Women and Justice: Topics: Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The Act focuses on the non-consensual distribution of explicit images, inter alia. Section 2 makes it an offence to distribute, publish, or threaten to distribute or publish an intimate image with (i) intent to harm or (ii) being reckless as to whether harm is caused. Section 1 defines “distribute” and “publish” as being distributed or published to the public or a section of the public. Section 1 further defines an “intimate image” in broad terms, encompassing a photographic, film, video, or digital representation, and includes nude, non-nude, or sexual images. “Harm” includes psychological harm (Section 1). A person found guilty of an offence under Section 2 is subject to a Class A fine (up to €5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment if tried summarily, or a fine and/or up to seven years’ imprisonment if convicted on indictment. Section 3 makes it an offence to record, distribute, or publish intimate images without consent. A person found guilty of such an offence is liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (up to €5,000), and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment. Section 4 makes it an offence to distribute, publish, or send threatening or grossly offensive communications. A person found guilty of an offence under Section 2 is subject to a Class A fine (up to €5,000) and/or up to six months’ imprisonment if tried summarily, or a fine and/or up to two years’ imprisonment if convicted on indictment. Section 7 provides that summary proceedings for an offence under the Act may be instituted within two years from the date on which the offence was committed.

This law amended the definition of sexual harassment in the French Criminal Code and increased the maximum penalties for sexual harassment. The definition of sexual harassment became broader and more precise, encompassing the imposition upon a person, in a repeated manner, of words or behaviors of a sexual nature, which either violate a person’s dignity due to their humiliating or degrading nature or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive situation. The use of any pressure, even on a one-off basis, for the real or apparent purpose of obtaining a sexual favor was also assimilated to the definition of sexual harassment.

Cette loi modifie la définition du harcèlement sexuel dans le Code Pénale Français et augmente la peine maximum pour le harcèlement sexuel. La définition de harcèlement sexuel s’élargit et devient plus précis, encadrant l’imposition sur une personne, d’une manière répétée, de mots ou d’actions d’une nature sexuelle, qui enfreint la dignité d’une personne à cause de la nature humiliante ou dégradante de ces propos, ou crée une situation d’intimidation, d’hostilité, ou une situation offensante. L’utilisation de pression, même une seule fois, pour le but d’obtenir une faveur sexuelle est aussi assimilé à la définition de harcèlement sexuel.

Article 155 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that an adult who commits acts of sexual nature associated with the vaginal, anal, or oral penetration into the body of a person under the age of 16, using genitals, another body part, or any item, shall be punished by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years, or imprisonment for the same term. If such acts are committed by close relatives or family members, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim; or if they are associated with the provision of monetary or other remuneration to the victim or a third party or with a promise of such remuneration; or where they have caused infertility or any other grave consequences, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Article 156 provides criminal liability for debauched actions committed against a person under 16 years of age. This dangerous culpable act shall be punishable by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years or imprisonment for the same term. If the same acts committed against a child or committed by family members or close relatives, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Harassment of a child for sexual purposes is criminalized by the Article 1561. Harassment under this article means proposal of a meeting made by an adult to a person under the age of 16, for the purpose of committing any acts of sexual nature or debauched acts, after which at least one action was taken to ensure that meeting will take place.

Стаття 155 Кримінального кодексу України визначає, що повнолітня особа, яка вчинила дії сексуального характеру, пов’язані із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло особи, яка не досягла шістнадцятирічного віку, з використанням геніталій, іншого органу чи частини тіла або будь-якого предмета, карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. У випадку, якщо ті самі дії, вчинені близькими родичами або членами сім’ї, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілої особи або піклування про неї, або якщо вони поєднані з наданням грошової чи іншої винагороди потерпілій особі чи третій особі або з обіцянкою такої винагороди, або якщо вони спричинили безплідність чи інші тяжкі наслідки, злочинець карається позбавленням волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Стаття 156 передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за розпусні дії, вчинені щодо особи, яка не досягла 16 років. Це суспільно небезпечне винне діяння карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Якщо ті самі дії вчинені щодо малолітньої особи або вчинені членами сім’ї чи близькими родичами, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілого або піклування про нього, винний підлягає покаранню у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Домагання дитини для сексуальних цілей криміналізовано статтею 1561. Домагання за цією статтею означає пропозицію зустрічі, зроблену повнолітньою особою, особі, яка не досягла 16 років з метою вчинення стосовно неї будь-яких дій сексуального характеру або розпусних дій, у разі якщо після такої пропозиції було вчинено хоча б одну дію, спрямовану на те, щоб така зустріч відбулася.

The purpose of the Act is to set out penalties for administrative offenses. In addition, it classifies hate crimes and discrimination on the grounds of “gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, religion, belief, opinion, or other grounds” to be an aggravating circumstance. Article 81 dictates that the breach of rights conferred by the Republic of Lithuania Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men is subject to a fine of EUR 40 to EUR 560 and EUR 560 to EUR 1000 for repeat offenses.

Šios įstatymo tikslas yra nustatyti baudas už administracinius nusižengimus. Jame neapykantos nusikaltimai ir diskriminacija dėl „lyties, rasės, tautybės, kalbos, kilmės, socialinės padėties, religijos, tikėjimo, nuomonės ar kitų priežasčių“ klasifikuojami kaip sunkinanti aplinkybė. Be to, 81 straipsnyje nustatyta, kad už Lietuvos Respublikos moterų ir vyrų lygių galimybių įstatymo suteiktų teisių pažeidimą gresia baudą nuo 40 iki 560 EUR ir nuo 560 iki 1000 EUR už pakartotinius nusikaltimus.

Among other aspects, this act aims at ensuring gender equality in various areas of life, for instance, in the workplace. It addresses issues like equal opportunities for men and women as well as sexual harassment in the workplace. It also lists the authorities a person may turn to if they feel they are being discriminated against. Notable is the shift of the burden of proof in Section 25: a discrimination claimant only has to credibly substantiate the claim, whereas the defending party has to prove that there was no discrimination.

Dieses Gesetz zielt unter anderem darauf ab, die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter in verschiedenen Lebensbereichen zu gewährleisten, zum Beispiel am Arbeitsplatz. Es behandelt Themen wie Chancengleichheit für Männer und Frauen sowie sexuelle Belästigung am Arbeitsplatz. Außerdem werden die Behörden genannt, an die sich eine Person wenden kann, wenn sie sich diskriminiert fühlt. Bemerkenswert ist die Umkehr der Beweislast in Abschnitt 25: Ein Kläger, der eine Diskriminierung geltend macht, muss seine Behauptung lediglich glaubhaft machen, während die beklagte Partei beweisen muss, dass keine Diskriminierung vorlag.

The Gender Equality Act promotes gender equality for men and women in all parts of society, and seeks to prohibit and provide redress for sex discrimination, harmful practices (including social, cultural, or religious practices that are physically or sexually harmful) and sexual harassment. Under the Act, persons (and the government) are prohibited from treating people less favorably than they would otherwise due to sex. The law defines and criminalizes sexual harassment, including workplace harassment. Moreover, the law places an affirmative obligation on the government to ensure that employers are developing appropriate procedures and policies to respond to and eliminate issues of workplace sexual harassment. The law also ensures equal access to education at all levels regardless of sex, and affirmatively requires the government to provide equal access. Further, the law provides an affirmative right to sexual and reproductive health, including access to health services and the right to choose whether or not to have a child. A Human Rights Commission in Malawi is tasked with the enforcement of this law, including gender-based quotas for membership on Commission. The penalties for violating the Act include large fines and imprisonment of up to five years.

This section states crimes against sexual freedom, including the conditions under which sexual encounters violate a woman’s safety and the punishments thereafter. Anyone who engages in sexual activity without the woman’s consent by means of violence or physical intimidation, even if an act of artificial procreation, is subject to two to eight years in prison. Those who have sexual encounters with minors face imprisonment of 16-20 years. Anyone who takes advantage of a hierarchical position in a workplace to constrain someone to obtain sexual advantage is punished with imprisonment up to two years and a fine.

Essa seção estabelece os crimes contra a Liberdade sexual, incluindo as condições nas quais os encontros sexuais violam a segurança da mulher e as punições referentes. Aquele que inicia atividade sexual sem o consentimento da mulher por meio de violência ou intimidação física, ainda que seja um ato de procriação artificial, está sujeito a pena de dois a oito anos de prisão. Aquele que mantém encontros sexuais com menores encaram uma prisão de 16-20 anos. Aquele que tira proveito da sua posição hierárquica em um ambiente professional para constranger alguém para obter vantagem sexual é punido com prisão de até dois anos e multa.

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 was passed in the aftermath of the Nirbhaya case wherein a female student was gang-raped in December 2012. The Act amended several provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Indian Evidence Act, and the Criminal Procedure Code. By way of this amendment, several new offenses have been recognized and incorporated into the Indian Penal Code, including acid attack (Section 326 A & B), voyeurism (Section 354C), stalking (Section 354D), attempt to disrobe a woman (Section 354B), sexual harassment (Section 354A), and sexual assault which causes death or injury causing a person to be in persistent vegetative state (Section 376A). The Act also amended the already existing offenses to make them more stringent. Notably, the definition of rape in Section 375 was broadened to include acts in addition to penetration. Also, Section 370 was replaced with Section 370 and 370A. The amended section incorporated the definition of trafficking as provided in the UN Trafficking Protocol while excluding “forced labour.” Also see the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2018 for additional amendments to rape and sexual violence crimes.

The Law on Gender Equality forms the basis for creating a network of mechanisms and institutional structures for advancing gender equality at all levels of administration in BiH. Its stated goal is to “regulate, promote and protect gender equality, guarantee equal opportunities and equal treatment of all persons regardless of gender in public and private sphere of society, and regulate protection from discrimination on grounds of gender.” The legislation defines the following offenses: discrimination on grounds of gender, direct gender-based discrimination, indirect gender-based discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, and victimization. Unofficial English translation available from LegislatiOnline here.

This law includes several amendments to the Employment Code to govern sexual harassment, some examples of which include companies with more than 10 employees must have a protocol to observe and guarantee a workplace environment of dignity and mutual respect, including rules and internal sanctions for cases of sexual harassment; including dismissal without compensation as a cause of action related to sexual harassment, to address sexual harassment as a conduct that jeopardizes and harms the workplace environment; and including a protocol for cases where the sexual harassment cases can reach the Labor Department Inspection.

Esta ley incluye varias enmiendas al Código de Trabajo para regular el acoso sexual, algunos ejemplos de las cuales incluyen: empresas con más de 10 empleados deben tener un protocolo para observar y garantizar un ambiente laboral de dignidad y respeto mutuo, incluyendo reglas y sanciones internas para los casos de Acoso sexual, e incluyendo el despido sin compensación como causa de acción relacionada con el acoso sexual, para abordar el acoso sexual como una conducta que pone en peligro y daña el entorno laboral, e incluyendo también un protocolo para los casos en que los casos de acoso sexual puedan llegar a la Inspección del Departamento de Trabajo.

Section 14(1) makes it a discriminatory practice to harass an individual in the context of provisions of goods, services, facilities or accommodation, provision of commercial or residential accommodation, or in matters of employment. Subsection (2) clarifies that sexual harassment is deemed to be harassment on a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The Act aims to prevent, ensure accountability for, and apply standards set by the United Nations and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women to domestic violence. It aims to fulfill these objectives by “empowering courts to make apprehended domestic violence orders to protect people from domestic violence, intimidation (including harassment) and stalking” (§ 9(2)(a)). Intimidation is defined as: “conduct amounting to harassment or molestation of the person,” “an approach made to the person by any means (including by telephone, telephone text messaging, e-mailing, and other technologically assisted means) that causes the person to fear for his or her safety,” or “any conduct that causes a reasonable apprehension of injury to a person or to a person with whom he or she has a domestic relationship, or of violence or damage to any person or property” (§ 7(1)). Stalking is defined as following, watching, frequenting the vicinity of or approaching a person’s place of residence, business or work, or any place that a person frequents for the purposes of any social or leisure activity (§ 8(1)). The Act (at Parts 3 and 4) gives courts the authority to issue orders relating to apprehended domestic or personal violence. The Act provides that a “person who stalks or intimidates another person with the intention of causing the other person to fear physical or mental harm” may be punished with up to five years imprisonment (§ 13(1)). A person who “knowingly contravenes a prohibition or restriction specified in an apprehended violence order made against the person” may be punished with up to two years imprisonment (§ 14(1)).

NSW, much like the rest of Australia, suffers from high incidents of domestic violence. Across Australia, one in three women have experienced physical and/or sexual violence perpetrated by someone known to them, one in five women have been stalked during their lifetime, and on average one woman is killed every week by a current or former partner. Aboriginal women and girls are 35 times more likely than the wider female population to be hospitalised due to family violence. In 2016, the NSW Minister for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, launched the ‘NSW Domestic Family Violence Blueprint for Reform 2016-2021: Safer Lives for Women, Men and Children’ setting out actions to reform the domestic violence system in NSW over a five-year period (the blueprint is the first of its kind in Australia). The NSW Government has allocated AUD 350 million in the 2017/18 budget over a four-year period to fund the effort. (http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Pages/bocsar_pages/Domestic-Violence.aspx; https://www.whiteribbon.org.au/understand-domestic-violence/facts-violence-women/domestic-violence-statistics/; http://www.domesticviolence.nsw.gov.au/home)

The Equal Opportunity Act aims to eliminate discrimination, sexual harassment, and victimisation to the greatest extent possible and to promote equality as far as reasonably practicable. It defines and prohibits discrimination in relation to various “attributes,” including sex, sexual orientation, marital status, and pregnancy. The prohibitions apply in a range of situations, including employment-related discrimination. Sexual harassment and victimisation are also defined and prohibited. The Act also regulates the operation of the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (“VEOHRC”), its powers, and the process by which people may bring disputes concerning violations of the Act to the Commission. After investigating a dispute, the VEOHRC may refer a matter to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, which may order a person to refrain from further violating the Act or pay compensation to the applicant for loss, damage or injury suffered.

The Discrimination Act (“DA”) promotes equality regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or any other identity by defining and prohibiting discrimination and sexual harassment. The DA provides anti-discrimination laws which state that as long as an individual is capable of performing the relevant task, or eligible to receive services, he or she may not be discriminated against based on any identity factors. Moreover, the DA provides that organization leaders are obligated to investigate and take measures to prevent future discrimination or harassment upon becoming aware of such potential discrimination or harassment. Finally, the DA provides immunity provisions for those who report behavior that violates the DA. The penalty for failing to fulfill obligations under the DA is an obligation to pay compensation for the discrimination suffered, decided by the Board against Discrimination, and subject to appeal by the payee.

The Criminal Code defines and criminalizes domestic violence under Article 194, which is the main legislation providing for domestic violence prosecution. Domestic violence is defined as the “use of violence, threat of attacks against life or body, insolent or ruthless behaviour [that] endangers the tranquility, physical integrity or mental condition of a member of his family.” The definition of “family member” does not include ex-spouses or unmarried partners who do not live together or have children. The penalties for domestic violence under the Criminal Code are fines or imprisonment for up to 15 years. In 2017, new crimes for stalking (Art. 138a) and sexual harassment (Art. 182a) were added to the Criminal Code. Additionally, the minimum statutory sentence for rape was increased from three years to five years. In 2019, amendments to the Criminal code introduced life imprisonment without conditional release for those who commit crimes of rape or murder of children, pregnant women, or disabled persons. New crimes for stalking, sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, and forced marriage were also introduced. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

Law No. 05/L-020 on Gender Equality promotes gender equality, by defining the relevant concepts, setting forth various measures to protect equal rights of genders, and specifying the institutions responsible for gender equality. The Law defines “woman” and “man” as including any person who considers oneself as such, and describes gender identity – which does not require medical intervention – as a “protected characteristic.” Direct and indirect gender discrimination are prohibited under the Law, including less favorable treatment of women for reasons of pregnancy, maternity, or sexual orientation, and gender-based violence. Harassment and sexual harassment are also forbidden, and whether a person refuses or surrenders to such behavior shall not be used as a basis for a decision affecting that person in a legal proceeding. The Law directs the Kosovo institutions to implement various general measures to achieve gender equality in Kosovo, including gender mainstreaming in all policies and legislation, gender budgeting in all areas, and ensuring recruitment and appointment are consistent with the requirement for equal representation of women and men. In areas where inequities exist, public institutions are further instructed by the Law to take temporary special measures to accelerate the realization of gender equality, including quotas, preferential treatment, hiring, and promotion. The Law in particular requires legislative, executive, and judicial bodies at all levels to adopt special measures until equal gender representation is achieved. The Law establishes an Agency for Gender Equality to support the implementation of the Law, and further mandates that all ministries and municipalities must appoint gender equality officials, and allocate sufficient resources from their budget, to implement the Law. Discrimination on bases including sex, pregnancy, or birth, is prohibited in employment matters including access to employment or training, and working conditions. In regard to education, the Law proscribes sex discrimination in access to education and scholarships, evaluation results, and attainment of degrees, and mandates the inclusion of gender equality education in school curricula at all levels. Persons who believe the principle of equal treatment has not been implemented in relation to them may initiate proceeding in accordance with the Law on Protection from Discrimination. Violations of the Law are punishable by fines of up to 700 Euros for individuals, and 900 Euros for legal entities. (Unoffocial English version available here.)

This Act is a comprehensive act that replaced several pieces of legislation, including the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. In general, The Equality Act 2010 legally protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in wider society, and provides equality provisions, including the following:

The Labour Code enshrines equality in the workplace into Albanian legislation and provides specific protection to women’s rights. Article 9 (Prohibition against Discrimination) expressly prohibits any discrimination in the fields of labour and education (including but not limited to discrimination based on sex, race and nationality). Article 32 (Protection of Personality) specifically prohibits any acts of sexual harassment against an employee by an employer or other employees. Sexual harassment is defined to include any act that “considerably harms the psychological state of the employee because of sex.” Article 54 (Working Conditions) provides a requirement for pregnant women to have breaks every three hours. Article 105/a (Woman's Employment Protection) provides that women cannot be dismissed solely based on the reason of pregnancy or child delivery. Article 115 (Equality between Sexes in terms of Reward) makes mandatory equal pay between men and women for carrying out jobs of equal value. (External link to the International Labour Organization website for Albanian labor-related legislation, including the ILO's unofficial English translation available here.)

The Gender Equity Education Act (the “GEEA”) aims to encourage respect for gender diversity, eliminate gender discrimination and promote substantive gender equality through education. The GEEA charges the competent authorities (as well as schools) with establishing gender equity education committees whose tasks include drafting regulations and policies, coordinating resources, supervising gender equity-related activities and promoting research and development of curricula, teaching and assessments. Under the GEEA, schools must provide a safe, gender-fair learning environment by respecting, giving due consideration to, and not discriminating against prospective students, students, faculty, and staff of different genders. Schools shall strive towards this objective by taking steps such as integrating gender equity education into their curriculum, providing gender equity education when training new staff members, reporting known incidents of sexual assault, sexual harassment or sexual bullying within 24 hours and promptly handling and investigating such cases. Schools and any principal, faculty or staff member found to be in violation of the GEEA may be subject to a fine. Persons may also be dismissed or discharged from employment.

性別平等教育法（即「GEEA」）旨在鼓勵尊重性別多樣性，消除性別歧視，並透過教育促進實質性別平等。性別平等教育法責成主管機關（以及學校）建立性別平等教育委員會，其任務包括擬定法規和政策，協調資源，監督與性別平等有關的活動，並促進課程、教學和評估的研究及發展。根據性別平等教育法，學校必須透過尊重、適當考慮及不歧視不同性別的潛在學生、學生、教職員工等方式，提供一個安全、性別平等的學習環境。學校應努力實現這一目標，採取的措施包括：將性別平等教育納入課程、在培訓新員工時提供性別平等教育、在24小時之內報告已知的性侵、性騷擾或性霸凌事件，並及時處理和調查此類案件。任何被發現違反性別平等教育法的學校、校長、教職員工可能會被處以罰鍰。該等人員也可能被開除或解聘。

In 2000, the Public Service Act was amended to recognize sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is defined as “any unwanted, unsolicited or repeated sexual advance, sexually derogatory statement or sexually discriminatory remark made by an employee to another,” and it covers all offensive or objectionable remarks made in or outside the workplace that cause the recipient discomfort or humiliation or that “the recipient believes interferes with the performance of his or her job security or prospects” or that “create[s] a threatening or intimidating work environment.” The Act delineates the penalties for sexual harassment.

An man appealed his restraining order, which prevented him from contacting his ex-wife, arguing that the lower court did not properly establish a finding of domestic abuse despite his ex-wife’s testimony that he repeatedly used vulgar and threatening language towards her, at times placing her in fear of physical harm. The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the restraining order and underlying finding of domestic abuse, citing the definition of domestic abuse in Title 15, Chapter 15 of the General Laws of Rhode Island: “Among the acts specified in . . . the statute as constituting ‘domestic abuse’ is ‘stalking,’ [which means] ‘harassing another person.’” Because the court found that the ex-husband was “harassing” (and thus “stalking”) his ex-wife, the ex-husband’s conduct fell within the plain meaning of the statute defining domestic abuse. This case is important because it provides that the “unambiguous language” of Rhode Island’s domestic abuse statute does not require a finding of actual physical harm or threats of physical harm as a predicate for domestic abuse—other harassing language is enough.

The Italian Penal Code prohibits domestic violence (art. 572), female genital mutilation (art. 583), personal injury aggravated by permanent deformation or scarring of the face (art. 583 quinquies), harassment (art. 612 bis), the crime of illicit diffusion of sexually explicit images or videos without the consent of the persons represented (so-called revenge porn) (art. 612 ter). Punishable crimes against a person's freedom also include slavery and forced prostitution (art. 600), human trafficking (art. 601), sexual acts coerced through violence, threats, or abuse of authority (art. 609 bis) and group sexual assault (art. 609 octies). Sexual acts with a minor of 14 year old is always a crime (art. 609 quarter). Aggravating factors in sexual violence are: when the perpetrator is a relative, a parent or a guardian, when the sexual act is committed against a pregnant woman, when the victim is under 18 years old, and when the perpetrator uses a weapon (art. 609 ter). Sexual acts with a minor are not punishable when (1) both parties are minors, (2) the minor is at least 13 years old, and (3) the age difference between the two is no more than four years (art. 609 quater). Moreover, the Italian Penal Code prohibits the crime of coercion or induction into marriage (art. 558 bis) and the violation of the order for removal from the family home and of the prohibition to approach the places frequented by the victim (art. 387 bis). Finally, the Italian Penal Code prohibits crimes against pregnancy. In particular, under article 593-ter, anyone who causes the termination of a pregnancy without the woman’s consent shall be punished by imprisonment from four to eight years. Consent that is extorted by violence or threat, or that is obtained by deceit, shall be considered as not having been given. Aggravating factors in crimes against pregnancy include a woman under 18 years of age.

The Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (the “LEOWM”) is specialized legislation that prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex and gender. Articles 3(3), 4, 5 and 7 expressly mention that prohibition of sex discrimination is an essential part of the law. The LEOWM further provides that “gender-based sexual harassment is any type of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical behaviour of sexual nature, aimed at or resulting in violation of the dignity of a person, especially when an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive atmosphere is created.” (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)

The Protection Against Sexual Harassment Act defines “unwelcome sexual advances,” outlines actionable forms of sexual harassment, and the process for filing a complaint with the court. It is the court that may then carry out investigations and “may endeavor by such means as it considers reasonable to resolve a complaint.” This Act also penalizes retribution and retaliation against complainants or witnesses, as well as false complaints.

An interim protection order (IPO) protects survivors during police investigation, while a protection order (PO) protects survivors during criminal court proceedings. The amendments specify when an IPO ends, and when a PO begins, so survivors won’t be left without protection between police investigations and court proceeding. Pursuant to the amendments, an IPO can include additional safeguards, like prohibiting an abuser from coming near a survivor so police can intervene before further violence happens. The expanded definition of domestic violence will protect against: misappropriating property, which causes distress; threatening, which causes distress or fear for safety; or communicating (including electronically) with the survivor to insult modesty. A court can no longer order a survivor to attend reconciliatory counseling with the abuser, which could put the survivor in danger. Instead, the abuser can be ordered to complete a rehabilitation program. If a court grants a survivor occupancy of a shared residence, it must grant the survivor exclusive occupancy rather than just a specified part of the residence. The police officer must keep survivors informed on the status of investigation, status of IPO and PO, and important court dates. The amendments also create the Emergency Protection Order (EPO), which helps survivors get protection faster. EPOs are issued by social welfare officers who are easily accessible. Survivors no longer have to make a police report to get an EPO, which is valid for seven days.

Article 1 of this act states that it is intended to promote equality between men and women. Article 3 prohibits discrimination against employees based on sex. Article 4 prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace. Article 5 provides for relief, including injunctive relief and lost salary. Article 10 protects against retaliation against complainants.

This law requires the courts to secure the privacy and dignity, as well as physical and psychological well-being of victims of sexual violence during proceedings. However, it does not detail any specific measures to be undertaken. The law also stops courts from inferring sexual consent from silence or lack of resistance and prevents courts from taking into consideration a victim’s sexual history in ascertaining a defendant’s guilt.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in human beings because he intentionally, for financial purposes, recruited financially vulnerable Ukrainian women for sex trafficking in Russia. The court of first instance sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property for an “accumulation of crimes” (in Ukraine, this term means commission of two or more crimes by one person stipulated by different Articles or different parts of one Article of the Special Part of this Code, where that person has not been convicted of any of these crimes). The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. The appellant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, claiming that the appellant was not guilty, because there was no evidence that he recruited women. Instead, the appellant argued that there was a mutual agreement between himself and the women. The Supreme Court left the decisions of the previous courts unchanged, drawing attention to the fact that the courts' conclusions were based on the testimony of the victims and the witness, the protocol of secret investigative actions, and audio and video recordings of the appellant’s meetings with women.

Скаржник був засуджений за торгівлю людьми через те, що він умисно, маючи корисну мету, вербував незаможних українських жінок для торгівлі ними в сексуальних цілях у Росії. Суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді п’яти років позбавлення волі з конфіскацією майна за "сукупністю злочинів" (в Україні це поняття означає вчинення однією особою двох або більше злочинів, передбачених різними статтями або різними частинами однієї статті Особливої ​​частини Кримінального кодексу, якщо ця особа не була засуджена за жоден із цих злочинів). Апеляційний суд залишив цей вирок без змін. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що він невинний, оскільки немає доказів того, що він вербував жінок. Натомість, скаржник стверджував, що між ним і жінками існувала взаємна домовленість. Верховний Суд залишив рішення попередніх судів без змін, звернувши увагу на те, що висновки судів ґрунтуються на показаннях потерпілих і свідків, протоколах негласних слідчих дій, аудіо- та відеозаписах зустрічей скаржника із жінками.

In this case, a member of the Parliament was accused of sexually harassing women who applied to become his secretary. The Constitutional Court held that sexual harassment is a gross violation of the Constitution and the breaking of the oath of a Parliament member. The Court explained that sexual harassment is defined as “undesirable behavior related to sex intended to degrade or degrade human dignity and create a hostile, humiliating or offensive environment.” It emphasized that harassment infringes on a person’s physical, psychological, and spiritual integrity and intellectual and creative freedom. English translation available here.

Šioje byloje Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo narys buvo apkaltintas seksualiniu priekabiavimu prie moterų, kurios ėjo jo padėjėjos-sekretorės pareigas bei pokalbių dėl šios darbo vietos metu. Konstitucinis Teismas konstatavo, kad seksualinis priekabiavimas yra šiurkštus Konstitucijos pažeidimas ir Seimo nario priesaikos sulaužymas. Teismas paaiškino, kad seksualinis priekabiavimas yra apibrėžiamas kaip „nepageidaujamas elgesys, susijęs su lytimi, kuriuo siekiama pažeminti ar yra žeminamas žmogaus orumas“ sukuriant, ar siekiant sukurti, priešišką, žeminančią ar žeidžiančią aplinką. Be to, pabrėžta, kad priekabiavimas pažeidžia asmens fizinę, psichologinę ir dvasinę neliečiamybę bei intelektinę ir kūrybinę laisvę.

The defendant was indicted under the Stalker Regulation Law on a charge of stalking his former girlfriend. The defendant demanded many times by email and phone that she repay costs he incurred while they were dating. The defendant sent a letter to her threatening to distribute nude photos of her if she did not unblock him on her cell phone. The Supreme Court determined that, even though he sent the letter only once, his conduct amounted to “stalking” under the Stalker Regulation Law since his conduct was as a whole persistent and repetitive.

被告人は、元交際相手に対し、交際中にかかった費用の返済をメールや電話で何度も要求し、携帯電話のブロックを解除しなければヌード写真をばら撒くと脅す手紙を送った。最高裁は、手紙を送ったのが1回だけであっても、「つきまとい等」の行為が反復することから、ストーカー規制法の「ストーカー行為」に該当すると判断した。

The plaintiff alleged that, during the course of her employment at construction firm Winslow Constructors, she was abused, bullied, and sexually harassed by Winslow employees and subcontractors. She alleged that Winslow was vicariously liable for the acts of its employees and subcontractors, or in the alternative, negligent in failing to provide a safe working environment. On the fifth day of the trial, Winslow admitted liability for negligence. The decision before the Court was the quantum of damages available to the plaintiff. The Court found that she had sustained very considerable psychiatric injuries and a jaw injury (due to teeth grinding) as a direct consequence of the bullying, abuse, and sexual harassment leveled at her by Winslow’s employees and subcontractors. The Court found that these injuries “have and will continue to diminish the quality of her life.” The Court awarded general damages AUD 380,000. Based on “virtually unanimous” evidence that the plaintiff would never work again, the Court also awarded her AUD 283,941.70 for past economic loss AUD 696,085.41 for future economic loss, to reflect her loss of future earning capacity.

The defendant was arrested for being suspected of touching a female police officer’s shoulder and trying to kiss her, and charged with Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession pursuant to Article 200 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and attempt to commit such an offense, among other crimes. The municipal court found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to two years and four months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for three years. The district court rejected the charge of Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession, and reduced the sentence to 12 months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for two years. Thereafter, the defendant filed a Request for Protection of Legality against the lower courts’ decisions, arguing that the lower courts unlawfully convicted him of attempted Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession. The defendant argued that an attempt requires the offender to intentionally take immediate action toward the commission of the offense. Here, the commencing of the criminal offense was not proven because there was no action manifesting a sexual purpose behind his touching. The Supreme Court held the defendant’s claim was unfounded, pointing out that Article 200’s text states only “[w]hoever touches another person for a sexual purpose.” Here, the defendant not only touched the victim but also tried to kiss her, and was prevented from kissing her mouth only by the victim’s resistance. Hence, the defendant did not commit an attempt, but in fact completed the offense. The court, however, determined that the principle of reformatio in peius (prohibiting placing the appellant in a worse position after appeal) barred it from changing the lower courts’ qualification of the criminal offense. The court additionally rejected the defendant’s argument that the attempt in this case was not punishable, determining that an attempt to commit Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession was punishable under the Criminal Code. (Also available in English.)

The plaintiff was a registered veterinary surgeon who had been found guilty of violating a provision of the Veterinary Surgeons Registration Ordinance after complaints that he had sent sexually inappropriate text messages to a co-worker. He argued that, because the co-worker was not a patient or customer of the clinic where they both worked, her complaints were not within the scope of the ordinance. The court dismissed his argument, finding that the ordinance was meant to be broad in scope and covered such misconduct.

The applicant, a married woman, was a member of the National Security Services stationed at Maseru. On 4 May 2007 she received a letter from the respondent notifying her of her transfer from Maseru to Mafeteng, though the transfer was not implemented. The transfer letter followed a complaint of sexual harassment lodged by the applicant against one of her superiors. The applicant had lodged the complaint in April 2007, and it was duly attended to. A Commission of Enquiry was set up to investigate the matter, but no report was published nor furnished to the applicant despite her numerous requests. The applicant argued that, among other reasons, the transfer was unlawful because it was not bona fide and was intended to serve as a punishment for lodging the complaint of sexual harassment. The applicant stated that she had no problem leaving Maseru but that she had only received two weeks’ notice in which to do so. The respondent did not deny that the complaint of sexual harassment or its failure to furnish the applicant with a report. The High Court found that the transfer was mala fide as the applicant was not afforded a hearing prior to such transfer, the report was unreasonably withheld, and she was not afforded enough time to prepare herself and her family to move to that new station. The court declared the decision to transfer the applicant to Mafeteng null and void.

The respondent was a married aboriginal woman employed at the The Black Community Housing Service as a bookkeeper since 1985 and later as an Administrator until her resignation in August 1992. The first appellant became the director of the Housing Service in December 1990, and the second appellant was the employer, The Black Community Housing Service. The respondent started receiving calls from the appellant where he expressed his love to her and made inappropriate sexual remarks. The appellant also made inappropriate sexual remarks to the respondent when attending meetings together, on other occasions he gifted her “sexually explicit figurines,” and “touched her sexually suggestively on numbers of occasions.” The respondent did not confront the appellant in fear of losing her job, but she did complain to the board of directors who took no action against the appellant. Respondent filed a complaint against the appellant on the basis of sexual harassment and discrimination, and ultimately resigned when the board of directors would not remove appellant from his position while the investigation was underway. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal found the claims of the respondent to be true. The Tribunal also learned that the employer did not have any policies on discrimination or sexual harassment, nor provided its employees with a training regarding the same. Since these are considered unlawful acts under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, the Tribunal ordered the employer and the appellant pay the respondent compensation for damages caused by the discrimination and sexual harassment. The first appellant filed this appeal stating that the Tribunal had no evidence that the respondent suffered any hurt and/or humiliation, nor that the respondent’s resignation was due to the behaviour of the appellant. The first appellant also objected on the compensation amount being “excessive in the circumstances.” The second appellant appealed, stating that the employer was not vicariously liable for the acts of the first appellant. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the orders of the Tribunal.

The plaintiff, a female police officer sued a police department, alleging hostile work environment, sexual harassment, and retaliation claims under Title VII. The plaintiff alleged that she suffered years of abuse because she was a woman, including derogatory remarks, disproportionately burdensome assignments, sabotage of her work, threats, and false accusations of misconduct. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Second Circuit reviewed all the evidence in the light most favorable to the officer and found that a reasonable jury could have arrived at a different conclusion than the district court. The Second Circuit determined that the evidence presented by the officer formed a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that she was subjected to hostile work environment because she was a woman and that she was suspended, put on probation, and then terminated in retaliation for having complained about her treatment. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the claims for retrial.

The plaintiff was fired for falsifying documents related to her work time. She sued in the Davidson County Chancery Court, alleging sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). The plaintiff alleged that her supervisors made sexually derogatory remarks to her, and that she was fired shortly after she complained about these comments. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed because the employer had established the affirmative defense of exercising reasonable care.

The plaintiff worked as a youth services officer with the Dyer County Juvenile Court, where she alleged that a Chancery Court judge sexually harassed her verbally and physically. When she rejected his advances, the judge demoted her from her supervisory position, denied her salary increases, and altered her job requirements weekly. She sued the judge for quid-pro-quo sexual harassment, in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). The Dyer County Chancery Court determined that the State was not the plaintiff’s employer for purposes of the THRA and dismissed her complaint for failing to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed and the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the plaintiff did state a cause of action because the State was the plaintiff’s employer and the defendant was a supervisor acting in the scope of his employment, making the employer strictly liable under an “alter-ego” theory of liability.

The plaintiff worked as a bookkeeper for the defendant. The general manager of the district repeatedly touched her inappropriately and made inappropriate remarks to her. Parker made numerous complaints to her immediate supervisor, but the harassing conduct continued until she resigned. Soon after, she sued the defendant for sexual harassment in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act in the Warren County Chancery Court. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that it took prompt corrective action in response to plaintiff’s complaints, thereby establishing a complete affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant acted promptly and adequately. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that an employer is subject to vicarious liability for actionable hostile work environment sexual harassment by a supervisor with immediate, or successively higher, authority over employee, but that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the employer exercised reasonable care. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Two plaintiffs, A and B, sued their former employer for wrongful termination, one based on racial discrimination and the other based on gender discrimination. Plaintiff B alleged that her supervisor touched her sexually without her consent and, when she complained, he fired her. The lower courts dismissed the actions, concluding that, pursuant to the employment-at-will doctrine, the plaintiffs were at-will employees who could be terminated for any or no reason at all. The issue before the Court was whether workplace discrimination could constitute a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and whether the availability of federal statutory remedies precluded state tort lawsuits. In reversing lower courts’ decision, the Court cited its precedents recognizing a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and concluded that it is “[w]ithout question” that it is the public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia that individuals within the state are “entitled to pursue employment free of discrimination based on race or gender.” The Court rejected the employer’s argument that the availability of federal statutory remedies should preclude a state tort cause of action based on wrongful discharge, explaining that it is not uncommon for injuries resulting from the same set of operative facts to give rise to multiple remedies.

The plaintiff-respondent worked as a sales representative for Hoffman-La Roche Inc, the defendant-petitioner. The respondent alleged that her supervisor told sexually inappropriate jokes and asked inappropriate questions on multiple occasions. She submitted complaints to Human Resources, which began an investigation. During the respondent’s performance review, her supervisor yelled at her and repeatedly criticized her performance, giving her a below average rating. Shortly afterwards, the petitioner fired both the respondent’s supervisor and the respondent. The respondent then filed a complaint for sexual harassment with the Texas Commission on Human Rights. At issue for the Supreme Court was whether the respondent could recover damages for emotional distress due to sexual harassment under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act and common tort law. The Court of Appeals held that the respondent could recover under both statutory and common law, awarding damages. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that when the complaint is for sexual harassment, the plaintiff must proceed solely under a statutory claim unless there are additional facts, unrelated to sexual harassment, to support an independent tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court found that the respondent could not identify additional extreme and outrageous conduct by the petitioner to support an independent intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The plaintiff-appellant, who worked for General Motors for more than 30 years, sued the company for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that she experienced a hostile work environment and retaliation. She alleged that she suffered a variety of sexually harassing comments, as well as other slights such as being the only employee denied a break and the only employee without a key to the office. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer on both her hostile work environment and retaliation claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, but reversed and remanded the lower court’s ruling on her hostile work environment claim, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her allegations were sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to violate Title VII.

The plaintiff-appellant, a trans (“a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual”) police officer, applied to be promoted to sergeant within the Cincinnati Police Department. The plaintiff passed the sergeants exam but failed a rigorous training program and was denied promotion. The plaintiff sued the City of Cincinnati, alleging that the denial of her promotion was due to sex-based discrimination and failure to conform to male sex stereotypes, such as wearing makeup, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $320,511 as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff met all four requirements of a claim of sex discrimination: that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she applied and was qualified for a promotion, that she was considered for and denied a promotion, and that other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions.

After the plaintiff-appellant, a theater professional who was openly homosexual, complained that a coworker had threatened him based on his sexual orientation and a union hiring hall of which the plaintiff was a member refused to provide him with work. Gilbert sued his union and a collection of various employers, alleging, among other claims, discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court observed that, while Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, and that this prohibition includes “sex stereotyping” whereby a plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action due to his or her nonconformity with gender stereotypes. The court held that Gilbert had not plead a sex stereotyping claim since other than his sexual orientation, the plaintiff fit every male stereotype, and sexual orientation did not suffice to obtain recovery under Title VII: “[f]or all we know,” the Court stated, “Gilbert fits every ‘male stereotype’ save one—sexual orientation—and that does not suffice to obtain relief under Title VII.”

The plaintiff-appellant, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, initiated sexual harassment and retaliation claims under Title VII against New Breed Logistics, the defendant, on behalf of three employees. The plaintiff alleged that Calhoun, a supervisor at New Breed sexually harassed three female employees and then retaliated against the women after they complained. The plaintiff further alleged that Calhoun retaliated against a male employee who verbally objected to Calhoun’s harassment of the women. The evidence presented to the district court that showed that each woman communicated her intent to complain about Calhoun’s sexual harassment shortly after which all three women were fired or transferred. One of the women lodged a complaint through the company’s complaint line but the company asked Calhoun five questions about his conduct and determined there was no misconduct. A jury found the defendant liable under Title VII for Calhoun’s sexual harassment and retaliation, and the district court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law. The district court determined that complaints to management and informal protests were protected activities under Title VII. Therefore, the three employees’ demand that Calhoun stop harassing them were considered protected activity under Title VII, and retaliation constituted a violation of Title VII. The defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of its post-trial motions. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, finding that sufficient evidence supported the district court’s rulings and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when providing instructions to the jury.

The respondent was charged with two counts of sexual harassment of female coworkers and with the verbal abuse of another female coworker. His employer (the “company”) found that he had violated the company’s policies and fired him. The respondent brought a claim for wrongful termination to the Office of the Labour Commissioner, and the dispute was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator found in favor of the respondent and ordered the company to reinstate him and pay him N$102,000 in lost wages. The company appealed the decision to the courts. The judge overturned the arbitrator’s decision, finding that he overlooked numerous relevant facts in making his conclusions, which “no reasonable court or tribunal court have reached.” The court held that the company acted appropriately in terminating the respondent’s employment because sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace are serious offenses that create obstacles to equality in employment.

The plaintiff filed suit against her employer, the Ministry of Defense—Argentine Air Force, seeking damages for sexual harassment and workplace persecution because her supervisor made indecent proposals, threatened her employment if she did not accede to his demands, made sexually explicit comments, and impeded her advancement. The trial court ruled against the plaintiff on the basis that (1) a psychological report indicated that she suffered from “moderate reactive development,” therefore making it impossible to determine the level of fault that corresponded to the alleged hostile conduct or to her “moderate reactive development,” (2) while certain testimony indicated the plaintiff was subject to certain “inconveniences” caused by her supervisor, the court found that these were insufficient to support a claim of sexual harassment or other unlawful conduct and (3) the plaintiff was therefore subject to a higher burden of proof in relation to the alleged conduct and that this burden was not met. In reversing the trial court’s ruling, the appellate court noted that (1) workplace sexual harassment is characterized by extreme psychological violence in the workplace that is both systematic and prolonged and that is carried out for the purpose of devaluing, perturbing, or debasing the victim so that the victim abandons the workplace or accepts other workplace conditions, and (2) particular difficulties arise in proving that the offensive conduct took place. For this reason, the court noted, special importance must be given to testimony given by work colleagues, medical or psychological reports to determine the existence of physical or psychological damage and documentary evidence. Specifically, the appellate court found that the plaintiff presented sufficient witness testimony, documentary evidence and psychological and accounting reports to sustain her claims. In addition to allowing damages, the appellate court ordered the defendants to pay costs.

La demandante interpuso una demanda contra su empleador, el Ministerio de Defensa - Fuerza Aérea Argentina, reclamando daños por acoso sexual y persecución laboral porque su supervisor le hizo propuestas indecentes, amenazó su empleo si no accedía a sus demandas, hizo comentarios sexualmente explícitos y impidió su avance profesional. El tribunal de primera declaró en contra de la demandante sobre la base de que (1) un informe psicológico indicó que padecía de “desarrollo reactivo moderado”, por lo que no se pudo determinar el nivel de culpa que correspondía a la presunta conducta hostil o a su “moderado desarrollo reactivo ”, (2) mientras que ciertos testimonios indicaron que la demandante estaba sujeta a ciertos“ inconvenientes ”causados ​​por su supervisor, el tribunal determinó que estos eran insuficientes para sustentar una denuncia de acoso sexual u otra conducta ilegal y (3) la demandante fue por lo tanto, sujeto a una mayor carga de la prueba en relación con la conducta alegada y que esta carga no se cumplió. El tribunal de apelaciones revirtió estas conclusiones. En la apelación, el tribunal señaló que (1) el acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo se caracteriza por una violencia psicológica extrema en el lugar de trabajo que es tanto sistemática como prolongada y que se lleva a cabo con el propósito de devaluar, perturbar o degradar a la víctima. de modo que la víctima abandone el lugar de trabajo o acepte otras condiciones laborales, y (2) surjan dificultades particulares para probar que la conducta ofensiva tuvo lugar. Por ello, señaló el tribunal, se debe otorgar especial importancia a las declaraciones de los compañeros de trabajo, los informes médicos o psicológicos para determinar la existencia de daño físico o psicológico, y la prueba documental. Específicamente, la corte de apelaciones determinó que la demandante presentó suficiente testimonio de testigos, evidencia documental e informes psicológicos y contables para sustentar sus acusaciones. Además de otorgar daños, el tribunal de apelaciones ordenó a los acusados ​​pagar los costos judiciales.

The claimant brought a claim of damages for unlawful termination of employment because she alleged she was terminated before her two-year contract had run despite a positive one-year evaluation. She claimed her contract was not renewed because she made reports of sexual harassment by her supervisor to the police. However, that report was made four months after the claimant was informed of the decision not to renew her contract. The court also determined that her contract was a one-year contract. As a result, her claim was dismissed. However, the court “condemn[ed] in the strongest possible terms the exploitation and degradation of women by predatory male behavior in the workplace” and found that the respondent “has an obligation to not sweep these grave allegations under the rug.” The court urged an investigation into the alleged conduct by claimant’s supervisor and for the respondent to “duly penalize such behavior if substantiated, in keeping with Belize’s national and international obligations to protect the rights of women and children from sexual exploitation under treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence and Discrimination Against Women.”

In 2009, a female employee made a formal complaint regarding improper conduct in the workplace, including continuous inappropriate and derogatory comments, by a Northern Territory Police Force member to whom she was a personal assistant, Bert Hofer. The complaint resulted in an investigation and Hofer’s demotion and transfer. On April 13, 2010, the female employee further made a complaint to the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Commission of discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of the Anti-Discrimination Act (Northern Territory). Pursuant to Section 66 of the Anti-Discrimination Act, the Commissioner must accept or reject a complaint not later than 60 days after receipt of the complaint. The complaint was accepted on November 1, 2010, well beyond the 60-day timeframe. Hofer argued that the decision to accept the complaint should be set aside due to the Commissioner’s failure to accept the complaint within the statutory timeframe. Further, Hofer argued that the Commissioner failed to consider whether the complaint was frivolous or vexatious. The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory held that the Commissioner did consider whether the complaint was vexatious, and determined that it was not. The fact that the Commissioner failed to accept the complaint within of the 60-day timeframe did not invalidate the decision as such a finding would result in unacceptable injustice inflicted on victims due to government inaction. Accordingly, Hofer’s application was dismissed and the Commissioner’s decision to accept the complaint was upheld.

The Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) brought charges against the defendant, “A” (name omitted from public record), for sexual harassment against the victim, “D” (name omitted from public record) a minor girl. A had naked pictures of D and threatened to expose them using the internet unless D agreed to have sexual intercourse with him. The Lower Court held that D’s conduct did not meet the requirements of sexual harassment under section 163 of the Portuguese Penal Code, which requires a grave threat to the victim as an element of the crime. The Lower Court held that the threat to expose naked pictures of D is considered a grave threat under the Portuguese Penal Code. The Public Prosecutor appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed the decision, finding B guilty of sexual harassment.

O Ministério Público trouxe acusações contra o réu, “A” (nome omitido do registro público), por assédio sexual contra a vítima, “D” (nome omitido do registro público) uma garota menor de idade. A tinha fotos de D pelada e ameaçou expor as fotos na internet a menos que D concordasse em ter relações sexuais com ele. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que a conduta de D não cumpria com as exigências de assédio sexual sob a seção 163 do Código Penal Português, que requer uma grave ameaça à vítima como elemento do crime. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que a ameaça de expor as fotos de D pelada é considerada grave ameaça sob o Código Penal Português. O Ministério Público apelou, e o Tribunal da Relação reverteu a decisão, condenando B pelo crime de assédio sexual.

In May 2015, a girl purchased bread from Defendant Luis Alonso, a 50-year-old baker, at his home. While the girl was at Luis’ home, Luis physically attacked her and stated that he would “rape her.” Although Luis did not carry out his threat, he threatened the girl that if she reported him, she would pay and that he would continue to harass her and physically assault her every time he saw her on the street. In February, 2016, the girl was approached by Luis in a small town in Ciudad Delgado and was afraid that Luis would sexually assault her again so she reported the previous events to patrolling officers. The patrolling officers arrested Luis for sexual harassment. Section 165 of the El Salvadoran Penal Code provides that a person is liable for sexual harassment—punishable by three to five years imprisonment—when that person engages in unwanted sexual conduct involving phrases, touching, signs or other unequivocal sexual conduct that does not in itself constitute a more serious offense. The court found that the defendant Luis Alonso sexually harassed the girl in violation of article 165. The court replaced the three-year prison sentence with 144 days of community service and ordered that Luis pays the victim a civil penalty of $300.

En mayo del 2015, una niña le compró pan al acusado Luis Alonso, quien era un panadero de 50 años, en su casa. Mientras la niña estaba en la casa de Luis, Luis la agredió físicamente y le dijo que la “violaría.” Aunque Luis no cumplió con su amenaza, amenazó a la niña con que si lo denunciaba, ella pagaría y que seguiría acosándola y agrediéndola físicamente cada vez que la viera en la calle. En febrero del 2016, Luis se acercó a la niña en un pequeño pueblo de Ciudad Delgado. La niña, quien temía que Luis la agrediera sexualmente, denunció los hechos anteriores a los agentes de patrulla. Los agentes de patrulla arrestaron a Luis por acoso sexual. La Sección 165 del Código Penal salvadoreño establece que una persona es responsable de acoso sexual, punible con tres a cinco años de prisión, cuando esa persona participa en una conducta sexual no deseada que involucre frases, tocamientos, señas u otra conducta sexual inequívoca que no constituyen un delito más grave. El tribunal determinó que el acusado Luis Alonso acosó sexualmente a la niña en violación del Artículo 165. El tribunal reemplazó la sentencia de tres años de prisión por 144 días de servicio comunitario y ordenó que Luis pagara a la víctima una multa civil de $300.

The Plaintiff worked as a cashier at King Palace Chinese Restaurant, which was operated by King of the King Group Limited (“Defendant”). The Plaintiff alleged that she was sexually assaulted by Mr. Leung, an employee of the Defendant, who made a sexual remark to the Plaintiff and also touched the Plaintiff’s chest. Immediately after the incident, the Plaintiff reported it to her direct supervisor, who promised to follow up on the incident, but did not do so. When the Plaintiff raised the harassment again later on and wanted to report it to the police, her supervisor asked the Plaintiff not to do so or the Defendant would terminate both her and Leung’s employment. Eventually, her supervisor arranged a meeting and asked Leung to apologize to the Plaintiff, but he did it reluctantly and disrespectfully. The Plaintiff, irritated by the disrespect, slapped Leung, and was then immediately fired by the Defendant. The Plaintiff settled the case with Leung and made a claim under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. The Court held that the dismissal was not made by the Defendant on the ground of the Plaintiff’s sex, or because she was sexually harassed, but because the Plaintiff slapped the harasser. However, the Court ruled that the acts committed by Leung constituted unlawful sexual harassment, and that the Defendant, as employer of Leung, was vicariously liable for Leung’s sexual harassment for the reason that the Defendant failed to take all reasonably practicable steps to prevent the sexual harassment against the Plaintiff in the workplace. The Court awarded the Plaintiff damages for injury to her feelings and costs caused by or in connection with the sexual harassment.

The appellee, a former employee of the appellant’s subsidiary, suffered sexual harassment and stalking from an employee of the appellant’s other subsidiary who shared the same work site with the appellee. The appellant had developed a corporate-group-wide compliance system, which included a consulting desk at which an employee of the appellant or its subsidiaries could raise and discuss any compliance-related matters. The appellee brought the harassment issue to her supervisors at her immediate employer (i.e. the appellant’s subsidiary) twice, but sufficient solutions were not provided, following which she left the company without bringing the issues to the consulting desk. The stalking continued even after her resignation, so her former colleague who still worked at the appellant's subsidiary brought the issue before the appellant through the consulting desk, but it did not provide sufficient solutions either. The question brought before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant (i.e. a parent company of her former immediate employer) bore the duties based on the principle of good faith to provide certain protective measures to the appellant because it had developed the corporate-group-wide compliance system. The Supreme Court found that the appellant was not imposed with such duties in light of particular facts in the case since the appellant did not bring the harassment issue to the consulting desk during her employment. However, in dicta, the Court stated that a parent company, depending on particular facts of the case, can be responsible for providing sufficient solutions to an employee of its subsidiary who is a victim of sexual harassment––failure of which would result in liability for damage based on the principle of good faith––if the parent company provides a system through which the employee could, and actually did, bring an issue of sexual harassment to the parent company’s attention.

上告人の子会社の元契約社員である被上告人は、同じ事業場内で就労していた他の子会社の従業員からセクシャル・ハラスメントやストーカー行為を受けていた。被上告人は、直属の勤務先（上告人の子会社）の上司にこの問題に関して二度相談したが、問題が十分に解決されなかったため、上告人が設置していたグループ会社内全体の社員が事業場内に関する事項を相談できるコンプライアンス相談窓口に相談することなく退職した。その後も被上告人に対するストーカー行為が継続していたため、上告人の子会社に勤務していた被上告人の元同僚は、被上告人のため、上告人の設置したコンプライアンス相談窓口に相談した。しかし、それでも問題は解決されなかった。最高裁では、コンプライアンス相談窓口を設置していたことを理由に、上告人が信義則に基づき一定の付随義務を負うか否かが問題となった。被上告人が在職中にハラスメント問題を相談窓口に申し出なかったことと、本件の特殊な事実関係に照らして、最高裁は上告人が雇用契約上の付随義務を負わないことを確認した。一方で、本件判決は、子会社の従業員がセクシャルハラスメントに遭った際、問題を親会社の相談窓口への申出ることができ、その申出の具体的状況によって、親会社が申出をした者に対し、申出に係る相談の内容等に応じて適切に対応すべき信義則上の義務を負う場合があると判示した。

Two former employees of the defendant were subjected to repeated instances of sexual harassment by the clinic’s patients. The employees alleged that they complained to the defendant about the conduct, but he failed to take any corrective action. They filed suit in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas alleging sexual harassment. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that Ohio law did not recognize such a claim based on the conduct of non-employees. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, holding that Ohio Civil Rights law does permit courts to impose liability on employers for non-employees’ sexual harassment at the place of employment.

Marilyn Payton worked for Receivables Outsourcing for six weeks, during which time she was sexually harassed by a fellow employee who was assigned to train her at her new job. The harassment consisted of inappropriate comments until one day the coworker pulled up to her car as she was driving away from work, asked her to roll down her window, and then offered her ten dollars to perform a sex act. She complained to her manager that she felt unsafe, and the manager said he would “take care of it.” When she returned to work to find the manager not there, she informed the company lawyer of the harassment and left work, stating that she felt unsafe without the manager there. The next day she was fired for leaving work. She filed suit against her employer in the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas for hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge, but the Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether the alleged harassment rose to the level of creating a hostile work environment and whether the employer negligently retained the alleged harasser.

The plaintiff was fired from his job with MTD Consumer Group after sexually harassing a coworker. He and the coworker had been in a romantic relationship, which had since ended, when the coworker complained that the plaintiff had made a threatening gesture to her and her new boyfriend outside of her home. The plaintiff was also verbally derogatory toward this coworker until his employment was terminated. He sued MTD in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, alleging reverse gender discrimination and negligent retention of his coworker. The Court granted the employer’s motion for a directed verdict, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed, holding that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim that he was treated differently form a similarly-situated coworker.

Dawn Thompson, an employee with the Louisville Department of Corrections, was approached by her immediate supervisor, Kevin Sidebottom, who wanted to begin a romantic relationship with her. After she rebuffed his advances, Thompson began to hear rumors that the two were romantically involved, which she denied. She was later denied a promotion to captain. Instead, the two promotions went to a woman who had the highest test scores and a man with lower test scores than Thompson. Thompson claimed that Sidebottom denied her promotion because she declined his romantic advances two years earlier. However, a higher-ranking officer claimed that he made the promotion decisions alone and declined to promote Thompson because of a recent EEO complaint against her, which was eventually dropped. Two months later, Thompson received a promotion to captain despite again hearing rumors about her romantic involvement with Sidebottom in addition to rumors that he had tried to prevent her promotion. After Thompson filed an EEO complaint, the department found that Sidebottom did not retaliate against her because he did not make the promotion decision. Thompson then sued the Louisville government and Sidebottom individually and in his professional capacity for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, but the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that she was unable to demonstrate that the legitimate reason for her initial failure to be promoted was not the real reason she was denied, and in addition, failed to show that she suffered an adverse employment action.

A female employee brought suit against her former employer for retaliation and sexual harassment based on claims that, among other things, her supervisor was constantly talking about his penis including graphic descriptions of its size, and his sexual prowess, history, successes, and aspirations. Blizzard did not allege that her supervisor’s comments were directed to her. Instead, she alleged that his comments were pervasive and that the female employees who were receptive to his “management style” received favors and preferences that Blizzard did not. Blizzard’s sexual harassment claim against her employer was based on the employer’s creation of a hostile work environment. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the employer. The appellate court explained that to establish a hostile work environment claim based on harassment by a supervisor, Blizzard was required to show: (1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on her sex, (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that there was a basis for holding the employer liable. Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007), the court found that Blizzard could maintain her claims even though the offensive language and acts at issue were not specifically directed at her and remanded the case for a new trial.

The applicant, Salome Jumbo, claimed she was dismissed as a result of her pregnancy. In 1999, the applicant started as a temporary nurse aid at a clinic and continued in that position until 2001. In 2001, the manager of the clinic assured the applicant that her job had become permanent. On April 4, 2001, the manager discovered that the applicant was pregnant. He immediately warned the applicant that he would not allow her to keep her job if she remained pregnant, as they wanted a permanent nurse aid. The manager also enquired into the applicant’s private affairs and made inappropriate sexual remarks. On June 1, 2001, the manager terminated the applicant’s employment explicitly informing her that her termination was due to her pregnancy. The applicant asked for a reference letter, but the manager refused saying that she was a temporary employee and did not deserve one. The Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (the “Court”) ruled that the termination was contrary to the spirit of the Employment Act and ordered that the clinic immediately re-instate the applicant. The Court found that the respondent specifically violated the applicant’s rights under §31(1) of the Employment Act, which requires employers to provide a reference if the employee requests one on termination of an employment contract. In addition, the respondent violated § 49 (1) of the Employment Act, which dictates that “terminating a woman’s employment because of pregnancy amount[s] to an offence [that is] punishable with a fine of K20,000 and imprisonment of five years” (p. 3). The Court also found that the manager’s inquiries into the applicant’s private affairs with her husband amounted to sexual harassment. This case is notable in Malawi because it set the precedent that inquiring into a married woman’s private affairs with her husband is an unfair labor practice.

The plaintiffs were two male employees who had been temporarily suspended from work and demoted from their managerial positions for sexually harassing female employees by making comments of a sexual nature in the office. The plaintiffs sued the company, seeking a declaratory judgment that such disciplinary actions were void because there were no grounds for such actions, and/or the actions were taken abusively. The High Court found for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s judgment, finding that the disciplinary actions taken against the plaintiffs were not an abuse of the company’s right to take action, and that furthermore the actions did not lack objectively reasonable grounds and were appropriate from a general societal perspective. The Supreme Court reasoned that 1) the plaintiffs had repeatedly made obscene or insulting statements to or about the female employees, despite warnings from superiors, 2) the company had distributed guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment and had held a mandatory seminar on sexual harassment, 3) in many cases, employees who experience sexual harassment may not expressly object due to concerns about damaging relationships with colleagues, despite the distress caused by the harassment, and 4) the plaintiffs, who were in managerial positions, should have recognized the policy and attitude of the company on the issue of sexual harassment as a matter of course.

被上告人らは、上告人の男性従業員2人で、オフィスで女性従業員に性的な発言をしてセクシュアル・ハラスメントを行ったとして、一時的な出勤停止と管理職からの降格処分を受けていた。被上告人らが上告人に対し、上記各処分は懲戒事由を欠き又は懲戒権を濫用したものとして無効であり、上記各降格処分もまた無効であるなどと主張して、出勤停止処分の無効確認や各降格処分前の等級を有する地位にあることの確認等を求めた事案である。高裁は被上告人らを支持したが、最高裁は、被上告人らに対する懲戒処分は、会社の懲戒権を濫用したものではなく、また、客観的に合理的な理由を欠くものでもなく、社会通念上相当であると判断し、高裁の判決を破棄した。最高裁は、(1）原告が上司の警告にもかかわらず、女性従業員に対して卑猥な発言や侮辱的な発言を繰り返していたこと、(2）会社がセクシャル・ハラスメントを禁止するガイドラインを配布し、セクシャル・ハラスメントに関するセミナーを義務的に開催していたこと、(3）多くの場合、セクシャルハラスメントを受けた従業員は、苦痛を感じているにもかかわらず、同僚との関係を懸念して、明確にセクシャル・ハラスメントに反対しない場合が多いこと、(4）管理職であった原告らは、セクシャルハラスメントの問題に関する会社の方針・姿勢を当然認識していたはずであることなどを理由に挙げた。

The petitioners sued the defendants for operating “mehadrin” bus lines for orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jews. Petitioners argue that these bus lines discriminate based on gender by allowing men to board and sit in the front of the bus while requiring that women board by the rear door, sit in the back, and dress modestly. Petitioners claim these restrictions violate their fundamental and constitutional rights to equality, dignity, freedom of religion, and freedom of conscience. Petitioners refused to comply with the gender restrictions, which respondents claimed were not compulsory but voluntary and thus legal. Petitioners, however, countered that the gender separation on mehadrin lines is not voluntary and that they were subjected to verbal harassment, threatened with physical violence, humiliated, and forced to leave the bus when they declined to observe the gender separation. After the respondents agreed to an examination of public transportation arrangements on lines serving the ultra-orthodox sector by an independent committee and the committee delivered its analysis, the Court ordered respondent 1 to instruct respondent 2 to publicize the cancellation of the separation arrangements (within 10 days of the date on which the judgment was rendered), and ordered respondent 2 to carry out its instructions within 30 days of the judgment. Within that period of time, respondents 2 and 3 were to post signs regarding the cancellation in all buses formerly subject to “mehadrin” arrangements, without exception.

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor trespassing after he stayed for several hours in a women’s restroom at a gas station. Numerous store employees entered during the two hours he was in the restroom and told him that there was no smoking, as he smelled like smoke. During these encounters, the store personnel were under the impression the defendant was female as he disguised his voice to mimic a woman’s. When the defendant did not leave, the police arrived and escorted the defendant out of the restroom. The defendant gave the police consent to search him and they found lotion and a pornographic magazine; the defendant was then arrested. The trial court found him guilty of the misdemeanor trespass and sentenced him to six months in jail. The defendant appealed citing an error in denying his motion for acquittal and for exclusion of the lotion and pornographic magazine. The appellate court found that the lotion was relevant as to motive for remaining unlawfully and also relevant to whether his presence was an accident which undermines his defense. Accordingly, the evidence was lawfully admitted and the conviction stood.

Three female petitioners sued a state-managed prison facility after prison officials required them to verify that they were menstruating before bringing feminine hygiene products into a male prison when visiting inmates. One of the petitioners’ children was also forced to watch the mother being searched because prison rules require children be supervised at all times. The women cited violations of due process, invasion of privacy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, unconstitutional seizures, unconstitutional search and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied the prison’s motion to dismiss, noting that filing a case against an agent in his official capacity as well as the entity to which the individual agent is not legally precluded and that liability can rest on the individuals given that the actors at least knowingly acquiesced in the search and likely facilitated the policy that allowed it to happen.

At an elementary school dinner party attended by school faculty, the Principal offered to pour alcohol to three male and three female teachers. The three male teachers then reciprocally offered the Principal alcohol, but the three female teachers did not do the same. The Vice Principal (Plaintiff/Appellee) twice requested the female teachers to offer the Principal alcohol as well. Two out of the three female teachers (Defendants) stated that they felt sexually harassed, the request causing the female teachers to feel a sense of sexual mortification or repugnance. Considering the nature of this dinner party, the relationship between the participants, the place, the prevailing situation when Plaintiff uttered the words in question, the lower court judged that the comment and language of Plaintiff in this case could not be interpreted as sexual harassment or unpardonable behavior in violation of public morals or social order, considering the common sense and customs of society as a whole. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of and criteria for determining the prerequisite "sexual speech and behavior, etc.," for a finding of sexual harassment under Article 2 Subparagraph 2 of the former Act on the Prohibition and Remedy of Sexual Discrimination (amended by Act No. 6915 of May 29, 2003). The Article stipulates that the prerequisite "sexual speech and behavior” for sexual harassment is behavior which provokes in the average person a feeling of sexual mortification and repugnance, viewed in terms of the sound knowledge and practices of society, usually involving a physical, linguistic, or visual act relating to the physical traits of man and woman or a physical relationship between the two. The Court stated that it was not necessary to show that the actor in question had a sexual motive or intent to establish sexual harassment, but rather that the acts would provoke a sense of sexual mortification and repugnance to the average person in a similar situation, taking into account the relationship between the parties, the place and circumstances of the behavior, the content of the clear or presumed response to the behavior, the content and degree of the behavior, and whether the act is fleeting or short-term, as opposed to continual. Considering the conversation of the dinner party location and the circumstances under which Plaintiff requested those acts, the Court interpreted Plaintiff’s request to be not of sexual intent, but of the intent that the offer of alcohol from the boss be reciprocated. Accordingly, the Court stated that sexual harassment could not be established merely by reason of the opposing party feeling sexual mortification and repugnance if it would not objectively provoke such sexual mortification and repugnance in the average person in a similar situation. The Court upheld the lower court’s decision and dismissed the appeal.

Wilcox worked as a corrections officer at McRae Correctional Facility with her husband. After her husband was fired, Wilcox alleged that she was subject to sexual harassment by her supervisor. She alleged that her supervisor caressed her, touched her thighs and referred to them in evocative language, slapped her buttocks in front of other employees, and discussed his female friend’s genitalia with her. Wilcox complained to the EEOC that her supervisor’s actions created a hostile work environment. The Circuit Court agreed, citing that all five requirements for hostile work environment were met: 1) that the complainant belong to a protected group 2) that the complainant was subject to sexual harassment 3) the harassment was based on the sex of the complainant 4) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe to change the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment 5) a basis for holding the employer liable.

Twenty-one former employees of the defendant’s hotel and casino alleged sexual discrimination, gender stereotyping, and disparate treatment and impact as a result of their employer’s standards for appearance. The casino instituted a standard weight applicable to men and women (which was 7% above a base rate adjusted for gender). The women’s job was to bring drinks to casino patrons, and to do so wearing a revealing costume. The plaintiffs reported incidents of sexual harassment by casino patrons to their employers, who did not address the incidents. The lower court granted summary judgment to the casino on the complaints of facial discrimination citing the statute of limitations. However, the appellate court determined that the summary judgment was in error, as it did not take into consideration that the plaintiffs’ claim that the employer ignored sexual harassment by casino patrons, creating a hostile work environment was a continuing violation. Because one of the alleged acts occurred within the two years prior to filing the case, the case is thus not time-barred.

The defendant was indicted under the Stalker Regulation Law on a charge of stalking his former girlfriend by sending two rose bouquets and five letters. The defendant argued that the Stalker Regulation Law is unconstitutional because it infringes a “right to fulfill romantic feelings”. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument opining that even if a right to fulfill romantic feelings were to exist, the purpose of the Stalker Regulation Law is legitimate and its contents are reasonable.

The Plaintiff worked as an employee for a corporation in which the Defendant served as a supervisor. The Defendant, who had the authority to hire and fire employees, singled out the Plaintiff frequently for her passive nature and alleged inferior job skills. On numerous occasions, the Defendant forced the Plaintiff to touch his penis and engaged in other various acts of sexual misconduct. The lower court found that the Defendant’s sexual misconduct constituted an invasion of the Plaintiff’s right to self-determination. Additionally, the lower court found the employer, the Defendant-Corporation, liable for the supervisor’s sexual misconduct. The Supreme Court of Korea affirmed, finding the supervisor and employer liable. Under Article 756 of the Civil Act, an employer can be held liable for an employee’s action if the act is “related to the employee’s execution of the undertaking (for which he is employed).” Thus, the Supreme Court noted that when an employee injures another intentionally, even if the act is not related to the employee’s undertaking of his job responsibilities, employer liability still attaches if the misconduct is “apparently and objectively related” to the employer’s work. Additionally, if an employee commits an intentional act such as sexual misconduct, the court noted employer liability attaches where the misconduct was objectively related to the execution of the employer’s work. Noting the Defendant-employee’s authority to fire and hire employees, as well as his ability to punish the Plaintiff for resisting his unwelcome sexual advances, the Supreme Court held that the Defendant-employee took advantage of his superior position over the Plaintiff and therefore committed the sexual misconduct in a situation proximate, in terms of time and place, to his job responsibilities. Therefore, the court found the lower court correctly applied the law in finding employer liability, as the sexual misconduct was objectively related to the Defendant’s job duties.

This case concerns the sentencing of a sexual offender. The offender was convicted of eight counts of sexual intercourse and indecent assault against a sixteen year old girl. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the judge erred in his determination that the victim “suffered significant psychological damage as a result of the offense.” On appeal, the Court found that the lower court erred in making the finding of “substantial” harm. The Court further held that the victim’s “psychological damage was multifactorial and that in the absence of medical evidence which separated out the effects of these offences,” the lower court’s determination of substantial psychological harm resulting from the offenses was inappropriate.

The defendant was charged with two charges of rape of the complainant, a 14 year old female, punishable under section 376(1) of the Penal Code, and two charges of unlawful carnal knowledge with a girl under 16 years old, an offence under section 2 of the Unlawful Carnal Knowledge Act (Cap. 29). DNA and other forensic evidence indicated that the defendant was the biological father of the complainant’s child. While that evidence alone could not prove rape, the complainant’s evidence, consisting largely of her testimony, was found credible despite minor discrepancies in the testimony of her various witnesses. The court held that the prosecution had proved beyond the reasonable doubt the four charges against the defendant, and he was accordingly convicted. The court sentenced the defendant to 10 years imprisonment on the first and second charge, and four years imprisonment on the third and fourth charge, to run concurrently. A total sentence of imprisonment was 10 years was imposed.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to raping a 16 year old female, punishable under section 376(1) of the Penal Code, and the alternative charge of attempted rape, punishable under section 376(2) of the Penal Code. The court was satisfied that the complainant’s complaint to her mother was made by her at the earliest possible moment, which was consistent with her complaint to the police and other evidence, therefore corroborating the complainant’s evidence. The court found the complainant credible, and accepted her evidence indicating that she did not consent. In addition, the complainant was examined by a doctor, who found numerous injuries and concluded in her report that there was some injury to the complainant’s vulva, which may be due to attempted sexual intercourse. The court found, however, that the doctor did not seem sure whether penetration occurred. Regarding whether there was penetration, the court found the complainant’s evidence unreliable, and therefore reasonable doubt. The court convicted the defendant of attempted rape and voluntarily causing hurt. The court imposed sentences of 10 years imprisonment and 12 strokes.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to five charges of rape of an approximately 13 year old female, under section 376 of the Penal Code. The court emphasized that these were rapes only because of the complainant’s age, not because any force was used against her. The court noted that the fact that a rape is committed with consent does not lower the standard of proof which is required of the act itself. The court reasoned that it would be dangerous to convict in reliance on the complainant’s evidence, which had several inconsistencies. Additionally, the testimony of an examining doctor showed that the complainant’s evidence was suspect. The complainant denied having had sexual intercourse with anyone in the date range at issue, which did not agree with the evidence of the examining doctor, which the court accepted. The court found that if she cannot be believed as to that, it could not rely on her uncorroborated evidence on any of the charges. The defendant was acquitted of all five charges and the court ordered his discharge.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of rape for allegedly raping two girls, aged 4 and 8 years, respectively. He was sentenced to 10 years on each count, with five years suspended for five years on condition of good behavior. The appellant appealed against the convictions and the sentences. It was accepted that the two girls were sexually interfered with, which both confirmed through testimony. Both girls were (i) examined by a doctor, who observed attenuation of the hymen and a deep notch on both girls and (ii) able to identify the appellant as the perpetrator to the police. The court was satisfied with the identification, finding that the appellant was correctly convicted. The appellant argued that the sentence was too harsh. The court found that numerous factors were considered before sentencing. It held that the appellant did not use gratuitous violence, and was entitled to some leniency. The court ruled that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh and induced a sense of shock. The sentence was overturned and substituted for 10 years imprisonment, with two years suspended for five years on condition the appellant does not within this period commit any offence of a sexual nature for which he is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine.

The accused was convicted of two counts, rape and robbery, as he allegedly raped the complainant and threatened to kill her if she told anyone. The two counts were taken as one for the purpose of imposing a sentence of 20 years imprisonment. He received an effective prison term of 17 years. The court noted that the conviction of rape was not at issue; instead, it was the conviction of robbery and the trial judge’s sentencing approach at issue. The court was not convinced that the essential elements of robbery were established regarding the accused’s taking of a cellphone and his subsequent actions, as the circumstances under which the cellphone was surrendered were not clear. Therefore, the facts supported a conviction of theft, not robbery. The court found that the trial judge should not have treated both counts as one for the purpose of sentencing. The court confirmed the conviction of rape, with a sentence of 12 years imprisonment with labor. The robbery conviction was set aside, and substituted for theft of a cellphone, with a sentence of six months imprisonment with labor.

The accused was convicted of three counts of contravening s 65 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act Cap 9:23, for allegedly raping the complainant, aged 12 years, on three different occasions. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, with three years suspended on condition of good behavior and the remaining two years suspended on condition he performed 840 hours of community service. The court found that case law clearly demonstrated that rape can only be committed when there is penetration. Evidence of the slightest penetration is sufficient. As the accused failed to penetrate the complainant on the first and third occasions, the court found that he should not have been convicted of rape on counts one and three, but only attempted rape. The court overturned the convictions for rape on counts one and three, which were substituted for attempted rape. The court upheld the imposed sentence, but it reduced the community service sentence to 630 hours.

The appellant, a Catholic priest, was convicted of two counts of rape as defined in section 65(1) of the Criminal Law [Codification and Reform] Act (Chapter 9:23), for allegedly raping the complainant, aged 23 years. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, with two years suspended on condition of good behavior. The appellant appealed his conviction. The evidence showed speculation about a possible love relationship between the parties. The court noted that the complainant wrote a letter to the appellant, which was not properly addressed during the trial. The court found that the letter should have been carefully addressed at trial. The court held that the trial judge should not have convicted the appellant. The conviction was quashed and the sentence was set aside.

This case relates to sexual harassment in the workplace. The relevant facts are as follows. The victim was a receptionist at her company, and experienced sexual harassment by her superior, as evidenced by lascivious emails he sent her. She reported the harassment to supervisors, who suggested that they work together to find a solution, which resulted in the employer suggesting that she resign. The victim resigned and the harasser was sanctioned with three days docked pay. The court found that the employer did not respond to the sexual harassment appropriately, resulting in the victim’s continued harassment and eventual loss of employment. The court notes that employers and supervisors have an obligation to maintain good working conditions for their employees, including preventing sexual harassment. Pursuant to this obligation, employers and supervisors must: (1) communicate to all employees about relevant policies, (2) establish procedures to guarantee the effectiveness of such policies and (3) protect any whistleblowers (including victims) with respect to sexual harassment. The court also notes that sexual harassment is a form of sexual violence and a form of discrimination because it denies victims of their fundamental human rights of freedom, respect, physical, sexual and emotional integrity, the right to work in a safe environment and equality under the law.

Este caso aborda acoso sexual en el centro de trabajo. Los hechos relevantes son los siguientes: la víctima era una recepcionista y sufrió acoso sexual de un superior evidenciado con correos electrónicos lascivos que ella recibió. Ella reportó el acoso a sus superiores, quienes acordaron en trabajar juntos para solucionar el problema. El empleador sugirió que la víctima resignara. Ella resignó su posición mientras que el acusado solo fue suspendido sin salario por 3 días. La corte concluyó que el empleador no respondió apropiadamente con respecto a la queja de acoso sexual, pues el resultado para la víctima después de haber traído el asunto a su atención, fue el continuo acoso y eventualmente la pérdida de su trabajo. La corte especifica que los empleadores y supervisores tienen una obligación continua de mantener buenas condiciones de trabajo para sus empleados, lo cual incluye prevenir el acoso sexual. Con respecto a esta obligación, los empleadores y supervisores tienen que: (1) comunicar esta política a todos los empleados, (2) establecer procedimientos que garanticen la efectividad de dichas políticas, y (3) proteger a los informantes, incluyendo la propia víctima, con respecto al acoso sexual. La corte también agrega que el acoso sexual es en sí una forma de violencia sexual y de discriminación porque le niega a las víctimas sus derechos fundamentales de libertad, respeto, integridad física, sexual, y emocional, así como el derecho de trabajar en un ambiente seguro y bajo igualdad legal.

The appellant was convicted of indecent assault and rape for allegedly taking the complainant to his house, chasing her around during the night and raping her. He was sentenced to one year imprisonment with labor and eight years imprisonment with labor, respectively, to run concurrently, with two years suspended for five years on condition of good behavior. The appellant appealed against both the conviction and the sentence on both counts. The court found that the complainant had an opportunity to report the incident on many occasions but she deliberately chose not to use it, which casts doubt as to her credibility. The court found that the complainant was not a convincing witness and the trial court should not have accepted her evidence in order to convict the appellant. The court held that the state completely failed to prove rape beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction and sentence on both counts were set aside. The appeal against conviction and sentence were upheld.

The respondent, a law student, filed an administrative complaint for harassment against the petitioner, her professor, alleging that she was given a poor final grade because he wanted to go on a date with her. A school committee found that the petitioner improperly conducted school-related activities outside school premises, indicative of sexually motivated intentions, in violation of the respondent’s policy of providing its students with an environment free from sexual harassment. The NLRC affirmed, declaring a one year suspension from the University. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that his constitutional right to due process was violated, finding that in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, to explain one’s side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and that the petitioner had been afforded that opportunity.

The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by a governor of a province claiming that because he was found not violating the Election of Public Officials Act (the “Election Act”), he should also be found not guilty of sexual harassment charges under the former Prohibition of and Remedies for Gender Discrimination Act (the “Discrimination Act”). The governor sexually harassed the defendant, a president of a vocation association, at meetings to discuss the upcoming general elections for governor. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff’s sexual behavior at such meetings constituted workplace sexual harassment, because their meetings had relevance to work, i.e. meeting to discuss governor’s elections.

A citizen of Indonesia sought protection on the basis that she feared persecution on the grounds of race, religion and membership of a particular social group, alleged to be either Indonesian women or Chinese Christian women in Indonesia. The appellant was raped in Indonesia. The Refugee Review Tribunal concluded that perpetrators of sexual assault in Indonesia do not engage in rape as a means of persecuting ethnic Chinese women (or women) as a particular social group. The court found that the Tribunal did not fully consider the applicant’s arguments that she feared persecution from local authorities for reporting the rape and the applicant was granted leave to amend her application to raise that ground and any other new grounds.

A citizen of Nigeria sought protection for fear that she would be subject to female genital mutilation. The Refugee Review Tribunal found that female genital mutilation constitutes serious harm amounting to persecution, but that on the facts, there was no real risk that the applicant would be subjected to female genital mutilation.

The plaintiff and the defendant were both taxi drivers. The plaintiff claimed the defendant harassed her with phone calls and unwanted and offensive touching. The court was not satisfied that the events that took place gave rise to any tenable claim of sexual harassment. The court found that for a short period at and about the time that the defendant was making contact with the plaintiff, she did suffer from a level of anxiety while at work, which was sufficient to constitute a ‘detrimental effect’ to her employment under the Human Rights Act.

The plaintiff worked at a motel. She alleged that her manager made offensive comments to her and spread rumors about her in the community. The court found that the plaintiff suffered a detriment in the course of her employment under the Human Rights Act.

The plaintiff was employed at a bakery. After working there for several years, the bakery was acquired by new owners, including the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant made unwanted comments and physical overtures in the workplace, eventually causing the plaintiff to leave the job. The plaintiff claimed that the harassment caused humiliation, injury to feelings, and loss of dignity. The Tribunal found that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful sexual harassment under the Human Rights Act and awarded damages. The Tribunal also ordered the defendant to attend a training session on sexual harassment in the workplace. The Tribunal noted that the case “demonstrates the dangers of running a business without any understanding of the provisions of the HRA relating to sexual harassment, and with no insight whatsoever that some behaviours can be unwelcome to others no matter how innocent they may be thought by the perpetrator to be.”

Ms. Ayoub claimed harassment and discrimination following a performance appraisal after which her position was made redundant. She also sought worker’s compensation for anxiety/distress caused by the alleged conduct. An arbitrator found for Ms. Ayoub on the basis that the company had failed to consult her on the redundancy decision and mishandled the performance appraisal and these actions caused her mental injuries. A court overturned the arbitrator, finding that first, while it would be unreasonable for an employer to inform a worker of her redundancy in a callous way, the redundancy decision was unrelated to Ms. Ayoub’s performance, and second, Ms. Ayoub’s position was such that she did not legally have to be consulted ahead of time. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Acting Deputy President’s decision, finding no error of law.

A department head accused of harassing four women was not permitted to learn the names of his accusers due to confidentiality issues. The EAT re-affirmed that the primary test when ordering disclosure of documents is whether disclosure is necessary for fairly disposing of the proceedings, not whether the document is confidential in nature. The Court ruled the alleged harasser must demonstrate that this information is necessary in the context of his specific case.

This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a six-year-old girl and was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Appellant was a teacher at the victim’s school. The school held a special program for students during school holidays. During this program, appellant took the victim into his office at school and had sexual intercourse with her. Despite his warning not to tell anyone, the victim told her brother, who told her parents. A medical examiner confirmed that she had been defiled. On appeal, appellant argued that the sentence of 14 years was too harsh. In support, he argued that he was the sole breadwinner for 11 dependents, including two lame dependents and four orphans. Appellant also argued that since the victim was a very young child, she had already gotten over the trauma of the defilement. The court upheld the sentence and ruled against appellant. The court found that, as a teacher, he had a duty to protect the victim, but instead chose to ravish her, disgracing himself, his profession, and society.

Rosaria, a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl, was raped by defendant teacher, and consequently contracted a venereal disease. The rape occurred in the defendant's home, which Rosaria entered with the intent of picking up some past school papers that the defendant had failed to bring to school on multiple occasions. After bringing this incident to the Head Teacher's attention, it was uncovered that the defendant had done this before, that measures had been taken to warn or protect students from the defendant, that the defendant had only received a verbal warning, and that the previous student victim had transferred to another school. In his defense, the defendant claimed that he was in a relationship with Rosaria, to which she consented, as evidenced by a Valentine's Day card that Rosaria had given him. The High Court held that the defendant breached the duty of care that he owed to his pupils and was therefore negligent, noting that it is the duty of a school teacher to care for his pupils, as would a father for his family. The Court reasoned that school teachers are in a position of moral superiority, and a young schoolgirl's "consent" is fictitious in light of the ethics compelling a teacher to not engage in sexual relations with schoolgirls, a young girl's cognitive inability to truly consent, as well as Section 138 of the penal code, which states that defilement of a girl under the age of 16 is an offense. Notably, the Court held that society's indignation of this type of behavior ought to be reflected in the amount of damages awarded. The Court entered a judgment in favor of Rosaria for K 45,000,000 for her pain and suffering, medical expenses, aggravated damages, and mental torture. Furthermore, the Court held that the School, Ministry of Education, and the Attorney General are vicariously liable for this judgment, noting that the government is responsible for all school going children in the care of its agents, including teachers like the defendant.

This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a baby girl and was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment. Appellant was a relative of the child and was known as a teacher of Christianity. Appellant requested a more lenient sentence of 10 years. The Court of Appeals ruled against Appellant and increased his sentence to 25 years, citing the policy consideration that, despite the fact that defilement can be punishable by death, individuals still continue to defile babies. Thus, the court used this case as an opportunity to send a message to society that “violating the rights of child females must stop.”

In an application under Article 102 of the Constitution, the Bangladesh National Women's Lawyers Association (BNWLA) petitioned the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court Division) to address the exploitation and abuse endured by child domestic laborers in Bangladesh. The BNWLA argued that child domestic workers are subjected to economic exploitation, physical and emotional abuse, and the deprival of an education in violation of their fundamental constitutional rights. In support of these arguments, it presented multiple reports of extreme abuse suffered by child domestic workers. In deciding this case, the Court reviewed the current laws in Bangladesh, including the Labour Act, 2006, which fails to extend labor protections to "domestic workers," including children, and lacks an effective implementation and enforcement system. The Court directed the government of Bangladesh to take immediate steps to increase its protection of the fundamental rights of child domestic workers including prohibiting children under the age of 12 from working in any capacity including domestic settings; supporting the education of adolescents; implementing the National Elimination of Child Labour Policy 2010 and applying the Labour Act, 2006 to domestic workers. Additionally, the Court directed the government to monitor and prosecute incidents of violence against child domestic workers, maintain a registry of domestic workers and their whereabouts to combat trafficking, promulgate mandatory health check-ups and strengthen the legal framework relating to child domestic workers.

This is a proceeding for the disciplining of Schwartz, a trial court judge. Judge Robert Schwartz initiated a romantic relationship with an assistant public defender with cases before him. The assistant public defender informed her supervisor of Judge Schwartz’s planned recusal via a voice message. In the following days, Judge Schwartz provided dishonest reasons for his recusal from some cases involving the assistant public defender, and entered rulings in some other cases involving the assistant public defender.

Plaintiff worked for the defendant as a police officer. During training where plaintiff was one of three women amongst twenty-four participants, plaintiff started to feel that she could never raise complaints because of her gender as a result of comments such as how the male troopers had better “watch out” or she would charge them with sexual harassment, or about another female trooper whose sex discrimination complaint had been dismissed by the Board. Plaintiff also received lewd and sexually inappropriate comments from a male officer in training who also attacked her in a kick-boxing fashion, and ridiculed her when she protested. After completing training, plaintiff was the only female full-time officer in her department and continued to experience more harassment, including exposure to openly-displayed pictures of semi-nude women, an officer telling his girlfriend that plaintiff was his sex slave, personnel and supervisors frequently discussing plaintiff’s marital difficulties, and interfering with her personal relationship with a former police officer. During the plaintiff’s first evaluation, she received a good score for her work performance but her overall score was lowered due to comments from others. Further, when it was a male colleague’s birthday, he demanded the plaintiff kiss him and when she refused, he made fun of her appearance. When plaintiff’s supervisor did not respond to her complaints regarding these incidents, she met with the Commissioner, setting forth her sexual harassment claims. She was offered an unfeasible transfer far from her home and children as the only alternative. When the plaintiff failed to report to the transfer location, she was terminated. Plaintiff subsequently filed claims for sexual harassment and hostile work environment with the Board. The Board found there was discrimination and ordered her reinstatement and reimbursement of back pay. In response to the state’s appeal, the court agreed with the Board and found that the plaintiff’s work environment, characterized by her colleagues’ and supervisor’s attitudes towards her as a woman, established that she was judged more harshly than her male colleagues. The court found the evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that there existed a hostile work environment and that the plaintiff was sexually harassed.

Here, petitioner, a male employer, sought review of a final order of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries, which found petitioner had created an intimidating, hostile and offensive working environment based on respondent’s gender, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.030(1), which provides, “(1) [i]t is an unlawful employment practice: (B) [f]or an employer, because of an individual's . . . sex . . . to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” The statute does not require that the unlawful employment practice be “sexual” in nature to be actionable. It requires only that the practice have occurred “because of” the employee’s sex. Furthermore, no independent corroboration of a complaining witness is required to establish an unlawful employment practice claim. Petitioner, the owner of a store selling adult toys and gifts, only referred to his employee, respondent Theresa Getman, using derogatory terms. Petitioner also frequently passed derogatory comments on the appearance of female customers and directed a number of sexually inappropriate remarks towards Getman. Additionally, petitioner frequently threatened Getman that he was going to “bitch slap” her and on several occasions slapped Getman on the top of her head and across her face. Throughout the duration of the employment, Getman was physically ill. She had a stomach ache and found herself unable to sleep because of the stress. The appellate court affirmed the finding that respondent was the victim of gender discrimination in her employment, as there was substantial evidence to support the finding that all of petitioner’s offensive conduct had occurred because respondent was a woman.

Appellant, a former dispatcher with the Cheyenne Police Department, appealed from the summary judgment which was entered in favor of police officer-appellee, also employed by the Cheyenne Police Department, on appellant’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, because as a matter of law, appellant presented sufficient evidence in support of her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on inappropriate sexual conduct by a co-employee in the workplace, to survive appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The court identified several recurring factors that could be used in determining whether particular conduct in the workplace is sufficiently outrageous to survive a preliminary motion: (1) abuse of power; (2) repeated incidents and/or pattern of harassment; (3) unwelcome touching and/or offensive, non-negligible physical contact; and (4) retaliation for refusing or reporting sexually-motivated advances. The court found that conditions and circumstances alleged by appellant, including repeated incidents over a period of time and offensive, non-negligible physical contact, could lead a jury to construe appellee’s conduct as outrageous. Furthermore, appellant’s evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue on the severity of her emotional distress.

In May of 1990, Piatt represented clients A and B in their respective domestic relations actions. During his representation of client A, Piatt repeatedly asked her questions such as whether she had masturbated at the age of fourteen, and whether she had ever had sexual relationship without emotional involvement. He also made comments about the length of client A’s skirt and how “delicious” she looked. Piatt later told client A during a meeting that if she did not respond to his sexual advances, he would be forced to charge her a large sum of money for continued representation. Piatt threatened client B in substantially the same way.

Plaintiff Ford’s supervisor, Karl Braun, began to sexually harass Ford at a dinner on April 3, 1980, where Braun told Ford that she would regret it if she didn’t sleep with him. At a company picnic a month later, Braun said to Ford: “I want to fuck you, Leta,” and restrained her in a chokehold, from which Ford eventually escaped. Despite Ford having reported the harassment to regional management later than month and to headquarters in November, 1980, no action was taken until Braun’s employment was terminated in October, 1981, almost a year and a half after plaintiff’s original complaints. During this period Braun’s continuing threats led to Ford developing symptoms of emotional stress such as high blood pressure and chest pains.

Plaintiff was hired as a bookkeeper and secretary for the defendant company, and worked exclusively for the company’s president. The president subjected plaintiff to comments about the her clothing and body, quizzed her about intimate details of her sex life, purchased underwear for her, and showed her pictures of naked women. Some of this behavior was done in front of other employees. In response, plaintiff began wearing baggy clothing to work and told the president that his behavior made her uncomfortable. Subsequently, in a discussion about plaintiff’s work performance, the president told plaintiff that he was happy with her work and that she may receive a raise if her performance continued. Two days after this discussion, plaintiff met with the president again to discuss her discomfort at work due to his comments. Several days later, the president terminated plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff sought back pay and reimbursement to the state for unemployment compensation benefits. The trial court granted back pay but did not order reimbursement. Defendant appealed against having to provide back pay, arguing that under Gen. Stat. § 46a-86, an order of reinstatement to the employment position is a prerequisite for back pay or reimbursement, and the court had not ordered reinstatement. The court rejected this argument and found it could order back pay and reimbursement even though reinstatement to the position was not ordered by the trial court.

Plaintiff alleged that her superior violated the Department of Public Safety’s sexual harassment policy to attempt to pursue a sexual relationship with her. At various times during plaintiff’s employment, her superior had allegedly engaged in sexually harassing behavior towards her. At a later date when plaintiff had received poor performance reviews, claimed that her supervisor made her believe he could save her job if internal investigations against her concerning the reviews did not go well. With this indication, the supervisor made sexual advances towards the plaintiff, who felt pressured into submitting to these advances for fear of losing her job. The court noted that Delaware courts have not yet adopted federal tests to determine a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. However, it noted that based upon the Supreme Court’s interpretation, “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment when ‘(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment or (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual’.” The court noted that under this test, the consequences of a rejection to such advances or requests must “be sufficiently severe as to alter the harassed employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” The court found that the plaintiff pleaded a qui pro quo claim of sexual harassment against the defendant.

Here, the plaintiff was an at-will employee whose contract could be terminated by either party giving thirty days written notice. The plaintiff mainly worked for the defendant, who was the president and controlling shareholder of the company. The plaintiff alleged the defendant made sexual comments and advances towards her a few weeks after she commenced work and also touched her inappropriately. The plaintiff told the defendant his behavior made her uncomfortable but he did not stop. Subsequently, the plaintiff began recording the defendant’s conduct in a journal and rejecting his advances more forcefully. The defendant subsequently fired the plaintiff for substandard job performance. Under 19 Del. C. § 711, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based upon gender. The defendant argued that there could be no common law cause of action for employment discrimination because there was already a statutory scheme, and the plaintiff was required to abide by the specific procedures of that statute to bring such a claim. Specifically, the defendant argued that judicial review is only available after the Delaware Department of Labor Review Board hears the matter. Plaintiff based her theory on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing derived from the employment contract and as such, her claim did not arise directly from § 711. The court found that the plaintiff had a common law cause of action and she could bring her claim.

Here, the plaintiff volunteered at a swap shop operated by the Town of Falmouth at its waste management facility. The defendant was the land supervisor and gatekeeper of the facility. The defendant often visited the shop and made sexual advances toward the plaintiff for three years, despite her requests that he leave her alone. The town subsequently terminated the plaintiff’s volunteer services and barred her from the facility. Id. at 572. The plaintiff sued the defendant for sexual harassment in violation of M.G.L.A. 214 § 1C. The court found that M.G.L.A. 214 § 1C states that “[a] person shall have the right to be free from sexual harassment, as defined in chapter 151B and 151C.” Id. at 577. The court then noted that the definition of sexual harassment in G. L. C. 151B and 151c does not explicitly protect volunteers from sexual harassment and instead limit conduct to academic and employment contexts. The court thus found that there is only statutory protection against sexual harassment in employment and academic contexts and there was no such protection for volunteers. Id. However, persons outside of this context, including volunteers, may pursue common law claims of sexual harassment. Id. at 580-81.

Plaintiff worked the midnight shift in a prison. One night another officer kissed her without any invitation and subsequently repeatedly referred to the incident, and made intimidating jokes about raping the plaintiff. Despite being made aware of these incidents, plaintiff’s superiors did not take any action. It was almost two years before the warden responded to plaintiff’s attempts to talk to him about the harassment, at which time plaintiff refused to file a complaint in fear for her safety. The warden later advised her again to file a complaint and issued a cease and desist letter to the officer. Eventually, the County filed disciplinary charges against the officer but dismissed the charges. Plaintiff eventually brought a lawsuit alleging a hostile work environment. Although the County had an anti-sexual harassment policy, numerous employees testified that they were never trained on the policy, and the plaintiff testified that the policy was loosely enforced. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, reasoning that the fact that an individual violates a policy does not render the policy wrong. The Appellate Division affirmed. The plaintiff appealed the Appellate Division decision, contending that in determining employer liability for sexual harassment, the court was required to consider (1) whether the company had mandatory training for supervisors and managers which is offered to all members of the company; and (2) effective sensing or monitoring systems to check the trustworthiness of the prevention and remedial structures for employees. The court agreed with the plaintiff; even though the policy was known to many high-ranking officials, no action was taken to address the plaintiff’s complaints, even if they were not “formal” complaints. The court found that summary judgment was improper because there were questions of fact as to the adequacy of the policy.

After commencing her employment, plaintiff agreed to prepare lunches for a new co-worker in exchange for $25 a week. Plaintiff later stopped providing lunches to the co-worker who in return, became hostile towards her, commencing a pattern of sexual harassment, including lewd comments, uninvited sexual advances, and interference with her ability to work. In keeping with company policy, plaintiff addressed complaints to her supervisor. Although the supervisor met with the co-worker and issued warnings, the harassment continued. Eventually the general manager suspended the co-worker and changed his duties so he would not be working near the plaintiff. When he returned, however, the co-worker continued to harass plaintiff. Eventually, there was an incident where the two got into a physical altercation, for which both were suspended. The plaintiff sued the defendant for failing to remedy the situation and for a hostile work environment. The court found that an employer may be liable for the sexual harassment of an employee by a co-worker under a hostile environment claim if the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate steps to correct it. The court noted that in determining whether a work environment is hostile, a court should consider the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, if it is physically threatening or humiliating as opposed to a mere offensive utterance, and if it reasonably interferes with the plaintiff’s work. The court then concluded that a jury could conclude that the defendant’s response to the harassment was neither immediate nor appropriate. Specifically, the three-day suspension and warnings were insufficient given the pattern of harassment. Thus, the court vacated the trial court’s issuance of summary judgment to the defendant and remanded the case.

Here, a female employee appealed the decision of the Commission Against Discrimination which dismissed her complaint against her employer for sexual discrimination. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. Under Gen .L. C. 151B, §4(1) (1990), employment discrimination on the basis of gender is prohibited. The Massachusetts Code defines sexual harassment as “sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (a) submission to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment or as a basis for employment decisions; (b) such advances, requests or conduct have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive work environment.” Gen. L. C. 151B, §1(18) (1990).

Here, an employer appealed the superior court’s decision that it discriminated against an employee on the basis of sex. A few weeks after College-Town hired the employee, Rizzi, Rizzi’s supervisor began making sexually suggestive comments to her. Once he touched her back, and another time he put his hand over a slit in her dress and told her to fix her skirt. On one occasion, Rizzi asked her supervisor to review her performance in a meeting and he told her that she handled it well and that he “liked the way [her] tits stood out in the red shirt.” Once, he asked her if she was a good f----. Rizzi then spoke to the director of manufacturing, who told her he was “not qualified to go into these things,” and refused to talk to her. Rizzi had to wait several days before she could tell someone else at work. A College-Town executive finally spoke with the supervisor about the allegations, which were denied. A meeting was held to determine the truth of the allegations, which the supervisor and all other women in the department attended except for Rizzi. She was not asked to the meeting or notified of its occurrence. At the meeting, the supervisor explained the allegations and Rizzi’s co-workers were generally supportive of the supervisor. College-Town made no further investigation. Prior to that meeting, Rizzi sought a promotion to a position in another department. After the meeting was held, Rizzi was informed she was not qualified for the promotion and College-Town hired someone with more knowledge and experience. Soon thereafter, College-Town attempted to transfer Rizzi as tension in the office was affecting productivity and she declined. Rizzi was never told the transfer was mandatory, and within weeks of her denial, she was discharged. The trial court found that College-Town’s supervisor created a sexually harassing work environment, it failed to remedy the situation, and it retaliated against the employee in its attempt to transfer her and discharge her once she declined the transfer. Id. at 158. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the decision and found that sexual harassment may constitute discrimination under Gen. L. C. 151B, §4(1), which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of gender.

Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, female minor children in the custody of Alabama’s Department of Youth Service (“DYS”), brought an action against DYS and its executive director, alleging federal claims of sexual harassment and abuse under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“Title IX”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision of DYS employees, and intentional misrepresentation. Defendants’ filed a motion to dismiss the claims based on various arguments for immunity, which the trial court denied. Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint. In ruling on Defendants’ petition, the Supreme Court considered each claim for immunity. First, DYS claimed it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. The Court, however, held that, because Congress enacted Title IX not only pursuant to its Article I powers, but also pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment, § 5, power, Congress successfully abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states from suits in federal and state courts for violations of Title IX. Second, the executive director argued he was entitled to federal qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim, since he was a government official. The Court disagreed, citing law holding that there is no state interest in protecting government officials accused of sexually molesting a child. Because the plaintiffs alleged that the executive director failed to protect them from harm even after he received notice of the sexual harassment and abuse, he did not have a clear legal right to dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim on the ground of federal qualified immunity. Third, the Court found that, based on the sovereign immunity provision of the Alabama constitution, dismissal of plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the executive director in his official capacity was proper. However, the Court found that the doctrine of state-agent immunity did not warrant dismissal of plaintiffs’ state law claims against the executive director in his individual capacity.

Here, the plaintiff sued her former attorney for sexual misconduct and malpractice. Under 11 Del. C. § 601, there are criminal penalties for sexual harassment. The statute does not explicitly provide for a private right of action. Further, the plaintiff did not bring her cause of action under this statute, and instead, claimed she could bring a common law cause of action for sexual harassment. The court held that the plaintiff did not have a private cause of action under § 601; in other words, she could not bring common law private claims under that section for sexual harassment. Id. at 512-13

An insurance agency, Walthall, Sachse & Pipes, Inc., brought suit against its former employee, Rosemary Spring, for opening a competing insurance agency in violation of her non-compete agreement. Ms. Spring then brought several counterclaims against her former employer, including claims for 13 under the Texas Labor Code and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and assault by her supervisor, Mr. Sachse. She alleged that he pushed her head into his hip, thrust his buttocks into her pelvic area and grinded against her while laughing, and kissed her cheek and neck. The trial court entered summary judgment against Ms. Spring on all counts and she appealed. The appellate court held that Ms. Spring failed to plead a prima facie case for 13. To plead 13 under a hostile work environment theory, a plaintiff must establish: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was the victim of uninvited 13, (3) the harassment was based on sex, and (4) the harassment affected a “term, condition, or privilege” of her employment. The appellate court recognized that for the conduct to be actionable, she must show “the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment.” The 13 must be sufficiently severe or pervasive such that to a reasonably objective third person the conduct created an “abusive working environment.” Despite her allegations, the court looked at other similar cases where the harassment was even more severe and found that the conduct didn’t rise to “such severe or pervasive 13 that would create a hostile or abusive work environment as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment of a reasonable person in Spring’s position.” However, the court did reverse the entry of summary judgment on the assault claim. Conduct can be actionable as civil assault when it doesn’t rise to the level of discrimination under the Texas Labor Code and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. To allege assault, Ms. Spring must have shown Mr. Sachse intentionally or knowingly caused physical contact with her when he knew or should have known she would regard the contact as offensive or provocative. Ms. Spring presented testimony of a co-worker who corroborated the contact in the elevator. The other two incidents both involved physical contact. Since reasonable minds could differ on whether the unsolicited physical contact was offensive or provocative, the court reversed on the assault claim.

Lisa Rodriguez was a patrol officer at Texas Southern University (“TSU”) who alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed her by making sexual innuendos, making inappropriate remarks, commenting on her physical attractiveness, asking about the color of her undergarments, and keeping a picture of her on his desk. Eventually, Ms. Rodriguez filed a charge form with the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division (“TWC”) alleging, among other things, 13. In the charge form, she alleged that the 13 began a week after she was hired, and had continued until as recently as four months before filing the TWC complaint. As a defense, TSU claimed Ms. Rodriguez had failed to meet the 180-day deadline for filing the complaint. In Texas, a complaint under the Texas Labor Code for 13 (a type of sex discrimination) must be filed “not later than the 180th day after the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.202(a). TSU argued that because Ms. Rodriguez only documented 13 at the beginning of her employment, the 180-day deadline had passed. However, the court recognized there are two types of 13—quid pro quo and hostile work environment. “Quid pro quo harassment occurs when employment benefits are conditioned on sexual favors, while a hostile work environment is the result of 13.” Since Ms. Rodriguez’s claim was of a hostile work environment, the “continuing violation doctrine” applied since the “unlawful employment practice manifest[ed] itself over time, rather than as a series of discrete acts.” Since Ms. Rodriguez alleged “a series of related acts, one or more of which [fell] within the limitations period,” the complaint was timely filed and the appellate court found that it had jurisdiction over the case.

Rebecca Wright was a waitress at Arlington Steakhouse, Inc. for four months. She alleged that during this time, her supervisor, Christopher O’Dell, made lewd sexual comments to her, touched her in sexual ways that she found offensive, and created a hostile work environment by his 13. Specifically, Ms. Wright alleged O’Dell put his fingers down her blouse and in her pants and brushed up against her, offered to pay her for oral sex, verbally degraded her and the other waitresses, and made inappropriate comments about her physical appearance. The jury trial resulted in a verdict for Ms. Wright on all claims, finding O’Dell assaulted her, Ms. Wright was constructively discharged, and was subjected to 13. The jury award was for $175,000 in mental anguish damages for assault and $250,000 in mental anguish damages for 13. O’Dell appealed this decision on many grounds, one of which was that the award of damages was unsupported and violated the statutory cap on damages for employers with less than 500 employees. The appellate court affirmed, recognizing that mental anguish damages require a plaintiff introduce “direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of her mental anguish, thus establishing that there was a substantial disruption of her daily routine.” The requirement is a “high degree of mental pain and distress” and must be more than “mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment or anger.” Direct evidence must be shown of this and the evidence shown must justify the amount awarded to be affirmed on appeal. The court found Ms. Wright presented sufficient evidence at the trial since she experienced severe anxiety, clenched her jaw, held her breath, at times felt paralyzed and nauseous, and had nightmares of her attacker, O’Dell. In addition, the appellate court found the amount was fair and reasonable since the jury considered the “disruption in her life and personal toll taken by the events surrounding the assault and 13.” The court also found that the statutory cap provided in Texas Labor Code Section 21.2585 (capping damages based on the size of the employer) did not apply because the burden was on the defendant to plead and prove this defense, it was not an automatic cap.

William and Elizabeth Mecanti were married with children. William subjected Elizabeth to a pattern of harassment that lasted months. The couple had been experiencing marital difficulties and Elizabeth had been sleeping on the couch. She slept during the daytime because she worked the night shift. William would come home from work and wake her up to argue and instigate fights. He hacked into Elizabeth’s emails and looked through her pockets, cell phone logs, purses, and car. He would follow her when she was out with friends. He wrote her pages expressing his love, his fear of losing her, and his wish to stay together forever. On one occasion William hid her house and car keys and locked her out of the house; when she was finally able to reenter the house, Elizabeth discovered that he had disconnected the telephone lines. Elizabeth sought a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order after an incident when William wanted her to sleep with him in their bedroom, even though she had told him she wanted a divorce and they had been sleeping apart for three years. When she refused to follow him to the bedroom, William told her “this is going to get ugly” and “this is just the tip of the iceberg.” Then he left the house. Elizabeth went to sleep on the couch and woke up when William returned home and turned on the television. She asked him to turn it off but he refused; after some argument he stormed out of the room after saying “you better not go to sleep. You better not even close your eyes.” Elizabeth heard a noise like the cocking of a gun (William kept guns in the house) so she called the police. After this incident she sought the order of protection, which was granted. She had not filed for divorce because she was afraid of what William might do. On appeal, William argued that the PFA should not have issued because his threats were indirect and Elizabeth never testified to a past occasion when he threatened her as he did the night of the incident. The court considered the pattern of harassment as a whole, including Elizabeth’s testimony that she had heard William cock guns in the past, and concluded that that his behavior established “abuse” under the statute.

Frazier, a middle school teacher, alleged that Badger, the assistant principal, sexually harassed her. When she rejected his advances, he allegedly had her classroom moved to the basement. The jury found that Badger’s conduct met the elements of the tort of outrage and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in assessing the new issues brought before it, held that Badger did not get to claim governmental immunity. Under South Carolina law, governmental immunity would be provided to a governmental employee who commits a tort while acting in the scope of his official duty. The court held that sexual advances do not fall within the scope of official duties. It looked at the phrase “scope of employment,” used in insurance policies, and found that it had previously concluded that 13 is not within the “scope of employment.” Since “scope of official duties” is a phrase construed more narrowly than “scope of employment,” it concluded that 13 could not fall under the “scope of official duties.” The court found that Frazier’s testimony that Badger began making sexual advances towards her years before, when he was her high school basketball coach, did not warrant a mistrial. The court also held that Frazier did not have to file a 13 claim; it was permissible to file an outrage claim. The court rejected Badger’s argument that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the jury’s punitive damage award, noting that “a defendant’s inability to pay does not prohibit a jury from awarding punitive damages.”

Plaintiff Parker alleged that defendant Grissom, a general manager who hired her as a bookkeeper, sexually harassed her. She reported the harassment to her immediate supervisor, Link. Parker stated that she feared losing her job if she did anything, so asked that Link do nothing. The harassment continued, and Link reported it to Vinson, a member of the Utility’s Board of Commissioners. Vinson agreed that plaintiff would likely lose her job if she reported the harassment. Plaintiff later discussed the issue with Vinson, who did not assure her that she would not lose her job. Grissom voluntarily resigned in April of 1994 but was rehired in the fall, despite the fact that plaintiff notified the board of the alleged harassment. The board rehired him, but also retained counsel to conduct an independent investigation of his alleged harassment. Plaintiff filed several claims; the remaining hostile work environment/13 claim before the Court was against the Utility District under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Utility District filed a summary judgment motion, arguing that “it took prompt corrective action in response to plaintiff’s complaints and that the corrective action was ‘a complete defense’ to a claim for 13.” An employer has an affirmative defense to a hostile work environment claim based on 13 by a supervisor if the employer can show: (1) that employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by employer or that employee unreasonably failed to otherwise avoid the harm. The court held that Parker’s supervisor could be held vicariously liable for her hostile work environment 13 claim. There was no evidence that the District exercised reasonable care to prevent the alleged harassment, and that there was no evidence of a written anti-discrimination policy given to employees to deal with the circumstances of the case. It reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer, and modified a previous decision, Carr v. United Parcel Service, 955 S.W.2d 832, according to which a supervisor could be vicariously liable only for quid pro quo, and not hostile work environment 13 claims. The court modified Carr to “reflect the recently articulated standard for supervisor harassment adopted by the United States Supreme Court.”

Mitchem filed a motion for judgment against her former employer, Counts, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the common law following her refusal to have a sexual relationship with him, as well as several instances of 13. She argued that her discharge violated Virginia’s policy “that all persons . . . are entitled to pursue and maintain employment free of discrimination based upon gender.” The trial court held that the amendments to the Virginia Human Rights Act “eliminated the VHRA as a source of public policy to support a common law cause of action for wrongful termination. The trial court also held that Code §§ 18.2-57, -344 and -345 do not articulate public policies that support a common law action for wrongful termination. The court dismissed Mitchem’s action with prejudice, and Mitchem appealed from this judgment. On appeal, Mitchem withdrew parts of her previous claim, arguing that she was discharged from employment due, not to gender but rather, to the fact that she would not consent to her employer’s demands that she violate sections of the Virginia code prohibiting fornication, lewd and lascivious cohabitation, and was discharged for failing to “consent to commission of a battery upon her person.” The court addressed whether Code §2.1-725(D) “bars a common law action for wrongful termination based on public policies not reflected in the VHRA, when the conduct alleged in the motion for judgment also violates a public policy reflected in the VHRA.” That section states, “Causes of action based upon the public policies reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those actions, procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights statutes or local ordinances.” The court noted that the statute only abrogated common law causes of action for wrongful discharge based on public policies in the VHRA; common law causes of action for wrongful discharge based on public policies not in the VHRA are not prohibited by the section. The Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy of “refusing to consent to commission of battery upon her person” – since if she had consented, there would have been no battery. However, it reversed the trial court’s holding as to wrongful termination based on public policy in Code §§ 18.2-344 and -345, which prohibit fornication, and lewd and lascivious behavior respectively.

A former employee brought an action against supervisor and employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress due to harassment. She alleged that her supervisor intentionally sought to humiliate her in front of her co-workers and made harassing, sexist, and belittling comments. Although she complained to her manager and other supervisors, they failed to intervene. The Defendant argued that her claims were barred by the exclusivity provision (Code § 65.2-307) of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act. The court held that her allegations of gradually incurring severe emotional distress due to harassment did not amount to “injury by accident” under the Workers’ Compensation Act; therefore the action against the employer was not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act.

Plaintiff brought a hostile work environment claim, among others. She witnessed her supervisor and another employee in a compromising position. Her supervisor threatened her with the loss of employment and her license if she shared what she had witnessed. She promised to remain silent and shortly thereafter went on vacation. When she returned, her supervisor fired her, stating that he did not like the way she dressed or styled her hair. Plaintiff was an at-will employee at the time of termination. Plaintiff alleged that she “was subjected to improper and sexually explicit conduct by her superiors … thereby creating a hostile and abusive environment in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act.” To state a claim for 13 under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the … [plaintiff’s] conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment, and (4) it was imputable on some factual basis to the employer.” The Court also held that “an employee may state a claim for hostile environment 13 if unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” The Court held that plaintiff sufficiently pled a cause of action for hostile workplace and overturned the lower court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff sued John Haynes for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and Copland, Inc. for ratification of Haynes’ conduct, negligent retention and supervision of Haynes, and imputed liability. The plaintiff alleged that Haynes intimidated and harassed her during the one year that she worked for Copland, Inc. She asked him to stop and reported the incidents to her supervisor. The supervisor reportedly told her that he was a “youngun” and to ignore him. After one incident outside of work, she complained to her supervisors. They had a meeting with the plaintiff and Haynes; Haynes was terminated, and the plaintiff was also terminated later that day. The plaintiff alleged that the harassment caused her to cry, disturbed her sleep, and gave her nightmares. She testified to a long history of sexual abuse at the hands of various individuals. Experts explained that she had a dissociative disorder and the experience of harassment caused a flashback that triggered severe mental problems. The trial court dismissed all claims except the claim “for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Haynes and the claims against Copland for ratification of Haynes’ conduct and negligent retention of Haynes.” The jury awarded monetary damages, and the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, citing an error in the charge. The North Carolina Supreme Court considered the “thin skull” rule, which “provides that if the defendant’s misconduct amounts to a breach of duty to a person of ordinary susceptibility, he is liable for all damages suffered by the plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that these damages were unusually extensive because of the particular susceptibility of the plaintiff.” Copland argued that there was error because the jury was permitted to “consider the thin skull damages when it determined the liability issue.” Copland contends therefore that the jury was able to find liability “without finding that defendant Haynes’ action could have caused severe emotional distress in a person of ordinary susceptibility.” The court disagreed, noting that a clinical psychologist testified that a person of “ordinary sensibilities” could have been affected in a manner similar to the plaintiff in this case. It also held that there was no error in the jury instructions, and that the instructions correctly explained that the jury had to find that Haynes’ actions could have reasonably injured a person of normal sensibilities before it could hold him liable for all of the consequences of his actions. The court also did not review the Court of Appeals finding that the thin skull rule applies to mental, not just physical injury, and that the fact that the jury received instructions during the damages, rather than liability phase of the case, was not error.

Aida Armani worked as a hairstylist at Raya and Haig Hair Salon. One of her customers, Kadyshes, began verbally and physically sexually harassing Aida by telling sexual jokes, commenting on her breasts, telling her she would be good in bed, and touching her rear and shoulders. The Salon eventually hired Kadyshes as a business manager, and he became Aida’s direct supervisor. Aida complained on at least six occasions but no action was taken to stop Kadyshes’s conduct. Eventually Aida decided to open her own salon but before she could resign the Hair Salon learned of her plans and fired her. The Commission found that the Salon unlawfully discriminated against her by subjecting her to a hostile work environment and constructively discharging her because of her sex. The Salon challenged the decision on multiple grounds. First, it argued that Aida was not discharged because of her sex but because she opened her own salon. The court found that Aida established a prima facie claim for hostile work environment and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the Hair Salon violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act by allowing the existence of a hostile work environment. In order to establish a prima facie claim for hostile work environment, a complainant must prove that she (1) suffered intentional discrimination because of her race or gender; (2) the harassment was severe or persuasive and regular; (3) the harassment detrimentally affected the complainant; (4) the harassment would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same protected class; and (5) the harasser was a supervisory employee or agent. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer knowingly permits conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign. The fact that Aida stayed at her job did not preclude a finding of constructive discharge—she was the sole source of income for her family and she endured the treatment as long as she could take it. Second, the Salon argued that it was improper to admit testimony about Aida’s work conditions that predated the time frame for which she alleged discrimination. But the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim is permissible for assessing liability, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period. Third, the Salon challenged the determination that Aida attempted to mitigate her damages. While a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate her damages, the burden of showing that she did not exercise reasonable diligence in seeking comparable employment lies with the employer. Aida’s self-employment constituted mitigation because she took immediate steps to open her salon after she was fired.

Ms. Ericson and Ms. Kornechuk brought an action against Syracuse University and its employees under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. section 1681 (“Title IX”) and the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. section 13981 (“VAWA”). Plaintiffs alleged that they were sexually harassed by their tennis coach, and that the University was aware of the tennis coach’s behavior and conducted a sham investigatory proceeding to conceal the extent of the tennis coach’s misconduct, which had occurred for more than twenty years. Defendants moved to dismiss the claims. They contended that Title IX did not provide a private right of action and the VAWA claim was barred by the statue of limitations. The court held that there was a private right of action under Title IX pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist. (1998). Erickson held that a student who has been sexually harassed by an employee of an institution may bring suit against the institution, under Title IX, for private damages if: (1) the institution has authority to institute corrective measures on its behalf; (2) has actual notice of the behavior; and (3) is deliberately indifferent to its employee’s misconduct. The court found that Plaintiffs’ complaint, on its face, satisfied that standard because it alleged the individuals who investigated the charges against the tennis coach not only had actual notice that the tennis coach had been harassing female student-athletes for twenty years but had also conspired to conduct a sham investigation to conceal the full extent of the coach’s misconduct. The court reasoned that the allegation that the institution knew of the 13 of female-athletes and did not respond adequately was sufficient to state a claim under Title IX. The court also held that the statute of limitations did not bar the Plaintiffs’ claim under the VAWA. VAWA provides a civil cause of action to victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence. It does not contain an express statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court found that it should look to the “most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations.” The court reasoned that Congress’ stated purpose, in enacting this law, was to “protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence by establishing a federal civil rights cause of action.” Because of Congress’ stated purpose, the court found that the cause of action that was most analogous to VAWA was a personal injury claim, and as such, a three-year statute of limitations should apply. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim under VAWA was not barred by the statue of limitations because the alleged acts of violence occurred within three years from when Plaintiffs filed their complaint.

A. Griffin was employed as a billing clerk in the City of Opa-Locka’s water department in 1993. Shortly after hiring Griffin, the city hired Earnie Neal as its City Manager. After taking office, Neal immediately began sexually harassing Griffin. He called her derogatory names, aggressively pursued her, and made inappropriate advances. He performed some of these acts in front of the Mayor and City Commissioner. Griffin continually resisted his advances and attempted to go on with her daily routines in fear of being fired. Eventually, Neal raped Griffin in her apartment after insisting he drive her home after an event put on by the city. Griffin waited several months to come forward about the rape, and the lawsuit ensued. Griffin sought damages against the City for 13 and sexual assault under Title VII; the Florida Civil Rights Act; 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state tort law. She also alleged claims against Neal. At trial, a jury found that Neal sexually harassed Griffin, that the harassment was a custom or policy of the City, Neal raped Griffin under color of law, the City was deliberately indifferent in hiring Neal, and found against Neal on all tort claims. The subsequent damage award amounted to $2 million dollars. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that Neal was acting under the color of law and that 13 was the on-going, accepted practice at the City and that the City Commissioner, Mayor, and other high ranking City officials knew of, ignored, and tolerated 13. But because the record did not establish that the jury below found the City had a custom or policy of allowing rape or that the rape incident was part of the custom or pattern of 13, the court found that the suit lacked all essential aspects of a § 1983 case against the City. As such, the verdict and judgment against the City for rape under § 1983 was vacated. All other charges against the City were affirmed. The $1.5 million dollar verdict against the City was reversed. The City was still found liable for 13 due to the hostile work environment it fostered, as well as deliberate indifference in the hiring of Neal.

The court upheld an elected clerk’s three-year suspension from the practice of law for various acts, including sexual advances toward female employees in the clerk’s office. Six female employees made allegations that he sexually harassed them. Respondent attempted to argue that his actions toward the employees did not meet the standard for “13” as defined by the EEOC. The Court found that it did not need to rely on a federal agency’s definition to “find that the respondent’s creation and perpetuation of a work environment infected with inappropriate and unwelcome sexual advances violated Prof. Cond. R. 8.4(d).” It found that his acts were “prejudicial to the administration of justice,” whether or not they met a legal definition of 13. Furthermore, he did not testify at the hearing or otherwise rebut the evidence, but merely contended that the allegations by former employees were untrue. It therefore suspended him from the practice of law for three years.

The respondent won a judgment against the appellant for 13 by a manager trainee employed by the appellant. On appeal the appellant claimed (1) it could not be held liable for its employee's actions that occurred off work premises, (2) it had no knowledge of the harassment incidences, and (3) the employee was not acting within the scope of employment. The court held that employers have a legal duty to protect their employees from physical and psychological harm caused by co-employees.

Die respondent het 'n vonnis teen die appellant vir 13 gewen deur 'n bestuurder-leerling in diens van die appellant. Op appèl het die appellant beweer dat (1) dit nie aanspreeklik gehou kan word vir die optrede van sy werknemer wat nie op die perseel plaasgevind het nie, (2) hy het geen kennis van die voorvalle van teistering gehad nie, en (3) die werknemer het nie binne die omvang van indiensneming opgetree nie . Die hof het beslis dat werkgewers 'n wetlike plig het om hul werknemers te beskerm teen fisiese en sielkundige skade wat medewerkers veroorsaak.

Mr. Azadani, the appellant, was under an injunction not to go within 250 yards of a specified address, after he had repeatedly sought a close and intimate relationship with Ms. Burris, which she refused, leading to repeated telephone calls and threats. Ms. Burris sought and obtained an interlocutory injunction prohibiting Mr. Azadani from pestering or contacting Ms. Burris, her children or her friends, or of going within 250 yards of her house. He breached the injunction and was committed to prison; he appeals the injunction. The Court held that an order prohibiting the defendant from being in a defined area in which the plaintiff's home was situated was possible in support of an injunction forbidding tortious harassment.

Mrs. Z.A. contended that she had been unfairly dismissed for having refused sexual advances by the personnel manager. The Court found that Mrs. Z.A. did not have the obligation to prove that she had been the subject of sexual harassment. Her employer had the burden of proof to show that she had been dismissed fairly. The Court found that Mrs. Z.A. had been dismissed because she did not submit to her personnel manager's sexual advances, and therefore awarded her punitive damages in addition to six months pay.

The applicant was a German national arrested in Turkey on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist organization. She claimed that she was subjected to a gynecological exam during her detainment and that the local gendarmes stripped her naked and sexually harassed her. The court found that in these circumstances the gynecological exam was an interference with her right to physical integrity and her right to respect for her private life.

Ms. Zoilamérica Narváez Murillo suffered physical (sexual abuse, rape, and sexual harassment) and psychological violence by her adoptive father, Mr. Daniel Ortega Saavedra. Mr. Ortega was a deputy in Nicaragua’s National Assembly and protected by congressional immunity from charges against him. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) held in 2001 that it had competence to review Ms. Murillo’s petition. The IACHR withheld on deciding the case on the merits in hopes that the parties would amicably come to a settlement. On June 9, 2009, Ms. Murillo sent a communication to the IACHR, which expressed her willingness to withdraw the lawsuit against the state of Nicaragua. Ms. Murillo requested that the IACHR keep the reasons of her amicable withdraw confidential.

La Sra. Zoilamérica Narváez Murillo sufrió violencia física (abuso sexual, violación y acoso sexual) y violencia psicológica por parte de su padre adoptivo, el Sr. Daniel Ortega Saavedra. El Sr. Ortega era diputado en la Asamblea Nacional de Nicaragua y estaba protegido por la inmunidad del Congreso de los cargos en su contra. La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) sostuvo en 2001 que tenía competencia para revisar la petición de la Sra. Murillo. La CIDH se negó a decidir el caso en cuanto al fondo con la esperanza de que las partes llegaran a un acuerdo amistoso. En efecto, el 9 de junio de 2009, la Sra. Murillo envió una comunicación a la CIDH, que expresaba su disposición a retirar la demanda contra el estado de Nicaragua. La Sra. Murillo solicitó a la CIDH que mantuviera la confidencialidad de los motivos de su retiro amistoso.

Ms. Abramova, a citizen of Belarus, is a journalist who was arrested for her activism on behalf of the “For Freedom” movement and convicted of “minor hooliganism.” She was held in a temporary detention facility for five days, where she shared a small, unheated cell with an unenclosed toilet area that lay in open view of the all-male staff. During her detention, the male prison staff directed numerous humiliating comments at Ms. Abramova, treatment that the male detainees at the facility did not receive. Upon her release, Ms. Abramova submitted a complaint of violation of her rights in detention to authorities at the Interior Department, who informed her that her allegations had not been verified. Ms. Abramova then filed a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office, again with a response that her claims had not been confirmed. Next, Ms. Abramova filed an application to the District Court under civil procedure, but the court claimed that it lacked jurisdiction and rejected her application. She appealed, and the Judicial Board rejected her appeal. Ms. Abramova proceeded to file a complaint to the District Court under administrative procedure, which again refused to initial civil proceedings. On appeal, the Judicial Board reversed the decision of the District Court and remanded the case for new consideration; on remand, the District Court dismissed Ms. Abramova’s complaint on procedural grounds. She submitted a complaint to the CEDAW Committee alleging that the conditions under which the State detained her constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, and that such treatment amounted to discrimination against her on the basis of gender. The Committee found that Ms. Abramova’s temporary detention in poor, unhygienic conditions, in a facility staffed exclusively by men, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and discrimination on the basis of her gender. Further, the Committee found that the State was in violation of its obligations under the Convention (CEDAW).

This case was brought against Venezuela under allegations of harassment and physical and verbal assault toward journalists, including some female journalists, by state actors over a period of four years. While the Court found Venezuela to be in violation of the right to speak freely, to receive and impart information, and to humane treatment (violations of Articles 1(1), 5(1) and 13(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), the Court also found there was insufficient evidence to establish violations of Articles 13(3), 21 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court further noted that it would not analyze the alleged actions under Articles 1, 2 and 7(b) of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women.

The Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of Witwatersrand and Avon Global Center for Women and Justice at Cornell Law School released a joint report on sexual violence committed by educators against students in South African schools.

Die Sentrum vir Toegepaste Regstudies by die Universiteit van Witwatersrand en Avon Global Centre for Women and Justice by Cornell Law School het 'n gesamentlike verslag vrygestel oor seksuele geweld wat opvoeders teen studente in Suid-Afrikaanse skole gepleeg het.

On May 14th, The Avon Global Center and the University of Chicago Law School co-hosted a meeting of experts on the causes, conditions and consequences of women’s imprisonment globally. About 35 experts from the U.S., U.K., Russia, and Argentina participated in the meeting, including policy advocates, impact litigators, scholars, service providers, and senior department of corrections officials.

El 14 de mayo, el Avon Global Center y la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Chicago organizaron conjuntamente una reunión de expertos sobre las causas, las condiciones y las consecuencias del encarcelamiento de mujeres en todo el mundo. Alrededor de 35 expertos de los EE. UU., EE. UU., Rusia y Argentina participaron en la reunión, incluidos defensores de políticas, litigantes de impacto, académicos, proveedores de servicios y funcionarios superiores del departamento de correcciones.