Women and Justice: Topics: Acid violence, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The defendant was accused of murdering his wife and sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment, in addition to paying of kz. 1.500.000,00 (1.5 million kwanzas, i.e. approximately US$ 2,300) to the victim’s family, plus court expenses. The prosecution (Ministério Público) then appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that, in accordance with the court’s own jurisprudence, the compensation amount should be risen to kz. 2.000.00,00, i.e. the equivalent of US$ 3,100. It argued that, as shown by the evidence, the accused had tried to have sexual relations with his wife and, when she declined, beat her in front of their two underage children. When she tried to escape, the defendant stabbed her in the back with a “homemade knife” multiple times, which killed her. The accused fled to the woods, while their nine-year-old daughter went to get help. The Supreme Court reasoned that, although the object used to stab the victim had not been examined, there was no doubt as to the fact that it was used to injure the victim and caused her death. Furthermore, in agreement with the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had undoubtedly committed the crime of which he was accused, noting that he confessed to it during police interrogations. The defendant’s motive was also considered as particularly vile (i.e., as his attempt of sexual intercourse was simply frustrated) and his intent was proven by the predictability of death as a direct consequence of his actions. The appeal was, therefore, granted by the Supreme Court, increasing the compensation amount to the family’s victim to the requested amount.

O réu foi acusado de matar sua esposa e sentenciado a 18 anos de prisão, em adição ao pagamento de kz. 1.500.000,00 (1.5 milhões de kwanzas, i.e. aproximadamente US$2,300) para a família da vítima, além dos gastos com o tribunal. A acusação (Ministério Público) então apelou para o Tribunal Supremo alegando que, de acordo com a jurisprudência da própria corte, o valor da compensação deve aumentar para kz. 2.000.000,000, i.e. o equivalente a US$3,100. Ele afirmou que, como mostrado pela evidência, o acusado tentou ter relações sexuais com a sua esposa e, quando ela negou, ele bateu nela na frente das suas duas crianças menores de idade. Quando ela tentou escapar, o réu esfaqueou ela nas costas com uma “faca caseira” por múltiplas vezes, o que a matou. O acusado fugiu para a floresta, enquanto a sua filha de nove anos de idade foi buscar ajuda. O Tribunal Supremo raciocinou que, ainda que o objeto usado para esfaquear a vítima não tenha sido examinado, não restou dúvida sobre o fato dele ter sido usado para machucar a vítima e causar a sua morte. Além disso, de acordo com a decisão da corte inferior, o Tribunal Supremo sustentou que o réu sem dúvidas cometeu o crime pelo qual ele foi acusado, já que ele confessou o crime durante interrogações policiais. O motivo do réu também foi considerado particularmente vil (i.e. já que a sua tentativa de relação sexual simplesmente foi frustrada) e a sua intenção foi provada pela previsibilidade da morte como consequência direta das suas ações. A apelação foi, assim, acolhida pelo Tribunal Supremo, aumentando a indenização para a família da vítima para o valor requerido.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison for the attempted murder of his spouse, and the conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the lower court erred by (1) failing to consider the facts as exposed by the appellant, (2) failing to take into account that the wounds suffered by the victim were not deadly, (3) refusing to consider the “voluntary and timely abandonment of the act”, (4) failing to set out its reasoning in reaching its conclusions as to the events and the injuries suffered by the victim, and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the Trial Court considered witness testimony and set out the facts underlying the decision, which were sufficient to uphold the decision and sentence. It also found that the fact that the wounds suffered by the victim were not fatal was not inconsistent with the crime charged. Finally, it upheld the Trial Court’s determination that the appellant did not voluntarily “abandon[…] the act”, but instead was interrupted by the victim fleeing and seeking assistance from her neighbors, which were independent of the appellant’s actions. Therefore, the appellant never ended his attempt to commit the murder. The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence. (External Link leads to the website for the Chilean Judicial System. The case is available by searching for the case number.)

El recurrente fue declarado culpable y condenado a siete años de prisión por el intento de asesinato de su cónyuge, y la condena fue confirmada por el Tribunal de Apelación. En la apelación, el apelante alegó que el tribunal inferior incurrió en error al (1) no considerar los hechos expuestos por el apelante, (2) no tener en cuenta que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no eran mortales, (3) negarse a considerar el “abandono voluntario y oportuno del acto,” (4) no exponer su razonamiento para llegar a sus conclusiones sobre los hechos y las lesiones sufridas por la víctima, y ​​(5) imponer una pena excesiva. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia y determinó que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia consideró el testimonio de los testigos y expuso los hechos subyacentes a la decisión, que fueron suficientes para confirmar la decisión y la sentencia. Asimismo, concluyó que el hecho de que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no fueran mortales no contradecía el delito imputado. Finalmente, confirmó la determinación del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de que el recurrente no “abandonó […] el acto” voluntariamente, sino que fue interrumpido por la víctima que huyó y solicitó la asistencia de sus vecinos, quienes ayudaron, y no fue el recurrente quien detuvo el acto por si mismo. Por tanto, el recurrente nunca puso fin a su intento de cometer el asesinato. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial chileno. El caso está disponible buscando el número de caso).

The appellants were charged with the murder of a 13-year-old girl. The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the prosecutor proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The victim was found hanging by rope in the appellants’ bathroom and died the same day in the hospital. The appellants brought the victim to the hospital prior to her death. Evidence showed that she had bruises on the left and right side of her neck, and she had sexual intercourse prior to her death. The grand jury indicted the appellants in the circuit Court. The Judge granted the appellants’ motion for bail. In the trial, the appellants produced multiple witnesses to testify that they were in the same house when the incident occurred. The prosecutors had two autopsy reports proving that the victim’s death was caused by sexual abuse or homicide. The Circuit Judge convicted the appellants for murder and sentenced them to death by hanging. The appellants filed a petition for the writ of certiorari for a crime not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that in the case of murder, the prosecutors are required to overcome the presumption of innocence. Here, the government failed to establish each element of the crime of murder, specifically, the government failed to prove that each of the appellants choked the victim to death, failed to prove that each of the appellants hanged her body in the bathroom in their house, and failed to prove the missing belt, which was used to tie the victim belonged to the appellants. The Supreme Court also explained that the government failed to produce the DNA specimens from the victim to test after taking the appellants’ DNA for testing, and could not produce any evidence that linked the hanging to the appellants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment for the lower court to reconsider.

The defendant was charged with murder by stabbing the deceased woman. The prosecution presented evidence that the accused had stalked the deceased for days, at school and at home, and he had threatened to kill the deceased. Four days before the murder, the deceased, her father, and her brother visited the home of the defendant and his brother, with whom the defendant lived, about the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. Witnesses testified that the defendant became angry at the accusations and falsely accused the deceased of following him. After, the defendant’s brother agreed, as the defendant’s guardian, to stop the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. At the murder scene, a road near the entrance to the deceased’s school, the police recovered the murder weapon, a bloody knife. After the murder, the defendant attempted suicide and was taken to a hospital where doctors found photographs of the deceased and a note indicating that the accused had pledged himself to commit suicide and to cause the death of the deceased at the same time. Based on the evidence, the court found the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.

The accused appeared at his former girlfriend’s kitchen window from outside and poured an acid-like substance on her. The substance was later determined to be sulfuric acid. The victim suffered first and second degree burns over 60% of her body, which resulted in a complication in the form of pneumonia in both lungs and caused her death. The court found that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the accused of murder. The court decided not to impose the death penalty and instead sentenced the accused to 15 years imprisonment because he was a first-time offender, it was an “offence of passion”, he was 22 years old, and he had a one-month-old child.

The deceased victim D.K. met her partner A.J. in secondary school, formed a union with him, and gave birth to a daughter. D.K. subsequently filed a claim to dissolve the union and for child custody at the Municipal Court because of a deterioration in her relationship with A.J. She also took their daughter to live with her parents. Following continuous threats by A.J., D.K. submitted a request to the Municipal Court for an emergency protection order under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence. The court did not act within the statutorily mandated 24 hours of the request, and A.J. shot and killed D.K. several weeks later. The Kosovo Judicial Council (“KLJ”, the body which administers the judiciary) disciplinary committee issued a decision to discipline the responsible Municipal Court judge in response to a request by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel, but D.K.’s parents were not party to the disciplinary proceedings. D.K.’s parents submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging the Municipal Court by its inaction violated D.K.’s rights under the Constitution of Kosovo, including Article 25 (Right to Life), Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies), and Article 54 (Judicial Protection of Rights), as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), including Article 2 (Right to Life) and Article 13 (Right to Effective Remedy). The Constitutional Court observed that ECHR caselaw stresses that it is the duty of state authorities to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This includes a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to (i) protect one whose life is at risk from another, (ii) where the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from a criminal offense, but (iii) failed to take measures which reasonably might have been expected to avoid the risk. The court found the Municipal Court ought to have known about the real risk in existence when D.K. requested the emergency protection order since she had explained the deterioration of her relationship with A.J., specifically his death threats and her reports to the police. Furthermore, the Municipal Court was handling D.K.’s case for the dissolution of union and child custody. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that the Municipal Court was responsible for acting under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and that its inaction was a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the ECHR. The court also found that the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and the statute governing the judiciary do not offer effective legal remedies for the protection of the applicants’ rights, because the former does not contain measures for addressing court inaction, and the latter does not allow the applicants to participate in any disciplinary investigation or procedure. Thus, the inaction of the Municipal Court and the KJC’s practice of not addressing judicial inaction violated the deceased’s and applicants’ right under Articles 32 and 54 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the ECHR. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The appellant and the victim were married for 37 years. On 6 May 2010, the victim was struck at least 15 times on the head, face, and forearm with severe force, causing her death. When police arrived, they found the victim’s body doused in petrol in the garage near her car.. Police found the appellant lying on the floor in the lounge room in the house with a head injury and had a letter opener sticking out of his right hand. The appellant was taken to hospital and later interviewed by the doctors and police. The appellant told police that he got out of bed, walked into the lounge room, and was hit on the head by a man wearing a stocking over his head. Throughout this interview and later investigations by the police, the appellant maintained that there was an intruder who entered the house, assaulted him, and then killed his wife. At trial, the Crown’s case against the appellant included several pieces of circumstantial evidence: the victim was covered by appellant’s clothing, someone attempted to clean up the blood with towels, the victim was doused in petrol but not ignited, indicating that someone tried to destroy DNA, the footprints around the victim’s body matched footwear commonly worn by appellant, the appellant’s DNA was on a bloody metal bar found near the victim’s body, the metal bar appeared to come from the household, blood in and around the house matched victim’s and appellants, appellant had dried, flaky blood on him, the appellant gave inconsistent accounts of the events, appellant lied to officials, and appellant had the motive to kill her because he had financial difficulties and was the beneficiary of her life insurance. In light of the evidence, the appellant was convicted of murdering the victim.The appellant filed an appeal on the grounds that the trial judge erred in (i) directing the jury that they could use appellant’s lie in relation to the murder weapon belonging to him as implied admission of his guilt; (ii) directing the jury that they could use appellant’s lie about owning footwear similar to that which left footprints around the victim’s body as implied admission of his guilt; (iii) admitting the lack of reaction from the appellant when learning of his wife’s death as evidence of his guilt; (iv) failing to direct the jury in relation to evidence that the appellant did not ask how his wife died; (v) misdirecting the jury in relation to motive; and, (vi) failing to direct the jury in relation to evidence of DNA analysis. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in jury instructions or admissions.

The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for stabbing his wife (Cui) and mother-in-law (Zhao) to death, which was upheld by the Supreme People’s Court. Cui had previously filed for divorce. On October 4, 2012, the defendant got into an argument with Zhao and Cui. The defendant chased Zhao out of the house and stabbed her to death. The defendant then caught up with Cui, who had run to a neighbor’s house for help, and stabbed her to death. The Supreme People’s Court affirmed the lower courts’ finding that the defendant was guilty of unlawfully depriving others of their lives, which constituted intentional homicide. The Supreme People’s Court upheld the death penalty, holding that the defendant’s killing method was cruel and the consequences were particularly serious, and thus the death penalty was the appropriate sentence according to the law.

家庭暴力、杀害妇女

被告人因捅刺其妻子及岳母致二人死亡，被河北省保定市中级人民法院认定犯故意杀人罪，判处死刑。最高人民法院核准了河北省高级人民法院维持第一审对被告人丛艳青以故意杀人罪判处死刑，剥夺政治权利终身的刑事裁定。被告人妻子崔某甲曾起诉离婚。2012年10月4日，被告人与其妻子和岳母发生争执。被告人追逐其岳母至屋外并持刀将其捅刺至死。被告人妻子跑至邻居家求救，被告人追至邻居家家门前胡同内，持尖刀捅刺其妻子数下，致其死亡。最高法院认为，被告人，故意非法剥夺他人生命，其行为构成故意杀人罪。犯罪手段残忍，情节、后果特别严重，应依法惩处。

The accused was charged with assaulting and murdering a woman. At trial, the accused filed an application for his discharge at the close of the prosecution’s case, arguing that the prosecution failed to make a case requiring the accused to answer. According to prosecution evidence, after buying alcohol and drinking it with a group of women he did not know, including the deceased, an argument began because the accused stated that he could have sex with all the women. The driver stopped the car when the accused hit the deceased with a bottle. The accused continued to beat the woman outside of the car and the others drove away in fear for their lives to report the attack the police. Upon their return to the scene, they found and picked up the deceased, who was running down the road after escaping the accused. She later passed away from her injuries. At trial, prosecutors presented several eye-witnesses to testify against the accused, as well as direct and circumstantial evidence to support their case. The accused argued that the eye-witnesses had been intoxicated at the time of the assault and therefore their testimony was unreliable. He also argued that the prosecutors failed to meet their burden to convict him. However, the court agreed with the prosecution and refused to discharge the accused, finding that the prosecution’s evidence presented a prima facie case that the accused was legally obliged to answer.

Defendant Mr. H.R.A was convicted of aggravated homicide based on his prior ties and relationship with the victim, Ms. N.A. (his partner), whom he murdered with a gun. Mr. H.RA. was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to Law No. 26,791, Article 80, which provides that “[l]ife imprisonment or confinement shall be imposed upon a person that murders an ascendant, descendent, spouse or ex-spouse or a person that kills another with whom he or she maintains a relationship, irrespective of whether they maintained a joint household.” The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it violates principles of equal protection because it does not afford (or it is not clear that the statute affords) equal protection to similarly situated homosexual couples. In rejecting the defendant’s challenge, the court notes (1) Supreme Court precedent making clear that holding legislation unconstitutional is a grave act that should be taken as a last resort and when it is clear that the legislation is clearly unconstitutional, and (2) the legislation in question sought to introduce as aggravating circumstances factors that had previously been ignored, extending the definition of the concept of “family” to include different family realities.

El acusado, el Sr. H.R.A fue condenado por homicidio con acciones agravadas debido a sus vínculos anteriores y su relación con la víctima, la Sra. N.A. (su pareja), a quien asesinó con un arma. El Sr. H.RA. fue condenado a cadena perpetua con conformidad con la Ley Nº 26.791, Artículo 80, que dispone que “se impondrá la reclusión o el encarcelamiento a una persona que asesine a un ascendiente, descendiente, cónyuge o ex cónyuge o una persona que asesine” otro con quien él o ella mantiene una relación, independientemente de si mantuvieron un hogar conjunto ”. El acusado impugnó la constitucionalidad de la ley, argumentando que violaba los principios de protección igualitaria porque no permite (o no está claro si el el estatuto otorga igual protección a las parejas homosexuales en situación similar). Al rechazar la impugnación del acusado, el tribunal señala (1) el Tribunal Supremo precedente, dejando en claro que mantener la legislación inconstitucional es un acto grave que debe tomarse como último recurso y solamente cuando está claro que la legislación es claramente inconstitucional, y cuando (2) la legislación en cuestión buscaba introducir como circunstancias agravantes factores que anteriormente se habían ignorado, extendiendo la definición del concepto de "familia" para incluir diferentes realidades familiares.

The Supreme Court, in deciding upon the applicability of certain procedural rules, confirmed the main international definitions of violence within relationships. Particularly, the local court dismissed the case against a man charged with the crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, without giving any notice of the motion to dismiss to the person injured by the crime in accordance with Article 408 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The injured person appealed the decision of the local court and requested that the Italian Supreme Court declare the dismissal of the case null and void. In deciding the procedural issue at hand, the Italian Supreme Court pointed out that the Italian criminal law has drawn the definitions of gender violence and violence against women mainly from international law provisions, which are directly enforced in the system pursuant to Article 117 of the Constitution. In this decision the Italian Supreme Court gave all the definitions of violence within gender relationships in consideration of international conventions and specifically European law, and concluded that such definitions, even if not directly included in domestic regulations, “are fully part of our national system through international law and are therefore enforceable.” According to this interpretation, the definitions of gender violence given by the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence are directly applicable in the Italian legal framework. On this basis, the Court ruled that notice of dismissal of the case must always be served on the person injured by crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, as those provisions relate to the gender violence notion set forth under the international and EU provisions applicable in the Italian legal framework.

La Corte di Cassazione, in una decisione riguardo all’applicabilità di alcune regole procedurali, ha confermato l’applicabilità delle principali definizioni internazionali in tema di violenza di genere. In particolare, il Tribunale ha archiviato un caso contro un uomo accusato di aver commesso i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, senza aver dato avviso della richiesta di archiviazione alla parte offesa secondo quanto disposto dall’articolo 408 del codice di procedura penale italiano. Il difensore della persona offesa ricorreva per cassazione e chiedeva alla Corte di Cassazione di dichiarare nullo il provvedimento di archiviazione. Nel decidere la questione procedurale, la Corte di Cassazione evidenziava che il diritto penale italiano ha tratto le definizioni di violenza di genere e violenza contro le donne principalmente dalle disposizioni di diritto internazionale, che sono direttamente applicabili nel sistema ai sensi dell’articolo 117 della Costituzione. In questa decisione la Corte di Cassazione ha fornito tutte le definizioni di violenza di genere in considerazione delle convenzioni internazionali e in particolare del diritto europeo, e ha concluso che tali definizioni, anche se non direttamente incluse nelle normative nazionali, “per il tramite del diritto internazionale sono entrate a far parte dell’ordinamento e influiscono sull’applicazione del diritto”. Secondo questa interpretazione, le definizioni di violenza di genere previste dalla Convenzione di Istanbul sulla prevenzione e la lotta contro la violenza nei confronti delle donne e la violenza domestica sono direttamente applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano. Sulla base di ciò, la Cassazione ha ritenuto che l’avviso della richiesta di archiviazione debba sempre essere notificato alla persona offesa nel caso in cui si proceda per i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, in quanto queste disposizioni si riferiscono alla nozione di violenza di genere sancita dalle disposizioni internazionali e comunitarie applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano.

The defendant appealed a homicide conviction for the shooting of his wife, arguing that the killing resulted from his discovery of her adultery and could, therefore, only amount to manslaughter. In a charge of homicide, the law requires a showing of malice (i.e., a murder committed with premeditation). Implied malice (i.e., murder committed in the “heat of passion;” without premeditation) is nullified by sufficient provocation. The court found that his contention of provocation was unsupported and that his testimony was contradicted by witnesses’ testimony, which indicated that he routinely beat his wife and threatened her life. On the day of the shooting, he took the rifle home without permission and he called his wife to return home prior to shooting her. No evidence showed that his wife was committing adultery. Thus, the Court upheld the conviction, refusing to consider provocation as a mitigating circumstance and finding that the murder was premeditated because the evidence proved express malice.

Due to the increase of femicide crimes in the Dominican society, the Constitutional Court proclaimed the termination of violence against women in all its forms as it is a violation of the Constitution. The proclamation was made in commemoration of the murder of Mirabal, Minerva, Patria and María Teresa, political opponents of the regime of Rafael Trujillo, and in accordance with the international agreements executed in defense of women's rights, as well as the laws issued against gender violence, sexual violence and femicide.

Debido al aumento de los delitos de femicidio en la sociedad dominicana, el Tribunal Constitucional proclamó el cese de la violencia contra la mujer en todas sus formas, incluyéndolo como una forma de violación de la Constitución. Dicha proclamación se realizó en conmemoración del asesinato de Mirabal, Minerva, Patria, y María Teresa, quienes fueron opositores políticos del régimen de Rafael Trujillo. La proclamación está en conformidad con los acuerdos internacionales celebrados en defensa de los derechos de las mujeres y con las leyes emitidas contra la violencia basada en género sexual, violencia sexual en sí, y femicidio.

Appellant was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for the murder of his elderly aunt and appealed for 10 years of his sentence to be suspended because the appellant believed the victim was a witch and could kill him with the power of witchcraft. The Supreme Court upheld the original sentence and held that a perpetrator’s belief in witchcraft is not a mitigating factor when computing an appropriate sentence for murder. While a genuine belief in witchcraft could be treated as an extenuating circumstance in certain instances, murder committed because of a belief in witchcraft would not be mitigated by the belief.

A citizen of Somalia sought a protection order on the basis that she feared persecution due to her status as young, a Somali and a woman. The application asserted that she had been sentenced to death by stoning for adultery in Somalia. The Refugee Review Tribunal denied the application, finding the applicant not credible and holding that neither married nor divorced Somalia women constituted a protected group. The court held that the Tribunal erred because it did not examine whether the law against adultery was applied and administered in Somalia in a discriminatory manner.

The accused physically assaulted his romantic partner, with whom he lived, and drunkenly hit and kicked her to death. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but asked for sentencing leniency on the grounds that he was in remand for four years, served part of his sentence, and had dependents. The Court emphasized that this offence was committed “in the course of domestic violence” and made note of the Republic’s commitment to CEDAW and the eradication of violence against women. The accused was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

Abraham Alfeus was convicted of murder with direct intent after admitting to shooting his intimate partner twice with a shotgun. The presiding judge, Naomi Shivute, read the ruling citing provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, Act 4 of 2003 and sentenced Alfeus to 30 years in prison. In the ruling Shivute stressed a need for stiffer sentences in response to extremely high levels of domestic violence against women and children in Namibia; including that it was a matter of protecting the constitutional right for human dignity, the rights of the victim, and in the interest of society generally. The judge’s ruling was meant to deter future domestic violence offenders and is an important precedent in Namibia where domestic violence runs rampant but is rarely prosecuted.

In 1991 Lesly Yajayra Perdomo (“Perdomo”), a citizen and native of Guatemala, joined her mother in the United States. In April 2003 the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged her as removable because she unlawfully entered the United States in 1991. Perdomo conceded removability but requested asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. Perdomo sought asylum because of her fear of future persecution as a member of a particular social group of “women in Guatemala between the ages of fourteen and forty.” Perdomo explained she was fearful because of: (1) the large number of women killed in Guatemala; (2) the failure of the Guatemalan government to respond appropriately; and (3) the lack of explanation for the killings. The immigration judge denied Perdomo’s requests. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) affirmed the denials and rejected the particular social group definition, “women in Guatemala between the ages of fourteen and forty” and Perdomo’s revised group definition, “all women in Guatemala,” as too broad to qualify for protection. The Ninth Circuit granted Perdomo’s petition for review and held that prior case law established that, “women in a particular country, regardless of ethnicity or clan membership, could form a particular social group.” The court noted that the size and breadth of the group, “all women in Guatemala,” did not preclude it from qualifying as a protected social group and that the BIA erred when it held to the contrary. The court remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether “all women in Guatemala” is a particular social group and, if so, whether Perdomo qualified for asylum.

Article 132 of the Portuguese Penal Code imposes a more severe penalty (imprisonment from 12 to 25 years) for the crime of qualified homicide (“homicídio qualificado”), if, among other special circumstances, the victim is the current or former spouse or person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender, if the victim is pregnant or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

O artigo 132 do Código Penal português impõe uma pena mais severa (de 12 a 25 anos de prisão) aos crimes de homicídio qualificado, se, além de outras circunstâncias especiais, o crime for praticado: (i) contra cônjuge, ex-cônjuge, pessoa de outro ou do mesmo sexo com quem o agente mantenha ou tenha mantido uma relação de namoro ou uma relação semelhante à de conjuges, ainda que sem coabitação; (ii) contra mulher gestante; e (iii) em razão de sexo, orientação sexual ou pela identidade de gênero da vítima.

Articles 342 to 345 relate to abortion as a crime, other than an abortion under any of the conditions established by Law No. 21,030 of 2017. The penalty varies considerably depending on the circumstances and motives for the abortion, including, for example, whether the abortion was performed by the mother or a third party, whether it was done with or without the consent of the mother, or whether it was done to hide any shame (deshonra). Article 390 of the Criminal Code provides that the killing of a woman who is or used to be in a relationship with the murderer is murder (spousal) (femicidio), the penalty for which is imprisonment from 15 years and one day to qualified perpetual imprisonment. Article 400 increases by one degree penalties for crimes committed in the context of domestic or family violence. Article 411 prohibits acts done with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the entry or exit of individuals who perform sex work within or outside the Chilean borders. The penalty is imprisonment from three years and one day to five years, plus a fine. Article 411 also prohibits acts of violence, coercion, or taking advantage of vulnerability of persons in order to obtain the consent of a person to be sexuality exploited, such as in pornography, slavery, or forced labor. The penalty is imprisonment from five years and one day to 15 years, plus a fine.

Los Artículos 342 al 345 regulan aborto como delito, distinto del aborto en cualquiera de las condiciones establecidas por la Ley N ° 21.030 de 2017. La sanción varía considerablemente según las circunstancias y motivos del aborto, incluyendo, por ejemplo, si el el aborto fue realizado por la madre o una tercera persona, ya sea con o sin el consentimiento de la madre, o para ocultar alguna vergüenza (deshonra). El Artículo 390 del Código Penal establece que el homicidio de una mujer que está o solía estar en relación con el asesino es homicidio (conyugal) (femicidio), cuya pena es de prisión de 15 años y un día a prisión perpetua calificada. El Artículo 400 aumenta en un grado las penas por delitos cometidos en el contexto de violencia doméstica o familiar. El Artículo 411 prohíbe los actos realizados con el propósito de promover o facilitar la entrada o salida de personas que realizan trabajo sexual dentro o fuera de las fronteras chilenas. La pena es de prisión de tres años y un día a cinco años, más una multa. El Artículo 411 también prohíbe los actos de violencia, coacción o aprovechamiento de la vulnerabilidad de las personas para obtener el consentimiento de una persona para ser explotada sexualmente, como en la pornografía, la esclavitud o el trabajo forzoso. La pena es de prisión de cinco años y un día a 15 años, más una multa.

On March 9, 2015, Brazil’s existing Penal Code was amended to criminalize femicide, with sentencing ranging from twelve to thirty years of imprisonment. The new legislation defined femicide as a sex-based homicide committed against women, with the involvement of domestic violence, discrimination or contempt for women. The crime is aggravated if the victim is a pregnant woman, a woman within the first three months of maternity, a girl under the age of fourteen years or a woman over sixty years of age. Besides amending the existing criminal code, the new legislation also amended Law no. 8.072/1990, adding femicide to the list of heinous crimes.

Em março de 2015, o Código Penal brasileiro foi emendado para criminalizar o feminicídio, impondo penas de 12 a 30 anos de reclusão. A nova lei definiu feminicídio como homicídio em razão da condição do sexo feminicídio, seja no âmbito da violência doméstica ou em virtude de menosprezo ou discriminação à condição da mulher. Além disso, o Código Penal também foi alterado para aumentar em 1/3 da pena, na hipótese de o feminicídio ser praticado contra gestante ou após 3 meses da realização do parto, contra pessoa menor de 14 anos ou maior de 60 anos, contra pessoa com deficiência ou na presença de ascendente ou descendente da vítima.