Women and Justice: Keywords

Three minor girls, victims of human trafficking who the defendant lured in with promises of working in a restaurant, but instead sent to work at a bar, appealed their case. When the work conditions turned out to be exploitative, the appellants reported the defendant to the police. The case was appealed to the High Court on the basis that: (i) the case file did not go through the standard process whereby a case is registered in the Criminal Registry then distributed to a Magistrate by a Chief Resident Magistrate, and (ii) the magistrate did not follow proper procedure for the child witnesses’ testimony. In concluding that a proper lower court be assigned to re-hear the matter, the High Court underscored the importance of following legal procedure designed to protect the rights of vulnerable child witnesses. The High Court pointed out a number of procedural protocols, such as ensuring that the child witnesses did not come into direct contact with the accused, making provision for the witness to be accompanied by a supportive figure in court, and considering the possibility of a pre-recorded interview of a child witness as evidence. The court noted that a court competent in handling child witnesses must re-hear the matter, as causing witnesses to endure repeat trials as a result of the failure to follow proper judicial procedure is akin to repeat victimization of such witnesses.

While intoxicated, the defendant committed lewd acts against a minor (under 14 years old) by forcing her to expose herself and photographing her naked. He also took the photographs, which were recognized as a pornographic product. According to the courts of the first and second instance, the illegal actions qualified as corruption of a minor (Article 156 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and the production of child pornography for which he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment. In his complaint to the Supreme Court, the prosecutor demanded a longer sentence, arguing that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and emphasizing the defendant’s criminal history. The Supreme Court noted that the court of the first instance considered the severity of the crimes, the personal information about the offender, the defendant’s attitude towards the crimes, the defendant’s partial recognition of his guilt, and the aggravating circumstance of intoxication. Thus, by imposing a penalty of imprisonment near the maximum allowable sentence, the Supreme Court held that court of the first instance complied with the requirements of proportionality and fairness. In this case, the prosecutor's complaint was dismissed.

Чоловік в стані алкогольного сп’яніння вчинив відносно малолітньої (до 14 років) потерпілої розпусні дії (ст. 156 КК), які виразились у її примушуванні до оголення та фотографуванні в оголеному вигляді; він також створив фотознімки з таким зображенням потерпілої (було визнано продукцією порнографічного характеру). За результатами розгляду справи судом першої та другої інстанції протиправні дії було кваліфіковано як розбещення малолітньої особи та виготовлення дитячої порнографії та засуджено до 7 років позбавлення волі. Прокурор у своїй скарзі до Верховного Суду вимагає скасування рішення та призначення нового розгляду через невідповідність призначеного покарання скоєному злочину та неврахування особи винного, що неодноразово притягувався до адміністративної відповідальності. Верховний Суд зазначає, що суд першої інстанції, призначаючи покарання у виді позбавлення волі, врахував ступінь тяжкості вчинених злочинів, ставлення до вчиненого, часткове визнання своєї винуватості, наявність обставини, що обтяжує покарання - вчинення злочину в стані алкогольного сп'яніння, а також дані про його особу. Таким чином, суд першої інстанції, призначаючи покарання у виді позбавлення волі в розмірі, наближеному до максимального (передбаченого за інкриміновані правопорушення), дотримався вимоги співмірності та справедливості. Скарга прокурора не підлягає задоволенню.

For years, the appellant lived with his civil wife in the same apartment (in Ukraine, the term 'civil marriage' means cohabitation of a man and a woman without official marriage registration). While intoxicated one evening, he began to accuse his wife of cheating on him with other men and degrading his honor and dignity as a man. After a verbal conflict, the man, decided to kill his wife. In order to cause the most severe physical pain, he purposefully poured sulfuric acid from a bottle on his wife and verbally wished for her death, causing serious chemical burns. In addition, the acid fell on her minor son, which burned him. The court of first instance sentenced the man to eight years imprisonment for attempted murder, as well as causing bodily injury to the wife and her son. Also, the court imposed the obligation on the appellant to pay for the costs of their treatment. The appellant filed an appeal, arguing that the first-instance court wrongly characterized his actions because he did not want to kill his wife, but only cause her bodily injury. The Court of Appeal left the sentence unchanged, citing the following facts: when the appellant poured acid on the victim, he expressed his desire for her death; he poured the acid on her head and face, which are vital organs; and, according to the conclusion of the experts, the man poured most of the acid in the bottle on the victim.

Скаржник роками проживав зі своєю цивільною дружиною в одній квартирі (в Україні термін "цивільний шлюб" означає спільне проживання чоловіка та жінки без офіційної реєстрації шлюбу). Одного вечора, перебуваючи у стані алкогольного сп’яніння, він почав звинувачувати свою дружину в тому, що вона зраджує йому з іншими чоловіками та принижує його честь і гідність як чоловіка. Після словесної сварки чоловік вирішив убити свою дружину. З метою заподіяння сильного фізичного болю, він цілеспрямовано облив дружину сірчаною кислотою з пляшки та на словах побажав їй смерті, спричинивши серйозні хімічні опіки. Крім того, кислота потрапила на її неповнолітнього сина, від чого він отримав опіки. Суд першої інстанції засудив чоловіка до восьми років позбавлення волі за замах на вбивство, а також заподіяння тілесних ушкоджень дружині та її сину. Також суд поклав на скаржника обов'язок оплатити витрати на їх лікування. Скаржник подав апеляцію, вважаючи, що суд першої інстанції неправильно кваліфікував його дії, оскільки він не хотів вбити свою дружину, а лише заподіяти їй тілесні ушкодження. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін, посилаючись на такі факти: коли скаржник облив потерпілу кислотою, він висловив бажання, аби вона померла; він вилив кислоту на її голову та обличчя, які є життєво важливими органами; та, відповідно до висновку експертів, чоловік вилив на потерпілу більшу частину кислоти із пляшки.

In this case, the defendant, the mayor of a Colombian town, was convicted of rape and non-consensual abortion. The penalty was 261 months of imprisonment and 20 years of disqualification from exercising political roles in the public sector. The prosecutor argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, a minor, against her will and, as a result, she got pregnant. The defendant forced the plaintiff to terminate the pregnancy. The defendant argued before the Supreme Court of Justice that the appellant court omitted at least seven fundamental testimonies. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff’s testimony, as well as some of the testimonies from other witnesses, was inconsistent. The plaintiff declared out-of-court that the defendant raped her and forced her to abort, however, during the appellate trial she testified that the lawsuit was a stratagem designed by her uncle, who was a candidate and political opponent of the defendant, to discredit the defendant. However, the appellate court learned that defendant, in order to obtain an acquittal, extorted, threatened, and attempted to bribe the plaintiff, plaintiff’s relatives, and other witnesses involved in the case. The Supreme Court of Justice found that even though the plaintiff changed her testimony, the other evidence suggested that the defendant was guilty of the charges. Therefore, the Court ultimately upheld the defendant’s conviction.

En este caso, el acusado, alcalde de un pueblo colombiano, fue condenado por acceso carnal violento y aborto no consentido. La pena fue de 261 meses de prisión y 20 años de inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos. El fiscal argumentó que el acusado tuvo varios encuentros sexuales con una víctima menor de edad, en contra de su voluntad y, como consecuencia, quedó embarazada. La víctima fue obligada por el acusado a interrumpir el embarazo. El acusado alegó ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia que la corte de segunda instancia omitió al menos siete testimonios fundamentales para el caso. También afirmó que el testimonio de la víctima, así como algunos de los testimonios de otros testigos, eran inconsistentes. La víctima declaró extrajudicialmente que el acusado la violó y la obligó a abortar, sin embargo, durante el juicio de apelación declaró que la demanda fue una estrategia diseñada por su tío, quien era candidato y opositor político del acusado, para desacreditar al acusado. Sin embargo, la corte de segunda instancia se enteró que el acusado extorsionó, amenazó e intentó sobornar a la víctima, a los familiares de la víctima y a otros testigos involucrados en el caso, con el fin de obtener una absolución. La Corte Suprema de Justicia encontró que, a pesar de que la víctima cambió su testimonio, la evidencia sugería que el acusado era culpable de los cargos que se le imputaban. Por lo tanto, la Corte finalmente confirmó la condena del acusado.

The 21-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to the defilement of a 15-year-old girl with whom he had an ongoing sexual relationship and who was, by the time of the trial, pregnant as a result. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years imprisonment with hard labor. He unsuccessfully appealed to reduce the sentence, claiming the following mitigating factors: (i) his willingness to financially support the girl and her baby; (ii) his age; and (iii) his status as a first-time offender. The court rejected this appeal on the grounds that appellate courts may only interfere with sentences that are either “manifestly excessive (or inadequate) or otherwise erroneous in principle,” citing cases in which the state had successfully enhanced initial sentences from six to eight years as evidence that this sentence was not unusually excessive or otherwise erroneous.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to eight years imprisonment including hard labor for defilement of an11-month-old girl. On appeal, the appellant’s primary argument was that the testimony of the child’s mother was not sufficiently corroborated and therefore the conviction was not supported by the evidence. He also argued that the sentence was excessive. Regarding the corroboration rule in sexual violence cases, the court announced that it was a longstanding practice based on blatant discrimination against women, who are the predominant victims of such offenses and assumed to be unreliable witnesses. The court found the corroboration rule unlawful under existing constitutional (article 20), evidence, and criminal laws. Instead, the court held that courts should take caution basing convictions on uncorroborated evidence to ensure satisfaction of the burden of proof. Regarding the appellant’s arguments, the court found that there was not sufficient evidence of penetration to sustain the defilement conviction, thus acquitting the appellant of defilement. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported a conviction for the lesser offense of indecent assault, for which the court imposed a sentence of three years of imprisonment out of a maximum of 14 years. The court chose a substantially lower sentence than the maximum due to what it described as mitigating factors, including that: (i) the appellant was a first-time offender; (ii) the child was largely unharmed physically according to the medical report; (iii) there was no evidence that the child would subsequently suffer an STI or psychological impacts; and (iv) the crime was not premeditated in the court’s view, but a crime of opportunity.

The appellant was convicted of two accounts of domestic violence in the form of sexual assault of two minors (11 and 9-years-old) and sentenced to 8 years in prison, in addition to payment of a compensation to the victims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant 1) claimed that the accusation was based merely on the victims’ testimony, which he alleged untrue and made with the sole purpose of monetary gain by their mother (his partner at the time of the crimes), 2) denied having any kind of sexual intercourse with the victims, and 3) claimed the conviction violated his constitutional rights because the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The Supreme Court argued that there was enough physical evidence that the defendant violated both victims, including evidence that proved anal rape. However, as the evidence and testimony of the victims showed, the assault had not occurred through vaginal penetration, but solely anal. Therefore, the type of crime perpetrated had not been correctly invoked by the lower court, as the configuration of sexual assault requires vaginal penetration under Angolan law. Under that paradigm, the Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed was indecent exposure and, consequently, domestic violence and that such criminal offense is punishable with a sentence lower than 12 years in prison. The Supreme Court then found the defendant amnestied and, consequently, extinguished the criminal proceedings against him, without prejudice of the monetary compensation for damages. In 2016, Angola published an amnesty law (Lei nº 11/16) in which it pardoned common crimes punishable by a prison sentence of up to 12 years. Although the amnesty law excludes sexual crimes, the crime committed in this case does not fit the exception, precisely because of the absence of vaginal penetration. At the end of 2020, a new Angolan Penal Code was enacted, which has been in effect since February 2021. The new Penal Code considers both vaginal and anal penetration to be sexual penetration.

O apelante foi condenado por duas ocorrências de violência doméstica na forma de abuso sexual de dois menores (11 e 9 anos de idade) e sentenciado a 8 anos na prisão, com adição de pagamento de indenização às vítimas. Na apelação para o Tribunal Supremo, o apelante 1) afirmou que as acusações foram feitas somente com base nos depoimentos das vítimas, os quais ele alegou serem falsos e feitos com o único propósito de ganho financeiro pela mãe (a sua parceira no momento dos crimes), 2) negou ter qualquer tipo de relação sexual com as vítimas, e 3) afirmou que a condenação violou os seus direitos constitucionais porque a evidência não foi suficiente para provar a sua culpa. O Tribunal Supremo argumentou que havia evidência física suficiente para provar que o réu violou ambas as vítimas, incluindo evidência que provou estupro anal. Entretanto, como a evidência e o depoimento mostraram, o abuso não foi feito por penetração vaginal, mas somente anal. Assim, o tipo do crime perpetrado não tinha sido corretamente aplicado pela corte inferior, já que a configuração de abuso sexual na legislação de Angola requer penetração vaginal. Sob este paradigma, o Tribunal Supremo deliberou que o crime foi de atentado ao pudor e, consequentemente, violência doméstica e esse tipo penal é punido com sentença menor que 12 anos de prisão. O Tribunal Supremo então declarou o réu anistiado e, portanto, extinguiu os procedimentos criminais contra ele, sem prejuízo da indenização por danos. Em 2016, Angola publicou uma lei de anistia (Lei nº 11/16) em que perdoou crimes comuns que são puníveis com penas de até 12 anos. Ainda que a lei de anistia excluda crimes sexuais, o crime neste caso não se encaixa nessa exceção, precisamente por causa da abstinência da penetração vaginal. No fim de 2020, um novo Código Penal Angolano foi promulgado, o qual está em vigor desde Fevereiro de 2021. O novo Código Penal considera ambas penetrações vaginal e anal como penetração sexual.

The defendant-husband of Dutch nationality, married but separated from his Japanese wife, forcibly took his two-year-old daughter away from her mother with the purpose of taking her away to the Netherlands. The court held that the defendant kidnapped his daughter in a "malicious manner" when he pulled her by the legs, hanged her upside down and wedged her between his arm and waist, a criminal offense of kidnapping for the purpose of transporting the kidnapped person to a foreign country, under Article 226(1) of the Penal Code.

本件は、オランダ国籍で日本人の妻と婚姻していた被告人が、当時2歳の娘をオランダに連れ去る目的で、娘の足を引っ張り、逆さに吊るし、腕と腰の間に挟んだりして、母から娘を強制的に連れ去った事件である。 裁判所は、被告人が「悪質な方法」で娘を略取したとし、刑法第226条第1項の「国外移送略取罪」に該当するとした。

The respondent was convicted of two charges of defilement of a 13-year-old girl and sentenced to four years and six months of imprisonment even though the maximum punishment for each charge was life imprisonment. The Attorney General of Kiribati appealed this sentence as “manifestly inadequate.” The Court of Appeal of Kiribati allowed the appeal and delineated the proper framework for sentencing in the context of this offense. First, the court noted that the minimum sentence for defilement should be five years and that any aggravating or mitigating factors must be accounted for in the final sentencing decision. Second, a court must make an upward adjustment for any aggravating factors external to the criminal act such as a person’s relevant criminal record. Third, a court should allow a reduction of the sentence where there are mitigating factors, such as guilty pleas, expressions of genuine remorse, prior good character, cooperation with police, or the youth of the offender. Fourth, a court should reduce the sentence based on the amount of time the offender spent in custody prior to sentencing. Finally, where a sentence would be less than two years, the court should consider a suspended sentence. Considering the aggravating factor of the multiple instances of sexual abuse against the victim and the mitigating factor of the respondent’s record of past good character, the court found the initial sentence manifestly inadequate and adjusted it to six years and six months imprisonment.

The Criminal Trial Court issued a condemnatory sentence against the defendants for the repeated rape of their daughter and for other sexual crimes, including sexual abuse of a minor of less than 14 years of age and production of child pornography. The defendants sought to reverse the judgment, alleging that the Trial Court failed to consider the mental disabilities of one of the perpetrators and erred by failing to consider a lesser sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the failure of the Trial Court to consider the mental disability of the defendant was an error and should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the mother should have been charged solely as an accomplice because she had also actively participated in photographing the sexual abuse of the victim. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment solely in respect to the sentencing calculation, as the crimes were of the same nature and, therefore, the Trial Court should have granted a lesser sentence. (External Link leads to the website of the Chilean Judicial System. This case is available by searching by the case number.)

El Tribunal Penal de Primera Instancia dictó sentencia condenatoria contra los imputados por la violación reiterada de su hija y por otros delitos sexuales, incluido el abuso sexual de un menor de 14 años y la producción de pornografía infantil. Los acusados ​​buscaron revocar la sentencia, alegando que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no consideró la discapacidad mental de uno de los imputados y cometió un error al no considerar una sentencia menor. El Tribunal de Apelaciones sostuvo que el hecho de que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no tuviera en cuenta la discapacidad mental del acusado fue un error y debería haber sido considerado como una circunstancia atenuante en la sentencia. La Corte de Apelaciones rechazó el argumento de que la madre debería haber sido acusada únicamente como cómplice porque también había participado activamente en la fotografía del abuso sexual de la víctima. La Corte de Apelaciones revocó la sentencia únicamente en lo que respecta al cálculo de la sentencia, ya que los delitos eran de la misma naturaleza y, por lo tanto, la Corte de Primera Instancia debería haber dictado una sentencia menor. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial de Chile. Este caso está disponible buscando por el número de caso).

The victim, a minor of the age of 15, was trafficked by men including defendants I.I. and Sh. G, from Albania to Kosovo, where she was imprisoned and forced to work as dancer at multiple restaurants. She eventually escaped and met two men who helped her find accommodations and work as a waitress. One of the men, S.B., had sexual intercourse with her, as did D.B., the manager who hired her as a waitress. I.I., Sh. G., and the men involved in the victim’s trafficking and employment were convicted of Trafficking in Persons contrary to Article 139 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and S.B. and D.B. were additionally convicted of Sexual Abuse of Persons under the Age of 16 contrary to Article 198. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the court of first instance’s ruling that the fact that the victim perceived I.I. as a person who had helped her was a mitigating circumstance, and agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on I.I. was very lenient, noting that I.I. had participated in the victim’s trafficking despite his awareness of the victim’s age and vulnerable situation, including her dependency on narcotics, presence alone in a foreign country, and lack of options to return home. The court accordingly increased I.I.’s sentence from one year to two years. The tribunal then dismissed Sh. G.’s argument that he was found guilty based only on the statement of the victim, holding that in the case of human trafficking, “it is the injured party who is the most reliable person.” The Supreme Court also agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on S.B. was very lenient, considering that he had intercourse with the victim, being aware of her age and vulnerable situation, and thus increased S.B.’s sentence from one year and one month to one year and six months. Finally, the court agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on D.B. was very lenient. The tribunal held that the trafficking of minors need not involve the use of force or violence, and that a conviction of sexual abuse of a minor could stand even if it was proven that it was done with the permission of the victim. The court accepted that the victim may have shown gratitude to D.B. for his assistance, but dismissed it as the “distorted perception” of a “vulnerable victim” and held that the gratitude did not change the criminal nature of the act or serve as an exculpatory circumstance. D.B.’s sentence was accordingly increased from two years to two years and four months. (Also available in English.)

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to two years in prison for aggravated domestic violence. The court considered the aggravating circumstances to be the accused’s recidivism and the use of his strength to overpower his female victim. AA had a history of domestic violence against his wife (BB). Even though he had repeatedly assaulted BB and stabbed her once, BB refused to file a complaint against him. A family court judge imposed a restraining order against AA pursuant to which he could not get closer than 300 meters to BB and her children. However, BB on several occasions allowed AA back in her home and near the children. On October 7, 2008, AA came over to BB’s house with the intention of moving back in, but when BB declined, AA locked her and her children in a room for two hours. He did not physically assault them, but did threaten to kill them. BB filed a complaint and AA was convicted of domestic violence. AA appealed arguing that BB had subsequently withdrawn her criminal complaint against him, which constituted consent to his conduct. The Appeals Court determined that the victim’s withdrawal of her complaint was a consequence of “battered women’s syndrome,” and had no bearing on a criminal action. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a dos años de prisión por violencia doméstica agravada. El Tribunal consideró que las circunstancias agravantes eran la reincidencia del acusado y el uso de su fuerza para dominar a su víctima femenina. AA tenía antecedentes previos de violencia doméstica contra su esposa (BB). Aunque había asaltado repetidamente a BB y la apuñaló una vez, BB se negó a presentar una queja contra él. Un juez de un tribunal de familia impuso una orden de restricción contra AA en virtud de la cual no podía acercarse más de 300 metros a BB y sus hijos. Sin embargo, BB en varias ocasiones permitió que AA regresara a su casa y estuviera cerca de los niños. El 7 de octubre del 2008, AA vino a la casa de BB con la intención de regresar, pero cuando BB declinó, AA la encerró a ella y a sus hijos en una habitación durante dos horas. No los agredió físicamente, pero amenazó con matarlos. BB presentó una queja y AA fue condenado por violencia doméstica. AA apeló argumentando que BB había retirado posteriormente su denuncia penal contra él, lo que constituía un consentimiento para su conducta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que la retirada de la denuncia de la víctima fue una consecuencia del "síndrome de las mujeres maltratadas" y no tenía relación con una acción penal. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to four years in prison for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor (BB). AA and the mother of BB had a common law marriage. AA had been sexually abusing BB since she was eight years old and started raping her when she turned 11. At age 14, BB became pregnant as a result of rape committed by AA. BB’s mother discovered AA’s abuse and filed the criminal complaint. AA confessed to being the victim’s “lover.” The court found aggravating circumstances including that AA had taken advantage of his domestic relationship with BB’s mother and that he had abused his victim during the night. AA’s confession constituted an attenuating circumstance, reducing the sentence imposed. The Appeals Court dismissed AA’s appeal and affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, ruling that there was enough evidence presented to establish the facts of the case.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a cuatro años de prisión por abuso sexual agravado de un menor (BB). AA y la madre de BB tenían un matrimonio común. AA había abusado sexualmente de BB desde que tenía ocho años y comenzó a violarla cuando cumplió los 11. A los 14 años, BB quedó embarazada como resultado de una violación cometida por AA. La madre de BB descubrió el abuso de AA y presentó esta denuncia penal. AA confesó ser el "amante" de la víctima. El tribunal encontró circunstancias agravantes, incluyendo que AA se había aprovechado de su relación doméstica con la madre de BB y que había abusado de su víctima generalmente durante las noches. La confesión de AA constituyó una circunstancia atenuante, reduciendo la sentencia impuesta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó la apelación de AA y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, dictaminando que se presentaron suficientes pruebas para establecer los hechos del caso.

The defendant was convicted of rape and sexual abuse of his minor daughter and appealed, challenging the trial court’s refusal to order the victim to undergo a mental health examination and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The defendant’s daughter, who was 11 years old, reported to her mother that defendant had sex with her on two occasions when she was seven and eight years old. In a motion to order a psychiatric examination of the child, defendant pointed to the child’s mental health history, which showed that she “had been diagnosed with psychological disorders and exhibited dysfunctional behavior.” The trial court denied the motion and the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. The issue before the Court was whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to subject the plaintiff, a rape victim, to a psychiatric examination and whether the plaintiff’s testimony alone, without the requested mental examination, was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction. The Court affirmed the lower courts, finding that the trial process afforded “adequate safeguards to the accused to test the competency of the complaining witness without a court-ordered mental health examination of that witness.” Therefore, “a trial court has no authority to order a complaining witness in a rape case to undergo a psychiatric or psychological evaluation.” With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court noted its precedents establishing that “the victim’s testimony alone, if not inherently incredible, is sufficient to support a conviction for rape,” and that because the child’s testimony was not inherently incredible, it was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to subject plaintiff to a mental examination and the plaintiff’s testimony, by itself, was sufficient to support the conviction.

The appellant and respondent are divorced parents of three children. At the time of the divorce, custody of the children was awarded to the respondent. The appellant then moved for an interim protection order, claiming that the respondent physically abused their minor children. A court granted the interim protection order on October 3, 2011, and awarded the appellant interim custody of the children, subject to visitation by the respondent, and ordered respondent to cease abusing the children. The Magistrate’s Court subsequently discharged the interim order on October 24, 2011, based on Section 12 of the Combating of Domestic Violence Act 4 of 2003, reasoning that the beatings were an isolated incident and were only meant to punish the children for bad behavior. The appellant challenged the discharge. The appellate court agreed with appellant and granted a final protection order effective through July 2013, which awarded the appellant custody of the children with visitation for the respondent on alternate weekends and holidays. In its decision, the appellate court stated the importance of rooting out the “evil that is domestic violence in order to give effect to the protection of the constitutional value of human dignity.”

The appellant Barry Carne was formerly in a relationship with L.S., the victim and the mother of his four children. One day Carne entered L.S.’s home without consent, destroyed property, and confronted L.S.. During the altercation he grabbed and twisted L.S.’s right hand and fingers, causing her to fall in pain. As a result he was charged with aggravated assault, and a domestic violence order was issued against him. The domestic violence order restrained him from contacting, approaching, intimidating or harassing the victim and from exposing their children to domestic violence. While the domestic violence order was in force, Carne again went to L.S.’s house. After L.S. did not answer, he attempted to hang himself outside the home, only to be saved by his son, who was 14 at the time. Carne was charged with breaching the domestic violence order, and pleaded guilty. The sentencing magistrate sentenced him to eight months’ imprisonment for the breach and two months for the aggravated assault, to be served concurrently. Carne appealed the sentence, claiming that it was manifestly excessive, and argued that the magistrate took into account irrelevant matters, in particular his suicide attempt. The court of appeal considered the definition of “domestic violence” and whether Carne’s attempted suicide in front of the children was an attempt to cause mental harm to L.S. and/or her children. The court held that the sentencing magistrate had not received sufficient evidence from the prosecution demonstrating that Carne had attempted the suicide in order to cause mental harm to L.S. and/or her children and, accordingly, it was not open to the magistrate to make such a finding. The magistrate was required to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis, permitted by the facts, regarding the attempted suicide before concluding that the intent was to cause mental harm. As such, the sentence was reduced to one month’s imprisonment.

One month after marrying the victim, “BB” (name omitted from public record), the defendant, “AA” (name omitted from public record) coerced BB to become a prostitute so she could help with their financial problems. After BB engaged in sexual relations as a prostitute, AA began to physically assault BB and to threaten to kill her children, alleging that was enjoying being a prostitute. Concurrently, AA’s 15-year old daughter “CC” (name omitted from public record) moved in with AA and BB, and shortly thereafter, AA engaged in non-consensual sexual activities with CC for approximately six months. AA had previously convictions for robbery, physical harassment and child pornography, among others. The Superior Court of Justice found AA guilty of the crimes of promoting prostitution under section 169 of the Portuguese Penal Code, domestic violence under section 152 of the Portuguese Penal Code, sexual abuse of a person incapable of resistance under sections 164 and 177 of the Portuguese Penal Code and illegal possession of weapon, and sentenced AA to 16 years of imprisonment.

Um mês depois de se casar com a vítima, “BB” (nome omitido do registro público), o réu, “AA” (nome omitido do registro público) coagiu BB a se tornar uma prostituta para que ela pudesse ajudar com os seus problemas financeiros. Depois de BB começar a ter relações sexuais como uma prostituta, AA começou a agredir fisicamente BB e ameaçar a matar os seus filhos, alegando que ela estava gostando de ser uma prostituta. Simultaneamente, “CC” (nome omitido do registro público), a filha de 15 anos de “AA”, se mudou para morar com AA e BB, e logo após, AA começou a ter relações sexuais não consentidas com CC por aproximadamente seis meses. AA tinha condenações anteriores por roubo, assédio físico e pornografia infantil, entre outros. A Corte Superior de Justiça considerou AA culpado dos crimes de promoção de prostituição sob a seção 169 do Código Penal Português, violência doméstica sob a seção 152 do Código Penal Português, abuso sexual de pessoa incapaz de resistir sob as seções 164 e 177 do Código Penal Português e posse ilegal de arma, e sentenciou AA a 16 anos de prisão.

The Turkish Criminal Code, Article 103, Number 5237, provides sentencing for child sexual abuse without graduating the sentence in proportion to the child’s age. The Bafra High Criminal Court applied to the Constitutional Court to annul this provision, and the Court annulled the following two provisions: (1) child sexual abuse carries a sentence between eight and fifteen years; (2) child sexual molestation carries a sentence between three and eight years. The Court reasoned that the legislature may consider the country’s moral values and social and cultural structure in determining the punishment, and while heavier sentences for crimes against younger children who are more vulnerable to sexual assault would be reasonable, the Court opined that in some cases the crime and the punishment might not be proportional, which would violate the “state of law” principle. Therefore, the Court annulled the sentencing guidelines, effective six months following publication in the Official Gazette.

L.G. was accused of violation of a woman’s integrity (Sw. kvinnofridskränkning), assault (Sw. misshandel) and rape of his wife, C.G. Because the couple’s three children were present when the alleged abuse occurred, L.G. was also charged with violation of their integrity. The Supreme Court found that C.G.’s statements were more credible than L.G.’s, partly because the couple’s three children concurred with C.G.’s version of events. Accordingly, due to L.G.’s repeated violation of C.G.’s integrity, the Supreme Court found L.G. guilty of violating C.G.’s integrity. Regarding the rape charge, however, the Supreme Court did not find sufficient evidence to convict L.G. Aside from C.G.’s testimony – which left doubt as to the time of the alleged rape – there was no evidence to substantiate the rape charge. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the rape charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, because the court determined that L.G. had assaulting C.G. and their children, the court sentenced L.G. to two years and six months imprisonment.

In May 2015, a girl purchased bread from Defendant Luis Alonso, a 50-year-old baker, at his home. While the girl was at Luis’ home, Luis physically attacked her and stated that he would “rape her.” Although Luis did not carry out his threat, he threatened the girl that if she reported him, she would pay and that he would continue to harass her and physically assault her every time he saw her on the street. In February, 2016, the girl was approached by Luis in a small town in Ciudad Delgado and was afraid that Luis would sexually assault her again so she reported the previous events to patrolling officers. The patrolling officers arrested Luis for sexual harassment. Section 165 of the El Salvadoran Penal Code provides that a person is liable for sexual harassment—punishable by three to five years imprisonment—when that person engages in unwanted sexual conduct involving phrases, touching, signs or other unequivocal sexual conduct that does not in itself constitute a more serious offense. The court found that the defendant Luis Alonso sexually harassed the girl in violation of article 165. The court replaced the three-year prison sentence with 144 days of community service and ordered that Luis pays the victim a civil penalty of $300.

En mayo del 2015, una niña le compró pan al acusado Luis Alonso, quien era un panadero de 50 años, en su casa. Mientras la niña estaba en la casa de Luis, Luis la agredió físicamente y le dijo que la “violaría.” Aunque Luis no cumplió con su amenaza, amenazó a la niña con que si lo denunciaba, ella pagaría y que seguiría acosándola y agrediéndola físicamente cada vez que la viera en la calle. En febrero del 2016, Luis se acercó a la niña en un pequeño pueblo de Ciudad Delgado. La niña, quien temía que Luis la agrediera sexualmente, denunció los hechos anteriores a los agentes de patrulla. Los agentes de patrulla arrestaron a Luis por acoso sexual. La Sección 165 del Código Penal salvadoreño establece que una persona es responsable de acoso sexual, punible con tres a cinco años de prisión, cuando esa persona participa en una conducta sexual no deseada que involucre frases, tocamientos, señas u otra conducta sexual inequívoca que no constituyen un delito más grave. El tribunal determinó que el acusado Luis Alonso acosó sexualmente a la niña en violación del Artículo 165. El tribunal reemplazó la sentencia de tres años de prisión por 144 días de servicio comunitario y ordenó que Luis pagara a la víctima una multa civil de $300.

In 2004, the common-law marriage between Dalibor Perić (“Perić”) and his wife was terminated. Perić’s ex-wife was granted custody of their two-year-old son, and Perić was ordered to pay BAM 100 per month in child support. Over the next three years, Perić never paid child support, he verbally abused and physically assaulted his ex-wife and her parents resulting in two domestic violence charges. In addition, he beat the child on several occasions. In 2007, the mother of the child filed a motion to terminate Perić’s parental rights. Two years later, the Basic Court in Bijeljina stripped Perić of his parental rights pursuant to Article 106 of the Family Law of the Republika Srpska. The County Court of Bijelina dismissed Perić’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s ruling. Perić then appealed to the Constitutional Court of BiH, arguing the ruling of the County Court violated his right to a fair trial and right to private and family life. Because no draft decision received a majority vote, the Constitutional Court of BiH dismissed Perić’s appeal.

Decision available in English here.

The appellant in this case had been arrested and punished with a fine for allegedly paying for child prostitution in violation of the Act on Punishment of Activities Relating to Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and the Protection of Children (before its revision by Act No. 79 of 2014). The news media reported his arrest for the alleged charge, and all or part of the coverage was made available at several websites that were searchable on the appellee search engine. This case concerned the appellant’s request—based on his personal rights and moral interests—for an order of provisional disposition, requiring the search engine to make websites that refer to the appellant’s criminal record unsearchable. The High Court dismissed the request. The Supreme Court, on one hand, recalled its finding from precedents that the protection of information related to an individual’s privacy is subject to legal protection. On the other hand, it noted that search engines’ provision of search results (1) may constitute acts of expression and (2) has become an important infrastructure for distribution of information through the internet. The Supreme Court then found that the evaluation of whether providing particular search results amounts to an illegal action must take into account both the benefits of making the information at question unsearchable, and reasons and circumstances pertaining to providing such search results; the court can require that the search engine remove such search results only if the former exceeds the latter. In this case, the Supreme Court found that, while the criminal record at issue pertained to the privacy of the appellant and which he did not wish to be made largely available to the public, such information also concerned the public interest in light of the nature of crimes relating to child porn and child prostitution. In addition, the Supreme Court took into account that the information dissemination was limited to a certain degree considering that such search results did not show up unless a search engine user used the appellant’s name and his residing prefecture together as search keywords. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the benefit of making the information at issue unsearchable did not exceed the need of having the websites at issue on the search engine and sustained the lower court’s ruling.

本件の抗告人は、「児童買春、児童ポルノに係る行為等の規制及び処罰並びに児童の保護等に関する法律」（平成26年法律第79号による改正前）に違反した容疑で逮捕され、罰金刑に処せられた。複数のニュースメディアがその逮捕に関する記事をネット上で公開し、それらの記事は抗告人の氏名と居住する都道府県をキーワードに入れ、検索エンジンで検索すれば出るようになっていた。本件は、抗告人がその人格的権利に基づき、犯罪歴を公開するウェブサイトを検索できないよう検索事業者に削除を求めた仮処分命令の事案である。高裁は、抗告人の請求を棄却した。最高裁は、個人のプライバシーに関する情報は法的保護の対象であるという判例から、本件検索結果の提供は、（1）検索エンジンの表現行為である可能性があり、（2）ネット検索エンジンによる情報流通の社会的役割を果たしていると指摘した。また、特定の検索結果を提供することが違法行為に当たるか否かの評価は、当該検索結果を提供しない法的利益と、提供する理由に関する諸般の事情を比較衡量しなければならず、前者が後者を上回る場合のみ、検索エンジンに対して当該検索結果の削除を求めることができると最高裁は判断した。本件の場合、問題となっている犯罪記録は、抗告人のプライバシーに関わり、抗告人が広く公開されることを望んでいないものではあるが、児童ポルノや児童買春に関する犯罪の性質を鑑み、公共の利益にも関わるものでもある。また、検索エンジンの利用者は、抗告人の氏名と居住する都道府県を検索キーワードとして併用しなければ、関連する逮捕情報が検索結果として表示されないことを考慮すると、その逮捕情報の公開が一定程度制限されていたことが分かる。本件において、最高裁は、検索結果を提供しない法的利益は、検索結果を提供する必要性を超えていないと判断し、高裁判決を支持した。

A nine-year-old girl was sexually abused by her father, Florencio Arias, on several occasions. The defendant was sentenced to 10 years in prison, which was confirmed by the Criminal Appeals Court on April 25, 2003.

Una niña de nueve años fue abusada sexualmente por su padre, Florencio Arias, en varias ocasiones. El imputado fue condenado a 10 años de prisión, lo cual fue confirmado por la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal el 25 de abril de 2003.

N.C., a minor, filed a personal injury action against her physical education teacher, her school principal, and the Tallapoosa County Board of Education. N.C. alleged that after her seventh grade physical education class, she was pulled into the boys’ locker room and raped by A.H., a 12th grade student whom her teacher, Caldwell, had appointed as a teacher’s aide. N.C.’s complaint alleged that Caldwell had actual knowledge that A.H. was sexually harassing students and had negligently or wantonly supervised N.C. and the other students in her class. Caldwell, the principal, and the Board filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that N.C.’s claims were barred by the doctrine of state-agent immunity. N.C. opposed entry of summary judgment against only Caldwell. The trial court reasoned that the Alabama Supreme Court “has been particularly reluctant to hold an educator responsible for sexual misconduct by another” and granted summary judgment in favor of Caldwell based on stage-agent immunity. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court considered an exception to state-agent immunity: “a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity . . . when the State acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.” The Alabama Supreme Court found that Caldwell was exercising judgment in the discharge of his duty to supervise students at the time of the rape, which occurred after the dismissal bell had rung. Nonetheless, the Alabama Supreme Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to (i) whether Caldwell actually appointed A.H. as a student aide, and, if so, whether he acted beyond his authority in doing so, and (ii) whether Caldwell ignored and failed to report allegations of sexual harassment from other female students about A.H.. The Alabama Supreme Court also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Caldwell was aware that A.H. was sexually harassing other female students and, if so, whether he failed to respond to the allegations. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that these issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and accordingly reversed the trial court.

The appellant was convicted of raping his minor daughter and sentenced to 18 years and three years imprisonment, for rape and incest respectively, to run concurrently. He appealed his conviction, claiming that his minor daughter was the only witness to the alleged crime, that the trial judge improperly assumed the complainant was under 18 years old, that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof, that his rights to legal representation were not explained, and that the sentences were unreasonable. The High Court of Namibia (“High Court”) determined that the child’s testimony was sufficient to sustain the conviction pursuant to Section 208 of Act 51 of 1977, which allows for conviction based on “the single evidence of any competent witness.” The High Court held that “although the complainant is a single witness to the actual rape, the fact that she immediately reported that to her sister and her niece corroborates her evidence,” and that the medical report, which was the result of a doctor’s examination conducted on the night of the rape after the complainant took a bath, corroborated her account of being raped. However, the High Court allowed the appeal on the charge of incest. The High Court cited the “single intent” test, which requires that two criminal acts be considered as one transaction if the evidence for one of the acts necessarily involves proof of another criminal act. The Court stated that the defendant had a single intent – to rape his daughter – so he should only be convicted of one crime (rape) rather than two.

The defendant (a Private in the army) met the victim (a 10-year-old girl in the 4th grade) through an online gaming site. While video chatting, the defendant repeatedly requested that victim show her body from the waist down. Despite expressing her unwillingness, the victim showed her private parts on several occasions to Defendant while video chatting. The military prosecutor indicted Defendant on the charge of sexual abuse under the former Child Welfare Act. Two courts acquitted the Defendant and the military prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that “sexual abuse” refers to sexual harassment, sexual assault, or similar acts, which can cause a victimized child to feel shame, can undermine a child’s health and welfare, or harm a child’s normal development. The Court also held that whether an act constitutes “sexual abuse” should be determined objectively according to social norms by factoring in specific circumstances, such as: (i) intent, gender, and age of the offender and victimized child; (ii) the extent to which the victimized child had knowledge of sexual values and the ability to exercise the right to sexual self-determination; (iii) the relationship between the offender and the victimized child; (iv) the background leading up to the act; (v) detail of the committed act; and (vi) the impact of such act on the victimized child’s personality development and mental health. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment because the victim, who was just 10 years old, lacked knowledge of sexual values and did not have the ability to protect herself; therefore, she was not capable of exercising the right to sexual self-determination. The defendant took advantage of the victim’s ignorance and naivety for his own sexual satisfaction. Even if the victim complied with the defendant’s demand without expressing any resistance and did not experience physical/psychological pain due to the defendant’s act, the victim could not voluntarily and earnestly exercise the right to sexual self-determination. As such, the defendant’s act committed against the victim constituted sexual abuse. English version available here.

육군 이병이던 피고인은 인터넷 게임을 통하여 알게 된 초등학교 4학년의 피해자 (여, 10세)와 영상통화를 하던 중 ‘화장실에 가서 배 밑에 있는 부분을 보여달라’고 요구했다. 이에 피해자는 영상통화를 하면서 피고인에게 바지와 팬티를 벗고 음부를 보여주거나 아예 옷을 전부 다 벗고 음부를 보여주기도 했다. 한편 위 각 영상통화 과정에서 피해자는 음부를 보여주는 행동을 그만하겠다거나 못하겠다는 의사를 표시하기도 한 사실을 알 수 있다. 구 아동복지법상 금지되는 성적 학대행위라 함은 아동에게 성적 수치심을 주는 성회롱, 성폭행 등의 행위로서 아동의 건강, 복지를 해치거나 정상적 발달을 저해할 수 있는 성적 폭력 또는 가혹행위를 말한다. 이에 해당하는지 여부는 행위자 밎 피해 아동의 의사 성벽 연령, 피해 아동이 성적 자기결정권을 제대로 행사할 수 있을 정도의 성적 가치관과 판단능력을 갖추었는지 여부, 행위자와 피해 아동의 관계, 행위에 이르게 된 경위, 구체적인 행위 태양, 그 행위가 피해 아동의 인격 발달과 정신 건강에 미칠 수 있는 영향 등의 구체적인 사정을 종합적으로 고려하여 그 시대의 건전한 사회 통념에 따라 객관적으로 판단하여야 할 것이다. 만 10세에 불과한 피해자는 성적 가치관과 판단능력이 충분히 형성되지 아니하여 성적 자기결정권을 제대로 행사하기 어렵고 자신을 보호할 능력도 상당히 미약하다고 볼 수 있는데, 피고인은 위와 같은 피해자의 성적 무지와 타인의 부탁을 쉽게 거절하지 못하는 피해자의 성향을 이용하여 자신의 성적 만족을 얻기 위한 의도로 영상통화를 하면서 음부를 보여 달라는 요구를 반복하였다. 이 것은 구 아동복지법을 어기는 행위다. 설령 피해자가 피고인의 위와 같은 요구에 특별한 저항 없이 응하였다거나 이 때문에 현실적으로 유체적 또는 정신적 고통을 느끼지 아니한 사정이 있다 하더라도 당시 피해자가 자신의 성적 행위에 관한 자기결정권을 자발적이고 진지하게 행사한 것으로 보기는 어려우므로, 위와 같은 사정 때문에 피고인의 피해자에 대한 위와 같은 행위가 성적 학대행위에 해당하지 아니한다고 볼 수는 없다. 그러므로 원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 다시 심리 판단하게 하기 위하여 원심법원에 환송하기로 하여, 관여 대법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

The appellant was found guilty of the crime of statutory rape of his daughter. On appeal, the appellant argued there was insufficient physical evidence of the rape. The Supreme Court noted that the results of the physical examination did not discount the possibility that the daughter was raped. The Supreme Court further noted that rape of a minor under 12 years of age is statutory rape. It explained that (a) in statutory rape, only the following two elements must be established: 1) carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse; and 2) that the woman is below 12 years of age and (b) both of those elements had been established.

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment that appellants, Living Counsellor, Wisdom Counsellor, and Righteous Counsellor, were guilty of rape. Their four female victims ranged from ages 7 to 12. The victims were introduced into the Kingdom Assembly Church of Africa, or the “Never Die Church,” so named because it promised followers eternal life on earth. It also promoted free sexual relations among its members. The victims testified that they were beaten and raped by members of the church. The court stated that “the evidence adduced during the trial show that rape is institutionalized in the Never Die Church. The testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses also points to a situation where the victims were living in a condition of servitude almost identical to slavery.” The appellants argued that “they did not rape the girls but that they only share love with their sisters because they have no earthly mother or father but only Wonderful Counsellor.” They argued that their conviction should be overturned because they were also charged with gang rape, but the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on that charge. Still, their conviction was upheld because they were convicted of rape nonetheless.

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus of the petitioner, upholding the constitutionality of Article 224(a) of the Penal Code which establishes a presumption of violence in sex crimes against minors. The petitioner was convicted of rape and child abuse, and was sentenced to a prison term of eight years for rape and one year and ten months for child abuse. In his appeal and writ, the petitioner argued he had committed no violence and that the presumption of violence set forth in Article 224(a) of the Penal Code was unconstitutional. The Court first noted that the provision in question predated Brazil’s 1988 Constitution and could not be found “unconstitutional” with respect to its construction. Rather, the Court examined its compatibility with the 1988 Constitution and found that the purpose of the presumption – to protect minors who legally are incapable of offering consent – was consistent with and expressed by the broad statement in Article 227 § 4 of the Constitution that “[t]he law shall severely punish abuse, violence and sexual exploitation of children and adolescents.” The STF held that the presumption did not violate constitutional principles, even when the presumption embraced what otherwise would be a factual matter requiring evidentiary proof.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF denegou o habeas corpus do paciente, afirmando a constitucionalidade do artigo 224, alínea “a” do Código Penal, o qual estabelece a presunção de violência nos casos de crimes sexuais praticados contra menores de idades. O paciente foi condenado por estupro e abuso infantil, sentenciado a uma pena de prisão de oito anos por estupro e um ano e dez meses por abuso infantil. Em sua recurso, o paciente alegou não ter cometido nenhuma violência e que a presunção de violência estabelecida no Artigo 224, alínea “a” do Código Penal era inconstitucional. A Corte primeiro observou que a disposição em questão era anterior à Constituição brasileira de 1988 e não podia ser considerada "inconstitucional" com relação à sua construção. Ao contrário, o Tribunal examinou sua compatibilidade com a Constituição de 1988 e considerou que o objetivo da presunção - proteger menores legalmente incapazes de oferecer consentimento - era consistente com e expresso pela ampla declaração do artigo 227 § 4 da Constituição de que "a lei punirá severamente o abuso, a violência e a exploração sexual de crianças e adolescentes". O STF sustentou que a presunção não violava os princípios constitucionais, mesmo quando a presunção abraçava o que de outra forma seria um assunto factual exigindo prova probatória.

Father and Mother were divorced in 2003 and were granted joint custody of their son, Z. In January 2008, Mother sought an order of protection against Father covering her house, her mother’s house, and Z’s school, claiming that Father, a police officer, had committed domestic violence against her, and had intimidated Z to a point where he left a suicide note. After an evidentiary hearing, the family court found sufficient evidence to support an order protecting Mother. The court found, however, evidence was insufficient to cover Z in the order, and thus removed Z’s school from coverage. Father appealed, arguing that the order was wrongly entered because only Mother’s side of the story “had been heard,” to which the court responded that the family court was entitled to resolve conflict in evidence. The court determined that Mother’s account was more convincing, and thus rejected Father’s argument. Father also argued that because of the protective order, he must check his service weapon at the end of every shift and asked for it again at the beginning of every shift. As a result, he could not perform security work in off-duty hours. The court did not consider the argument because Father failed to cite any legal authority in support of a need for him to perform off-duty security work. Finally, Father argued that the protective order would diminish his right to participate decision-making about Z. The court found the argument unconvincing because father was free to reach Mother via e-mail or phone. Accordingly, the court affirmed the family court’s grant of a protective order covering Mother.

The appellant was convicted of raping his 12 year old daughter and sentenced to 22 years imprisonment. The Court upheld the sentence in light of the heinous nature of rape as a crime and the importance of society sending a message of severe condemnation of the crime.

The 2012 Act makes it an offence to withhold information, without reasonable excuse, about certain offences against children and vulnerable adults from the Garda Síochána (Sections 2 and 3). These ‘certain offences’ include, inter alia, murder, assault, false imprisonment, rape, sexual assault, and incest. Defences are set out in Section 4, including those which may be raised by “prescribed persons” employed or engaged by a prescribed organization (defined in Sections 5 and 6). Penalties for offenses under Sections 2 or 3 are set forth in Section 7. Upon summary conviction, a person is liable to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment; for conviction on indictment, the term of imprisonment changes relative to the term of imprisonment stipulated in the statute providing for the principal offence (Section 7).

The 1996 Act targets sex tourism. It provides that, where an Irish citizen or a person “ordinarily resident” in Ireland (a) commits an act in another country involving a child (person under the age of 17), and (b) the act constitutes an offence under the law of that country and would constitute an offence in Ireland, then the person will be guilty of the offense under Irish law (Section 2(2)). Other offences include attempted offences (Section 2(3)); procuring, aiding or abetting, and conspiring in an offence (Sections 2(4)–2(6)); transporting persons to enable such offences (Section 3); and publishing information likely to promote offenses (Sections 4). The Act also provides for offenses committed by corporate bodies (Section 5). Penalties are up to a maximum of a £10,000 fine and 5 years imprisonment on conviction on indictment, or up to 12 months’ imprisonment on summary conviction (Section 6).

The 1998 Act prohibits trafficking of children for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) amended the 1998 Act’s provisions related to child trafficking and sexual exploitation (Section 3) and the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2013 (available here) expanded the definition of labour exploitation and aggravating factors. The 1998 Act also criminalizes allowing a child to be used for child pornography (Section 4). A person found guilty on indictment of this offence faces up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Section 5 has been substituted by Section 12 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here), which prohibits the production, distribution, and possession, inter alia, of child pornography. Persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 14 years’ imprisonment (Section 5, as amended). Section 6, as amended, prohibits the possession of child pornography; persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Section 13 of the Criminal Justice Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here) also inserts Section 5A, prohibiting, inter alia, causing, inciting, compelling, coercing, recruiting, inviting, or inducing of a child to participate in a pornographic performance or the gaining from such participation.

The 2008 Act, which amends the 1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act (available here) among other legislation, defines trafficking as when a person, in relation to another person, “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbours the person, or (i) transfers the person to, (ii) places the person in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the person to, another person, (b) causes a person to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of a person or takes a person— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the person with accommodation or employment” (Section 1). Exploitation includes labour exploitation, sexual exploitation, or exploitation consisting of the removal of one or more of the organs of a person. Labour exploitation includes subjecting the person to forced labour, forcing him or her to render services to another, or enslavement or similar servitude. Sexual exploitation includes production of pornography depicting the person alone or with others, causing the person to engage in sexual activity for the purpose of the production of pornography, prostitution of the person, or otherwise causing the person to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 1). The Act contains specific provisions regarding trafficking of a child (a person under the age of 18), which were further amended by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here). Trafficking a child for exploitation is an offense, as is selling or offering to sell a child, or purchasing or offering to purchase a child (Sections 2 and 3). There is an additional definition of “trafficks” in relation to a child, meaning that a person “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbors the child, or— (i) transfers the child to, (ii) places the child in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the child to, another person, (b) causes the child to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of the child or takes the child— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the child with accommodation or employment” (Section 3). There is also separate definition of “sexual exploitation” in relation to a child, and includes inviting, inducing, or coercing a child to engage in prostitution or the production of child pornography, or inviting, inducing, or coercing the child to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 3). The offences of exploitation and sexual exploitation in relation to children are subject to penalties specified in sections 2 and 3; a court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. Penalties for trafficking of persons other than children are specified in Section 4; the court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. The Act also explicitly provides for penalties where an accused is found guilty of attempt, incitement, or conspiracy in relation to the offences under the Act. Soliciting or importuning for purposes of prostitution of trafficked persons, or benefiting from such activities, is also an offence subject to specified penalties (Section 5), as are offences committed by corporate bodies (Section 6). Jurisdiction includes extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., where a person commits an act in relation to an Irish citizen in a place other than the State that, if done in the State, would constitute one of certain enumerated offenses). The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 (available here) further amends these provisions, in particular with expanded definitions of labour exploitation and aggravating factors.

Article 8 of the law amended the French Civil Code provisions regarding parental custody. Specifically, it included harassment or violence, whether physical or psychological, by one parent against the other among the factors in custody determinations. Article 31 of the law amended the French Criminal Code as follows: (i) it clarified that psychological violence falls within the scope of violence against the person; and (ii) it introduced a penal offense when the harassment of one’s spouse or partner results in a degradation of that spouse’s or partner’s physical or mental health.

Article 8 modifie les provisions du Code Civile Français qui adresse la garde des enfants. En particulier, l’article inclut le harassement ou la violence, physique ou psychologique, par un parent contre un autre comme un facteur a considéré durant la détermination de la garde d’un enfant. Article 31 modifie le Code Civile Français de deux manières : (i) cela clarifie que la violence psychologique est un type de violence contre un individu ; et (ii) cela introduit une offense pénale quand le harcèlement d’un conjoint, d’un partenaire lié par un pacte civil de solidarité, ou d’un concubin aboutit à la dégradation de leur santé physique ou mentale.

Article 3012 states that involving a minor in: (i) conducting an entertainment show of a sexual nature (i.e., public display in any form of products of sexual nature or stage actions including acts of sexual nature), including with the use of information and telecommunication systems or technologies, or (ii) attending such a show, shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. If the act involved forcing a minor to participate in such a show through deception, blackmail, exploiting a vulnerable condition, or the use of threat of violence, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of seven to ten years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years.

Стаття 3012 визначає, що залучення неповнолітнього до: (I) проведення видовищного заходу сексуального характеру (тобто публічного показу у будь-якій формі продукції сексуального характеру або сценічних дій, метою яких є втілення сексуальних дій.), у тому числі з використання інформаційно-телекомунікаційних систем або технологій, або (II) відвідування видовищного заходу сексуального характеру, караються позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до семи років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю. терміном до трьох років. Якщо діяння полягало в примушуванні неповнолітнього до участі в такому заході, шляхом обману, шантажу, уразливого стану особи або із застосуванням чи погрозою застосування насильства, винний карається позбавленням волі на строк від семи до десяти років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років.

The legislation implements the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the Lithuanian Parliament ratified in 1995. The Act sets out the rights of a child and defines neglect, physical, psychological, and sexual abuse. In 2019, the text was amended to include a clause on the prioritization of biological family, which means that the separation of children and parents against their will is only allowed in “extreme cases,” where it is “unavoidable and necessary to protect a child from real danger to his physical and psychological security, health, or life and when there is no other recourse to achieve such protection.”

Šiuo teisės aktu įgyvendinama Jungtinių Tautų Vaiko Teisių konvencija, kurią Lietuvos Seimas ratifikavo 1995 metais. Šis įstatymas nustato vaiko teises ir apibrėžia nepriežiūrą, fizinę, psichologinę ir seksualinę prievartą. Tekstas buvo iš dalies pakeistas 2019 m., įtraukiant nuostatą dėl biologinės šeimos prioriteto, kuri reiškia, kad vaikų ir tėvų atskyrimas prieš jų valią leidžiamas tik „kraštutiniais atvejais“, kai „neišvengiama ir būtina apsaugoti vaiką nuo realaus pavojaus jo fiziniam ir psichologiniam saugumui, sveikatai ar gyvybei ir kai nėra kitų priemonių tokiai apsaugai pasiekti“.

The Trafficking in Persons Act provides for the prevention and elimination of human trafficking, in addition to establishing the National Coordination Committee against Trafficking in Persons which serves to coordinate and manage related issues in Malawi (the “Committee”). The Act applies to offenses committed at least partly in Malawi (or in contemplation of committing a crime inside Malawi), committed by a citizen of Malawi, or involving the trafficking of a citizen of Malawi. The Committee is responsible for coordinating and overseeing investigations and prosecutions under the Act, as well as formulating policy, educational programming, and recommendations with Malawi on the topic, amongst other responsibilities. The Act provides the Committee with affirmative responsibilities to trafficked persons, including access to adequate health care and shelter, protection from discrimination, and legal support. The Act criminalizes the trafficking of other persons, punishable up to 14 years of imprisonment. The Act provides a list of aggravating factors that can extend the punishment by life imprisonment, including if a trafficked person becomes pregnant or is forced to terminate a pregnancy. There are additional penalties associated with trafficking in children, including a maximum sentence of 21 years imprisonment, as well as for benefiting from exploitation or trafficking and providing support for trafficking offenses. The Act further regulates international transportation organizations, and provides specialized investigatory and judicial mechanisms for the enforcement of the Act.

The Penal Code distinguishes and applies different penalties in accordance with the age of the minor. Pursuant to article 192, the prohibition of the perpetration of a sexual act with a minor under 14 years old or leading that minor to practice such acts with a third person is punished with up to 12 years in prison. Again, the law makes a distinction whether the act involved penetration, in which case the maximum punishment increases to 15 years. If the minor is under the age of 16, pursuant to article 193, the perpetration of a sexual act leads to a maximum penalty of five years, which increases to eight years if there was penetration. Article 194 provides penalties for cases in which the minor is in the perpetrator’s custody.. Article 198 punishes the crime of child pornography with up to five years of imprisonment and is defined as to 1) promote, facilitate, or allow minors to participate in any kind of obscene interaction (including films, photographs, talks, recordings, etc.); 2) using minors in pornographic tapings or photos; or 3) giving such tapings, recordings, or pornographic instruments to a minor. The maximum penalty is increased to 10 years in prison in case the child pornography is produced with the intent to be spread through information systems or if the agent offers, makes available, or transmits such child pornography through information systems. An individual who acquires, obtains, or facilitates the access to child pornography is punished with up to five years of imprisonment and, if such agent practices such acts as means of profession, the maximum penalty is increased to 10 years.

O Código Penal distingue e aplica penalidades diferentes de acordo com a idade do menor. De acordo com o artigo 192, a proibição da perpetração do ato sexual com menor de 14 anos de idade ou a orientação ao menor para praticar tais atos com uma Terceira pessoa é punível com até 12 anos de prisão. Novamente, a lei faz uma distinção se o ato envolve penetração, caso em que a punição máxima aumenta para 15 anos. Se o menor tem menos de 16 anos de idade, de acordo com o artigo 193, a perpetração do ato sexual leva a uma penalidade máxima de cinco anos, que aumenta para oito anos se houve penetração. O artigo 194 prevê penalidade para casos em que o menor está sob custódia do perpetrador. O artigo 198 pune o crime de pornografia infantil com até cinco anos de prisão e é definido como 1) promover, facilitar, ou permitir que menores participem de qualquer tipo de interação obscena (incluindo filmes, fotografias, falas, gravações, etc); 2) usar menores em vídeos ou fotos pornográficos; ou 3) dar tais vídeos, gravações, ou instrumentos pornográficos a menores. A penalidade máxima aumenta até 10 anos na prisão no caso em que a pornografia infantil é produzida com a intenção de ser divulgada por meio de sistemas de informação ou se o agente oferecer, disponibilizar, ou transmitir tal pornografia infantil por meio de sistemas de informação. O indivíduo que adquire, obtém, ou facilita o acesso a pornografia infantile é punido com até cinco anos de prisão e, se esse agente pratica tais atos como meios profissionais, a penalidade máxima aumenta para 10 anos.

Originally enacted in 1995 as the Child and Youth Sexual Transaction Prevention Act, this Act (the “CYSEPA”) was enacted to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation of children and youths and ensure their healthy physical and mental development. The CYSEPA specifies the responsibilities of the relevant authorities and governs the prevention of sexual exploitation of children and youths and the rescue, protection, and counseling of victims. Competent authorities must arrange the placement of the victim in a child and youth welfare institution, foster family, or other appropriate medical or educational institution on an emergency basis; evaluate the necessity of continuing placement within 72 hours; and to apply to the court for longer-term placements. The authorities must also offer counseling, intervention, and assistance with school enrollment, employment, independent living, or other necessary matters for a period of at least one year or until the victim’s 20th birthday. If the offender is the victim’s parent, foster parent, or guardian, the victim, the prosecutors, or other interested parties may apply to a court to stop such person from exercising parental rights over the victim and to appoint another guardian. After becoming aware of any victim or any suspect of a crime covered by the CYSEPA, medical personnel, social workers, educational personnel, caregivers, and personnel of other business or governmental organizations must report the crime to the authorities. Internet platform providers, online application service providers, and telecommunications companies are obligated to remove information relating to suspicious criminal activities, to notify law enforcement, and to provide data to law enforcement and judicial authorities for investigation. The competent authorities are also authorized to require the parents, guardian, or other caregiver of a victim to receive parental education and counseling for a period of up to 50 hours and to attend a family treatment program. Persons found guilty under the CYSEPA are subject to imprisonment as well as to fines up to N.T.10 million, with offenders who intentionally kill the victim subject to the death penalty or life imprisonment. English translation available here.

Article 1:31 of the Civil Code sets the legal age for marriage at 18 years for both women and men. This Act address instances child and/or forced marriage in the Netherlands. It removed a previous provision that allowed for marriage at the age of 16 under exceptional circumstances. The Act also provides for criminal prosecution in cases of forced marriage involving Dutch nationals and/or non-Dutch national-permanent residents. Dutch nationals and non-Dutch national permanent residents can be prosecuted for a forced marriage abroad even if forced marriage is not a criminal offence in the country where the marriage took place. (English summary of the Act available here: https://www.government.nl/topics/forced-marriage/tackling-forced-marriage)

Within Chapter 6, certain prohibitions related to marriage and clarifications related to the rights of children are outlined in the Criminal Code. If a woman is forced to marry under duress the marriage is voidable under Section 100. Likewise, compulsion of marriage is criminalized in Section 109. It states that a person who causes another to marry against his or her will shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 110 pertains to the custody of children. It states that if a parent or guardian is guilty under Section 108, which outlines causing or encouraging child seduction or prostitution, the Court may divest that person of authority over the child and appoint someone willing to take care of the child until he or she is twenty-one years of age or an age directed by the Court. The Court may also rescind or vary the appointment or order. Section 111 outlines the power of the Court to issue a warrant to search for a child detained for an "Immoral Purpose."

Chapter 16 sets forth criminal offenses for conduct against the family. §16.3 provides that an abortion after 24 weeks of pregnancy is a felony, unless it is conducted by a licensed physician upon his belief that the pregnancy causes danger to the mother or the child would be born with a grave defect. §16.1-16.2 prohibits bigamy, polygamy, incest, or deviate sexual intercourse with a family member and designates these acts as felonies. Separately, the Law prohibits harassment, which is defined as a written threat, an offensive telephone call, or repeated telephone calls with no legitimate communication purpose with the intent to frighten or harass the recipient. Chapter 14 Subchapter D outlines crimes involving sexual violence against persons committed on or after January 17, 2006. The age for statutory rape is 18 years. Gang rape constitutes first-degree felony. The Law defines lack of “consent” as including violence or the threat of violence against the victim or another person, the victim’s unconsciousness, a physical disability that prevents the victim from being able to to communicate his or her consent, or intentionally forcing the victim’s consent. The following acts constitute first-degree rape: rape of an underage victim, gang rape, rape that results in permanent disability to the victim, and use of a deadly weapon. The maximum punishment for first-degree rape is life imprisonment, and the maximum punishment for second-degree rape is 10 years imprisonment. Chapter 14 Subchapter D also covers sexual violence crimes committed before January 17, 2006. For those earlier offenses, the following constitute rape: a male has sexual intercourse with a female that is not his wife by force or by impairing her power to control her conduct; or a male has sexual intercourse with a female less than 16 years old. First-degree rape includes the following: the defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim, the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female under 16 years of age, or the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female who has not previously consented. The change of language regarding crimes committed after 2006 indicates several important gender-related developments. First, the new language explicitly allows for the prosecution of men and women as perpetrators of rape. Second, it allows for the prosecution of rapes of male victims. Third, it no longer exempts “marital rape” from prosecution. Finally, it raises the age of statutory rape from 16 to 18 years. However, the Law also criminalizes homosexuality, making “voluntary sodomy” a misdemeanor (chapter 14.74).

The Swedish Penal Code includes regulations that defines and prohibits various sexually and/or physically motivated crimes against people. The penalty for kidnapping with intent to injure a person, to force a person into service or to practice extortion is imprisonment for at least four years and at most eighteen years, or for life. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is six years. The penalty for human trafficking is imprisonment for 2-10 years. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is four years. If a crime is in violation of liberty and peace or a sexual offense and it was committed by a man against a woman with whom he had a close intimate relationship (marriage or cohabitation), then the man will be sentenced for gross violation of a woman’s integrity and imprisoned for at least nine months and at most six years, as opposed to being sentenced for each individual crime committed. This crime was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code in 1998 and the construction of it is unique because several individual criminal offences together can constitute a gross crime. Perpetrators of rape shall be imprisoned for at least two and at most six years. If the rape is considered less aggravated, the sentence drops to at most four years. In the event the rape is “gross”, the sentence is extended to at most 10 years. The penalty for sexual intercourse with a child under 15 years of age (or an act comparable to sexual intercourse) is at least two and at most six years. If the crime is “gross”, the penalty is extended to at least five years and at most ten years. The penalty for sexual coercion is at most two years of imprisonment. Notwithstanding, if the sexual coercion is “gross”, the sentence is extended from at least six months to at most six years. The penalty for intercourse with an offspring is imprisonment for at most two years and for intercourse with a sibling is at most one year. The penalties for crimes of exploitation of a child for sexual posing, purchase of a sexual ct from a child and sexual molestation are sentencing to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. Except for gross exploitation of a child for sexual posing where the sentence is at least six months and at most six years imprisonment. The penalty for purchase of sexual service is a fine or imprisonment for at most one year. Purchase of sexual service has occurred when a person obtains a temporary sexual relation in return for payment. This also applies if the payment was promised or given by another person. Selling sexual services in Sweden is not criminalized. The penalty for someone who promotes or improperly financially exploits a person’s engagement in temporary sexual relations in return for payment (procuring) is at most four years. In the event the procuring is “gross”, the sentence is 2-10 years. As of 2018, the Penal Code defines rape as any sex without consent, either with words or clear actions. Before the amendment, crimes of rape required the intent to rape someone through violence or threats, or that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable position. Furthermore, the 2018 sex crime reform of the Swedish Penal Code introduced criminal liability for negligent rape (Chapter 6 Section 1a) and negligent sexual abuse (Chapter 6 Section 3). Gross negligence is required for liability under the new regulations, rather than intention, as required for regular rape and sexual abuse in Chapter 6 Section 1 and 2. The penalty for negligent rape or negligent sexual abuse is at most four years.

Article 10 both prohibits domestic violence and states that “everyone has the right to protection form domestic violence in accordance with the law.” The definition of family members is wider than under the Criminal Code as it includes former spouses and “persons who have been or still are in a mutual emotional or sexual relation…although they have never lived in the same family household.” The Family Law Act also included new protection measures for those victims of domestic violence including the right to file a civil lawsuit for restraining orders and eviction powers. Family members, the public prosecution service, and social workers are also empowered by the Family Law Act to file for protective orders on behalf of the victims. Greater protections include the right to evict perpetrators from the family home and restraining orders. (External link redirects to automatic download. Unofficial English version available here.)

Medically assisted reproduction is available only to married couples, or those in a registered partnership or cohabitation. Further, it is only permitted to the couple if certain difficulties in conceiving exist, such as (i) all other possible or reasonable treatments to induce pregnancy through sexual intercourse are unsuccessful or hopeless; (ii) pregnancy through sexual intercourse would expose the spouse or partner to a serious risk of transmitting a serious infectious disease; (iii) for certain couples where there may be difficulty becoming pregnant or giving birth, or may give birth to a child with a hereditary disease (such as severe, untreatable pain or brain damage, or which would require the child be kept alive through constant use of modern medical technology) due to genetic dispositions. It is also available to a woman living in a registered partnership or cohabitation with another woman. Surrogacy is not permitted in Austria because medically assisted reproduction is only permissible within a marriage or registered partnership or cohabitation, and only the ova and the semen of the spouses, registered partners, or cohabitants may be used. There are two exceptional circumstances in which a third party’s genetic material may be used for medically assisted reproduction: (i) the semen of a third person may be used if the spouse, registered partner or cohabitant is not capable of reproduction, or if the couple is two women in a registered partnership; or (ii) the oocyte of a third person may be used if a woman, younger than 45, whom the pregnancy will be induced is otherwise not able to reproduce.

Medizinisch assistierte Fortpflanzung steht verheirateten Paaren, eingetragenen Partnerschaften oder einer Lebensgemeinschaft zur Verfügung. Außerdem ist es Paaren nur gestattet, wenn sie gewisse Schwierigkeiten bei der Empfängnis haben; dies sind z.B.: (1.) alle oder zumutbare Behandlungen, um eine Schwangerschaft durch Geschlechtsverkehr herbeizuführen, sind erfolglos oder aussichtslos; (2.) der Geschlechtsverkehr ist dem Paar nicht zumutbar, da eine ernsthafte Gefahr der Übertragung einer schweren Infektionskrankheit besteht; (3.) wenn das Paar Schwierigkeiten hat schwanger zu werden oder zu gebären, oder das Kind wegen genetischer Dispositionen mit einer Erbkrankheit geboren würde (so wie ernsthaften, unbehandelbaren Schmerzen oder Gehirnschäden, oder solche die es erforderlich machen, dass das Kind dauerhaft durch moderne Technologie am Leben erhalten würde). Außerdem stehen die Möglichkeiten homosexuellen Frauen offen, die in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft oder Lebensgemeinschaft leben. Nicht erlaubt ist Leihmutterschaft in Österreich, denn medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung ist nur in der Ehe, eingetragenen Partnerschaften und in Lebensgemeinschaften erlaubt. Es gibt zwei Ausnahmen, in denen das genetische Material für eine medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung genutzt werden darf: (1.) Der Samen einer dritten Person darf verwendet werden, wenn der Ehegatte, eingetragene Partner oder Partner in Lebensgemeinschaft nicht der Fortpflanzung fähig ist oder das Paar aus zwei Frauen in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft besteht; (2.) die Eizelle einer dritten Person darf einer Frau eingesetzt werden, wenn diese jünger als 45 Jahre alt ist und auf andere Weise nicht fähig ist, sich fortzupflanzen.

The Child Pornography (Prevention) Act prohibits the production, distribution, importation, exportation or possession of child pornography and the use of children for pornography A “Child” is a male or a female person under the age of 18 years. Child pornography constitutes any visual representation, any audio recording or written material depicting engagement of a child in sexual activity or depicts body parts of child for sexual purposes, or depicts a child subject to torture, cruelty, or physical abuse of a sexual context. A person who has custody of, charge or care of a child and knowingly causes or incites the involvement of a child in the production of child pornography commits an offence and will be liable for a fine or to imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 15 years. The production or distribution of child pornography carries a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years. Possession of child pornography carries a penalty of a fine or imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 8 years. The receipt of any financial benefit from any offence in terms of the act carries a penalty of a fine or imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 20 years. The act preserves the identity of the victims, thereby preventing any disclosure in relation to the victim. Any person that publishes information in contravention of the act shall be liable for a fine not exceeding one million dollars or imprisonment for a maximum period of 12 months.

La Ley (de prevención) de la pornografía infantil prohíbe la producción, distribución, importación, exportación o posesión de pornografía infantil y el uso de niños para la pornografía. Un "niño" es un hombre o una mujer menor de 18 años. La pornografía infantil constituye cualquier representación visual, cualquier grabación de audio o material escrito que represente la participación de un niño en una actividad sexual o que muestre partes del cuerpo de un niño con fines sexuales, o que represente a un niño sujeto a tortura, crueldad o abuso físico de un contexto sexual. Una persona que tiene la custodia, el cargo o el cuidado de un niño y, a sabiendas, causa o incita a la participación de un niño en la producción de pornografía infantil, comete un delito y será responsable de una multa o de prisión (o ambas) por un período máximo a 15 años. La producción o distribución de pornografía infantil conlleva una pena de prisión por un período no superior a 20 años. La posesión de pornografía infantil conlleva una pena de multa o encarcelamiento (o ambos) por un período no superior a 8 años. La recepción de cualquier beneficio económico de cualquier delito en términos del acto conlleva una pena de multa o prisión (o ambas) por un período no superior a 20 años. El acto preserva la identidad de las víctimas, impidiendo así cualquier revelación en relación con la víctima. Toda persona que publique información en contravención a la ley será responsable de una multa que no exceda de un millón de dólares o pena de prisión por un período máximo de 12 meses.

Provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who carries out sexual acts with a minor or induces a minor to carry out such acts in return for payment or promises of payment. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 182 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment or a monetary penalty for any person who as a supplier, intermediary or customer engages in the trafficking of a human being for the purpose of sexual exploitation, exploitation of his or her labor or for the purpose of removing an organ. If the victim is a minor or if the offender acts for commercial gain, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than one year. In every case, a monetary penalty must also be imposed. The statute also provides that the soliciting of a person for these purposes is equivalent to trafficking, and that any person who commits the act abroad is also guilty of an offense. Unofficial English translation available here.

Article 66a provides that a foreign national shall be expelled from Switzerland for a period of five to 15 years if they are convicted of, among other things, female genital mutilation (Penal Code Art. 124, para. 1), forced marriage or forced registered partnership (Penal Code Art. 181a), trafficking in human beings (Penal Art. 182), sexual acts with children (Penal Code Art. 187, para. 1), sexual coercion (Art. 189), rape (Art. 190), sexual acts with persons incapable of judgement or resistance (Art. 191), encouraging prostitution (Art. 195), aggravated pornography (Art. 197, para. 4, second sentence – pornography containing genuine sexual acts with minors), genocide (Art. 264), crimes against humanity (Art. 264a), serious violations of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Art. 264c), and other war crimes (Art. 264d and 264h). Unofficial English translation available here.

The Domestic Violence Act and the Domestic Violence Regulations promulgated thereunder offer complainants (any person in a domestic relationship who alleges she/he is the subject of domestic violence, including a child in the care of the complainant) the maximum protection possible from domestic abuse by imposing obligations on the police and other organs of state to prevent and assist the elimination of domestic violence (defined as including, inter alia, sexual abuse, physical abuse, stalking and harassment). Persons deemed to be in a domestic relationship include, inter alia, persons married by any law or custom, persons living (or who recently lived) together, parents of a child and parties in a romantic or sexual relationship. The Act allows any complainant to obtain a protection order against a respondent by application to the court and allows for interim orders to be granted without the respondent having received notice of such application in certain circumstances. When granting a protection order the court must make an order for the arrest of the respondent and may make an order to confiscate any weapons in the respondent’s possession.

Wet op Gesinsgeweld en die Regulasies vir Gesinsgeweld (1999)

Gesinsgeweld en intieme maatskaplike geweld​

Die Wet op Gesinsgeweld en die regulasies daarvan uitgevaardig bied klaers (enige persoon in ‘n huishoudelike verhouding wat beweer dat hy of sy die onderwerp is aan huishoudelike geweld, insluitend ‘n kind in die sorg van die klaer) die hoogste moontlike beskerming teen huishoudelike geweld aan deur verpligtinge op te lê aan die polisie en ander staatsorganisasies om die uitskakeling van huishoudelike geweld te voorkom (omskryf as, onder andere, seksuele mishandeling, fisiese mishandeling, agtervolging en teistering.) Persone wat geag word om ‘n huishoudelike verhouding te hê is, onder andere, persone wat getroud is volgens enige wet of gewoonte, persone wat saamwoon (of wat onlangs saam gewoon het), ouers van ‘n kind en partye in ‘n romantiese of seksuele verhouding. Die Wet laat enige klaer toe om ‘n beskermingsbevel teen ‘n respondent te kry deur aansoek by die hof en laat toe in sekere omstandighede dat tussentydse bevele toegestaan kan word sonder dat die respondent kennis gegee word vir sodanige aansoeke. By die toestaan van 'n beskermingsbevel moet die hof 'n bevel maak vir die inhegtenisneming van die respondent en kan 'n opdrag gee om enige wapens in die respondent se besit te konfiskeer.

This section of the Virginia Code provides that a cause of action resulting from sexual abuse during incapacity or infancy accrues upon the later of the removal of incapacity or infancy or when facts of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician or psychologist.

The Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) empowers the Magistrates’ Court to issue orders for the protection for victims of domestic violence. A domestic violence order may impose restrictions on the ability of the person whom the order is against to contact, use violence against, damage the property of, threaten, stalk or harass the victim. A domestic violence order may be issued to victims including: a spouse or former spouse of the perpetrator of the violence; a person who is or has been living with the perpetrator; a relative or former relative of the perpetrator; and a person who has or has had an intimate personal relationship with the perpetrator. The domestic violence order may be sought by the victim (if over 15 years old), his/her legal representative, a police or child protection officer, or a court. Knowingly breaching a domestic violence order is a criminal offence, punishable by up to 400 penalty units ($62,000 as of August 2018) or imprisonment for two years. The domestic violence order remains in force for the period stated, but may be revoked earlier by the victim’s consent or a court order.

The applicant was sterilized at age 17 during the birth of her second child. She claimed that she was coerced into signing the authorizations for the sterilization, segregated in the hospital based on her Roma ethnicity, and that the decision to sterilize her was discriminatory. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s civil action against the hospital on the basis that the sterilization was required to save her life and, therefore, did not need consent. On appeal, the Regional Court, found that the sterilization was not required to save her life and valid consent had not been provided as she was a minor and parental consent was required. The Court ordered EUR 1,593 in damages for the applicant. A criminal action and complaint at the Constitutional Court were both dismissed. The applicant argued she had been subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment, her private and family life had been negatively impacted, and that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and ethnic origin as there were no anti-discrimination laws effective in Slovakia at the time of her sterilization. The State argued the compensation already awarded was appropriate, as she was 10 days away from the age of majority when she signed the consent documents, the medical staff had acted in good faith, and that she was not permanently infertile as she could pursue in-vitro fertilization or reverse the sterilization through surgery. The European Court of Human Rights held that there was a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and that the State’s failure to provide sufficient legal protections of the reproductive health of Roma women violated Article 8. The Court awarded the applicant damages.

The first applicant, who was in the fifth month of pregnancy, was detained by the police on suspicion of robbery. The national court ordered her pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. During her detention, the applicant gave birth to her son, the second applicant. Later, the woman appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) to obtain just satisfaction, as she argued that her right under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of torture) was violated during detention. The applicant alleged that she had been continuously shackled to her hospital bed or to a gynecological examination chair. In addition, the woman claimed that the detention conditions were inhuman (due to absence of hot water and bed for child, irregular supply of cold water, etc.). She also complained about her placement in a metal cage during court hearings. In view of the above facts, the Court concluded that the unjustified shackling of the first applicant (during and after childbirth, when she was particularly sensitive) can be qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment. Also, the Court drew attention to (i) the woman's physical and psychological suffering, which was caused by the lack of normal nutrition, (ii) improper organization of sanitary and hygiene arrangements, and (iii) the applicant's placement in a metal cage, which is incompatible with the standards of civilized behavior that are the hallmark of a democratic society. Thus, the domestic authorities failed to comply with their obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR, deciding in equity, awarded both applicants €22,000. This case is important because it identifies the shortcomings of places of detention within a criminal justice system, which neglects the needs of female prisoners with children and during the pregnancy.

Першу заявницю, яка перебувала на п'ятому місяці вагітності, було затримано міліцією за підозрою у вчиненні розбою. Національний суд обрав заявниці запобіжний захід у вигляді тримання під вартою. Під час перебування під вартою заявниця народила сина, другого заявника. Пізніше жінка звернулася до Європейського суду з прав людини (“ЄСПЛ”) для отримання справедливої сатисфакції, оскільки вона стверджувала, що її право, гарантоване статтею 3 Конвенції про захист прав людини та основоположних свобод (заборона катування) було порушено під час тримання під вартою. Заявниця стверджувала, що вона весь час була прикута наручниками до лікарняного ліжка або до гінекологічного крісла. Крім того, жінка стверджувала, що умови утримання були нелюдськими (через відсутність гарячої води та ліжка для дитини, нерегулярного постачання холодної води тощо). Також вона скаржилась на те, що під час судових засідань її поміщали до металевої клітки. З огляду на вищенаведені факти, Суд дійшов висновку, що невиправдане застосування наручників до першої заявниці (під час і після пологів, коли вона була особливо чутливою) можна кваліфікувати як нелюдське чи таке, що принижує гідність, поводження. Також Суд звернув увагу на (i) фізичні та психологічні страждання жінки, які були спричинені відсутністю нормального харчування, (ii) неналежну організацію санітарних та гігієнічних заходів, а також (iii) поміщення заявниці в металеву клітку, що несумісне зі стандартами цивілізованої поведінки, яка є ознакою демократичного суспільства. Таким чином, національні органи влади не виконали своїх зобов’язань за статтею 3 Конвенції про захист прав людини та основоположних свобод. ЄСПЛ, вирішуючи справу на засадах справедливості, присудив обом заявникам 22 000 євро. Ця справа важлива, оскільки вона визначає недоліки місць ув’язнення в системі кримінального правосуддя, яка нехтує потребами ув’язнених жінок з дітьми та під час вагітності.