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commerce clause

Ashcroft v. Raich

 

This case raises the issue of whether Congress's ability to regulate interstate commerce allows it to proscribe the use of medical marijuana. The plaintiff-appellees, Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson, suffer from "more than serious medical conditions," including, respectively, an inoperable brain tumor and a degenerative spinal disease. Under the advice of their doctors and the auspicious of California's Compassionate Use Act, they both use California-grown marijuana to treat the symptoms of their diseases. Fearing prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act, the plaintiffs sued for declaratory relief in Federal District Court where they were denied the grant of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit overturned this decision, and the case is now before the Supreme Court. The Court will determine whether the use of California-grown medical marijuana substantially effects interstate commerce based on the four-factor balancing test established in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and refined in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Though none of the factors are particularly weighty in the present case, the majority of them point to Congress' ability to regulate this activity and the Court is likely to overturn the Ninth Circuit's preliminary injunction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for purported personal medicinal use or to the distribution of marijuana without charge for such use.

Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. � 801 et seq.("CSA") as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub .L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. The CSA establishes five "schedules" of certain drugs and other substances designated "controlled substances." 21 U.S.C.

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Bond v. United States

Issues

Do the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, read in connection with the treaty power, allow a statute that was enacted by Congress to enforce a treaty to serve as a valid basis for prosecuting a criminal defendant in Federal District Court?

Petitioner Carol Anne Bond was arrested in 2007 for attempts to poison a romantic rival, which culminated in a minor burn to the rival’s thumb. A federal district court sentenced Bond to six years in prison and five years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay a fine and make restitution, under the authority of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. Congress passed that statute to implement an international arms-control agreement to prohibit chemical warfare. Bond challenged her conviction, claiming the statute’s application to her domestic conduct exceeded Congress’ limited and enumerated powers. In reviewing her challenge, the Third Circuit held that Congress’ power to implement treaties validated the statute and Bond’s conviction. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will affect not only how broadly federal criminal statutes apply, but also the scope of Congress’ authority to implement treaties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations; and
  2. whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229, can be interpreted not to reach ordinary poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities since the Framing, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional questions involving the scope of and continuing vitality of this Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

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Facts

In 2006, Carol Anne Bond discovered that her friend, Myrlinda Haynes, was pregnant from an affair with Bond’s husband. See United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir.

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DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno; Wilkins v. Cuno

Issues

Does either the investment tax credit or the property tax exemption at issue violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States or Ohio State Constitutions by discriminating in favor of businesses locating new investments in Ohio and against incumbent businesses or those locating elsewhere?

Do the Respondents here (and plaintiffs below) have standing as the state and municipal taxpayers to challenge the tax incentive programs at issue?

 

The Ohio State investment tax credit (Ohio Revised Code ? 5733.33) encourages development in economically depressed areas by providing tax breaks to companies or individuals that choose to locate in such areas and to install new manufacturing machinery and equipment. The personal property tax incentive, under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ?? 5709.62 and 5709.631, permits municipalities to grant property tax exemptions to corporations that develop in economically depressed areas and meet certain employment and investment levels. Together, these two statutes create incentives for corporate development in Ohio in otherwise unfavorable locations. Respondents, state and non-state taxpayers and one Ohio business forced to relocate upon the construction of a DaimlerChrysler plant, argue that this tax-incentive scheme is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits state taxes from discriminating against interstate commerce. Petitioners assert that (1) the Respondents lack standing to bring the suit, and (2) the dormant Commerce Clause prevents only state taxes which discourage companies from doing businesses in other states and not incentives that encourage companies to locate within the state.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno (04-1704):

Whether Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Revised Code ? 5733.33, which seeks to encourage economic development by providing a credit to taxpayers who install new manufacturing machinery and equipment in the State, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

Whether Respondents have standing to challenge Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ? 5733.33.

Wilkins v. Cuno (04-1724):

Does the dormant Commerce Clause allow a State to attempt to attract new business investment in the State by offering credits against the State's general corporate franchise or income tax, where the amount of the credit is based on the amount of a business's new investment in the State?

Whether Respondents have standing to challenge Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ? 5733.33.

Factual Background

DaimlerChrysler contracted with the City of Toledo, Ohio in 1998, to construct a new vehicle-assembly plant in exchange for tax incentives. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741. DaimlerChrysler forecasted its total investment in the project to be about $1.2 billion, which would result in tax incentives totaling an estimated $280 mil

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Granholm v. Heald; Swedenburg v. Kelly; Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Heald

 

In the Granholm, Swedenburg, and Michigan Beer cases, the Court must consider how much power the Twenty-First Amendment grants states to regulate the importation of alcoholic beverages. The cases deal with states that bar out-of-state companies from shipping alcohol directly to in-state customers. Such states generally require liquor distribution through licensed in-state wholesalers. The Twenty-First Amendment, which explicitly declares that transporting liquor into a state "in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited," would seem to grant states wide leeway to regulate the importation of alcohol. However, the Commerce Clause specifically grants Congress, not the states, the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States." Historically, courts have read the Commerce Clause as preventing states from interfering with interstate commerce. The states claim that they are simply trying to regulate the liquor market, collect all applicable taxes and make sure alcohol stays out of minors' hands, but the plaintiffs, who include liquor interests and consumers, accuse the states of protecting their local industries, in violation of the Commerce Clause.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does Michigan's regulation of the importation of beverage alcohol under the Twenty-first Amendment facially violate the Commerce Clause when it permits in-state licensed wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but requires out-of-state wineries to import its products through licensed in-state wholesalers and to sell its products through licensed retailers or request permission of the Liquor Control Commission to bypass this distribution system and ship directly to consumers?
 
Michigan Beer
 
Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling (in conflict with a Seventh Circuit decision upholding a similar Indiana statute against the same challenge) that the Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act do not authorize Michigan to enact statutes that prohibit the importation of alcoholic beverages by unlicensed persons, and that the Commerce Clause bars such statutes.
Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling (in conflict with a Fourth Circuit decision with respect to a similar North Carolina statute) that the proper remedy for the alleged discrimination was to invalidate the state's control over importation of alcoholic beverages rather than merely strike the offending exception for in-state wineries.
Swedenburg
 
Does New York's discriminatory and protectionist prohibition against direct interstate shipment of wine to consumers by out-of-state wineries while permitting in-state licensed wineries to ship directly to consumers violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and if so, is it "saved" by the Twenty-first Amendment?
Does New York's discriminatory and protectionist prohibition against direct interstate shipment of wine to consumers by out-of-state wineries while permitting in-state licensed wineries to ship directly to consumers violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Like many states, Michigan and New York regulate alcohol sales via "three-tier systems". Only licensed manufacturers may sell to licensed wholesalers, who in turn may only sell to licensed retailers, who can then sell to consumers. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 2003). Both states allow wineries within their borders to ship wine directly to resident consumers, but out-of-state wineries are prevented from shipping wine directly to consumers, subject to narrow exceptions.
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McBurney v. Young

The Virginia Freedom of Information Act (“VFOIA”) states that “all public records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the Commonwealth.” Va.Code Ann. § 2.2-3704(A). Petitioners Mark McBurney and Roger Hurlbert made VFOIA requests and were denied because they are not citizens of Virginia. After being denied, Petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents, the agencies which denied their VFOIA requests, with the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Petitioners argued that the VFOIA’s citizens-only provision violated their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and Hurlbert’s rights under the dormant Commerce Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment for the agencies, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Petitioners now appeal, arguing that Virginia’s citizens-only restriction violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates against out-of state economic interests both facially and in effect, and also violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it creates an inequality in access to information. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact whether a state is required allow all United States citizens to access their public records. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of  Article IV and the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, a state my preclude citizens of other states from enjoying the same right of access to public records that the state affords its own citizens?

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Issue

Whether a state’s refusal to provide public records to an individual who is not a citizen of th

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National Pork Producers Council v. Ross

Issues

Does a state statute violate the dormant Commerce Clause when its practical effect burdens out-of-state commerce?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether California’s Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause by failing the extraterritoriality doctrine and the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test. National Pork Producers Council (“NPPC”) argues that Proposition 12 violates the extraterritoriality doctrine by producing a “practical effect,” beyond its influence in California, that unduly burdens the integrated national pork market. NPPC also claims that Proposition 12 does not pass the Pike balancing test, as it imposes an undue burden on out-of-state commerce that is clearly excessive compared to its local benefits. Karen Ross, California’s Secretary of Food and Agriculture, counters that Proposition 12 regulates only the in-state pork market and that the opposing side’s expansive reading of the extraterritoriality doctrine may render it meaningless. Ross also argues that Proposition 12 survives the Pike balancing test. The outcome of this case has important implications for determining the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause as well as the extent of states’ police power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether allegations that a state law has dramatic economic effects largely outside of the state and requires pervasive changes to an integrated nationwide industry state a violation of the dormant commerce clause, or whether the extraterritoriality principle described in the Supreme Court’s decisions is now a dead letter; and (2) whether such allegations, concerning a law that is based solely on preferences regarding out-of-state housing of farm animals, state a claim under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.

In 2018, California voters passed ballot initiative Proposition 12, which prohibits businesses from knowingly selling various meat products within California, unless the confinement of animals in the production process complies with certain restrictions.  See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v.

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New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, New York

Issues

Does New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed handgun to a location outside of the City violate the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the right to travel?

This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether New York City’s (the “City”) restrictions on the transportation of handguns is unconstitutional pursuant to the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the fundamental right to travel. Under a former rule, the City issued premises licenses to qualified individuals. Such licenses permitted a licensee to possess a handgun at the licensee’s City residence but placed restrictions upon the transportation of the handgun to locations outside of the City. Romolo Colantone, Efrain Alvarez, and Tony Irizarry (collectively, “Petitioners”) were issued premises licenses and wanted to use their handguns at shooting ranges and competitions located outside of the City, and Colantone wanted to transport his handgun to and from his second home in upstate New York. Petitioners, joined by the New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, argue that the City’s transportation restrictions violate the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the fundamental right to travel. The City, joined by the New York City Police Department-License Division, counters that its former rule is a constitutional exercise of its regulatory power and protects public safety. The City recently amended the rule at issue, so the City also argues that this case is moot. In addition to impacting City residents who possess handguns under a premises license, the Court’s decision will have implications for public safety concerns of vulnerable populations and populations living within major urban areas and is likely to inform national debate on gun control.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the commerce clause and the constitutional right to travel.

New York State prohibits the unlicensed possession of handguns. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York at 52. In New York City (the “City”), licensing officers may issue a handgun license to a City resident pursuant to 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23 (the “Rule”). Id.

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Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon

Issues

Are airline cargo loaders and their supervisors, who load and unload goods from planes that cross international or interstate borders but do not physically transport such goods themselves, “transportation workers” who are exempt from arbitration under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether an airline ramp supervisor is exempt from arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Federal Arbitration Act codifies the federal policy for disputes to go through arbitration, exempting workers that engage in interstate commerce. Southwest Airlines argues that Saxon must resolve her dispute through arbitration because Saxon is not an exempt employee under the Act. Saxon argues that her work as a ramp supervisor includes loading and unloading cargo that travels interstate, so she is exempt from mandatory arbitration. The outcome of this case has implications for defining the limits of the Federal Arbitration Act and how courts define a worker operating in interstate commerce.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether workers who load or unload goods from vehicles that travel in interstate commerce, but do not physically transport such goods themselves, are interstate “transportation workers” exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act.

Latrice Saxon is a Southwest Airlines (“Southwest”) ramp supervisor that manages the loading and unloading of passenger luggage. Saxon v. Sw. Airlines Co. at 494. As a ramp supervisor, Saxon trains, supervises, and occasionally assists ramp agents with loading and unloading cargo. Id.

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Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann

Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant") seeks to export water to Texas from multiple sources within Oklahoma which are covered by the Red River Compact ("Compact"), a congressionally approved water apportionment agreement between Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.  In 2007, Tarrant sued members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("OWRB"), including Herrmann, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.  Tarrant sought a declaratory judgment that certain Oklahoma statutes dealing with water apportionment are unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the OWRB from applying the statutes to Tarrant's application for water.  Tarrant argued that the Oklahoma statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause by burdening interstate commerce and that the statutes are preempted insofar as they conflict with the Compact's language. Tarrant argues that the Compact provides Texas with cross-border rights to access water located in Oklahoma and that Oklahoma’s water permitting statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state water users. OWRB argues that the signatory states to the Compact did not surrender their sovereignty by signing the Compact and that the Commerce Clause does not apply in this case because the Compact shelters Oklahoma’s water laws from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.  Both parties fear that this decision, if decided for the opposing party, will cause severe social, economic, and environmental harm to their states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether Congress's approval of an interstate water compact that grants the contracting States "equal rights" to certain surface water and - using language present in almost all such compacts - provides that the compact shall not "be deemed … to interfere" with each State's "appropriation, use, and control of water … not inconsistent with its obligations under this Compact," manifests unmistakably clear congressional consent to state laws that expressly burden interstate commerce in water.

2. Whether a provision of a congressionally approved multi-state compact that is designed to ensure an equal share of water among the contracting states preempts protectionist state laws that obstruct other states from accessing the water to which they are entitled by the compact.

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Issue(s)

Whether signatories to a multi-state compact agree to give up their sovereign rights to exclusive use within their borders and to the licensing of permits for the use of water within their borders when the compact provides signatory states with equal rights to use of water in areas where the distribution of water is allocated asymmetrically

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