Women and Justice: Topics: Statutory rape or defilement

Three minor girls, victims of human trafficking who the defendant lured in with promises of working in a restaurant, but instead sent to work at a bar, appealed their case. When the work conditions turned out to be exploitative, the appellants reported the defendant to the police. The case was appealed to the High Court on the basis that: (i) the case file did not go through the standard process whereby a case is registered in the Criminal Registry then distributed to a Magistrate by a Chief Resident Magistrate, and (ii) the magistrate did not follow proper procedure for the child witnesses’ testimony. In concluding that a proper lower court be assigned to re-hear the matter, the High Court underscored the importance of following legal procedure designed to protect the rights of vulnerable child witnesses. The High Court pointed out a number of procedural protocols, such as ensuring that the child witnesses did not come into direct contact with the accused, making provision for the witness to be accompanied by a supportive figure in court, and considering the possibility of a pre-recorded interview of a child witness as evidence. The court noted that a court competent in handling child witnesses must re-hear the matter, as causing witnesses to endure repeat trials as a result of the failure to follow proper judicial procedure is akin to repeat victimization of such witnesses.

While intoxicated, the defendant committed lewd acts against a minor (under 14 years old) by forcing her to expose herself and photographing her naked. He also took the photographs, which were recognized as a pornographic product. According to the courts of the first and second instance, the illegal actions qualified as corruption of a minor (Article 156 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and the production of child pornography for which he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment. In his complaint to the Supreme Court, the prosecutor demanded a longer sentence, arguing that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and emphasizing the defendant’s criminal history. The Supreme Court noted that the court of the first instance considered the severity of the crimes, the personal information about the offender, the defendant’s attitude towards the crimes, the defendant’s partial recognition of his guilt, and the aggravating circumstance of intoxication. Thus, by imposing a penalty of imprisonment near the maximum allowable sentence, the Supreme Court held that court of the first instance complied with the requirements of proportionality and fairness. In this case, the prosecutor's complaint was dismissed.

Чоловік в стані алкогольного сп’яніння вчинив відносно малолітньої (до 14 років) потерпілої розпусні дії (ст. 156 КК), які виразились у її примушуванні до оголення та фотографуванні в оголеному вигляді; він також створив фотознімки з таким зображенням потерпілої (було визнано продукцією порнографічного характеру). За результатами розгляду справи судом першої та другої інстанції протиправні дії було кваліфіковано як розбещення малолітньої особи та виготовлення дитячої порнографії та засуджено до 7 років позбавлення волі. Прокурор у своїй скарзі до Верховного Суду вимагає скасування рішення та призначення нового розгляду через невідповідність призначеного покарання скоєному злочину та неврахування особи винного, що неодноразово притягувався до адміністративної відповідальності. Верховний Суд зазначає, що суд першої інстанції, призначаючи покарання у виді позбавлення волі, врахував ступінь тяжкості вчинених злочинів, ставлення до вчиненого, часткове визнання своєї винуватості, наявність обставини, що обтяжує покарання - вчинення злочину в стані алкогольного сп'яніння, а також дані про його особу. Таким чином, суд першої інстанції, призначаючи покарання у виді позбавлення волі в розмірі, наближеному до максимального (передбаченого за інкриміновані правопорушення), дотримався вимоги співмірності та справедливості. Скарга прокурора не підлягає задоволенню.

The case concerned the breach of constitutional guarantees of due process and the right of defense. The Supreme Court of Justice, Criminal Division, ruled in favor of the application of art. 499 Code on Criminal Procedure of 1890, revoking the sentence enacted by the Criminal Court of Appeal 3rd Division and acquitting the defendant. The defendant was accused of sexual abuse and rape of his stepdaughters. The action was brought by the presumptive victims’ aunt. In the trial court, several expert opinions and testimonies supported the aunt’s claim, however, one of the alleged victims argued that she had not been raped but was forced by her aunt to accuse the defendant. From the analysis of the evidence, defendant was convicted by the trial court. The defendant appealed the decision and argued that i) some expert opinions had inconsistencies and underlying defects or omissions, and ii) the trial court omitted the testimony by one of the presumptive victims. The Criminal Court of Appeal 3rd Division upheld the trial court’s decision. Next, the defendant brought an action before the Supreme Court of Justice -Criminal Division-, alleging the procedure was null because of a due process violation. Even though the Supreme Court did not consider the procedure was void because the defendant had the opportunity to defend himself, the Supreme Court revoked the decision made by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court, because there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant. The full decision can be accessed via the External URL to the Supreme Court of Paraguay's website's search engine.

El caso se refería a la vulneración de las garantías constitucionales al debido proceso y al derecho de defensa. La Corte Suprema de Justicia -Sala de lo Penal-, falló a favor de la aplicación del art. 499 Código Procesal Penal de 1890, revocando la sentencia dictada por la Sala Penal de Apelaciones -3ra Sala- y por lo tanto absolviendo al acusado. El acusado fue denunciado por abuso sexual y violación de sus hijastras. La acción fue interpuesta por la tía de las presuntas víctimas. En el tribunal de primera instancia, varios peritajes y testimonios respaldaron la afirmación de la tía, sin embargo, una de las presuntas víctimas argumentó que no había sido violada, sino que fue obligada por su tía a denunciar al acusado. Del análisis de las pruebas, el acusado fue condenado por el tribunal de primera instancia. El imputado apeló la decisión y alegó que i) algunos peritajes presentaban inconsistencias y vicios subyacentes u omisiones y ii) el tribunal de instancia omitió el testimonio de una de las presuntas víctimas. La Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Penal -División 3ra- confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia. A continuación, el imputado interpuso una acción ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia -Sala de lo Penal-, alegando la nulidad del procedimiento por violación al debido proceso. Si bien la Corte Suprema no consideró nulo el procedimiento porque el acusado tuvo la oportunidad de defenderse, la Corte Suprema revocó la decisión tomada por el tribunal de primera instancia y confirmada por el tribunal de apelación, porque no había pruebas suficientes para condenar al acusado

The case concerned abortion, the right to life, the right to health, and the right to self-determination. The court ruled for the partial decriminalization of abortion and set circumstances under which voluntary termination of pregnancy would be permissible. The Criminal Code previously criminalized voluntary abortion with one to three years of imprisonment. The plaintiffs argued that the criminalization of abortion violated women’s constitutional rights to life and dignity, physical integrity, equality, liberty, and unhindered development of personality, health, and reproductive self-determination. The Colombian Constitutional Court determined that abortion shall not be considered a crime in any of the following three circumstances: (i) a physician certified that pregnancy could threaten the woman’s health or life; (ii) a physician concluded that the fetus would suffer from serious malformations that could eventually endanger or terminate his life; and (iii) if the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or non-consensual artificial insemination, as long as the criminal act was lawfully reported to the competent authorities. The court found that articles 32.7, 122, 123, and 124 were constitutional, subject only to the aforementioned criteria. This case is of paramount importance because it established for the first time the right of women to terminate their pregnancy under the three specific scenarios. The scope of this decision was recently modified under Decision C-055-22 by the Constitutional Court, which has been announced but not yet published as of April 2022. This decision decriminalized voluntary abortion under any circumstances until 24 weeks of pregnancy. Voluntary abortions carried out after week 24 will not be deemed criminal offenses only if they are performed under any of the three events previously recognized by the Constitutional Court in the Decision C-355-06.

El caso se refería al aborto, el derecho a la vida, el derecho a la salud y el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. La Corte Constitucional falló a favor de la despenalización parcial del aborto y fijó las circunstancias bajo las cuales sería permisible la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. El Código Penal tipificaba como delito el aborto voluntario con uno a tres años de prisión. Los demandantes argumentaron que la penalización del aborto violaba los derechos constitucionales de las mujeres a la vida y la dignidad, la integridad física, la igualdad, la libertad, el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la salud y la libre determinación reproductiva. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia determinó que el aborto no sería considerado delito en ninguna de las siguientes tres circunstancias: (i) cuando un médico certifique que el embarazo puede poner en peligro la salud o la vida de la mujer; (ii) cuando un médico concluya que el feto sufriría de graves malformaciones que eventualmente podrían poner en peligro o acabar con su vida; y (iii) si el embarazo fue producto de violación, incesto o inseminación artificial no consentida, siempre que el hecho delictivo haya sido legalmente denunciado ante las autoridades competentes. El tribunal consideró que los artículos 32.7, 122, 123 y 124 eran constitucionales condicionados a los criterios antes mencionados. Este caso es de suma importancia porque estableció por primera vez el derecho de la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo bajo los tres supuestos específicos. El alcance de esta decisión fue modificado recientemente mediante la Sentencia C-055-22 de la Corte Constitucional. Esta decisión despenalizó el aborto voluntario bajo cualquier circunstancia hasta la semana 24 de embarazo. Los abortos voluntarios practicados después de la semana 24 no serán considerados delitos si se realizan bajo cualquiera de los tres supuestos previamente reconocidos por la Corte Constitucional en la Sentencia C-355-06.

In this case, the defendant, the mayor of a Colombian town, was convicted of rape and non-consensual abortion. The penalty was 261 months of imprisonment and 20 years of disqualification from exercising political roles in the public sector. The prosecutor argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, a minor, against her will and, as a result, she got pregnant. The defendant forced the plaintiff to terminate the pregnancy. The defendant argued before the Supreme Court of Justice that the appellant court omitted at least seven fundamental testimonies. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff’s testimony, as well as some of the testimonies from other witnesses, was inconsistent. The plaintiff declared out-of-court that the defendant raped her and forced her to abort, however, during the appellate trial she testified that the lawsuit was a stratagem designed by her uncle, who was a candidate and political opponent of the defendant, to discredit the defendant. However, the appellate court learned that defendant, in order to obtain an acquittal, extorted, threatened, and attempted to bribe the plaintiff, plaintiff’s relatives, and other witnesses involved in the case. The Supreme Court of Justice found that even though the plaintiff changed her testimony, the other evidence suggested that the defendant was guilty of the charges. Therefore, the Court ultimately upheld the defendant’s conviction.

En este caso, el acusado, alcalde de un pueblo colombiano, fue condenado por acceso carnal violento y aborto no consentido. La pena fue de 261 meses de prisión y 20 años de inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos. El fiscal argumentó que el acusado tuvo varios encuentros sexuales con una víctima menor de edad, en contra de su voluntad y, como consecuencia, quedó embarazada. La víctima fue obligada por el acusado a interrumpir el embarazo. El acusado alegó ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia que la corte de segunda instancia omitió al menos siete testimonios fundamentales para el caso. También afirmó que el testimonio de la víctima, así como algunos de los testimonios de otros testigos, eran inconsistentes. La víctima declaró extrajudicialmente que el acusado la violó y la obligó a abortar, sin embargo, durante el juicio de apelación declaró que la demanda fue una estrategia diseñada por su tío, quien era candidato y opositor político del acusado, para desacreditar al acusado. Sin embargo, la corte de segunda instancia se enteró que el acusado extorsionó, amenazó e intentó sobornar a la víctima, a los familiares de la víctima y a otros testigos involucrados en el caso, con el fin de obtener una absolución. La Corte Suprema de Justicia encontró que, a pesar de que la víctima cambió su testimonio, la evidencia sugería que el acusado era culpable de los cargos que se le imputaban. Por lo tanto, la Corte finalmente confirmó la condena del acusado.

The 21-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to the defilement of a 15-year-old girl with whom he had an ongoing sexual relationship and who was, by the time of the trial, pregnant as a result. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years imprisonment with hard labor. He unsuccessfully appealed to reduce the sentence, claiming the following mitigating factors: (i) his willingness to financially support the girl and her baby; (ii) his age; and (iii) his status as a first-time offender. The court rejected this appeal on the grounds that appellate courts may only interfere with sentences that are either “manifestly excessive (or inadequate) or otherwise erroneous in principle,” citing cases in which the state had successfully enhanced initial sentences from six to eight years as evidence that this sentence was not unusually excessive or otherwise erroneous.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to eight years imprisonment including hard labor for defilement of an11-month-old girl. On appeal, the appellant’s primary argument was that the testimony of the child’s mother was not sufficiently corroborated and therefore the conviction was not supported by the evidence. He also argued that the sentence was excessive. Regarding the corroboration rule in sexual violence cases, the court announced that it was a longstanding practice based on blatant discrimination against women, who are the predominant victims of such offenses and assumed to be unreliable witnesses. The court found the corroboration rule unlawful under existing constitutional (article 20), evidence, and criminal laws. Instead, the court held that courts should take caution basing convictions on uncorroborated evidence to ensure satisfaction of the burden of proof. Regarding the appellant’s arguments, the court found that there was not sufficient evidence of penetration to sustain the defilement conviction, thus acquitting the appellant of defilement. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported a conviction for the lesser offense of indecent assault, for which the court imposed a sentence of three years of imprisonment out of a maximum of 14 years. The court chose a substantially lower sentence than the maximum due to what it described as mitigating factors, including that: (i) the appellant was a first-time offender; (ii) the child was largely unharmed physically according to the medical report; (iii) there was no evidence that the child would subsequently suffer an STI or psychological impacts; and (iv) the crime was not premeditated in the court’s view, but a crime of opportunity.

The appellant was convicted of statutory rape of his partner’s 8-year-old daughter and sentenced to 10 years in prison as well as of payment of a compensation to the victim. Before the trial, the appellant confessed having sexual relations with the minor, arguing that it only happened because he was under the influence of alcohol and had mistaken her for his partner. In his appeal, he, however, 1) denied all accusations against him, 2) argued that no evidence was produced against him, and 3) alleged that his partner had convinced the victim to accuse him of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, ruling that there was enough physical evidence through gynecological examination that the appellant sexually assaulted the minor more than one time. In deciding to increase the appellant’s sentence and compensation order, the court noted that he waited for his partner to go to sleep before entering another room with the intent and will to perpetrate the morally reprehensible crime against his stepdaughter.

O apelante foi condenado por estupro da filha de 8 anos da sua parceira e sentenciado a 10 anos de prisão, assim como ao pagamento de indenização para a vítima. Antes do julgamento, o apelante confessou ter tido relações sexuais com a menor, argumentando que isso só aconteceu porque ele estava sob a influência do álcool e tinha confundido ela pela sua parceira. Na sua apelação, no entanto, ele 1) negou todas as acusações contra ele, 2) arguiu que não havia evidência produzida contra ele, e 3) alegou que sua parceira havia convencido a vítima a acusá-lo do crime. O Tribunal Supremo reafirmou a decisão da corte inferior, decretando que o exame ginecológico mostrava evidência física suficiente de que o apelante abusou sexualmente da menor mais de uma vez. Ao decidir que a sentença e a ordem de indenização fossem aumentadas, a corte notou que ele esperava a sua parceira dormir para entrar em outro quarto com intenção e vontade de cometer o crime moralmente repreensível contra a sua enteada.

The appellant was convicted of two accounts of domestic violence in the form of sexual assault of two minors (11 and 9-years-old) and sentenced to 8 years in prison, in addition to payment of a compensation to the victims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant 1) claimed that the accusation was based merely on the victims’ testimony, which he alleged untrue and made with the sole purpose of monetary gain by their mother (his partner at the time of the crimes), 2) denied having any kind of sexual intercourse with the victims, and 3) claimed the conviction violated his constitutional rights because the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The Supreme Court argued that there was enough physical evidence that the defendant violated both victims, including evidence that proved anal rape. However, as the evidence and testimony of the victims showed, the assault had not occurred through vaginal penetration, but solely anal. Therefore, the type of crime perpetrated had not been correctly invoked by the lower court, as the configuration of sexual assault requires vaginal penetration under Angolan law. Under that paradigm, the Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed was indecent exposure and, consequently, domestic violence and that such criminal offense is punishable with a sentence lower than 12 years in prison. The Supreme Court then found the defendant amnestied and, consequently, extinguished the criminal proceedings against him, without prejudice of the monetary compensation for damages. In 2016, Angola published an amnesty law (Lei nº 11/16) in which it pardoned common crimes punishable by a prison sentence of up to 12 years. Although the amnesty law excludes sexual crimes, the crime committed in this case does not fit the exception, precisely because of the absence of vaginal penetration. At the end of 2020, a new Angolan Penal Code was enacted, which has been in effect since February 2021. The new Penal Code considers both vaginal and anal penetration to be sexual penetration.

O apelante foi condenado por duas ocorrências de violência doméstica na forma de abuso sexual de dois menores (11 e 9 anos de idade) e sentenciado a 8 anos na prisão, com adição de pagamento de indenização às vítimas. Na apelação para o Tribunal Supremo, o apelante 1) afirmou que as acusações foram feitas somente com base nos depoimentos das vítimas, os quais ele alegou serem falsos e feitos com o único propósito de ganho financeiro pela mãe (a sua parceira no momento dos crimes), 2) negou ter qualquer tipo de relação sexual com as vítimas, e 3) afirmou que a condenação violou os seus direitos constitucionais porque a evidência não foi suficiente para provar a sua culpa. O Tribunal Supremo argumentou que havia evidência física suficiente para provar que o réu violou ambas as vítimas, incluindo evidência que provou estupro anal. Entretanto, como a evidência e o depoimento mostraram, o abuso não foi feito por penetração vaginal, mas somente anal. Assim, o tipo do crime perpetrado não tinha sido corretamente aplicado pela corte inferior, já que a configuração de abuso sexual na legislação de Angola requer penetração vaginal. Sob este paradigma, o Tribunal Supremo deliberou que o crime foi de atentado ao pudor e, consequentemente, violência doméstica e esse tipo penal é punido com sentença menor que 12 anos de prisão. O Tribunal Supremo então declarou o réu anistiado e, portanto, extinguiu os procedimentos criminais contra ele, sem prejuízo da indenização por danos. Em 2016, Angola publicou uma lei de anistia (Lei nº 11/16) em que perdoou crimes comuns que são puníveis com penas de até 12 anos. Ainda que a lei de anistia excluda crimes sexuais, o crime neste caso não se encaixa nessa exceção, precisamente por causa da abstinência da penetração vaginal. No fim de 2020, um novo Código Penal Angolano foi promulgado, o qual está em vigor desde Fevereiro de 2021. O novo Código Penal considera ambas penetrações vaginal e anal como penetração sexual.

The respondent pleaded guilty to two charges of indecent assault and two charges of defilement for repeatedly raping his wife’s 12-year-old granddaughter. When the girl reported the rapes to her grandmother, the respondent’s wife, he apologized. Later, the respondent wanted the victim to sleep with him and the victim’s grandmother told her to do so. The respondent again raped the victim. The High Court, in sentencing the respondent to two years imprisonment, considered his early plea, the seriousness of the case, and his apology to the girl. Counsel for the Republic appealed on the grounds that the two-year sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Republic argued that due to the rising prevalence of sexual offences in Kiribati, sentencing guidelines were needed. She further contended that the High Court erred in considering the respondent’s apology to the girl a mitigating factor. Relying on Kimaere v The Republic, a Kiribati Court of Appeal decision from 2005, and sentencing standards of New Zealand and Australia, the Court found that a five-year prison sentence was an appropriate starting point in defilement cases. The Court noted that in cases involving multiple offenses, it is more important that the overall sentence appropriately reflect the entirety of the defendant’s conduct rather than adding together the sentences for each offense. Determining that the respondent’s conduct justified a prison sentence of seven to eight years, the Court then reduced his sentence for his early plea to a total of five years. The Court found that the sentencing judge incorrectly weighted the respondent’s apology as a mitigating factor. The Court also held that the starting point for the indecent assault charges would have been two-and-a-half years before accounting for mitigating factors.

In this interpretation, the Taiwan Constitutional Court upheld a criminal penalty provision of the Child and Juvenile Sexual Transaction Prevention Act (subsequently amended and retitled as the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act, or “CYSEPA”) that provided for imprisonment and monetary fines for parties publishing, broadcasting, or otherwise spreading information that may by any means induce a person to engage in an unlawful sexual transaction. The Court cited its earlier precedents holding that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech was not absolute and that lawmakers may impose restrictions through clear and unambiguous laws. With regard to the Constitution’s Article 23 proportionality principle, the Court addressed the broad scope of the criminal penalty provision, which did not require that the information in question specifically involve or result in underage sexual transactions or inducement of children or juveniles to engage in sexual transactions. The Court noted that children and juveniles are still in danger of becoming objects of sexual transactions because of the wide distribution of such information and, therefore, distribution of such information constitutes a crime. The Court held that the criminal penalty provision in question was a rational and necessary means of achieving the significant state interest of protecting children and juveniles from becoming objects of sexual transactions and therefore was consistent with the principle of proportionality. The Court nonetheless directed competent authorities to design a “classified management system” so that readers and viewers of such information “can be strictly differentiated in light of the technological developments so as to comply with the principle of proportionality.” The current version of this criminal penalty provision, as reflected in the CYSEPA, has a narrower scope and applies to “messages that are deemed to be sufficient to seduce, arrange, suggest, or cause a child or youth to be subjected” to sexual exploitation. English translation available here.

The Criminal Trial Court issued a condemnatory sentence against the defendants for the repeated rape of their daughter and for other sexual crimes, including sexual abuse of a minor of less than 14 years of age and production of child pornography. The defendants sought to reverse the judgment, alleging that the Trial Court failed to consider the mental disabilities of one of the perpetrators and erred by failing to consider a lesser sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the failure of the Trial Court to consider the mental disability of the defendant was an error and should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the mother should have been charged solely as an accomplice because she had also actively participated in photographing the sexual abuse of the victim. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment solely in respect to the sentencing calculation, as the crimes were of the same nature and, therefore, the Trial Court should have granted a lesser sentence. (External Link leads to the website of the Chilean Judicial System. This case is available by searching by the case number.)

El Tribunal Penal de Primera Instancia dictó sentencia condenatoria contra los imputados por la violación reiterada de su hija y por otros delitos sexuales, incluido el abuso sexual de un menor de 14 años y la producción de pornografía infantil. Los acusados ​​buscaron revocar la sentencia, alegando que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no consideró la discapacidad mental de uno de los imputados y cometió un error al no considerar una sentencia menor. El Tribunal de Apelaciones sostuvo que el hecho de que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no tuviera en cuenta la discapacidad mental del acusado fue un error y debería haber sido considerado como una circunstancia atenuante en la sentencia. La Corte de Apelaciones rechazó el argumento de que la madre debería haber sido acusada únicamente como cómplice porque también había participado activamente en la fotografía del abuso sexual de la víctima. La Corte de Apelaciones revocó la sentencia únicamente en lo que respecta al cálculo de la sentencia, ya que los delitos eran de la misma naturaleza y, por lo tanto, la Corte de Primera Instancia debería haber dictado una sentencia menor. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial de Chile. Este caso está disponible buscando por el número de caso).

The accused was charged with conducting a business involving sexual servitude, in violation of section 260.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. She pled not guilty and proceeded to trial, facing charges that she had recruited four women from Malaysia to work at a brothel. The victims entered Australia on student visas, were forced to repay AUD 5,000 each, and were not permitted to leave the brothel until they repaid that amount. The accused also threatened the women with physical violence and deportation. The Court found the work that the women were forced to perform, including being paraded in front of potential customers wearing numbers for identification, was demeaning and dehumanizing. The Court found the accused guilty on all seven counts and sentenced her to six years’ imprisonment.

A man was sentenced to nine years in prison in the Skane and Blekinge Court of Appeal for approximately 100 cases of rape and other sexual offenses against a child over the course of five years. The Swedish Supreme Court ruled that when assessing the penalty value for repeated serious sexual offenses against the same plaintiff, the court must weigh the connection between the crimes and their characteristics. When the perpetrator has committed crimes for a long time against the same person, the victim is often vulnerable and in a constrained situation. There is therefore particular reason to consider the effects of the crime on the victim. Considering these factors, the Supreme Court increased the sentence to 12 years' imprisonment.

The victim, a minor of the age of 15, was trafficked by men including defendants I.I. and Sh. G, from Albania to Kosovo, where she was imprisoned and forced to work as dancer at multiple restaurants. She eventually escaped and met two men who helped her find accommodations and work as a waitress. One of the men, S.B., had sexual intercourse with her, as did D.B., the manager who hired her as a waitress. I.I., Sh. G., and the men involved in the victim’s trafficking and employment were convicted of Trafficking in Persons contrary to Article 139 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and S.B. and D.B. were additionally convicted of Sexual Abuse of Persons under the Age of 16 contrary to Article 198. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the court of first instance’s ruling that the fact that the victim perceived I.I. as a person who had helped her was a mitigating circumstance, and agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on I.I. was very lenient, noting that I.I. had participated in the victim’s trafficking despite his awareness of the victim’s age and vulnerable situation, including her dependency on narcotics, presence alone in a foreign country, and lack of options to return home. The court accordingly increased I.I.’s sentence from one year to two years. The tribunal then dismissed Sh. G.’s argument that he was found guilty based only on the statement of the victim, holding that in the case of human trafficking, “it is the injured party who is the most reliable person.” The Supreme Court also agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on S.B. was very lenient, considering that he had intercourse with the victim, being aware of her age and vulnerable situation, and thus increased S.B.’s sentence from one year and one month to one year and six months. Finally, the court agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on D.B. was very lenient. The tribunal held that the trafficking of minors need not involve the use of force or violence, and that a conviction of sexual abuse of a minor could stand even if it was proven that it was done with the permission of the victim. The court accepted that the victim may have shown gratitude to D.B. for his assistance, but dismissed it as the “distorted perception” of a “vulnerable victim” and held that the gratitude did not change the criminal nature of the act or serve as an exculpatory circumstance. D.B.’s sentence was accordingly increased from two years to two years and four months. (Also available in English.)

The appellant was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of raping a 13-year-old girl by dragging her to a nearby farm, raping her and later threatening her with retaliation if she did not stay silent. The appellant appealed, pointing to inconsistencies in the number of times the victim testified as being raped and arguing that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. According to the court, the victim making inconsistent statements about the number of times the appellant raped her did not harm her credibility, given the fear and distress the victim suffered, and the frequency is also not an element of the crime. The required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age, or demented. The medical examination and victim’s credible testimony meets the first element. The element of force or intimidation is met by the fact that the appellant dragged her and pushed her to the ground to abuse her. The appellant also intimidated her after the act. Thus, the required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are met. The appellant’s alibi or denials were weak and uncorroborated.

The defendant pleaded guilty to having sexual intercourse with his daughter, a minor. The daughter became pregnant as a result and the child was adopted.. The judge commended the daughter for reporting the offense, despite the defendant’s attempt to persuade her not to. The defendant was sentenced to six years and eight months in prison.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to four years in prison for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor (BB). AA and the mother of BB had a common law marriage. AA had been sexually abusing BB since she was eight years old and started raping her when she turned 11. At age 14, BB became pregnant as a result of rape committed by AA. BB’s mother discovered AA’s abuse and filed the criminal complaint. AA confessed to being the victim’s “lover.” The court found aggravating circumstances including that AA had taken advantage of his domestic relationship with BB’s mother and that he had abused his victim during the night. AA’s confession constituted an attenuating circumstance, reducing the sentence imposed. The Appeals Court dismissed AA’s appeal and affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, ruling that there was enough evidence presented to establish the facts of the case.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a cuatro años de prisión por abuso sexual agravado de un menor (BB). AA y la madre de BB tenían un matrimonio común. AA había abusado sexualmente de BB desde que tenía ocho años y comenzó a violarla cuando cumplió los 11. A los 14 años, BB quedó embarazada como resultado de una violación cometida por AA. La madre de BB descubrió el abuso de AA y presentó esta denuncia penal. AA confesó ser el "amante" de la víctima. El tribunal encontró circunstancias agravantes, incluyendo que AA se había aprovechado de su relación doméstica con la madre de BB y que había abusado de su víctima generalmente durante las noches. La confesión de AA constituyó una circunstancia atenuante, reduciendo la sentencia impuesta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó la apelación de AA y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, dictaminando que se presentaron suficientes pruebas para establecer los hechos del caso.

The appellant advertised in Korea for families to come to Australia to attend a missionary school. The appellant was responsible for settling those families’ affairs, and they were dependent on him to organize the necessary extensions of visas. Most of the time, the parents spoke no English and their children spoke little English. The appellant organized accommodation for the parents of the complainant among other families, and at the same time he arranged for separate accommodation for their daughter with children of other families. The accommodation for the daughter was close to the appellant’s house, but an hour’s drive from her parents’ house. The appellant was the only individual who had the keys to the children’s rooms. The appellant advised the father of the complainant to return to Korea to seek more families, and he did. One night, the appellant returned around 1:00 AM to the children’s accommodation and entered the complainant’s room where another girl was with her. That girl left after certain remarks by the appellant. The appellant took the complaint in his van to a remote place where he proceeded to touch her, took off her pyjamas, and then had sexual intercourse with her, despite her resistance. During this resistance, they both fell to the floor of the van and the appellant injured his arm. The appellant threatened the complainant not to inform anyone about this incident, reminding her that her family needed him to renew their visas. The complainant immediately told her friends at the accommodation of the sexual assault. In the morning, the complainant walked to a public telephone where she called her father in Korea and told him about the incident, and then called her mother to inform her of the same. In fear with respect to their visas, the family went with the appellant to Brisbane where they had their visas renewed, acting as if nothing happened. Later, the father flew back to Australia and immediately lodged a complaint with the police. Through investigation, the police found physical evidence of rape, including injuries to her genitals consistent with rape, the appellant’s DNA, and wounds consistent with complainant’s statement of the rape. Based on the evidence, the District Court sentenced the appellant to eight years for two counts of rape and one count of indecent dealing with a circumstance of aggravation. Relying on older cases, the appellant filed this appeal to lower his sentence, claiming it was too high for someone his age, considering he had no previous convictions and that there were no violence or weapon used. The Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, stating that the older cases referenced by the appellant were dated before the implementation of new rules that increased the sentences for rape. In addition, even though no violence was used against the complainant, the court found that the appellant took advantage of her because of her visa situation, and this was an aggravating factor. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The defendant pled guilty to wounding and causing grievous harm to an adult female after dragging her into the bushes and attacking her with a piece of wood and cutlass, leaving deep lacerations and abrasions. The defendant also pled guilty to the rape and robbery of a 16-year-old female, which occurred just two days later. The defendant was before the court for sentencing. Analyzing the aggravating factors, the court observed that defendant had a criminal history, was not remorseful, preferred violence, and presented a danger to the community. The court also recognized that the victims were not only physically hurt, but had “been severely traumatized by their experiences.” The only mitigating factor was the guilty plea. Accordingly, the court sentenced the defendant to 14 years and three months imprisonment.

El acusado se declaró culpable de herir y causar graves daños a una mujer adulta después de arrastrarla hacia los arbustos y golpearla con un trozo de madera y un alfanje, dejando profundas laceraciones y abrasiones. El acusado también se declaró culpable de la violación y robo de una joven de 16 años, lo cual ocurrió solo dos días después. El acusado compareció ante el tribunal para dictar sentencia. Al analizar los agravantes, el tribunal observó que el acusado tenía antecedentes penales, no tenía remordimientos, prefería la violencia como medio de resolución a conflictos y representaba un peligro para la comunidad. El tribunal también reconoció que las víctimas no solo estaban heridas físicamente, sino que habían "sido gravemente traumatizadas por sus experiencias." El único factor atenuante fue que el acusado se declaró culpable. En consecuencia, el tribunal condenó al acusado a 14 años y tres meses de prisión.

The 47-year-old male applicant requested bail pending the appeal of his conviction and 15-year sentence for raping the 16-year-old complainant. The applicant appealed, arguing that the intercourse was consensual because the victim did not scream or immediately report the rape after a witness stumbled upon the incident. The applicant had to show, among other things, the likelihood of success of his appeal to obtain bail. The court dismissed the bail application after rejecting the state's concession that the applicant had a meritorious appeal because complainant's failure to scream or to immediately report the rape cast doubts upon her lack of consent. Citing research about cultural inhibitions on gender violence victims, the court concluded that silence could not be equated to acquiescence. With women often held culturally as custodians of appropriate sexual conduct, and with the responsibility for sexual restraint being placed on a woman, regardless of her age or power imbalances, the court found it understandable that the complainant failed to make an immediate report. The court noted that a young girl may not make a voluntary report because her cultural context makes it difficult for her to do so without being re-victimized. Consequently, the proposition that the victim's initial silence implied consent was untenable and could not be ground for bail.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island rejected the argument that the state’s criminal statute outlawing carnal knowledge of a girl under 16 years of age violated equal protection of the law, even though it created a classification based on sex by designating females as the only possible victims and subjecting only males to conviction under the statute. In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court applied the rule that sex-based classifications that served important governmental objectives and were substantially related to the achievement of those objectives were not unconstitutional. The court cited the fact that the classification was substantially related to the important state’s interest in protecting female children “from the severe physical and psychological consequences of engaging in coitus before attaining the age of consent in the statute.” Therefore, the classification based on sex did not violate the constitution’s equal protection law.

The defendant sexually abused the plaintiff between 1969 and 1978 when she was 5-14 years old. The plaintiff turned 18, the age of majority in Virginia, in 1982. She first received information from her psychologist regarding the causal connection between the childhood sexual abuse and the severe emotional harm she manifested in March 1990, and she subsequently filed a lawsuit against defendant for the abuse in July 1991. However, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit as untimely. The issue before the Virginia Supreme Court was whether, upon the lapse of the time fixed in the statute of limitations and the tolling statute (the grace period before the statute of limitations begins), the defendant acquired a right protected by due process guarantees notwithstanding a recent statute by the legislature with provisions to: (a) retroactively apply a ten-year statute of limitations . . . in cases in which the statute of limitations had expired . . . and (b) to create a twelve-month period during which such cases could be filed regardless of when the cause of action accrued. In affirming the lower court’s ruling the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its well-established principle that the legislature possesses the power to enact retrospective legislation only if the statute is not destructive of vested rights. Here, defendant’s statute of limitations defense was a vested right. Infant plaintiff suffered an injury in that "she experienced positive, physical or mental hurt" each time defendant committed a wrongful act against her "and her right of action accrued on that date." The last such act was committed in 1978. Because plaintiff was 14 years old at that time, the statute of limitations was tolled until she attained her majority in 1982. The two-year time limitation expired in 1984. At that time defendant right to a statute of limitations defense vested and could not be repealed by subsequent legislation. The court therefore affirmed the lower courts’ ruling that defendant had acquired a right protected by due process guarantees and plaintiff’s suit was untimely.

A bus driver was convicted of sexually assaulting three developmentally disabled women, two of whom were passengers on the defendant’s bus route. On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the trial court erred in precluding him from questioning the victim’s mother about a previous incident that suggested the victim was promiscuous. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to question the victim’s mother about the incident, because the defendant did not notify the trial justice beforehand of his intention to probe into the victim’s conduct or otherwise seek a hearing with the court about the admissibility of such evidence.

The accused was charged with raping a 10-year-old girl (the “complainant”). The trial judge convicted the accused of attempted rape, finding that the prosecution did not prove penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor was not satisfied with the sentence and appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking a conviction for rape. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that penetration had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Supreme Court stressed that the slightest unwanted penetration of a woman’s genitalia by a man’s genitalia is sufficient to constitute the crime of rape.

The appellant was charged with the rape and indecent assault of a three-year-old girl (“the complainant”). He pled “not guilty” to both counts but was convicted on the first count and sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. The trial court acquitted the appellant on the second count. On appeal, the appellant argued that (a) the charge did not contain adequate particulars of the date and time of the alleged crimes; (b) the degree of the injuries to the complainant made it doubtful that he could have raped her; and (c) the cautionary rule was not correctly applied when the trial court reviewed the complainant’s evidence. The Supreme Court confirmed that the trial court was not only aware of the risks associated with the evidence presented by a sole young witness, but also exercised appropriate caution in considering the complainant’s evidence. It further found that the evidence presented at trial, including testimony by the complainant’s mother and older sister provided sufficient details to uphold the conviction. The appeal was accordingly denied.

Appellant B (name omitted from the public record) challenged the district court’s (Tribunal da Comarca) ruling that convicted him of child sexual abuse for having sexual intercourse with underage victims F, E and K (names omitted from the public record). Appellant B argued that the victims were not sexually inexperienced, and had intercourse with him out of their own free will, as the victims had sufficient means to reject him if they had so decided. Under the Portuguese Penal Code, a person who, being over the age of 18, maintains sexual intercourse or relations with victims between the age of 14 and 16, taking advantage of their inexperience, is guilty of child sexual abuse (Sec. 173). The appellate court (Tribunal da Relação) held that victims between the age of 14 and 16 are still considered inexperienced despite having prior sexual relations. The appellate court upheld the district court’s conviction of Appellant B.

Apelante B (nome omitido do registro público) impugnou a decisão do Tribunal da Comarca que condenou ele de abuso sexual por ter relações sexuais com as vítimas menores de idade F, E, e K (nomes omitidos do registro público). O Apelante B arguiu que as vítimas não eram sexualmente inexperientes, e tiveram relações com ele de maneira voluntária, já que as vítimas tinham meios suficientes de rejeitarem ele se quisessem. Sob o Código Penal Português, a pessoa que, sendo maior de 18, mantiver relações sexuais ou relações amorosas com vítimas entre 14 e 16, tirando vantagem de sua inexperiência, é condenado por abuso sexual (Sec. 173). O Tribunal da Relação considerou que as vítimas entre 14 e 16 ainda são consideradas inexperientes apesar de já terem tido relações sexuais. O Tribunal da Relação manteve a condenação do Apelante B feita pela corte distrital.

Appellant (who was 38 years of age at the time of the offences) appealed a sentence of imprisonment for kidnapping, disfiguring with intent to injury and wounding with intent to injure the complainant (who was 17 years of age at the time of the offences). The complainant and appellant began a relationship after the complainant left the care of Child, Youth and Family (Ministry for Vulnerable Children). The appellant accused the complainant of sexually assaulting his daughter. As punishment for the sexual assault and a condition for continuing their relationship, he convinced the complainant to allow him to break her finger with a rock. He subsequently subjected the complainant to other physical abuse, after which she fled to a neighbor for help. The appellant argued at the Court of Appeal that a High Court Judge had wrongly withheld the defense of consent on the charge of wounding with intent to injure. The Court dismissed the appeal and concluded that it was possible to eliminate the defense of consent depending on the specific facts of the case. In this case, the Court found it permissible to eliminate the defense of consent because of the power imbalance between the parties, the fact that the complainant acquiesced because of a threat to their relationship, the gravity of domestic violence, and the severity of the injury.

The appellant was convicted of carnal knowledge of a female child under the age of 14. During trial the complainant claimed to not remember anything about the night in question or even where she lived, her mother’s occupation or place of work, or where her best friend lived. When the complainant continued to “evince no desire to cooperate with prosecuting counsel” and stated her previous statement to the prosecution about the night in question was untrue, the trial court granted the prosecution permission to treat the complainant as a hostile witness. However, the Court of Appeal faulted the trial court for the fact there is “no indication in the record that the judge took the steps dictated by long established practice in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that [the trial judge] formed, at the proper time, the opinion that [the complainant], being then a child of only 13 years, understood the nature of an oath.” Given the importance of the sworn testimony of the complainant on the identification of the appellant, the court ordered a retrial and granted bail on the condition the appellant stayed away from the complainant and her family.

The defendant, a teacher, was charged with sexual harassment of children for multiple offenses against two of his students. On repeated occasions, the defendant inappropriately touched and made obscene gestures to the students, who were 11 and 12 years old. The Lower Court found the defendant guilty of the charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that he did not have sexual intent towards the students, and therefore did not satisfy all requisites of the crime of sexual harassment under section 171 of the Portuguese Penal Code. The Appellate Court affirmed the Lower Court’s decision, and held that the crime of sexual harassment of children under section 171 of the Penal Code requires only that the victim’s freedom and sexual self-determination is hindered by the defendant.

O réu, um professor, foi acusado de assédio sexual infantil por múltiplas ofensas a dois de seus estudantes. Em ocasiões repetidas, o réu de maneira inapropriada tocou e fez gestos obscenos para os estudantes, que tinham 11 e 12 anos de idade. A Corte Inferior declarou o réu culpado das acusações. O réu apelou, argumentando que ele não tinha intenções sexuais em relação aos alunos, e então não cumpriu com todos os requisitos do crime de assédio sexual sob a seção 171 do Código Penal Português. O Tribunal da Relação reafirmou a decisão da Corte Inferior, e considerou que o crime de assédio sexual infantil sob a seção 171 do Código Penal requer apenas que a liberdade da vítima e a sua auto-determinação sexual sejam afetadas pelo réu.

The defendant, “B” (name omitted from public record), was sentenced in the Lower Court for statutory rape and qualified rape of the victim, a minor girl. The court found that the defendant had repeated sexual intercourse with the victim, who had initially consented to sexual intercourse but, over time, changed her mind and wanted to end her sexual relationship with B. B threatened to have sexual intercourse with the victim’s sister, and in order to prevent that, the victim continued her sexual relationship with B. On appeal, the Appellate Court partially overturned the decision to absolve B from the charges of qualified rape. The Appellate Court held that B did not threaten the victim personally, and therefore could not be charged with qualified rape under section 163 of the Penal Code. However, the Appellate Court further held that, under Section 174 of the Portuguese Penal Code, when an adult practices sexual acts with a minor aged from 14 to 16, it is considered statutory rape if the evidence suggests that the adult has taken advantage of the minor’s inexperience, and consent from the minor does not automatically rebut the presumption of inexperience. Therefore, the Lower Court’s decision was affirmed with respect to the sentencing of the defendant as guilty for statutory rape.

O réu, “B” (nome omitido do registro público), foi sentenciado na Corte Inferior por estupro legal e estupro qualificado da vítima, uma garota menor de idade. A corte decidiu que o réu teve relações sexuais repetidas com a vítima, que inicialmente tinha consentido a ter relações sexuais, mas, ao longo do tempo, mudou de ideia e queria acabar com a sua relação sexual com B. B ameaçou ter relações sexuais com a irmã da vítima, e para impedir isso, a vítima continuou a sua relação sexual com B. Na apelação, o Tribunal da Relação anulou parcialmente a decisão de absolver B das acusações de estupro qualificado. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que B não ameaçou a vítima pessoalmente, e então não poderia ser acusado de estupro qualificado sob a seção 163 do Código Penal. No entanto, o Tribunal da Relação posteriormente considerou que sob a Seção 174 do Código Penal Português, quando um adulto pratica relações sexuais com uma menor de idade entre 14 e 16 anos, é considerado estupro legal se as provas sugerem que o adulto tirou vantagem da inexperiência do menor, e o consentimento do menor não refuta automaticamente a presunção de inexperiência. Então, a decisão da Corte Inferior foi afirmada com relação à sentença do réu pelo crime de estupro legal.

The Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) brought charges of child pornography against defendant, “B” (name omitted from public record), for committing the crime of child pornography. The Public Prosecutor argued that B. kept naked pictures of a 14-year-old girl. The Lower Court found B not guilty of child pornography, because B did not coerce the girl to send him the pictures, but instead had received the pictures from the girl out of her own free will. The Appellate Court reversed the decision, holding that the means by which the pictures were obtained were irrelevant, and maintaining that possession of naked pictures of a minor is sufficient for the crime of child pornography under section 176 of the Portuguese Penal Code.

O Ministério Público trouxe acusações de pornografia infantil contra o réu, “B” (nome omitido do registro público), por cometer o crime de pornografia infantil. O Ministério Público argumentou que B mantinha fotos peladas de uma menina de 14 anos. A Corte Inferior absolveu B das acusações de pornografia infantil, pois B não coagiu a garota a mandar fotos para ele, mas recebeu fotos da garota por sua própria vontade. O Tribunal da Relação reverteu a decisão, mantendo que os meios pelos quais as fotos foram obtidas eram irrelevantes, e manter a posse de fotos peladas de uma menor é suficiente para o crime de pornografia infantil sob a seção 176 do Código Penal Português.

The Appellate Court reaffirmed the District Court’s decision which found defendants, “Mr. V” and “Ms. M” (both names omitted from public record), guilty of child sexual abuse pursuant to sections 171 and 177 of the Portuguese Penal Code and sentenced Mr. V and Ms. M to five years in prison. According to evidence (including photos and victim’s testimony) presented to the Appellate Court, Mr. V and Ms. M would play games with the victim, “L” (name omitted from public record), their five-year-old daughter, during which L had to touch and kiss part of Mr. V’s and Mrs. M’s bodies in exchange for candies or the ability to watch television. The Appellate Court held that, although the conduct in question occurred in an apparently playful environment, Mr. V and Ms. M incentivized L to behave with sexual connotation that could jeopardize her personal development.

O Tribunal da Relação reafirmou a decisão da Corte Distrital que considerou os réus, “Sr. V” e “Sra. M” (ambos os nomes omitidos do registro público), culpados pelo crime de abuso sexual de acordo com as seções 171 e 177 do Código Penal Português e sentenciou Sr. V e Sra. M a cinco anos de prisão. De acordo com as provas (incluindo fotos e o testemunho da vítima) apresentadas ao Tribunal da Relação, o Sr. V e a Sra. M faziam jogos com a vítima, “L” (nome omitido do registro público), a sua filha de cinco anos de idade, nos quais L tinha que tocar e beijar partes dos corpos do Sr. V e da Sra. M em troca de balas ou da possibilidade de assistir televisão. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que, apesar da conduta em questão ocorrer em um ambiente aparentemente de brincadeira, o Sr. V e a Sra. M incentivavam L a se comportar com conotação sexual que poderia prejudicar o seu desenvolvimento pessoal.

A man invaded his neighbor’s house at night while two girls (12 and 17 years old) and their grandmother slept, and sexually assaulted the two girls. The trial court convicted him of sexual abuse and physical violence. After the court of appeals affirmed the conviction, the defendant brought a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court of appeals erred by (1) selectively giving weight only to certain testimony of the victims and their grandmother, while ignoring exculpatory evidence; and (2) finding facts without articulating grounds for each finding. Noting that weighing of evidence and fact finding are the exclusive domain of the trial court and that appellate review must be limited to assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence, the Supreme Court denied the appeal, expressly rejecting it as an attempt to replay the appeal below.

A teenage girl reported she had been sexually abused by a man. A medical exam confirmed she had suffered involuntary anal penetration on the date of her report. At trial, however, the girl testified that she was in a sexual relationship with a boyfriend at the time of the alleged abuse, another girl had advised her to blame the defendant in order to protect the boyfriend, and the defendant was innocent. Her father corroborated her testimony, explaining that she recanted her accusations when he told her “where the defendant was being held.” Noting “contradictions” in the girl’s and father’s testimony (e.g., the girl did not know the full name or the address of the boyfriend or the other girl), the trial court gave “no weight” to the recantation, indicating that it was the product of “manipulation.” Instead, based on the medical evidence and the testimony of witnesses who responded to the girl’s initial report, the trial court convicted the defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. On a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that (1) the trial court failed to articulate the grounds for finding each element of the offense, and (2) the conviction was incongruous because there was no evidence identifying him as the perpetrator other than the girl’s own now-recanted statements. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial, ruling that the trial court had made certain findings about the alleged crime without citing a basis in the record. Notably, after a lengthy discussion of the importance of protecting victims from “secondary victimization” in the legal process, the Court authorized the trial court to read the girl’s testimony from the first trial into the record of the new trial, in lieu of requiring her to submit to live re-examination.

A 12-year-old girl with the cognitive ability of a nine-year-old reported that she had had consensual sex with her boyfriend and separately with his roommate, both adult males. A medical exam confirmed she had engaged in intercourse. The roommate came forward to the police, saying that he wished to clear his name and felt “remorse” because he “had been with” the girl. The two men were charged under a statute that outlaws sexual relations, even without violence or intimidation, to the detriment of a woman who is “vulnerable” because of her age. A girl under 13 is per se vulnerable under the statute. At trial, the girl’s mother and a psychologist testified that the girl had told them that she falsely accused the defendants because the real perpetrator, who had subsequently died, had threatened her. But the psychologist further explained the girl’s contradiction was the product of cognitive limitations and did not mean that the defendants were innocent. For his part, the roommate admitted that he had made the above-quoted statements to the police, but added that he made them under coercion. Based on that admission, the trial court convicted the roommate and sentenced him to over 17 years of imprisonment. The roommate appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to articulate the grounds for finding each element of the alleged offense. The appellate court denied the appeal in a conclusory opinion. On a cassation appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the roommate’s argument, vacated the appellate decision, and remanded the appeal for rehearing before a different appellate court.

The applicant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Kingston for the offences of indecent assault, incest and assault. Later, a single judge granted leave to appeal and granted legal aid to the appellant. The prosecution conceded that the learned trial judge erred in imposing a sentence of 15 years imprisonment in respect of the incest charge, under the Child Care Protection Act of 2004, because the appellant was actually charged under the Incest (Punishment) Act, which establishes as maximum penalty for the crime is five years. As a consequence, the appeal against the sentence was allowed on the incest charge and this was set aside and substituted for five years imprisonment. The Court didn’t take into account, nor studied, the possibility of amending the indictment due to the specific circumstances and seriousness of the case, that is, the fact that the appellant sexually assaulted an underage girl on more than one occasion, and also, according to the evidence, threatened her to kill her if she made him go to prison.

The applicant pleaded guilty before the Circuit Court of Westmoreland for the offence of having sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16, in violation of section 10(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. He was in a serious relationship with the underage girl, but the matter was brought to the attention of the police when the complainant discovered she was pregnant and there was a dispute regarding the defendant’s paternity (tests showed he indeed was the father). He then argued that he was lured and tempted by the complainant, who would attend to his shop in revealing clothes and make sexual advances to him. The grounds for the defendant’s application was that the four-year sentence was manifestly excessive and that the judge was obliged to indicate, as a matter of law, the sentence that would have been imposed if the applicant had been convicted at trial and use that as a starting point for taking into account the fact that the applicant had plead guilty. In addition, his counsel highlighted as mitigating factors: the girl was just six months away from the age of consent and the sexual intercourse was consensual. His counsel also argued that the judge did not take into consideration the character and antecedents of the applicant, as well as the classic sentencing principles of retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation. However, the Court decided that, although the indication of a starting point for sentencing would have been desirable, they do not see the omission as being fatal to the reasoning underlying the sentencing. They also highlighted that it’s clear that Parliament has recognized this offence as a serious one, and their commitment against it. This case is particularly important because the Court stated that Jamaica has particular difficulties in dealing with offences involving young girls constantly being abused and exploited by older men, and that they have to get the message out that the children must be allowed to transition into adulthood without any molestation. Furthermore, the court stated that the pregnancy of the girl must not be taken as a mitigating factor, because that would send the message that a man who gets the girl pregnant is likely to be treated more favorably by the Court. Finally, the Court insisted that these pronouncements, in the context of the alarming local circumstances, should be guiding principles in sentencing these matters and cases.

On 24 May 2013, the applicant was found guilty of the abduction and rape of a 14-year-old girl. He had a good relationship with the parents of the girl and thus was a trustworthy person to her. The applicant’s first appeal application was denied. He renewed his application and the Supreme Court of Criminal Appeal granted the application. This time his conviction was quashed, the sentences were set aside, and the Court ordered a new trial at the next sitting of the Circuit Court. The applicant criticized the quality of the representation given by his counsel at the trial, arguing that his attorney did not provide an adequate defense and did not take full instructions from him. The attorney defending the applicant at the first trial argued that the applicant was properly defended, that the prosecutor also submitted that the defense was adequate and that, as the case turned on the contest of credibility between the complainant and the applicant, the jury’s verdict would have been the same, regardless of any omission by the defense counsel at the trial. Despite the seriousness of the alleged crime, the Court held that the applicant was denied the substance of a fair trial and quashed the conviction, setting aside the sentences, without doing a balancing test between the rights of the 14-year-old girl who was a victim of a crime, and the sex offender’s due process rights.

This case is an appeal from a judgment by a lower court. Judge Delmy Elizabeth Mejia Salazar found Alvin, a 27-year-old farmer originating from Concepcion de Ataco, guilty of attempted rape of a minor (11 years old) in violation of articles 159 and 172 of the El Salvadoran criminal code, and sentenced Alvin to seven years imprisonment. In the underlying case, the victim testified that Alvin forced her into a crawling position, raped, and sodomized her. On appeal, Alvin argued that the sentencing judge did not properly apply article 179 of the criminal code of procedure as the evidence presented by the forensic expert did not show any injuries in support of a finding of rape and/or sodomization. On appeal, the court emphasized that the medical examination was conducted a month and a half after the attempted rape and sodomization, which provided sufficient time for any injuries to heal. The court further stated that article 159 of the penal code does not require the use of violence and indicated that not every attempted violation will leave physical evidence (e.g., if the victim has a passive reaction to the aggression which does not result in the use of force). Additionally, Alvin did not deny attempting to sexually assault the victim by putting her in a crawling position. Thus, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling and sentence, which was shorter than the eight years imprisonment recommended by the relevant statute.

Este caso es una apelación de una decisión de un tribunal inferior. La jueza Delmy Elizabeth Mejía Salazar encontró culpable a Alvin, un campesino de Concepción de Ataco de 27 años, por intento de violación de una menor (11 años) en violación de los Artículos 159 y 172 del Código Penal salvadoreño, y sentenció a Alvin. a siete años de prisión. En el caso visto en el tribunal inferior, la víctima testificó que Alvin la obligó a gatear, la violó y la sodomizó. En la apelación, Alvin argumentó que el juez de sentencia no había aplicado correctamente el Artículo 179 del Código de Procedimiento Penal, ya que las pruebas presentadas por el perito forense no mostraban lesiones que respaldaran la determinación de violación y / o sodomización. En la apelación, el tribunal enfatizó que el examen médico se realizó un mes y medio después de la violación y sodomización, lo que proporcionó tiempo suficiente para que cicatrizaran las heridas. El tribunal declaró además que el Artículo 159 del Código Penal no requiere el uso de la violencia e indicó que no todo intento de violación dejará evidencia física (por ejemplo, si la víctima tiene una reacción pasiva a la agresión que no da lugar al uso de fuerza). Además, Alvin no negó haber intentado agredir sexualmente a la víctima poniéndola en una posición de gateo. Por lo tanto, el tribunal de apelación confirmó las conclusiones y la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia, la cual era más breve que los ocho años de prisión recomendados por la ley pertinente.

F.A.P.A., the defendant, was a 54-year-old unmarried Salvadoran farmer residing in La Reina, El Salvador. At the time of the allegations giving rise to the case, he was receiving treatment for epilepsy. An evening, F.A.P.A. visited his niece. F.A.P.A. and his niece, a minor, were sitting on a couch watching television when his niece’s mother left the room to attend to her other children. During that time, F.A.P.A. engaged in sexual behavior with his niece against her will by touching her genitals and kissing her in the mouth. F.A.P.A. was subsequently arrested by Salvadoran police officers for sexually harassing his niece. F.A.P.A. later confessed to these underlying facts. Section 165 of the El Salvadoran Penal Code states a person is liable for sexual harassment when that person (1) engages in sexual behavior involving phrases, touching , signs, or other unequivocal conduct of a sexual nature or content, (2) the action is undesired by the person who receives it, (3) the action does not constitute a more serious sexual offence, (4) in the case of a person of legal age, the action is repeated, and (5) the action is intentional. The court found that F.A.P.A.’s confession of intentionally touching his niece’s genitals and kissing her against her will satisfies the elements of sexual harassment. Although F.A.P.A. was being treated for epilepsy, the court found that he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong and acted consciously. The court found F.A.P.A. guilty of sexual harassment punishable by two years imprisonment. However, in lieu of the prison sentence, the court exercised its discretion under articles 77 and 79 of the Penal Code and sentenced F.A.P.A. to two years of probation with the following restrictions: (1) prohibition from leaving the country; (2) prohibition from approaching the victim or her family; (3) prohibition from ingesting intoxicating drinks; and (4) will be under probationary surveillance.

F.A.P.A., el acusado, era un agricultor salvadoreño soltero de 54 años que residía en La Reina, El Salvador. En el momento de las denuncias que dieron lugar al caso, se encontraba en tratamiento por epilepsia. Una noche, F.A.P.A. visitó a su sobrina. F.A.P.A. y su sobrina, menor de edad, estaban sentados en un sofá viendo la televisión cuando la madre de su sobrina salió de la habitación para atender a sus otros hijos. Durante ese tiempo, F.A.P.A. participó en un comportamiento sexual con su sobrina en contra de su voluntad, tocándole los genitales y besándola en la boca. F.A.P.A. posteriormente fue detenido por policías salvadoreños por acosar sexualmente a su sobrina. F.A.P.A. más tarde confesó estos hechos subyacentes. La Sección 165 del Código Penal de El Salvador establece que una persona es responsable de acoso sexual cuando (1) participa en un comportamiento sexual que involucra frases, tocamientos, señas u otra conducta inequívoca de naturaleza o contenido sexual, (2) no deseada por quien la recibe, (3) la acción no constituye un delito sexual más grave, (4) en el caso de una persona mayor de edad, la acción se repite, y (5) la acción es intencional. El tribunal determinó que la confesión de F.A.P.A. de tocar intencionalmente los genitales de su sobrina y besarla en contra de su voluntad satisfacía los elementos del acoso sexual. Aunque F.A.P.A. estaba siendo tratado por epilepsia, el tribunal determinó que era capaz de distinguir el bien del mal y actuó conscientemente. El tribunal encontró a F.A.P.A. culpable de acoso sexual punible con dos años de prisión. Sin embargo, en lugar de la pena de prisión, el tribunal ejerció su discreción en virtud de los Artículos 77 y 79 del Código Penal y sentenció a F.A.P.A. a dos años de libertad condicional con las siguientes restricciones: (1) prohibición de salir del país; (2) prohibición de acercarse a la víctima o su familia; (3) prohibición de ingerir bebidas embriagantes; y (4) mantenerse bajo vigilancia probatoria.

Defendant Juan Carlos, a member of a gang known as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS), was arrested for sexually harassing and detaining a 16-year-old girl. The victim was waiting for a bus an early afternoon when the defendant snatched her bag, attempted to kiss her, grabbed her by the neck, and forced her into a restaurant. When the victim attempted to run away, the defendant pursued her and forcibly took her into a house where the defendant detained her in a room. An anonymous individual in the neighborhood informed the police that the defendant was holding a girl captive. Police officers entered the house and arrested the defendant. Section 165 of the El Salvadoran Penal Code provides that a person is liable for sexual harassment when that person engages in unwanted sexual conduct involving phrases, touching, signs or other unequivocal sexual conduct that does not in itself constitute a more serious offense. Sexual harassment is punishable by three to five years of imprisonment. Section 165 further provides that sexual harassment against a child under the age of 15 is punishable by eight years imprisonment. Additionally, Section 148 of the El Salvadoran Penal Code provides that a person is liable for deprivation of freedom when that person deprives another of his or her individual liberty. The crime of deprivation of freedom is punishable by three to six years imprisonment. The court found that the defendant sexually harassed the victim in violation of article 165 and deprived the victim of her freedom in violation of article 148. Because the defendant performed multiple crimes, he was sentenced to 10 years 8 months of imprisonment. Three years of this sentence are attributable to sexual harassment, five years attributable to deprivation of freedom, increased by 1/3 for depriving a minor under the age of 18 of her liberty.

El acusado Juan Carlos, quien era miembro de una banda conocida como Mara Salvatrucha (MS), fue arrestado por acosar sexualmente y detener contra su voluntad a una niña de 16 años. La víctima estaba esperando un autobús a primera hora de la tarde cuando el acusado le arrebató el bolso, intentó besarla, la agarró del cuello y la obligó a entrar en un restaurante. Cuando la víctima intentó huir, el acusado la persiguió y la llevó a la fuerza a una casa donde el acusado la detuvo en una habitación. Un individuo anónimo en el vecindario informó a la policía que el acusado tenía cautiva a una niña. Los agentes de policía entraron a la casa y detuvieron al acusado. El Artículo 165 del Código Penal salvadoreño establece que una persona es responsable de acoso sexual cuando esa persona participa en una conducta sexual no deseada que involucre frases, tocamientos, señas u otra conducta sexual inequívoca que no constituye en sí misma un delito más grave. El acoso sexual se castiga con tres a cinco años de prisión. El Artículo 165 dispone además que el acoso sexual contra un niño menor de 15 años se castiga con ocho años de prisión. Además, el Artículo 148 del Código Penal salvadoreño establece que una persona es responsable de la privación de libertad cuando esa persona priva a otra de su libertad individual. El delito de privación de libertad se castiga con prisión de tres a seis años. El tribunal determinó que el acusado acosó sexualmente a la víctima en violación del Artículo 165 y privó a la víctima de su libertad en violación del Artículo 148. Debido a que el acusado cometió múltiples delitos, fue condenado a 10 años y 8 meses de prisión. Tres años de esta sentencia son imputables a acoso sexual, cinco años imputables a privación de libertad, incrementados en 1/3 por privar de su libertad a una menor de 18 años.

Between 2006 and 2007, Čedo Markelić recruited two minors for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Markelić promised the girls he would give them money and help them with school-related problems if they provided sexual services to him and his acquaintances. In May 2010, the Court of BiH found Markelić guilty of Trafficking in Persons (minors) in violation of Article 186(2) of the CC BiH and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. The trial court, in determining whether Markelić had exploited the victims, took into consideration not only the girls’ age at the time of the crimes (15 and 16 years old), but also that, due to the victims’ “insufficient emotional development,” they did not have the capacity to consent to sexual acts. Furthermore, the court held that under Article 186(4) of the CC BiH, whether a victim of human trafficking “consents” to the exploitation is irrelevant, particularly if the victim is a minor. On appeal, Markelić argued that one of the three elements of human trafficking – the act of perpetration – was lacking in his case. Specifically, he argued Article 186(1) of the CC of BiH requires that a human trafficking recruiter must have effective contact with a third person who controls the victim, and that third person must give his or her consent to the exploitation of the victim. The Constitutional Court of BiH dismissed Markelić’s appeal, holding the Court of BiH correctly found all constituent elements of human trafficking under Article 186(2) were present. The Constitutional Court of BiH found Markelić had committed the offense of human trafficking by recruiting the minors for the purpose of sexual exploitation; contact with a third party who controlled the victims was not required under the CC BiH.

Decision available in English here.

In the summer of 1992, during an assault on the non-Serb civilian population of Foča in the early months of the Bosnian War, Radovan Stanković, a member of the Republika Srpska Army, established a small detention center for women at an apartment known as “The Brothel.” He and others brought at least nine non-Serb females, most of whom were minors, to the apartment and detained them there. Between August and November 1992, Stanković repeatedly raped one woman and her underage sister and incited other soldiers who visited the apartment to rape the detainees. In addition, Stanković forced the victims to perform physical labor, including cooking for the soldiers, washing the soldiers’ uniforms, and bathing the soldiers. In 2002, Stanković was arrested by the NATO peacekeeping force, KFOR, and transferred to the ICTY. The ICTY referred Stanković’s case to the Court of BiH in 2005. One year later, the Court of BiH convicted Stanković of Crimes against Humanity (enslavement, imprisonment, torture, and rape) under Article 172(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH and sentenced him to sixteen years imprisonment. In 2007, a panel of the Appeals Division increased the prison term to twenty years. Stanković appealed his sentence, which the ICTY and The Hague Court of Appeal upheld. This case is notable because it was the first time the ICTY referred a case to a court of national jurisdiction.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

From the spring of 1992 to the autumn of 1993, during the Bosnian War, Predrag Kujundžić, a commander in the local military and later police force, led several attacks against non-Serb civilians in Doboj. During that time, he incited, aided, and abetted the murder, rape, imprisonment, and persecution of non-Serb civilians. In addition, from June to December 1992, Kujundžić forced a Muslim minor into sexual slavery by use of force and threats to kill the victim’s mother and younger sister. Kujundžić repeatedly raped the victim, forced her to have sexual intercourse with soldiers, and controlled every aspect of her life. In 2009, the Court of BiH found Kujundžić guilty of Crimes against Humanity under Article 172(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH. The Court found several aggravating circumstances present in Kujundžić’s case, including Kujundžić’s status as a commander, the motives for the attack, the large number of victims, and the fact that the victim of rape and sexual slavery was a minor. The Court accordingly sentenced Kujundžić to 22 years imprisonment. A panel of the Appellate Division later reduced his prison sentence to 17 years.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

The appellant was convicted in a regional magistrates' court of one count of human trafficking, three counts of rape, one count of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and one count of common assault against a 14-year-old schoolgirl, whom he had married in accordance with customary marriage laws. After she ran away from the appellant, the appellant took the complainant to Cape Town by taxi, where they resided with the appellant's brother and his wife. There, the incidents of rape and assault occurred. The appellant raised as one of his defenses and as a ground of appeal that the alleged rapes took place in the context of a customary arranged marriage, or ukuthwala. According to expert evidence, ukuthwala was an irregular form of initiating a customary marriage. Experts have stated that, in its traditional form, ukuthwala was consensual and innocuous, but there existed an 'aberrant' form in which young girls were abducted and often raped and beaten to force them into marriage. The magistrate held that the matter was not about ukuthwala and its place in our constitutional democracy, but about whether the state had shown that the accused had committed the offences he was charged with and, if so, whether he acted with the knowledge of wrongfulness and the required intent. The court held that child-trafficking and any form of abuse or exploitation of minors for sexual purposes is not tolerated in South Africa’s constitutional dispensation. Furthermore, it ruled that the appellant could not rely on traditional ukuthwala as justification for his conduct because practices associated with an aberrant form of ukuthwala could not secure protection under the law. Thus, the Court could not find that he did not traffic the complainant for sexual purposes or that he had committed the rapes without the required intention ̶ even on the rather precarious grounds of appellant’s assertion that his belief in the aberrant form of ukuthwala constituted a 'traditional' custom of his community.

Die appêlant is skuldig bevind in 'n streek magistraat hof op een geval van mensehandel, drie gevalle van verkragting, een geval van aanranding met die opset om ernstige liggaamlike skade te berokken en een geval van algemene aanranding teen ’n 14 jarige skoolmeisie met wie hy getroud is volgens die gebruiklike huwelikswette. Nadat sy weggehardloop het van die appèllant, het die appèllant die klaer per taxi na Kaapstad geneem waar hulle by die broer van die appellant en sy vrou gewoon het. Daar het die voorval van verkragting en aanranding gebeur. Die appèllant het as verdediging en op gronde van ’n appel beweer dat die sogenaamde verkragting plaas gevind het binne konteks van ’n gebruiklike gerëelde huwelik of ‘ ukuthwala’. Volgens kundige getuienis was ukuthwala ’n onreëlmatige vorm om ’n gebruilike huwelik te begin. Kenners meen dat ukuthwala in sy traditionele vorm, konsensueel en onskuldig was maar dat daar ’n afwykende vorm bestaan waarin jong meisies ontvoer en dikwels verkrag en geslaan is om hulle tot die huwelik te dwing. Die landdros het gesê dat die aangeleedheid nie oor ukuthwala en die plek daarvan in ons grondwettige demokratse gaan nie maar wel of die staat bewys het dat die beskuldigde die misdrywe gepleeg het waarvoor hy aangekla is en indien wel, of hy opgetree het met die wete van onregmatigheid en die vereiste opset(intent). Die hof het beslis dat mensenhandel of uitbuiting van minderjariges vir seksuele doeleindes nie geduld word in Suid-Afrika se gondwetlike bedeling nie. Verder het dit beslis dat die appèllant nie op die tradisionele ukuthwala kon staatmaak as regsverdediging vir sy optrede nie omdat prakyke wat verband hou met ’n afwykende vorm van ukuthwala nie beskerming onder die wet verkry nie. Die Hof kon dus nie bevind dat hy die klaer nie vir mensenhandel met seksuele doeleindes gebruik het nie en dat hy die verkragtings sonder die verwagte intensie gepleeg het nie - selfs op die taamlike onveilige gronde van die bewering van die appellant dat sy geloof in die afwykende vorm van ukuthwala, ’n tradisionele gewoonte in sy gemeenskap is.

The defendant committed acts of obscenity upon a young girl. He alleged that it was only for a monetary purpose—to record the act and give the recording to his acquaintance in return for receiving a loan —and that he had no sexual intent. The defendant appealed the High Court’s ruling that sexual intent is not required to establish a prima facie case of indecent assault, which is proscribed by Article 176 of the Japanese Penal Code. He argued that the High Court’s finding was inconsistent with judicial precedent holding that sexual intent is an element of the crime. The Supreme Court, upon noting that the scope of sexual crimes cannot be properly determined without taking into account the views of contemporary society, found that, in the present day, the focus should be on the existence, details, and extent of sexual damage caused to a victim rather than an assailant’s intent. Thus, the Supreme Court, upheld the High Court’s finding and overturned the 47-year-old jurisprudence. The Court found that, while it could not deny that there may be a situation in which the sexual intent of a perpetrator becomes an important factor in finding the crime, it was not reasonable to uniformly require the existence of such a factor for the crime of indecent assault.

被告人は、金を借りようとしたところ、金を貸す条件として若い女の子にわいせつ行為を行い、その行為を撮影するよう指示された。被告人はこれに関して、その行為の目的は金銭を得ることであり、性的意図はなかったと主張した。被告人は、刑法第176条の強制わいせつ罪の成立には性的意図が必要で、高裁判決は以前の判例に違反するとして、強制わいせつ罪が成立するとした高裁判決を不服とした。最高裁は、性犯罪の範囲は社会の受け止め方を考慮しなければ処罰対象を適切に決することができないとし、現代においては、加害者の意図だけでなく、被害者に与えた性的被害の有無、内容、程度に焦点を当てるべきであると判断し、加害者の性的意図が犯罪認定の重要な要素となる場合はあるが、強制わいせつ罪にこの要素の存在を一律に要求することは妥当ではないとして、高裁判決を支持した。

The appellant was charged with defilement contrary to Section 138 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia (unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 16 years) and was sentenced to the minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. On behalf of the appellant, the appeal was filed on two grounds. On ground one, it was contended that the Court had erred in law by deciding not to conduct a voir dire and proceeding to receive the sworn evidence of a child. On ground two, it was contended the court below erred by finding corroboration and concluding the appellant was guiltywwww. Relative to the first grounds, the Court held that, while there had been no voir dire and while the Magistrate had failed to inquire as to whether the child understood the nature of the oath, this did not necessitate a re-trial, given that such orders are typically discretionary and this was not the only evidence tendered at trial. Relative to the second grounds, the Court observed that the question of identity was not in dispute and that there was substantial corroborative evidence that the crime had been committed. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the grounds lacked merit, as the Court was competent to convict the appellant even without the victim’s evidence. The Court further noted that the crime was compounded by the breach of trust that the appellant (who was the prosecutrix’s step-grandfather and exercising parental responsibility over her at the time) had committed against the victim and, therefore, set aside the 15-year minimum sentence in favor of a 20-year hard labour sentence.

S.J.D.S and M.J.D.S (16 and 13 years old) were sexually abused by their father, Joao María Dos Santos on several occasions. The victims testified that they were forced to have sexual relations with their father. The accused admitted that he raped them. The accused was sentenced to 16 years in prison. His sentenced was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1997.

L.M.S.V. and W.F.C.M were accused of sexual coercion against the victim L.del R.A., an 18 year old woman, who was sexually coerced by the two accused males with a knife. The accused, who were minors, were sentenced to 3 years in prison. L.M.S.V appealed and the Court of Appeals confirmed the lower court sentence. Finally, L.M.S.V challenged the decision before the Supreme Court which partially overturned the decision. The Supreme Court found that because L.M.S.V. was a minor at the time of the crime and, in order to hold minors criminally responsible, minors must have sufficient psycho-social maturity (“madurez sico-social”) to understand the criminality of their actions, the sentence should be reduced to two years in prison. The court also ordered that during the probation period, L.M.S.V. must live no less than 10 kilometers away from the victim.

L.M.S.V. y W.F.C.M fueron acusados ​​de fuerza sexual contra la víctima L. del R.A., una mujer de 18 años, quien fue forzada sexualmente por los dos hombres acusados ​​con un cuchillo. Los acusados, que eran menores de edad, fueron condenados a 3 años de prisión. L.M.S.V apeló y el Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia del tribunal inferior. Finalmente, L.M.S.V atacó la decisión ante la Corte Suprema que revocó parcialmente la decisión. La Corte Suprema determinó que debido a que L.M.S.V. era menor en el momento del delito y, para responsabilizar penalmente a los menores, los menores deben tener suficiente madurez psicosocial (“madurez psico-social”) para comprender la criminalidad de sus actos, la pena debía reducirse a dos años de prisión. El tribunal también ordenó que durante el período de prueba, L.M.S.V. debía vivir a no menos de 10 kilómetros de la víctima.

The child victim was sexually abused by Derlis Mauro Rodriguez. The parents of the victim stated that the child was found with the defendant in an abandoned house while he was touching her. Medical reports confirmed the defendant had been sexually abusing the victim. The defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, which was confirmed by the Criminal Appeals Court on April 16, 2002.

La niña víctima fue abusada sexualmente por Derlis Mauro Rodríguez. Los padres de la víctima afirmaron que la menor fue encontrada con el acusado en una casa abandonada mientras la tocaba inapropiadamente. Los informes médicos confirmaron que el acusado había abusado sexualmente de la víctima. El imputado fue condenado a quince años de prisión, lo cual fue confirmado por la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal el 16 de abril de 2002.

The accused was charged with rape of his seven-year-old granddaughter between the months of August to October 2008. The prosecution alleged that the accused did intentionally have unlawful sexual intercourse with a female seven-year-old minor who is incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. The complainant, her brother who was sharing a bedroom with her during the rapes, the complainant’s aunt who the complainant first told of the rapes, a neighbor who had been told of the accused’s actions by his wife, the doctor who examined the complainant, and the constable all testified for the prosecution. The accused denied the charges and argued that all of the witnesses were lying, specifically that the children had been coached by the police. The Court discussed the elements that the Crown must prove in order for the accused to be found guilty of rape, namely (1) the accused must be identified; (2) there must be sexual intercourse; and (3) there must be lack of consent by the complainant. The accused was found guilty of rape. In sentencing, the Court found that the Crown proved that there were aggravating factors under Section 185(bis) of the Criminal Evidence Act (1938), namely, (1) the victim was a minor of a tender age; (2) the accused sexually assaulted the victim on more than one occasion; and (3) the accused stood in locus parentis to the victim and this abused the relationship of trust. The Court found the witnesses credible and found the accused guilty as charged.

The defendant in this case spent 11 days at a hotel in Honduras with a 13-year-old girl. The victim and defendant had sexual relations throughout this time. Following a trial, the defendant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for the crime of special, or statutory, rape. The defendant challenged this decision on several grounds. First, he claimed that he lacked the requisite mens rea, as he was unaware of the victim’s age. He claimed that was due to both the victim’s physical appearance and her statements to him affirming that she was an adult. The Court dismissed this argument, and found the defendant capable of knowing that he was committing a crime when having sexual intercourse with the victim. Furthermore, the Court found that actual knowledge of the victim’s age was irrelevant, as special rape is a statutory crime. In addition to his claim regarding intent, the defendant also claimed that the evidence presented did not demonstrate sexual intercourse. The defendant pointed to a physical examination preformed on the victim, showing that her hymen was intact. The Court considered that oral statements during trial proved that there was sexual intercourse and that the state of the victim’s hymen was irrelevant, as sexual penetration does not always entail the hymen’s breaking. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the sentence.

En este caso, el acusado pasó 11 días en un hotel en Honduras con una niña de 13 años. La víctima y el acusado tuvieron relaciones sexuales durante este tiempo. Después de un juicio, el acusado fue sentenciado a 15 años de prisión por violación estatutaria. El demandado desafió esta decisión por varios motivos. En primer lugar, afirmó que no cumplía los requisitos para la condena, ya que desconocía la edad de la víctima. Afirmó que esto se debía tanto a la apariencia física de la víctima como a las declaraciones que le hizo afirmando que era una persona adulta. Sin embargo, el tribunal desestimó este argumento y encontró que el acusado debia de saber que estaba cometiendo un delito al tener relaciones sexuales con la víctima. Además, el Tribunal argumentó que el conocimiento real de la edad de la víctima era irrelevante, ya que la violación estatutaria es un delito legal independiente del conocimiento del acusado. Además de su reclamo con respecto a la intención, el acusado también alegó que la evidencia presentada no demostró relaciones sexuales. El acusado señaló un examen físico realizado en la víctima, lo que demuestra que su himen estaba intacto. El Tribunal consideró que las declaraciones orales durante el juicio probaron que habían habido relaciones sexuales y que el estado del himen de la víctima era irrelevante, ya que la penetración sexual no siempre implica la ruptura del himen. Por lo tanto, el Tribunal desestimó la apelación y confirmó la sentencia.

On June 27, 2008, a man invited a 15-year-old girl to his home, where he and an accomplice proceeded to drug and sedate her. Once she regained consciousness, the defendant had oral sexual relations with her, while his friend made a video recording of it. Both the defendant and his accomplice were sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for "special violation," also known as statutory rape, and child pornography. The defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that no child pornography crime had been committed by him, as it was his accomplice that made the video. The Court rejected this argument and reasoned that, regardless of who made the recording, the defendant clearly consented to having it recorded. In accordance with Honduras criminal law, that consent constitutes conspiracy for the commission of the crime of child pornography. A co-conspirator is equally responsible for a crime as the principal. Therefore, the court upheld the sentence.

El 27 de junio de 2008, un hombre invitó a una niña de 15 años a su casa, donde él y un cómplice procedieron a drogarla y sedarla. Una vez que recuperó la conciencia, el acusado tuvo relaciones sexuales orales con ella, mientras que su amigo hizo una grabación en video del acto. Tanto el acusado como su cómplice fueron condenados a 18 años de prisión por "violación especial", también conocida como violación estatutaria y pornografía infantil. El acusado apeló su convicción sobre la base de que él no había cometido ningún delito de pornografía infantil, ya que fue su cómplice el que hizo el video. El Tribunal rechazó este argumento y razonó que, independientemente de quién hiciera la grabación, el acusado consintió claramente en grabarla. De conformidad con el derecho penal de Honduras, ese consentimiento constituye una conspiración en la comisión del delito de pornografía infantil. Un co-conspirador es igualmente responsable de un crimen como el principal. Por lo tanto, el tribunal confirmó la sentencia.

The Civil Party brought suit on behalf of his 13-year-old daughter and sought criminal sanctions against four men whom he accused of violently raping his daughter. The four men jumped on her, held her down and one by one proceeded to engage in sexual relations with her when she was returning home from laundering clothes with her little sister. The case proceeded in expedited fashion as a flagrant intentional crime. The Tribunal found the four men guilty of violent rape, noting that even if the girl consented, her mere thirteen years of age prevented any clear and free consent to sexual relations which would mitigate the charges. The Tribunal imposed criminal sanctions of five years imprisonment for each of the four men, imposed equitable damages equivalent to $100 each payable to the girl’s father, and charged the men with paying court fees.

In 2013, the appellant was found having sexual intercourse with the victim, who was 15 years old. The next day the victim told the court that she and the appellant had been in love since June 2011 and that they had a sexual relationship. She testified that they were married and she was his second wife, but Malawi required parental permission for children aged 15-17 to marry (as of 2015, section 14 of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act requires that parties be 18 years old to marry). Malawi charged the defendant with defilement contrary to Penal Code § 138(1) and indecent assault contrary to § 137(1). Section 138(1) provides, “Any person who unlawfully and carnally knows any girl under the age of sixteen years shall be guilty of a felony and shall be liable to imprisonment to life” (¶ 7.1). In the lower court, the appellant pleaded not guilty arguing that the victim consented to the sexual acts and that she showed him an identification card that she had doctored to state that she was 17 years old at the time. Acknowledging that the victim had changed her year of birth on her identification, the lower court found the appellant guilty on both counts. The appellant filed two grounds of appeal asking: (i) “whether the conviction of the appellant was proper with regard . . . to the circumstances of the case;” and; (ii) “whether the sentences were manifestly excessive considering the” fact the victim had mislead the appellant with respect to her age (¶ 3.1). The High Court upheld the conviction citing the strict liability nature of the crime. The Court noted that the victim was clearly underage at the time of the sexual intercourse and rejected the defendant’s consent defense noting that “girls under the age of . . . [16] are incapable of giving consent due to immaturity (¶ 7.4).” Notwithstanding, the Court reduced the appellant’s sentence to four years for defilement and one year for indecent assault to run concurrently, noting that the appellant did not know that the victim was under age.

Appellant was convicted of defilement of a girl less than 18 years old and was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Trial testimony established that while the 13-year-old girl and her younger sister were fetching water at a well, appellant, disguised as a ghost, ordered the two to remove their dresses, blindfolded them, and led them through a swamp to some bush where he had sexual intercourse with the older sister. He then left the sisters in the bush overnight, and the sisters’ father was unable to find them. Appellant then went to the father’s house and told him that he could use his witchcraft powers to find the sisters if the father paid him two goats and two chickens. Upon payment, appellant went back to the brush and brought the sisters to his home, claiming that they needed treatment. While at appellant’s home, the older sister told her father that appellant had raped her. At trial, the court rejected appellant’s defense that a ghost had abducted the sisters and he was merely using his witchcraft powers to help find the girls. Instead, the court relied on the sisters’ testimony, who claimed that they recognized appellant’s voice. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence. First, the court found that appellant lived only a quarter mile away from the sisters and used to come to their home and speak to their father, thus supporting the assertion that the sisters were able to identify appellant through voice recognition. Second, the court found that appellant’s witchcraft defense could not be reasonably believed and that the fact that he immediately located the sisters upon payment supported the inference that he was the one who brought them there.

At issue in this case is the distinction between rape, simple defilement, and aggravated defilement in the Uganda Penal Code. The crime of defilement, created in 1990, prohibits having or attempting sexual intercourse with a girl under 18 years of age and carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Defilement is considered aggravated if the girl is under 14 years old, the offender has HIV/AIDS, the offender is the victim’s parent or guardian, the girl has a disability, or the offender is a serial offender, and it carries a maximum penalty of death. There is no consent requirement for defilement because children cannot consent to sexual intercourse. The Penal Code section prohibiting rape describes it as “unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl without her consent” (emphasis added) or if consent is obtained through any force, threat, or intimidation. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The victim in this case was 16 when the defendant had unlawful carnal knowledge of her without her consent. The defendant argued that he should be charged with simple defilement instead of rape because rape only applies to an adult woman who can give consent. The State argued that the statutes give the State discretion to choose between the charges. Citing other cases in which the State charged for rape instead of defilement because the defendant used excessive force, the State argued that this case the charge of rape was justified. The Court found that these cases were decided before Parliament had fully settled the statutory details of rape, simple defilement, and aggravated defilement. Now that the law is settled, the law does not allow rape charges for children because of the element of consent; unlawful sexual intercourse with children must be prosecuted as defilement.

The accused was charged with human trafficking and aggravated child trafficking for transporting minor girls, who were promised supermarket jobs in Uganda, from Rwanda to Uganda for the purposes of forced unpaid household labor and prostitution. The accused pleaded not guilty and maintained that she transported the girls to Uganda with their parents’ permission for a holiday. The Court found her guilty of the charges related to two of the girls, but found that one of the girls was over the age of majority (19 years old). The Court sentenced the accused to two concurrent terms of imprisonment: eight years for aggravated child trafficking and five years for trafficking in persons.

Appellant, a school librarian, was accused of multiple instances of indecent assault, rape, and sodomy by several students. At least one student accused the appellant of “grooming” him for homosexuality. On appeal, the Court found that the trial court erred by dismissing the appellant’s evidence before he presented it, refusing to let him call witnesses, and allowing her biases to interfere with the appellant's right to a fair trial. The High Court overturned the verdict and set aside the sentence.

The defendant, an 18-year-old uncle of the complainant, was criminally charged for housebreaking with intent to rape and raping his 12-year-old niece. The complainant alleged that the defendant, on three separate occasions, came to the complainant’s home and raped her. The complainant’s mother found out after take the complainant to a clinic, which confirmed that she was pregnant, and confronting the defendant through the headman, as tradition dictates. According to the defendant, the complainant invited him to her home and agreed to have sex with him for money, specifically N$6. Given the conflicting testimony, the High Court of Namibia (“High Court”) found that the prosecution failed to prove the housebreaking with the intent to rape and rape charges beyond a reasonable doubt. In explaining its reasonable doubt, the Court cited the facts that complainant did not mention until her cross-examination that her uncle in fact gave her money on the day of the first rape, that she did not wake her seven-year-old brother or otherwise raise an “alarm” when her uncle arrived at her hut at night, and that she continued to withhold information from her mother “after her mother created a secure environment and the accused failed to execute his threat” to beat the complainant if she told anyone. Still, the Court did not believe the defendant’s testimony that his niece was a “great temptress.” Instead of homebreaking with intent to rape and rape as charged by the State, the High Court convicted the defendant under section 14, sexual offences with youths, of the Immoral Practices Act, 21 of 1980, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding N$40,000. The Court found that the State proved the three elements of that offense: the defendant (1) committed a sexual act with a child under the age of 16 (2) when he was more than three years older than her and (3) not married to her. Although the defendant claimed that he did not know the complainant’s age, the High Court held that, in order to avoid conviction, the defendant had the burden of proving that the complainant deceived him regarding her age. The defendant failed to provide such proof.

The accused was tried for beating and raping his girlfriend A.S. (the third complainant), sexually abusing and beating their five-month-old male and female twin children, and murdering his son by throwing him on the floor. Medical experts testified that the injuries on the twins suggested sexual and other physical violence. Denying the charges, the accused testified that A.S., the children’s mother, beat the twins and assaulted the accused. The accused also argued that there was no credible evidence of the crime and that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof because A.S. was the only eye-witness to the accused’s alleged crimes. The High Court of Namibia disagreed, finding the accused not credible and finding the A.S. credible, not least because the circumstantial and medical evidence supported her testimony. Citing precedent regarding single witnesses, the Court determined that a single eye-witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness (a) is credible, (b) gives her statement in a straight-forward manner, and (c) has no reason to falsely incriminate the accused. In addition, an inference may be properly drawn from the fact that the accused and the complainant were the only two adults in the room between the time the complainant went to bed at night without injuries and when she awoke in the morning with injuries. This finding is significant for domestic violence cases, which often do not involve unbiased third-party testimony.

The defendant was convicted for sexual assault and attempted rape of his 16-year-old niece. The appellate court upheld the conviction, but overturned the sentence imposed by the trial court. The appellate court held that the lower court failed to consider aggravating factors, including the close relationship between the parties. Given the prevalence of sexual assault in Lesotho, the court determined that jail sentences needed to serve as a deterrent for both the perpetrator and the general public. According to the court, “a very loud and clear message must be sent to all those who consider themselves with power and right to abuse or rape girls and women, that they will be dealt with the seriousness their unlawful actions demand” (p. 5). The Court sentenced the defendant to two years imprisonment with one year suspended for five years, unless the defendant commits another violent offense.

The defendant was acquitted of having sexual intercourse with a woman placed in his care, contrary to Penal Code § 219 which provides that any person who is employed in or in charge of any children’s or young person’s home or institution for the mentally deficient, among others, and who has sexual intercourse with any person who is an inmate of the same institution, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four years. The defendant, a thirty-year old man, was approved by the municipality to have children and adolescents in his care at his home. The victim was a twenty-four year old woman who was placed in his care for her drug abuse. The Municipal Court and the High Court found that Penal Code § 219 was intended to protect individuals under state care from disregard of special duties or abuses of power by employees and superintendents of the mentioned institutions. According to the travaux preparatories, Penal Code § 219 applies to both public and private foster homes as well as institutions and therefore, would apply in this case. However, the court found that the protection from sexual relations in relation to arrangements for private care is provided for by different provisions of the Penal Code, not the travaux preparatories of § 219. Consistent with this finding, the High Court found the defendant not guilty because the provision in § 219 only applies with certainty to those under institutional care, not private care.

Appellant appealed his conviction of rape of a 4 year-old girl on the ground that the victim was the sole witness and her young age made her unreliable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the victim’s consistent testimony of the rape and corroborating evidence from a medical examination was sufficient to uphold the verdict.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to (i) two charges of attempted rape and (ii) two charges of rape, punishable under section 376 of the Penal Code. The prosecution withdrew the fourth charge during the trial. The court noted that since the complainant was under the age of 14 at the time of each alleged incident, her consent was not relevant. As the court found no corroboration of the complainant’s evidence, it had to rely upon her credibility. The court found that the complainant was exaggerating when she claimed that the defendant attempted to rape her. The court did not agree that he did more than commit an act of indecency under Section 354 P.C., which contains the offence of assault or criminal force used on a woman with intent to outrage her modesty. The court acquitted the defendant of attempted rape and rape, but convicted him of the offence of indecency for all three charges. He was sentenced to three years and four strokes for each of the three charges, which are cumulative and consecutive sentences. The defendant was ordered to serve a total of nine years and suffer a total of 12 strokes, with a reduction for time already spent in custody.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to two charges of raping a 14 year old female, under sections 376(1) and (2) of the Penal Code, and having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 16 years, under Section 2 of the Unlawful Carnal Knowledge Act, Cap. 29. The fact of sexual intercourse was not disputed. However, because the complainant was under 14 years old when the offences occurred, her consent was not relevant to the charge of rape. Nonetheless, because of her consent, the defendant was acquitted of the charge of aggravated rape. The court convicted the defendant of rape, and imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment and six strokes. The court also convicted the defendant of having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 16 years, and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment and six strokes. The sentences of imprisonment were concurrent, with the defendant to serve four years total. The sentences of whipping were consecutive, with the defendant to receive 12 strokes total.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to five charges of rape of an approximately 13 year old female, under section 376 of the Penal Code. The court emphasized that these were rapes only because of the complainant’s age, not because any force was used against her. The court noted that the fact that a rape is committed with consent does not lower the standard of proof which is required of the act itself. The court reasoned that it would be dangerous to convict in reliance on the complainant’s evidence, which had several inconsistencies. Additionally, the testimony of an examining doctor showed that the complainant’s evidence was suspect. The complainant denied having had sexual intercourse with anyone in the date range at issue, which did not agree with the evidence of the examining doctor, which the court accepted. The court found that if she cannot be believed as to that, it could not rely on her uncorroborated evidence on any of the charges. The defendant was acquitted of all five charges and the court ordered his discharge.

Brials and another defendant were convicted of the sexual assault and unlawful restraint of an 11-year-old girl. In their appeal, the defendants contended that the conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on commission during the felony of unlawful restraint should be reduced to a conviction for criminal sexual assault because unlawful restraint is a lesser-included offense and should not be used as an aggravating factor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, but remanded to the trial court to resentence. Because unlawful restraint was already an inherent factor in criminal sexual assault, it could not also be used as an aggravating factor. Thus, the defendants could only be convicted of criminal sexual assault.

The defendants Wang Chuanbao and Qu Qinchen were charged of crime of rape for repeatedly raping the victim, and crime of coercive indecency for violently digging and touching the victim's genitals. The prosecutor alleges that according to Article 25 section 1, Article 236 section 1 and Article 237 section 1 of Criminal Law of PRC, Chuanbao and Qinchen raped and molested the victim “with violence or threats”, constituting the crime of rape and coercive indecency. Chuanbao argues that he did not have sex with the victim, and all the evidences are hearsay evidence, thus is not guilty. Qinchen argues that he did not commit the crime of coercive indecency because taking off the trousers of the victim is to have sex with the victim. After the victim refused to do so, Qinchen stopped raping her and has no mens rea to molest her. The court finds that the fact the Chuanbao and Qinchen raped the victim had also been proved by the testimony of Qinchen’s girlfriend, one of the witnesses, therefore is founded. The act of coercive indecency is regarded as absorbed by the act of rape and thus would not be convicted separately under this crime.

性暴力与强奸

被告王传宝与瞿勤晨因多次强奸被害人王某并暴力扣摸王某的生殖器被控强奸罪和强制猥亵罪。检方称，根据中华人民共和国刑法第二十五条第一款、第二百三十六条第一款和第二百三十七条第一款，王传波与瞿勤晨使用暴力和威胁手段强奸并猥亵了王某，构成了强奸罪和强制猥亵罪。王传宝称，自己并没有和王某发生性关系，所有证据均系传来，自己并没有犯罪。 瞿勤晨称，自己并没有犯强制猥亵罪，因为脱下王某的裤子是为了与王某发生关系。在王某拒绝后，曲停止了强奸行为，并且没有猥亵王某的犯罪意图。法院认为，王传宝与瞿勤晨强奸王某的事实已被曲的女友证实，因此事实确凿。强制猥亵的行为应包含在强奸行为内，因此不应另外定罪。

Appellant in this case was convicted of various sexual offenses against his minor daughter, the complainant, including charges of possessing child pornography. During the course of the trial, a recording of a conversation between the appellant and complainant had been entered into evidence. The recording detailed a sexually inappropriate conversation between the parties. At the trial level, this piece of evidence was deemed “reasonably necessary for the complainant’s lawful interest in protecting herself” from abuse by the father and was therefore allowed in as evidence. Appellant asserted that the recording was entered in error. The Court held that even if the recording was in fact entered in error, there was “no substantial miscarriage of justice and the appellant has not lost a real chance of acquittal.” Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was found guilty of allegedly raping the complainant, aged 5 years and 11 months. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, with two years suspended on condition of good behaviour. He appealed against both the conviction and the sentence. The questions at issue were (a) whether the crime of rape was committed and (b) whether the complainant’s evidence was corroborated. The court highlighted that much of the complainant’s evidence was supported by the appellant’s wife. The trial court concluded that there was legal penetration. The court found, however, that mere contact without any slightest penetration does not amount to legal penetration. The court found that the appellant could not be guilty of rape, but only attempted rape. The conviction of rape was reduced to attempted rape. The court pointed out that the trial court erred on the side of leniency in sentencing. The court found that the sentence was still appropriate and did not interfere with it.

The defendant paid his friend to bring the victim, a 14-year-old child, to defendant’s café under the pretext of attending a birthday party. After defendant’s friend abandoned the victim at the café, the defendant told the victim to work as a server but also forced her to have sex with the male clients and kept all payments received for the victim’s services. Because the defendant used fraud to bring the victim to the café and exploited the victim by forcing her to act as a sex worker for profit, the Court of First Instance found the defendant guilty of human trafficking under section 2(1) of Law No. 21 of 2007 and sentenced the defendant to 10 years imprisonment with a fine of Rp. 120,000,000. The High Court upheld the lower court’s decision but amended the defendant’s sentence to seven years imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the High Court’s sentence of seven years was an error since the court did not consider that the victim had stayed with the defendant’s friend before coming to the café and therefore the health and condition of the victim may have worsened before coming to the defendant. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court and did not rule on the sentencing since it was a “judex facti matter (question of fact of the case)”.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment that appellant, Allen Rogers, was guilty of rape. The 11-year-old complainant alleged that the appellant kidnapped her and a boy for two months, raping her daily during this time period. She testified that the appellant threatened to kill her if she talked about the rape. In his defense, the appellant testified that the week before the alleged kidnapping occurred, he knelt down to pray and heard the voice of someone he called Evee. Evee told him “your two children have come.” He then met the complainant and the other child. He took them to the town advisor, who said that the appellant could keep them at his house. The appellant was found guilty of statutory rape and given the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The court reversed the conviction because the appellant did not receive adequate representation. His representation was inadequate because the public defender assigned to his case failed to call corroborating witnesses and counsel “knew, or ought to have known that the lone testimony of the appellant was not sufficient to establish his innocence. Thus, his failure to have ensured that other witness[es] appear to testify for the appellant was a serious dereliction of duty.” In Liberia, “the uncorroborated testimony of the accused person is not sufficient to rebut proof of guilt.” Therefore the court reversed the appellant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

Appellant, So Wai Lun, was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16, in contravention of section 124 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, which made sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 a strict liability offense, punishable by five years’ imprisonment. Appellant first argued that section 124 was unconstitutional because it criminalized only the male’s conduct, depriving him of equality under the law. Appellant also argued, alternatively, that the law was arbitrary because it did not deter people who did not believe that what they were doing is unlawful. The Court dismissed the first argument, noting that the legislature is entitled to take into account various differences between men and women, such as the problem of teenage pregnancies, deterring females from reporting if they would also be criminally liable, etc., and concluded that the legislature’s differing treatment was justified by reference to genuine need, rationality and proportionality. The Court also dismissed the second argument, stating that protecting young girls is a choice constitutionally open to the legislature. Therefore, the judge dismissed both of Appellant’s appeals.

The appellant was found guilty of the crime of statutory rape of his daughter. On appeal, the appellant argued there was insufficient physical evidence of the rape. The Supreme Court noted that the results of the physical examination did not discount the possibility that the daughter was raped. The Supreme Court further noted that rape of a minor under 12 years of age is statutory rape. It explained that (a) in statutory rape, only the following two elements must be established: 1) carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse; and 2) that the woman is below 12 years of age and (b) both of those elements had been established.

The appellant was convicted of rape of his daughter. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, noting that the appellant failed to proffer a credible defense, instead merely denying the accusations. To the contrary, there is a recognized presumption of credibility when a daughter accuses her father. The conviction was upheld.

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment that appellant was guilty of rape and reduced his sentence from life imprisonment to 50 years imprisonment. The victim, an 11-year-old girl, stated that the appellant, 38, forced her into his room and had nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her. The court affirmed the lower court’s admission in evidence of the testimony of the victim’s mother, who testified that she saw blood on the victim’s skirt and questioned the victim about the incident. The court held that the testimony qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule because statements are generally admissible “to determine the trustworthiness and reliability of statements made by child victims of abuse.” In addition, the court affirmed the lower court’s admission in evidence of the expert testimony of a physician’s assistant. The court held that even though the physician’s assistant did not have a medical degree, he qualified as an expert because of his experience with and knowledge of victims of sexual violence. The court noted that social workers trained in these areas would qualify as expert witnesses.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment that appellant was guilty of rape. The complainant alleged that the appellant had sex with her when she was 13 years old and he was 18 years old. She alleged that the appellant invited her to his room, gagged her, and had sexual intercourse with her. Her brother’s wife forced open the door after the complainant failed to answer her phone call. The complainant's brother then called the police. The appellant admitted to police that he and the complainant had sex. The court found the appellant guilty of rape because the elements of Liberian statutory rape law are (1) sexual intercourse, (2) the perpetrator is at least 18 years of age, and (3) the victim is less than 18 years of age. However, the court reversed his conviction because the trial court relied on inaccurate information in determining the appellant’s age. The appellant testified that he was 17 years old at the time of the rape. Documents such as a passport or birth certificate were unavailable. The court held that in the absence of any rebuttal evidence by the prosecution, the court must accept that the appellant was 17 years old and therefore a juvenile when he had sex with the complainant. Under Liberian law, a juvenile cannot commit a crime, but is instead considered a juvenile delinquent. If a case involves a juvenile delinquent who is over 16 years of age and is accused of conduct that would constitute a felony carrying a sentence of life imprisonment or death if committed by an adult of at least 18 years of age, then the circuit court must consider the best interests of the Republic and the juvenile to determine whether to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter and preside over the case or choose to refer it to the juvenile court. However, the circuit court did not make this determination. Rather, it proceeded with the trial as though the the appellant was an adult and sentenced him to life imprisonment as an adult. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded him to the custody of his parents until the age of 21.

A secondary school teacher, convicted of raping a student and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment, appealed for the second time on the grounds that he had been framed. The Court found no justification for doubting the evidence of the witness, especially as the results from the medical examination corroborated her testimony. The Court also noted that his claim of being framed was insupportable, as there was no justification for the other witnesses to lie against him. Finally, the Court pointed out that the lack of an order for compensation offended the mandatory provisions of Section 13(1) of the Penal Code. The appeal was dismissed and the teacher ordered to pay shs. 500 000 in compensation to the student.

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus of the petitioner, upholding the constitutionality of Article 224(a) of the Penal Code which establishes a presumption of violence in sex crimes against minors. The petitioner was convicted of rape and child abuse, and was sentenced to a prison term of eight years for rape and one year and ten months for child abuse. In his appeal and writ, the petitioner argued he had committed no violence and that the presumption of violence set forth in Article 224(a) of the Penal Code was unconstitutional. The Court first noted that the provision in question predated Brazil’s 1988 Constitution and could not be found “unconstitutional” with respect to its construction. Rather, the Court examined its compatibility with the 1988 Constitution and found that the purpose of the presumption – to protect minors who legally are incapable of offering consent – was consistent with and expressed by the broad statement in Article 227 § 4 of the Constitution that “[t]he law shall severely punish abuse, violence and sexual exploitation of children and adolescents.” The STF held that the presumption did not violate constitutional principles, even when the presumption embraced what otherwise would be a factual matter requiring evidentiary proof.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF denegou o habeas corpus do paciente, afirmando a constitucionalidade do artigo 224, alínea “a” do Código Penal, o qual estabelece a presunção de violência nos casos de crimes sexuais praticados contra menores de idades. O paciente foi condenado por estupro e abuso infantil, sentenciado a uma pena de prisão de oito anos por estupro e um ano e dez meses por abuso infantil. Em sua recurso, o paciente alegou não ter cometido nenhuma violência e que a presunção de violência estabelecida no Artigo 224, alínea “a” do Código Penal era inconstitucional. A Corte primeiro observou que a disposição em questão era anterior à Constituição brasileira de 1988 e não podia ser considerada "inconstitucional" com relação à sua construção. Ao contrário, o Tribunal examinou sua compatibilidade com a Constituição de 1988 e considerou que o objetivo da presunção - proteger menores legalmente incapazes de oferecer consentimento - era consistente com e expresso pela ampla declaração do artigo 227 § 4 da Constituição de que "a lei punirá severamente o abuso, a violência e a exploração sexual de crianças e adolescentes". O STF sustentou que a presunção não violava os princípios constitucionais, mesmo quando a presunção abraçava o que de outra forma seria um assunto factual exigindo prova probatória.

The petitioners are eleven minors and the non-governmental organization that shelters, educates, and cares for the eleven minors. Each child claims to have been subjected to child abuse and defilement in Meru County, where police "neglected...or otherwise failed" to investigate or protect the children in any way. The High Court of Kenya held that the police have a duty to investigate allegations of sexual abuse made by female complainants, stating that “by failing to enforce existing defilement laws, the police have contributed to the development of a culture of tolerance for pervasive sexual violence against girl children and impunity.”

This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a six-year-old girl and was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Appellant was a teacher at the victim’s school. The school held a special program for students during school holidays. During this program, appellant took the victim into his office at school and had sexual intercourse with her. Despite his warning not to tell anyone, the victim told her brother, who told her parents. A medical examiner confirmed that she had been defiled. On appeal, appellant argued that the sentence of 14 years was too harsh. In support, he argued that he was the sole breadwinner for 11 dependents, including two lame dependents and four orphans. Appellant also argued that since the victim was a very young child, she had already gotten over the trauma of the defilement. The court upheld the sentence and ruled against appellant. The court found that, as a teacher, he had a duty to protect the victim, but instead chose to ravish her, disgracing himself, his profession, and society.

Ms. V. Ž. (the “Aggrieved”) was sexually assaulted by her mother’s partner, Mr. M. P. (the “Accused”) who had lived with them in same household for more than 5 years. The Bratislava I County Prosecutor terminated criminal proceedings after the Aggrieved refused to testify and to give her consent to initiate the criminal prosecution. The Attorney General of the Slovak Republic challenged this termination arguing that the Aggrieved was not entitled to refuse her testimony or withhold permission to initiate criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic ruled that by testifying against the Accused, a person with whom she has family like ties, she could suffer considerable harm herself, as the harm reflected upon the Accused could be perceived as a harm done to the Aggrieved herself and therefore she was in a position to refuse such testimony. The Attorney General challenged the decision and the Supreme Court admitted the insufficient assessment of the relevant criminal offence as only restraint of personal freedom and determined the relevant criminal offence as a combination of the criminal offences of sexual abuse and blackmail. Pursuant to Section 163a of the former Criminal Procedure Code , the initiation of criminal prosecution for these criminal offences was subject to the consent of the aggrieved person. Whereas, the Aggrieved was a minor and did not have full legal capacity to provide such consent, she should have been represented by her legal representatives, i.e., her parents. In this case, since her mother was the partner of the Accused, there was a high risk of conflict of interest. In such cases, the parents are replaced by other legal representatives, i.e., court appointed custodians. Since the Bratislava I County Prosecutor failed to observe these requirements, the Supreme Court superseded its resolution and ordered a new one to follow all of the findings made by the Supreme Court. According to current legislation, the prosecution of defendants of two related criminal offences, i.e., sexual abuse and blackmail, is no longer subject to the consent of the aggrieved person. Nonetheless, this Supreme Court Decision No. 11/1995 is applicable, especially in regard to the mandatory legal representation of aggrieved minors. Pursuant to Section 211 of the current Criminal Procedure Code, the prosecution of offenders of other criminal offences (e.g., copyright violations or theft) is still subject to the consent of the aggrieved person. Minors must be represented by their legal representatives not only in relation to giving consent, but in performing any relevant legal action. The relevant authorities shall always examine whether there is possibility of a conflict of interest and if so, exclude such representatives and ask the relevant court to appoint a custodian.

A man convicted of raping a six-year-old girl appealed his sentence of 10 years, alleging the child’s testimony should not have been accepted without corroboration. He also insisted his sentence was too harsh. A child’s testimony is acceptable as long as the court carefully evaluates it. Both the trial court and the High Court did this and found the child’s evidence reliable. The Supreme Court denied his appeal regarding the girl’s testimony but lessened his sentence to 5 years imprisonment with fines.

Appellant was convicted of defilement of a girl less than 18 years old and was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Trial testimony established that while the 13-year-old girl and her younger sister were fetching water at a well, appellant, disguised as a ghost, ordered the two to remove their dresses, blindfolded them, and led them through a swamp to some bush where he had sexual intercourse with the older sister. He then left the sisters in the bush overnight, and the sisters’ father was unable to find them. Appellant then went to the father’s house and told him that he could use his witchcraft powers to find the sisters if the father paid him two goats and two chickens. Upon payment, appellant went back to the brush and brought the sisters to his home, claiming that they needed treatment. While at Appellant’s home, the older sister told her father that appellant had raped her. At trial, the court rejected appellant’s defense that a ghost had abducted the sisters and he was merely using his witchcraft powers to help find the girls. Instead, the court relied on the sisters’ testimony, who claimed that they recognized appellant’s voice. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence. First, the court found that appellant lived only a quarter mile away from the sisters and used to come to their home and speak to their father, thus supporting the assertion that the sisters were able to identify appellant through voice recognition. Second, the court found that appellant’s witchcraft defense could not be reasonably believed and that the fact that he immediately located the sisters upon payment supported the inference that he was the one who brought them there.

Rosaria, a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl, was raped by defendant teacher, and consequently contracted a venereal disease. The rape occurred in the defendant's home, which Rosaria entered with the intent of picking up some past school papers that the defendant had failed to bring to school on multiple occasions. After bringing this incident to the Head Teacher's attention, it was uncovered that the defendant had done this before, that measures had been taken to warn or protect students from the defendant, that the defendant had only received a verbal warning, and that the previous student victim had transferred to another school. In his defense, the defendant claimed that he was in a relationship with Rosaria, to which she consented, as evidenced by a Valentine's Day card that Rosaria had given him. The High Court held that the defendant breached the duty of care that he owed to his pupils and was therefore negligent, noting that it is the duty of a school teacher to care for his pupils, as would a father for his family. The Court reasoned that school teachers are in a position of moral superiority, and a young schoolgirl's "consent" is fictitious in light of the ethics compelling a teacher to not engage in sexual relations with schoolgirls, a young girl's cognitive inability to truly consent, as well as Section 138 of the penal code, which states that defilement of a girl under the age of 16 is an offense. Notably, the Court held that society's indignation of this type of behavior ought to be reflected in the amount of damages awarded. The Court entered a judgment in favor of Rosaria for K 45,000,000 for her pain and suffering, medical expenses, aggravated damages, and mental torture. Furthermore, the Court held that the School, Ministry of Education, and the Attorney General are vicariously liable for this judgment, noting that the government is responsible for all school going children in the care of its agents, including teachers like the defendant.

Plaintiff-child and parents sued defendant-school district, principal and teacher, alleging that teacher had sexually abused the child and the district and principal were negligent in hiring and supervising the teacher. In a responsive pleading, defendant-school district and principal asserted as affirmative defense that plaintiff’s voluntary participation in the sexual relationship with defendant teacher constituted contributory fault. The trial court certified to the Supreme Court of Washington a question whether a 13-year-old victim of sexual abuse, who brought a negligence action, could have contributory fault assessed against her under the Washington Tort Reform Act. The Supreme Court of Washington held that, as a matter of law, a child under the age of 16 could not have contributory fault assessed against her for participating in sexual activities. Plaintiff lacked the capacity to consent and was under no legal duty to protect herself from sexual abuse. Societal interests embodied in the criminal laws protecting children from sexual abuse applied equally in the civil arena when harm was caused to the child by an adult perpetrator of sexual abuse or a third party in a position to control that person’s conduct. Furthermore, the idea that a student had a duty to protect herself from sexual abuse at school by her teacher conflicted with the well-established law that a school district had an enhanced and solemn duty to protect minor students in its care.

After pleading guilty, appellant-father was convicted of several counts of sexually abusing his daughter. Appellee-mother filed a petition to terminate father’s parental rights to the daughter, and the District Court terminated his parental rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(iv). The Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the decision. In terminating appellant-father’s parental rights, the Supreme Court held that the fact of incarceration, by itself, is not per se evidence of unfitness. However, incarceration is a reality that severely impacts the parent-child relationship and, therefore, cannot be ignored. The length of appellant’s incarceration of 47 years makes it extremely improbable that appellant would ever be able to care for the ongoing physical, mental or emotional needs of the daughter. Most importantly, appellant was convicted on several counts of sexually abusing his daughter, and there can be nothing that makes a parent more intrinsically unfit than abusing his child.

The appellant was convicted of raping his 12 year old daughter and sentenced to 22 years imprisonment. The Court upheld the sentence in light of the heinous nature of rape as a crime and the importance of society sending a message of severe condemnation of the crime.

The appellant, a 15 year old, was charged with inciting a girl under 14 years old to commit an act of gross indecency for asking a 13 year old girl to perform oral sex with him several times; the girl repeatedly refused. The defense argued that the appellant honestly believed the girl was over 14 years old. The prosecution submitted the offense was one of strict liability. The Lords held that a reasonable belief, even if mistaken, as to the victim's age was a defense to the charge

The appellant, K, was convicted of a single count of indecent assault against a girl aged 14; his defense was that the intercourse between the two was consensual and that she had told him she was 16. The House of Lords allowed the appeal on the grounds that the appellant's honest belief that the complainant was over the age of 16 was a defense to the charge of indecent assault.

The appellant was charged with the rape of a nine-year-old girl. At trial, evidence demonstrated that he had penetrated the girl anally, which required a conviction for indecent assault rather than rape. The High Court, however, amended the common law definition of rape to include anal penetration as well and made the definition gender-neutral. The appellant appealed. The Constitutional Court affirmed the High Court and held that the definition of rape must be extended to include nonconsensual anal penetration of females; the Court did say that for the court to extend the definition to include male rape would encroach onto the legislature's prerogative.

Die appellant is aangekla van die verkragting van 'n negejarige meisie; tydens die verhoor het getuienis uitgekom dat hy die meisie anaal binnegedring het, wat 'n skuldigbevinding vir onsedelike aanranding eerder as verkragting vereis het. Die Hooggeregshof het egter die gemeenregtelike definisie van verkragting gewysig om ook anale penetrasie in te sluit en die definisie geslagsneutraal gemaak. Die appellant het appèl aangeteken. Die Konstitusionele Hof het met die Hooggeregshof bevestig en beslis dat die definisie van verkragting uitgebrei moet word om anale indringing sonder toestemming van vroue in te sluit; die hof het wel gesê dat vir die hof om die definisie uit te brei om ook manlike verkragting in te sluit sou die regspraak van die wetgewer oorskry.

The appellant, a 24-year-old police officer at the time of the charged conduct, was convicted of the attempted rape of a 17-year-old girl. She fought him off and managed to escape the car. The examining physician found some evidence of unlubricated sexual contact, but no conclusive evidence of penetration. He appealed on the grounds of the cautionary rule, encouraging the court to handle accusations of rape cautiously to prevent false convictions. The Court held that the cautionary rule was based on outdated stereotypes against women and that in criminal cases, the burden is on the State to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, without an application of a general cautionary rule. The Court adopted the formula used in England whereby a judge could choose, on a case by case basis, to use caution only in cases where it was proven that the complainant was untrustworthy for some reason, e.g. had made previous false complaints or bore the defendant a grudge.

Jackson is aangekla van poging tot verkragting van S., 'n 17-jarige meisie, toe hy haar polse vasgebind het en gepoog het om met haar gemeenskap te hê. Sy het hom afgeveg en daarin geslaag om uit die motor te ontsnap en is daarna deur 'n dokter ondersoek wat bewyse van ongeoorloofde seksuele kontak gevind het, maar geen geweldige bewys van penetrasie nie. Jackson het appèl aangeteken op grond van die versigtigheidsreël en aangemoedig dat beskuldigings van verkragting versigtig hanteer moet word om vals skuldigbevindings te voorkom. Die hof het beslis dat die versigtigheidsreël gebaseer is op verouderde stereotipes teen vroue en dat in strafregtelike gevalle dit die las van die Staat is om die skuld van die beskuldigde bo alle redelike twyfel te bewys sonder die toepassing van 'n algemene versigtigheidsreël. Die Hof het die formule wat in Engeland gebruik is aanvaar waardeur 'n regter, van geval tot geval, kon kies om versigtig te wees in gevalle waar daar bewys is dat die klaer om een ​​of ander rede onbetroubaar was, bv. het vorige vals klagtes gemaak of teen die verweerder 'n wrok gehad het.

The accused was charged and convicted on two separate counts of rape for raping two 15-year-old girls more than once and sentenced to six years imprisonment for the first count and 10 years imprisonment for the second. On appeal, the defense argued that the sentence was too severe because of mitigating circumstances, specifically that the victims did not suffer serious physical or psychological injuries and that both victims had previously been sexually active. The Court dismissed the appeal and held that the sentences were, in fact, too lenient, especially as the victims' previous sexual history was irrelevant and also that the extent of harm to the victims matters less because rape is a basic violation of dignity. The sentence was increased to 8 years for the first count and 12 years for the second.

Die beskuldigdes is op twee afsonderlike aanklagtes van verkragting aangekla en skuldig bevind vir die verkragting van twee 15-jarige meisies meer as een keer en gevonnis tot ses jaar gevangenisstraf op die eerste en tien jaar gevangenisstraf op die tweede. Op appèl het die verdediging gesê dat die vonnis te ernstig was weens versagtende omstandighede deurdat die slagoffers nie ernstige liggaamlike of sielkundige beserings opgedoen het nie en dat albei die slagoffers voorheen seksueel aktief was. Die hof het die appèl van die hand gewys en beslis dat die vonnisse in werklikheid te versagtend was, veral omdat die vorige seksuele geskiedenis van die slagoffers nie van belang was nie en dat die skade aan die slagoffers minder belangrik is omdat verkragting 'n basiese waardigheidskending is. Die vonnis is verhoog tot 8 jaar vir die eerste en 12 jaar vir die tweede.

The appellant was charged with defilement for having unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 13 years of age. The trial court convicted him of indecent assault because there was no penetration. He appealed his conviction for indecent assault because it was not included in the original charge. He also argued that his sentence was excessive. The Court dismissed the appeal of the conviction on the grounds that where the evidence is sufficient to sustain the lesser charge of indecent assault but may not be sufficient for defilement, the accused may be convicted of the lesser crime even when it was not included in the original charge. However, the Court upheld the appeal of the sentence and lowered it, despite of the fact that women and girls need to be protected, taking into account the mitigating factor of the appellant's youth.

The appellant was found guilty of defiling a girl under 13 years of age and appealed on the grounds that the sentence is excessive and that his taking care of his grandparents should be considered as a mitigating factor. The complainant had since been diagnosed with a sexually transmitted infection and medical examinations revealed multiple instances of sexual abuse. The appellant testified that neither he nor his wife had a sexually transmitted infection, but the Court did not find this claim persuasive because neither of them had been tested (neither took the initiative to be tested and the government could not force them to be tested). The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the sentence, considering the harm done to the complainant in infecting her with a sexually transmitted infection.

The State appeals the decision in the High Court to acquit the accused of all charges of rape and abduction of an 11 year old by taking her away from her guardian with the intent to have sexual intercourse with her. The Court reversed the acquittal and found the accused guilty on the charges of rape and abduction and affirmed an earlier judgment that the cautionary rule discriminates against women in violation of the Constitution and should only be used at a judge's discretion in extreme cases where there is some valid reason to question a complainant's veracity

The appellant was convicted of defilement of a girl under the age of 14 years and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with ten strokes of the cane. The appellant appealed his conviction and the sentence as being excessive for a first offense. The Court dismissed the appeal of the conviction as the complainant identified the appellant and medical evidence is no longer necessary to convict an accused if the evidence was sufficiently cogent. The "defilement" conviction was substituted with rape and the appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

The appellant was charged and convicted of defilement and indecent assault of a six-year-old girl. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on the first count and five years imprisonment for the second. He appealed on the grounds of insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction and an excessive sentence. The Court affirmed the convictions because the six-year-old complainant described the incident in detail, the medical evidence was corroborative, and the appellant's abrupt and unexplained disappearance after the incident was also properly considered corroborative evidence. The Court also held that the sentences were not excessive.

The accused was charged with defilement of a girl under the age of 14 years, and was convicted and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. He appealed for leniency on the grounds that he was remorseful, suffering from acute pneumonia and only 17 years of age at the time of the incident. The Court upheld the sentence finding that the sentence of 10 years for defilement of a girl and 5 years for indecent assault is not excessive and no circumstances existed to justify mitigating the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of defiling a 12-year-old girl and appealed the conviction on the grounds that the intercourse was consensual and that he believed the complainant was older than 12 years at the time. The Court dismissed the appeal and noted that the evidence was sufficient to prove a lack of consent but also that, at 12 years old, the complainant was too young to give consent. The Court also noted aggravating factors, including that the appellant had intercourse with the complainant on multiple occasions and the appellant had threatened the complainant against telling her parents.

A man took a six year-old girl into his house, removed her clothes and masturbated until he ejaculated on her stomach. The prosecution charged that he was found in the act of raping the girl, but the medical evidence showed that he could not have done so. The Court held that he could be found guilty of an "offence to modesty," which the court defined as any action that would be shocking the sense of decency of a woman. Here, the Court finds the perpetrator guilty despite India's inadequate criminal law to deal with sexual assault not amounting to rape.

Defendant was convicted of the rape of a minor age 14 to 17, in violation of Article 309 of the Penal Code. The defendant admitted to having engaged in sexual relations with the victim, but claimed the relations were consensual, and apologized for his actions. Taking into account the defendant's apology and previous record of good conduct, defendant received a prison sentence of only 4 years. Both parties appealed, but the appellate court affirmed the trial court ruling, finding that the victim had failed to produce evidence of force which would carry a heavier sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant had seduced the minor, but that it had not been shown that he used force.

El acusado fue condenado por la violación de una menor de 14 a 17 años, en violación del Artículo 309 del Código Penal. El acusado admitió haber tenido relaciones sexuales con la víctima, pero afirmó que las relaciones fueron consensuadas y se disculpó por sus acciones. Teniendo en cuenta la disculpa del acusado y el historial previo de buena conducta, el acusado recibió una sentencia de prisión de solo 4 años. Ambas partes apelaron, pero el tribunal de apelaciones confirmó el fallo del tribunal de primera instancia, encontrando que la víctima no había presentado evidencia suficientemente fuerte para conllevara a una sentencia más severa. La Corte Suprema afirmó, sosteniendo que el imputado había seducido al menor, pero que no se había demostrado que hubiera usado la fuerza.

In accordance with the Law on the Basic Principles of Education, educational institutions are obliged to secure conditions for safe and encouraging growth and development of the child and pupil (girls and boys), protection from all forms of violence, abuse and neglect, and social reintegration of a child and pupil who committed or was exposed to violence, abuse or neglect. educational institution must (1) establish a team for protection from violence, abuse, and neglect and (2) adopt a protection program and to document, analyze, and report on the cases of violence against children and staff members in their institution. (See External URL for official English translation.)

The 2012 Act makes it an offence to withhold information, without reasonable excuse, about certain offences against children and vulnerable adults from the Garda Síochána (Sections 2 and 3). These ‘certain offences’ include, inter alia, murder, assault, false imprisonment, rape, sexual assault, and incest. Defences are set out in Section 4, including those which may be raised by “prescribed persons” employed or engaged by a prescribed organization (defined in Sections 5 and 6). Penalties for offenses under Sections 2 or 3 are set forth in Section 7. Upon summary conviction, a person is liable to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment; for conviction on indictment, the term of imprisonment changes relative to the term of imprisonment stipulated in the statute providing for the principal offence (Section 7).

Marital rape is a crime under the 1990 Act. The 1990 Act deletes the word “unlawful” from the statutory definition of rape (‘unlawful sexual intercourse’ without consent, as set forth in the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981). The amended definition of rape therefore does not exclude ‘lawful’ sexual intercourse (i.e., between married persons). The 1990 Act also explicitly abolished ‘any rule of law by virtue of which a husband cannot be guilty of the rape of his wife’ (Section 5). Section 4 defines rape as any penetration (however slight) of the anus or mouth by the penis or of the vagina by any object held or manipulated by another person, providing for a punishment on conviction of up to life imprisonment (Section 4). Section 7 of the Act also deals with the corroboration rule in the case of sexual offences. In particular, the judge is no longer required to give the jury a corroboration warning, but such warning is not prohibited.

The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 gave effect to European Council Directive No. 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. It also amended certain other legislation, including the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 (available here), the Criminal Law (Incest Proceedings) Act 1995, the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here), the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here), and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006. The Act provides for offences relating to sexual acts with protected persons and relating to payment for sexual activity with sex workers, offensive conduct of a sexual nature and harassment of victims of sexual offences. The Act defines ‘sexual exploitation’ in relation to a child and specifies the elements that would constitute a sexual offence against a child, including performing sexual acts in front of a child and prostitution of a child. Generally, Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 broaden the scope of criminal acts in relation to children, such as the prohibition of causing a child to watch sexual activity (Section 6), meeting a child for the purposes of sexual exploitation (Section 7), and the use of information and communication technology to facilitate the sexual exploitation of a child (Section 8). The Act also criminalizes the purchase of sexual services and prohibits sexual activity with a protected person, as defined by the Act. The Act creates a distinction related to the commission of a sexual act with a child under 17 years of age and with a child under 15 years of age, with a conviction on indictment for the former offence resulting in a term of imprisonment of up to 7 years (unless the person is in authority, in which case they may be sentenced for up to 15 years) (Section 17), and with a conviction on indictment for the latter offence resulting in a term of imprisonment of life (Section 16). Importantly, Section 48 of the Act reforms the law in relation to consent to sexual acts. In particular, it states that a person does not consent to a sexual act if, inter alia, they permits the act to take place or submits to it because of the application, threat or fear of use of force against them, if they are asleep, if they are incapable of consenting because of intoxication, or if they are mistaken as to the nature and purpose of the act or the identity of the person involved. The Act also clarifies that consent can be withdrawn at any time and that lack of physical resistance does not, of itself, constitute consent (Section 48). Finally, Section 46 allows a court to issue a “Harassment order” against a person when imposing a sentence for a sexual offence or at any time before the convicted person is released from prison.

The Human Trafficking Amendment Act amends the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) and the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here). The Act of 2008 defined human trafficking and exploitation for the purposes of trafficking. It also contains specific provisions for the trafficking of children. The Human Trafficking Amendment Act of 2013 amends the 2008 Act by (a) expanding the definitions of “labour exploitation” to include forced begging and of “exploitation” to include forced participation in criminal acts for profit (in line with the EU Human Trafficking Directive) and (b) adding aggravating factors (e.g., where a public official trafficks for sexual or labor exploitation).

Articles 97-98 and 340-341 relate to who may benefit from more lenient sentences for “honour crimes,” such as a person who has witnessed his or her spouse committing adultery. However, Article 345 now excludes honor crimes where the victim is under 15 from qualifying as a mitigating circumstance as enumerated in Articles 97 and 98. Further, Article 308, which allowed a rapist to avoid punishment if they married their victim, was removed in the same 2017 amendment. Article 292 criminalizes intercourse with a woman, other than the man's wife, without her consent through either the means of coercion, threat, or deception. The punishment for such an action is at least 15 years’ imprisonment. This is extended under Article 293 to those women who are unable to resist sexual advances due to a physical or mental disability. In Article 294, a person who has intercourse with a girl of 15-17 years of age will be subject to 7 years temporary hard labor. If the victim is between 12 - 15 years, the minimum penalty will be 15 years. Article 304 provides a minimum standard of six months to three years imprisonment for those persons who “deflower virgins” of 18 years after promising to marry them in addition to compensation. Article 305 and 306 provides that anyone who commits sexual harassment or any type of sexual gesture with a child of under 18 (male or female), or over 18 without consent, is penalized. Article 314 provides that caretakers who permit a child between 6-16 to frequent brothels is penalized for imprisonment for a period of 6 years or with a fine of 20 (JD). Articles 309-318 prohibit prostitution, running a brothel, forcing a woman into prostitution, exposing a child to a brothel, renting a house for brothel, living off of a woman’s sex work. Article 323 punishes whomever aborts a woman's pregnancy without her consent with labor penalties for 10 years, and more than 10 years if the abortion leads to the woman’s death. Abortion remains illegal, but obtaining an abortion “to preserve honor” is a mitigating factor.

توضح المواد 97-98 والمواد 340-341 من يمكن أن يستفيد من العقوبات المخففة لجرائم الشرف مثل الشخص الذي فوجئ بزوجته بجريمة الزنا. بينما بينت المادة 345 أن العقوبات المخففة لا تشمل من هم دون 15 عام. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه تم حذف المادة 308 التي كانت تسمح للمغتصب بأن يتزوج الضحية. ومنعت المادة 292 مواقعة أنثى بغير رضاها سواء بالتهديد أو بالإكراه أو بالحيلة أو الخداع، وتكون العقوبة 15 سنة فأكثر. كما تمتد ذات العقوبة إلى الأنثى التي لا تستطيع المقاومة بسبب ضعف نفسي أو عقلي أو جسدي. كما أشارت المادة 294 إلى أن كل شخص واقع أنثى ما بين 15-17 سنة عوقب بالأشغال المؤقتة لمدة لا تقل عن 7 سنوات، أما إذا كان يقل عمره عن 15 سنة فتمتد عقوبة الأشغال إلى 15 سنة كحد أدنى. ووضحت المادة 304 أن كل شخص قام بخداع بكرًا يبلغ عمرها 18 عام فأكثر بوعده لها بالزاوج ففض بكارتها أو تسبب في حملها يعاقب بالحبس من 6 أشهر على 3 سنوات، بالإضاقة إلى ضمان بكارتها. ذكرت كل من المادتين 305 و306 أنه يعاقب كل شخص قام بفعل جنسي أو أي إيحاء يدل على ذلك لشخص لم يتم 18 من عمره أو أكمل 18 من عمره لكن لو يؤخذ برضاه. كما أشارت المادة 314 أن كل من عوهد إليه بالعناية بولد يتراوح عمره ما بين 6-16 سنة، وسمح له بالاقامة في بيت بغاء أو التردد عليه، يعاقب بالحبس حتى 6 أشهر أو بغرامة حتى 20 دولار. أما اامواد 309-318 فقد جاءت لتمنع الدعارة، والمادة 323 أشارت إلى أنه من أقدم بأي وسيلة كان على اجهاض امرأة، فيعاقب بالحبس لمدة لا تزيد على 10 سنوات، وأكثر من 10 سنوات إذا سبب ذلك الإجهاض وفاة. الإجهاض لا يزال غير قانوني، ولكن لو أرادت المرأة أن تقوم بالإجهاض للحفاظ على الشرف هو عامل مؤثر.

Article 3012 states that involving a minor in: (i) conducting an entertainment show of a sexual nature (i.e., public display in any form of products of sexual nature or stage actions including acts of sexual nature), including with the use of information and telecommunication systems or technologies, or (ii) attending such a show, shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. If the act involved forcing a minor to participate in such a show through deception, blackmail, exploiting a vulnerable condition, or the use of threat of violence, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of seven to ten years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years.

Стаття 3012 визначає, що залучення неповнолітнього до: (I) проведення видовищного заходу сексуального характеру (тобто публічного показу у будь-якій формі продукції сексуального характеру або сценічних дій, метою яких є втілення сексуальних дій.), у тому числі з використання інформаційно-телекомунікаційних систем або технологій, або (II) відвідування видовищного заходу сексуального характеру, караються позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до семи років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю. терміном до трьох років. Якщо діяння полягало в примушуванні неповнолітнього до участі в такому заході, шляхом обману, шантажу, уразливого стану особи або із застосуванням чи погрозою застосування насильства, винний карається позбавленням волі на строк від семи до десяти років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років.

This law amends Paraguay’s Criminal Code and establishes (among other things) penalties for (i) sexual harassment, article 133; (ii) domestic violence, article 229; (iii) sexual coercion, including sexual abuse without intercourse, article 128; (iv) human trafficking, article 129; (v) sexual abuse of defenseless victims, article 130; and (vi) sexual abuse of persons held in custody, children under 14, and/or persons under guardianship –articles 130, 131, 135, 136, 137 and 230.

Esta ley modifica el Código Penal de Paraguay y establece, entre otras, penas por (i) acoso sexual, artículo 133; (ii) violencia intrafamiliar, artículo 229; (iii) coacción sexual, incluido el abuso sexual sin penetración, artículo 128; (iv) trata de personas, artículo 129; (v) abuso sexual de víctimas indefensas, artículo 130; y (vi) abuso sexual de personas privadas de libertad, menores de 14 años y/o personas bajo tutela –artículos 130, 131, 135, 136, 137 y 230.

Under the Criminal Code, rape is defined quite narrowly as “sexual intercourse against a person’s will with the use or threat of physical violence present or deprivation of possibility of resistance.” There is also no mention of rape in marriage. To hold a person liable for rape, which is punished by imprisonment for up to seven years, the victim or their representative must file a complaint. However, in the case of rape (i) by a group of accomplices or (ii) of a minor or a young child, the term of imprisonment can be longer, and complaint filing is not needed. Further, sexual assault is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to seven years, sexual abuse is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to three years, and sexual harassment is punished by a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest. However, Lithuania is one of the few European Union states to have not yet criminalized stalking. Trafficking in Human Beings is punished by imprisonment from two to ten years. Infanticide is punished by arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. In the case of illegal abortion, as defined in Decree No. 50 of the Minister of Health “On the Termination of Pregnancy Operation Procedure,” the doctor and assisting persons are liable. Finally, the Code recognizes acts committed to express hatred towards persons due to their, amongst other characteristics, gender and sexual orientation, to be an aggravating circumstance. English translation available here.

Pagal baudžiamąjį kodeksą išžaginimas gana siaurai apibrėžiamas kaip lytiniai santykiai prieš asmens valią „panaudojant fizinį smurtą ar grasinant tuoj pat jį panaudoti, ar kitaip atimant galimybę priešintis, ar pasinaudojant bejėgiška nukentėjusio asmens būkle”. Apie išprievartavimą santuokoje neužsimenama. Laikyti asmenį atsakingu už išžaginimą, kuris baudžiamas laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, auka ar jų atstovas turi pateikti skundą. Tačiau tuo atveju, kai išžaginama (i) bendrininkų grupės arba (ii) nepilnametį vaiką, laisvės atėmimo bausmė gali būti ilgesnė ir skundo padavimo nereikia. Už seksualinę prievartą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, už seksualinį smurtą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki trejų metų, o už seksualinį priekabiavimą baudžiama bauda, laisvės apribojimu arba areštu. Lietuva yra viena iš nedaugelio Europos Sąjungos valstybių, kuri dar nėra kriminalizavusi persekiojimo. Už prekybą žmonėmis baudžiama laisvės atėmimu nuo dvejų iki dešimties metų. Už nužudymą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki penkerių metų. Neteisėto aborto atveju, kaip apibrėžta sveikatos apsaugos ministro įsakyme Nr. 50 „Dėl nėštumo operacijos procedūros nutraukimo“, atsako gydytojas ir pagalbą teikiantys asmenys. Galiausiai kodekse pripažįstama, kad veiksmai, kuriais siekiama išreikšti neapykantą asmenims dėl jų, įskaitant kitų savybių, lyties ir seksualinės orientacijos, yra sunkinanti aplinkybė.

The promotion or facilitation of prostitution involve taking advantage of the victim’s economic necessity or vulnerability or coerce the victim by means of violence, threat or fraud pursuant to article 189, and it is punished with a sentence of 1-8 years of imprisonment. If the facilitation or coercion to prostitution is made in a foreign country, the crime committed falls within article 190, i.e. human sexual trafficking, which command a higher sentencing of up to 10 years in prison. The promotion or facilitation of the prostitution of minors under 18 years old is prohibited by article 195. Under the same article and incurring in the same penalties is the individual who repeatedly practices sexual acts with a minor. Here, if the agent coerces, threatens, acts with violence, has the intent of monetary gains, if the minor has diminished psychological capacity, or if the minor is under the age of 14, the maximum penalty increases to 15 years. The act of soliciting by means of paying the minor is punished under article 197 with up to three years of imprisonment, whilst if penetration was involved the penalty increases to five years (in case another more severe penalty pursuant to another article is not applicable).

A promoção ou facilitação da prostituição envolve tirar vantage da necessidade econômica ou vulnerabilidade da vítima ou coerção da vítima por meio de violência, ameaça ou fraude nos termos do artigo 189, e é punido com 1-8 anos de encarceramento. Se a facilitação ou coerção à prostituição é feita em outro país, o crime cometido recai no previsto pelo artigo 190, i.e. tráfico sexual humano, que tem uma sentença maior de até 10 anos de prisão. A promoção ou facilitação de prostituição de menores de 18 anos é proibida pelo artigo 195. Sob o mesmo artigo e incorrendo na mesma pena está o indivíduo que repetidamente realiza atos sexuais com menor. Aqui, se o agente coage, ameaça, age com violência, tem a intenção de ganho financeiro, se o menor tem capacidade psicológica diminuída, ou se é menor de 14 anos de idade, a penalidade máxima aumenta para 15 anos. O ato de solicitar por meio do pagamento ao menor é punido sob o artigo 197 com até três anos de encarceramento, enquanto se houver penetração envolvida a penalidade aumenta cinco anos (no caso de outra penalidade mais severa relacionada a outro artigo não for aplicável).

This section outlines the punishments for prostitution. Anyone who promotes or facilitates prostitution by a woman is subject to one-two years in prison, but anyone who promotes another’s prostitution through violence, fraud, abuse of authority, or exploitation of the other’s situation is punishable with two-eight years in prison. Whomever habitually partakes in prostitution with someone under the age of 18 can be imprisoned from two-eight years or be fined for up to one year.

Essa seção estabelece as sanções para prostituição. Aquele que promove ou facilita a prostituição de uma mulher está sujeito a um-dois anos de prisão, mas aquele promove a prostituição de outra pessoa por meio de violência, fraude, abuso de autoridade, ou exploração da situação alheia é punido com dois-oito anos de prisão. Quem habitualmente realiza prostituição com uma pessoa menor de 18 pode ser preso de dois-oito anos ou sofrer multa até um ano.

The plan outlines the materialization of the National Plan for the Advancement of Women (Plano Nacional para o Avanço da Mulher) by mapping out its objectives, finances, and progress evaluations given specific deadlines. It focuses on expanding services available to victims of domestic, sexual, physical, and psychological violence; improving institutions to educate the public on gender-based violence; implementing advocacy strategies to prevent and combat violence against women; and establishing multi-sector mechanisms to intervene in violent situations in which women may find themselves. For example, as women are 57% of all HIV-positive people in Mozambique, the plan provides for an STI, including HIV, prophylaxis service for victims of sexual violence. Each sector is in charge of managing its own budget in accordance with its objectives, but the Mozambican government and the Economic and Social Plan (Plano Económico e Social) are expected to be driving forces in attracting more partners and resources for the plan. The timeline is set for five years, with the Monitoring and Evaluation (Monitoria e Avaliação) creating conditions, such as annual check-ins, and using the Report on the Economic and Social Plan (Balanço do Plano Económico e Social) to ensure that each division maintains consistency in their actions.

O plano esboça a materialização do Plano Nacional para o Avanço da Mulher ao mapear os seus objetivos, finanças, e avaliações de progresso em prazos específicos. Ele foca em expandir os serviços disponíveis para as vítimas de violência doméstica, sexual, física, e psicológica; melhorando as instituições para educar o público sobre violência de gênero; implementando estratégias legais para prevenir e combater violência contra mulheres; e estabelecendo mecanismos multissetoriais para intervir em situações de violência em que as mulheres se encontrem. Por exemplo, como as mulheres são 57% das pessoas HIV-positivas em Moçambique, o plano fornece serviço de profilaxia para ISTs, incluindo HIV, para vítimas de violência sexual. Cada setor está responsável por administrar o seu próprio orçamento de acordo com os seus objetivos, mas é esperado que o governo Moçambicano e o Plano Econômico e Social sejam forças motrizes na atração de mais parceiros e recursos para o plano. O cronograma é de cinco anos, com a Monitoria e Avaliação criando condições, como check-ins anuais, e usando o Balanço do Plano Ecônomico e Social para garantir que cada divisão mantenha consistência em suas ações.

Sets out the procedure for the identification of victims of trafficking in persons by Internal Affairs bodies, State security bodies, Border Service bodies, Prosecutors, and the Investigative Committee using a questionnaire filled out by a person that could be a victim of trafficking in persons.

Art. 343 prohibits the production and distribution of pornographic materials or items of a pornographic nature depicting minors, which is punishable by correctional work for up to two years, administrative arrest, restraint on liberty, or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, and by a term of up to eight years in case of aggravating circumstances.

Art. 166 of the Criminal Code defines rape as “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim with the use of violence” or threat of such violence against the woman or her relatives, or using the woman’s helpless state. Rape is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of up to four years or imprisonment for a term of three to seven years. Rape in aggravating circumstances, including repeated rape, rape by a group of people, or rape by a person who has previously committed sexually violent acts, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to thirteen years and knowing rape of a minor or rape that causes grave consequences (e.g., death, bodily harm, or HIV infection) is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8-15 years. Art. 167 likewise prohibits violent acts of sexual nature, such as “sodomy” or “lesbianism” against the will of the victim with the use of violence or threat of such violence, or using the victim’s helpless state. The punishments for committing an Art. 167 crime in aggravated circumstances are the same as those for rape. Art. 168 prohibits sexual intercourse and other acts of a sexual nature with a person below the age of 16. This crime is punishable by, in case there are no signs of criminal acts set out above, restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, with a fine. The punishment, in case the offender has previously committed the crimes described above, has duties owed to the victim, or the crime is committed by a group of persons, is imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. “Depraved acts” committed against a person below the age of 16 are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years under Art. 169. Art. 170 criminalizes the compulsion to commit acts of a sexual nature by means of blackmail, threat of destruction of property, or by using the dependence (workplace, monetary, etc.) of the victim. The crime is punishable by restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up three years, with a fine and prohibition to occupy certain offices. Such a crime knowingly committed against a minor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to six years. Arts. 171 and 171 prohibit the organization, use, or creation of conditions for prostitution, including by removing the victim outside of the country; such crimes are punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment.

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act replaced the Ordinance of the same name which was promulgated in the aftermath of the Kathua Rape case in Jammu & Kashmir region of India in 2018, which involved the rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl. The Act amended various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Indian Evidence Act, and The Code of Criminal Procedure. Notably, the Act increased the minimum punishment for rape from seven years to ten years of rigorous imprisonment which is extendable to life imprisonment. The penalty for rape of a girl under 16 years of age has also been increased to 20 years of imprisonment extendable to life, a significant increase from the original term of 10 years. Rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with imprisonment of minimum 20 years extendable to life or with capital punishment. Lastly, the gang rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with life imprisonment or capital punishment. The Act includes measures related to bail restrictions, speedy trial, and strengthening prosecution.

This law sets out the measures for protecting women’s rights, promoting gender equality, development of women (including physical, mental, educational, and professional and skills developments), eliminating gender-based discriminations, and preventing crimes, such as human trafficking and domestic violence, against women. Article 17, Equal Rights in the Family, mandates that women and men have equal rights in all matters concerning family relationships, including equal rights in matrimonial property and inheritance. Part IV, The Protection of Women and Children against Trafficking and Domestic Violence, sets out measures to assist and protect women and children victims of trafficking and domestic violence; duties and obligations of governments and officers, social organizations, individuals, doctors, social workers, or other organizations that discover or receive information concerning a victim; and criminal procedures relating to offenders. Unofficial English translation available from the ILO here.

The Criminal Code Section 286 criminalizes any person over the age of 16 years who subsists in whole or part on the earnings of a sex worker. The sentence is imprisonment of 7-20 years and a fine of 14,000-40,000 Baht, or imprisonment for life. The provisions of this section do not apply if the sex worker is bound to give maintenance according to law or morality.

English translation as of 2003 via ILO available here.

Several sections of the Criminal Code (in particular, sections 242-243) penalize rape, including spousal rape, and domestic violence. Penalties include imprisonment not exceeding 12 years, a fine not exceeding 78,000 euros ($93,600), or both. For cases involving violence against a spouse, the penalty for various forms of abuse can be increased by one-third. Section 244 and 245 of the Criminal Code penalize statutory rape. Under section 244, in cases where the victim is younger than 12, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed 12 years. In cases where the victim is 12-16 years of age, under section 245, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed eight years. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)

Law No. 21,030 amends article 119 of the Sanitary Code to permit the interruption of a pregnancy by a surgeon, with the consent of the woman, for: (i) any risk to the life of the mother; (ii) unfeasibility of the embryo or fetus; and (iii) rape.

La ley numero 21,030 amenda el Articulo 119 del Codigo Sanitario, permitiendo la interrupcion del embarazo por un cirujano, con la autorizacion de la mujer, por: (i) cualquier riesgo a la vida de la madre, (ii) imposibilidad de exito del embrion o feto, y (iii) violacion.

The Human Trafficking Act ("the Act") criminalizes the trafficking of persons within and across borders by the use of threat, fraud, and exploitation of vulnerability or by paying to gain consent. Under the Act, induced prostitution, all other forms of sexual exploitation, and slavery all constitute trafficking. The Act mandates that persons with information on trafficking have a duty to inform authorities. Authorities in this case include the police or the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Department of Social Welfare, the Legal Aid Board, or a reputable Civil Society Organization. The Act covers the rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration of trafficked persons, as along with creating a fund for victims. Punishment for trafficking is imprisonment for not less than five years.

Within Chapter 6, certain prohibitions related to marriage and clarifications related to the rights of children are outlined in the Criminal Code. If a woman is forced to marry under duress the marriage is voidable under Section 100. Likewise, compulsion of marriage is criminalized in Section 109. It states that a person who causes another to marry against his or her will shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 110 pertains to the custody of children. It states that if a parent or guardian is guilty under Section 108, which outlines causing or encouraging child seduction or prostitution, the Court may divest that person of authority over the child and appoint someone willing to take care of the child until he or she is twenty-one years of age or an age directed by the Court. The Court may also rescind or vary the appointment or order. Section 111 outlines the power of the Court to issue a warrant to search for a child detained for an "Immoral Purpose."

Section 14 of Chapter 2 of the Ghanaian Criminal Code provides the definition of consent. It states that consent is void if the person giving it is under years.12 of age, or in sexual offences under 16 years of age Consent is void if the person is insane, immature, intoxicated, or is as a result of any other cause unable to understand the nature or consequences of the act to which he consents. Consent is void if obtained (i) under duress or by means of deceit; (ii) by undue influence; or (iii) given on behalf of a parent or guardian in bad faith or (iv) by reason of a fundamental mistake of fact or (v) if actual authority to consent is not present. Consent is considered to have been obtained by the preceding causes if consent would not have otherwise been given but for those causes. A person should not be prejudiced by the invalidity of any consent if he did not know and could not have known of the invalidity by exercise of reasonable diligence.

Article 279.01 defines and prohibits human trafficking. The penalty for trafficking including aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, or death is five years to imprisonment for life or for any other case, four to fourteen years imprisonment.

Chapter 16 sets forth criminal offenses for conduct against the family. §16.3 provides that an abortion after 24 weeks of pregnancy is a felony, unless it is conducted by a licensed physician upon his belief that the pregnancy causes danger to the mother or the child would be born with a grave defect. §16.1-16.2 prohibits bigamy, polygamy, incest, or deviate sexual intercourse with a family member and designates these acts as felonies. Separately, the Law prohibits harassment, which is defined as a written threat, an offensive telephone call, or repeated telephone calls with no legitimate communication purpose with the intent to frighten or harass the recipient. Chapter 14 Subchapter D outlines crimes involving sexual violence against persons committed on or after January 17, 2006. The age for statutory rape is 18 years. Gang rape constitutes first-degree felony. The Law defines lack of “consent” as including violence or the threat of violence against the victim or another person, the victim’s unconsciousness, a physical disability that prevents the victim from being able to to communicate his or her consent, or intentionally forcing the victim’s consent. The following acts constitute first-degree rape: rape of an underage victim, gang rape, rape that results in permanent disability to the victim, and use of a deadly weapon. The maximum punishment for first-degree rape is life imprisonment, and the maximum punishment for second-degree rape is 10 years imprisonment. Chapter 14 Subchapter D also covers sexual violence crimes committed before January 17, 2006. For those earlier offenses, the following constitute rape: a male has sexual intercourse with a female that is not his wife by force or by impairing her power to control her conduct; or a male has sexual intercourse with a female less than 16 years old. First-degree rape includes the following: the defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim, the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female under 16 years of age, or the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female who has not previously consented. The change of language regarding crimes committed after 2006 indicates several important gender-related developments. First, the new language explicitly allows for the prosecution of men and women as perpetrators of rape. Second, it allows for the prosecution of rapes of male victims. Third, it no longer exempts “marital rape” from prosecution. Finally, it raises the age of statutory rape from 16 to 18 years. However, the Law also criminalizes homosexuality, making “voluntary sodomy” a misdemeanor (chapter 14.74).

Division 10 of the Act prohibits and defines sexual violence against adults and children. A person consents to sexual intercourse if the person freely and voluntarily agrees (§ 61HE(2)). As provided in section 61HE(3), a perpetrator is deemed to know that the other person does not consent if they have actual knowledge, are reckless as to consent, or had no reasonable belief that the other person consented. In determining consent, the trier of fact must consider all of the circumstances, including any steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the other person consents, but not including any self-induced intoxication of the person. There can be no consent if the person is a minor, unconscious or asleep, cognitively incapacitated, under duress, or unlawfully detained.

The Swedish Penal Code includes regulations that defines and prohibits various sexually and/or physically motivated crimes against people. The penalty for kidnapping with intent to injure a person, to force a person into service or to practice extortion is imprisonment for at least four years and at most eighteen years, or for life. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is six years. The penalty for human trafficking is imprisonment for 2-10 years. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is four years. If a crime is in violation of liberty and peace or a sexual offense and it was committed by a man against a woman with whom he had a close intimate relationship (marriage or cohabitation), then the man will be sentenced for gross violation of a woman’s integrity and imprisoned for at least nine months and at most six years, as opposed to being sentenced for each individual crime committed. This crime was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code in 1998 and the construction of it is unique because several individual criminal offences together can constitute a gross crime. Perpetrators of rape shall be imprisoned for at least two and at most six years. If the rape is considered less aggravated, the sentence drops to at most four years. In the event the rape is “gross”, the sentence is extended to at most 10 years. The penalty for sexual intercourse with a child under 15 years of age (or an act comparable to sexual intercourse) is at least two and at most six years. If the crime is “gross”, the penalty is extended to at least five years and at most ten years. The penalty for sexual coercion is at most two years of imprisonment. Notwithstanding, if the sexual coercion is “gross”, the sentence is extended from at least six months to at most six years. The penalty for intercourse with an offspring is imprisonment for at most two years and for intercourse with a sibling is at most one year. The penalties for crimes of exploitation of a child for sexual posing, purchase of a sexual ct from a child and sexual molestation are sentencing to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. Except for gross exploitation of a child for sexual posing where the sentence is at least six months and at most six years imprisonment. The penalty for purchase of sexual service is a fine or imprisonment for at most one year. Purchase of sexual service has occurred when a person obtains a temporary sexual relation in return for payment. This also applies if the payment was promised or given by another person. Selling sexual services in Sweden is not criminalized. The penalty for someone who promotes or improperly financially exploits a person’s engagement in temporary sexual relations in return for payment (procuring) is at most four years. In the event the procuring is “gross”, the sentence is 2-10 years. As of 2018, the Penal Code defines rape as any sex without consent, either with words or clear actions. Before the amendment, crimes of rape required the intent to rape someone through violence or threats, or that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable position. Furthermore, the 2018 sex crime reform of the Swedish Penal Code introduced criminal liability for negligent rape (Chapter 6 Section 1a) and negligent sexual abuse (Chapter 6 Section 3). Gross negligence is required for liability under the new regulations, rather than intention, as required for regular rape and sexual abuse in Chapter 6 Section 1 and 2. The penalty for negligent rape or negligent sexual abuse is at most four years.

Pursuant to Article 143, one who commits rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, knowing such offense is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, shall be punished by imprisonment of at least 15 years for committing crimes against humanity. Article 145 states that one who commits rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave violation of the Geneva Conventions, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than 10 years for the commission of war crimes. Similarly, Article 147 punishes the same war crimes as Article 145 in conflicts of a non-international character. Articles 163 – 166 criminalize human trafficking, slavery, and related offenses including smuggling migrants and destroying victims’ identification papers. Penalties for violations of these articles include fines and imprisonment from between 1 – 12 years. Articles 179-180 prohibit sterilization without consent and female genital mutilation. The Criminal Code also punishes sexual violence including rape (Article 227), sexual harassment (Article 183), sexual assault (Article 228), and sex trafficking and forced prostitution (Articles 229, 234). Finally, Articles 239 and 248 contain gender-neutral bans on forced and early marriage and domestic violence, respectively. (Unofficial English version available here.)

The Criminal Code Act 1924 prohibits forced and unauthorized abortions and assaults on pregnant women, sexual violence, stalking, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation. The termination of a pregnancy by a person other than a medical practitioner or the pregnant woman herself is a crime at any stage of the pregnancy. Termination carried out without the pregnant woman’s consent is a crime if it is performed intentionally or recklessly, regardless if any other harm is inflicted on the woman. Any person who unlawfully assaults a woman, knowing that woman is pregnant, is guilty of assault on pregnant woman under section 184A of the Act. Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without that person's consent is guilty of rape under section 185 of the Act. “Sexual intercourse” is defined as the penetration of a person’s vagina, genitalia, anus or mouth by a penis, the penetration of a person’s vagina, genitalia or anus by another body part or object, or the continuation of either act of penetration. “Consent” means free agreement, and does not include, among other things, if a person does not say or do anything to communicate consent. Additionally, it is a crime to have sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 17 according to section 124 of the Act. A person is guilty of stalking if they, among other things, follow, surveille, threaten, direct abusive acts towards, communicate, send or publish offensive material, or contact another person or a third person, with intent to cause the another person physical or mental harm, including self-harm or extreme humiliation or to be apprehensive or fearful under section 192 of the Act. Under section 170A of the Act, a person commits persistent family violence in relation to another person with whom the person is, or has been, in a family relationship is guilty of persistent family violence when the accused has committed unlawful family violence on at least three occasions. Family violence includes, among other things, acts of physical, psychological and economic abuse, with the specific definitions set out in the Family Violence Act 2004. Under section 178A, any person who performs female genital mutilation on another person is guilty of a crime, regardless of custodial consent. Removing or making arrangements to remove a child from Tasmania with the intention of having female genital mutilation performed on the child is also a crime.

As stated in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act aims to “prohibit[] all forms of violence against persons in private and public life, and provide[] maximum protection and effective remedies for victims and punishment of offenders.” The Act provides general protections against offenses including infliction of physical injury, coercion, offensive conduct, willfully placing a person in fear of physical injury, willfully making false statements against another person, damage to property with intent to cause distress, and deprivation of personal liberty. The Act also provides protections against offenses that affect women disproportionately, including a prohibition of female genital mutilation; forceful ejection from home; forced financial dependence or economic abuse; forced isolation; emotional, verbal and psychological abuse; harmful widowhood practices; and spousal battery, among others. Notably, the Act defines the offense of rape in Section 1(1) without an exception for marital rape, which had not traditionally been recognized as an offense (note that the Penal Code Act of 1960 does include an exception for marital rape). The Act provides a procedure for injured parties to apply for a protection order and empowers the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory with jurisdiction to hear and grant applications brought under the Act. As stated in Section 47, the Act is a product of federal legislation enacted in regard to criminal law, a residual matter over which the states have exclusive legislative power pursuant to the Nigerian Constitution. Thus, the VAPP Act applies only to the Federal Capital Territory and is not binding law in a state unless adopted by that state.

The Penal Code prohibits abortion, rape, sexual contact with minors, indecent assault, incest, and bigamy outside of customary law. Abortion is an offence pursuant to the Penal Code Act. Only a registered medical practitioner may terminate a pregnancy if it is necessary to prevent significant harm to the woman’s health, the fetus will be severely disabled, or the woman became pregnant through incest or rape. An adult who has sexual intercourse with a child, defined as under 18 years old, commits an offence and the consent of the child is irrelevant. It shall be defence for this crime if the adult can prove that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe, and did so believe, that the child had attained the age of 18 years.

This Act prescribes measures to prevent and combat trafficking in persons with particular regard to victims who are women and children, and aims to assist victims of trafficking and facilitating efficient investigation of cases of trafficking. The offence of trafficking is committed if a person recruits, transports, transfer, harbors or receives another person within Jamaica, from Jamaica to another country, or from another country to Jamaica. A person found guilty of an offence in terms of the Act is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years.

Esta ley prescribe medidas para prevenir y combatir la trata de personas con especial atención a las víctimas que son mujeres y niños, y tiene como objetivo ayudar a las víctimas de la trata y facilitar la investigación eficaz de los casos de trata. El delito de trata se comete si una persona recluta, transporta, traslada, alberga o recibe a otra persona dentro de Jamaica, de Jamaica a otro país o de otro país a Jamaica. Una persona declarada culpable de este delito en los términos de la ley puede ser sancionada con una multa o con una pena de prisión por un período no superior a 20 años.

The Sexual Offences Act specifically outlaws many sex-based crimes, including rape, sexual assault, marital rape, sexual touching or interference, inducing or encouraging the violation of a child, indecent assault, violation of persons suffering from mental or physical disabilities, forcible abduction, procuration, unlawful detention with the intent to have sexual intercourse, and living on earnings of prostitution. It also amended certain laws and standards regarding consent. It abolished the common law presumption that a boy under fourteen years of age could not commit rape, and further noted that consent is “immaterial” in any offences involving a child. The Act restricts evidence that can be brought at rape trials, specifically preventing the complainant from being asked about his or her sexual history. It preserves the possibility of anonymity for persons bringing claims under the Sexual Offences Act. Finally, it creates a sex offender registry and mandates registration for persons convicted of sexual offences.

El Decreto de Ley de Delitos Sexuales prohíbe específicamente muchos delitos basados ​​en el sexo, incluyendo la violación, la agresión sexual, la violación conyugal, el contacto o la interferencia sexual, la inducción o el fomento de la violación de un niño, la agresión indecente, la violación de personas que padecen discapacidades mentales o físicas, el secuestro forzoso, procuración, detención ilegal con la intención de tener relaciones sexuales y vivir de las ganancias de la prostitución. También modificó ciertas leyes y normas relativas al consentimiento. Abolió la presunción de derecho consuetudinario de que un niño menor de catorce años no podía cometer una violación y señaló además que el consentimiento es "inmaterial" en cualquier delito que involucre a un niño. La ley restringe las pruebas que pueden presentarse en los juicios por violación, específicamente evitando que se le pregunte al denunciante sobre su historial sexual. Preserva la posibilidad de mantener el anonimato para las personas que presenten demandas en virtud de la Ley de delitos sexuales. Por último, crea un registro de delincuentes sexuales y ordena el registro de personas condenadas por delitos sexuales.

Art. 264e provides for a criminal penalty of not less than three years for any person who commits certain specified offenses in connection with an armed conflict, including (among other things) raping a person of the female gender protected by international humanitarian law or, after she has been forcibly made pregnant, confining her unlawfully with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population, forcing a person to tolerate a sexual act of comparable severity or forcing a person protected by international humanitarian law into prostitution or to be sterilized. In especially serious cases, and in particular where the offense affects a number of persons or the offender acts in a cruel manner, life imprisonment may be imposed. In less serious cases, imprisonment of not less than one year may be imposed. Unofficial English translation available here.

Provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who has sexual intercourse with a blood relative in direct line or with a brother or sister, or a half-brother or half-sister.

Provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who carries out sexual acts with a minor or induces a minor to carry out such acts in return for payment or promises of payment. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 182 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment or a monetary penalty for any person who as a supplier, intermediary or customer engages in the trafficking of a human being for the purpose of sexual exploitation, exploitation of his or her labor or for the purpose of removing an organ. If the victim is a minor or if the offender acts for commercial gain, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than one year. In every case, a monetary penalty must also be imposed. The statute also provides that the soliciting of a person for these purposes is equivalent to trafficking, and that any person who commits the act abroad is also guilty of an offense. Unofficial English translation available here.

Article 66a provides that a foreign national shall be expelled from Switzerland for a period of five to 15 years if they are convicted of, among other things, female genital mutilation (Penal Code Art. 124, para. 1), forced marriage or forced registered partnership (Penal Code Art. 181a), trafficking in human beings (Penal Art. 182), sexual acts with children (Penal Code Art. 187, para. 1), sexual coercion (Art. 189), rape (Art. 190), sexual acts with persons incapable of judgement or resistance (Art. 191), encouraging prostitution (Art. 195), aggravated pornography (Art. 197, para. 4, second sentence – pornography containing genuine sexual acts with minors), genocide (Art. 264), crimes against humanity (Art. 264a), serious violations of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Art. 264c), and other war crimes (Art. 264d and 264h). Unofficial English translation available here.

The Act defines and prohibits human trafficking. The PCTP Act adopts a broad definition of human trafficking, namely, that a person is guilty of human trafficking if he or she delivers, recruits, transports, transfers, harbours, sells, exchanges, leases or receives another person, through various means, including the use of force, deception, or coercion, aimed at the person or an immediate family member for the purpose of exploitation. Furthermore, a person who adopts a child, facilitated or secured through legal or illegal means; or concludes a forced marriage with another person, for the purposes of exploitation of that child or person, is guilty of an offence. The PCTP Act criminalizes various acts that constitute or relate to trafficking in persons and imposes harsh penalties, including life imprisonment for trafficking in persons; 15 years’ imprisonment for engaging in conduct that causes a person to enter into debt bondage or benefiting from services of a trafficking victim; and 10 years’ imprisonment for facilitating trafficking. The PCTP Act also provides for severe fines and enables the state to confiscate the assets of traffickers.

Die Wet op Voorkoming en Bestryding van Handel in Persone (2013)

Gedwonge en minderjarige huwelike, seksuele geweld en verkragting, statutêre verkragting of besoedeling, mensehandel​

Die Wet definieer en verbied mensehandel. Die Wet aanvaar ‘n wye definisie van mensehandel, naamlik dat ‘n persoon skuldig is aan mensehandel indien hy of sy betrokke is by die werwing, vervoer, verskuiwing, huisvesting of ontvang van persone of gebruik van dreigemente, geweld of ander vorme van dwang, teen ‘n persoon of familielid met die doel van uitbuiting. Verder, ‘n persoon wat ‘n kind aanneem deur wettig of onwettige middele te gebruik; of ‘n gedwonge troue af te dwing met ‘n ander persoon, met die doel om uitbuiting van die kind of persoon, is skuldig aan ‘n oortreding. Die Wet kriminaliseer verskeie dade wat bestaan uit of verband hou met mensehandel, en dit stel swaar strafmaatrëels daar, insluitend lewenslange tronkstraf vir mensehandel; 15 jaar tronkstraf vir gedrag wat lei tot die skuldigbevinding van ‘n persoon wat betrokke was en voordeel trek uit die dienste van ‘n mensehandel slagoffer; en 10 jaar tronkstraf vir die fasilitering van mensehandel. Die Wet maak ook voorsiening vir strawwe boetes en gee die staat die reg om bates van mensehandelaars te konfiskeer.

A person is guilty of first-degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person 14 years of age or under.

This section of the Virginia Code provides that a cause of action resulting from sexual abuse during incapacity or infancy accrues upon the later of (1) the removal of incapacity or infancy or (2) when facts of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician or psychologist.

Rhode Island law prohibits minors from knowingly and voluntarily and without threat or coercion using a computer or telecommunication device to transmit an indecent visual depiction of himself or herself to another person. Minors who transmit indecent images of themselves will not be subject to sex offender registration.

This law makes it a felony to knowingly engage in, or benefit from, knowing participation in recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining by any means another person, intending or knowing that the person will be subjected to forced labor in order to commit a commercial sexual activity. The statute also mandates the creation and composition of a council on human trafficking to provide victims services, analyze human trafficking in Rhode Island, conduct a public awareness campaign, coordinate training on human trafficking prevention and victim services for state and local employees. It creates an affirmative defense to prostitution charges for victims of human trafficking, enumerates aggravating factors, and outlines criminal procedure details.

The Combating of Rape Act (the “Act”) seeks to prevent rape and provides minimum imprisonment sentences for rape. It also abolishes the previous law, which presumed that a boy under the age of 14 was incapable of rape and sexual intercourse. This Act also regulates the granting of bail to perpetrators to further protect the rights of the victim, and provides protection to victims of rape and sexual abuse. Finally, it abolishes the customary rule, common among rural areas, that marriage is a justification for, or a defense to, rape.

Chapter VI of Title 8 (Crimes against Life and Physical Integrity) delineates the circumstances under which abortion is illegal and establishes the penalties performing illegal abortions. Pursuant to Article 267 of the Criminal Code, anyone who, without complying with public health regulations established in respect of abortions, performs an abortion or in any way destroy the embryo, with the consent of the pregnant woman, is subject to a penalty of imprisonment for three months up to one year or a fine of 100 to 300 cuotas. If an abortion is performed (1) for profit, (2) outside of official institutions or (3) by a person that is a physician, such person is subject to an increased punishment of imprisonment for two to five years. Pursuant to Article 268, an individual who purposefully destroys the embryo (a) without using any force or violence on the pregnant woman, but without her consent, is subject to two to five years’ imprisonment or (b) with the use of any force or violence on the pregnant woman, is subject to three to eight years’ imprisonment. If concurrently with the occurrence of (a) or (b), any of the circumstances described in (1), (2) or (3) also exist, the punishment is increased to imprisonment for four to ten years. If a pregnant woman dies as a result of any of the above actions, the offending person is subject to imprisonment for a period of five to twelve years. Articles 270 and 271, respectively, prescribe the punishments for those who, without intending to do so, cause an abortion and for those who prescribe any abortion-inducing substance to destroy the embryo.

Chapter I of Title XI covers crimes against the normal development of sexual relations. Article 298 prescribes a penalty of four to ten years imprisonment for anyone who rapes a woman (either through vaginal intercourse or contra naturam) if during the criminal event any of the following circumstances occurs: (a) use of force or sufficient intimidation in order to achieve the goal or (b) if the victim is in a mentally disturbed state or suffers from temporary insanity, or the victim is deprived of reason or sense for any reason, or unable to resist, or lacks the ability to understand the consequences of her actions or to conform her conduct. Article 298 prescribes a term of imprisonment of 7 to 15 years if (a) the event is carried out with the participation of two or more persons, (b) if the perpetrator dresses up in military uniform or purports to be a public official, in each case, to facilitate consummating the act or (c) if the victim is over 12 and under 14 years of age. Finally, the Article prescribes a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years or the death penalty if (a) the event is carried out by a person who has previously been sanctioned for the same crime, (b) as a result of the act, the victim suffers serious injuries or illness, or (c) if the perpetrator knows that he is infected with a sexually transmitted disease. Anyone who rapes a minor who is under 12 years of age will be punished with either a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years or the death penalty, even if none of the circumstances described in the preceding sentence occur. Article 299 of the Criminal Code sanctions individuals guilty of “active” pedophilia. Any person who commits an act of “active” pedophilia using violence or intimidation, or by taking advantage of the fact that the victim is deprived of reason or sense or unable to resist, will be punished with imprisonment for seven to 15 years. Such penalty increases to 15 to 30 years or death if (a) the victim is a minor under 14 years of age, even if the circumstances set forth in the immediately preceding sentence are not present, (b) if, as a consequence of the criminal act, the victim suffers serious injuries or illness or (c) if the perpetrator has been previously sanctioned for the same crime.

Article 295 imposes a punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years or a fine of 200 to 500 cuotas, or both, to anyone who discriminates, or promotes or incites, discrimination, against another person, with manifestations in an offensive manner, on account of sex, race, color or national origin, or with actions to obstruct or impede, with motives relating to sex, race, color or national original, the exercise or enjoyment of rights of equality set forth in the Constitution. Any person who spreads ideas based on the superiority of races or racial hatred or commits, or incites, acts of violence against any race or group of people of another color or ethnic origin, shall be subject to the same punishment as indicated above.

El Capítulo VI del Título 8 (Delitos contra la vida y la integridad física) describe las circunstancias bajo las cuales el aborto es ilegal y establece las sanciones por realizar abortos ilegales. En conformidad con el artículo 267 del Código Penal, cualquier persona que, sin cumplir con las normas de salud pública establecidas con respecto a los abortos, realice un aborto o destruya de cualquier modo el embrión, con el consentimiento de la mujer embarazada, está sujeta a una pena de prisión. Por tres meses hasta un año o una multa de 100 a 300 cuotas. Si se realiza un aborto (1) con fines de lucro, (2) fuera de las instituciones oficiales o (3) por una persona que es un médico, dicha persona está sujeta a un aumento de la pena de prisión de dos a cinco años. En conformidad con el Artículo 268, una persona que destruye a propósito el embrión (a) sin usar ninguna fuerza o violencia contra la mujer embarazada, pero sin su consentimiento, está sujeta de dos a cinco años de prisión o (b) con el uso de cualquier fuerza o violencia en la mujer embarazada, está sujeto de tres a ocho años de prisión. Si concurrentemente con la ocurrencia de (a) o (b), cualquiera de las circunstancias descritas en (1), (2) o (3) también existen, el castigo se incrementa a la prisión de cuatro a diez años. Si una mujer embarazada muere como resultado de cualquiera de las acciones anteriores, la persona ofensora está sujeta a prisión por un período de cinco a doce años. Los artículos 270 y 271, respectivamente, prescriben los castigos para aquellos que, sin la intención de hacerlo, causan un aborto y para aquellos que prescriben cualquier sustancia inductora del aborto para destruir el embrión.

El Capítulo I del Título XI cubre los delitos contra el desarrollo normal de las relaciones sexuales. El artículo 298 prescribe una pena de cuatro a diez años de prisión para toda persona que viole a una mujer (ya sea por coito vaginal o contra naturam) si durante el evento criminal ocurre alguna de las siguientes circunstancias: (a) uso de la fuerza o suficiente intimidación para: lograr la meta o (b) si la víctima está en un estado mentalmente perturbado o sufre de locura temporal, o si la víctima está privada de razón o sentido por cualquier razón, o no puede resistirse, o carece de la capacidad de entender las consecuencias de las acciones o para conformar su conducta. El artículo 298 prescribe un período de prisión de 7 a 15 años si (a) el evento se lleva a cabo con la participación de dos o más personas, (b) si el perpetrador se viste de uniforme militar o pretende ser un funcionario público, en en cada caso, para facilitar la consumación del acto o (c) si la víctima es mayor de 12 años y menor de 14 años. Finalmente, el artículo prescribe un período de prisión de 15 a 30 años o la pena de muerte si (a) el evento es llevado a cabo por una persona que ha sido sancionada previamente por el mismo delito, (b) como resultado del acto, la víctima sufre lesiones o enfermedades graves, o (c) si el autor sabe que está infectado con una enfermedad de transmisión sexual. Cualquier persona que viole a un menor de edad menor de 12 años será castigada con una pena de prisión de 15 a 30 años o con la pena de muerte, incluso si no ocurre ninguna de las circunstancias descritas en la oración anterior. El artículo 299 del Código Penal sanciona a las personas culpables de pedofilia "activa". Cualquier persona que cometa un acto de pedofilia "activa" mediante el uso de la violencia o la intimidación, o aprovechando el hecho de que la víctima está privada de razón o sentido o no puede resistir, será castigada con pena de prisión de siete a 15 años. Dicha penalización aumenta a 15 a 30 años o fallece si (a) la víctima es menor de 14 años, incluso si las circunstancias establecidas en la oración inmediatamente anterior no están presentes, (b) si, como consecuencia de la acto criminal, la víctima sufre lesiones graves o enfermedad o (c) si el autor ha sido previamente sancionado por el mismo delito.

El artículo 295 impone una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años o una multa de 200 a 500 cuotas, o ambas, a cualquier persona que discrimine, promueva o incite a la discriminación de otra persona, con manifestaciones de manera ofensiva. , debido al sexo, raza, color u origen nacional, o con acciones para obstruir o impedir, con motivos relacionados con el sexo, raza, color u origen nacional, el ejercicio o disfrute de los derechos de igualdad establecidos en la Constitución. Cualquier persona que difunda ideas basadas en la superioridad de las razas o el odio racial o cometa, o incite, actos de violencia contra cualquier raza o grupo de personas de otro color u origen étnico, estará sujeta al mismo castigo que se indicó anteriormente.

This law criminalizes the act of human trafficking and sets out minimum and maximum sentencing standards (up to 15 years) for its various permutations, such as in assisting or abetting such a crime. It also states that Indonesia will cooperate with regional and international authorities in order to thwart any actions relating to human trafficking and sexual exploitation.

Peraturan ini mengkriminalisasikan tindak pidana perdagangan orang dan menetapkan standar hukuman minimum dan maksimum (maksimal 15 tahun) untuk berbagai bentuknya, seperti dalam membantu dan bersengkongkol tindak pidana tersebut. Peraturan juga menyatakan bahwa Indonesia akan bekerja sama dengan otoritas regional dan internasional untuk menggagalkan setiap tindakan yang berkaitan dengan perdagangan manusia dan eksploitasi seksual.

Article 260 punishes spouses who conceal from their spouse a legal barrier to marriage with a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Article 284 punishes adulterous spouses and their partners, regardless of their marital status. The penal code only criminalizes acts of rape outside marriage unless the wife is underage and incurs injuries as a result. Articles 285 prohibits forcing or threatening force a woman to have sexual intercourse outside of marriage and punishes violators with a maximum penalty of 12 years. Article 286 punishes sexual intercourse with an unconscious or helpless woman with a maximum of nine years imprisonment. If there is a complaint, Article 287 imposes a maximum sentence of nine years imprisonment for “carnal knowledge” of a girl outside of marriage when the man knows or reasonably should presume that she is less than 15 years of age. Prosecutions are triggered automatically when the girl is less than 12 years of age. Article 288 punishes husbands that have “carnal knowledge” of their wives who “are not yet marriageable” if it results in injury (four years imprisonment), serious injury (eight years), or death (12 years). Article 292 punishes adults that have carnal knowledge of those they know to be or reasonably should know to be minors of the same sex with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Article 293 punishes sexual abuse of a minor with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Incest is punishable by a maximum of seven years imprisonment pursuant to Article 294. Article 297 prohibits trafficking in woman and boys, which carries a maximum sentence of six years imprisonment. Article 299 imposes a four-year maximum sentence for abortion and provides for a one-third increase in sentencing for professionals (e.g., doctor, midwife) who perform abortions.

Section 74 of the Evidence Act governs “[r]estrictions on evidence at trials for rape.” This section provides that when a man is being prosecuted for rape or attempted rape, the “sexual experience of a complainant with a person other than that defendant” is inadmissible. The exception to this rule is if a judge is satisfied that it would be unfair to the defendant to refuse to allow the evidence. Under Section 92(3), a judge has discretion to warn the jury of the “special need for caution” when the prosecution relies only on the testimony of the accuser where a person is “prosecuted for rape, attempted rape, carnal knowledge or any other sexual offence.”

This Act provides policies that address the improvement of the quality of life of individuals and the reduction of the growth rate of the population. (§§ 1-3). §7 sets forth that the Ministry of Gender Development and women’s organizations shall implement gender policy to achieve gender equity, specifically, to increase women’s participation in the work force and in political institutions, to protect women’s property rights in statutory law and customary practices, and to prevent various forms of violence against women, including female genital mutilation, early marriage, teenage pregnancy. §5 sets forth that the family planning facilities shall actively involve the participation of women in deciding family size. §10 states that marriage of young girls before 18 years old, and marriage of boys before 21 years old should be discouraged.

The Act regulates sexually transmitted diseases including HIV, provides information for treatment of HIV, and provides punishment for violations. §18.3 of the Act provides that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports shall provide education on the prevention and control of HIV. §18.4-18.5 provide that educating the public regarding HIV and AIDS is part of the national response, and the government shall train all relevant personnel. While §18.7 provides that all employees shall receive the HIV training regarding the prevention and control of HIV and AIDS. Several portions of the act speak to the rights of women and girls specifically. §18.9(a) of the Act notes that when providing HIV and AIDS service to women and girls differences in sex and gender should be considered. §18.9(b) directs the government agencies, when implementing the strategies, policies and programs to address the following issues: protection of the equality of women in private and public life, to address their rights to refuse sex and to access reproductive services independently, to address men’s equal responsibilities in sexual and reproductive health, to increase educational, economic, and employment opportunities to women, to reduce inequalities in laws regarding marital issues, and to protect women’s rights in religious contexts. §18.9(c) covers pregnant women with HIV and grants them the right to marry. The government shall provide them with consultation and information regarding future pregnancy decisions and the protection of future children from HIV. Section 18.9(d) requires the government to implement national education and training to health care providers to reduce HIV infection caused by sexual assault, protect the confidentiality of the HIV test result, report the sexual violence, and assist the investigation of such violence, and to develop and implement education and training for security personnel and prosecuting authorities in conducting investigations and prosecutions about the sexual violence. §18.27 provides that willful transmission of HIV by an infected person who knows his or her HIV test constitutes first degree felony. §18.28 prohibits discrimination on the basis of HIV status.

This act defines human trafficking and provides punishment for and methods of preventing human trafficking. §1.100-§1.102 of the act define human trafficking as including recruitment, transportation, and retention of a person by force or coercion for the purpose of slavery, forced labor, keeping a person in a state of servitude, prostitution, other commercial sexual exploitation, and removal of human organs. §3 provides that a person that commits trafficking must pay restitution to the victim. §7 provides that the Court shall sentence a person convicted of human trafficking to prison for at least one year, and that the offender can be sentenced to prison for longer periods under different situations. §8 provides that the fact that the victim was old enough to consent to sex shall not serve as a defense to the human trafficking offense. While §9 provides that the victim is immune from the prostitution or other criminal offenses caused by human trafficking. Art. II, §1 provides that the President shall implement a National Plan to prevent human trafficking and shall appoint members to a task force on implementation, which shall be led by the Minister of Labor. The Law also provides that a victim has a right to restitution including damages to compensate for costs of medical treatment, rehabilitation, transportation costs, lost income, legal fees, and general compensation for distress and pain as well as any other loss suffered. Compensation is paid by the defendant directly to the victim upon conviction. The right to restitution is not affected by the victim returning to his or her home country or by the victim not being present in Liberia. Section 9 provides immunity to any immigration offence that may have been committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Additionally, under Section 8, the Law confirms that consent to sex is not a valid defence to trafficking when violence is used to commit the crime. The Law also imposes corporate liability on international transport companies that fail to verify that passengers in company vehicles which enter other countries have the requisite travel documentation. A company may be fined for failing to comply. Additionally, a company that knowingly facilitates trafficking is liable for the cost of accommodating and providing meals to the victim and any dependent.

This law requires the courts to secure the privacy and dignity, as well as physical and psychological well-being of victims of sexual violence during proceedings. However, it does not detail any specific measures to be undertaken. The law also stops courts from inferring sexual consent from silence or lack of resistance and prevents courts from taking into consideration a victim’s sexual history in ascertaining a defendant’s guilt.

The applicant was repeatedly sexually abused by her school principal during the 1970s. When these events were reported to the police in 1996, the complete police investigation revealed that the principal had sexually abused 21 former students during a 10-year period. In total, the principal was charged with 386 criminal offences of sexual abuse. The applicant brought a civil action against the Minister for Education and the Attorney General of Ireland, claiming that the State had vicarious liability for the personal injury she suffered as a result of the abuse in the public school. The High Court ruled that the state did not have vicarious liability for its employee’s actions, and the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. In January 2014, the applicant brought a case to the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), alleging violations of Article 3 (torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and Article 13, alleging that she did not have an effective domestic remedy. The ECtHR held the following: (1) the Irish State failed to meet its positive obligation, in violation of Article 3; (2) there was no violation of the procedural obligations under Article 3 since an effective official investigation into the ill-treatment of the applicant had been carried out in 1995 once the a complaint was made by another former pupil to the police; (3) the applicant did not have an adequate remedy available to her regarding her Article 3 complaints, in violation of Article 13; and (4) the applicant was awarded 85,000 euros for the costs and expenses of the proceedings. As a result of this case, Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny gave an apology to the applicant, and, in August 2014, the Irish government submitted an Action Plan to the Council of Europe setting out the measures that have been taken since this ECtHR decision.

Applicant is a citizen of Ukraine who came to Slovenia as a teenager with her family. Applicant alleged that when she was 14 a family friend repeatedly sexually assaulted her. The police investigated and an expert in gynecology examined the applicant. After complaints and a letter from the State Prosecutor’s Office to the local police a criminal complaint was issued. The ensuing investigation and trial extended over a period of eight years. During that time the defendant was allowed to repeatedly cross examine the applicant. Moreover, a lawyer with whom the applicant had shared confidential information about the case was allowed to represent the defendant. The defendant was acquitted, the applicant was referred to civil court for damages, and the applicant received a settlement from the government for the undue delays in the proceedings. The Court found that Slovenia violated the European Convention of Human Rights in two ways. Slovenia violated Article 3 when it failed to promptly investigate and prosecute the complaint of sexual abuse. Furthermore, Slovenia violated Article 8 because it failed to sufficiently protect the applicant’s personal integrity and privacy in the proceedings.

S filed a complaint on behalf of her seven-year-old daughter, V, who was sexually assaulted by a neighbor. The perpetrator, B, was indicted for sexual molestation, at which time, was not a ‘serious crime’ under the State’s criminal code and thus permitted B to enter into a plea-bargain agreement under which he admitted guilt and received a three-year suspended sentence. S brought a civil tort claim on behalf of V as she was not permitted to bring a civil claim against B in connection with B’s prosecution and received a judgment of approximately EUR 15,000 for moral damages two years later. The law did not provide for a state actor to enforce the judgment, and S was only able to collect approximately EUR 500 from B. B continued to live in the vicinity of V’s home, and she repeatedly expressed fear of further harm from him. After the assault, V was diagnosed as a person with disability. S brought a communication before the CEDAW alleging violations by Bulgaria of Articles 1, 2(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g), 3, 5, 12 and 15 of CEDAW by failing to effectively protect V against sexual violence and compensation, to ensure V’s rights to health, including reproductive health and education, to provide V with proper rehabilitative services, and to guarantee V’s right against re-victimization by B. The Committee upheld all of S’s claims, ordered the State to provide V with appropriate reparations and addressed the State to adopt specified changes to State laws, including amendments to provide effective protection from re-victimization and to provide appropriate support and financial compensation to victims, and enact new policies, including health care protocols and hospital procedures, to address sexual violence against women and girls.

A 15-year-old girl, P, was allegedly sexually assaulted by three men. She immediately reported the attack to the police, but was kept waiting for hours at the police station and a medical center before being performed anal and vaginal palpations which caused her intense pain and despite complaining the sole anal nature of the attack. A social worker was sent to interview P's neighbors and relatives about her sexual history and morals during the investigation, leasing aside the three accused. The three accused were acquitted following a trial solely in Spanish despite the first language of P and several of the witnesses was Qom, and in which great reliance was placed on P's sexual history by the prosecution and the judge. P was not notified of her rights to participate in the trial nor of the outcome of the trial and she only became aware of the acquittal after two years and was unable to appeal. The Human Rights Committee found violations of Articles 2(3), 3, 7, 14(1), 17, 24, 26 of the Convention. The Committee found that the police, medical examiner and the court did not provide appropriate protections to P's age, discriminated against her in the emphasis that was placed on her sexual history, and denied her right of access to the courts when she was not informed of her legal rights. It also found that the events at the police station and the medical examination constituted inhumane or degrading treatment, and that the investigation had arbitrarily interfered with P's private life. The Committee called on the State to guarantee access for victims, including victims of sexual assault, to the courts in conditions of equality in the future. However the operative gender stereotypes, including that as a young women from a marginalized ethnic minority group, she was sexually promiscuous, which contributed towards the acquittal of the accused of the rape were unnamed, leaving the role of the stereotypes in discriminating against similar victims and their rights unaddressed.

Una niña de 15 años, P, presuntamente fue agredida sexualmente por tres hombres. Ella informó de inmediato del ataque a la policía, pero se mantuvo esperando durante horas en la estación de policía y en un centro médico antes de que se realizaran las palpaciones anales y vaginales, lo que le causó un dolor intenso, además ella especificó la naturaleza anal única del ataque. Se envió a una trabajadora social para entrevistar a los vecinos y familiares de P sobre su historial sexual y su moral durante la investigación, dejando a un lado a los tres acusados. Los tres acusados fueron absueltos después de un juicio únicamente en español a pesar del primer idioma de P y varios de los testigos era Qom, y en los que la fiscalía y el juez depositaron una gran confianza en la historia sexual de P. P no fue notificada de sus derechos a participar en el juicio ni del resultado del juicio y solo se enteró de la absolución después de dos años, cuando ya era muy tarde para apelar. El Comité de Derechos Humanos encontró violaciones de los artículos 2 (3), 3, 7, 14 (1), 17, 24, 26 de la Convención. El Comité determinó que la policía, el médico forense, y el tribunal no proporcionaron las protecciones adecuadas a la edad de P, la discriminaron por el énfasis que le pusieron en su historial sexual y negaron su derecho de acceso a los tribunales cuando no se le informó de sus derechos legales. También encontró que los eventos en la estación de policía y el examen médico constituían un trato inhumano y degradante, y que la investigación había interferido arbitrariamente en la vida privada de P. El Comité pidió al Estado que garantice el acceso de las víctimas, incluidas las víctimas de agresión sexual, a los tribunales en condiciones de igualdad en el futuro. Sin embargo, los estereotipos operativos de género, incluyendo que como mujeres jóvenes de un grupo minoritario étnico marginado, la tacharon como sexualmente promiscua, lo que contribuyó a la absolución de las acusadas de la violación no fue identificado, dejando el papel de los estereotipos en la discriminación contra víctimas similares y sus derechos no defendidos.

With the goal of assessing the impact of mandatory minimum sentences for sexual offences in Tanzania, this memorandum provides a comparative study with a small sample of jurisdictions – including Canada, Kenya, Lesotho, Zambia, South Africa and Tanzania - to showcase how different countries have utilized mandatory minimum sentences to address sexual offences. It also explores whether imposing mandatory minimums has resulted in a reduction of the commission of the sexual offences they target.