South America

Report by the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice and International Human Rights Clinic, University of Chicago Law School's International Human Rights Clinic, and the Public Defender's Office in Argentina finding that women and their families are disproportionately affected by the harsh penalties imposed for low-level drug offences in Argentina.

Informe del Centro Mundial para las Mujeres y la Justicia y la Clínica Internacional de Derechos Humanos de Avon, la Clínica Internacional de Derechos Humanos de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Chicago, y la Oficina del Defensor Público de Argentina que encuentran que las mujeres y sus familias se ven afectadas de manera desproporcionada por las duras sanciones impuestas por delitos de drogas de nivel en la Argentina.

This law promotes protection for victims of domestic violence who have suffered physical or psychological aggression from any of the members of the family, whether or not they cohabitate. Protection orders, as precautionary measures, shall be granted by a ‘Peace Judge’ (Juez de Paz). This law also regulates other support measures for the victim-survivor, such as the immediate attention and health care by the public health agencies.

Esta ley promueve la protección de las víctimas de violencia doméstica que hayan sufrido agresiones físicas o psíquicas por parte de alguno de los miembros de la familia, convivan o no. Las órdenes de protección, como medidas cautelares, serán otorgadas por un Juez de Paz. Esta ley también regula otras medidas de apoyo a la víctima-sobreviviente, como la atención inmediata y el cuidado de la salud por parte de los organismos públicos de salud.

This law promotes, protects, and supports motherhood and breastfeeding for working women, up to 24 months of age, to ensure the proper care of the children. On this note, every pregnant worker shall have the right to access a maternity leave, for a period of 18 uninterrupted weeks, regardless the type of contract under which she provides a service. This leave will be extended to 24 weeks in cases of baby’s severe diseases or premature births. Mothers have the right to receive their regular salary during maternity leave.

Esta ley promueve, protege y apoya la maternidad y lactancia de la mujer trabajadora, hasta los 24 meses de edad del menor, asegurando el cuidado adecuado de los hijos. En este sentido, toda trabajadora embarazada tendrá derecho a acceder a la licencia de maternidad, por un período de 18 semanas ininterrumpidas, independientemente del tipo de contrato bajo el cual preste un servicio. Este permiso se extenderá a 24 semanas en caso de enfermedades graves del bebé o parto prematuro. Las madres tienen derecho a recibir su salario regular durante la licencia de maternidad.

Article 48 states that both men and women have equal civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. Articles 49 to 59 protect the family and the rights of each member of its members. In turn, article 60 states that government authorities must promote public policies to prevent any kind of violence within the family unit. Article 89 provides for special labor protections for pregnant and lactating women, who cannot be dismissed by their employers. Article 115 supports peasant woman by allowing their participation in public debates on rural matters. Article 117 promotes the right of women to access public positions and perform as public servants.

El artículo 48 establece que tanto hombres como mujeres tienen los mismos derechos civiles, políticos, sociales, económicos y culturales. Los artículos 49 a 59 protegen la familia y los derechos de cada uno de sus miembros. A su vez, el artículo 60 establece que las autoridades gubernamentales deben promover políticas públicas para prevenir cualquier tipo de violencia dentro de la unidad familiar. El artículo 89 prevé protecciones laborales especiales para las mujeres embarazadas y lactantes, que no pueden ser despedidas por sus empleadores. El artículo 115 apoya a la mujer campesina al permitir su participación en los debates públicos sobre asuntos rurales. El artículo 117 promueve el derecho de las mujeres a acceder a cargos públicos y desempeñarse como servidoras públicas.

This Decree adopted the National Public Policy of Gender Equity (‘Política Pública Nacional de Equidad de Género’). It aims for the development of specific plans and programs that guarantee the rights of forcibly displaced women, including their right to a violence-free life. The policy also acknowledged the importance of the differential approach from the gender perspective, taking into account the particularities arising out of urban and rural context, Afro-Colombian, indigenous, and peasant women. In turn, the Decree created a cross-sectional commission in charge of the coordinating the implementation and technical and operational follow-up of the National Public Policy on Gender Equality.

Este Decreto adoptó la Política Pública Nacional de Equidad de Género. Esta tiene como objetivo el desarrollo de planes y programas específicos que garanticen los derechos de las mujeres que han sido desplazadas forzosamente, incluyendo su derecho a una vida libre de violencia. La política también reconoció la importancia del enfoque diferencial desde la perspectiva de género, tomando en cuenta las particularidades que surgen del contexto urbano y rural, las mujeres afrocolombianas, indígenas y campesinas. A su vez, el Decreto creó una comisión transversal encargada de coordinar la implementación y el seguimiento técnico y operativo de la Política Pública Nacional de Igualdad de Género.

This law modified articles 236, 239, 57, and 58 of the Labor Code, among other provisions to establish special labor protections for pregnant and lactating women. The law prohibits the dismissal of pregnant or lactating women without cause and without prior permission of a labor inspector. It also granted women the right to receive their regular salary during a 14-week maternity leave.

Esta ley modificó los artículos 236, 239, 57 y 58 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, entre otras disposiciones. Su intención es establecer protecciones laborales reforzadas para las mujeres embarazadas y lactantes. En esta medida, la ley establece la prohibición de despedir a una mujer embarazada o lactante sin causa y sin permiso previo de un inspector de trabajo. También otorgó a las mujeres el derecho a recibir su salario regular durante una licencia de maternidad de 14 semanas.

This law enacted rules for the prevention and sanction of several forms of violence and discrimination against women. It established provisions that guarantee all women i) a life free of violence, both in the public and private sectors, ii) the exercise of their rights granted both by the domestic and the international legal systems, iii) access to administrative and judicial procedures for protection and attention, and iv) the adoption of public policies against violence and discrimination.

Esta ley promulgó normas para la prevención y sanción de diversas formas de violencia y discriminación contra la mujer. Estableció disposiciones que garantizan a todas las mujeres i) una vida libre de violencia, tanto en el sector público como en el privado, ii) el ejercicio de los derechos que les otorgan tanto el ordenamiento jurídico interno como el internacional, iii) el acceso a los procedimientos administrativos y judiciales para su protección y atención, y iv) la adopción de políticas públicas contra la violencia y la discriminación.

This law establishes rules that further develop equal opportunities for women. It establishes guidelines for the design of public policies that foster and guarantee the full exercise of women’s political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the free development of their personality, capacities, and aptitudes. The law also appoints the institutions responsible for their execution.

Esta ley consagra reglas que desarrollan la igualdad de oportunidades para las mujeres. Establece lineamientos para el diseño de políticas públicas que propicien y garanticen el pleno ejercicio de los derechos políticos, civiles, económicos, sociales y culturales de las mujeres, y el libre desarrollo de su personalidad, capacidades y aptitudes. La ley también designa las instituciones encargadas de su ejecución.

This law serves as the basis for the Colombian Criminal Code, it enumerates conducts that constitute crimes and their sanctions. The code sets forth several gender-related crimes. Article 104A criminalizes femicide, meaning the killing of women because they are female. Article 123 sanctions people who forcibly terminate a pregnancy. Article 187 prohibits forcing in-vitro treatments on women against their will. Article 229 regulates domestic violence offenses. Articles 208 and following criminalize rape and establish aggravating circumstances including, among others, if the victim is under 14 years old, if the victim is incapable of defending him or herself, if the abuser used violence and if the abuse was held within the household. Article 116 A prohibits the use of chemical agents or corrosive substances that cause injuries or harm when they come into contact with human tissue. Finally, for some crimes, the code treats as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the victim is a woman. Law 1719 of June 18, 2014 modified and expanded these provisions.

Esta ley que contiene el Código Penal colombiano enumera las conductas que constituyen delitos y sus sanciones. El código establece varios delitos relacionados con el género. El artículo 104A tipifica como delito el feminicidio, es decir, el asesinato de mujeres solo por el hecho de ser mujeres. El artículo 123 sanciona a las personas que obligan a la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo. El artículo 187 prohíbe realizar tratamientos in vitro a mujeres en contra de su voluntad. El artículo 229 regula el delito de violencia doméstica. Los artículos 208 y siguientes tipifican como delito la violación y establecen circunstancias agravantes que incluyen, entre otras, que la víctima sea menor de 14 años, que sea incapaz de defenderse por sí misma, si el abusador usó violencia y si el abuso se llevó a cabo dentro del hogar. El artículo 116 A prohíbe el uso de agentes químicos o sustancias corrosivas que causen lesiones o daños cuando entren en contacto con tejidos humanos. Finalmente, para algunos delitos, el código trata como circunstancia agravante el hecho de que la víctima sea mujer. La Ley 1719 de junio 18, 2014 modificó y amplió algunas de estas disposiciones.

Law 82 provides support measures for women serving as heads of the family unit or household. The law is intended to guarantee adequate living conditions and promote equity and social participation of women. Assistance is provided in the form of education, health, housing, credit incentive benefits, among others.

La Ley 82 establece medidas de apoyo a las mujeres que se desempeñan como madres cabeza de familia. La ley tiene por objeto garantizar condiciones de vida adecuadas y promover la equidad y la participación social de las mujeres. La asistencia se brinda en forma de beneficios de educación, salud, vivienda, incentivos crediticios, entre otros.

The Maria da Penha Act alters the penal procedure code to allow the judge to order preventive custody when there is risk to the physical or psychological integrity of the woman. (Article 42). Article 45 alters the law of criminal enforcement to allow the judge to determine the obligatory attendance of the aggressor in recovery and re-education programs. The Act orders the creation of special courts for domestic and family violence against women with civil and penal competence to address family issues derived from violence against women. Article 43 amends the Penal Code by including violence against women as an aggravating factor. Article 44 imposes the penalty sentences ranging from three months to three years of detention to domestic violence. If domestic violence is committed against a woman with special needs, the sentence will be increased by 1/3.

A Lei Maria da Penha alterou o Código de Processo Penal para permitir a que juiz decrete prisão preventiva quando há risco à integridade física ou psicológica da mulher (artigo 42). O artigo 45 altera a Lei de Execuções Penais permitindo que o juiz determine o comparecimento obrigatório do agressor a programas de recuperação e reeducação. A LMP prevê a criação de Juizados contra Violência Doméstica e Familiar contra Mulher, com jurisdição civil e penal para tratar sobre assuntos cíveis e criminais. Por fim, o artigo 43 emenda o Código Penal para incluir a violência contra mulheres no rol de circunstância agravantes, enquanto o artigo 44 estabelece pena de 3 meses a 3 anos de detenção para lesão corporal contra ascendente, descendente, irmão, cônjuge ou companheiro, ou com quem conviva ou tenha convivido, ou, ainda, prevalecendo-se o agente das relações domésticas, de coabitação ou de hospitalidade. Nos casos de violência doméstica praticada contra pessoas com necessidades especiais, a pena imposta é acrescida de 1/3.

The law decrees that a judge shall determine, for a defined period of time, the inclusion of the woman in a situation of domestic and family violence in the registry of assistance programs of the federal, state and municipal government. (Article 9). Article 10-A sets guidelines on how the victim's assistance will be handled by the police authority and guarantees specialized police and forensic care to be provided by previously trained officers - preferably female. If there is a current or imminent risk to the life or physical integrity of a woman in a situation of domestic or family violence, or to her dependents, the aggressor must be immediately removed from the home, residence, or place where the victim lives with him/her (Article 12-C). The law prohibits the imposition of pecuniary sentences against the aggressor. (Article 17).

O juiz determinará, por prazo certo, a inclusão da mulher em situação de violência doméstica e familiar no cadastro de programas assistenciais do governo federal, estadual e municipal (Artigo 9º). O artigo 10-A estabelece os procedimentos que deverão ser seguidos pela autoridade policial quando do atendimento das mulheres vítimas de violência doméstica, dentre os quais a garantia de polícia e perícia especializada e treinad e atendimento realizado preferencialmente por mulheres. Na existência de risco atual ou iminente à vida ou à integridade física da mulher em situação de violência doméstica e familiar, ou de seus dependentes, o agressor será imediatamente afastado do lar, domicílio ou local de convivência com a ofendida (artigo 12-C). A LMP ainda proíbe a imposição exclusiva de pena pecuniária contra o agressor (artigo 17).

Law No. 11.108/2005 was enacted to amend existing Law No. 8.080/1990, which regulates the Unified Health System (“SUS”). It included a new chapter providing that pregnant woman shall have the right to an accompanying party to be present during all health services provided by the SUS in connection with labor, birth, and the immediate post-partum period.

A Lei Federal n. 11.108/2005 altera a Lei n. 8.080/1990, para garantir às parturientes o direito à presença de acompanhante durante o trabalho de parto, parto e pós-parto imediato, no âmbito do Sistema Único de Saúde - SUS.

Under the Brazilian Criminal Code, it is illegal to terminate a pregnancy, as well as to kill a child during childbirth, or shortly thereafter. Under Article 124, it is a crime for someone to cause an abortion on themselves or to allow others to cause it, either of which carries a sentence of 1-3 years of imprisonment. Article 125 prohibits anyone from practicing an abortion on a pregnant woman without her consent and imposes a sentence of 3-10 years of imprisonment. Article 126 imposes a 1-4-year prison sentence to anyone who practice an abortion with pregnant woman’s consent. Pursuant to Article 128, a doctor is not punished for performing an abortion if (i) the pregnant woman’s life is at risk, or (ii) the pregnancy resulted from rape. The Brazilian Supreme Court authorized the practice of an abortion on fetus with anencephaly (Claim of non-compliance with fundamental precept - ADPF 54). Under no circumstances is it permissible for someone to cause an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman.

Nos termos do Código Penal brasileiro, é ilegal terminar uma gestação, ou matar um recém-nascido. De acordo com o artigo 124, é crime sujeito à detenção de um a três anos provocar aborto em si mesma ou consentir que outrem lhe provoque. O artigo 125 proíbe a prática de aborto sem o consentimento da gestante, impondo pena de reclusão de três a 10 anos de reclusão. O artigo 126 impõe pena de um a quatro anos de reclusão para quem provoca o aborto com o consentimento da gestante. Nos termos do artigo 128, o médico não será punido ao provocar o aborto nas seguintes situações: (i) se não há outro meio de salvar a vida da gestante; ou (ii) se a gravidez resulta de estupro e o aborto é precedido de consentimento da gestante ou, quando incapaz, de seu representante legal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), quando do julgamento da Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) 54, autorizou interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico. Ainda, sob nenhuma hipótese é permitido provocar o aborto sem o consentimento da gestante.

A person who takes, hides, or imprisons a pregnant woman in order to force the woman or a third party to do, not do, or tolerate something against his or her will is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. A person who kidnaps or hides a pregnant woman to obtain a ransom is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. If perpetrator obtains the desired gain, the minimum penalty will be raised to eight years.

La persona que toma, esconde o encarcela a una mujer embarazada con el fin de obligar a la mujer o a una tercera persona a hacer, no hacer o tolerar algo en contra de su voluntad está sujeta a pena privadora de libertad de 10 a 25 años. La persona que secuestra u oculta a una mujer embarazada para obtener un rescate está sujeta a una pena de prisión de entre 10 y 25 años. Si el agresor obtiene la ganancia deseada, la pena mínima se elevará a ocho años.

Abortion is a criminal offense unless there are no other means with which to save the life or health of the pregnant woman, the woman is mentally ill or otherwise challenged, or her pregnancy is the result of sexual assault. Those who perform abortions with the consent of the woman are liable to imprisonment for one to four years, or up to six years if the woman does not survive. Performing an abortion without the consent of the woman is punishable by three to ten years in prison, or up to 15 years if the woman does not survive. In addition to these prison sentences, doctors, surgeons, midwives, and pharmacists who assist or perform an abortion may be disqualified from practicing their profession for twice the period of imprisonment. A person who unintentionally causes an abortion through acts of violence is liable for six months to two years imprisonment. Finally, a woman who causes or consents to an abortion may be sentenced to one to four years imprisonment. An unsuccessful abortion attempt is not a punishable offense, so women who do so should be able to seek medical attention without penalty. (Note: The government of Argentina is voting on legalizing abortion as of December 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)

El aborto es un delito penal a menos que no existan otros medios con los que salvar la vida o la salud de la mujer embarazada, la mujer tenga una enfermedad mental o sufra algún otro problema, o su embarazo sea el resultado de una agresión sexual. Quienes practican abortos con el consentimiento de la mujer pueden ser castigados con una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años, o hasta seis años si la mujer no sobrevive. Realizar un aborto sin el consentimiento de la mujer se castiga con tres a diez años de prisión, o hasta 15 años si la mujer no sobrevive. Además de estas penas de prisión, los médicos, cirujanos, parteras y farmacéuticos que ayuden o practiquen un aborto pueden ser inhabilitados para ejercer su profesión por el doble del período de prisión. Una persona que provoque involuntariamente un aborto mediante actos de violencia puede ser sancionada con una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años. Finalmente, una mujer que provoque o consienta en un aborto puede ser condenada a una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años. Un intento de aborto fallido no es un delito punible, por lo que las mujeres que lo hagan deberían poder buscar atención médica sin sanción. (Nota: El gobierno de Argentina está votando sobre la legalización del aborto a diciembre de 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)

If the descendants inherit, the spouse shares in the hereditary estate in the same proportion as sons and/or daughters. If the ascendants inherit, half of the inheritance corresponds to the spouse. In the absence of descendants and ascendants, the spouse inherits the entirety of the estate. The spouse does not inherit if the deceased dies within 30 days of the marriage due to an illness, which existed at the time of marriage and was known by the survivor to have a foreseeable fatal outcome, unless, the marriage was preceded by a union in joint habitation.

Si los descendientes heredan, el cónyuge comparte la herencia hereditaria en la misma proporción que los hijos y / o hijas. Si los ascendientes heredan, la mitad de la herencia corresponde al cónyuge. En ausencia de descendientes y ascendientes, el cónyuge hereda la totalidad de la herencia. El cónyuge no hereda si el fallecido muere dentro de los 30 días posteriores al matrimonio debido a una enfermedad, que existía en el momento del matrimonio y que el sobreviviente sabía que tenía un desenlace fatal previsible, a menos que el matrimonio fuera precedido por una unión en habitación conjunta.

Article 402 prohibits the interpretation or application of any norm in a manner that limits, restricts, excludes, or suppresses the equality of rights and obligations of the parties to a marriage, whether such marriage is consummated between two people of different sexes or the same sex.

El artículo 402 prohíbe la interpretación o aplicación de cualquier norma de manera que limite, restrinja, excluya o suprima la igualdad de derechos y obligaciones de las partes contrayentes, ya sea que dicho matrimonio se consuma entre dos personas de diferente sexo o del mismo sexo.

Article 37 guarantees the full exercise of political rights, in accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty and the laws that are enacted accordingly. Suffrage is universal, equal, secret, and obligatory. The political parties must guarantee the equality between men and women for access to elected and support positions. Article 75 empowers Congress to foster democratic values and equal opportunities free from all forms of discrimination.

El artículo 37 garantiza el pleno ejercicio de los derechos políticos, de acuerdo con el principio de soberanía popular y las leyes que se dicten en consecuencia. El sufragio es universal, igual, secreto y obligatorio. Los partidos políticos deben garantizar la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres para el acceso a cargos electos y de apoyo. El artículo 75 faculta al Congreso para fomentar los valores democráticos y la igualdad de oportunidades libres de toda forma de discriminación.

This law includes several amendments to the Employment Code to govern sexual harassment, some examples of which include companies with more than 10 employees must have a protocol to observe and guarantee a workplace environment of dignity and mutual respect, including rules and internal sanctions for cases of sexual harassment; including dismissal without compensation as a cause of action related to sexual harassment, to address sexual harassment as a conduct that jeopardizes and harms the workplace environment; and including a protocol for cases where the sexual harassment cases can reach the Labor Department Inspection.

Esta ley incluye varias enmiendas al Código de Trabajo para regular el acoso sexual, algunos ejemplos de las cuales incluyen: empresas con más de 10 empleados deben tener un protocolo para observar y garantizar un ambiente laboral de dignidad y respeto mutuo, incluyendo reglas y sanciones internas para los casos de Acoso sexual, e incluyendo el despido sin compensación como causa de acción relacionada con el acoso sexual, para abordar el acoso sexual como una conducta que pone en peligro y daña el entorno laboral, e incluyendo también un protocolo para los casos en que los casos de acoso sexual puedan llegar a la Inspección del Departamento de Trabajo.

Its objective is to prevent, sanction, and reduce domestic violence and protect victims, especially woman, elders, and children. It defines domestic violence as physical acts and physical abuse committed by a person having a family bond with the victim. The Family Tribunal has jurisdiction over cases where the conduct does not qualify as a crime (according to the Criminal Code) and no prison penalties may be imposed. Article 4 states that enforcement of this law is within the purview of the Minister of Women and Gender Equity.

Su objetivo es prevenir, sancionar y reducir la violencia intrafamiliar y proteger a las víctimas, especialmente a mujeres, ancianos y niños. Define la violencia doméstica como los actos físicos y el abuso físico cometidos por una persona que tiene un vínculo familiar con la víctima. El Tribunal de Familia tiene jurisdicción sobre los casos en que la conducta no califica como delito (según el Código Penal) y no pueden imponerse penas de prisión. El Artículo 4 establece que la aplicación de esta ley es competencia de la Ministra de la Mujer y la Equidad de Género.

Articles 342 to 345 relate to abortion as a crime, other than an abortion under any of the conditions established by Law No. 21,030 of 2017. The penalty varies considerably depending on the circumstances and motives for the abortion, including, for example, whether the abortion was performed by the mother or a third party, whether it was done with or without the consent of the mother, or whether it was done to hide any shame (deshonra). Article 390 of the Criminal Code provides that the killing of a woman who is or used to be in a relationship with the murderer is murder (spousal) (femicidio), the penalty for which is imprisonment from 15 years and one day to qualified perpetual imprisonment. Article 400 increases by one degree penalties for crimes committed in the context of domestic or family violence. Article 411 prohibits acts done with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the entry or exit of individuals who perform sex work within or outside the Chilean borders. The penalty is imprisonment from three years and one day to five years, plus a fine. Article 411 also prohibits acts of violence, coercion, or taking advantage of vulnerability of persons in order to obtain the consent of a person to be sexuality exploited, such as in pornography, slavery, or forced labor. The penalty is imprisonment from five years and one day to 15 years, plus a fine.

Los Artículos 342 al 345 regulan aborto como delito, distinto del aborto en cualquiera de las condiciones establecidas por la Ley N ° 21.030 de 2017. La sanción varía considerablemente según las circunstancias y motivos del aborto, incluyendo, por ejemplo, si el el aborto fue realizado por la madre o una tercera persona, ya sea con o sin el consentimiento de la madre, o para ocultar alguna vergüenza (deshonra). El Artículo 390 del Código Penal establece que el homicidio de una mujer que está o solía estar en relación con el asesino es homicidio (conyugal) (femicidio), cuya pena es de prisión de 15 años y un día a prisión perpetua calificada. El Artículo 400 aumenta en un grado las penas por delitos cometidos en el contexto de violencia doméstica o familiar. El Artículo 411 prohíbe los actos realizados con el propósito de promover o facilitar la entrada o salida de personas que realizan trabajo sexual dentro o fuera de las fronteras chilenas. La pena es de prisión de tres años y un día a cinco años, más una multa. El Artículo 411 también prohíbe los actos de violencia, coacción o aprovechamiento de la vulnerabilidad de las personas para obtener el consentimiento de una persona para ser explotada sexualmente, como en la pornografía, la esclavitud o el trabajo forzoso. La pena es de prisión de cinco años y un día a 15 años, más una multa.

Law No. 20,820 created the Ministry of Women and Gender Justice, an initiative designed to bring focus to gender issues that were formerly led by the Women National Service (“Sernam”). The Ministry of Women and Gender Justice is a more autonomous and resourceful entity and its mission is to create policies, plans, and programs that benefit women and work to eliminate any type of gender discrimination, making Chile a more equitable country.

The Domestic Violence Act sets forth the procedures for granting protection orders in situations involving domestic violence. Under Part III of the Act, once a protection order has been granted, a police officer can, without a warrant, enter any premises “if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that a protection order is being violated.” Section 42 of Part IV of the Act provides that, once a police officer has intervened in a case of domestic violence, “the police officer shall as soon as possible take all reasonable measures within his power to prevent the victim of domestic violence from being abused again.”

The Sexual Offences Act was created “to reform and consolidate the laws relating to sexual offences.” Part II of the Act sets forth the elements of the offenses of rape and sexual assault and defines the meaning of consent, providing that if a defendant raises “consent” as a defense, “the belief must be objectively reasonable” for the defense to succeed. Part II of the Act also defines various categories of sexual offenses against children. Part III of the Act sets parameters for the investigation of sexual offenses, Part IV of the Act defines procedures to be followed at court, and Part V of the Act governs evidentiary standards. Part IX of the Act deals with the prevention of sexual assault and establishes the National Task Force for the Prevention of Sexual Violence.

The objective of this law is to protect the human rights of every Venezuelan woman or woman resident in Venezuela. This law, independent of the race, creed, political, economic or social affinity of the women, seeks to defend the rights of the women in the following aspects: social, family, work and in all areas of daily life. This law intends to dignify women by providing that their fundamental rights are inviolable. It also recognizes as “violence” any form of abuse that violates or annuls any of the women’s human rights and sets forth diverse categories for all forms of violence against women and the procedures for the defense of the women’s rights. This legal instrument provides for all rights, regulations, and specific defense procedures necessary to protect the Venezuelan women from gender violence, but it is unclear the degree to which it will be enforced.

This law amends Article 1,520 of the Civil Code in order to establish that only persons who have reached the age of marriage determined in article 1,517 of the Civil Code may marry. Article 1,517 of the Civil Code provides that a man and woman who have not reached the age of majority may marry at age 16 if they have received authorization from both of their parents or their legal representatives. (Article 5 of the Civil Code provided that minority ceases at the age of 18, when the person is entitled to practice all acts of civil life.) Before this amendment, Article 1,520 of the Civil Code established that those who had not yet reached the age of marriage according to Article 1,517 would be allowed to marry to avoid the imposition or enforcement of criminal penalties or in the case of pregnancy. This is no longer permitted as a reason to marry younger than the age of 16.

Referida Lei Federal alterou o artigo 1520 do Código Civil para estabelecer que apenas pessoas que atingiram a idade núbil poderiam contrair casamento. Nesse aspecto, o artigo 1517 do Código Civil estabelece que o homem e a mulher com dezesseis anos podem casar-se, exigindo-se autorização de ambos os pais, ou de seus representantes legais, enquanto não atingida a maioridade civil, que é de 18 anos, nos termos do artigo 5º. Antes dessa alteração, o artigo 1520 estabelecia que aqueles que ainda não tinham atingido a idade núbil poderiam se casar, para evitar imposição ou cumprimento de pena criminal ou em caso de gravidez.

Federal Law No. 11.340/2006 commonly known as “Lei Maria da Penha” (or Maria da Penha Act) creates a new body of legal provisions regarding domestic and familiar violence against women in Brazil and requires that public authorities develop policy and measures that aim to guarantee women's human rights within the scope of domestic and family relations. The law also addresses urgent protective measures for victims. In addition, it provides for the creation of equipment essential to its effectiveness: Specialized Police Stations to Assist Women, Shelters, Women's Reference Centers, and Courts for Domestic and Family Violence against Women, among others. Brazil enacted this law after its namesake brought a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), arguing that Brazil effectively condoned domestic violence that culminated in her irreversible paraplegia by failing to properly investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrator. The IACHR criticized the practices of the Brazilian criminal justice system and urged reform at the national level. Title II, Title III, Title IV, Title VII

A Lei Federal n. 11.340/1006, conhecida como “Lei Maria da Penha” (LMP) criou uma série de mecanismos legais para combate à violência doméstica e familiar sofrida por mulheres no Brasil. A lei impõe que as autoridades públicas desenvolvam políticas e procedimento que objetivem a garantia dos direitos das mulheres dentro de suas relações domésticas e familiares. A lei ainda prevê a os procedimentos para concessão de medidas protetivas de urgência das vítimas. Além disso, a LMP institui a criação de mecanismos necessários para efetivação do combate à violência doméstica tais como a criação de: (i) delegacias especializadas em atendimento da mulher vítima de violência doméstica, (ii) casas-abrigos e centro de referência para atendimento as mulhers em situação de violência doméstica e familiar, bem como (iii) a criação de Juizados de Violência Doméstica e Familiar contra a mulher, além de outras disposições. Importa recordar que a Lei Maria da Penha foi promulgada após a própria Maria da Penha denunciar perante a Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos (CIDH) que o sistema judiciário brasileiro era condescendente com violência sofrida pelas mulheres em ambiente familiar e que, em razão da inefetividade da justiça brasileira em investigar, processar e punir o agressor, ela acabou vítima de uma paraplegia irreversível. Título II, Título III, Título IV, Título VII

On May 14, 2013, the National Justice Council issued a resolution stating that competent authorities are not allowed to refuse (a) to celebrate same-sex civil marriages nor (b) to convert same-sex common-law marriages (stable union) into civil marriages. The National Justice Council is a public administrative body that aims to advance the work of the Brazilian judicial system. The resolution was issued after the Supreme Court declared in 2011 that it is unconstitutional to apply a different legal treatment to same-sex common-law marriages (stable union), from the one applied to heterosexual common-law marriages (stable union).

Em maio de 2013, o Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ), que é o órgão da administração pública que visa aperfeiçoar o trabalho do sistema judiciário brasileiro, emitiu resolução estabelecendo que as autoridades competentes não poderiam se recursar a habilitar e celebrar casamento civil entre pessoas do mesmo sexo ou se recusar a converter a união estável entre pessoas do mesmo sexo em casamento civil. Referida resolução foi emitida após o Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF declarar, em 2011, que é inconstitucional a aplicação de tratamento jurídico distinto aos casamentos e união estável entre pessoas do mesmo sexo.

This decision established the guidelines for the institutional policy on gender for the Paraguayan Judicial Branch. The Supreme Court agreed on: i) ensuring that users of judicial services receive communications (with an emphasis on gender) in a timely manner that are both easily accessible and understandable; ii) providing information on gender and gender rights; raising awareness on the importance of reporting events that violate individuals’ rights and dignity; iii) publicizing case law that studies gender issues; iv) digitizing the rulings (with a focus on gender issues) issued by different courts; complying with international standards; creating a framework for decision-making that incorporates a gender approach; v) hiring trained personnel to handle gender-related claims.

Esta decisión estableció los lineamientos de la política institucional de género del Poder Judicial de Paraguay. La Corte Suprema acordó: i) asegurar que los usuarios de los servicios judiciales reciban comunicaciones (con énfasis en género) en tiempo y forma que sean de fácil acceso y comprensión; ii) brindar información sobre género y derechos de género; sensibilizar sobre la importancia de denunciar hechos que vulneran los derechos y la dignidad de las personas; iii) difundir jurisprudencia que estudie temas de género; iv) digitalizar las sentencias (con enfoque de género) emitidas por diferentes tribunales; cumplir con los estándares internacionales; crear un marco para la toma de decisiones que incorpore un enfoque de género; v) contratación de personal capacitado para atender reclamos relacionados con el género.

This decision resolved to implement the content of the ‘United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders,’ known as the ‘Bangkok Rules.’ The incorporation of such rules seeks for the creation of public policies aimed to eliminate discrimination against convicted women, establish legal protection of women’s rights in courts, and promote equality between women and men before the Justice Administration System. The decision also provided for a multidisciplinary commission composed of the Secretariat for Gender, the Directorate of Human Rights, the Directorate of International Affairs and the Penitentiary Monitoring Unit. Such commission is responsible of promoting the Bangkok Rules and raising awareness of all components of the Judiciary branch.

Esta decisión resolvió implementar el contenido de las 'Reglas de las Naciones Unidas para el Tratamiento de Reclusas y Medidas no Privativas de la Libertad para Mujeres Delincuentes', conocidas como 'Reglas de Bangkok'. La incorporación de dichas reglas busca la creación de políticas públicas dirigidas eliminar la discriminación contra las mujeres condenadas, establecer la protección legal de los derechos de las mujeres en las cortes y promover la igualdad entre mujeres y hombres ante el Sistema de Administración de Justicia. La decisión también dispuso una comisión multidisciplinaria integrada por la Secretaría de Género, la Dirección de Derechos Humanos, la Dirección de Asuntos Internacionales y la Unidad de Seguimiento Penitenciario. Dicha comisión es responsable de promover las Reglas de Bangkok y sensibilizar a todos los componentes del Poder Judicial.

The case concerned the breach of constitutional guarantees of due process and the right of defense. The Supreme Court of Justice, Criminal Division, ruled in favor of the application of art. 499 Code on Criminal Procedure of 1890, revoking the sentence enacted by the Criminal Court of Appeal 3rd Division and acquitting the defendant. The defendant was accused of sexual abuse and rape of his stepdaughters. The action was brought by the presumptive victims’ aunt. In the trial court, several expert opinions and testimonies supported the aunt’s claim, however, one of the alleged victims argued that she had not been raped but was forced by her aunt to accuse the defendant. From the analysis of the evidence, defendant was convicted by the trial court. The defendant appealed the decision and argued that i) some expert opinions had inconsistencies and underlying defects or omissions, and ii) the trial court omitted the testimony by one of the presumptive victims. The Criminal Court of Appeal 3rd Division upheld the trial court’s decision. Next, the defendant brought an action before the Supreme Court of Justice -Criminal Division-, alleging the procedure was null because of a due process violation. Even though the Supreme Court did not consider the procedure was void because the defendant had the opportunity to defend himself, the Supreme Court revoked the decision made by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court, because there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant. The full decision can be accessed via the External URL to the Supreme Court of Paraguay's website's search engine.

El caso se refería a la vulneración de las garantías constitucionales al debido proceso y al derecho de defensa. La Corte Suprema de Justicia -Sala de lo Penal-, falló a favor de la aplicación del art. 499 Código Procesal Penal de 1890, revocando la sentencia dictada por la Sala Penal de Apelaciones -3ra Sala- y por lo tanto absolviendo al acusado. El acusado fue denunciado por abuso sexual y violación de sus hijastras. La acción fue interpuesta por la tía de las presuntas víctimas. En el tribunal de primera instancia, varios peritajes y testimonios respaldaron la afirmación de la tía, sin embargo, una de las presuntas víctimas argumentó que no había sido violada, sino que fue obligada por su tía a denunciar al acusado. Del análisis de las pruebas, el acusado fue condenado por el tribunal de primera instancia. El imputado apeló la decisión y alegó que i) algunos peritajes presentaban inconsistencias y vicios subyacentes u omisiones y ii) el tribunal de instancia omitió el testimonio de una de las presuntas víctimas. La Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Penal -División 3ra- confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia. A continuación, el imputado interpuso una acción ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia -Sala de lo Penal-, alegando la nulidad del procedimiento por violación al debido proceso. Si bien la Corte Suprema no consideró nulo el procedimiento porque el acusado tuvo la oportunidad de defenderse, la Corte Suprema revocó la decisión tomada por el tribunal de primera instancia y confirmada por el tribunal de apelación, porque no había pruebas suficientes para condenar al acusado

The case concerned domestic violence and resulted in a one-year prison sentence pursuant to article 229 of the Criminal Code. The plaintiff filed a complaint with the police, alleging that three days earlier, at approximately 6:00 A.M., her husband punched her and threated to kill her during an argument. The evidence showed that this violence was not an isolated incident, but part of continuous behavior of the defendant. The Court held that the physical and psychological violence suffered by the victim in the household shall include any conduct that by action or omission is intended to cause harm or pain. Witness testimony proved that the defendant deliberately used threats and intimidation to control and manipulate his wife. Therefore, the defendant was convicted for domestic violence.

El caso se basó en violencia doméstica y resultó en una pena de prisión de un año de conformidad con el artículo 229 del Código Penal. La demandante presentó una denuncia ante la policía, alegando que tres días antes, aproximadamente a las 6:00 a. m., su esposo la golpeó y la amenazó de muerte durante una discusión. La evidencia mostró que esta violencia no fue un incidente aislado, sino parte de un comportamiento continuo del acusado. La Corte sostuvo que la violencia física y psíquica que sufre la víctima en el ámbito doméstico comprende toda conducta que por acción u omisión tenga por objeto causar daño o dolor. El testimonio de los testigos demostró que el acusado usó deliberadamente amenazas e intimidación para controlar y manipular a su esposa. Por lo tanto, el acusado fue condenado por violencia doméstica.

The case concerned abortion, the right to life, the right to health, and the right to self-determination. The court ruled for the partial decriminalization of abortion and set circumstances under which voluntary termination of pregnancy would be permissible. The Criminal Code previously criminalized voluntary abortion with one to three years of imprisonment. The plaintiffs argued that the criminalization of abortion violated women’s constitutional rights to life and dignity, physical integrity, equality, liberty, and unhindered development of personality, health, and reproductive self-determination. The Colombian Constitutional Court determined that abortion shall not be considered a crime in any of the following three circumstances: (i) a physician certified that pregnancy could threaten the woman’s health or life; (ii) a physician concluded that the fetus would suffer from serious malformations that could eventually endanger or terminate his life; and (iii) if the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or non-consensual artificial insemination, as long as the criminal act was lawfully reported to the competent authorities. The court found that articles 32.7, 122, 123, and 124 were constitutional, subject only to the aforementioned criteria. This case is of paramount importance because it established for the first time the right of women to terminate their pregnancy under the three specific scenarios. The scope of this decision was recently modified under Decision C-055-22 by the Constitutional Court, which has been announced but not yet published as of April 2022. This decision decriminalized voluntary abortion under any circumstances until 24 weeks of pregnancy. Voluntary abortions carried out after week 24 will not be deemed criminal offenses only if they are performed under any of the three events previously recognized by the Constitutional Court in the Decision C-355-06.

El caso se refería al aborto, el derecho a la vida, el derecho a la salud y el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. La Corte Constitucional falló a favor de la despenalización parcial del aborto y fijó las circunstancias bajo las cuales sería permisible la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. El Código Penal tipificaba como delito el aborto voluntario con uno a tres años de prisión. Los demandantes argumentaron que la penalización del aborto violaba los derechos constitucionales de las mujeres a la vida y la dignidad, la integridad física, la igualdad, la libertad, el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la salud y la libre determinación reproductiva. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia determinó que el aborto no sería considerado delito en ninguna de las siguientes tres circunstancias: (i) cuando un médico certifique que el embarazo puede poner en peligro la salud o la vida de la mujer; (ii) cuando un médico concluya que el feto sufriría de graves malformaciones que eventualmente podrían poner en peligro o acabar con su vida; y (iii) si el embarazo fue producto de violación, incesto o inseminación artificial no consentida, siempre que el hecho delictivo haya sido legalmente denunciado ante las autoridades competentes. El tribunal consideró que los artículos 32.7, 122, 123 y 124 eran constitucionales condicionados a los criterios antes mencionados. Este caso es de suma importancia porque estableció por primera vez el derecho de la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo bajo los tres supuestos específicos. El alcance de esta decisión fue modificado recientemente mediante la Sentencia C-055-22 de la Corte Constitucional. Esta decisión despenalizó el aborto voluntario bajo cualquier circunstancia hasta la semana 24 de embarazo. Los abortos voluntarios practicados después de la semana 24 no serán considerados delitos si se realizan bajo cualquiera de los tres supuestos previamente reconocidos por la Corte Constitucional en la Sentencia C-355-06.

The case concerned maternity leave. In this case, the plaintiff gave birth to a premature baby in the 32nd week of pregnancy. The Colombian Labor Code provides a regular maternity leave of 14 weeks, however, the court ruled that the terms must be extended in cases of premature births since the babies are highly prone to health complications and, therefore, are subject to special constitutional protection. According to the Constitutional Court, maternity health care is not limited to the period of gestation and birth. The court held that, in accordance with articles 57, 59, 236 and 239 of the Labor Code, the extension of maternity leave in premature births must comprise, in addition to the regular 14 weeks, the period between the expected and the premature date of birth. The court explained that the benefit of maternity leave ceases to be exclusively a legal issue, acquiring constitutional relevance, when the rights of pregnant women, such as right to live with dignity, depend on the payment of the maternity leave benefit.

El caso se refería a la licencia de maternidad. En este caso, la demandante dio a luz a un bebé prematuro en la semana 32 de embarazo. El Código Laboral de Colombia establece una licencia de maternidad de 14 semanas, sin embargo, la Corte sostuvo que los plazos deben extenderse en casos de partos prematuros ya que los bebés son altamente propensos a complicaciones de salud y, por lo tanto, están sujetos a una protección constitucional especial. Según la Corte Constitucional, la atención de la salud de la maternidad no se limita al período de gestación y nacimiento. La Corte sostuvo que, de conformidad con los artículos 57, 59, 236 y 239 del Código del Trabajo, la extensión de la licencia de maternidad en partos prematuros debe comprender, además de las 14 semanas regulares, el período entre la fecha de nacimiento esperada y la fecha prematura del parto. La Corte explicó que el beneficio de la licencia de maternidad deja de ser una cuestión exclusivamente jurídica, adquiriendo relevancia constitucional, cuando los derechos de las mujeres embarazadas, como el derecho a vivir con dignidad, dependen del pago del beneficio de la licencia de maternidad.

This judicial review concerned domestic violence. The court ruled that there ought to be greater criminal sanctions for domestic violence offenses. The law provides for four to eight years of imprisonment in cases of domestic violence, irrespective of the magnitude of the injuries. The plaintiff claimed that the article went against the proportionality principle set forth by the Colombian Constitution. The Constitutional Court held that special protection should be provided to families and especially to those who are more vulnerable to domestic violence and are in need of enhanced protective measures. The court pointed out that the family unit shall be preserved, among others, by virtue of the State’s powers and sanctions in accordance with article 42 of the Constitution. That is to say, the Colombian State is obliged to enact and establish a number of strict legal provisions allowing for the investigation and adequate punishment of any sort of domestic violence. To that end, the legislature had the power to discourage the forms of violence that may affect the family unit by increasing sanctions for domestic violence offenses, as provided in article 229 of the Criminal Code –and amended by article 33 of Law 1142 of 2007.

Esta demanda de constitucionalidad se refería a la violencia doméstica. La Corte Constitucional dictaminó que debería haber mayores sanciones penales para los delitos de violencia doméstica. La ley prevé de cuatro a ocho años de prisión para casos de violencia intrafamiliar, independientemente de la magnitud de las lesiones. La demandante alegó que el artículo contravenía el principio de proporcionalidad consagrado en la Constitución Política de Colombia. La Corte Constitucional sostuvo que se debe brindar protección especial a las familias y especialmente a aquellas que son más vulnerables a la violencia doméstica y necesitan mayores medidas de protección. El tribunal señaló que la unidad familiar se debe preservar, entre otras, a través de las facultades del Estado y de regímenes sancionatorios de conformidad con el artículo 42 de la Constitución. Es decir, el Estado colombiano está obligado a promulgar y establecer una serie de estrictas disposiciones legales que permitan investigar y sancionar adecuadamente cualquier tipo de violencia intrafamiliar. Para tal efecto, el legislador tenía la facultad de desalentar cualquier forma de violencia que pueda afectar la unidad familiar mediante el aumento de las sanciones por delitos de violencia intrafamiliar, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 229 del Código Penal –y reformado por el artículo 33 de la Ley 1142 de 2007.

(Sentencia T-274-15 - Acción de Tutela; Expedientes acumulados: T-4.492.963; T-4.715.291; T-4.725.592; T-4.734.867)

These cases concerned women’s reproductive health rights, specifically related to in vitro fertilization treatment (“IVF”). The Constitutional Court analyzed four cases where health care providers refused to perform IVF treatments since they were not covered by the mandatory health plan. The court ruled that the right to reproductive health protects the people's right to make free decisions about their sexuality and reproduction and involves the obligation of the Government to provide the necessary resources to make such determination effective. On this note, the court held that a health care company infringes the fundamental rights of a woman with fertility issues by denying authorization for in vitro fertilization treatment. The Colombian Constitutional Court followed the guidelines provided by other judgments held by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) on this note, including the 2012 case Artavia Murillo and others v. Costa Rica. Furthermore, the court affirmed the decision T-528 of 2014, which instructed the Colombian Government to analyze the possibility to adding IVF treatments to the national mandatory health plan.

La Corte analizó varios casos que se referían a los derechos de salud reproductiva de las mujeres, específicamente aquellos relacionados con el tratamiento de fertilización in vitro. La Corte Constitucional analizó cuatro casos en los que los prestadores de servicios de salud se negaron a realizar tratamientos de fecundación in vitro por no estar cubiertos por el plan obligatorio de salud. La Corte dictaminó que el derecho a la salud reproductiva protege la posibilidad de que las personas tomen decisiones libres sobre su sexualidad y reproducción e implica la obligación del Gobierno de proporcionar los recursos necesarios para hacer efectiva tal determinación. En este sentido, la Corte sostuvo que una empresa de atención médica viola los derechos fundamentales de una mujer con problemas de fertilidad al negar la autorización para el tratamiento de fertilización in vitro. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia siguió los lineamientos brindados por otras sentencias proferidas por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos sobre este aspecto, incluyendo el caso Artavia Murillo y otros vs. Costa Rica de 2012. Asimismo, la Corte confirmó la sentencia T-528 de 2014, que instruyó al Gobierno colombiano analizar la posibilidad de incorporar tratamientos de fecundación in vitro al plan nacional obligatorio de salud.

This decision unified the court’s criteria regarding employment rights for pregnant women and their special labor protections. The Constitutional Court analyzed three cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers, who were not aware of the workers’ pregnancy status at the time of dismissal. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed the importance of guaranteeing job security for pregnant workers, especially during the lactation period, as a measure to avoid discrimination against women at work. Consequently, in order to dismiss a worker whose pregnancy status was known by the employer, an employment inspector must grant permission beforehand. However, the court ruled by elaborating on previous jurisprudence, that it was excessive to oblige a former employer to readmit an employee and pay social security contributions for a worker who was dismissed without prior knowledge of her pregnancy status. In the study of those cases, the court held that when the employer has no knowledge of the pregnancy status and terminates a pregnant employee’s employment contract, no discrimination can be argued and therefore no protection of motherhood can be granted.

Esta sentencia unificó el criterio de la Corte Constitucional respecto de los derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas y su protección laboral reforzada. La Corte Constitucional analizó tres casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores, quienes desconocían el estado de embarazo de las trabajadoras al momento del despido. La Corte Constitucional reafirmó la importancia de garantizar la estabilidad laboral de las trabajadoras embarazadas, especialmente durante el período de lactancia, como medida para evitar la discriminación laboral de las mujeres. En consecuencia, para despedir a una trabajadora cuyo estado de embarazo era conocido por el empleador, un inspector de trabajo debe otorgar un permiso previo. Sin embargo, la Corte Constitucional dictaminó, con base en fuentes jurisprudenciales, que era excesivo obligar a un ex empleador a readmitir a una empleada y pagar las contribuciones a la seguridad social de una trabajadora que fue despedida, si no tenían conocimiento previo de su estado de embarazo. En el estudio de esos casos, la Corte Constitucional sostuvo que cuando el empleador no tiene conocimiento del estado de embarazo y termina el contrato de trabajo de una empleada embarazada, no se puede alegar discriminación y, por lo tanto, no se puede otorgar protección laboral reforzada.

The case concerned the capacity and dignity of mothers with disabilities. The court ultimately reinstated the mother’s custody of her child, who was given for adoption by the state as a result of the mother’s disability in violation of her rights. The court’s decision served two purposes: (i) to protect the best interests of the child, guarantee their right to have a family, and not be separated from it; and (ii) compliance with all of the state’s obligations towards persons with disabilities and their right to form a family with dignity. The court ordered the Ombudsman’s Office to compose a committee consisting of a doctor, psychologist, and a social worker in order to follow-up with the mother and identify the obstacles and specific problems that she may have in the exercise of her responsibilities when raising her child.

El caso se refería al derecho de la dignidad humana de las madres con discapacidad. La Corte decidió restablecer la custodia de la madre sobre su hijo. El tribunal encontró que existió una violación de los derechos de una madre en situación de discapacidad cuyo hijo fue dado en adopción por el Estado como resultado de la discapacidad de la madre. La decisión de la Corte atendió a dos propósitos: (i) proteger el interés superior del niño y garantizar su derecho a tener una familia y a no ser separado de ella; y (ii) el cumplimiento de todas las obligaciones del Estado hacia las personas con discapacidad y el derecho de las personas en situación de discapacidad a formar una familia en condiciones dignas. Adicionalmente, la Corte ordenó a la Defensoría del Pueblo conformar un comité integrado por un médico, un psicólogo y una trabajadora social con el fin de hacer seguimiento a la madre e identificar los obstáculos y problemas específicos que pueda tener en el ejercicio de sus responsabilidades al criar a su hijo.

The case concerned labor rights and protection of sex workers. The plaintiff, a sex worker, sued her former employer for firing her after she became pregnant. Under articles 236 and 239 of the Colombian Labor Code, a pregnant woman is subject to special labor protection, and therefore cannot be fired without cause and without authorities’ permission. The court consisdered whether pregnant sex workers should have the same labor protection as other professions. Article 13 of the Constitution provides the right of all citizens to be treated equally, as such, the court held it necessary to provide the aforementioned labor protection to sex workers. This conclusion was achieved by virtue of comparative law and legislation, where the protection shall be provided in connection with the right to motherhood. Sex workers, whether men or women, shall not be discriminated and should hold the same rights as any other worker. In this regard, court acknowledged the plaintiff’s right to the financial compensation she was entitled to.

El caso se refería a los derechos laborales y la protección de las trabajadoras sexuales. La demandante, una trabajadora sexual, demandó a su antiguo empleador por despedirla después de quedar embarazada. De conformidad con los artículos 236 y 239 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, la mujer embarazada es sujeto de una protección laboral reforzada, por lo que no puede ser despedida sin justa causa y sin permiso de las autoridades competentes. El tribunal analizó si las trabajadoras sexuales embarazadas deberían tener la misma protección laboral que otras profesiones. El artículo 13 de la Constitución establece el derecho de todos los ciudadanos a ser tratados por igual, por lo que el tribunal consideró necesario extender la mencionada protección laboral a las trabajadoras sexuales. Esta conclusión se logró en virtud de análisis de derecho comparado y de la legislación local, donde la protección nace del estado de embarazo. Los trabajadores sexuales, ya sean hombres o mujeres, no deben ser discriminados y deben tener los mismos derechos que cualquier otro trabajador. En este sentido, el tribunal reconoció el derecho de la demandante a la compensación económica a la que tenía derecho.

The defendant was convicted on charges of domestic violence and sentenced to 72 months of imprisonment. The plaintiff accompanied a friend to the bus station, where the defendant, her ex- partner, insulted and physically attacked her. One of the plaintiff’s daughters intervened and the defendant ceased. The defendant appealed his conviction and requested judicial review on the grounds that they were no longer a couple, therefore, the conduct did not qualify as domestic violence. Domestic violence requires the aggressor to be part of the immediate family, which includes husband and wife, as well as unmarried partners in permanent and stable a relationship and sharing a household. Evidence proved that even though the defendant and the plaintiff did not live together as a couple at the time of the aggression, he previously lived permanently in the plaintiff’s household as an integrated member of the immediate family. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Justice did not overturn the defendant’s conviction. This ruling established that a fundamental element in domestic violence determinations is the parties’ daily and permanent cohabitation in the same household.

El acusado fue condenado por cargos de violencia intrafamiliar y sentenciado a 72 meses de prisión. La víctima estaba acompañando a una amiga a la estación de autobuses cuando el acusado, su expareja, la insultó y agredió físicamente. Una de las hijas de la víctima intervino y detuvo la agresión. El acusado apeló su condena y solicitó revisión judicial bajo el argumento de que ya la víctima y él ya no eran pareja, por lo que la conducta no podía calificarse como violencia intrafamiliar. La violencia intrafamiliar requiere que el agresor sea parte de la familia inmediata, incluyendo parejas casadas o en unión libre, que comparten un hogar. En juicio se probó que, si bien al momento de la agresión el acusado y la víctima no convivían como pareja, el acuado cohabitaba diaria y permanentemente en el domicilio de la víctima como miembro integrante de la familia inmediata. Por lo tanto, la Corte Suprema de Justicia no concedió la revisión de la condena del acusado toda vez que un elemento fundamental en las determinaciones de violencia intrafamiliar es la convivencia diaria y permanente juntos.

The defendant, a public servant from a local prosecutor office in Colombia, was charged with a sexual harassment offense and acquitted. It was argued that the defendant met the plaintiff in a public park to discuss the subpoena of a parallel judicial proceeding in which the plaintiff was involved. Instead, he offered her money in exchange for sex. The plaintiff refused. The Supreme Court of Justice upheld the acquittal, finding that the prosecutor incorrectly qualified the defendant’s conduct as sexual harassment. On one hand, sexual harassment requires an element of hierarchy in order to qualify as a criminal offense. In this case, the public servant did not hold a hierarchically superior position in respect to the plaintiff. On the other hand, to be deemed sexual harassment, the conduct must be relentless and constant. However, the public servant’s conduct was an isolated event. Furthermore, the event could not qualify as a crime against Public Administration because the defendant did not offer the plaintiff any advantage in the parallel judicial proceeding in which she was involved.

El acusado, un servidor público empleado de una fiscalía regional en Colombia, fue acusado del delito de acoso sexual y posteriormente fue absuelto. La denunciante argumentó que el acusado se reunió con ella en un parque público para discutir la citación a un proceso judicial en el que estaba involucrada la denunciante. En cambio, le ofreció dinero a cambio de sexo. La denunciante se negó. La Corte Suprema de Justicia confirmó la absolución al considerar que el ente acusador calificó incorrectamente la conducta del acusado como acoso sexual. Por un lado, para que sea delito, el acoso sexual requiere un elemento de jerarquía. En este caso, el servidor público no ocupaba un cargo jerárquicamente superior respecto de la denunciante. Por otro lado, para ser considerado acoso sexual, la conducta debe ser incesante y constante. Sin embargo, la conducta del servidor público fue un hecho aislado. Finalmente, el hecho tampoco podía calificarse como delito contra la Administración Pública porque el acusado no ofreció a la denunciante ninguna ventaja en el proceso judicial paralelo en el que ella se encontraba involucrada.

The Criminal Trial Court issued a condemnatory sentence against the defendants for the repeated rape of their daughter and for other sexual crimes, including sexual abuse of a minor of less than 14 years of age and production of child pornography. The defendants sought to reverse the judgment, alleging that the Trial Court failed to consider the mental disabilities of one of the perpetrators and erred by failing to consider a lesser sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the failure of the Trial Court to consider the mental disability of the defendant was an error and should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the mother should have been charged solely as an accomplice because she had also actively participated in photographing the sexual abuse of the victim. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment solely in respect to the sentencing calculation, as the crimes were of the same nature and, therefore, the Trial Court should have granted a lesser sentence. (External Link leads to the website of the Chilean Judicial System. This case is available by searching by the case number.)

El Tribunal Penal de Primera Instancia dictó sentencia condenatoria contra los imputados por la violación reiterada de su hija y por otros delitos sexuales, incluido el abuso sexual de un menor de 14 años y la producción de pornografía infantil. Los acusados ​​buscaron revocar la sentencia, alegando que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no consideró la discapacidad mental de uno de los imputados y cometió un error al no considerar una sentencia menor. El Tribunal de Apelaciones sostuvo que el hecho de que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no tuviera en cuenta la discapacidad mental del acusado fue un error y debería haber sido considerado como una circunstancia atenuante en la sentencia. La Corte de Apelaciones rechazó el argumento de que la madre debería haber sido acusada únicamente como cómplice porque también había participado activamente en la fotografía del abuso sexual de la víctima. La Corte de Apelaciones revocó la sentencia únicamente en lo que respecta al cálculo de la sentencia, ya que los delitos eran de la misma naturaleza y, por lo tanto, la Corte de Primera Instancia debería haber dictado una sentencia menor. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial de Chile. Este caso está disponible buscando por el número de caso).

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal of a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals of Santiago (Case No. 11717-2016), which had ratified the judgment of the 12th Civil Court of Santiago finding for the plaintiff in a complaint for violation of the Article 2 of Law No. 20,069 by the defendant. The plaintiff, a host in a TV show, claimed discrimination for his sexual orientation by his employer, the TV show. The Trial Court found that, in light of focus group research that found the plaintiff was well received by the audience of his TV show, there was no basis for his change in roles other than his sexual orientation, and that the actions of the TV show that forced the plaintiff to make his sexual orientation public were not reasonable or proportional. Thus, the defendant violated the plaintiff’s right to privacy.

La Corte Suprema rechazó el recurso de apelación de una decisión de la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (Causa No. 11717-2016), que había ratificado la sentencia del 12º Juzgado Civil de Santiago en favor de la demandante en su denuncia de la violación del demandado del artículo. 2 de la Ley N ° 20.069. El demandante, presentador de un programa de televisión, reclamó discriminación por su orientación sexual por parte de su empleador, el programa de televisión. El Tribunal de Primera Instancia determinó que, a la luz de la investigación de grupos focales que encontró que el demandante fue bien recibido por la audiencia de su programa de televisión, no había ninguna base para su cambio de roles además de su orientación sexual, y que las acciones del programa de televisión que obligaron al demandante a hacer pública su orientación sexual no eran razonables ni proporcionales. Por lo tanto, el acusado, el programa, en efecto violó el derecho a la privacidad del demandante.

During the night of August 14, 2009, the respondent and another man raped the complainant, a 15-year-old girl, in a motel. The victim testified that she had been given a drink that caused her to fall asleep. When she awoke, the the appellant asked her to accompany him and his companion. When she refused, they forcibly restrained her and transported her to the motel in a truck where they raped her. The appellant was sentenced to 12 years of extraordinary imprisonment (“reclusión mayor extraordinaria”) for the crime. He appealed his sentence to the criminal chamber of the National Court of Justice. The appellant argued that the complainant’s testimony was unreliable. The National Court of Justice denied the appeal, noting that the protection of minors and adolescents against sexual violence is an important government priority, and the rights of this vulnerable group are protected by the Constitution. Furthermore, the National Court of Justice agreed with the lower court’s assessment of the complainant’s testimony, noting that crimes like rape are necessarily perpetrated in private or otherwise hidden and thus there would be likely few witnesses beyond the complainant herself. The lower court, therefore, appropriately afforded the complainant’s testimony particular importance when determining the defendant’s guilt. The court also noted that competent doctors and psychologists who examined the complainant also testified and corroborated aspects of her testimony.

Durante la noche del 14 de agosto del 2009, el demandado y otro hombre violaron a la denunciante, una joven de 15 años, en un motel. La víctima declaró que le habían dado una bebida que la hizo quedarse dormida. Cuando se despertó, el apelante le pidió que lo acompañara a él y a su acompañante. Cuando ella se negó, la sujetaron por la fuerza y ​​la trasladaron al motel en una camioneta donde la violaron sexualmente. El apelante fue condenado a 12 años de prisión extraordinaria (“reclusión mayor extraordinaria”) por el delito. Él discutió su sentencia ante la Sala Penal de la Audiencia Nacional. El apelante argumentó que el testimonio de la autora no era correcto. La Corte Nacional de Justicia denegó el pedido, señalando que la protección de menores y adolescentes contra la violencia sexual era una prioridad importante del gobierno y los derechos de este grupo vulnerable están protegidos por la Constitución. Además, la Corte Nacional de Justicia estuvo de acuerdo con la evaluación del tribunal de primera instancia del testimonio de la autora, señalando que delitos como la violación son necesariamente perpetrados en privado o de otra manera encubiertos y, por lo tanto, probablemente habría pocos testigos además de la propia víctima. Por lo tanto, el tribunal de primera instancia concedió una importancia especial al testimonio del autor al determinar la culpabilidad del acusado. El tribunal también señaló que los médicos y psicólogos competentes que habían examinado a la denunciante también testificaron y corroboraron aspectos de su testimonio.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to 20 months in prison for crimes of domestic violence against his wife (BB). AA filed an appeal to the Appeals Court arguing that the scope of the law against domestic violence applied only to victims that were deemed to be defenseless. AA argued that the victim, BB was a member of the military and as such could not be deemed a defenseless person. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal affirming the decision of the Trial Court. The Appeals Court determined that the fact that the victim was a member of the military was irrelevant and that the acts of violence were appropriately analyzed considering only the aggressor’s actions.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a 20 meses de prisión por delitos de violencia doméstica contra su esposa (BB). AA presentó una apelación ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones argumentando que el alcance de la ley contra la violencia doméstica se aplicaba solo a las víctimas que se consideraban indefensas. AA argumentó que la víctima, BB era miembro del ejército y, como tal, no podía considerarse una persona indefensa. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó la apelación afirmando la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que el hecho de que la víctima era miembro de las fuerzas armadas era irrelevante y que los actos de violencia se analizaron adecuadamente considerando solo las acciones del agresor.

The plaintiff sued the defendant in Civil Labor Court for damages suffered because of sexual harassment in the workplace. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant for 13 years, always received good performance reviews, and was promoted. One of the company’s directors continuously harassed her in the workplace for over two years even though the plaintiff rejected his propositions. Over the course of those two years, the director sent several inappropriate text messages and emails to the plaintiff, to which she never responded. On one occasion, he sent an email with more than 70 pictures of sexual content to the plaintiff. After this incident, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint with one of the company’s executives who asked the director to apologize, but did not take any additional action. The plaintiff then quit her job and sued her employer for sexual harassment in the workplace. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her UR$ 880.272 pesos and a 10% administrative fine against the defendant. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to find for the plaintiff and that, if anything, the plaintiff had consented to the director’s advances. The Appeals Court analyzed all the unanswered harassing emails and messages sent to the plaintiff and determined that the appeal had no basis. The court determined that the director’s conduct qualified as sexual harassment in the workplace per Law No. 18.561 and that his conduct had effectively created a hostile work environment for the plaintiff, which had forced her to quit her job. Therefore, The Appeals Court affirmed the Trial Court’s award.

La demandante demandó al acusado en el Tribunal de Trabajo Civil por los daños sufridos por el acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo. La demandante era empleada del acusado durante 13 años, siempre recibió buenas evaluaciones de desempeño y fue promovida. Uno de los directores de la compañía la acosó continuamente en el lugar de trabajo durante más de dos años, a pesar de que la demandante rechazó sus propuestas. En el transcurso de esos dos años, el director envió varios mensajes de texto y correos electrónicos inapropiados al la demandante, a lo que ella nunca respondió. En una ocasión, envió un correo electrónico con más de 70 imágenes de contenido sexual a la demandante. Después de este incidente, la demandante presentó una queja formal ante uno de los ejecutivos de la compañía que le pidió disculpas al director, pero no tomó ninguna medida adicional. La demandante luego renunció a su trabajo y demandó a su empleador por acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo. El Tribunal de Primera Instancia falló a favor de la demandante y le otorgó UR $ 880.272 pesos y una multa administrativa del 10% contra el acusado. El acusado apeló, argumentando que no había pruebas suficientes y que, en todo caso, la demandante había dado su consentimiento a los avances del director. El Tribunal de Apelaciones analizó todos los correos electrónicos y mensajes de acoso no respondidos enviados a la demandante y determinó que la apelación no tenía fundamento. El tribunal determinó que la conducta del director calificaba como acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo según la Ley N ° 18.561 y que su conducta había creado efectivamente un ambiente de trabajo hostil para la demandante, lo que la había obligado a renunciar a su trabajo. Por lo tanto, el Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la conclusión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia.

The Trial Court sentenced the 28-year-old accused (AA) to seven years and six months in prison for the crimes of rape, kidnapping and robbery. On March 27, 2011, AA approached the 18-year-old victim (BB) at a bus station and threatened her with a knife. BB offered him money, but AA put a knife to her throat and took her to a nearby field where he sexually assaulted her several times during the night, hit her repeatedly, and videotaped the sexual assault with his cellphone. AA then tied up BB and, before leaving her in the field, used BB’s cellphone to text her mother the location where BB could be found. He stole the cellphone and sold it at a fair. On July 22, 2011, AA was arrested. The police found in his possession a memory card with pornography and the video of BB’s rape. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The Appeals Court amended the qualification of the crimes to aggravated and rendered opinion that the sentence imposed by the Trial Court should have been more severe due to the proven dangerous nature of AA.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) de 28 años a siete años y seis meses de prisión por los delitos de violación, secuestro y robo. El 27 de marzo de 2011, AA se acercó a la víctima que tenía 18 años (BB) en una estación de autobuses y la amenazó con un cuchillo. BB le ofreció dinero, pero AA le puso un cuchillo en la garganta y la llevó a un campo cercano donde la agredió sexualmente varias veces durante la noche, la golpeó repetidamente y grabó en video la agresión sexual con su teléfono celular. AA luego ató a BB y, antes de dejarla en el campo, usó el teléfono celular de BB para enviarle un mensaje de texto a su madre sobre el lugar donde se podía encontrar a BB. Robó el teléfono celular y lo vendió en una feria. El 22 de julio de 2011, AA fue arrestado. La policía encontró en su poder una tarjeta de memoria con pornografía y el video de la violación de BB. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones modificó la calificación de los delitos a agravada y emitió una opinión de que la sentencia impuesta por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia debería haber sido más severa debido a la naturaleza peligrosa comprobada de AA.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to two years in prison for aggravated domestic violence. The court considered the aggravating circumstances to be the accused’s recidivism and the use of his strength to overpower his female victim. AA had a history of domestic violence against his wife (BB). Even though he had repeatedly assaulted BB and stabbed her once, BB refused to file a complaint against him. A family court judge imposed a restraining order against AA pursuant to which he could not get closer than 300 meters to BB and her children. However, BB on several occasions allowed AA back in her home and near the children. On October 7, 2008, AA came over to BB’s house with the intention of moving back in, but when BB declined, AA locked her and her children in a room for two hours. He did not physically assault them, but did threaten to kill them. BB filed a complaint and AA was convicted of domestic violence. AA appealed arguing that BB had subsequently withdrawn her criminal complaint against him, which constituted consent to his conduct. The Appeals Court determined that the victim’s withdrawal of her complaint was a consequence of “battered women’s syndrome,” and had no bearing on a criminal action. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a dos años de prisión por violencia doméstica agravada. El Tribunal consideró que las circunstancias agravantes eran la reincidencia del acusado y el uso de su fuerza para dominar a su víctima femenina. AA tenía antecedentes previos de violencia doméstica contra su esposa (BB). Aunque había asaltado repetidamente a BB y la apuñaló una vez, BB se negó a presentar una queja contra él. Un juez de un tribunal de familia impuso una orden de restricción contra AA en virtud de la cual no podía acercarse más de 300 metros a BB y sus hijos. Sin embargo, BB en varias ocasiones permitió que AA regresara a su casa y estuviera cerca de los niños. El 7 de octubre del 2008, AA vino a la casa de BB con la intención de regresar, pero cuando BB declinó, AA la encerró a ella y a sus hijos en una habitación durante dos horas. No los agredió físicamente, pero amenazó con matarlos. BB presentó una queja y AA fue condenado por violencia doméstica. AA apeló argumentando que BB había retirado posteriormente su denuncia penal contra él, lo que constituía un consentimiento para su conducta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que la retirada de la denuncia de la víctima fue una consecuencia del "síndrome de las mujeres maltratadas" y no tenía relación con una acción penal. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to four years in prison for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor (BB). AA and the mother of BB had a common law marriage. AA had been sexually abusing BB since she was eight years old and started raping her when she turned 11. At age 14, BB became pregnant as a result of rape committed by AA. BB’s mother discovered AA’s abuse and filed the criminal complaint. AA confessed to being the victim’s “lover.” The court found aggravating circumstances including that AA had taken advantage of his domestic relationship with BB’s mother and that he had abused his victim during the night. AA’s confession constituted an attenuating circumstance, reducing the sentence imposed. The Appeals Court dismissed AA’s appeal and affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, ruling that there was enough evidence presented to establish the facts of the case.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a cuatro años de prisión por abuso sexual agravado de un menor (BB). AA y la madre de BB tenían un matrimonio común. AA había abusado sexualmente de BB desde que tenía ocho años y comenzó a violarla cuando cumplió los 11. A los 14 años, BB quedó embarazada como resultado de una violación cometida por AA. La madre de BB descubrió el abuso de AA y presentó esta denuncia penal. AA confesó ser el "amante" de la víctima. El tribunal encontró circunstancias agravantes, incluyendo que AA se había aprovechado de su relación doméstica con la madre de BB y que había abusado de su víctima generalmente durante las noches. La confesión de AA constituyó una circunstancia atenuante, reduciendo la sentencia impuesta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó la apelación de AA y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, dictaminando que se presentaron suficientes pruebas para establecer los hechos del caso.

The defendant was convicted for the crimes of human trafficking and association to commit crimes on May 15, 2014 in the state of Nueva Esparta. In its decision, the lower court said that in cases of rape and trafficking of persons, anyone who has been accused of having a relationship or knowledge of such crime could be deprived of liberty during trial, if it is deemed appropriate by the authorities. In the defendant’s case, he was accused of seducing and luring the female victim into the island of Margarita, where she was subjected, tortured, drugged, and raped. The defendant appealed the decision, alleging that it violated his right to be judged in freedom. The Court of Appeal for Violence Against Women on January 8, 2016 dismissed the appeal action and ratified the decision of the lower court and determined that the apprehension of the accused before his conviction did not represent a violation of the law. The appellate court ratified the criteria of the lower court according to which those defendants who are linked to the act of people trafficking and gender violence can be arrested before issuing a conviction decision, if deemed appropriate by the authorities.

The female victim declared to the competent authorities that she worked as a motorcycle taxi driver in La Fria, Táchira State. On the morning of September 9, 2014, she transported a male passenger. During the journey, the passenger threatened and sexually assaulted her with an object. On November 18, 2014, the lower court convicted the defendant of the crime of sexual violence even though psychological or physical violence were not proven at the trial, which used to be one of the elements for such crime. The defendant requested a review of the court’s decision to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (the “TSJ”) on the basis that neither physical nor psychological violence were confirmed by the lower court. The TSJ ratified the decision of the lower court and decided that it is no longer necessary to verify that physical or psychological violence occurred in order to determine the crime of sexual violence. As a result of this decision, each of the crimes of sexual, psychological, and physical violence can be committed separately, reinforcing the protection of women’s rights. This decision represents an improvement in rights for women in Venezuela.

The plaintiff, a female Venezuelan citizen married to a female Venezuelan citizen, got married in Argentina, where LGBT marriage rights are fully granted to homosexual couples. In the following years, they tried to validate their marriage in Venezuela through a judicial homologation process. Such homologation was denied on the basis that the marriage regulations in Argentina did not comply with the provisions of Article 44 of the Venezuelan Civil Code, which regulates marriage rights in Venezuela and provides that “marriage cannot be entered into except between one single man and one single woman.” Thereafter, the couple conceived a child through the assisted reproduction method in Argentina, who was born and presented for registration as their son in Argentina. Immediately after the baby was born, the couple moved back to Venezuela, where they tried to present the newborn as their son to the Venezuelan competent authorities, requiring that the baby carried the surnames of both mothers. The registration was denied. The couple introduced a complaint before the competent court and the judge decided the registration of the boy was inadmissible. The plaintiff appealed this decision until it reached the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (“TSJ”), Venezuelan’s highest judicial body, which decided to annul the decision of the lower court. The TSJ overruled the lower court’s decision on the basis that the decision violated the plaintiff’s right to present the child as an LGBTIQ couple’s child. Likewise, the TSJ stated that this action violated the child’s constitutional right to have an identity. The TSJ final decision was to allow the registration of the child with both mothers’ surnames.

Brazil’s Supreme Court decided by a majority that transgender individuals could change their legal name and gender originally included in their civil registry, without the presentation of psychological or medical evaluation, hormonal treatment, transition surgery, or any other medical procedure. The majority understood that no judicial authorization is necessary for the amendment, stating only a self-written report of the trans person is sufficient to change his/her legal name.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF decidiu, por maioria de votos, que as pessoas transgêneros podem alterar seu prenome e sua classificação de gênero no registro civil, mediante auto-declaração, sendo desnecessária a apresentação de laudos psicológicos, tratamento hormonais ou procedimentos cirúrgicos ou de autorização judicial.

In this case, the 2nd panel of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) issued a landmark ruling that pregnant women, mothers of children up to the age of 12, and mothers with disabled children accused of non-violent crimes should be permitted to await trial under house arrest rather than in detention. Justice Ricardo Lewandowski of the STF granted in this judgment habeas corpus ex officio so that women with children who had been arrested prior to this ruling and have not yet been placed under house arrest are entitled to the benefit.

Tratou-se de Habeas Corpus coletivo impetrado em favor de todas as mulheres presas preventivamente que ostentem a condição de gestantes, de puérperas ou de mães de crianças sob sua responsabilidade, bem como em nome das próprias crianças. O STF concedeu ordem para substituição de prisão preventiva pela domiciliar a todas as mulheres presas, gestantes, puérperas ou mães de crianças e deficientes, enquanto perdurar tal condição, com exceção aos casos de crimes praticados mediante violência ou grave ameaça, contra seus descendentes. O Ministro Ricardo Lewandowski determinou a extensão dos efeitos da decisão a todas as demais mulheres presas, gestantes, puérperas ou mães de crianças e de pessoas com deficiência, bem assim às adolescentes sujeitas a medidas socioeducativas em idêntica situação no território nacional.

The plaintiff in this action was an elected councilor in the municipality of Tolata. She was forced to sign a letter of resignation under pressure from a group of intruders who had entered the session room of the municipal building. The plaintiff alleged that her rights relating to legal security in the exercise of a public function under Articles 46 and 144 of the constitution were violated and sought constitutional protection and the return to the office of municipal councilor of Tolata. The Constitutional Tribunal granted these requests.

La demandante en esta acción era un concejal electo en el municipio de Tolata. Se vio obligada a firmar una carta de renuncia bajo la presión de un grupo de intrusos que habían entrado en la sala de sesiones del edificio municipal. La demandante alegó que sus derechos relacionados con la seguridad jurídica en el ejercicio de una función pública en virtud de los Artículos 46 y 144 de la constitución fueron violados y solicitó protección constitucional y el regreso a la oficina del concejal municipal de Tolata. El Tribunal Constitucional concedió estas solicitudes.

The Supreme Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Appeal Court, which refused to review the decision of the First Instance Court that had allowed summary proceedings in a case of domestic violence and had sentenced the accused to two years of prison. The Supreme Tribunal held that the Court of Appeal had sufficiently reasoned its decision by holding that the judge of First Instance had correctly applied Article 272 of the Criminal Code, which provides for abbreviated proceedings and for the imposition of the maximum penalty suggested by the public ministry where the accused pleads guilty and agrees with the public ministry to abbreviated proceedings.

El Tribunal Supremo confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Apelación, que se negó a revisar la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia que había permitido un proceso sumario en un caso de violencia doméstica y había condenado al acusado a dos años de prisión. El Tribunal Supremo sostuvo que el Tribunal de Apelación había razonado suficientemente su decisión al sostener que el juez de Primera Instancia había aplicado correctamente el Artículo 272 del Código Penal, que prevé un procedimiento abreviado y la imposición de la pena máxima sugerida por el ministerio público donde el acusado se declara culpable y está de acuerdo con el ministerio público para abreviar los procedimientos.

Following the separation of the plaintiff, Ms. L. del V., from the defendant, Mr. G., the defendant failed to pay their daughter’s school tuition or English lessons, took all of the family’s working vehicles, and sporadically paid no more than 40% of stipulated child support. The plaintiff further alleged that the parties’ attempt at a negotiated solution constituted extortion given that she would not receive any support until they reached an agreement. The parties subsequently negotiated an agreement, which the plaintiff later found to be inadequate. In finding for the plaintiff, the court found that the defendant’s conduct constituted economic violence defined as the failure to provide required assistance, particularly where the woman has dedicated herself to childrearing at the time of separation and that the repeated failure to provide required support following separation would have a severe effect on the mother and child.

Luego de la separación del demandante, la Sra. L. del V., del demandado, el Sr. G., el demandado no pagó la matrícula escolar o las clases de inglés de su hija, tomó todos los vehículos de trabajo de la familia y esporádicamente no pagó más del 40% de la pensión alimenticia estipulada. La demandante además alegó que el intento de las partes por una solución negociada constituía una extorsión, dado que ella no recibiría ningún apoyo hasta que llegasen a un acuerdo. Posteriormente, las partes negociaron un acuerdo, que luego el demandante consideró inadecuado. Al encontrar al demandante, el tribunal determinó que la conducta del acusado constituía violencia económica definida como la falta de asistencia requerida, en particular cuando la mujer se habia dedicado a la crianza de los hijos desde el momento de la separación y que la falta reiterada de proporcionar la asistencia necesaria después de la separación tendría un efecto severo en la madre y el niño.

Mr. M. R. committed successive acts of violence and made threats against his wife, Mrs. F.M.S. Upon finding that the declarations made by Ms. F.M.S., photographs and medical reports constituted sufficient probative evidence, the court determined that Mr. M. R. committed simple aggravated assault based on the relationship between the parties and that the threats made against Mrs. F.M.S. were grave and imminent. Accordingly, the court found sufficient cause to hold the defendant in preventative confinement.

El Sr. M. R. cometió varios actos de violencia e hizo amenazas contra su esposa, la Sra. F.M.S. Al descubrir las declaraciones hechas por la Sra. F.M.S., las fotografías y los informes médicos constituyeron pruebas probatorias suficientes. El tribunal determinó que el Sr. M. R. cometió un asalto agravado simple basado en la relación entre las partes y que las amenazas contra la Sra. F.M.S. Fueron graves e inminentes. En consecuencia, el tribunal encontró causa suficiente para retener al acusado en confinamiento preventivo.

The plaintiff daughters, R.H. and V.C., filed suit against the State government and certain police officials requesting damages for the loss of the lives of their mother, Mrs. S., and father, Mr. A. The day after her decision to flee her home together with her daughters and reside with other family members, Mrs. S. filed a civil proceeding against Mr. A. for domestic violence. Mr. A. was prohibited from approaching Mrs. S. and his daughters, and Mrs. S. obtained permission to remove her and her daughters’ personal belongings from their previous home while escorted by police officers. While accompanied by police officers and her sister to remove the belongings, Mr. A. killed Mrs. S. with a knife and subsequently committed suicide. In finding for the daughters in the case of Mrs. S., the appellate court identified the following factors in support of its finding: (1) the existence of a real and immediate risk that threatened the rights of Mrs. S. and her daughters that had the potential to materialize immediately and which was expressly referenced by the Office of Domestic Violence, (2) the risk related to a specific threat against a woman and was therefore particular, (3) the State knew of the risk or should have reasonably known of the risk and (4) the State could have reasonably prevented and avoided the materialization of the risk.

Las hijas de la demandante, RH y VC, presentaron una demanda contra el gobierno del estado y ciertos oficiales de policía que solicitaron daños por la pérdida de la vida de su madre, la Sra. S. y el padre, el Sr. A. El día después de su decisión de huir de la casa junto con sus hijas, la Sra. S. presentó un proceso civil contra el Sr. A. por violencia doméstica. Al Sr. A. se le prohibió acercarse a la Sra. S. y a sus hijas, y la Sra. S. obtuvo permiso para retirar a ella y las pertenencias personales de sus hijas de su hogar anterior mientras estaba escoltada por agentes de policía. Mientras estaba acompañada por oficiales de policía y su hermana para retirar las pertenencias, el Sr. A. mató a la Sra. S. con un cuchillo y posteriormente se suicidó. Al encontrar a las hijas en el caso de la Sra. S., la corte de apelaciones identificó los siguientes factores que respaldan su descubrimiento: (1) la existencia de un riesgo real e inmediato que amenazaba los derechos de la Sra. S. y sus hijas que tenía el potencial de materializarse de inmediato y que la Oficina de Violencia Doméstica hacía referencia expresamente, (2) el riesgo relacionado con una amenaza específica contra una mujer y, por lo tanto, era particular, (3) el Estado sabía del riesgo o debería haberlo hecho razonablemente conocido del riesgo y (4) el Estado podría haber prevenido y evitado razonablemente la materialización del riesgo.

The defendant was found guilty of aggravated economic exploitation through the prostitution of vulnerable women, having been found to be the operator of a prostitution establishment in which the four identified victims were sexually exploited. Despite evidence that the women (1) could enter and leave the establishment as they pleased, (2) were never treated with violence, (3) were never required to work for minimum periods of time and (4) would not be charged an “exit” fee if they terminated their employment at the establishment, the court found that (1) the vulnerable status of the women was confirmed by their inability to finish their formal education and their difficulty in finding employment that would enable them to meet their basic needs, (2) the immigrant status of two of the women resulted in social, cultural and economic disadvantages that facilitated their exploitation and (3) their decision to work at the establishment was not the result of a truly free election, but rather was viewed as their only means to subsist. The court further noted that fines imposed for tardiness served as a mechanism to control the women given the financial impact of such fines. Based on these findings, the court ratified the plea bargain of five years imprisonment.

El acusado fue declarado culpable de explotación económica agravada a través de la prostitución de mujeres vulnerables, habiéndose encontrado como operador de un establecimiento de prostitución en el que las cuatro víctimas identificadas eran explotadas sexualmente. A pesar de la evidencia de que las mujeres (1) podían entrar y salir del establecimiento como quisieran, (2) nunca fueron tratadas con violencia, (3) nunca se les obligó a trabajar por períodos mínimos de tiempo y (4) no se les cobraría un “ tasa de salida ”si terminaban su empleo en el establecimiento, el tribunal determinó que (1) la situación de vulnerabilidad de las mujeres se confirmó por su incapacidad para terminar su educación formal y su dificultad para encontrar un empleo que les permitiera satisfacer sus necesidades básicas , (2) la condición de inmigrante de dos de las mujeres resultó en desventajas sociales, culturales y económicas que facilitaron su explotación y (3) su decisión de trabajar en el establecimiento no fue el resultado de una elección verdaderamente libre, sino que fue vista como su único medio para subsistir. El tribunal señaló además que las multas impuestas a las mujeres por tardanza sirvieron como un mecanismo para controlarlas dado el impacto financiero de tales multas. Con base en estos hallazgos, el tribunal ratificó el acuerdo de culpabilidad de cinco años de prisión.

Parents of students enrolled at Colegio Nacional de Monserrat, a private all-male high school, filed suit to prevent the implementation of an order of the High Council of the National University of Córdoba (Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba) mandating that the high school admit female applicants. They argued that parents have the right to choose the type of education their children receive. The court of first instance found partially in favor of the parents, which was overturned by the appellate court. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court ruling on the basis that (1) the High Council of the National University of Córdoba acted within its statutory authority, (2) the Argentine constitution does not guarantee the right to enroll children in schools limited to a specific gender, (3) mixed gender schools do not infringe on the rights of parents to elect the type of education their children receive, and (4) establishing a mixed gender school is the only alternative compatible with the constitutional principles of equality and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to which Argentina is a signatory.

Los padres de los estudiantes matriculados en el Colegio Nacional de Monserrat, una escuela secundaria privada exclusivamente masculina, presentaron una demanda para evitar la implementación de una orden del Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba que ordenaba que el la escuela secundaria admitiera mujeres solicitantes. Argumentaron que los padres tienen derecho a elegir el tipo de educación que reciben sus hijos. El tribunal de primera instancia falló parcialmente decidiendo a favor de los padres, lo que fue anulado por el tribunal de apelaciones. Entre otras razones, la Corte Suprema confirmó la sentencia de la corte de apelaciones sobre la base de que (1) el Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba actuó dentro de su autoridad estatutaria, (2) la constitución argentina no garantizaba el derecho a matricular a los niños en las escuelas limitadas a un género específico, (3) las escuelas mixtas no infringen los derechos de los padres a elegir el tipo de educación que reciben sus hijos, y (4) establecer una escuela mixta es la única alternativa compatible con los principios constitucionales de igualdad y la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer de la que Argentina es signataria.

On July 6, 2016, the plaintiff notified the defendant-employer of her pregnancy and intention to take maternity leave. As of the date of notification, the plaintiff held a temporary executive position. On July 11, 2016, the defendant notified the plaintiff that her temporary designation as an executive was of no effect. The defendant subsequently provided a maternity compensation package beginning on the date her temporary designation was revoked, but it did not reflect her higher earnings as a temporary executive. The court of first instance granted the plaintiff maternity leave at a salary corresponding (1) to her executive status as from the date she provided notice until 30 days before the probable date of birth and (2) to her non-executive status during the 100 days following the birth of the plaintiff’s child. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the trial court’s ruling denying her executive pay for the 100-day period following the birth of her child, while the defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling granting the plaintiff executive pay from the date of notice of her pregnancy because of the subsequent cancellation of the plaintiff’s executive status on July 11, 2016. The appellate court found in favor of the plaintiff, noting that (1) the Argentine Constitution provides for the full protection of women during pregnancy and breastfeeding, (2) the International Treaty for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (to which Argentina is a signatory) requires the adoption of laws that prevent discrimination based on marriage or pregnancy, and (3) the failure to award the plaintiff maternity compensation corresponding to her executive status would result in a failure to ensure employment stability. The appellate court ruled against the plaintiff’s request to return to her executive position following maternity leave on the basis that the designation was temporary in nature and that laws protecting women during maternity leave cannot alter the fundamental nature of the relationship prior to maternity.

El 6 de julio de 2016, la demandante notificó a su empleador que estaba embarazada y que tenía intención de tomar la baja por maternidad. En la fecha de notificación, la demandante ocupaba un cargo ejecutivo temporal. El 11 de julio de 2016, el empleador notificó a la demandante que su designación temporal como ejecutiva no surtía efecto. Adicionalmente, el empleador le proporcionó un paquete de compensación por maternidad a partir de la fecha en que se revocó su designación temporal, pero este no reflejaba sus mayores ingresos como ejecutiva temporal. El Juzgado de Primera Instancia otorgó a la demandante licencia de maternidad con un salario correspondiente (1) a su condición de ejecutiva a partir de la fecha de notificación hasta 30 días antes de la fecha probable de nacimiento y (2) a su condición de no ejecutiva durante el 100 días después del nacimiento del hijo del demandante. La demandate apeló esta decisión, citando como error del tribunal de primera instancia el que se le negara la paga ejecutiva durante el período de 100 días después del nacimiento de su hijo. El empleador discutió que la orden inicial le otorgaba a la demandante paga ejecutiva desde la fecha de notificación de su embarazo debido a la subsiguiente cancelación de la condición de ejecutivo de la demandante el 11 de julio de 2016. El tribunal de apelaciones decidió a favor de la demandante, señalando que (1) la Constitución Argentina prevé la protección total de la mujer durante el embarazo y la lactancia, (2) el Tratado Internacional para la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (de la cual Argentina es signataria) requiere la adopción de leyes que prevengan la discriminación por matrimonio o embarazo, y (3) la falta de adjudicación a la demandante de una compensación por maternidad correspondiente a su condición de ejecutiva sería resultar en un fracaso para asegurar la estabilidad del empleo. El tribunal de apelación decidió en contra de la solicitud de la demandante de regresar a su puesto ejecutivo después de la licencia de maternidad sobre la base de que la designación era de carácter temporal y que las leyes que protegen a las mujeres durante la licencia de maternidad no pueden alterar la naturaleza fundamental de la relación antes de la maternidad.

A mother was charged with sexual abuse of her own son and daughter. The trial court issued an order of detention pending trial. When the mother brought an extraordinary constitutional petition seeking protection against the order, the court of appeals declined to hear the petition on the ground that such a petition can heard only after ordinary remedies have been exhausted. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the mother argued that the underlying order of detention suffered from various constitutional defects, mainly that special courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving sexual violence against a girl and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction. (The mother argued, moreover, that she was being prosecuted and detained in order to prevent enforcement of her visitation rights—this after she had already been deprived of them the two years prior.) The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, noting that the mother had not exhausted any of the three remedies still available to her: motion for reconsideration, motion for substitution, and an ordinary appeal.

An indigenous man was charged with physical violence and threats against his ex-partner (a non-indigenous woman), a violation of the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence (the “statute”), which created special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the statute. The special court issued a restraining order in lieu of detention pending trial. Prosecutors appealed. While the appeal was pending, the man violated the restraining order. The court of appeals vacated the restraining order and ordered detention. On a constitutional appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that, because of his identity as an indigenous person, his community’s authorities had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court acknowledged that (1) the Organic Law on Indigenous Peoples and Communities creates special jurisdiction authorizing indigenous communities to resolve controversies arising among their members within their lands, (2) this special jurisdiction allows the communities to apply their own laws, and (3) the national courts must recognize the decisions of the communities. But the Court also stressed that international conventions, the national constitution, and special laws (such as the statute) placed limitations on that jurisdiction. The Court cited, for example, Article 9 of the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which provides that “the methods customarily practiced by the peoples concerned for dealing with offenses committed by their members shall be respected,” but only “[t]o the extent compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognized human rights.” More precisely, the Court noted that the statute itself established that indigenous authorities could serve as agents for receiving complaints of violence against women, but only without prejudice to the victim’s right to seek remedy in the special courts. Based on that analysis, the Court held that the special courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the statute, regardless of the defendant’s ethnic identify. Notably, the Court ordered that its holding be published as binding precedent.

A landlady alleged that two delinquent male tenants assaulted her and threatened to kill her if she sought to evict them. The tenants were charged with “violence against a woman,” a violation of the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence (the “statute”), which created special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases under the statute. The ordinary court declined jurisdiction and referred the case to the special court. In the meantime, after completing their investigation, prosecutors downgraded the charges to “general injuries,” a violation of the general penal code. The special court also declined jurisdiction, reasoning that its jurisdiction under the statute was limited to gender-based violence and that the violence alleged in the case was rooted in a contractual dispute and not in the landlady’s gender. When the jurisdictional conflict was certified to the Supreme Court, it held that the landlady’s gender was sufficient to bring the case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the special courts, irrespective of the statutory classification of the alleged crime. Dissenting judges argued that the special court’s jurisdiction was confined to gender-based crimes and that the majority opinion would result in a separate system of justice for each gender.

A 13-year-old girl reported having consensual sex with her 26-year-old boyfriend. He was charged under a statute that outlaws sexual relations, even without violence or intimidation, to the detriment of a woman who is “vulnerable” because of her age. The trial court convicted the defendant, finding the girl “vulnerable” based on psychological evaluations. On appeal, the court of appeals focused on the girl’s “discernment” to “decide concerning an active sexual life.” The court of appeals then found the girl not “vulnerable” in light of her testimony that she consented to the alleged crime. The court thus vacated the conviction. The court of appeals also found that the psychological evaluations had “nothing to do with” the issue, because they did not focus on the girl’s “discernment,” but rather on her emotional state, which, in any event, was caused by “rigid standards and values” at home and the “the presence of a controlling feminine figure” (her mother), and not by the relationship with the boyfriend. Because the couple had been dating for four months before deciding “by mutual accord” to have sex, the court found that the boyfriend had not taken advantage of the girl. Prosecutors then brought a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court of appeals had misinterpreted and misapplied the statute. Although the Supreme Court also focused on the “degree of discernment or maturity possessed by the victim to make decisions regarding her sexual freedom,” the Court also held that the girl’s emotional state was essential to the analysis of her vulnerability and her ability to give “free consent,” because “emotions are determinants” that “directly influence human behavior.” The Supreme Court thus remanded the case to a new appeals panel, with directions to rehear the defendant’s appeal in a manner consistent with the Court’s opinion.

In 2013, a woman’s ex-partner wounded her with a machete and knife as she was arriving home at midnight. When the victim’s sister intervened, the man punched the sister and ran off. For his attack against his ex-partner, the man was charged with attempted homicide, a violation of both the general penal code and the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence (the “statute”). For his attack against the sister, he was charged with physical violence, a violation of the statute. Amended in 2014, the statute created special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases brought under the statute, but a subsequent Supreme Court decision clarified that all types of homicide offenses occurring prior to the amendment remained within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. During the preliminary hearing, the ordinary court found that the allegations did not support the attempted homicide charge but rather the offense of “minor injuries,” a violation of the statute. Accordingly, the ordinary court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and thus referred the case to the special court. In turn, finding that the allegations did support a homicide charge, the special court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. When the jurisdictional conflict was certified to the Supreme Court, it held that the special court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Court explained that the classification of the “homicide” charge was of no consequence, because the charge against the sister vested jurisdiction in the special court over all related charges involving gender violence.

On February 6, 2009, four transgender individuals (A, B, C, D) identifying as female were arrested and charged with both Loitering and Wearing Female Attire. The police detained the Applicants for the entire weekend without explaining the charges against them. Wearing Female Attire is prohibited under Section 153(1)(XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act, chapter 8:02. At the hearing on February 9, 2009, the Chief Magistrate commented that the Applicants were confused about their sexuality and told them they were men, not women, and needed to give their lives to Jesus Christ. The Applicants, who were all unrepresented at the time, pleaded guilty to the charge of Wearing Female Attire. Applicants A, B and D were fined $7,500, and Applicant C was fined $19,500 (Guyanese dollars). The loitering charges were eventually dismissed. The Applicants contacted the Society Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination (SASOD), the Equal Rights Trust’s Guyanese partner, about the case. SASOD agreed to represent Applicants and filed a Notice of Motion challenging the Magistrate’s Court decision and seeking redress. The Applicants argued that the police violated the Constitution because the officers failed to inform them of their arrest and did not permit the Applicants to retain counsel. They also argued that Section 153 (1) (XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act 1893 is: (1) vague and of uncertain scope; (2) irrational and discriminatory on the ground of sex; and (3) a continuing threat to their right to protection against discrimination on the ground of sex and gender under the Constitution. Applicants further argued that, by instructing the Applicants to attend Church and give their lives to Jesus Christ, the Chief Magistrate discriminated against them on the basis of religion, which violated a fundamental norm of the Co-operative of the Republic of Guyana as a secular state in contravention to the Constitution. The Court upheld the Applicants’ claims in relation to their fundamental right to be informed of the reason for their arrest under Article 139 of the Constitution, but rejected all of their other claims. The Court found that the prohibition of cross-dressing for an improper purpose was not unconstitutional gender or sex discrimination, impermissibly vague, or undemocratic. The Court also struck SASOD’s application in full, finding that SASOD did not have standing to be an applicant in the case.

In 2002, Ms. Sandra Patricia Lamprea Duque, a 23 year old Colombian woman, reported that she was raped by Nelson Otalora, the accused. The rape was part of multiple instances of mistreatments, threats, harassments and economic exploitations that lasted for eight years between 1994 and 2002. Due to statutory limitations, the accused was only charged with rape which took place in 2002. The Court of First Instance acquitted the accused based on the reasoning that Sandra Patricia had had a relationship, albeit a difficult one, with the accused and therefore the act at issue could not be ascertained as without consent. The Court of Second Instance found the accused guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment on the reasoning that occurrence of violence renders historical sexual intimacy and lack of resistance during the act at issue irrelevant. The Court also concluded that the credibility of the victims of sexual violence could not be questioned by the court based on previous sexual relations, that lawyers must respect fundamental human rights and that a victim of sexual violence should not be “re-victimized” by legal professionals during legal proceedings involving sexual violence. The Court noted, however, that lack of consent could not be inferred from a dysfunctional relationship, as was the case between the aggressor and the accused.

En 2002, la señora Sandra Patricia Lamprea Duque, colombiana de 23 años, denunció que fue violada por Nelson Otalora, el acusado. La violación fue parte de múltiples instancias de malos tratos, amenazas, hostigamientos y explotaciones económicas que se prolongaron durante ocho años entre 1994 y 2002. Debido a limitaciones legales, el imputado solo fue acusado de la violación que tuvo lugar en el 2002. El Juzgado de Primera Instancia absolvió el imputado en base a el razonamiento de que Sandra Patricia había tenido una relación, aunque difícil, con el imputado y, por lo tanto, el encuentro sexual en cuestión no podía determinarse que había occurrido sin consentimiento. El Juzgado de Segunda Instancia declaró culpable al imputado y lo condenó a prisión, razonando que la ocurrencia de violencia torna irrelevante la intimidad sexual que haya ocurrido en el pasado y la falta de resistencia durante el acto en cuestión. La Corte también concluyó que la credibilidad de las víctimas de violencia sexual no puede ser cuestionada por la Corte basada en relaciones sexuales previas, que los abogados deben respetar los derechos humanos fundamentales y que una víctima de violencia sexual no debe ser "re-victimizada" por profesionales legales durante procesos judiciales de violencia sexual. Sin embargo, la Corte señaló que la falta de consentimiento no puede meramente inferirse de una relación disfuncional, como fue el caso entre el agresor y el imputado.

The plaintiff filed a writ of constitutional challenge and requested the respondents, the plaintiff’s common-law partner for fifteen years and his current live-in partner, not disturb her home and that the house in which she was currently residing be granted to her. The trial court denied the relief sought on the grounds that the plaintiff could resort to other legal means such as liquidation of the partnership at will. The appeal court affirmed. The Constitutional Court denied the writ on lack of evidence showing torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. The Court did not equate a declaration of intent to sue (by the respondents over the property) to taking the law into one’s own hands, duress or threats against the person or family of the petitioner. The Court concluded that the plaintiff was independently employed and was not defenseless or subordinate to her former partner, and she had other legal means to enforce her rights.

La demandante interpuso una demanda constitucional, pidiendo de demandados, (la pareja del demandante durante quince años y la actual pareja de éste), no perturbar su casa y que además se le concediera la casa en la que actualmente residía. El tribunal de primera instancia negó los pedidos solicitados con el argumento de que el demandante podía recurrir a otros medios legales como la liquidación de la unión libre entre ella y el demandado. El tribunal de apelaciones afirmó. El Tribunal Supremo Constitucional denegó el pedido por falta de pruebas que demuestren tortura o tratos crueles, inhumanos o degradantes. El Tribunal no equiparó una declaración de intención de demandar (por parte de los demandados por la propiedad) con tomar la ley en sus propias manos, coacción o amenazas contra la persona o la familia del peticionario. El Tribunal concluyó que la demandante trabajaba de forma independiente y no estaba indefensa ni subordinada a su expareja, y contaba con otros medios legales para hacer valer sus derechos.

On August 27, 2014 Lucia Sandoval was acquitted after the court found insufficient evidence of her involvement in her husband’s death. In 2011, Sandoval was charged for the intended homicide of her husband. She subsequently spent over three years in prison awaiting trial. The incident that formed the basis for the charges took place on February 11, 2011, when Lucia Sandoval informed her husband that she had filed a complaint of domestic violence and had obtained a restraining order against him, which required him to leave their home. Sandoval’s husband responded violently and threatened her with a gun. When Sandoval tried to escape, a physical fight ensued and the gun was fired, resulting in her husband’s death. Amnesty International Paraguay, the Committee of Latin America and the Caribbean for the Defense of Women’s Rights (CLADEM) and Catholics for the Right to Decide (CDD Paraguay) helped advocate as to Sandoval’s innocence. These organizations claimed that “the first failure of the judicial system was that protection measures [for] . . . Sandoval were not applied. The court gave the [restraining] order to Sandoval, instead of sending the notice to the Police for it to be given to [her] husband.” The organizations noted that Paraguay had passed a law against domestic violence in 2000 but contended that the law “does not comprehensively address the problem, no[r] does it allow for a coordinated and coherent system in the country to collect data about gendered violence.” It should be noted that in 2013, the Human Rights Commission at the United Nations recommended that Paraguay implement a law to “prevent, punish, and eradicate gender violence, as well as assure that complain[t]s of domestic violence are effectively investigated, with perpetrators being punished appropriately and the survivors receiving attention and compensation.” Background information available at http://blog.amnestyusa.org/americas/victory-in-paraguay-is-a-big-step-fo... http://www.cladem.org/paraguay/Lucia-Sandoval-absuelta.pdf http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/amnesty_international/2014/Peru.pdf https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hk6bjsNKmrM

El 27 de agosto del 2014, Lucía Sandoval fue absuelta luego de que el tribunal no encontrara pruebas suficientes de su participación en la muerte de su esposo. En el 2011, Sandoval fue acusada del supuesto homicidio de su esposo. Posteriormente, pasaron más de tres años en prisión en espera de juicio. El hecho que sirvió de base a los cargos se produjo el 11 de febrero de 2011, cuando Lucía Sandoval informó a su esposo que había presentado una denuncia por violencia intrafamiliar y que había obtenido una orden de alejamiento en su contra, que le obligaba a abandonar su domicilio. El esposo de Sandoval respondió violentamente y la amenazó con un arma. Cuando Sandoval intentó escapar, se produjo una pelea física y se disparó el arma, lo que provocó la muerte de su esposo. Amnistía Internacional Paraguay, el Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (CLADEM) y Católicos por el Derecho a Decidir (CDD Paraguay) ayudaron a defender la inocencia de Sandoval. Estas organizaciones alegaron que “la primera falla del sistema judicial fue que las medidas de protección [para]. . . Sandoval no se aplicaron. El tribunal le dió la orden [de restricción] del marido a Sandoval, en lugar de enviar la notificación a la Policía para que se la entregue a [su] esposo” y así le informaran que no podía acercarse a ella. Las organizaciones señalaron que Paraguay aprobó una ley contra la violencia doméstica en el 2000, pero sostuvieron que la ley “no aborda el problema de manera integral, ni permite un sistema coordinado y coherente en el país para recopilar datos sobre violencia de género." Cabe señalar que en el 2013, la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas recomendó a Paraguay implementar una ley para “prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia de género, así como asegurar que las denuncias de violencia intrafamiliar sean efectivamente investigadas, con los perpetradores siendo castigados adecuadamente y los sobrevivientes recibiendo atención e indemnización.” Información de antecedentes disponible en el sito web.

In 2011, Ms. Tenjo Hernandez discovered that she was six weeks pregnant and requested voluntary termination of pregnancy based on information provided by the medical staff that her epilepsy medications could cause congenital deformities in the fetus. The doctor refused to perform the procedure unless a court order was issued. Ms. Hernandez filed a writ of constitutional challenge to enforce her rights, which the Courts of first and second instance denied based on the reasoning that Ms. Hernandez’s grounds for relief did not fall under any of the prongs of Decision C-355 of 2006 which permitted Colombian women and girls the right to voluntary termination of pregnancy. The Constitutional Court reviewed the case, despite the fact that there were not any deformities in the fetus and Ms. Hernandez had withdrawn her request for relief. The Court held that women do not carry the burden of establishing their health conditions and the status of their pregnancy; healthcare facilities and doctors are responsible to determine any fetal deformities incompatible with life outside the womb. Therefore, the Court ruled that healthcare facilities should comply with the Constitutional Court’s rulings in Decision C-355 of 2006, should not make value judgments of women who request voluntary termination of pregnancy and are prohibited from requesting court orders to perform voluntary termination of pregnancy.

En 2011, la Sra. Tenjo Hernández descubrió que tenía seis semanas de embarazo y solicitó la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo en base a la información proporcionada por el personal médico de que sus medicamentos para la epilepsia podrían causar deformidades congénitas en el feto. El médico se negó a realizar el procedimiento a menos que se emitiera una orden judicial. La señora Hernández presentó una demanda constitucional para hacer valer sus derechos, el cual los Juzgados de primera y segunda instancia denegaron con base en el razonamiento de que los motivos de reparación de la señora Hernández no se encuadran en ninguno de los extremos de la Decisión C-355 del 2006 que permitió a las mujeres y niñas colombianas el derecho a la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. La Corte Suprema Constitucional revisó el caso, a pesar de que no había deformidades en el feto y la Sra. Hernández había retirado su demanda. La Corte sostuvo que las mujeres no tienen el peso probatorio de establecer sus condiciones de salud y el estado de su embarazo, sin embargo, los centros de salud y los médicos son responsables de determinar cualquier deformidad fetal incompatible con la vida fuera del útero. Por tanto, la Corte decidió que los establecimientos de salud deben cumplir con las sentencias de la Corte Constitucional en la Sentencia C-355 de 2006, no deben emitir juicios de valor sobre mujeres que soliciten la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo y tienen prohibido solicitar órdenes judiciales para realizar la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo cuando la mujer ha expresado su voluntad de hacerlo.

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus of the petitioner, who had been convicted by the Superior Court of Justice (“STJ”) of raping his two minor daughters, both under the age of 14, over a period of five years. Although the petitioner had been sentenced to 16 years and 8 months in jail for his crimes, the lower court subsequently reduced the petitioner’ sentence by one-quarter, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 3,226/99, which grants a pardon to pardon to certain people who are convicted by the courts because they have served part of their sentence. The lower court determined that the reduction was not barred by Article 7, Section 1 of the Decree, which states that a pardon shall not apply to those convicted of “heinous crimes and those of torture, terrorism, illegal trafficking.” In response to the reduced sentence, the public prosecutor argued that the petitioner crime fell within the “heinous crimes” exception to sentence reductions. The Service of Criminal Review subsequently filed for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that crimes of rape and sexual assault do not fall within the scope of the “heinous crimes” exception, except where serious bodily injury or fatality results. The Court examined the legislative language and treatment of rape, sexual assault, and other crimes, with respect to qualifying such crimes as “heinous.” The majority of the Court held that the legislation already had classified rape as a heinous crime. The Court denied the writ, and petitioner’s sentence was not reduced.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal indeferiu o habeas corpus formulado após condenação do paciente no Superior Tribunal de Justiça – STJ por violar suas duas filhas menores, ambas com menos de 14 anos de idade, durante um período de cinco anos. Embora o paciente tivesse sido condenado a 16 anos e 8 meses de prisão por seus crimes, o tribunal de justiça estadual reduziu posteriormente a sentença do paciente em um quarto, de acordo com o Decreto Presidencial nº 3.226/99, que concede perdão a certas pessoas que são condenadas pelos tribunais por terem cumprido parte de sua sentença. O tribunal de justiça estadual determinou que a redução não foi impedida pelo Artigo 7, inciso 1 do Decreto, que estabelece que o perdão não se aplica aos condenados por "crimes hediondos e os de tortura, terrorismo, tráfico ilegal". Em resposta à redução da pena, o promotor público argumentou que o crime do paciente estava dentro da exceção de "crimes hediondos" à redução da pena. Posteriormente, o Serviço de Revisão Criminal apresentou um pedido de habeas corpus, argumentando que crimes de estupro e agressão sexual não se enquadram no escopo da exceção de "crimes hediondos", exceto quando resultam em sérios danos corporais ou fatalidade. A Corte examinou a linguagem legislativa e o tratamento de estupro, agressão sexual e outros crimes, em relação à qualificação de tais crimes como "hediondos". A maioria do STF considerou que a legislação já havia classificado o estupro como um crime hediondo, denegando a ordem e mantendo a sentença sem qualquer redução.

Following a request to Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) by then-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the STF reviewed and upheld the constitutionality of the Lei Maria da Penha (“LMP”). The LMP is Brazil’s first law to address the problem of domestic violence against women on a national scale. The law’s provision for the creation of special courts, as well as the law’s differentiated protection of women, had come under scrutiny in many of Brazil’s lower courts as unconstitutional. The STF, however, has previously held that those articles were constitutional. President Silva argued that the LMP was constitutional due to Article 226, § 8 of the Federal Constitution, and Brazil’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women. The Justices agreed that the LMP does not create a law of unequal treatment between men and women, but addresses the reality of longstanding discrimination and aggression directed at women, and offers substantive mechanisms to promote equality without infringing on the rights of males. The Court also found that the provision of specialized courts is constitutional and not in conflict with state control of the local courts. Finally, with a majority vote of 10-1, the Justices held that the office of the public prosecutor can prosecute domestic violence cases even when the victim fails to appear or file a complaint against her aggressor. The majority reasoned that state intervention is necessary to guarantee the victim’s protection from the risk of ongoing violence, which may be aggravated by the victim appearing in the action against her aggressor.

O Presidente do Brasil em 2012, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, ajuizou pedido de revisão da constitucionalidade da Lei Maria da Penha (LMP) ao Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, sob a ótica do tratamento diferenciado conferido pela Lei aos homens e as mulheres. Em breve retrospecto, a LMP é o primeiro dispositivo legal enderençando o problema da violência doméstica sofrida pelas mulheres em nível nacional. Em razão da referida lei prever a instituição de Juizados Especiais de violência doméstica e familiar contra a mulher, bem como diferenciar a proteção conferida às mulheres vítima de violência doméstica, diversas varas de primeira instância passaram a julgar os dispositivos das leis como inconstitucionais, muito embora o STF já tivesse firmado entendimento pela constitucionalidade da LMP. No pedido encaminhado pelo então presidente Lula argumentou que o parágrafo 8º do artigo 226 da Constituição Federal (o qual prevê que o Estado assegurará a assistência à família na pessoa de cada um dos que a integram, criando mecanismos para coibir a violência no âmbito de suas relações), bem como a ratificação do Brasil a Convenção sobre a Eliminação de todas as Formas de Discriminação contra a Mulher (CEDAW) e a Convenção Interamericana para Prevenir, Punir e Erradicar a Violência contra a Mulher garantiriam a constitucionalidade da LMP. Os Ministros do STF, quando da análise do assunto, entenderam a LMP não criou tratamento desigual em relação aos homens e mulheres, tendo endereçado apenas os problemas de discriminação e agressões dirigidas às mulheres, oferecendo, portanto, mecanismos de proteção que auxiliam na promoção da igualdade, sem retirar qualquer direito dos homens. O STF entendeu ainda que as provisões relativas à criação de Juizados Especiais são constitucionais, não havendo conflitos entre o controle jurisdicional estadual e local. Finalmente, a maioria dos Ministros (10-1) entendeu que as Promotorias Públicas têm competência para denunciar casos de violência doméstica, a inda que a vítima desista de aparecer em juízo ou prosseguir com a denúncia contra o agressor. A maioria justificou que a intervenção estatal se faz necessária para a garantia de proteção à vítima em razão do risco iminente de violência, a qual poderia ser agravada caso a vítima denunciasse seu agressor.

A parliamentary minority requested that the Constitutional Court declare unconstitutional a Ministry of Health decree that determined the availability of family planning methods and permitted distribution of emergency contraception by national health centers. The constitutional court noted that the “right to life” is fundamental under the Chilean Constitution. It rejected scientific arguments that emergency contraception did not affect the life of a conceived but unborn embryo. In a dissenting opinion, one judge noted that the rights protecting the reproductive rights of women were enshrined in CEDAW in conflict with the Constitutional Court’s decision. The Constitutional Court’s decision did not prevent all distribution of emergency contraception in Chile, but banned it from being distributed by clinics and hospitals that are part of national health system. The constitutional court decision was effectively overruled in January 2010 by Law No. 20.418, promulgated by President Bachelet, which permitted distribution of emergency contraceptive pills in both public and private health centers, including to persons under 14 without parental consent. The law also requires high schools to enact sexual education programs.

Una minoría parlamentaria solicitó a la Corte Constitucional que declare inconstitucional un decreto del Ministerio de Salud que determinaba la disponibilidad de métodos de planificación familiar y permitía la distribución de anticonceptivos de emergencia por los centros nacionales de salud. El tribunal constitucional señaló que el “derecho a la vida” es fundamental en la Constitución chilena. Rechazó los argumentos científicos de que la anticoncepción de emergencia no afecta la vida de un embrión concebido pero no nacido. En una opinión disidente, un juez señaló que los derechos que protegen los derechos reproductivos de la mujer estaban consagrados en la CEDAW, en conflicto con la decisión del Tribunal Constitucional. La decisión de la Corte Constitucional no impidió toda la distribución de anticonceptivos de emergencia en Chile, pero prohibió su distribución en clínicas y hospitales que forman parte del sistema nacional de salud. La decisión del tribunal constitucional fue efectivamente cancelada en enero de 2010 por la Ley No. 20.418, promulgada por la presidenta Bachelet, que permitía la distribución de píldoras anticonceptivas de emergencia en centros de salud públicos y privados, incluso a personas menores de 14 años sin el consentimiento de los padres. La ley también requiere que las escuelas secundarias promulguen programas de educación sexual.

The Criminal Court of Viña del Mar sentenced Rodrigo Gacitúa Escobar to life imprisonment for a series of robberies, rapes, and other crimes committed between 2010 and 2012. The prosecutor, Vivian Quiñones, expressed satisfaction at the result, and pointed out the impact of the testimony from the victims. The defense unsuccessfully attempted to discredit the victims’ testimony, including using postings on social media.

El Juzgado de lo Penal de Viña del Mar condenó a Rodrigo Gacitúa Escobar a cadena perpetua por una serie de robos, violaciones y otros delitos cometidos entre 2010 y 2012. La fiscal, Vivian Quiñones, expresó satisfacción por el resultado y señaló el impacto del testimonio de las víctimas para la conclusión legal. La defensa intentó sin éxito desacreditar el testimonio de las víctimas por medios que incluyeron el uso de publicaciones en las redes sociales.

The defendant was charged with trafficking in persons. He was accused of recruiting Peruvian women to come to Chile, where they then were engaged in prostitution. The defendant used an employment agency in Peru to recruit the women, who signed labor contracts to serve as waitresses in the defendant’s premises. The women victims were forced to wear provocative clothing and drink alcohol with the premises’ clients. There also was prostitution at the premises. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to six years in prison.

Al acusado se le inculpó de trata de personas. Fue acusado de reclutar mujeres peruanas para venir a Chile, donde luego las forzaba a dedicarse a la prostitución. El acusado utilizó una agencia de empleo en Perú para contratar a las mujeres, quienes firmaron contratos laborales para servir como camareras en las instalaciones del acusado. Las mujeres víctimas fueron obligadas a llevar ropa provocativa y beber alcohol con los clientes del local. También hubo prostitución en el local. El acusado fue declarado culpable y condenado a seis años de prisión.

Anonymous had been continually sexually abused and raped by her father since 2001 at the age of twelve. An Argentinean trial court had sentenced the father to eighteen years in prison for abusing his daughter, but this decision was overturned by an Argentinean appellate court, believing the father was not clearly guilty and his punishment was, thus, incommensurate with the crime. The Supreme Court overturned the appellate court decision, stating that there was clear guilt on the father’s part, repeated cries for help by Anonymous, and that the appellate court showed a lack of regard for the facts and the suffering of Anonymous. The case was remanded for new sentencing.

Anónimo había sido continuamente abusada sexualmente y violada por su padre desde 2001 a la edad de doce años. Un tribunal de primera instancia argentino había condenado al padre a dieciocho años de prisión por abusar de su hija, pero esta decisión fue revocada por un tribunal de apelación argentino, creyendo que el padre no era evidentemente culpable y que su castigo era, por lo tanto, incompatible con el crimen. La Corte Suprema anuló la decisión de la corte de apelaciones, declarando que había una clara culpabilidad por parte del padre, repetidos gritos de ayuda por parte de Anonymous, y que la corte de apelaciones mostró una falta de respeto por los hechos y el sufrimiento de Anonymous. El caso fue remitido para nueva sentencia.

A married woman with three children was allowed to undergo a therapeutic abortion for an anencephalic fetus for health reasons. To do so, she had to file a request with the hospital and the court, which had a formal hearing to determine that the rights of the fetus were being respected and that the procedure was strictly for health reasons. The decision was appealed to a higher court, which affirmed the family court’s decision. They cited international law to support the decision, citing both the mother’s rights to raise a family as she saw fit and the rights of the anencephalic fetus. Along with Argentinean Supreme Court, the most cited laws were the Convención de los Derechos del Niño and the Convención Americana sobre los Derechos Humanos. While this ruling may not seem progressive by American standards, abortion is still essentially outlawed in Argentina.

A una mujer casada con tres hijos se le permitió someterse a un aborto terapéutico para un feto anencefálico por razones de salud. Para hacerlo, tuvo que presentar una solicitud ante el hospital y el tribunal, que tuvo una audiencia formal para determinar que se respetaban los derechos del feto y que el procedimiento era estrictamente por razones de salud. La decisión fue apelada ante un tribunal superior, que confirmó la decisión del tribunal de familia. Citaron el derecho internacional para respaldar la decisión, citando tanto los derechos de la madre de criar a una familia como consideraba oportuno como los derechos del feto anencefal. Junto con la Corte Suprema argentina, las leyes más citadas fueron la Convención de los Derechos del Niño y la Convención Americana sobre los Derechos Humanos. Si bien esta decisión puede no parecer progresista para los estándares estadounidenses, el aborto aún está esencialmente prohibido en Argentina.

A seventeen-year old girl won her court petition for an abortion despite the fact that there was no issue of fetus viability. The minor had suffered repeated sexual abuse at the hands of her father and uncle for the past six years. The court reaffirmed constitutional and human rights protections for fetuses against abortions, but explained that the right to life is not protected from conception to death with the same intensity. In this case, the fact that the pregnant minor had suffered repeated sexual abuse, had passed a psychological evaluation, and was only 11 weeks pregnant were sufficient reasons to override the presumption of protection for the fetus.

Una niña de diecisiete años ganó su petición en la corte para un aborto a pesar del hecho de que no había ningún problema de viabilidad del feto. La menor había sufrido repetidos abusos sexuales a manos de su padre y su tío durante los últimos seis años. El tribunal reafirmó las protecciones constitucionales y de derechos humanos para los fetos contra los abortos, pero explicó que el derecho a la vida no está protegido desde la concepción hasta la muerte con la misma intensidad. En este caso, el hecho de que la menor embarazada había sufrido abuso sexual repetido, había pasado una evaluación psicológica y tenía solo 11 semanas de embarazo era razón suficiente para anular la presunción de protección para el feto.

The Supreme Court declared the Organic Law on Women's Right to a Life Without Violence approved by the National Assembly on 25 November 2006 constitutional. The Court found that the Law develops the constitutional protection referred to in article 21.2 of the Constitution for the benefit of women, a traditionally vulnerable social group.

The Supreme Court, Penal division, upheld the conviction of a defendant who raped his stepdaughter under threat of death or grievous injury. The Court held that the conviction was consistent with Article 54 of the National Constitution, Article 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights ("Pact of San Jose"), Article 24 of the International Pact of Civil and Political Rights, Article 19 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3 of the Code of Children and Adolescents, and Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women.

La Corte Suprema, División Penal, confirmó la condena de un acusado que violó a su hijastra bajo amenaza de muerte o lesiones graves. La Corte sostuvo que la condena era compatible con el Artículo 54 de la Constitución Nacional, el Artículo 19 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos ("Pacto de San José"), el Artículo 24 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, el Artículo 19 del Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, Artículo 3 del Código de la Niñez y Adolescencia y el Artículo 1 de la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer.

A male schoolteacher was accused of sexually abusing one of his female students, a third-grader, and was removed from his job pending the outcome of his trial. He filed a constitutional challenge to his removal, arguing that it violated his due process right to a presumption of innocence, as enumerated in Article 2 of the Peruvian Political Constitution. The court of first instance agreed with the teacher, ordering the school system to reinstate him. The school system argued that the Law of Teachers ("Ley de Profesorado") allows for termination of a teacher without a conviction. The Constitutional Tribunal held that while professionals normally cannot be removed from a job until proven guilty, the interest of protecting minor children outweighed the interest of the teacher in this case. The Court held that the teacher's removal was consistent with Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Article 2 of the Interamerican Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, as well as numerous other Peruvian laws.

The Court recognized the special constitutional protection that women displaced by armed conflict are entitled to, as well as international obligations applicable to women displaced by armed conflict. The Court ordered the creation of programs to bring attention to the plight of displaced women and to strengthen their constitutional rights. The court also granted protective orders to more than 600 displaced women. Finally, the court alerted the Attorney General of numerous sexual crimes committed against women during Colombia's armed conflict.

La Corte reconoció la protección constitucional especial a la que tienen derecho las mujeres desplazadas por conflictos armados y guerras, así como las obligaciones internacionales que se aplican a ellas. La Corte ordenó la creación de programas para llamar la atención sobre la difícil situación de las mujeres desplazadas y fortalecer sus derechos constitucionales. El tribunal también otorgó órdenes de protección a más de 600 mujeres desplazadas. Finalmente, el tribunal alertó al Fiscal General sobre numerosos delitos sexuales cometidos contra mujeres durante el conflicto armado de Colombia.

Explaining that the right to marry or remarry is a fundamental right, the Court held that wills and testaments that required a woman to remain single or widowed were unconstitutional.

Al explicar que el derecho a contraer matrimonio o volver a casarse es un derecho fundamental, la Corte sostuvo que los testamentos que exigían que una mujer permaneciera soltera o viuda eran inconstitucionales porque abrogaban este derecho.

The Court was asked to reexamine the domestic implications of Colombia's adoption of the CEDAW. Those opposing the CEDAW argued that its adoption would have grave consequences and be inconsistent with the Colombian Constitution. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of Colombia's participation in the CEDAW.

Se solicitó a la Corte que reexaminara las implicaciones internas de la adopción de la CEDAW por parte de Colombia. Quienes se oponen a la CEDAW argumentaron que su adopción tendría graves consecuencias y sería incompatible con la Constitución colombiana. La Corte afirmó la constitucionalidad de la participación de Colombia en la CEDAW.

The Court ruled that a complete ban on abortion was unconstitutional and legalized abortion in cases of incest, danger to the health of the mother, and rape, involuntary insemination, serious deformity to the fetus, or when the mother is under the age of 14. In instances of deformity to the fetus or danger to the mother, the Court required that medical evidence be provided. The Court relies on its obligations in international law to protect women's rights to health and life, among others.

La Corte dictaminó que la prohibición total del aborto era inconstitucional y legalizó el aborto en casos de incesto, peligro para la salud de la madre, casos de violación, inseminación involuntaria, deformidad grave del feto, y cuando la madre es menor de 14 años. En casos de deformidad para el feto o peligro para la madre, el Tribunal requirió que se proporcionaran pruebas médicas. La Corte se basa en sus obligaciones en derecho internacional para proteger los derechos de las mujeres a la salud y la vida, entre otros.

The Court was asked to examine the constitutionality of Article 34 of the Colombian Civil Code, which established the minimum age of marriage for women as 12, while the minimum age for men as 14. The Court struck the wording from the Civil Code that differentiated in age based on gender, and set the minimum age of marriage at 14.

Se solicitó a la Corte que examinara la constitucionalidad del Artículo 34 del Código Civil colombiano, que establece la edad mínima para contraer matrimonio para las mujeres en 12 años, mientras que la edad mínima para los hombres en 14 años. La Corte eliminó la redacción del Código Civil que diferenciaba en edad basada en el género, y fijó la edad mínima para contraer matrimonio en 14 años.

The Court held that 4, while prima facie unconstitutional, is acceptable if done with the constitutional purpose of furthering the rights of women, considered a constitutionally-protected class, and not with the purpose of maintaining traditional societal roles. The Court held that "the special protection of women allows for discriminatory treatment with constitutional ends." The Court also affirmed that minors are a protected class, protected both by the Colombian Constitution but also by the international treaties to which Colombia is a signatory.

La Corte sostuvo que 4, aunque prima facie en violación a la constitución, es aceptable si se hace con el propósito constitucional de promover los derechos de la mujer, la cual es considerada una clase protegida constitucionalmente, y no con el propósito de mantener roles sociales tradicionales. La Corte sostuvo que "la protección especial de la mujer permite un trato positivamente discriminatorio con fines constitucionales." La Corte también afirmó que los menores son una clase protegida, amparada tanto por la Constitución colombiana como por los tratados internacionales de los que Colombia es signataria.

Reversing an appellate court ruling and affirming a trial court ruling, the Court reaffirmed the rights to employment of pregnant and nursing women.

Revocando una decisión del tribunal de apelaciones y afirmando una decisión del tribunal de primera instancia, el Tribunal reafirmó los derechos al empleo de las mujeres embarazadas y lactantes.

Recognizing the constitutional vulnerability of pregnant women and unborn and newborn children, the Court ordered defendant, and insurance company, to insure plaintiff, an 18-year old pregnant woman, who had lost the right to her parents' insurance upon reaching the age of 18.

Reconociendo la vulnerabilidad constitucional de las mujeres embarazadas y de los niños que están por nacer y los recién nacidos, la Corte ordenó al demandado y a la compañía de seguros que aseguraran a la demandante, una mujer embarazada de 18 años, que había perdido el derecho al seguro de sus padres al cumplir los 18 años.

Therapeutic abortion in cases of rape, incest, and to save the health and life of the woman. The Court reaffirmed that a ban on abortion in all instances would an unconstitutional violation of women's fundamental rights.

Este caso analizó los abortos terapéuticos en casos de violación, incesto y para salvar la salud y la vida de la mujer. La Corte reafirmó que la prohibición del aborto completamente en todos los casos absolutos, sin mirar las circunstancias particulares constituiría una violación inconstitucional de los derechos fundamentales de la mujer.

Alleged victim claimed that defendant pushed her down the stairs and raped her while she was unconscious. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding there was insufficient evidence to convict him of committing grave bodily injury, harassment and rape. The Appellate Court affirmed acquittals for grave bodily injury and harassment, but reversed the acquittal for rape, finding that there was sufficient medical evidence for a conviction. Medical testimony indicated that the victim had recently engaged in sexual relations, but that after the victim had fallen down the stairs, she would have been in so much pain that consensual sexual relations would have been highly unlikely. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling.

La presunta víctima afirmó que el acusado la empujó escaleras abajo y la violó mientras estaba inconsciente. El tribunal de primera instancia decidió a favor del acusado, al considerar que no había pruebas suficientes para condenarlo por loa legados crímenes de cometer lesiones corporales graves, acoso y violación. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó las absoluciones por lesiones corporales graves y acoso, pero revocó la absolución por violación y encontró que había pruebas médicas suficientes para una condena. El testimonio médico indicó que la víctima había tenido relaciones sexuales recientemente, pero que después de que la víctima se hubiera caído por las escaleras, habría sentido tanto dolor que las relaciones sexuales consensuales hubieran sido muy poco probables. La Corte Suprema ratificó la decisión de la corte de apelaciones.

Defendant was charged with repeatedly raping his two underage daughters. The victims alleged that they did not report the incidents immediately because their father threatened them against doing so. Witnesses testified that the defendant was regularly drunk and abusive. The trial court found him guilty of rape. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed the conviction.

El acusado fue acusado de violar repetidamente a sus dos hijas menores de edad. Las víctimas alegaron que no denunciaron los hechos de inmediato porque su padre las amenazó que no lo hicieran. Los testigos declararon que el acusado se emborrachaba y maltrataba con regularidad. El tribunal de primera instancia lo declaró culpable de violación. Los tribunales de apelación y supremo afirmaron la condena.

Defendant was charged with homicide and rape of a woman, in violation of Articles 251 and 308 of the Penal Code. Defendant admitted to having raped the victim, but claimed that he did not kill her, claiming he left her alone after he finished raping her. The trial court found there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of both crimes. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed the ruling.

El imputado fue acusado de homicidio y violación de una mujer, en violación de los Artículos 251 y 308 del Código Penal. El acusado admitió haber violado a la víctima, pero afirmó que no la mató, alegando que la dejó sola después de que terminó de violarla. El tribunal de primera instancia determinó que había pruebas suficientes para condenar al acusado de ambos delitos. Los tribunales de apelación y supremo confirmaron la decisión.

Charges were brought against defendant for the aggravated rape of a 20-year old handicapped woman, suffering from muscular atrophy. According to the victim, who was the defendant's sister-in-law, the defendant entered her room, threw her on the bed, raped her and left. The defendant allegedly raped the victim a number of more times, resulting in pregnancy. The defendant then allegedly attempted unsuccessfully to induce victim's abortion, at which time the victim reported the incidents to her father. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, holding the victim's testimony to be too inconsistent and contradictory to secure a conviction. The appellate and Supreme Court, disagreed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a conviction.

Se presentaron cargos contra el acusado por la violación agravada de una mujer discapacitada de 20 años de edad que sufría de atrofia muscular. Según la víctima, quien era la cuñada del imputado, el imputado entró a su habitación, la tiró sobre la cama, la violó y se fue. El acusado supuestamente violó a la víctima varias veces más, lo que resultó en un embarazo. Luego, la acusada supuestamente intentó sin éxito inducir el aborto de la víctima, momento en el que la víctima informó de los incidentes a su padre. El tribunal de primera instancia decidió a favor del acusado y consideró que el testimonio de la víctima era demasiado inconsistente y contradictorio para asegurar una condena. La apelación y la Corte Suprema no estuvieron de acuerdo, sosteniendo que había pruebas suficientes para una condena.

Defendant was accused of aggravated rape of his 11-year old daughter, in violation of Art. 308 and 310-2 of the Penal Code. The defendant admitted to the rape, explaining it was an irresistible impulse. The trial court held that there was sufficient evidence not only to prove that the Defendant had raped his daughter, but that he had used force and threats of force to do so. Defendant was sentenced to 12 years in jail, and fined punitive damages. On appeal, the appellate court held that the appropriate sentence was 13 years, and that the penal code did not allow for the punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed.

El imputado fue acusado de violación agravada de su hija de 11 años, en violación del Artículo 308 y 310-2 del Código Penal. El acusado admitió la violación, explicando que fue un impulso irresistible. El tribunal de primera instancia sostuvo que había pruebas suficientes no solo para probar que el acusado había violado a su hija, sino que había usado la fuerza y ​​amenazas de fuerza para hacerlo. El acusado fue sentenciado a 12 años de cárcel y una multa por daños punitivos. En apelación, el tribunal de apelaciones sostuvo que la sentencia apropiada era de 13 años y que el código penal no permitía los daños punitivos. Afirmó la Corte Suprema.

Defendant was charged with the aggravated rape of his 9-year old daughter. After considering a medical exam that confirmed rape had occurred, and hearing testimony from the victim naming her father as the aggressor, the lower court found defendant guilty of aggravated rape. The defendant appealed, alleging the accusation of rape was an attempt by the girl's mother of getting revenge against him. Finding there to be sufficient evidence for a conviction, the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling.

El acusado fue acusado de violación agravada de su hija de 9 años. Después de considerar un examen médico que confirmó que había ocurrido una violación y escuchar el testimonio de la víctima que nombraba a su padre como el agresor, el tribunal inferior declaró al acusado culpable de violación agravada. El acusado apeló alegando que la acusación de violación era un intento de la madre de la niña de vengarse de él. Al encontrar que existen pruebas suficientes para una condena, el Tribunal confirmó el fallo del tribunal inferior.

Charges were brought against defendant for allegedly sexually abusing his 14-year old daughter for a period of 30 days while they were in Argentina. The lower court found defendant guilty of aggravated rape, in violation of Article 308-2 and 310-2 of the Penal Code. Upon defendant's appeal, the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that the victim's testimony coupled with that of the defendant's brother, who witnessed and first reported the rape, was sufficient evidence to convict the plaintiff.

Se presentaron cargos contra el acusado por presuntamente abusar sexualmente de su hija de 14 años durante un período de 30 días mientras se encontraban en Argentina. El tribunal de primera instancia declaró al acusado culpable de violación agravada, específicamente, en violación de los Artículos 308-2 y 310-2 del Código Penal. Tras la apelación del acusado, el Tribunal confirmó el fallo del tribunal inferior, sosteniendo que el testimonio de la víctima junto con el del hermano del acusado, que presenció y denunció por primera vez la violación, era prueba suficiente para condenar al demandante.

VDA, on behalf of her daughter LMR, filed a petition alleging violations of LMR’s rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The petition alleged violations of LMR’s right under article 2 (right to protection from state against violations of the rights within the ICCPR), article 3 (right to be free from discrimination), article 7 (to freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), article 17 (freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence, or unlawful attacks on honor or reputation), and article 18 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion). At the time of the incident, LMR was 20 years old but had permanent mental disability with a mental age between 8 and 10 years old. When LMR’s mother brought her to hospital after LMR complained of pains, she discovered that LMR was raped by her uncle and was 14.5 weeks pregnant. Under section 82.6 of the Argentinean Criminal Code, abortion is legal if the pregnancy is the result of the rape of a mentally impaired woman. LMR filed a police complaint and scheduled an abortion, but the abortion was prevented by an injunction against the hospital. LMR appealed unsuccessfully to the Civil Court. The Supreme Court of Buenos Aires ruled the abortion could take place. However, under pressure from anti-abortion groups, the hospital refused to perform the abortion because her pregnancy was too far advanced. LMR eventually obtained an illegal abortion. Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR creates an obligation for state parties to protect individuals’ rights under the Covenant. The United Nations Human Rights Committee found that court hearings caused LMR’s abortion to be delayed to the point that she required an illegal abortion. The Committee found that although forcing LRM to endure a pregnancy that resulted from rape did not constitute torture under Article 7, it did cause physical and emotional suffering and therefore still constituted a violation of LRM’s rights under Article 7. Article 7 protects individuals from mental as well as physical suffering, and the Committee saw the violation as particularly serious given LRM’s status as a person with a disability. Further, the Committee found that because the decision of whether to proceed with an abortion should only have been made between the patient and her physician, LRM’s right to privacy under Article 17 was violated. Even though the Supreme Court ruled in favor of LRM’s abortion, this litigation process was so prolonged that LRM’s pregnancy had advanced to the stage that her physician would no longer perform the abortion. This fact, the Committee reasoned, amounted to a violation of Article 2, because LRM did not, in fact, have access to an effective remedy (the abortion) and was forced to obtain one illegally. This case contributed to a growing consensus in international law that restricting women’s access to an abortion may be considered torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 7 of the ICCPR. It also demonstrated that obstructing access to legal, elective medical procedures may violate the Covenant. Additionally, it indicated that the Court will analyze the right of a person with a disability under Article 7 in a way which heightens the recognized impact of the violation.

VDA, en nombre de su hija LMR, presentó una petición por violación de los derechos de LMR en virtud del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (PIDCP). La petición alegaba violaciones del derecho de LMR en virtud del artículo 2 (derecho a la protección del Estado contra violaciones del derecho en virtud del PIDCP), artículo 3 (derecho a no ser discriminado), artículo 7 (a no ser sometido a torturas u otros actos crueles, inhumanos o trato degradante), el artículo 17 (libertad de interferencia arbitraria con la privacidad, familia, hogar o correspondencia, o ataques ilegales a honor o reputación), y el artículo 18 (derecho a la libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión). Al momento del incidente, LMR tenía 20 años de edad, pero tenía una discapacidad mental permanente que la hacía tener una edad mental entre 8 y 10 años. Cuando la madre de LMR la llevó al hospital después de que LMR se quejó de dolores, descubrió que LMR fue violada por su tío y tenía 14.5 semanas de embarazo. Bajo la sección 82.6 del Código Penal Argentino, el aborto es legal si el embarazo es el resultado de la violación de una mujer con discapacidad mental. LMR presentó una denuncia policial y programó un aborto, pero el aborto fue prevenido por una orden judicial contra el hospital. LMR apeló sin éxito al Tribunal Civil.

La Corte Suprema de Buenos Aires determinó que el aborto podría llevarse a cabo. Sin embargo, bajo la presión de los grupos contra el aborto, el hospital se negó a realizar el aborto porque el embarazo estaba muy avanzado. LMR finalmente obtuvo un aborto ilegal. El artículo 2 del Protocolo Facultativo del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos establece la obligación de los Estados parte de proteger los derechos de las personas en virtud del Pacto. El Comité de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas determinó que las audiencias judiciales causaron un retraso en el aborto de LMR hasta el punto de que ella requirió un aborto ilegal. El Comité determinó que aunque obligar a LRM a soportar un embarazo que resultó de una violación no constituía una tortura en virtud del Artículo 7, causaba sufrimiento físico y emocional y, por lo tanto, seguía constituyendo una violación de los derechos de LRM en virtud del Artículo 7. El Artículo 7 protege la salud mental de las personas además del sufrimiento físico, y el Comité consideró que la violación era particularmente grave dado el estado de LRM como persona con discapacidad. Además, el Comité determinó que debido a que la decisión de proceder o no con un aborto solo debería haberse realizado entre la paciente y su médico, se violó el derecho a la privacidad de LRM en virtud del Artículo 17. A pesar de que la Corte Suprema falló a favor del aborto de LRM, este proceso de litigio fue tan prolongado que el embarazo de LRM había avanzado a la etapa en que su médico ya no realizaría el aborto. Este hecho, razonó el Comité, equivalía a una violación del artículo 2, porque LRM no tenía, de hecho, acceso a un recurso efectivo (el aborto) y estaba obligada a obtener uno ilegalmente. Este caso contribuyó a un consenso cada vez mayor en el derecho internacional de que restringir el acceso de las mujeres a un aborto puede considerarse tortura o tratos crueles, inhumanos o degradantes en virtud del Artículo 7 del PIDCP. También demostró que obstruir el acceso a procedimientos médicos electivos y legales puede violar el Convenio. Además, el caso indicó que la Corte analizará el derecho de una persona con una discapacidad según el Artículo 7 de una manera que aumenta el impacto reconocido de la violación.

A 15-year-old girl, P, was allegedly sexually assaulted by three men. She immediately reported the attack to the police, but was kept waiting for hours at the police station and a medical center before being performed anal and vaginal palpations which caused her intense pain and despite complaining the sole anal nature of the attack. A social worker was sent to interview P's neighbors and relatives about her sexual history and morals during the investigation, leasing aside the three accused. The three accused were acquitted following a trial solely in Spanish despite the first language of P and several of the witnesses was Qom, and in which great reliance was placed on P's sexual history by the prosecution and the judge. P was not notified of her rights to participate in the trial nor of the outcome of the trial and she only became aware of the acquittal after two years and was unable to appeal. The Human Rights Committee found violations of Articles 2(3), 3, 7, 14(1), 17, 24, 26 of the Convention. The Committee found that the police, medical examiner and the court did not provide appropriate protections to P's age, discriminated against her in the emphasis that was placed on her sexual history, and denied her right of access to the courts when she was not informed of her legal rights. It also found that the events at the police station and the medical examination constituted inhumane or degrading treatment, and that the investigation had arbitrarily interfered with P's private life. The Committee called on the State to guarantee access for victims, including victims of sexual assault, to the courts in conditions of equality in the future. However the operative gender stereotypes, including that as a young women from a marginalized ethnic minority group, she was sexually promiscuous, which contributed towards the acquittal of the accused of the rape were unnamed, leaving the role of the stereotypes in discriminating against similar victims and their rights unaddressed.

Una niña de 15 años, P, presuntamente fue agredida sexualmente por tres hombres. Ella informó de inmediato del ataque a la policía, pero se mantuvo esperando durante horas en la estación de policía y en un centro médico antes de que se realizaran las palpaciones anales y vaginales, lo que le causó un dolor intenso, además ella especificó la naturaleza anal única del ataque. Se envió a una trabajadora social para entrevistar a los vecinos y familiares de P sobre su historial sexual y su moral durante la investigación, dejando a un lado a los tres acusados. Los tres acusados fueron absueltos después de un juicio únicamente en español a pesar del primer idioma de P y varios de los testigos era Qom, y en los que la fiscalía y el juez depositaron una gran confianza en la historia sexual de P. P no fue notificada de sus derechos a participar en el juicio ni del resultado del juicio y solo se enteró de la absolución después de dos años, cuando ya era muy tarde para apelar. El Comité de Derechos Humanos encontró violaciones de los artículos 2 (3), 3, 7, 14 (1), 17, 24, 26 de la Convención. El Comité determinó que la policía, el médico forense, y el tribunal no proporcionaron las protecciones adecuadas a la edad de P, la discriminaron por el énfasis que le pusieron en su historial sexual y negaron su derecho de acceso a los tribunales cuando no se le informó de sus derechos legales. También encontró que los eventos en la estación de policía y el examen médico constituían un trato inhumano y degradante, y que la investigación había interferido arbitrariamente en la vida privada de P. El Comité pidió al Estado que garantice el acceso de las víctimas, incluidas las víctimas de agresión sexual, a los tribunales en condiciones de igualdad en el futuro. Sin embargo, los estereotipos operativos de género, incluyendo que como mujeres jóvenes de un grupo minoritario étnico marginado, la tacharon como sexualmente promiscua, lo que contribuyó a la absolución de las acusadas de la violación no fue identificado, dejando el papel de los estereotipos en la discriminación contra víctimas similares y sus derechos no defendidos.

Karen Atala Riffo, a judge in Chile, and her husband separated in 2002 and agreed that she would retain custody of their three daughters. After a few years, Ms. Atala began to live with her female partner. In response, her husband filed for custody claiming that the mother’s homosexuality was detrimental to the children. The lower court confirmed the grant of custody to the mother, finding that there was no evidence that homosexuality was pathological conduct that would make Ms. Atala unfit as a mother. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Chile granted custody to the father, on the basis that the mother’s sexuality would cause irreversible harm to the children’s development. Ms. Atala took the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”), marking the first time that the IACHR heard a case related to LGBT rights. The IACHR held that sexual orientation is a suspect class and that the Chilean courts had discriminated against Atala in the custody case in violation of the American Convention’s right to equality and non-discrimination. In 2012, the court ordered Chile to pay Atala USD $50,000 in damages and $12,000 in court costs. The Chilean government agreed to abide by the IACHR’s ruling.

Karen Atala Riffo, juez de Chile, y su esposo se separaron en el 2002 y acordaron que ella conservaría la custodia de sus tres hijas. Después de unos años, la Sra. Atala empezó una nueva relación y empezó a vivir con su pareja femenina. En respuesta, su esposo solicitó la custodia alegando que la homosexualidad de la madre era perjudicial para los niños. El tribunal de primera instancia confirmó el otorgamiento de la custodia a la madre, encontrando que no había evidencia de que la homosexualidad fuera una conducta patológica que hiciera que la Sra. Atala no fuera apta como madre. Sin embargo, en apelación, la Corte Suprema de Chile otorgó la custodia al padre, sobre la base de que la sexualidad de la madre causaría un daño irreversible al desarrollo de los hijos. La Sra. Atala llevó el caso a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (“CIDH”), siendo la primera vez que la CIDH conoce un caso relacionado con los derechos HGB. La CIDH sostuvo que la orientación sexual es una clase sospechosa y que los tribunales chilenos habían discriminado a Atala en el caso de custodia en violación del derecho a la igualdad y no discriminación de la Convención Americana. En el 2012, la corte ordenó a Chile que pagara a Atala USD $ 50,000 en daños y $ 12,000 en costas judiciales. El gobierno chileno acordó acatar la sentencia de la CIDH.

An Afro-Brazilian woman suffered a high-risk pregnancy and was repeatedly denied timely care at public health facility, before dying of a digestive hemorrhage following delivery of her stillborn fetus. Her death is not an isolated case; Brazil's maternal mortality rates are disproportionately high for a country of its economic status and the chances of dying in pregnancy and childbirth are greatest among indigenous, low-income, and Afro-descendant women. The husband of the deceased then filed a civil claim for material and moral damages, and twice requested the judicial mechanism of injunctive relief (tutela antecipada), which requests the judge to anticipate the protective effects of a decision. The first request was ignored and the second denied. The mother of the deceased then submitted a complaint to CEDAW Committee, alleging that the Rio de Janeiro State violated her daughter’s right to life and health under the Convention (CEDAW). The State contended that the evidence offered no link between the deceased’s gender and the possible errors committed, and that such errors therefore did not fall within the definition of discrimination set out in the Convention. Upon consideration, the Committee found that the death of the deceased must be regarded as maternal, that the deceased was denied appropriate services in connection with her pregnancy, that the State failed to fulfill its obligations under the Convention pursuant to the right to health, and that the State’s lack of appropriate maternal health services has a differential impact on the right to life of women. The Committee directed the State to take the following steps: compensate the deceased’s family, ensure women’s right to safe motherhood and affordable access to adequate emergency obstetric care, provide adequate professional training for health workers, ensure that private health care facilities comply with national and international standards on reproductive health care, and ensure that sanctions are imposed on health professionals who violate women’s reproductive health rights.

A vítima, uma mulher afro-brasileira que sofria com uma gravidez de risco, foi morta em razão do descaso do sistema público de saúde do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, após diversas negativas de atendimento apropriado a ela, ocasionando sua morte e de seu filho natimorto. Sua morte não se trata de um caso isolado. Com efeito, as taxas de mortalidade de gestantes são desproporcionalmente altas para um país com o status econômico do Brasil. Nesse aspecto, o risco de mortalidade durante a gravidez ou durante o parto é maior entre a população indígena, de baixa renda e afrodescendentes, o que explica o porquê desse caso ser relevante. O marido da vítima entrou com Pedido de Reparação de Danos Morais e Materiais e com dois pedidos de Tutela Antecipada, a fim de antecipar os efeitos da decisão. Contudo, o primeiro pedido de tutela antecipada não foi analisado pelo Judiciário, enquanto o segundo pedido foi negado. Em vista da ineficiência do Poder Judiciário brasileiro, a mão da vítima submeteu uma reclamação ao Comitê da CEDAW, sob o argumento de violação dos direitos à vida e à saúde de sua filha por parte do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. O Estado do Rio de Janeiro, por sua vez, argumentou acerca da inexistência de conexão entre o gênero da vítima e os possíveis erros médicos ocorridos, não sendo aplicável a definição de discriminação estabelecida pela CEDAW. Quando da análise do caso, o Comitê entendeu que: (i) a morte da vítima deveria ser considerada uma “morte materna” evitável, uma vez que foi negado atendimento apropriado relativo à gravidez da vítima; (ii) o Estado do Rio de Janeiro falhou em garantir o direito à saúde no termos da Convenção da CEDAW; e (iii) a ausência de atendimento médico adequado às gestantes por parte do Estado impacta diferentemente no direito à vida das mulheres. O Comitê ainda estabeleceu medidas a serem tomadas pelo Estado do Rio de Janeiro, tais como compensação à família da vítima, garantia do direito da mulher em ter uma gestação segura e atendimento obstétrico adequado, realizar atendimento adequado aos profissionais da saúde, garantir que o atendimento médico atenda o padrão nacional e internacional relativo à saúde reprodutiva, bem como garanta que as penalidades sejam imposta aos profissionais de saúde que violem os direitos reprodutivos das mulheres.

Loayza-Tamayo was detained by the National Counter-Terrorism Bureau ("DINCOTE"). While detained, she was threatened with torture and was repeatedly raped in an effort to force her to confess to belonging to the Peruvian Communist Party ("Shining Path"). She was charged and found guilty of treason and was held in solitary confinement. She filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, alleging numerous human rights violations and requesting her release. The Commission, unable to reach a decision, submitted the case to the Inter-American Court. The Court held that Peru violated Articles 5, 7, 8(1), 8(2) and 8(4) of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to Articles 25 and 1(1) thereof. The Court ordered that Loayza-Tamayo be released, and that she and her next of kin be compensated for any relevant expenses.

This case was brought against Venezuela under allegations of harassment and physical and verbal assault toward journalists, including some female journalists, by state actors over a period of four years. While the Court found Venezuela to be in violation of the right to speak freely, to receive and impart information, and to humane treatment (violations of Articles 1(1), 5(1) and 13(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), the Court also found there was insufficient evidence to establish violations of Articles 13(3), 21 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court further noted that it would not analyze the alleged actions under Articles 1, 2 and 7(b) of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women.

In 1978, the court of first instance ruled in favor of Graciela Ato del Avellanal on a claim for overdue rent owed to her by tenants of two apartment buildings she owned in Lima. The Superior Court reversed the judgment in 1980 because article 168 of the Peruvian Civil Code stated that when a woman is married, only the husband is entitled to represent matrimonial property before the Courts; therefore, Avellanal did not herself have standing to sue. Avellanal appealed to the Peruvian Supreme Court, arguing that the Peruvian Magna Carta and the Peruvian Constitution guarantee equal rights to both men and women. After the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision, Avellanal interposed the recourse of amparo (an order to guarantee protection of the complainant’s constitutional rights), claiming a violation of article 2(2) of Peru’s Constitution, which the Supreme Court rejected. In her complaint to the Committee, Avellanal cited violations on the ground that Peru discriminated against her because she was a woman. With respect to the requirements set forth in article 14 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals, the Committee noted that the Superior Court reversed the lower court’s decision on the sole ground that Avellanal was a woman and did not have standing as such under Peruvian Civil Code article 168. The Committee also concluded that the facts before it disclosed a violation of article 3 of the Covenant which requires the State party to undertake “to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights,” and article 26 which provides that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to its protection.

Forced sterilization. A complaint was raised against Peru for the forced sterilization of Mestanza Chavez, forced sterilization which eventually caused her death. The complaint alleged that she was pressured into sterilization as part of a government objective to curve the population numbers of poor, Indian and rural women. After the sterilization, Mestanza Chavez fell ill from complications and eventually died. The complaint alleged the violation of Articles 4, 5, 1, and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Articles 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, Articles 3 and 10 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and Articles 12 and 14(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The parties reached a friendly settlement under which Peru agreed to investigate and punish those responsible for the forced sterilization, pay the victim's next of kin moral and corollary damages, pay the victim's medical expenses to her next of kin, provide her children with free primary, provide secondary and public university education to the victim's children, and pay money for the victim's spouse to purchase a home. Peru also agreed to amend its reproductive laws to eliminate any discriminatory policies within such laws.

De La Cruz-Flores was detained, charged and convicted by a "faceless judge" for the crime of terrorism. In 2003, laws were passed ordering the annulment of judgments made by secret judges and practitioners. De La Cruz-Flores, however, remained in captivity, captivity she argued was arbitrary. The Court held that Peru violated De La Cruz-Flores's rights under Articles 1(1), 5, 7 and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court ordered Peru to reinstate De La Cruz-Flores in her previous employment, grant her any previous retirement benefits, pay her costs, pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, grant her medical and psychological treatment and provide her with a grant for professional development.

Vaginal inspections for visits to family inmates. A complaint was brought against Argentina by a woman and her 13-year old daughter who were routinely subjected to vaginal inspections when they would visit the woman's husband (and girl's father) at a prison. The complaint alleged that such inspections violated the "American Convention as it offends the dignity of the persons subjected to such a procedure (Article 11), and is a degrading penal measure which extends beyond the person condemned or on trial (Article 5.3) and, furthermore, discriminates against women (Article 24), in relation to Article 1.1." Argentina argued that such inspections were reasonably necessary and conducted with as little intrusion as possible by female guards. The Commission opined that such an inspection should not occur unless absolutely necessary. In this case, the Court found that the procedure was not absolutely necessary as there were alternatives that could achieve the same objective. The Commission also held that in cases where such an inspection was absolutely necessary, they should only be carried out by pursuant to a judicial order, and by qualified medical personnel. The Commission found the inspections in this case to violate Articles 5, 11, 17, 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

Inspecciones vaginales para visitas a familiares de internos. Una mujer y su hija de 13 años de edad fueron sometidas de forma rutinaria a una inspección vaginal cuando visitaban al marido de la mujer (y al padre de la niña) en una prisión, por lo cual demandan a Argentina. La queja alegó que tales inspecciones violaron la "Convención Americana, ya que ofende la dignidad de las personas sometidas a tal procedimiento (Artículo 11), y es una medida penal degradante que se extiende más allá de la persona condenada o enjuiciada (Artículo 5.3) y además, discrimina a las mujeres (artículo 24), en relación con el artículo 1.1 ". Argentina argumentó que tales inspecciones eran necesarias y que se llevaron a cabo con la menor intrusión posible de las guardias. La Comisión opinó que tal inspección no debería ocurrir a menos que sea absolutamente necesario. En este caso, el Tribunal consideró que el procedimiento no era absolutamente necesario ya que había alternativas que podrían lograr el mismo objetivo. La Comisión también sostuvo que en los casos en que dicha inspección fuera absolutamente necesaria, solo deberían llevarse a cabo de conformidad con una orden judicial y por personal médico calificado. La Comisión consideró que las inspecciones en este caso violan los artículos 5, 11, 17 y 19 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.

Discrimination against pregnant girl in school. Chile agreed to cover the educational expenses of a pregnant teenager who was expelled from her school for being pregnant.

Discriminación contra una niña en la escuela por estar embarazada. Chile acordó cubrir los gastos educativos de una adolescente embarazada que fue expulsada de su escuela por estar embarazada.