limited and enumerated powers. In reviewing her challenge, the Third Circuit held that Congress’ power to implement treaties validated the statute and Bond’s conviction. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will affect not only how broadly federal criminal statutes apply, but also the scope of Congress’ authority to implement treaties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations; and
  2. whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229, can be interpreted not to reach ordinary poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities since the Framing, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional questions involving the scope of and continuing vitality of this Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

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Facts

In 2006, Carol Anne Bond discovered that her friend, Myrlinda Haynes, was pregnant from an affair with Bond’s husband. See United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir.

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Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al.

Issues

Whether a state attorney general, who was voluntarily dismissed and bound by a final judgment, is allowed to become a party in the case to defend the state law at issue when no other state representative will.

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether it is appropriate for an attorney general to intervene in a case when no other governmental representative will defend the state law, despite the attorney general’s voluntary dismissal and contradictory stipulations in the case.  After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to prohibit the enforcement of a Kentucky law, the Secretary of Kentucky's Cabinet for Health and Family chose not to appeal the Sixth Circuit’s decision and Attorney General Daniel Cameron (“Cameron”) moved to intervene as a third-party to continue defending the law. Cameron argues that the court should consider the importance of the state’s legal interests, maintaining that states have the authority to decide who represents them in court, and that the Sixth Circuit abused its discretion by not permitting his intervention.  EMW Women’s Surgical Center (“EMW”) counters that Kentucky’s interests were protected because the Attorney General’s office left the initial suit voluntarily and agreed to be bound by the final judgment.  EMW contends that the Attorney General’s office should not receive unique exemptions from procedural rules, with intervention being appropriate at the appellate level in rare circumstances only.  The outcome of this case has important implications for separation of power between the state and the federal government and for the court’s application of procedural law to state-government litigants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law should be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law

Respondents EMW Women's Surgical Center ("EMW") sought to strike down Kentucky legislation, House Bill 454 (“H.B. 454”), which functionally disallowed the use of the “dilation and evacuation” abortion procedure, absent a narrow exception for medical emergencies.  EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, at 791.

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Cantero v. Bank of America

Issues

Does requiring a national bank to pay interest on escrow accounts attached to its mortgages under New York’s minimum interest-on-escrow law unconstitutionally infringe on the bank’s exercise of its federal power under the National Bank Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider to what extent nationally-chartered banks should be shielded from state banking regulations on mortgage escrow accounts. Alex Cantero argues that the Second Circuit’s standard for preemption based on control is improper, and that the Court must evaluate the actual impact the interest-on-escrow law has on bank operations. Bank of America maintains that the state law is preempted because it both impermissibly exerts control over bank operations and also significantly hinders national banks’ exercise of their federally-granted powers. This case has significant implications not only for mortgage escrow accounts but also for states’ capacity to regulate other practices and products of federally-chartered banks.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the National Bank Act preempts the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks.

The core banking powers of federally chartered banks such as the power to lend come from the National Bank Act (“NBA”). Brief for Respondent, Bank of America at 1. Under the NBA, chartering, regulation, and supervision of national banks are overseen by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”).

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Carney v. Adams

Issues

(1) Does a political independent have standing to challenge a provision of the Delaware Constitution requiring that no more than a bare majority of judges on the state’s highest courts may belong to the same political party (the “bare majority provision”) and that other judges on those courts must belong to the other major party (the “major party provision”); (2) does the major party provision violate potential judicial appointees’ First Amendment rights of association; and (3) is the bare majority provision severable from the major party provision such that the bare majority provision can survive a challenge to the major party provision?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of two provisions of the Delaware Constitution which require that the two major political parties be represented as evenly as possible on Delaware’s highest courts. John Carney, the Governor of Delaware, argues that James R. Adams, who challenges the Delaware Constitution, lacks Article III standing to assert these claims because Adams’ has suffered only a hypothetical injury and that injury was self-inflicted through a personal choice to change political affiliation. Governor Carney additionally contends that the state constitutional provisions are consistent with the First Amendment because judges fall under a policymaking exception to the First Amendment’s prohibition on using political affiliation as job criterion, and because the constitutional provisions are the only viable way to advance the state’s compelling interest in public confidence in the judiciary’s neutrality. Finally, Governor Carney asserts that in the event that the Court strikes down the major party provision, the bare majority provision of the Delaware Constitution is severable and thus should remain intact. Adams responds that he has standing to assert these claims by virtue of Delaware’s denial of any potential judgeship for him based on his political affiliation and the chilling effect that he experiences on his associative freedoms due to the constitutional provisions. Next, Adams contends that the provisions violate the First Amendment and do not fall within the exception for using political association as a job criterion for policymakers; therefore, he argues, the Court should apply strict scrutiny in its review of this alleged First Amendment violation. Finally, Adams asserts that the bare majority provision is not severable from the major party provision and therefore, if one is invalidated, both must be struck down. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect state interests in creating a politically neutral judiciary and the methods states can use to achieve this goal, as well as demonstrate the merits and burdens of associating political affiliations with judicial positions. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the First Amendment invalidates a longstanding state constitutional provision that limits judges affiliated with any one political party to no more than a “bare majority” on the state’s three highest courts, with the other seats reserved for judges affiliated with the “other major political party”; (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit erred in holding that a provision of the Delaware Constitution requiring that no more than a “bare majority” of three of the state courts may be made up of judges affiliated with any one political party is not severable from a provision that judges who are not members of the majority party on those courts must be members of the other “major political party,” when the former requirement existed for more than 50 years without the latter, and the former requirement, without the latter, continues to govern appointments to two other courts; and (3) whether the respondent, James Adams, has demonstrated Article III standing.

James R. Adams is a resident of Delaware and a member of the Delaware State Bar. Adams v. Governor of Delaware at 169. For years, Adams desired a position as a Delaware state judge. Id. In 2009, he applied to be a Family Court Commissioner, but was not selected. Id. at 172.

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Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

Issues

Does the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act violate the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine by preventing states from modifying or repealing state-law prohibitions on sports gambling?

The Court will decide whether § 3702(1) of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), which prohibits state authorization of sports gambling, is a lawful preemption of New Jersey’s 2014 law repealing previous state bans on sports gambling or is a violation of the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine. The issue was originally presented when the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) sued New Jersey claiming PASPA preempted a 2012 New Jersey law which legalized and regulated sports gambling. There, the Third Circuit held that PASPA did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine because it did not require states to act. In response, New Jersey enacted a 2014 law which repealed existing state-law bans of sports gambling. The NCAA once again filed suit and the case once again rose through the Third Circuit. Christie claims PASPA’s prohibition of authorization of sports gambling violates the anti-commandeering doctrine because requiring states to maintain prohibitions is just as harmful to federalism as is requiring states to act. The NCAA contends that PASPA is a lawful preemption of state law, and even if § 3702(1)’s prohibition of authorization is unlawful, the rest of PASPA’s provisions should remain in effect. The Court’s decision will determine the scope of the Tenth Amendment and could have significant consequences for the legality of sports gambling nationwide.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeer the regulatory power of States in contravention of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)?

In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), which prohibits states and their political subdivisions from authorizing, licensing, regulating, and controlling sports gambling. See NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 2016).

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City of Grants Pass, Oregon v.

Issues

Do fines for camping on public land constitute cruel and unusual punishment of homeless people?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a dispute between the City of Grants Pass, Oregon, and a class of homeless residents of Grants Pass represented by Gloria Johnson. Petitioner Grants Pass contends that its anti-camping ordinances do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent Johnson argues that the city’s ordinances amount to criminalization of the status of homelessness, contravening the Eighth Amendment. This case could impact the balance of power between federal, state, and local government and may clarify the limits on criminalizing conduct like camping outside at night.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

The homeless population in Grants Pass, Oregon exceeds the available shelter for homeless people. Johnson v.

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Cone v. Bell

Issues

Whether the procedural bar prevents federal habeas courts from reviewing habeas petitions that state courts dismissed based on state procedural rules against re-litigating fully adjudicated claims, and whether federal courts can review state application of such rules.

 

Gary Cone was convicted and sentenced to death in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, for the murder of two people. Subsequent to Cone’s direct appeal, the state made available documents that both supported Cone’s defense that he was a drug addict at the time of the killings and impeached the testimonies of several witnesses. Respondent Bell argues for the state that Cone is procedurally barred from raising his grounds for relief in a federal habeas corpus review, as state courts already rejected it and Cone failed to properly argue it in the state courts. Petitioner Cone, however, argues that there should not be a procedural bar in this case because he did not receive the new information until his second request for post-conviction review, so the courts erroneously found that his claim had been previously decided. He also argues that it is the federal court’s duty in federal habeas review to examine grounds for relief based on federal law.  The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could implicate the methods by which individuals convicted in state court can litigate their claims, both in state courts and upon federal habeas corpus review. Additionally, the Court’s decision could clarify the roles of state and federal courts in an area of law with implications for the federalist structure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The question presented is whether petitioner is entitled to federal habeas review of his claim that the State suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which encompasses two sub-questions:
1. Is a federal habeas claim “procedurally defaulted” because it has been presented twice to the state courts?
2. Is a federal habeas court powerless to recognize that a state court erred in holding that state law precludes reviewing a claim?

In 1982, Gary Bradford Cone, a Vietnam veteran, was found guilty and sentenced to death in a Tennessee criminal court for the murder of two elderly people during the commission of a robbery. See Cone v. Bell, 492 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir.

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Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils

Issues

Does the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”) preempt state anti-subrogation law and does 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) violate the Supremacy Clause? 

The Supreme Court will decide whether § 8902(m)(1) of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”) allows insurance companies to collect reimbursements from the insured after personal injury claims or whether a “presumption against preemption” allows state anti-subrogation laws to prevail.  Petitioner Coventry Health of Missouri, Inc. argues that FEHBA unambiguously preempts state anti-subrogation laws; preemption comports with the Supremacy Clause; and the Office of Personnel Management’s new final rule, codified in § 8902(m)(1), should be granted Chevron deference. In contrast, Respondent Jodie Nevils argues that FEHBA’s language is ambiguous; Chevron deference does not apply; and allowing preemption of state anti-subrogation law violates the Supremacy Clause by encroaching on law traditionally left to the states to regulate. This case will clarify the potential for state anti-subrogation law preemption to influence the cost of health care coverage for FEHBA plan enrollees and will address federalism concerns regarding the balance of power between the federal government and the states for the administration and provision of health insurance to federal employees. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8901 et seq., governs the health benefits of millions of federal workers and dependents, and authorizes the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) to enter into contracts with private insurance carriers to administer benefit plans. FEHBA expressly “preempt[s] any State or local law” that would prevent enforcement of “[t]he terms of any contract” between OPM and a carrier which “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits).” In a 2015 regulation, OPM codified its longstanding position that FEHBA-contract provisions requiring carriers to seek subrogation or reimbursement “relate to . . . benefits” and “payments with respect to benefits,” and therefore FEHBA preempts state laws that purport to prevent FEHBA insurance carriers from pursuing subrogation and reimbursement recoveries. 5 C.F.R. § 890.106(h). Expressly disagreeing with multiple federal circuits and state appellate courts, the Missouri Supreme Court nevertheless construed FEHBA not to preempt state laws—explicitly refusing to accord any deference to OPM’s regulation. A majority of the court further concluded that Section 8902(m)(1) violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The questions presented are:

  1. Whether FEHBA preempts state laws that prevent carriers from seeking subrogation or reimbursement pursuant to their FEHBA contracts.
  2. Whether FEHBA’s express-preemption provision, 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1), violates the Supremacy Clause. 

In 2006, Respondent Jodie Nevils, a federal employee working for the United States Postal Service, was injured in a car accident. See Brief for Respondent, Jodie Nevils at 11. Nevils was covered by a health insurance plan through the petitioner Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc.

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