Women and Justice: Topics: Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Legislation

Кодекс законів про працю № 322-VIII 1971, статті 178: переведення вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років, на легшу роботу (Labor Code, art. 178: work transfer rules for pregnant women, women with young children) (1971)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 178 of the Labor Code provides for the right of pregnant women and women with children under the age of three to request that their employer reduce the woman’s production and service rates, or transfer her to easier work in order to avoid dangerous conditions while maintaining her pay from her original position. At the same time, the woman must provide her employer with an appropriate medical documentation confirming the pregnancy and the impossibility of performing the original work. While the employer is making the decision about whether to provide the pregnant woman with another job, she must be released from work and all work days missed during that time must be paid. Women who have children under the age of three who can no longer perform their previous job also have the right to request that they be transferred to another job before the child reaches the age of three and preserve their earnings from their previous work.

Стаття 178 Кодексу законів про працю України встановлює, що вагітна жінка та жінка, яка має дітей віком до трьох років, має право вимагати від роботодавця зниження норм виробітку та обслуговування або переведення її на легшу роботу з метою уникнення шкідливих умов із збереженням оплати праці, яку вона мала на попередній посаді. При цьому, жінка повинна надати своєму роботодавцю відповідну медичну документацію, що підтверджує вагітність і неможливість виконувати первинну роботу. Поки роботодавець приймає рішення про надання вагітній жінці іншої роботи, її необхідно звільнити від роботи та оплатити всі пропущені за цей час робочі дні. Жінки, які мають дітей віком до трьох років, які не можуть виконувати попередню роботу, також мають право вимагати переведення їх на іншу роботу до досягнення дитиною трирічного віку із збереженням заробітку за попередньою роботою.



Кодекс законів про працю України № 322-VIII 1971, статті 63, 176-177: заборона надурочних робіт для жінок, а також пільги вагітним і жінкам, які мають дітей (Labor Code, arts. 63, 176-177: overtime work rules for pregnant women, women with young children) (1971)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 63 of the Code of Labor Laws prohibits overtime work for pregnant women and women with children under the age of three. This rule is meant to protect women, but at the same time it makes them vulnerable to discrimination. The direct application of this rule violates women's right to freely choose their work, restricts women's access to jobs for which additional payment is provided (for example, under the hourly payment system, overtime work is paid at doubled hourly rate), and can also inhibit women’s career and professional growth. In addition, such a prohibition leads to the unofficial, unsanctioned employment of women in such types of work, which leads to women lacking legal protection and adequate wages. Articles 176-177 determine that women are not allowed to work on nights or weekends. These articles also prohibit employers from sending pregnant women and women with children under three on business trips. Women with children aged three to fourteen, or children with disabilities cannot work overtime, and they cannot be sent on business trips without their consent. These rules also apply to men with children, but only if they are raising them without a mother permanently or long-term (for example, the mother is receiving long-term medical care). This approach discriminates against both men and women, and further reinforces stereotypes that child care is exclusively a woman's duty. For violations of these prohibitions, the Code of Labor Laws provides for fining the employer the amount of the minimum wage for each such violation (currently 6,700 hryvnias).

Статтею 63 Кодексу законів про працю забороняється надурочна робота вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років. Це правило покликане захистити жінок, але водночас воно робить їх уразливими до дискримінації. Пряме застосування цієї норми порушує право жінок на вільний вибір роботи, обмежує доступ жінок до робіт, за які передбачена додаткова оплата праці (наприклад, за погодинної системи оплати праці понаднормова праця оплачується у подвійному розмірі годинної ставки), а також може перешкоджати. кар'єрному і професійному росту жінки. Крім того, така заборона призводить до неофіційного незаконного працевлаштування жінок на такі види робіт, що призводить до того, що жінки не мають правового захисту та належної оплати праці. Статті 176-177 визначають, що жінки не можуть працювати у нічний час та у вихідні дні. Ці статті також забороняють роботодавцям направляти у відрядження вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років. Жінки, які мають дітей віком від трьох до чотирнадцяти років або дітей-інвалідів, не можуть працювати понаднормово, а також направлятися у відрядження без їх згоди. Ці правила поширюються і на чоловіків, які мають дітей, але тільки в тому випадку, якщо вони виховують їх постійно або тривалий час без матері (наприклад, мати перебуває на тривалому лікуванні). Такий підхід дискримінує як чоловіків, так і жінок і ще більше зміцнює стереотипи про те, що догляд за дітьми є виключно жіночим обов’язком. За порушення цих заборон Кодексом законів про працю передбачено накладення штрафу на роботодавця в розмірі мінімальної заробітної плати за кожне таке порушення (зараз це 6700 гривень).



Кодекс законів про працю України № 322-VIII 1971, статті 56, 60(1)-60(2): неповний робочий день та дистанційна робота жінок (Labor Code, arts. 56, 60(1)-60(2): part-time and remote work for women) (1971)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 56 of the Labor Code stipulates the employer's obligation to set part-time working hours for certain categories of employees, including (i) pregnant women; (ii) women with children under the age of 14 and/or a child with a disability; (iii) women caring for a sick family member. The scope of their labor rights is not limited; such women still have the right to a full-time vacation and social benefits. For part-time work days, a person is paid in proportion to the time worked. Article 60-1 provides for the right of pregnant women and women with children to choose to work from home. At the same time, a woman can work from home only if: (i) it is possible, taking into account the nature of the work they performed and (ii) employer has the appropriate resources and means to do so.

Стаття 56 Кодексу законів про працю України передбачає обов’язок роботодавця встановлювати неповний робочий час для окремих категорій працівників, у тому числі (I) для вагітних жінок; (II) жінок, які мають дітей віком до 14 років та/або дитину з інвалідністю; (III) жінок, які доглядають за хворим членом сім'ї. Обсяг їх трудових прав не обмежений; такі жінки зберігають право на повну відпустку та соціальні виплати. За неповний робочий день робота особа оплачується пропорційно відпрацьованому часу. Стаття 601 передбачає право вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей, вибирати роботу вдома. Водночас жінка може працювати вдома, лише якщо: (I) це можливо з урахуванням характеру виконуваної роботи та (II) роботодавець має для цього відповідні ресурси та засоби.



Сімейний кодекс України № 2947-III, Статті 109-115: розлучення за рішенням суду (Family Code, arts. 109-115: divorce by court decision) (2002)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

Spouses who have children may file to a competent court a divorce application supported by a written agreement detailing with whom the children will live following the divorce, to what extent the other parent will support the children, and the other parent's right to care for the children. The competent court shall award a divorce one month following the submission of the divorce application, if it is established that the divorce application is in line with the genuine intent of the wife and husband. It is interesting that the family law establishes rules according to which the court shall attempt to facilitate the reunification of the couple through measures that are not in conflict with the moral principles of society (in such circumstances, the court may suspend the proceedings and set a time limit for the spouses to reconcile, which may not exceed six months). If both spouses agree to dissolve the marriage, the terms for reconciliation are usually not set by the court. Either spouse may apply for a divorce. At the same time, the legislature limited access to justice to certain categories of persons, namely: pregnant wives and their husbands, as well as parents of children under one year of age. Thus, a divorce application may not be filed during the wife's pregnancy and within one year of childbirth, unless either spouse engages in illegal behavior that may be classified as a criminal offense against the other spouse or the child. Such a limitation does not typically preserve the family, and may interfere with a person's right to marry another person with whom they already live, affects decision-making regarding the acquisition of property, because in this case it will be considered joint property (it will be very difficult for a person to challenge the presumption of joint property in court even if the persons do not live together). When deciding the issue of divorce, the court shall investigate the actual relationship of the spouse and genuine grounds for filing for divorce, with due regard to whether the spouses have a minor child or any other important factors. After divorce, a person has the right to revert their pre-marriage last name. In case of divorce granted by the court, the marriage shall be deemed terminated as of the effective date of the court judgment awarding the divorce.

Подружжя, яке має дітей, може подати до компетентного суду заяву про розірвання шлюбу, яка супроводжується письмовою угодою, в якій вказується, з ким проживатимуть діти після розірвання шлюбу, в якому обсязі другий з батьків утримуватиме дітей, а також право другого з батьків піклуватися про дітей. Компетентний суд ухвалює рішення про розірвання шлюбу через місяць після подання заяви про розірвання шлюбу, якщо буде встановлено, що заява про розірвання шлюбу відповідає справжнім намірам дружини та чоловіка. Цікаво, що сімейне законодавство встановлює правила, відповідно до яких суд намагається сприяти возз’єднанню подружжя за допомогою заходів, які не суперечать моральним засадам суспільства (за таких обставин суд може призупинити провадження та призначити строк для примирення подружжя, який не може перевищувати шести місяців). У разі згоди обох з подружжя на розірвання шлюбу строк примирення судом зазвичай не встановлюються. Будь-хто з подружжя може подати заяву на розірвання шлюбу. Водночас законодавець обмежив доступ до правосуддя певним категоріям осіб, а саме: вагітним дружинам та їхнім чоловікам, а також батькам дітей віком до одного року. Таким чином, заява про розірвання шлюбу не може бути подана під час вагітності дружини та протягом одного року після пологів, за винятком випадків, коли будь-хто з подружжя вчинив протиправну поведінку, яка може бути кваліфікована як кримінальний злочин щодо іншого з подружжя або дитини. Таке обмеження, як правило, не зберігає сім’ю, може перешкоджати праву особи на шлюб з іншою особою, з якою вони вже проживають, впливати на прийняття рішення щодо придбання майна, оскільки в цьому випадку воно вважатиметься спільною власністю (вкрай важко оскаржити презумпцію спільної власності в суді, навіть якщо особи не проживають разом). При вирішенні питання про розірвання шлюбу суд з'ясовує фактичні стосунки подружжя та дійсні підстави для звернення до суду з позовом про розірвання шлюбу, з урахуванням наявності у подружжя неповнолітньої дитини та інших важливих обставин. Після розірвання шлюбу особа має право повернути своє дошлюбне прізвище. У разі розірвання шлюбу за рішенням суду шлюб вважається припиненим з дня набрання законної сили рішенням суду про розірвання шлюбу.



Закон України "Про державну службу" № 889-VIII 2015 (Law on Ukraine "On Civil Service") (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Law 'On Civil Service,' among the other main principles of civil service, defines equal access to civil service, namely the prohibition of all forms of discrimination, unjustified restrictions, and granting unjustified advantages to certain categories of citizens when entering and completing civil service. It is interesting that the enforcement of this rule is carried out through some measures, which are taken by the National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service. For example, in 2021, amendments were made to the General Rules of Ethical Conduct of Civil Servants and Local Self-Government Officials, including regulations regarding combating discrimination, ending sexual harassment, and ensuring gender equality among civil servants and local self-government officials. In addition, the National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service issues, within the scope of its powers, provides advanced training of employees of state authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations, and local self-government bodies to ensure equal rights and opportunities for women and men. Also, the Law prohibits sending pregnant women, civil servants who have children under 14 years of age, or women who independently raise children with disabilities on business trips without their consent. It is forbidden to involve pregnant women and women with children under the age of three in overtime work, as well as work on weekends, holidays and work at night. Women who have children aged 3 - 14 years or a child with a disability may engage in overtime work only with their consent.

Закон "Про державну службу" серед основних принципів державної служби визначає рівний доступ до державної служби, а саме заборону будь-яких форм дискримінації, необґрунтованих обмежень, надання необґрунтованих переваг окремим категоріям громадян під час вступу та проходження державної служби. Цікаво, що виконання цієї норми здійснюється за допомогою заходів, які вживає Національне агентство України з питань державної служби. Наприклад, у 2021 році внесено зміни до Загальних правил етичної поведінки державних службовців та посадових осіб місцевого самоврядування, зокрема норми щодо протидії дискримінації, припинення сексуальних домагань та забезпечення ґендерної рівності серед державних службовців та посадових осіб органів місцевого самоврядування. Крім цього, Національне агентство України з питань державної служби в межах своїх повноважень забезпечує підвищення кваліфікації працівників органів державної влади, підприємств, установ і організацій, органів місцевого самоврядування щодо забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків. Також Законом заборонено направляти у відрядження вагітних жінок, державних службовців, які мають дітей віком до 14 років, а також жінок, які самостійно виховують дітей-інвалідів, без їх згоди. Забороняється залучати до надурочних робіт вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років, а також до робіт у вихідні, святкові дні та у нічний час. Жінки, які мають дітей віком від 3 до 14 років або дитину-інваліда, можуть залучатися до надурочних робіт лише за їх згодою.



Наказ Міністерства охорони здоров’я України "Про визнання таким, що втратив чинність, наказу Міністерства охорони здоров'я України від 29 грудня 1993 року № 256", № 1254 2017 (Invalidation of Heath Order No. 256) (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This Order invalidated Order No 256, which listed heavy work and work with harmful and dangerous working conditions in which the employment of women was prohibited. Order No 256’s list of prohibited work for women included 70 types of work and 558 professions. Among the priority factors were the physical stress associated with lifting and carrying loads, forced working posture, vibration, and other similar tasks that could affect a woman's body and reproductive health. The following types of professions were prohibited for women: the well-paid professions of a subway driver, a motorist on a ship, and long-distance bus driver. In addition, the Law of Ukraine 'On Organization of Labor Relations under the Martial Law' specifies that during the period of martial law, the employment of women (except for pregnant women and women with a child under one year of age) is allowed for heavy work with their consent and in jobs with harmful or dangerous working conditions, including underground works. Invalidating Order No 256 is a positive step because (i) no one has the right to determine what a person should study for and where they should work; (ii) the Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that no one may be discriminated against based on gender, age, religion, etc.; (iii) Order 256’s now-defunct prohibitions deprived women of social protections because, for example, in practice, women unofficially worked in the positions they considered necessary in violation of the Law. This, in turn, led women not receiving salaries equal to men’s because women could not be officially employed.

Цим наказом визнано таким, що втратив чинність, Наказ № 256, який містив перелік важких робіт та робіт із шкідливими та небезпечними умовами праці, на яких заборонялося застосування праці жінок. До списку заборонених Наказом № 256 робіт для жінок увійшли 70 видів робіт і 558 професій. Серед пріоритетних факторів були фізичні навантаження, пов'язані з підйомом і перенесенням вантажів, вимушеною робочою позою, вібрацією та іншими подібними завданнями, які можуть вплинути на жіночий організм і репродуктивне здоров'я жінки. Для жінок були заборонені такі види професій: високооплачувані професії машиніста метрополітену, моториста на кораблі, водія автобуса далекого прямування. Крім цього, Законом України "Про організацію трудових відносин в умовах воєнного стану" визначено, що на період дії воєнного стану допускається прийняття на роботу жінок (крім вагітних і жінок, які мають дитину віком до одного року) на важких роботах за їх згодою та на роботах із шкідливими або небезпечними умовами праці, у тому числі на підземних роботах. Визнання недійсним Наказу № 256 є позитивним кроком, оскільки (I) ніхто не має права визначати, де людина має навчатися і де працювати; (II) Конституція України визначає, що ніхто не може бути дискримінований за ознакою статі, віку, віросповідання тощо; (III) заборони Наказу № 256, які тепер не діють, позбавляли жінок соціального захисту, оскільки, до прикладу, на практиці жінки неофіційно працювали на посадах, які вони вважали необхідними, всупереч Закону. Це, у свою чергу, призводило до того, що жінки не отримували заробітну плату на рівні заробітній платі чоловіків, оскільки жінки не могли бути офіційно працевлаштовані.



Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України "Про затвердження Національного плану дій з виконання резолюції Ради Безпеки ООН 1325 "Жінки, мир, безпека" на період до 2025 року" №1544 2020 (Order on UNSC resolution 1325 "Women, Peace, Security") (2020)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The National action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 'Women, peace, security' for the period until 2025 was developed, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine 'On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of Women and Men', as well as Ukraine's international obligations in the field of human rights. This document aims to address: women's participation in decision-making; combating gender-based violence and sexual violence related to armed conflict, etc. As a problem that needs to be solved in Ukraine, this document defines women's vulnerability to the negative consequences of armed conflict. In particular, according to official statistics, the majority of internally displaced persons, unemployed internally displaced persons, etc., are women. In addition, the analyzed document contains the results of the study on violence 'Women's Well-being and Security' conducted by the OSCE in 2019, according to which 67% of Ukrainian women (who have suffered from violence), they have been subjected to physical, psychological, or sexual violence by the time they are 15 years old. The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine is the executive body responsible for the implementation of the National action plan. This document includes the following strategic goals: ensuring the protection of women from sexual and gender-based violence (during armed conflict and peacetime); ensuring the process of post-conflict recovery; development and implementation of the transitional justice system based on the principles of ensuring equal rights and opportunities for women and men, etc. In addition, the National Plan includes the obligation of the Ministry of Social Policy to publish an annual report on its implementation for public discussion on its official website. But, at the same time, the website of this body contains the latest report for 2020 only.

Національний план дій розроблено відповідно до Закону України "Про забезпечення рівних прав та можливостей жінок і чоловіків", а також міжнародних зобов’язань України у сфері прав людини. Цей документ спрямований на забезпечення: участі жінок у прийнятті рішень; боротьби із ґендерно зумовленим насильством та сексуальним насильством, пов’язаним зі збройним конфліктом тощо. Як проблему, що потребує вирішення в Україні, цей документ визначає вразливість жінок до негативних наслідків збройного конфлікту. Зокрема, згідно з офіційною статистикою, більшість внутрішньо переміщених осіб, безробітних внутрішньо переміщених осіб тощо становлять жінки. Крім цього, аналізований документ містить результати дослідження з питань насильства "Жіноче благополуччя та безпека", проведеного ОБСЄ у 2019 році, згідно з яким 67% українських жінок (які постраждали від насильства) зазнавали фізичного, психологічного чи сексуального насильства у віці до 15 років. Органом виконавчої влади, відповідальним за реалізацію Національного плану дій, є Міністерство соціальної політики України. Цей документ містить такі стратегічні цілі: забезпечення захисту жінок від сексуального та ґендерно зумовленого насильства (під час збройного конфлікту та мирний час); забезпечення процесу постконфліктного відновлення; розвиток та впровадження системи правосуддя перехідного періоду, що заснована на принципах забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків, тощо. Крім того, Національний план містить обов’язок Міністерства соціальної політики публікувати щорічний звіт про його виконання для громадськості. обговорення на офіційному сайті. Але, при цьому, на сайті цього органу розміщено останній звіт лише за 2020 рік.



Закон "Про внесення змін до деяких законів України щодо забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків під час проходження військової служби у Збройних Силах України та інших військових формуваннях" № 2523-VIII 2018 (Equal Rights & Opportunity) (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Law (No 2523-VIII) amended the Statute of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine 'On Military Service and Military Duty' in order to allow women to be assigned to 24-hour military duty on an equal basis with men. Before these amendments, the Statute of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine contained the rule according to which female soldiers, as a rule, are not assigned to 24-hour military duty. In addition, all officer and sergeant positions now are available to women in the Armed Forces, subject to compliance with legislation on childhood and maternity protection. At the same time, advantages for women in the field of military service still exist. For example, Article 101 of the Law of Ukraine 'On social and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families' defines the following procedure for granting leave to men: only a female soldier can receive maternity leave during “special” periods, specifically (i) from the moment of the announcement of the decision to mobilize; (ii) the introduction of martial law in Ukraine or in some of its localities and includes the time of mobilization, wartime, and partial of the reconstruction period after the end of military actions. In contrast, a male soldier can use childcare leave only in peacetime. Similarly, the legislation of Ukraine contains a rule that prohibits male soldiers using childcare leave before a child reaches three years of age for military men during martial law or “special” period. Amendments introduced by the Law (No. 2523-VIII) are a step towards the equality of men and women in the field of military service, but there are still certain gender discriminatory norms that are not regulated by the current legislation.

Законом (№ 2523-VIII) внесено зміни до Статуту внутрішньої служби Збройних Сил України та Закону України "Про військову службу і військовий обов’язок", аби дозволити призначення жінок на цілодобове військове чергування на рівні з чоловіками. До цих змін у Статуті внутрішньої служби Збройних Сил України була норма, згідно з якою військовослужбовці-жінки, як правило, не призначаються на цілодобове військове чергування. Крім того, усі офіцерські та сержантські посади тепер доступні жінкам у Збройних Силах, за умови дотримання законодавства про охорону дитинства та материнства. Водночас переваги для жінок у сфері військової служби все ж існують. Наприклад, статтею 101 Закону України "Про соціальний і правовий захист військовослужбовців та членів їх сімей" визначено такий порядок надання відпустки чоловікам: лише військовослужбовець-жінка може отримати відпустку у зв’язку із вагітністю та пологами в "особливий" період, а саме (I) з моменту оголошення рішення про мобілізацію; (II) введення воєнного стану в Україні або в окремих її місцевостях, що охолює мобілізацію, воєнний стан та частково період відбудови після закінчення військових дій. Натомість військовослужбовець-чоловік може використовувати відпустку по догляду за дитиною лише в мирний час. Так само, в законодавстві України є норма, яка забороняє військовослужбовцям-чоловікам використовувати відпустку по догляду за дитиною до досягнення нею трирічного віку під час воєнного стану чи "особливого" періоду. Зміни, внесені Законом № 2523-VIII, є кроком до рівноправності чоловіків і жінок у сфері військової служби, але залишаються певні ґендерно-дискримінаційні норми, які не врегульовані чинним законодавством.



Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України "Про схвалення Концепції комунікації у сфері гендерної рівності" № 1128 2020 (Communication Concept on Gender Equality) (2020)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The purpose of the Concept is to improve society's understanding of the essence and tasks of state gender policy and to perceive it as an integral component of a democratic and legal state. The text of the Concept highlights the problems that need to be solved. For example, the gender discrimination, gender-based violence, and sexual harassment in Ukrainian society. Gender stereotypes are often ignored and dismissed, which is a negative trend. In addition, an extremely dangerous factor is the large amount of sexist and discriminatory content in the informational space, including sexist advertising. Women are underrepresented in the upper echelons of the labor sectors, public life, and politics. These, as well as a number of other global problems in the field of ensuring equal rights of women and men, led to the adoption of this Concept. The realization of this strategic program document is planned until 2025. For this, an action plan was developed and presented for discussion with the public, which contains successive steps for the implementation of the Concept and contains 8 strategic goals, in particular, ensuring the participation of women in the decision-making process and political activity; ensuring equal access of women and men to justice; elimination of gender-based violence, etc. It is planned that the achievement of these goals should be carried out mainly through public awareness (media appearances, discussions), educational activities, research on gender issues, communication companies, etc. The Concept should help intolerance of all forms of discrimination, overcoming established stereotypes regarding gender roles, as well as embedding standards of equal rights of women and men in society.

Метою Концепції є вдосконалення розуміння суспільством сутності та завдань державної ґендерної політики та сприйняття її як невід’ємної складової демократичної та правової держави. У тексті Концепції висвітлено проблеми, які потребують вирішення. Наприклад, ґендерна дискримінація, ґендерне насильство та сексуальні домагання в українському суспільстві. Ґендерні стереотипи часто ігноруються та відкидаються, що є негативною тенденцією. Крім цього, надзвичайно небезпечним фактором є велика кількість сексистського та дискримінаційного контенту в інформаційному просторі, в тому числі сексистської реклами. Жінки недостатньо представлені на керівних посадах, у громадському житті та політиці. Ці, а також низка інших глобальних проблем у сфері забезпечення рівності прав жінок і чоловіків зумовили прийняття цієї Концепції. Реалізація цього стратегічного програмного документу розрахована до 2025 року. Для цього розроблено та представлено на обговорення громадськості план заходів, який містить послідовні кроки щодо реалізації Концепції та містить 8 стратегічних цілей, зокрема забезпечення участі жінок у процесі прийняття рішень та політичній діяльності; забезпечення рівного доступу жінок і чоловіків до правосуддя; викорінення ґендерного насильства тощо. Передбачається, що досягнення цих цілей має здійснюватися переважно через інформування громадськості (виступи в ЗМІ, дискусії), просвітницьку діяльність, дослідження ґендерних питань, комунікаційні компанії тощо. Концепція має сприяти нетерпимості до будь-яких форм дискримінації, подолання усталених стереотипів щодо ґендерних ролей, а також утвердження стандартів рівних прав жінок і чоловіків у суспільстві.



Наказ Міністерства соціальної політики України "Про Експертну раду з питань розгляду звернень за фактами дискримінації за ознакою статі" №345 (Order on appeals of gender discrimination No. 345 of 2012) (2012)


Gender discrimination

The Expert Council on issues of consideration of appeals on facts of discrimination on the basis of gender (hereinafter “the Expert Council”), which was created under the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine with the purpose of responding to complaints and appeals from citizens regarding gender discrimination. Discrimination is when an individual and/or a group of individuals suffers from a gender-based restriction on the recognition, exercise, or enjoyment of rights and freedoms in any form established by the Law of Ukraine 'On the Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine', except for cases in which such restriction has a legitimate, reasonably justified aim that is achieved in an appropriate and necessary way. The main tasks of the Expert Council are: (i) evaluating appeals based on gender discrimination by executive authorities, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and citizens with the aim of providing an expert assessment and taking appropriate measures; (ii) preparing proposals for legislative amendments in order to ensure compliance with protecting equal rights and opportunities for women and men; (iii) preventing all forms of gender discrimination, etc. Most of the appeals considered by this body concern discriminatory advertising (sexist outdoor advertising on the streets of Ukrainian cities). At the same time, the creation of the Expert Council does not guarantee its effectiveness. According to the Order No 345: (i) there is no effective enforcement mechanism for the decisions of the Expert Council (it only provides recommendations to authorities and other entities regarding the elimination of violations and appropriate response measures); (ii) the decisions of the Expert Council are advisory and not binding in nature; (iii) Ukrainian law does not impose liability for failure to comply with decisions of the Expert Council. In addition, there is almost no information in the media about the activities of the Expert Council. Consequently, many citizens are not aware of the existence of this state body and how to contact it.

З метою реагування на скарги та звернення громадян за фактами дискримінації за ознакою статі при Міністерстві соціальної політики України було створено Експертну раду з питань розгляду звернень за фактами дискримінації за ознакою статі (надалі — "Експертна рада"). Дискримінація за ознакою статі означає ситуацію, за якої особа та/або група осіб зазнає обмежень у правах і свободах в будь-якій формі, встановленій Законом України "Про засади запобігання та протидії дискримінації в Україні", крім випадків, коли таке обмеження має правомірну, об’єктивно обґрунтовану мету, способи досягнення якої є належними та необхідними. Основними завданнями Експертної ради є: (I) оцінка звернень щодо гендерної дискримінації від органів виконавчої влади, органів місцевого самоврядування, громадських організацій, громадян з метою надання експертної оцінки та вжиття відповідних заходів; (II) підготовка пропозицій щодо внесення змін до законодавства з метою забезпечення захисту рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків; (III) запобігання будь-яким формам гендерної дискримінації тощо. Більшість звернень, розглянутих цим органом, стосуються дискримінаційної реклами (зовнішньої сексистської реклами на вулицях міст України). Водночас, створення зазначеного органу не говорить про його ефективність, оскільки (I) відсутній ефективний механізм виконання рішень Експертної ради (вона лише надає рекомендації органам влади та іншим установам усунути відповідні порушення та вжити відповідні заходи); (II) рішення цього органу мають рекомендаційний, а не обов’язковий характер; (III) законодавством України не передбачена відповідальність за невиконання рішення Експертної ради. Крім цього, у медіапросторі майже відсутня інформації про діяльність Експертної ради у зв’язку із чим багато громадян не обізнані про факт існування такого органу та можливості звернення до нього.



Gender Pay Gap Information Act 2021 (2021)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Act requires the Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth to make regulations requiring employers to publish information relating to the pay of their employees to show whether there are differences on account gender and the size of such differences (if they exist). Employers must publish the difference between both the mean and the median hourly pay of male and female employees, the difference between both the mean and the median bonus pay of male and female employees, the difference between both the mean and the median hourly pay of part-time male and female employees, and the percentage of male and female employees who received bonuses and benefits in kind. In addition, employers will be required to publish the reasons for any existing differences and the measures (if any) taken or proposed to be taken by the employer to eliminate or reduce such differences. The regulations will only apply to employers with 250 or more employees in the first two years after their introduction. In the third year, the requirements will also apply to employers with 150 or more employees. Thereafter, the requirements will apply to employers with 50 or more employees. The regulations will not apply to employers with fewer than 50 employees.



Redress for Women Resident in Certain Institutions (Amendment) Act 2019 (2019)


Gender discrimination

The 2019 Act made the 2015 Act’s (available here) health benefits available to a broader group of women – including those who had worked in 'the institutions covered by the Magdalen Restorative Justice ex-gratia Scheme' while residing in certain adjoining institutions (Section 2).



Redress for Women Resident in Certain Institutions Act 2015 (2015)


Gender discrimination

The 2015 Act provides for free health services for women who worked in Magdalen laundries (institutions ostensibly intended to house and employ ‘fallen’ women). Its Schedule provides for the 'Relevant Institutions' for the purposes of identifying women entitled to the provision of services. The 2015 Act was updated in 2019 (available here) to expand the group of women eligible for benefits under the Act.



Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989 (1989)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The 1989 Act prohibits incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation, race, religion, or nationality. The prohibition includes the publishing and distributing of written materials and visual images, inciting speech and behavior, and activities in private residences. It criminalizes various means of disseminating and/or promoting materials, words, or actions that are threatening, abusive, or insulting, and intended or likely to stir up hatred (Section 2). The prohibitions do not apply to fair and accurate reports of proceedings in the Oireachtas (Irish parliament) or before a court or tribunal exercising a judicial function (Section 5). Gender discrimination outside of sexual orientation is not addressed in this law.



Civil Registration Act 2019 (2019)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Civil Registration Act 2019 made technical amendments to the Civil Registration Act of 2004, the purposes of which were to facilitate legislation to provide for registration of the birth of donor-conceived children, and to enable both partners in a same-sex female relationship to have their details recorded in such registrations. Specifically, Section 10 provides for the recording of a ‘parent’s’ details and any parent may so register although the options of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are still available.



Adoption (Amendment) Act 2017 (2017)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The 2017 Act amends and extends the law in relation to the adoption of children and made conforming amendments to other legislation. Among other things, the Act, in conjunction with the Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 (available here), enables adoption by same-sex couples. The Act, in particular, amends use of heterosexual phrases in legislation, introducing more neutral terminology for words such as “parent” and “relative” (Section 3).



Gender Recognition Act 2015 (2015)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Act provides for recognition of changes of gender, issuance of gender recognition certificates, and conforming amendments to other legislation, including the Adoption Act 2010. Any person of at least 18 years of age who is not married or in a civil partnership, inter alia (Section 9), may apply to the Minister for Social Protection for a gender recognition certificate (Section 8). Where a gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, that person’s gender shall from the date of that issue become for all purposes the ‘preferred’ gender and sex (Section 18). The fact that a gender recognition certificate is issued to a person shall not affect the status of the person as the father or mother of a child born prior to the certificate’s date of the issue (Section 19), or the disposal or devolution of property under a will (including a codicil), or other instrument executed before the date the Act came into operation (Section 20). The Act also provides for “gender specific [criminal] offenses” in relation to the treatment of people with gender recognition certificates. Notably, where a relevant gender-specific sexual offence could be committed or attempted only if the gender of the person with a gender recognition certificate were not the ‘preferred’ gender, that fact does not prevent the sexual offence being committed or attempted (Section 23). Finally, a person who has a gender recognition certificate may apply to the Minister for Social Protection to revoke the certificate (Section 15).



Equal Status Act (updates through 2011) (2011)


Gender discrimination

The Equal Status Act pertains to the delivery of goods and services. (Section 1). It prohibits discrimination (with specified exceptions) in the disposal of goods and provision of services (Section 5), the disposal of premises and provision of accommodation (Section 6), and education establishments (Section 7). Discrimination by private clubs with regard to membership may be sanctioned via loss of permission to provide alcohol to members (Section 8 and 10) with some exceptions (Section 9). The Act also prohibits sexual and other harassment (Section 11); advertisement which indicates an intent to engage in prohibited conduct, or might reasonably be so understood (prohibited conduct means, per Section 1, discrimination against, or sexual harassment or harassment of, or permitting the sexual harassment or harassment of a person) (Section 12); and procurement of prohibited conduct (Section 13).



Thirty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution (Dissolution of Marriage) Act (2019)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

The 38th Amendment of the Irish Constitution (available here) (i) repealed a previous requirement under Article 41(3) for a period of separation before dissolution of a marriage and (ii) added that the law must provide for the recognition of a dissolution of a marriage granted under the civil law of another state.



الدستور الأردني (Constitution of Jordan) (1952)


Gender discrimination

Article 6 (1) states that all Jordanians are “equal before the law” and that there shall be no discrimination between them in rights and duties on the basis of race, language, or religion. This is an overarching provision, without explicit mention of gender, providing for equality for “all” Jordanians. Article 6 does not apply to Muslim personal status matters, which are instead governed by the Jordanian Personal Status Law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shari’ah courts (Article 103 (2) of the Jordanian Constitution).

ورد في الفقرة الأولى من المادة السادسة أن الأردنيين متاسوون في الحقوق والواجبات وإن اختلفت أعراقهم ولغاتهم وأديانهم. من الجدير بالذكر أنه وعلى الرغم من أن الفقرة لم تحدد الجنس كعامل فارق، إلا أن المادة جاءت عامة لتشمل جميع الأردنيين. لا تنطبق هذه المادة على قضايا الأحوال الشخصية، حيث أنها تخضع لقانون الأحوال الشخصية الأردني تحت اختصاص محاكم الشريعة الإسلامية.



Constitution of Egypt (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Article 11 requires that the state guarantee equality between women and men in all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The state must work to adopt measures ensuring the proportional representation of women in the houses of parliament, as determined by the constitution. In addition, the state must ensure women’s rights in pursuing public employment, employment in the senior management of the state, and appointment in judicial agencies without discrimination. The state is committed to the protection of women against all forms of violence and guarantees the empowerment of women in reconciling familial duties and professional obligations. Article 53 mandates that all citizens enjoy equality under the law, equally in their rights, freedoms, and general obligations, without discrimination on the basis of religion, faith, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, economic status, political affiliation, geography, or otherwise. Such discrimination, as well as the incitement of hate, constitutes a crime punishable under the law. The state is committed to adopting the necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and the law establishes a special independent commission to this end. English translation available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf.



ArbeitnehmerInnenschutzgesetz (ASchG) 1995 (Occupational Health and Safety Act) (1995)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The legislation generally serves to protect all male and female employees. Specifically targeting the protection of women, Article 6(4) states that female employees shall not perform work that, by its very nature, may hold specific dangers for women. Alternatively, women may only perform such work with certain restrictions or measures that prevent such risks. The Federal Ministry of Labor shall specify those works in a separate regulation (Article 18 no. 2).

Dieses Gesetz dient grundsätzlich dem Schutz sowohl von männlichen als auch weiblichen Angestellten. Spezifisch auf den Schutz von Frauen geht Artikel 6 Abs. 4 ein. Hiernach dürfen Frauen Arbeiten, die eine spezifische Gefahr für sie beinhalten nicht oder nur unter Bedingungen oder Einschränken ausführen, die diese besondere Gefahr vermeiden. Diese Arbeiten sollen von dem Bundesministerium für Arbeit in einer separaten Verordnung festgehalten werden (Artikel 18 Ziff. 2).



Про внесення змін до Кримінального та Кримінального процесуального кодексів України з метою реалізації положень Конвенції Ради Європи про запобігання насильству стосовно жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з цими явищами (No. 2227-VII) (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced sterilization, Gender discrimination, International law, Sexual violence and rape

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). In part, these amendments increased the punishment for an illegal abortion (meaning that it was conducted by a person who had no special medical education; or forcing an abortion without voluntary consent, which is punishable by a fine of 50-100 tax-free minimum incomes, community service of 100-240 hours, correctional labor for up to two years, or restriction of liberty for up to two years, or imprisonment for the same term. The amendments criminalized forcing an abortion and forced sterilization without consent. Rape (i.e., sexual acts involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration using the genitals or any other item, without voluntary consent) is punishable with imprisonment for three to five years and sexual violence (nonconsensual, non-penetrative sexual assault) is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, with consideration of attending circumstances.

У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни, що містять положення Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), ухваленої у 2011 році. Внаслідок цих змін статтю 134 Кримінального кодексу України, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за незаконне проведення аборту (проведення аборту особою, яка не має спеціальної медичної освіти; примус до проведення аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої), було змінено, в частині посилення відповідальності за це небезпечне злочинне діяння (тобто тепер незаконний аборт карається штрафом від 50 до 100 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадськими роботами на строк від 100 до 240 годин, або виправними роботами за на строк до двох років, або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк). Також криміналізовано примус до аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої, а також примусову стерилізацію без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи. Змінено статті, які передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за зґвалтування та сексуальне насильство. Зокрема, зґвалтування (тобто вчинення статевих дій, пов’язаних із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло іншої особи за допомогою статевих органів або будь-якого іншого предмета без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до п’яти років, а також сексуальне насильство (не пов'язане з проникненням в тіло іншої особи без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк до п'яти років. Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.



Про внесення змін до Кримінального та Кримінального процесуального кодексів України з метою реалізації положень Конвенції Ради Європи про запобігання насильству стосовно жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з цими явищами (No. 2227-VIII) (2017)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). As a result of these amendments, new dangerous acts were criminalized. For example, Article 151-2 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine by providing criminal liability for forced marriage. Forced marriage (meaning coercing a person to marry, to continue a forcible marriage, to enter into cohabitation without marriage, to continue cohabitation, or to move to a territory other than that in which they reside, regardless of citizenship) is punishable by arrest for a term of up to six months, by restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years, or by imprisonment for the same term. Article 126-1 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code by providing criminal liability for domestic violence. Domestic violence (meaning intentional systematic physical, psychological, or economic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or another person with whom an offender has had a family or close relationship) is punishable by community service of up to 150-240 hours, or arrest for up to six months, restriction of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. A new chapter, “Restrictions,” established that, in the interests of domestic violence victims, the convicted person might be (i) banned from living with a person who suffered from domestic violence or (ii) restricted in communications with their child if the child was a victim or observer of domestic violence. In addition, these amendments provide criminal liability for failure to comply with restrictive measures, which is punishment with arrest for up to six months or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, in consideration of attending circumstances.

У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни з метою закріплення положень Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), прийнятої у 2011 році. У результаті цих змін нові суспільно небезпечні діяння були криміналізовані. Наприклад, особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України доповнено статтею 151-2, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за примушення до шлюбу. Примусовий шлюб (тобто примушування особи до вступу в шлюб або до продовження примусово укладеного шлюбу, або до вступу у співжиття без укладання шлюбу, або до продовження такого співжиття, або спонукання з цією метою особи до переміщення на територію іншої держави, ніж та, в якій вона проживає (там «проживає» означає постійне місце проживання в певному місці, не обов’язково пов’язане з громадянством) карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Також у 2017 році особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України було доповнено статтею 126-1, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за домашнє насильство. Домашнє насильство (тобто умисне систематичне вчинення фізичного, психологічного або економічного насильства щодо подружжя чи колишнього подружжя або іншої особи, з якою винний перебуває (перебував) у сімейних або близьких відносинах, що призводить до фізичних або психологічних страждань, розладів здоров’я, втрати працездатності, емоційної залежності або погіршення якості життя потерпілої особи) караються громадськими роботами на строк від 150 до 240 годин, або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. Додано новий розділ «Обмежувальні заходи». Встановлено, що в інтересах потерпілого від злочину, пов'язаного з домашнім насильством, на засудженого можуть бути покладені такі обов'язки: заборона перебувати в спільному місці проживання з жертвою; обмеження спілкування з дитиною у разі вчинення насильства в сім'ї щодо дитини або в її присутності; крім того, ці зміни передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за невиконання обмежувальних заходів (покарання у вигляді арешту на строк до шести місяців або обмеження волі на строк до двох років). Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.



Кримінальний кодекс України (стаття 300: Ввезення, виготовлення або розповсюдження творів, що пропагують культ насильства і жорстокості, расову, національну чи релігійну нетерпимість та дискримінацію) (No. 2341-III) Criminal Code of Ukraine (Article 300) (2001)


Gender discrimination

The Criminal Code of Ukraine Article 300 prohibits the importation, manufacture or distribution of works that promulgate violence and cruelty, racial, national or religious intolerance and discrimination. Importation into Ukraine for sale or distribution purposes, or manufacture, storage, transportation or other movement for the same purposes, or sale or distribution of works (and also compelling others to participate in the creation of such works) that promulgate discrimination, among other things, are criminalized by Article 300. These dangerous culpable acts shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-4,000 tax-free minimum incomes, or arrest for a term of up to six months, or restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years. Committing the same actions with regard to motion pictures and video films that promulgate discrimination, and also selling works that promulgate discrimination, to minors or distribution of such works among minors are as aggravating circumstances.

Ввезення в Україну творів, що пропагують, серед іншого, дискримінацію, з метою збуту чи розповсюдження або їх виготовлення, зберігання, перевезення чи інше переміщення з тією самою метою або їх збут чи розповсюдження (а також примушування до участі в їх створенні) криміналізовано статтею 300. Ці небезпечні винні дії караються штрафом від 1000 до 4000 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років. Ті самі дії щодо кіно- та відеопродукції, що пропагують дискримінацію, а також збут такої продукції неповнолітнім чи розповсюдження серед них творів, що пропагують дискримінацію є кваліфікуючою ознакою цього злочину, що обтяжує покарання.



Виборчий кодекс України (Electoral Code of Ukraine (No.396-IX)) (2019)


Gender discrimination

The Electoral Code of Ukraine establishes the rights of citizens to participate in elections, and governs preparation and procedures for elections to state and local authorities. The Electoral Code establishes: any direct or indirect privileges or restrictions on the voting rights of Ukrainian citizens based on sex or other grounds are prohibited. The Code also established a gender quota, which requires that at least two of five candidates of electoral list of parties must be women (if the number of candidates is not a multiple of five, there is an alternate requirement for inclusion of candidates of different genders). A significant new measure of this legislation is the introduction of liability for the refusal of a party to register sufficient women candidates.

Виборчий кодекс України встановлює права громадян на участь у виборах, регулює підготовку та порядок проведення виборів до органів державної влади та органів місцевого самоврядування. Виборчий кодекс встановлює, що будь-які прямі чи непрямі привілеї або обмеження виборчих прав громадян України за ознаками статті чи за іншими ознаками забороняються. Кодекс також встановив гендерну квоту, відповідно до якої принаймні двоє з п’яти кандидатів у виборчий список партій повинні бути жінками (якщо кількість кандидатів не кратна п’яти, існує альтернативна вимога щодо включення кандидатів різної статі). Суттєвим нововведенням цього законодавства є запровадження відповідальності за відмову партії зареєструвати достатню кількість жінок-кандидатів.



Código Laboral (Ley 213 de octubre 19, 1993) (1993)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law serves as Paraguay’s Labor Code, which contains provisions that prohibit any gender-based discrimination in the workplace and guarantee the equal treatment between men and women, such as Articles 47 and 128. In turn, article 130 prohibits employers to assign risky labors to pregnant women. Articles 133 and 134 provide rights for lactating women, including requiring maternity leave and lactating rooms within the company.

Esta ley contiene el Código Laboral de Paraguay, el cual fija disposiciones que prohíben cualquier discriminación basada en el género en el lugar de trabajo y garantizan la igualdad de trato entre hombres y mujeres, como los artículos 47 y 128. A su vez, el artículo 130 prohíbe a los empleadores asignar labores riesgosas a mujeres embarazadas. Los artículos 133 y 134 prevén derechos para las mujeres lactantes, incluido el requisito de licencia por maternidad y salas de lactancia dentro de la empresa.



Ley 5508 de 2015 para la Protección de la Maternidad y la Lactancia, octubre 28, 2015 (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law promotes, protects, and supports motherhood and breastfeeding for working women, up to 24 months of age, to ensure the proper care of the children. On this note, every pregnant worker shall have the right to access a maternity leave, for a period of 18 uninterrupted weeks, regardless the type of contract under which she provides a service. This leave will be extended to 24 weeks in cases of baby’s severe diseases or premature births. Mothers have the right to receive their regular salary during maternity leave.

Esta ley promueve, protege y apoya la maternidad y lactancia de la mujer trabajadora, hasta los 24 meses de edad del menor, asegurando el cuidado adecuado de los hijos. En este sentido, toda trabajadora embarazada tendrá derecho a acceder a la licencia de maternidad, por un período de 18 semanas ininterrumpidas, independientemente del tipo de contrato bajo el cual preste un servicio. Este permiso se extenderá a 24 semanas en caso de enfermedades graves del bebé o parto prematuro. Las madres tienen derecho a recibir su salario regular durante la licencia de maternidad.



Ley para la Protección de las Mujeres contra Todas las Formas de Violencia Nº 5777 de 2016, diciembre 29, 2016 y Decreto Nº 6973 of 2017 que reglaenta la Ley Nº 5777 de 2016, marzo 27, 2017 (2016)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

This law seeks to promote and guarantee women’s right to live free from violence. Its purpose is to promote prevention and protection strategies, sanctions, and integral reparation measures for any kind of violence exercised against women. This law fosters public policies to prevent and remediate different forms of violence, such as psychological, sexual, and physical violence. It also assigns broad responsibilities to each Ministry and Governmental Agency to support the fight against discrimination. The law provides both for protection measures for women that are victims of abuse, such as specific agencies to channel the claims; and penalties for abusers, for instance from 10 to 30 years of imprisonment for femicide. In turn, Decree 6973 specifies that interpretation and application of Law 5777 of 2016 shall provide the broadest protection for women subject to violence. Subsequently, no legal provision may deny, undermine, or limit the rights guaranteed therein. The Decree sets specific courses of action authorities must undertake to prevent violence against women and particular procedures to accomplish that goal. Romantic, platonic, and other sorts of intra-family relationships are considered domestic. For these purposes, marriage is not a requirement.

Esta ley busca promover y garantizar el derecho de las mujeres a gozar de una vida libre de violencia. Su finalidad es promover estrategias de prevención y protección, sanción y medidas de reparación integral frente a cualquier tipo de violencia contra las mujeres. Esta ley fomenta políticas públicas para prevenir y remediar diferentes formas de violencia, como la violencia psicológica, sexual y física. También asigna amplias responsabilidades a cada Ministerio y agencia gubernamental para apoyar la lucha contra la discriminación. La ley prevé tanto medidas de protección para las mujeres que son víctimas de maltrato, como organismos específicos para canalizar las denuncias y penas para los abusadores, por ejemplo, de 10 a 30 años de prisión por feminicidio. A su vez, el Decreto 6973 especifica que la interpretación y aplicación de la Ley 5777 de 2016 brindará la más amplia protección a las mujeres víctimas de violencia. En consecuencia, ninguna disposición legal podrá negar, menoscabar o limitar los derechos en ella garantizados. El Decreto establece cursos de acción específicos que las autoridades deben emprender para prevenir la violencia contra las mujeres y procedimientos particulares para lograr ese objetivo. Las relaciones intrafamiliares, románticas y similares se consideran domésticas. A estos efectos, el matrimonio no es un requisito.



Constitución de la República de Paraguay (1992)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

Article 48 states that both men and women have equal civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. Articles 49 to 59 protect the family and the rights of each member of its members. In turn, article 60 states that government authorities must promote public policies to prevent any kind of violence within the family unit. Article 89 provides for special labor protections for pregnant and lactating women, who cannot be dismissed by their employers. Article 115 supports peasant woman by allowing their participation in public debates on rural matters. Article 117 promotes the right of women to access public positions and perform as public servants.

El artículo 48 establece que tanto hombres como mujeres tienen los mismos derechos civiles, políticos, sociales, económicos y culturales. Los artículos 49 a 59 protegen la familia y los derechos de cada uno de sus miembros. A su vez, el artículo 60 establece que las autoridades gubernamentales deben promover políticas públicas para prevenir cualquier tipo de violencia dentro de la unidad familiar. El artículo 89 prevé protecciones laborales especiales para las mujeres embarazadas y lactantes, que no pueden ser despedidas por sus empleadores. El artículo 115 apoya a la mujer campesina al permitir su participación en los debates públicos sobre asuntos rurales. El artículo 117 promueve el derecho de las mujeres a acceder a cargos públicos y desempeñarse como servidoras públicas.



Ley 1468 de junio 30, 2011 (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law modified articles 236, 239, 57, and 58 of the Labor Code, among other provisions to establish special labor protections for pregnant and lactating women. The law prohibits the dismissal of pregnant or lactating women without cause and without prior permission of a labor inspector. It also granted women the right to receive their regular salary during a 14-week maternity leave.

Esta ley modificó los artículos 236, 239, 57 y 58 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, entre otras disposiciones. Su intención es establecer protecciones laborales reforzadas para las mujeres embarazadas y lactantes. En esta medida, la ley establece la prohibición de despedir a una mujer embarazada o lactante sin causa y sin permiso previo de un inspector de trabajo. También otorgó a las mujeres el derecho a recibir su salario regular durante una licencia de maternidad de 14 semanas.



Ley 1257 de diciembre 4, 2008 (2008)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

This law enacted rules for the prevention and sanction of several forms of violence and discrimination against women. It established provisions that guarantee all women i) a life free of violence, both in the public and private sectors, ii) the exercise of their rights granted both by the domestic and the international legal systems, iii) access to administrative and judicial procedures for protection and attention, and iv) the adoption of public policies against violence and discrimination.

Esta ley promulgó normas para la prevención y sanción de diversas formas de violencia y discriminación contra la mujer. Estableció disposiciones que garantizan a todas las mujeres i) una vida libre de violencia, tanto en el sector público como en el privado, ii) el ejercicio de los derechos que les otorgan tanto el ordenamiento jurídico interno como el internacional, iii) el acceso a los procedimientos administrativos y judiciales para su protección y atención, y iv) la adopción de políticas públicas contra la violencia y la discriminación.



Ley 1009 de enero 23, 2006 (2006)


Gender discrimination

This law promoted the creation and establishment of a gender affairs observatory (‘Observatorio de Asuntos de Género’). The purpose of the observatory is to identify and select a system of gender indicators, to analyze gender data, and to monitor public and private plans and programs to suggest improvements on policies and regulations aiming for gender equity in Colombia.

Esta ley promovió la creación y establecimiento de un observatorio de asuntos de género (“Observatorio de Asuntos de Género”). El objetivo del observatorio es identificar y establecer un sistema de indicadores de género, analizar datos de género y monitorear planes y programas públicos y privados para sugerir mejoras en las políticas y regulaciones que apuntan a la equidad de género en Colombia.



Ley 823 de julio 11, 2003 (2003)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law establishes rules that further develop equal opportunities for women. It establishes guidelines for the design of public policies that foster and guarantee the full exercise of women’s political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the free development of their personality, capacities, and aptitudes. The law also appoints the institutions responsible for their execution.

Esta ley consagra reglas que desarrollan la igualdad de oportunidades para las mujeres. Establece lineamientos para el diseño de políticas públicas que propicien y garanticen el pleno ejercicio de los derechos políticos, civiles, económicos, sociales y culturales de las mujeres, y el libre desarrollo de su personalidad, capacidades y aptitudes. La ley también designa las instituciones encargadas de su ejecución.



Ley 731 de enero 14, 2002 (2002)


Gender discrimination

The purpose of this law is to improve the quality of life of rural women, prioritizing low-income and economically vulnerable women. It promotes and fosters equality between rural men and women, while containing provisions regarding social security, education, and training. As such, the law sets forth i) the right of rural women to participate in financing funds for the development of rural sectors, ii) subsidies in money or kind, iii) programs for adequate education for rural women and iii) their equitable participation in different decision-making, planning, and monitoring bodies at the territorial level.

El objeto de esta ley es mejorar la calidad de vida de las mujeres campesinas, priorizando a las mujeres de escasos recursos y económicamente vulnerables. Promueve y fomenta la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres rurales, al tiempo que contiene disposiciones en materia de seguridad social, educación y capacitación. Así, la ley establece i) el derecho de las mujeres rurales a participar en fondos de financiamiento para el desarrollo de los sectores rurales, ii) subsidios en dinero o en especie, iii) programas para una adecuada educación de las mujeres rurales y iii) su participación equitativa en diferentes órganos de decisión, planificación y seguimiento a nivel territorial.



Ley 82 de noviembre 3, 1993 (1993)


Gender discrimination

Law 82 provides support measures for women serving as heads of the family unit or household. The law is intended to guarantee adequate living conditions and promote equity and social participation of women. Assistance is provided in the form of education, health, housing, credit incentive benefits, among others.

La Ley 82 establece medidas de apoyo a las mujeres que se desempeñan como madres cabeza de familia. La ley tiene por objeto garantizar condiciones de vida adecuadas y promover la equidad y la participación social de las mujeres. La asistencia se brinda en forma de beneficios de educación, salud, vivienda, incentivos crediticios, entre otros.



Constitución Política de la República de Colombia (1991)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, International law

The Colombian Constitution of 1991 promotes values and principles that protect and defend the role of women in society. Article 13 prohibits discrimination based on sex, race, national or family origin, religion, language, and political or religious opinion. Article 40 stipulates that authorities must guarantee the adequate and effective participation of women at all decision levels in the Public Administration. Article 42 covers equal rights and duties in domestic and family relationships, providing that any form of violence in the family is considered a severe offense to its integrity and unity and will thus be sanctioned. The Constitution aims to achieve gender equality for Colombian women. Colombia also ratified, by virtue of the Decree Law 251 of 1981, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979.

La Constitución colombiana de 1991 promueve valores y principios que protegen y defienden el papel de la mujer en la sociedad. El artículo 13 prohíbe la discriminación por motivos de sexo, raza, origen nacional o familiar, religión, idioma y opinión política o religiosa. El artículo 40 establece que las autoridades deben garantizar la participación adecuada y efectiva de las mujeres en todos los niveles de decisión de la Administración Pública. El artículo 42 contempla la igualdad de derechos y deberes en las relaciones domésticas y familiares, disponiéndose que toda forma de violencia intrafamiliar se considera una falta grave a la integridad y unidad y, por tanto, será sancionada. La Constitución tiene como uno de sus objetivos lograr la igualdad de género para las mujeres colombianas. Colombia también ratificó, en virtud del Decreto Ley 251 de 1981, la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW) de 1979.



Administracinių nusižengimų kodekso patvirtinimo, įsigaliojimo ir įgyvendinimo tvarkos įstatymas (Law on Procedures for the Approval, Entry into Force, and Implementation of the Code of Administrative Offenses) (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The purpose of the Act is to set out penalties for administrative offenses. In addition, it classifies hate crimes and discrimination on the grounds of “gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, religion, belief, opinion, or other grounds” to be an aggravating circumstance. Article 81 dictates that the breach of rights conferred by the Republic of Lithuania Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men is subject to a fine of EUR 40 to EUR 560 and EUR 560 to EUR 1000 for repeat offenses.

Šios įstatymo tikslas yra nustatyti baudas už administracinius nusižengimus. Jame neapykantos nusikaltimai ir diskriminacija dėl „lyties, rasės, tautybės, kalbos, kilmės, socialinės padėties, religijos, tikėjimo, nuomonės ar kitų priežasčių“ klasifikuojami kaip sunkinanti aplinkybė. Be to, 81 straipsnyje nustatyta, kad už Lietuvos Respublikos moterų ir vyrų lygių galimybių įstatymo suteiktų teisių pažeidimą gresia baudą nuo 40 iki 560 EUR ir nuo 560 iki 1000 EUR už pakartotinius nusikaltimus.



Krašto apsaugos ministro 2005 m. gegužės 9 d. įsakymas Nr. V-561 „Dėl Lietuvos karių etikos kodekso patvirtinimo“ (Order of the Minister of National Defense "On Approval of the Code of Ethics for Lithuanian Military") (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

In 2015, the Lithuanian Military Code of Ethics was amended to include the obligation to “respect and protect the dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of every human being, regardless of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, religion, belief, opinion, age, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, religion.” The original version did not expressly include protection against discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation.

Lietuvos karo etikos kodeksas buvo pakeistas 2015 m. įtraukiant pareigą „gerbti ir ginti kiekvieno žmogaus orumą bei pagrindines teises ir laisves, neatsižvelgiant į jo lytį, rasę, tautybę, kalbą, kilmę, socialinę padėtį, tikėjimą, įsitikinimus ar pažiūras, amžių, lytinę orientaciją, negalią, etninę priklausomybę, religiją“. Pirminėje versijoje nebuvo aiškiai numatyta apsauga nuo diskriminacijos dėl lyties ar seksualinės orientacijos.



Lietuvos Respublikos karo prievolės įstatymas (Law on Military Service) (1996)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Since 2015, every year, around 4000 Lithuanian men in the age group of 18 - 23 can be required to perform compulsory military service for nine months. However, Article 3 of the Law on Military Service dictates that women, other than those who express their willingness, are exempt from being conscripted into the army.

Nuo 2015 m., kasmet apie 4000 Lietuvos vyrų 18 iki 23 metų amžiaus grupėje gali būti pakviesti atlikti privalomąją karinę tarnybą, kuri trunka devynis mėnesius. Tačiau, karo tarnybos įstatymo 3 straipsnyje nustatyta, kad moterys, išskyrus tas, kurios išreiškia norą, atleidžiamos nuo šaukimo į kariuomenę.



Lygių galimybių įstatymas (Law on Equal Treatment) (2003)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Equal Treatment Act defined and expanded protection against any discrimination and harassment to include, in addition to gender, “race, nationality, citizenship, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions or views, age, sexual orientation, disability, ethnic origin or religion.” It also established a duty of state and municipal institutions, educational institutions, and employers to actively prevent discrimination on the previously mentioned grounds. Under Article 13, a person who has suffered such discrimination has the right to claim material and non-material damages. English translation available here.

Šis įstatymas apibrėžė ir išplėtė apsaugą nuo bet kokios diskriminacijos ir priekabiavimo dėl lyties iki „amžiaus, lytinės orientacijos, negalios, rasės ar etninės priklausomybės, religijos ar įsitikinimų”. Taip pat nustatyta valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijų, švietimo įstaigų ir darbdavių pareiga aktyviai užkirsti kelią diskriminacijai dėl anksčiau minėtų priežasčių. Pagal straipsnį 13, asmuo, patyręs tokią diskriminaciją, turi teisę reikalauti turtinės ir neturtinės žalos atlyginimo.



Moterų ir vyrų lygių galimybių įstatymas (Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men) (1998)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The purpose of the Equal Opportunities Act is to prohibit any discrimination, harassment, or sexual harassment based on gender within employment, education, consumer protection, social security schemes, and involvement in organizations. It also established a duty of state and municipal institutions, educational establishments, and employers to actively implement equal rights for women and men. It defines the different types of discrimination and establishes that the burden of proving that equal rights were not violated rests within the person or institution against whom a complaint was filed. Under Article 24, a person who has suffered such discrimination has the right to demand pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages following the Civil Code. English translation available here.

Lygių galimybių įstatymo tikslas yra uždrausti bet kokią diskriminaciją, priekabiavimą ar seksualinį priekabiavimą dėl lyties darbe, švietimo institucijose, skelbimuose, socialinės apsaugos sistemoje ir organizacijose. Taip pat nustatyta valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijų, švietimo įstaigų ir darbdavių pareiga aktyviai įgyvendinti lygias moterų ir vyrų teises. Teisės akte apibrėžiamos skirtingos diskriminacijos rūšys ir nustatoma, kad pareiga įrodyti, kad lygios teisės nebuvo pažeistos, tenka asmeniui ar institucijai, prieš kurią buvo pateiktas skundas. Pagal straipsnį 24, asmuo, patyręs tokią diskriminaciją, turi teisę reikalauti turtinės ir neturtinės žalos atlyginimo pagal civilinį kodeksą.



Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija (Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania) (1992)


Employment discrimination, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Constitution is an essential pillar of gender equality legislation in Lithuania. Article 29 affirms that human rights may not be restricted, or any privileges granted, on the grounds of “gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, or views.” Further, Article 38 declares that marriage can only be concluded upon free mutual consent between a man and a woman, and that the rights of spouses are equal. The provisions do not declare same-sex marriages or partnerships valid. Article 39 states that working mothers are entitled to paid leave before and after childbirth, and favorable working conditions. English translation available here.

Konstitucija yra esminis lyčių lygybės teisės aktų ramstis Lietuvoje. Straipsnyje 29 teigiama, kad žmogaus teisės negali būti ribojamos ar suteikiamos privilegijos dėl „lyties, rasės, tautybės, kalbos, kilmės, socialinės padėties, tikėjimo, įsitikinimų ar pažiūrų“. Be to, straipsnyje 38 nustatyta, kad santuoka gali būti sudaroma tik gavus laisvą vyro ir moters tarpusavio sutikimą ir kad sutuoktinių teisės yra lygios. Šios nuostatos nedeklaruoja tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokų ar partnerysčių galiojančiomis. Straipsnyje 39 nustatyta, kad dirbančios motinos turi teisę į mokamas atostogas prieš gimdymą ir po jo bei palankias darbo sąlygas.



Kärntner Antidiskriminierungsgesetz (K-ADG) (Kärnten Anti - Discrimination Act) (2020)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Among other aspects, this act aims at ensuring gender equality in various areas of life, for instance, in the workplace. It addresses issues like equal opportunities for men and women as well as sexual harassment in the workplace. It also lists the authorities a person may turn to if they feel they are being discriminated against. Notable is the shift of the burden of proof in Section 25: a discrimination claimant only has to credibly substantiate the claim, whereas the defending party has to prove that there was no discrimination.

Dieses Gesetz zielt unter anderem darauf ab, die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter in verschiedenen Lebensbereichen zu gewährleisten, zum Beispiel am Arbeitsplatz. Es behandelt Themen wie Chancengleichheit für Männer und Frauen sowie sexuelle Belästigung am Arbeitsplatz. Außerdem werden die Behörden genannt, an die sich eine Person wenden kann, wenn sie sich diskriminiert fühlt. Bemerkenswert ist die Umkehr der Beweislast in Abschnitt 25: Ein Kläger, der eine Diskriminierung geltend macht, muss seine Behauptung lediglich glaubhaft machen, während die beklagte Partei beweisen muss, dass keine Diskriminierung vorlag.



Bundes-Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (B-GlBG) (Federal Equality Act) (1993)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The Federal Equality Act aims at creating equality throughout various service agreements (see Section 1) the Federal Government might have with individuals. The main body no. 1 (1. Hauptstück) focuses on the equal treatment of men and women (Section 3). Section 7(2) states that job advertisements should be written in such a way that they equally refer to both men and women and do not contain details that could lead to the conclusion that the advertisement is only for one gender. Sections 8 and 8a define sexual and gender-based harassment and emphasize that they constitute gender discrimination. Section 11 requires the promotion of equal opportunities for women. Section 11b states that, where women are underrepresented (meaning less than 50% of employees), employers must prioritize women applicants if they are equally well suited for the position as the best-suited male applicant until the percentage of employed women reaches at least 50%. Section 11c applies the same rule to job promotions. Section 11d provides that employers must prioritize female employees in participation in training and coaching measures to prepare them to assume higher-ranking and more senior positions.

Das Bundes-Gleichbehandlungsgesetz zielt darauf ab, für alle Dienstverhältnisse, die die Bundesregierung mit Einzelpersonen hat, Gleichheit zu schaffen. Das 1. Hauptstück des Gesetzes fokussiert sich auf die Gleichbehandlung von Mann und Frau (§ 3). § 7 Abs. 2 verlangt, dass Stellenausschreibungen in einer Art und Weise verfasst werden müssen, dass sie sich gleichermaßen an Männer und Frauen wenden und keine Details enthalten, die den Leser zu dem Schluss kommen lassen könnten, dass die Ausschreibung sich nur an ein Geschlecht richtet. § 8 und § 8a betonen, dass eine Diskriminierung auch in einem Fall vorliegt, in dem ein Arbeitnehmer (sexuell) belästigt wird. § 11 enthält ein Frauenförderungsgebot. In diesem Sinne gelten Frauen als unterrepräsentiert, wenn weniger als 50% der Angestellten Frauen sind. Nach § 11b müssen Frauen in unterrepräsentierten Bereichen bei der Bewerberauswahl bevorzugt behandelt werden, wenn sie für die Stelle gleichgeeignet sind wie der bestqualifizierte männliche Bewerber. Dies gilt, bis der Anteil der Frauen in diesem Bereich mindestens 50% beträgt. § 11c wendet diese Regel auch auf Beförderungen an. Nach § 11d sind weibliche Angestellte zur Teilnahme an Aus- und Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen, die zur Übernahme höherwertiger Verwendungen qualifizieren, vorrangig zuzulassen.



ArbeitnehmerInnenschutzgesetz (ASchG) (Occupational Health and Safety Act) (1995)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The legislation generally serves to protect of all male and female employees. Specifically targeting the protection of women, Article 6(4) states that female employees shall not perform work which, by its very nature, may hold specific dangers for women or alternatively, women may only perform such work with certain restrictions or measures suitable to prevent such risks. The Federal Ministry of Labor shall specify those works in a separate regulation (Article 18 no. 2).

Dieses Gesetz dient grundsätzlich dem Schutz sowohl von männlichen als auch weiblichen Angestellten. Spezifisch auf den Schutz von Frauen geht Artikel 6 Abs. 4 ein. Hiernach dürfen Frauen Arbeiten, die eine spezifische Gefahr für sie beinhalten nicht oder nur unter Bedingungen oder Einschränken ausführen, die diese besondere Gefahr vermeiden. Diese Arbeiten sollen von dem Bundesministerium für Arbeit in einer separaten Verordnung festgehalten werden (Artikel 18 Ziff. 2).



Personalkapazitätscontrollingverordnung (PersKapCoVo) (Personnel Capacity Controlling Regulation) (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The legislation shall support planning, execution, and controlling of personnel allocation on the Federal level. Personnel controlling shall ensure, inter alia, gender equality (Article 1 para. 1 no. 2). Therefore, Article 5 provides that federal service authorities shall submit to the chancellor biennially a report detailing the target quota of women holding the highest remuneration levels (para. 2). If the targeted percentage ratios are not met, the relevant federal service authority shall submit to the chancellor an additional report explaining the reasons for such non-compliance by the end of the first quarter of the following year (para. 4).

Dieses Gesetz soll die Planung, Ausführung und der Kontrolle von Personenallokation auf Bundesebene unterstützen. Personalkapazitätskontrolle soll u.a. Geschlechtergleichheit sicherstellen (Art. 1 Abs. 1 Ziff. 2). Hierfür haben die haushaltsleitenden Organe gemäß Artikel 5 dem Bundeskanzler alle zwei Jahre einen Bericht vorzulegen, der detailliert auf die Zielquoten von Frauen in der höchsten Vergütungsklasse eingeht (Abs. 2). Für den Fall, dass die angestrebten Zielanteile nicht erreicht werden, müssen die Organe dem Kanzler bis zum Ende des ersten Quartals des Folgejahres einen Zusatzbericht vorlegen, der die Gründe für das Nichterreichen der Quote angibt (Abs. 4).



Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG) (Federal Constitutional Act) (1945)


Gender discrimination

Article 7(1) states that all citizens are equal before the law and prohibits sex-based privileges (among other factors). Article 7(2) states that the federal government and all federal states and municipalities affirm actual equality between women and men. It further stresses that measures to achieve factual equality between women and men are legal. Regarding job titles or academic titles, Article 7(3) requires that the gendered nouns in those titles reflect the gender of the respective holder are in accordance with law. Article 14(6) states that public schools, kindergartens, and similar institutions shall be accessible to all children regardless of sex (among other factors).

Artikel 7 Abs. 1 macht deutlich, dass alle Bürger vor dem Gesetz gleich sind und verbietet gleichzeitig u.a. geschlechterbezogene Privilegien. Nach Artikel 7 Abs. 2 betonen die Bundesregierung, die Bundesstaaten sowie die Gemeinden die Gleichheit von Mann und Frau. Weiterhin betont das Gesetz, dass Maßnahmen, die dem Ziel dienen, eine faktische Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau zu erreichen, rechtmäßig sind. Betreffend Jobbezeichnungen oder akademischer Titel macht Artikel 7 Abs. 3 deutlich, dass eine geschlechterspezifische Anpassung dieser ebenso rechtmäßig ist. Artikel 14 Abs. 6 folgend müssen öffentliche Schulen, Kindergärten und vergleichbare Einrichtungen für alle Kinder egal welchen Geschlechts verfügbar sein.



Constitution of Malawi (2017)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Employment discrimination, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape

In recognition of the inherent dignity and worth of each human, Article 12 requires that the State and all persons recognize and protect human rights and afford the fullest protection to the rights and views of all individuals, groups, and minorities. All persons have equal status before the law. Limitations of rights are only justifiable insofar as they ensure peaceful human interaction in the context of an open and democratic society. Article 13 requires the State to actively promote the welfare and development of the people by affirmatively adopting legislation and policies to achieve gender equality. This requires: (i) women’s full participation in all spheres of society with opportunities equal to men; (ii) the implementation of nondiscrimination principles and other measures; and (iii) the implementation of policies addressing domestic violence, personal security, maternity benefits, economic exploitation, and rights to property, among other relevant social issues. Article 22 mandates that all members of a family shall enjoy equal respect and shall be protected under law against all forms of neglect, cruelty or exploitation. No person shall be forced to enter into any marriage, and no person over the age of 18 can be prevented from entering into marriage. All provisions of this section apply to civil, customary, and other forms of marriage. Article 24 specifically guarantees that women are entitled to full and equal protection of law, and have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender or marital status. This includes the following rights: (i) equal rights under civil law, including equal capacity in the realms of contracts, property, custody, decision-making regarding children, and acquisition and retaining of citizenship and nationality; and (ii) upon the dissolution of marriage, entitlement to fair disposition of jointly held property and to fair maintenance. Further, any laws that discriminate against women are invalid and legislation must affirmatively be passed to eliminate customs and practices that discriminate against women. This affirmative requirement particularly applies to practices of: sexual abuse, harassment, or violence; discrimination in work, business, or public affairs; and deprivation of property (inherited or otherwise). Article 30 provides that, while all persons have a right to the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political development, women in particular shall be given special consideration in regards to this right. The State must take all necessary measures for the realization of this right, including reforms aimed to eradicate social injustice and inequality. Other gender-related provisions include: the prohibition of torture, inhumane, and degrading treatment or punishment (Article 19); Article 20’s ban on all forms of discrimination; the right to education for all people (Article 25); Article 27’s prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor; and Article 31’s requirement that all persons are entitled to fair wages and equal remuneration for equal value work without discrimination of any kind, especially on the basis of gender.



الدستور الأردني (Jordanian Constitution) (2016)


Gender discrimination

Article 6 (1) states that all Jordanians are “equal before the law” and that there shall be no discrimination between them in rights and duties on the basis of race, language, or religion. This is an overarching provision, without explicit mention of gender, however it does provide a basis for equality for “all” Jordanians. Article 6 does not apply to Muslim personal status matters, which are instead governed by the Jordanian Personal Status Law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shari’ah courts (Article 103 (2) of the Jordanian Constitution).

ورد في الفقرة الأولى من المادة السادسة أن الأردنيون متاسوون في الحقوق والواجبات وإن اختلفت أعراقهم ولغاتهم وأديانهم. من الجدير بالذكر أنه وعلى الرغم من أن الفقرة لم تحدد الجنس كعامل فارق، إلا أن المادة جات عامة لتشكل جميع الأردنيين. لا تنطبق هذه المادة على قضايا الأحوال الشخصية، حيث أنها تخضع لقانون الأحوال الشخصية الأردني تحت اختصاص محاكم الشريعة الإسلامية.



Plano Nacional de Ação para a Implementação da Resolução Nº 1325/2000 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas sobre Mulheres, Paz e Segurança – Decreto Presidencial Nº 143/17 (2017)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, International law

The National Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Resolution Nº 1325/2000 of the UN Security Council on Women, Peace and Security was approved by the Angolan President in June 2017, revoking all legislation that contravenes it. The UN Resolution Nº 1325/2000 emphasizes the uneven impact of armed conflicts on men and women, and appeals for a higher degree of participation of women, and the integration of gender equality in the prevention, management, and resolution of armed conflicts. As such, it highlights the importance of gender equality in all phases of construction of peace and gives women the role not as victims, but as important actors in the peacemaking process. The National Plan follows those principles by planning to: 1) increase women’s participation in the construction of peace and related decision-making, 2) guarantee the formation and habilitation of women and girls, 3) promote and protect women’s and girls’ human rights in zones of conflict and post-conflict through empowerment and elimination of gender and sexual violence, among other objectives. In this respect, the plan also includes a series of activities, goals and execution times, and the expected result as an effective policy to implement the plan's objectives.

O Plano Nacional de Ação para a Implementação da Resolução Nº 1325/2000 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas sobre Mulheres, Paz e Segurança foi aprovado pelo Presidente da Angola em Junho de 2017, revogando toda a legislação que viola o plano. A Resolução Nº 1325/2000 da ONU enfatiza o impacto desigual dos conflitos armados para homens e mulheres, e apela para um maior grau de participação das mulheres, e para a integração da igualdade de gênero na prevenção, administração e resolução dos conflitos armados. Como tal, ele realça a importância da igualdade de gênero em todas as fases de construção da paz e dá às mulheres papeis não de vítimas, mas de importantes atrizes no processo de pacificação. O Plano Nacional segue esses princípios ao planejar: 1) o aumento da participação feminina na construção da paz e relacionada a tomadas de decisão, 2) a garantia da formação e habilitação de mulheres e garotas, 3) a promoção e proteção dos direitos humanos de mulheres e garotas em zonas de conflito e pós-conflito por meio do empoderamento e eliminação de violência sexual e de gênero, junto de outros objetivos. Nesse sentido, o plano também inclui uma série de atividades, metas e tempos de execução, e o resultado esperado como uma política efetiva para implementar os objetivos do plano.



Lei n. 24/2019: Special Part, Title One, Chapter One, Section One, Article 160 (2019)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Article 160 increases the penalty for murder to 20-24 years in prison if the crime was motivated by racial, religious, or political hatred, or generated by color, ethnic, or national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the victim.

O artigo 160 aumentou a pena para o crime de homicídio para 20-24 anos de prisão se o crime for motivado por ódio racial, religioso, ou político, ou gerado pela cor, etnia, ou origem nacional, sexo, orientação sexual, ou identidade de gênero da vítima.



Marriage and Family Code Chapter 10: Personal Non-Property Relations in the Family (1999)


Gender discrimination

Under Art. 75, both parents exercise parental authority equally, meaning that all issues regarding the forms and methods of upbringing, education, religion, organization of free time among other child-rearing matters, require mutual agreement. Disagreements between parents on raising children are resolved in the courts.



Marriage and Family Code Chapter 5: Rights and Obligations of the Spouses (1999)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Under Art. 20, spouses decide on issues related to their marriage and family relations jointly, by mutual agreement, and on the basis of equality. The relationship between the spouses must be based on mutual respect, assistance, and fair distribution of responsibilities. Spouses also have the right to resolve issues related to their personal interests independently. Spouses may choose any of their last names, a double last name, or leave their last name unchanged at their individual discretion in accordance with Art. 21. Both spouses are free to choose their occupation, profession, and place of residence in accordance with Art. 22. Under Art. 23, all property acquired during a marriage, even if one of the spouses did not have independent income during the time of the marriage due to being engaged in housekeeping or childcare, is the common joint property of the spouses. Both spouses have equal rights to the possession, use, and disposal of such property. However, property belonging to one spouse before marriage and property received during marriage by gift or inheritance remains the property of that spouse in accordance with Art. 26. In the event of division of the common joint property of the spouses, the property is divided equally in accordance with Art. 24.



Criminal Code Article 199 (Violation of Labor Legislation) (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Art. 199 prohibits the unjustified refusal to hire or the unlawful firing of a person, including a woman for reasons related to her pregnancy. This crime is punishable by a prohibition to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities, correctional labor, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.



Criminal Code Article 190 (Violation of the Equality of Citizens) (1999)


Gender discrimination

Art. 190 prohibits intentional violation or restriction of rights and freedoms, or the establishment of advantages for citizens based on, for example, gender resulting in substantial harm to the rights, liberties, and lawful interests of citizens. This crime is punishable with a fine, correctional labor, restraint on liberty, or imprisonment for a term up to two years, as well as restrictions to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities.



Plano Nacional de Ação para a Implementação da Resolução Nº 1325/2000 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas sobre Mulheres, Paz e Segurança – Decreto Presidencial Nº 143/17 (2017)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, International law

The National Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Resolution Nº 1325/2000 of the UN Security Council on Women, Peace and Security was approved by the Angolan President in June 2017, revoking all legislation that contravenes it. The UN Resolution Nº 1325/2000 emphasizes the uneven impact of armed conflicts for men and women, and appeals for a higher degree of participation of women, and to the integration of gender equality in the prevention, management, and resolution of armed conflicts. As such, it highlights the importance of gender equality in all phases of construction of peace and gives women the role not as victims, but as important actors in the peacemaking process. The National Plan follows those principles by planning to: 1) increase women’s participation in the construction of peace and related decision-making, 2) guarantee the formation and habilitation of women and girls, 3) promote and protect women’s and girls’ human rights in zones of conflict and post-conflict through empowerment and elimination of gender and sexual violence, among other objectives. In this respect, the plan also includes a series of activities, goals and execution times, and the expected result as an effective policy to implement the plan's objectives.

O Plano Nacional de Ação para a Implementação da Resolução Nº 1325/2000 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas sobre Mulheres, Paz e Segurança foi aprovado pelo Presidente da Angola em Junho de 2017, revogando toda a legislação que viola o plano. A Resolução Nº 1325/2000 da ONU enfatiza o impacto desigual dos conflitos armados para homens e mulheres, e apela para um maior grau de participação das mulheres, e para a integração da igualdade de gênero na prevenção, administração e resolução dos conflitos armados. Como tal, ele realça a importância da igualdade de gênero em todas as fases de construção da paz e dá às mulheres papeis não de vítimas, mas de importantes atrizes no processo de pacificação. O Plano Nacional segue esses princípios ao planejar: 1) o aumento da participação feminina na construção da paz e relacionada a tomadas de decisão, 2) a garantia da formação e habilitação de mulheres e garotas, 3) a promoção e proteção dos direitos humanos de mulheres e garotas em zonas de conflito e pós-conflito por meio do empoderamento e eliminação de violência sexual e de gênero, junto de outros objetivos. Nesse sentido, o plano também inclui uma série de atividades, metas e tempos de execução, e o resultado esperado como uma política efetiva para implementar os objetivos do plano.



Política Nacional para Igualdade e Equidade de Gênero (Decreto Presidencial Nº 222/13) (National Policy for Gender Equality and Equity) (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The President approved the National Policy for Gender Equality and Equity in December 2013. The policy and strategic plan on gender equality between men and women promotes equal opportunities, rights, and responsibilities in all domains of their economic, political, and social lives. It further establishes state liability in the adoption and execution of policies and promotes sustainable development, along with other basic human rights principles, such as non-discrimination, gender equality, and respect of individuals. The National Policy also brings data regarding the population of women in the country, analyzing the social, political, and economic situation. Finally, the Policy maps out the main problems faced by women (related to basic services, such as education and health, as well as domestic violence, participation in politics, and access to resources) and defines strategies and targets to achieve the specific goals in order to reduce gender inequalities present in the country.

O Presidente aprovou a Política Nacional para Igualdade e Equidade de Gênero em Dezembro de 2013. A política e o plano estratégico para equidade de gênero entre homens e mulheres promove oportunidades, direitos, e responsabilidades iguais em todos os âmbitos das suas vidas econômicas, políticas, e sociais. Ela também estabelece a responsabilidade do estado na adoção e execução de políticas e promove desenvolvimento sustentável, junto de outros princípios de direitos humanos básicos, como a não discriminação, equidade de gênero, e respeito aos indivíduos. A Política Nacional também traz dados relativos à população feminina do país, analizando as situações sociais, políticas, e econômicas. Finalmente, a Política mapeia os principais problemas enfrentados por mulheres (relativos a serviços básicos, como educação e saúde, assim como violência doméstica, participação na política, e acesso a recursos) e define estratégias e objetivos a serem alcançados para atingir metas específicas a fim de reduzir desigualdades de gênero presentes no país.



Constituição da República Portugal (2005)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Portuguese Constitution in Article 9 provides that it is the duty of the State to promote equality among men and women. Article 13 provides that no one shall be privileged or discriminated against for birth, gender, race, language, place of origin, religion, political or ideological conditions, social or economic status, or sexual orientation. Article 67 states that, in order to protect the family, the state is particularly charged with respect for individual freedom, guaranteeing the right to family planning by promoting the information and access to the methods and means required therefore, and organizing the legal and technical arrangements that make it possible to exercise motherhood and fatherhood with awareness. Article 68 determines that women have the right to special protection during pregnancy and following childbirth, and working women also have the right to an adequate period of leave from work without loss of remuneration or any privileges. Article 109 establishes that the direct and active participation in political life by men and women is a condition for and a fundamental instrument in the consolidation of the democratic system, and the law must promote both equality in the exercise of civic and political rights and the absence of gender-based discrimination in access to political office.

A Constituição portuguesa, em seu artigo 9º, estabelece que é dever do Estado promover a igualdade entre homens a mulheres. O artigo 13 prevê que ninguém deverá ser privilegiado ou discriminado em razão da ascendência, sexo, raça, língua, território de origem, religião, convicções políticas ou ideológicas, instrução, situação económica, condição social ou orientação sexual. O artigo 67 estabelece que, para proteção da família, o Estado deverá garantir, no respeito da liberdade individual, o direito ao planeamento familiar, promovendo a informação e o acesso aos métodos e aos meios que o assegurem, e organizar as estruturas jurídicas e técnicas que permitam o exercício de uma maternidade e paternidade conscientes. O artigo 67 da Constituição dispõe sobre o direito à proteção especial da mulher durante a gravidez e após o parto, tendo as mulheres trabalhadoras ainda direito a dispensa do trabalho por período adequado, sem perda da retribuição ou de quaisquer regalias. Por fim, o artigo 109 estabelece que a participação direta e ativa de homens e mulheres na vida política constitui condição e instrumento fundamental de consolidação do sistema democrático, devendo a lei promover a igualdade no exercício dos direitos cívicos e políticos e a não discriminação em função do sexo no acesso a cargos políticos.



Lei Federal n. 9.029/1995 (1995)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law prohibits any discrimination based on sex, origin, race, color, marital status, family status, disability, professional rehabilitation, age, among others, regarding the access to, or maintenance of, the employment relationship. Article 1 prohibits any discriminatory practices for the effect of access to employment (except with respect to minimum age, in order to prevent child labor). Article 2 prohibits any discriminatory practices such as (i) requiring a test, examination, skill, award, attestation, declaration, or any other procedure concerning sterilization or pregnancy, or (ii) the adoption of any measures, at the initiative of the employer that constitute induction or promotion of birth control. These crimes carry sentences of 1-2 years of imprisonment plus imposition of a fine to the employer. Even though the federal law only mentions “sex”, the Brazilian jurisprudence understand that this federal law also prohibits discrimination regarding sexual orientation, gender identity, or appearance.

A lei proíbe qualquer prática discriminatória por motivo de sexo, origem, raça, cor, estado civil, situação familiar, deficiência, reabilitação profissional, idade, entre outros, para acesso ao emprego ou para a sua conservação. O artigo 1º proíbe a discriminação para o efeito do acesso ao emprego (exceto com relação à idade mínima, a fim de evitar o trabalho infantil). O artigo 2 proíbe a adoção de quaisquer práticas discriminatórias, tais como (i) exigir um teste, exame, perícia, prêmio, atestado, declaração, ou qualquer outro procedimento relativo à esterilização ou gravidez, ou (ii) a adoção de quaisquer medidas, por iniciativa do empregador, que constituam indução ou promoção do controle de natalidade, constituindo crimes puníveis com um a dois anos de detenção mais aplicação de multa ao empregador. Embora a lei federal mencione apenas discriminação baseada no "sexo", a jurisprudência brasileira entende que esta lei federal também proíbe a adoção de práticas discriminatórias com relação à orientação sexual, identidade de gênero ou aparência quando do acesso ou manutenção de emprego.



Constituição do Brasil (1998)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Brazilian Constitution provides for equal rights to all individuals, regardless of sex, gender and/or sexual preference. However, specific discriminatory conducts are dealt with in the Criminal Code (Federal Decree No. 2.848/1940) and other Federal Laws. English translation available here.

A Constituição brasileira dispõe, expressamente, que todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza (Artigo 5º), seja em razão do sexo, gênero, ou preferência sexual. Contudo, ainda remanescem condutas discriminatórias específicas, seja no Código Penal, seja em outras leis federais.



中華民國憲法增修條文 Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (2005)


Gender discrimination

Article 10 states that the State shall protect the dignity of women, safeguard their personal safety, eliminate sexual discrimination, and further substantive gender equality. This Article further provides that the State shall, in accordance with the will of the ethnic groups, safeguard the status and political participation of the aborigines. The State shall also guarantee and provide assistance and encouragement for aboriginal education, culture, transportation, water conservation, health and medical care, economic activity, land, and social welfare, measures for which shall be established by law. Article 10 specifically includes the Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu areas. English translation available here.



Act for Implementation of J.Y. Interpretation No. 748 (2019)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

This Act was enacted to enforce the J.Y. Interpretation 748 and made same-sex marriage legal in Taiwan by legislation. The Act provides that two persons of the same sex may form a permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature for the purpose of living a common life. Same-sex marriages are bound by requirements and limitations relating to minimum age and consent, consanguinity and bigamy as well as provisions relating to cohabitation, sharing of living expenses, marital property, inheritance rights, grounds for termination, and other matters relating to marriage and its general effects. English translation available here.



中華民國憲法 Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (1947)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Constitution guarantees that all citizens are equal before the law. Article 5 guarantees equality among Taiwan’s various racial groups. Article 7 states that all citizens enjoy the same rights irrespective of their sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation. Article 22 provides that all other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution. Article 23 provides that all enumerated freedoms and rights shall not be restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public welfare. In J.Y. Interpretation 748, the Constitutional Court interpreted the classifications listed in Article 7 as only illustrative and recognized constitutional protection of same-sex marriage under Articles 7 and 23. All citizens have equal opportunity to receive an education under Article 159. English translation available here.



The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act (2019)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

Parliament enacted this law pursuant to the Supreme Court decision Shayara Bano v. Union of India. Section 3 of the Act bans and voids talaq-e-biddat declarations , while Section 4 stipulates imprisonment of up to three years along with fine for a Muslim man who pronounces talaq. Section 7 of the Act also declares the offence of pronouncing Talaq as a cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable offence. The Act provides additional protections to Muslim women upon whom talaq is pronounced in Sections 5 and 6, including a subsistence allowance from their husband and custody of their children (as determined by the magistrate) respectively.



Izborni zakon (Election law) (2001)


Gender discrimination

The Election Law promotes women’s participation in political and public life by mandating that every candidates list shall include candidates of male and female gender. There must be at least 40% female candidates. English translation available from RefWorld here.



Krivični zakon (Criminal Code) (2003)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, International law, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

The Criminal Code defines rape and the persecution of a person based on his or her sex as a crime against humanity (Article 172). It also includes rape or forcible prostitution under threat to a person’s life or limb and/or the threat to the life or the limb of a loved one as a crime of war (Article 180). English translation available from ILO and LegislatiOnline through External URL.



Zakon o azilu (Law on Asylum) (2016)


Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

This law sets the procedure for granting refugee status; the status of subsidiary protection; cessation and revocation of a refugee status and the status of subsidiary protection; temporary protection, identification documents; the rights and obligations of asylum-seekers, refugees, and aliens under subsidiary protection; and other issues related to asylum in BiH. Article 9 of the Law on Asylum enhances the protection of women as it prohibits the discrimination of aliens on all grounds stipulated in the Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination, including sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and sexual characteristics. English translation available through RefWorld External URL.



Zakon o zabrani diskriminacije (Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination) (2009)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

This law provides a framework for implementation of equal rights and opportunities to all persons in Bosnia and defines a system of protection from discrimination. It defines responsibilities and obligations of legislative, judicial, and executive authorities in Bosnia, as well as legal persons and individuals with public authorities to ensure the protection, promotion, and creation of conditions for equal treatment. The law further mandates the protection of women from discrimination, including the prohibition of sexual harassment, which is defined as every form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal, or physical behavior of a sexual nature that aims to or has the effect of harming dignity of a person, especially when it creates a fearful, hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment. English translation available here.



Zakona o ravnopravnosti spolova u Bosni i Hercegovini (Law on Gender Equality) (2009)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The Law on Gender Equality forms the basis for creating a network of mechanisms and institutional structures for advancing gender equality at all levels of administration in BiH. Its stated goal is to “regulate, promote and protect gender equality, guarantee equal opportunities and equal treatment of all persons regardless of gender in public and private sphere of society, and regulate protection from discrimination on grounds of gender.” The legislation defines the following offenses: discrimination on grounds of gender, direct gender-based discrimination, indirect gender-based discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, and victimization. Unofficial English translation available from LegislatiOnline here.



ກົດໝາຍວ່າດ້ວຍ ການພັດທະນາ ແລະ ປົກປ້ອງແມ່ຍິງ (Law on the Development and Protection of Women) (2004)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

This law sets out the measures for protecting women’s rights, promoting gender equality, development of women (including physical, mental, educational, and professional and skills developments), eliminating gender-based discriminations, and preventing crimes, such as human trafficking and domestic violence, against women. Article 17, Equal Rights in the Family, mandates that women and men have equal rights in all matters concerning family relationships, including equal rights in matrimonial property and inheritance. Part IV, The Protection of Women and Children against Trafficking and Domestic Violence, sets out measures to assist and protect women and children victims of trafficking and domestic violence; duties and obligations of governments and officers, social organizations, individuals, doctors, social workers, or other organizations that discover or receive information concerning a victim; and criminal procedures relating to offenders. Unofficial English translation available from the ILO here.



ປະມວນກົດໝາຍອາຍາ ມາດຕາ 224 ການ ຈຳ ແນກຕໍ່ແມ່ຍິງ (Penal Code article 224: discrimination against women) (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Discrimination against women or restriction of women’s participation in any political, economic, socio-cultural or family activity based on gender reasons is subject to one to three years of imprisonment. Violators are subject to “public criticism,” “re-education without deprivation of liberty,” or imprisonment of one to three years and a fine of 3 million to 10 million kip. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.



ประมวลกฎหมายอาญา Penal Code B.E. 2499, Chapter 3 (Abortion) (1956)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Section 301 states that any woman, causing herself an abortion or allowing another person to procure an abortion for herself, shall be liable to imprisonment up to a term of three years or a fine not exceeding 60,000 Baht. Section 302 punishes those who procure an abortion for a woman with her consent; the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine up to 20,000 Baht, with the term and amount varying according to if grievous bodily harm or death resulted from the abortion. Section 303 punishes those who procure an abortion for a woman without her consent; the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years or a fine up to 40,000 Baht, with the term and amount varying according to if grievous bodily harm or death resulted from the abortion. Section 305 exempts those under Sections 301 or 302 from the offense if the abortion was carried out be a medical practitioner on medical grounds or the woman is younger than 15 years and the pregnancy resulted from rape or fetuses with fatal abnormalities. Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled on 19 February 2020 that existing laws on abortion (Sections 301 and 305) conflict with Thailand’s 2017 Constitution as they fail to hold men responsible for illegal abortions. It remains unclear how the provisions will be amended; the ruling gives the government 360 days for the amendments and does not immediately change the law. English translation available from the ILO through External Link.



National Education Act of B.E. 2545 (1999) (as amended by the National Education Act, B.E. 2545 (2002)) (2002)


Gender discrimination

The National Education Act provides for Thailand’s educational system’s structure. Under Section 10, all individuals shall have equal rights and opportunities to receive basic education provided by the State for the duration of at least 12 years. Such education, provided on a nationwide basis, shall be of quality and free of charge. This extends to those with physical, mental, emotional, and social deficiencies, and those unable to support themselves or who are otherwise destitute or disadvantaged, where such persons shall have the rights and opportunities to receive basic education specially provided. Original Thai laws available here.



พระราชบัญญัติ ความเท่าเทียมระหว่างเพศ พ.ศ.๒๕๕๘ (Gender Equality Act 2015) (2015)


Gender discrimination

The “Equality Act” broadly prohibits almost all forms of gender discrimination. It establishes two groups, the Committee for the Promotion of Gender Equality (the “PGE Committee”) and the Committee on the Determination of the Unfair Gender Discrimination (the “UGD Committee”). The PGE Committee’s powers and duties broadly include prescribing and recommending policy on promoting gender quality, prescribing guidelines for providing assistance and remedy to victims of gender inequality, overseeing the performance of duties under the Equality Act, and promoting study and research into the prevention of gender discrimination. The UGD Committee’s powers and duties include considering problems submitted by petition claiming unfair gender discrimination, prescribing provisional measures before rendering decisions for protection or mitigation, and issuing orders to perform duties or provide compensation. Any person or organization found guilty of an offense shall be ordered to cease and prevent recurrence of unfair gender discrimination. Whoever fails to comply with such an order shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding 20,000 Baht. Under section 17(2) of the Equality Act gender discrimination is permitted on the basis of religious principles or national security. English translation available through External Link.



พระราชบัญญัติ ป้องกันและปราบปรามการค้าประเวณี พ.ศ. ๒๕๓๙ (Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act B.E. 2539 of 1996) (1996)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

The “Prostitution Act” criminalizes various activities associated with sex work. The criminalized activities include (see Sections 5 to 13): soliciting oneself in a public place, associating with another in a sex work establishment for the purpose of prostitution, advertising oneself or another for the purpose of sex work, procuring a person for the purpose of prostituting that person, a parent who connives in the prostitution of their child who is under the age of 18, being an owner/manager/supervisor in a prostitution establishment or other controller of sex workers in a prostitution establishment, and detaining a person or threatening in any manner to compel engagement in sex work. The Prostitution Act only criminalizes individuals involved with selling sex, but carries no criminalization or consequences for a customer buying it unless the sex worker is under the age of 18. The penalty for involvement in prostitution ranges from a fine up to a term of imprisonment for life depending on the offense committed. A sex worker could be charged with a fine not exceeding 1,000 Baht and imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month. Over the past few years, police have been conducting raids, sometimes violently, on prostitution establishments. It has been noted that those who exploit women in prostitution are rarely prosecuted and women working in the entertainment sector are often presumed guilty and subject to humiliating treatment following arrest. There are also reports to widespread corruption and official complicity in prostitution and trafficking cases.

English translation available here.



Commission on Gender Equality Amendment (Act 17 of 2013) (2013)


Gender discrimination

This Act amends the Commission on Gender Equality Act of 1996 to align with the Constitution. The Preamble in the Act substitutes the Preamble of the 1996 Act, and holds that §181 and item 20(2) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution provides for the continued existence of the Commission for Gender Equality ("the Commission"). Furthermore, it outlines the purpose of the Commission, which is to promote respect for gender equality and the protection, development, and attainment of gender equality. Among the Commission’s powers outlined in the Act is its power to monitor, investigate, research, educate, lobby, advise, and report on issues concerning gender equality. All its powers and functions are to be prescribed by national legislation.



Algemene wet gelijke behandeling (Equal Treatment Act) (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

This Act prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination between men and women. Direct discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or motherhood, and indirect discrimination is based other characteristics that result in sex discrimination. The Act covers discrimination in employment, equal pay and pension schemes, and excludes discrimination aimed at placing women in a privileged position or occupations in which sex is a determining factor because of the nature of the occupation in question.

This Act prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination between men and women. Direct discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or motherhood, and indirect discrimination is based other characteristics that result in sex discrimination. The Act covers discrimination in employment, equal pay and pension schemes, and excludes discrimination aimed at placing women in a privileged position or occupations in which sex is a determining factor because of the nature of the occupation in question. Sections 5(2)-(3) list the conditions in which sex may be considered. (English translation available here: https://mensenrechten.nl/sites/default/files/2013-05-08.Legislation%20Eq...)



Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) (2008)


Gender discrimination

Article 1 of the 2008 Constitution provides for the equal treatment of all people in the Netherlands. It further prohibits discrimination based on “religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever.” Article 11 of the 2008 Constitution holds that “Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of his person, without prejudice to restrictions laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament.” (English translation available through External Link.)



Law on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (No. 2391-II) (2014)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Pursuant to the law, the Public Defender of Georgia, along with common courts represents a legal mechanism for the protection of equality. People who believe that they were subjected to discrimination on any protected ground in any area of public life, have the opportunity to apply to the court or the Public Defender of Georgia against public agencies and physical or legal entities of private law. (External link hosts an English translation of the law.)



Código Civil y Comercial: Artículo 402 (Matrimonio) (2014)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Article 402 prohibits the interpretation or application of any norm in a manner that limits, restricts, excludes, or suppresses the equality of rights and obligations of the parties to a marriage, whether such marriage is consummated between two people of different sexes or the same sex.

El artículo 402 prohíbe la interpretación o aplicación de cualquier norma de manera que limite, restrinja, excluya o suprima la igualdad de derechos y obligaciones de las partes contrayentes, ya sea que dicho matrimonio se consuma entre dos personas de diferente sexo o del mismo sexo.



Constitución de la Nación Argentina (1995)


Gender discrimination

Article 37 guarantees the full exercise of political rights, in accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty and the laws that are enacted accordingly. Suffrage is universal, equal, secret, and obligatory. The political parties must guarantee the equality between men and women for access to elected and support positions. Article 75 empowers Congress to foster democratic values and equal opportunities free from all forms of discrimination.

El artículo 37 garantiza el pleno ejercicio de los derechos políticos, de acuerdo con el principio de soberanía popular y las leyes que se dicten en consecuencia. El sufragio es universal, igual, secreto y obligatorio. Los partidos políticos deben garantizar la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres para el acceso a cargos electos y de apoyo. El artículo 75 faculta al Congreso para fomentar los valores democráticos y la igualdad de oportunidades libres de toda forma de discriminación.



Civil Code (marriage, property, and inheritance) (2000)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Code sets various provisions related to marital property and duties. It also sets the minimum age for marriage at 18.

El Codigo establece varias leyes relacionadas a la propiedad y deberes matrimoniales. Tambien designa 18 como la edad minima para el matrimonio legal.



Codigo de Trabajo (Employment Code) (2003)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 2 of the Employment Code provides that discriminatory acts are against the principles of labor laws, including any distinction, exclusion, or restriction because of race, color, sex, age, civil status, union participation, religion, political opinion, nationality, ancestry, economic situation, language, or beliefs, among others, that have the goal of eliminating or altering equality of opportunities or of treatment in the workplace. Article 62 provides that the employer must comply with the principle of equal compensation between men and women who perform the same work. Differences based on skills, qualifications, suitability, responsibility or productivity may not be considered as arbitrary determinations of compensation. Included through Law 20,348 of 2009.

El Artículo 2 del Código de Empleo establece que los actos discriminatorios van en contra de los principios de la legislación laboral. Estos actos discriminatorios incluyen cualquier distinción, exclusión o restricción por motivos de raza, color, sexo, edad, estado civil, participación sindical, religión, opinión política, nacionalidad, ascendencia, situación económica, idioma o creencias, entre otros, que tengan como finalidad eliminar o alterar la igualdad de oportunidades o de trato en el lugar de trabajo. El Artículo 62 establece que el empleador debe cumplir con el principio de igualdad de remuneración entre hombres y mujeres que realizan el mismo trabajo. Las diferencias basadas en habilidades, calificaciones, idoneidad, responsabilidad o productividad no pueden considerarse determinaciones arbitrarias de compensación. Esta ley esta incluido a través de la Ley 20.348 de 2009.



Ley 20.609 (Anti-Discrimination Law) (2012)


Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

The main objective of this law is to establish a judicial mechanism that allows for an effective reestablishment of the rule of law whenever an act of arbitrary discrimination is committed. Pursuant to this law, arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction that lacks reasonable justification, made by agents of the State or individuals, and that causes deprivation, disturbance or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Political Constitution of the Republic or in the international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and that are in force, in particular when based on race or ethnicity, nationality, socio-economic situation, language, ideology or political opinion, religion or belief, unionization or participation in trade union organizations or the lack thereof, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, age, affiliation, personal appearance, and illness or disability.



Ley 20.820 (Creates the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity) (2015)


Gender discrimination

Law No. 20,820 created the Ministry of Women and Gender Justice, an initiative designed to bring focus to gender issues that were formerly led by the Women National Service (“Sernam”). The Ministry of Women and Gender Justice is a more autonomous and resourceful entity and its mission is to create policies, plans, and programs that benefit women and work to eliminate any type of gender discrimination, making Chile a more equitable country.



Intestate Succession Law (1985)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Intestate Succession Act governs family inheritance when a property owner dies without a will. The law provides a uniform system of intestate succession applicable regardless of the type of marriage (i.e., secular, customary, or Muslim). The estate is distributed through the various sections according to the number and type of heirs involved in the distribution. Section 5, for example, sets guidelines for how to divide an estate survived by both spouse and child, while section 6 dictates how to divide an estate when survived by a spouse only.



Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment Act 1996) (1996)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

Article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana relates to respect for human dignity and prohibits torture or cruel and inhuman punishment. Article 16 prohibits involuntary servitude or slavery. Article 17 relates to equality and non-discrimination and establishes that every person in Ghana is equal before the law. To this end, Article 17 specifically prohibits discrimination on the grounds of gender, race, color, ethnic origin, religion, creed, or social or economic status. Article 18 pertains to property rights and states that every person has the right to own property either alone or in association with others. Article 22 builds upon Article 18 and establishes that a spouse shall not be deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of a spouse whether or not the spouse died with a will. Article 22 states that Parliament shall enact legislation regulating the property rights of spouses as soon as possible after the Constitution came in to force. Article 22 clarifies that spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage and that assets that are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage. Article 24 of the Ghanaian Constitution concerns economic rights and establishes pay parity as a constitutionally enshrined principle. It states that every person has the right to work under satisfactory, safe, and healthy conditions and shall receive equal pay for equal work without distinction of any kind. Article 26 concerns cultural rights and practices and states that (a) every person is entitled to enjoy, practise, profess, maintain, and promote any culture, language, tradition, or religion subject to the provisions of the Constitution; but also that (b) all customary practices that dehumanise or injure the physical and mental well-being of a person are prohibited. Article 27 refers specifically to women’s rights. It states that special care shall be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth; and during these periods, working mothers shall be entitled to paid leave; that facilities shall be provided for the care of children below school-going age to enable women, who traditionally care for children, to realise their full potential; and that women shall be guaranteed equal rights to training and promotion without impediments. Article 36(6) refers specifically to the economic obligations of the state, which include ensuring that the State afford equality of economic opportunity to all citizens. Article 36(6) emphasizes that the State must take all necessary steps to ensure the full integration of women as equal partners in Ghana’s economic development.



Human Rights Act, Section 14 (1985)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Section 14(1) makes it a discriminatory practice to harass an individual in the context of provisions of goods, services, facilities or accommodation, provision of commercial or residential accommodation, or in matters of employment. Subsection (2) clarifies that sexual harassment is deemed to be harassment on a prohibited ground of discrimination.



Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, Part I, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms


Gender discrimination

Section 12 provides that everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Section 15 ensures the equal protection and benefit of the law “without discrimination […] based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Section 28 guarantees that all rights covered in the Charter apply equally to men and women.



Gender & Development Act (Amending Title 12) (2001)


Gender discrimination

§38 of the Act establishes a Ministry of Gender and Development in the executive branch of the government and sets forth the goal of the Ministry to improve gender equality and increase women’s equal participation in economy, society, politics, and culture. (§ 38.3). The Act provides the structure and organization of the Ministry, the procedure to appoint the Ministers and other staff members, and requires the government to provide an adequate budget for the Ministry. (§§ 38.4-38.10).



Defense Act of 2008 (2008)


Gender discrimination

The Act establishes the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which consists of army, coast guard, and air force. The Act lays out the organization of the AFL and the responsibilities of different staff. The Act provides that the AFL must reflect the ethnic, gender, and religious diversity of the country (§ 7.1). §8.7 provides that the AFL shall provide equal opportunities to people regardless of gender difference.



Constitution of Liberia (1986)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Article 11 guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms to all persons regardless of sex, ethnicity, race, political opinion, or national origin. Article 18 prohibits employment discrimination based on sex. Article 23 provides that the property obtained by a person during marriage because of his or her own labor shall not be used to satisfy the obligations of his or her spouse, nor shall the property be controlled by a spouse. It states further that the legislature is compelled enact laws to provide equal protection to the surviving spouses and children in both statutory and customary marriages.



Domestic Relations Law (1973)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Domestic Relations Law of 1973 governs various aspects of marriage, divorce, and custody of children—while also providing protections for women’s property rights in marriage. The statute sets forth the requirements for a valid marriage, procedures to obtain a marriage license, duties and liabilities in marriage, guardianship and adoption of children, and the procedures to obtain a divorce. Chapter 2 outlines the requirements for a valid marriage. §2.2 provides that when men reach 21 years old and women reach 18 years old, they are per se capable of entering into marriage. §2.2 prohibits marriage of those under 16 years old. §3.4 provides that a woman retains the property she owns at the time of her marriage or receives during the marriage. §3.5 provides that a woman has the right to sue her husband for the injury caused by him during the marriage. Contrary to the law in most countries, §4.1 mandates that both parents have equal custody rights when they live in the same household, but that the husband becomes the sole custodian of the children upon their separation. §5.3 provides, however, that the wife is responsible to support the children when the husband is dead or cannot be found. §6.1 provides that bigamous and incestuous relationships are void marriages. §8.1 outlines the grounds for divorce, including inhuman treatment that causes danger to the plaintiff-spouse’s physical and mental well-being, the defendant-spouse’s desertion of the plaintiff-spouse for a period of one or more years, the defendant-spouse’s adultery, or incompatibility of temper that results in danger to a spouse. With respect to divorce, the Supreme Court of Liberia has affirmed that a court has discretion to deny a divorce if the plaintiff is responsible for the incompatibility (see, e.g., Korkoya). §13.2 provides that injury caused to the wife in the domestic relationship may subject the husband to civil compensatory damages and punitive damages.



Equal Opportunity Act (Victoria) (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The Equal Opportunity Act aims to eliminate discrimination, sexual harassment, and victimisation to the greatest extent possible and to promote equality as far as reasonably practicable. It defines and prohibits discrimination in relation to various “attributes,” including sex, sexual orientation, marital status, and pregnancy. The prohibitions apply in a range of situations, including employment-related discrimination. Sexual harassment and victimisation are also defined and prohibited. The Act also regulates the operation of the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (“VEOHRC”), its powers, and the process by which people may bring disputes concerning violations of the Act to the Commission. After investigating a dispute, the VEOHRC may refer a matter to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, which may order a person to refrain from further violating the Act or pay compensation to the applicant for loss, damage or injury suffered.



Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act (Victoria) (2006)


Employment discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced sterilization, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights, Trafficking in persons

The Charter aims to protect and promote the human rights set out in Part 2, including property rights and freedom from forced work (slavery), as well as the right to enjoy those human rights without discrimination. With respect to any proposed new law, the Victorian Parliament must prepare a “statement of compatibility,” which must examine the proposed law’s compatibility (or incompatibility) with the human rights protected in the Charter. While this statement has no effect on the validity of any law, it furthers the purpose of the Charter in promoting human rights. Further, under section 32 of the Charter, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights (to the extent it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose). The Charter also allows the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission to intervene in any court or tribunal proceeding in relation to the Charter.



Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres, Decreto Nº 520 (Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-Free Life for Women, Decree No. 520) (2010)


Employment discrimination, Femicide, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Trafficking in persons

The Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-Free Life for Women (Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia) (“LEIV”) establishes a framework for prosecuting and preventing acts of violence against women, and for providing assistance and support for victims of gender-based violence. The law establishes 11 new crimes that aim to sanction various aspects of gender-based violence in various forms: physical (femicide, aggravated femicide, obstruction of justice, induced or assisted suicide); psychological (inducement and promotion of sex acts through electronic media; unlawful dissemination of information, dissemination of pornography); economic (breach of duty of economic assistance, theft of birthright, theft of profits of economic activity); and speech (violent speech against women). Rape is prosecuted through the Penal Code. The Salvadorean Institute for the Advancement of Women (Instituto Salvadoreno para el Desarollo de la Mujer) (“ISDEMU”) is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the law and with establishing women’s shelters and other programs designed to help victims of domestic and gender-based violence.

La Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres (LEIV) establece una avenida para enjuiciar y prevenir actos de violencia contra las mujeres, y para brindar asistencia y apoyo a víctimas que hayan sufrido violencia por razón de género. La ley establece 11 nuevos delitos que tienen como objetivo sancionar varios aspectos de la violencia de género en diversas formas: física (femicidio, femicidio agravado, obstrucción de la justicia, suicidio inducido o asistido); psicológica (inducción y promoción de actos sexuales a través de medios electrónicos; difusión ilegal de información, difusión de pornografía); económica (incumplimiento del deber de asistencia económica, robo de derechos de nacimiento, robo de beneficios de la actividad económica); y discurso (discurso violento contra la mujer). La violación es procesada por el Código Penal, el cual es el código penal criminal. El Instituto Salvadoreño para el Adelanto de la Mujer ("ISDEMU") tiene la tarea de supervisar la implementación de la ley y establecer refugios para mujeres asi como otros programas diseñados para ayudar a las víctimas de violencia doméstica y de violencia en base de género.



Ley del Régimen electoral 1985 (última revisión 2018) (Law on the General Electoral Regime) (2018)


Gender discrimination

Article 44 bis mandates that the lists proposed by political parties for elections to the Lower House of Congress, municipalities, regional parliaments and the European Parliament shall consist of a minimum of 40% women.

El Artículo 44 exige que las listas propuestas por los partidos políticos para las elecciones a la Cámara Baja del Congreso, los municipios, los parlamentos regionales y el Parlamento Europeo estén formadas por un mínimo del 40% de mujeres.



Ley de Educación 2006 (última revisión 2018) (2018)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The Law on Education established that one of the principles of Spain’s public education system is the prevention of gender-based violence (Article 1). Preference in the admission to public schools will be given to students who have had to move because they suffered acts of gender-based violence (Article 84.7).

La Ley de Educación estableció que uno de los principios del sistema de educación pública de España es la prevención de la violencia de género (Artículo 1). Se dará preferencia a la admisión a las escuelas públicas a los estudiantes que hayan tenido que mudarse porque sufrieron actos de violencia de género (Artículo 84.7).



Ley de Publicidad General 1988 (última revisión 2014) (2014)


Gender discrimination

Article 3 prohibits any publicity which discriminates against women. It describes discrimination as (i) showing women’s bodies or body parts as objects unrelated to the products being marketed or (ii) showing stereotyped descriptions of women’s behavior in a way that is contrary to their dignity.

El Artículo 3 prohíbe cualquier publicidad que discrimine a las mujeres. Describe la discriminación como (i) mostrar los cuerpos o partes del cuerpo de las mujeres como objetos no relacionados con los productos que se comercializan o (ii) mostrar descripciones estereotipadas del comportamiento de las mujeres de una manera que sea contraria a su dignidad.



Ley del Registro Civil 2011 (última revisión 2018) (Civil Registry Law) (2018)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

In Spain, two last names are generally used to identify an individual, typically with the father’s last name first and the mother’s last name second. Under Article 109 of the Civil Code, since 2000, parents can choose the order of their children’s last names. However, a recent amendment to the Civil Registry Law, which entered into force in 2017, established that if the parents have not decided what last name to use first, the person in charge of the Civil Registry will ask them to do so and, if they do not do so within three days, the Civil Registry representative will decide the order of the names based on the child’s best interest. This change in policy removes any legal preference for using the father’s last name first (Article 49 Civil Registry Law).

En España, generalmente se usan dos apellidos para identificar a un individuo, generalmente con el apellido del padre primero y el apellido de la madre segundo. Según el Artículo 109 del Código Civil, desde 2000, los padres pueden elegir el orden de los apellidos de sus hijos. Sin embargo, una enmienda reciente a la Ley de Registro Civil, que entró en vigencia en el 2017, estableció que si los padres no han decidido qué apellido usar primero, la persona a cargo del Registro Civil les pedirá que lo hagan y, si no lo hacen dentro de los tres días, el representante del Registro Civil decidirá el orden de los nombres en función del interés superior del niño. Este cambio en la política elimina cualquier preferencia legal por usar primero el apellido del padre (Artículo 49 de la Ley de Registro Civil).



Leyes Regionales de violencia sexual e igualdad de género (Regional laws on sexual violence and gender equality)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

Spain’s 17 autonomous regions have all enacted regional laws aimed at suppressing gender-based violence and promoting gender equality.

Las 17 regiones autónomas de España han promulgado leyes regionales destinadas a suprimir la violencia de género y promover la igualdad entre los géneros.



Ley de Violencia Sexual 2004 (última revisión 2018) (2018)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

This is a broad piece of legislation that regulates the prevention, education, social assistance, social security benefits, procedural, criminal, and medical aspects of gender-based violence. The Sexual Violence Law also created specific courts within the judiciary system, like the Courts of Violence Against Women, to hear all cases related to gender-based violence.

Esta es una amplia legislación que regula la prevención, educación, asistencia social, beneficios de seguridad social, aspectos procesales, penales y médicos de la violencia de género. La Ley de Violencia de Género también creó tribunales específicos dentro del sistema judicial, como los Tribunales de Violencia contra la Mujer, para escuchar todos los casos relacionados con la violencia de género.



Ley de Igualdad entre Hombres y Mujeres 2007 (última revision en 2013) (Law on Equality between Men and Women) (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law implemented the constitutional mandate of gender equality in terms of human dignity, rights, and obligations. Its purpose is to implement the principle of equality and ensure that women do not suffer gender discrimination in any realm of society (including politics, civil society, work environments, the economy, social and cultural). It also details the constitutional principles of equal treatment and the prohibition of gender discrimination. This law also contains extensive regulation on ways to promote equal treatment and to prevent discrimination with regards to the relations of citizens with the public authorities, including a broad mandate to promote equality with positive measures (Article 11).

Esta ley implementó el mandato constitucional de igualdad de género en términos de dignidad humana, derechos, y obligaciones. Su propósito es implementar el principio de igualdad y asegurar que las mujeres no sufran discriminación de género en ningún ámbito de la sociedad (incluyendo política, sociedad civil, entornos laborales, economía, social, y cultural). También detalla los principios constitucionales de igualdad de trato y la prohibición de la discriminación de género. Esta ley también contiene una extensa regulación sobre formas de promover la igualdad de trato y prevenir la discriminación con respecto a las relaciones de los ciudadanos con las autoridades públicas, incluído un amplio mandato para promover la igualdad con medidas positivas (Artículo 11).



Constitución de España de 1978 (última revision de 2011) (2011)


Gender discrimination

Spain’s Constitution contains three provisions particularly relevant to gender justice. Article 14 of the Constitution states that “Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion, or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.” Article 32.1 establishes that “[m]en and women have the right to marry with full legal equality.” Finally, Article 35.1 states that [a]ll Spaniards have the duty and the right to work, to the free choice of profession or trade, to professional advancement through work, and to a sufficient remuneration for the satisfaction of their needs and those of their families. Under no circumstances may they be discriminated on account of their sex.” (Official English translation available here: http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf)

La Constitución de España contiene tres disposiciones particularmente relevantes para la justicia de género. El Artículo 14 de la Constitución establece que “los españoles son iguales ante la ley y de ninguna manera pueden ser discriminados por motivos de nacimiento, raza, sexo, religión, opinión o cualquier otra condición o circunstancia personal o social.” El Artículo 32.1 establece que “los hombres y las mujeres tienen derecho a casarse con plena igualdad legal.” Finalmente, el artículo 35.1 establece que “[todos] los españoles tienen el deber y el derecho al trabajo, a la libre elección de profesión u oficio, a la promoción profesional a través del trabajo y a una remuneración suficiente para la satisfacción de sus necesidades y las de sus familias. Bajo ninguna circunstancia puede ningún español ser discriminados por su sexo.”



Diskrimineringslag (Discrimination Act) (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The Discrimination Act (“DA”) promotes equality regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or any other identity by defining and prohibiting discrimination and sexual harassment. The DA provides anti-discrimination laws which state that as long as an individual is capable of performing the relevant task, or eligible to receive services, he or she may not be discriminated against based on any identity factors. Moreover, the DA provides that organization leaders are obligated to investigate and take measures to prevent future discrimination or harassment upon becoming aware of such potential discrimination or harassment. Finally, the DA provides immunity provisions for those who report behavior that violates the DA. The penalty for failing to fulfill obligations under the DA is an obligation to pay compensation for the discrimination suffered, decided by the Board against Discrimination, and subject to appeal by the payee.



Kungörelse om beslutad ny regeringsform (1974:152 - Proclamation on a decided new form of government) (1974)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The constitution provides equality for all regardless of any identity. (Constitution of Sweden, Chapter 1 Articles 2 and 9).



Zakon o Zabrani Diskriminacije (The Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination) (2009)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment, Trafficking in persons

The Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination introduced a systematic basis for general anti-discrimination protection in Serbia. It includes a general prohibition on discrimination in addition to specific articles covering hate speech, harassment, and other more severe forms of discrimination such as slavery and trafficking. (English translation available here.)



Ligji Nr. 05/L -020 Për Barazi Gjinore (Law No. 05/L -020 on Gender Equality) (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

Law No. 05/L-020 on Gender Equality promotes gender equality, by defining the relevant concepts, setting forth various measures to protect equal rights of genders, and specifying the institutions responsible for gender equality. The Law defines “woman” and “man” as including any person who considers oneself as such, and describes gender identity – which does not require medical intervention – as a “protected characteristic.” Direct and indirect gender discrimination are prohibited under the Law, including less favorable treatment of women for reasons of pregnancy, maternity, or sexual orientation, and gender-based violence. Harassment and sexual harassment are also forbidden, and whether a person refuses or surrenders to such behavior shall not be used as a basis for a decision affecting that person in a legal proceeding. The Law directs the Kosovo institutions to implement various general measures to achieve gender equality in Kosovo, including gender mainstreaming in all policies and legislation, gender budgeting in all areas, and ensuring recruitment and appointment are consistent with the requirement for equal representation of women and men. In areas where inequities exist, public institutions are further instructed by the Law to take temporary special measures to accelerate the realization of gender equality, including quotas, preferential treatment, hiring, and promotion. The Law in particular requires legislative, executive, and judicial bodies at all levels to adopt special measures until equal gender representation is achieved. The Law establishes an Agency for Gender Equality to support the implementation of the Law, and further mandates that all ministries and municipalities must appoint gender equality officials, and allocate sufficient resources from their budget, to implement the Law. Discrimination on bases including sex, pregnancy, or birth, is prohibited in employment matters including access to employment or training, and working conditions. In regard to education, the Law proscribes sex discrimination in access to education and scholarships, evaluation results, and attainment of degrees, and mandates the inclusion of gender equality education in school curricula at all levels. Persons who believe the principle of equal treatment has not been implemented in relation to them may initiate proceeding in accordance with the Law on Protection from Discrimination. Violations of the Law are punishable by fines of up to 700 Euros for individuals, and 900 Euros for legal entities. (Unoffocial English version available here.)



Kushtetuta e Republikës së Kosovës (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo) (2008)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

Article 7 of the Constitution of Kosovo states that Kosovo’s constitutional order is based on principles including equality, respect for human rights, non-discrimination, and social justice. The article further declares that Kosovo ensures gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of the society, providing equal opportunities for both female and male participation in the political, economic, social, cultural, and other areas of societal life. Article 24(2) prohibits discrimination on grounds of gender and sexual orientation. Article 28(1) stipulates that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude, and paragraph (3) specifically forbids trafficking in persons. Article 37 declares that everyone enjoys the right to marry based on free will. It mandates that marriage and divorce be based on the equality of spouses. Article 71(2) stipulates that the composition of the Assembly of Kosovo shall respect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 101(1) stipulates that the composition of the civil service shall take into account internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 104(2) stipulates that the composition of the judiciary shall reflect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 108(2) charges the Kosovo Judicial Council to ensure that the Kosovo courts follow the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (4) requires proposals for appointment of judges to reflect principles of gender equality. Article 109(4) stipulates the State Prosecutor shall respect the principles of gender equality. Article 110(1) charges the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council to ensure that the State Prosecutor reflects the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (2) requires that proposals for appointments of prosecutors shall reflect principles of gender equality. Article 114(1) requires the composition of the Constitutional Court to respect principles of gender equality. (Unofficial English translation available here.)



Equality Act (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

This Act is a comprehensive act that replaced several pieces of legislation, including the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. In general, The Equality Act 2010 legally protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in wider society, and provides equality provisions, including the following:

the basic framework of protection against direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimization in services and public functions, work, education, associations and transport changing the definition of gender reassignment, by removing the requirement for medical supervision protection for people discriminated against because they are perceived to have, or are associated with someone who has, a protected characteristic clearer protection for breastfeeding mothers applying a uniform definition of indirect discrimination to all protected characteristics harmonizing provisions allowing voluntary positive action allowing claims for direct gender pay discrimination where there is no actual comparator making pay secrecy clauses unenforceable extending protection in private clubs to sex, religion or belief, pregnancy and maternity, and gender reassignment introducing new powers for employment tribunals to make recommendations that benefit the wider workforce


Equal Rights Act (1990)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Equal Rights Act was created “for the enforcement of the principles enshrined in article 29 of the Constitution so as to secure equality for women.” Section 2 of the Act provides that “[w]omen and men have equal rights and the same legal status in all spheres of political, economic and social life” and that [a]ll forms of discrimination against women or men on the basis of their sex or marital status are illegal.” The Act provides, among other things, that women and men be paid equally for the same work and that, in employment matters, men shall not be afforded more favorable opportunities than women.



Kodi i Punes (Labor Code) (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The Labour Code enshrines equality in the workplace into Albanian legislation and provides specific protection to women’s rights. Article 9 (Prohibition against Discrimination) expressly prohibits any discrimination in the fields of labour and education (including but not limited to discrimination based on sex, race and nationality). Article 32 (Protection of Personality) specifically prohibits any acts of sexual harassment against an employee by an employer or other employees. Sexual harassment is defined to include any act that “considerably harms the psychological state of the employee because of sex.” Article 54 (Working Conditions) provides a requirement for pregnant women to have breaks every three hours. Article 105/a (Woman's Employment Protection) provides that women cannot be dismissed solely based on the reason of pregnancy or child delivery. Article 115 (Equality between Sexes in terms of Reward) makes mandatory equal pay between men and women for carrying out jobs of equal value. (External link to the International Labour Organization website for Albanian labor-related legislation, including the ILO's unofficial English translation available here.)



Constitution of Belarus (2004)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Constitution provides for the general principles of equality and non-discrimination. Article 4 provides that democracy shall be exercised based on diversity of political institutions, ideologies and opinions. It also provides that the ideologies of different entities may not be made mandatory for citizens. Article 14 provides that the State shall regulate relations among social, ethnic and other communities on the basis of principles of equality before the law and respect of rights and interests. Article 16 states that religions and faiths shall have equality before the law. Article 22 provides that “all shall be equal before the law and have the right to equal protection of their rights and legitimate interest without any discrimination.” Further, Article 32 of the Constitution contains general protections with respect to marriage, family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood. In particular, it provides that “on reaching the age of consent, a woman and a man shall have the right to enter into marriage on a voluntary basis and found a family. Spouses shall have equal rights in family relationships” and women shall be guaranteed equal rights as men in their opportunities to receive education and vocational training, promotion in labor, social and political, cultural and other spheres of activity as well as in creating conditions safeguarding their occupational health and safety. Article 42 provides a right to equal pay. According to Art. 44, the State guarantees to every person the right to own property, meaning the right to own, use, and dispose of property individually or jointly with other persons. The right of ownership and inheritance are protected by law. Unofficial English translation available here.



Employment Ordinance (1968)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Employment Ordinance regulates the general conditions of employment and related work matters. Part III of the Ordinance provides for maternity protection, including provisions for maternity leave.



Family Status Discrimination Ordinance (1997)


Gender discrimination

The Family Status Discrimination Ordinance (“FSDO”) prohibits direct and indirect discrimination based on family status. The principles used by courts applying the FSDO are very similar to those of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.​



Sex Discrimination Ordinance (1996)


Gender discrimination

The Sex Discrimination Ordinance (“SDO”) prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, pregnancy, and marital status. Both direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited. Direct discrimination occurs where a party treats a person “less favorably” than another person in similar circumstances, except for the attribute of sex/pregnancy/marital status. Courts use a “but for test,” asking whether the complainant would not have received the less favorable treatment but for his/her sex/pregnancy/marital status. Indirect discrimination occurs where a seemingly uniform condition is applied, but the burden disproportionately falls on a group defined by sex/pregnancy/marital status.



Bill of Rights Ordinance (1991)


Gender discrimination, International law

The Bill of Rights Ordinance is the local legislation incorporating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into Hong Kong law. The rights recognized under it are to be enjoyed “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” The ordinance also provides that “[m]en and women shall have an equal right to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in [the ordinance].”



Anti-Discrimination Act (Tasmania) (1998)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 makes it unlawful to directly or indirectly discriminate on the basis of certain grounds (“attributes”) in connection to public life; including employment, education and training, and provision of facilities, goods and services. The various unlawful grounds of discrimination include: sexual orientation, lawful sexual activity, gender, gender identity, intersex variations of sex characteristics, martial status, relationship status, pregnancy, breastfeeding, parental status, family responsibilities, irrelevant medical record, association with a person who has, or is believed to have, any of these attributes. Additionally, the Act prohibits inciting hatred towards a person on the grounds of their race, disability, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, or gender identity, as well as harassment, sexual harassment, and victimization towards a person based on protected attributes or their intent to file a claim under this Act. It also prohibits a person from promoting discrimination through a sign, notice, or advertisement. The Act also establishes the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner to investigate and resolve complaints. Complaints can be initiated by the person targeted by the discrimination, a trade union, or another representative for the targeted person. The Commission can also investigate any discrimination ex officio. If the Commissioner believes that the complaint cannot be resolved by conciliation or that the nature of the complaint is such that it should be referred to the Tribunal, the Commissioner can refer the complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal. If the Tribunal finds that a complaint is substantiated, it may, among other remedies, order the respondent to pay the complainant an amount the Tribunal thinks appropriate as compensation for any loss or injury suffered by the complainant and caused by the respondent's discrimination or prohibited conduct.



Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act (Tasmania) (2019)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Act was adopted to amend several major pieces of legislation in Tasmania, including the Adoption Act 1988, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, and the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, with the purpose of improving and strengthening the rights of trans people. The new provisions make it possible to change legal gender through statutory declaration and remove the previous requirement of having completed gender reassignment surgery before amending a birth certificate. Additionally, gender is now allowed to be taken of birth certificates altogether. The Act entered into force on 5 September 2019.



性別平等教育法 (Gender Equity Education Act) (2018)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

The Gender Equity Education Act (the “GEEA”) aims to encourage respect for gender diversity, eliminate gender discrimination and promote substantive gender equality through education. The GEEA charges the competent authorities (as well as schools) with establishing gender equity education committees whose tasks include drafting regulations and policies, coordinating resources, supervising gender equity-related activities and promoting research and development of curricula, teaching and assessments. Under the GEEA, schools must provide a safe, gender-fair learning environment by respecting, giving due consideration to, and not discriminating against prospective students, students, faculty, and staff of different genders. Schools shall strive towards this objective by taking steps such as integrating gender equity education into their curriculum, providing gender equity education when training new staff members, reporting known incidents of sexual assault, sexual harassment or sexual bullying within 24 hours and promptly handling and investigating such cases. Schools and any principal, faculty or staff member found to be in violation of the GEEA may be subject to a fine. Persons may also be dismissed or discharged from employment.

性別平等教育法(即「GEEA」)旨在鼓勵尊重性別多樣性,消除性別歧視,並透過教育促進實質性別平等。性別平等教育法責成主管機關(以及學校)建立性別平等教育委員會,其任務包括擬定法規和政策,協調資源,監督與性別平等有關的活動,並促進課程、教學和評估的研究及發展。根據性別平等教育法,學校必須透過尊重、適當考慮及不歧視不同性別的潛在學生、學生、教職員工等方式,提供一個安全、性別平等的學習環境。學校應努力實現這一目標,採取的措施包括:將性別平等教育納入課程、在培訓新員工時提供性別平等教育、在24小時之內報告已知的性侵、性騷擾或性霸凌事件,並及時處理和調查此類案件。任何被發現違反性別平等教育法的學校、校長、教職員工可能會被處以罰鍰。該等人員也可能被開除或解聘。



Nigeria Penal Code Act (1960)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The Penal Code applies to the northern states of Nigeria. Section 55(1)(d), subject to customs that have been recognized as lawful, allows a husband to “correct[] his wife” as long as it does not amount to “grievous hurt.” Section 55(2) goes on to state that the correction must be reasonable in kind or degree with regards to the age, physical, and mental conditions of the person being corrected. Grievous hurt is defined in section 241 as “(a) emasculation; (b) permanent deprivation of the sight of an eye, of the hearing of an ear or the power of speech; (c) deprivation of any member or joint; (d) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; (e) permanent disfiguration of the head or face; (f) fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; (g) any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.” The law concerning abortion is found in sections 232. Referenced in the law as the causing of a miscarriage, abortion is only legal to save the life of the mother. Any person, including the mother, can be guilty of the offense and will be punished with up to 14 years in prison, a fine, or both. Sections 233-235 discuss the causing of a miscarriage intentionally or unintentionally through acts against the mother. These offenses also carry a penalty of imprisonment, fines, or both. Section 282 discusses rape and specifies that sexual intercourse by a man with his wife is not rape if she has gone through puberty. No longer available at External URL. Please contact the Women & Justice Collection for a PDF copy.



Labour Act (1990)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Under Section 55(1), women are prevented from working at night in any industrial or agricultural position. However, under 55(2) female nurses in either sector are allowed to work at night, as are women working in management positions not “ordinarily engaged in manual labour.” Women who work at night because of unforeseeable and nonrecurring work interruptions or who work with materials that require night work because of rapid deterioration are provided with a possible defense to the law. Under Section 56, no woman may be employed in any work that requires time in any underground mine unless they hold positions of management and do not perform manual labor, are employed in health and welfare services, or are working as part of their courses of study. Under Section 57, the Minister, at any time, may prohibit or restrict women from employment in any particular industry or in any process or work carried out. Violations under any of sections 55-56 of the Act carry with them a fine, imprisonment for a term not to exceed one month, or both.



Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act (2013)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act makes it illegal for same-sex individuals to marry, enter into a civil union, or gain entitlement to any benefits of a valid marriage. Additionally, it prohibits the public display of same-sex relationships. Any marriage or union entered into legally outside Nigeria is considered void within the country and no related benefits are recognized. The Act specially defines marriage as between a man and a woman and establishes criminal penalties against people who solemnize, witness, or aid various events supporting homosexuality. Sections 2-3; 5(3). The act also prohibits registering any same sex organizations and public displays of same sex romantic affection. Section 4. Punishments include imprisonment for 10-14 years depending on the offense. Section 5.



Matrimonial Causes Act (1990)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Matrimonial Causes Act governs marriages, dissolution of marriage, and custody of children. According to Section 5(d) a marriage is voidable if at the time of marriage “the wife is pregnant by a person other than the husband.” However, by Section 35(c), only the husband can nullify the marriage because of pregnancy; the wife has no right to petition to do so. Under Section 47, both husband and wife have grounds for a decree of restitution of conjugal rights, if either refuse to cohabitate with and render conjugal rights to the other. With respect to the wife, if the husband has paid any money to her with respect to a decree under Section 47 and she refuses to comply with the decree within a reasonable time, the money paid becomes a debt due and payable by the wife to the husband and recoverable by action in court.



Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act (2015)


Gender discrimination, Trafficking in persons

The Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, originally passed in 2003 and amended in 2005 and 2015, criminalizes human trafficking and related abuses. The Act provides trafficked persons with access to adequate health services and protection against discriminatory treatment. The Act establishes a National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (Part II), establishes Agency Transit Shelters for rescued trafficked persons, and establishes a Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund to provide compensation for victims (Part X). The Act provides protections against discriminatory treatment, barring discrimination on account of gender or sex or on the basis of the victim "having worked in the sex industry." Part IX, Section 61(a). The Act serves as implementing legislation for Nigeria’s international obligation under the Trafficking in Persons Protocol Supplementing the Transnational Organized Crime Convention (TOC), to which Nigeria became a signatory on December 13, 2000. Part Two available here.



National Commission for Women Act (1992)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

The National Commission for Women Act established the National Commission for Women to promote the general welfare of Nigerian women, “promote the full utilization of women in the development of human resources and bring about their acceptance as full participants in every phase of national development, with equal rights and corresponding obligations,” and “work towards total elimination of all social and cultural practices tending to discriminate against and de-humanise womanhood.” Some of the Commission’s objectives include “mobilizing women collectively in order to improve their general lot and ability to seek and achieve leadership roles in all spheres of society” and “raising consciousness about the rights of women, the availability of opportunities and facilities, their social, political, and economic responsibilities.”



Criminal Code Act (1990)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

The Criminal Code applies to the southern states of Nigeria. The Criminal Code Act distinguishes between the treatment of assault on men and assault on women, with Chapter 29 (Sections 351-356) addressing “Assaults” and Chapter 30 (Sections 357-362) addressing “Assaults on Females: Abduction.” Notably, indecent assault on a man is considered a more serious offense and carries a higher sentence than does indecent assault on a woman. Under Section 353, “[a]ny person who unlawfully and indecently assaults any male person is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for three years.” In contrast, under Section 360, “[a]ny person who unlawfully and indecently assaults a woman or girl is guilty of a misdemeanor, and is liable to imprisonment for two years.” Rape is defined in section 257. It is defined as “unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl, without her consent, or with her consent, if the consent is obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of harm, or by means of false and fraudulent representation as to the nature of the act, or, in the case of a married woman, by personating her husband.” Abortion is criminalized by sections 228-230. Abortion is defined in Section 228 as an attempt to procure a miscarriage. A mother trying to cause her own miscarriage is liable for imprisonment for seven years, while anyone who administers to her a poison or otherwise induces a woman’s miscarriage is liable for imprisonment for 14 years, and anyone who supplies or obtains any item with the knowledge of its intended use to cause an abortion is liable for imprisonment for three years. Sections 228-230. The laws derive culpability from intent and apply regardless of whether the woman is actually pregnant.



Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Sections 15(2) and 42(1) prohibit sex-based discrimination. Section 17 of the Constitution outlines the elimination of demographically derived disparities as a fundamental objective of state policy. Section 17(3)(e), focuses on gender-based disparity and states that the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that “there is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex, or on any other ground whatsoever.” Section 26 of the Constitution, which relates to citizenship, specifically provides for extension of a Nigerian man’s citizenship to his foreign-born wife while making no reference to a similar path to citizenship for the foreign-born husband of a woman who is a Nigerian citizen. Section 26(2) provides that the president may confer Nigerian citizenship on “any woman who is or who has been married to a citizen of Nigeria.” By implication, this section limits the right of a Nigerian woman to transmit her nationality to a foreign husband.



Children's Protection and Welfare Act (2011)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

The Children’s Protection and Welfare Act of 2011 aims to address issues of child custody. Stated goals of the act are to give women the right to raise their children and to protect the right of children to be supported by both of their parents.



National Assembly Election (Amendment) Act (2011)


Gender discrimination

The National Assembly Election (Amendment) Act, 2011 repeals and replaces the National Assembly Elections Act of 1992. Section 47(2)(b) states that political parties shall “arrange the candidates in order of preference from top to bottom, with a female or male candidate immediately followed by a candidate of the opposite sex; and (c) include equal numbers of “women and men.”



Companies Act (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Companies Act of 2011 enshrines in law the right of women to serve as directors of companies. According to the law, women are allowed to establish companies on their own, and the law removes the onus on women of securing spousal consent through Section 5(2), which establishes that “anything contained in the customary or common law” that pre­vents a married person from acting as promoter of a company “without his or her spouse’s con­sent” be disregarded and overridden.



Education Act (2010)


Gender discrimination

The Education Act of 2010 makes primary education free and compulsory for male and female children. Part 2(4)(2)(C) states that “The Minister, Principal Secretary, Teaching Service Commission, proprietors of schools, teachers and school boards shall promote the education of the people of Lesotho” and “ensure that the learner is free from any form of discrimination in accessing education.” While Part 9, Section 41 of the act establishes that at least two of the five members of the proposed Teaching Service Commission must be women.



Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act (2006)


Gender discrimination

The Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act, 2006 (“LCOMP”) removes the minority status of married women and other incidental matters. LCOMP removed the marital power that a husband has over the person and the property of his wife. In addition, LCOMP removes certain restrictions which the marital power places on the legal capacity of a wife, including entering into a contract, suing or being sued, registering immovable property in her name, acting as an executrix of a deceased’s estate, acting as a director of a company, binding herself as surety, and performing any other act that was restricted by any law as a result of the marital power before the commencement of the Act.



Local Government (Amendment) Act (2004)


Gender discrimination

The Local Government (Amendment) Act of 2004 amends the Local Government Act of 1997. It maintains Lesotho’s quota system and mandates that 30% of the total number of seats in municipal, urban, and community councils be reserved for women. It deletes instances of the words “he,” “his,” and “him” throughout the prior act and replaces them with "he or she," "his or her," and "him or her"; reiterates in Section 3 that “not less than one third of the seats in a council shall be reserved for women”; and section 4(3) calls for the creation of a Tender Board, which must have a third of its members be women.



Constitution of Lesotho (1993)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Section 18(1) of the Constitution makes any law with discriminatory provisions or effect presumptively invalid. Discriminatory is defined as “affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly” to their respective descriptions by race, colour, sex, language, and so on. However, Section 18(1) is limited in its scope by the exceptions enumerated in Section 18(4). Section 18(4)(a) exempts any analysis of discrimination for laws pertaining solely to non-citizens of Lesothol; Section 18(4)(b) allows for discriminatory laws related to “adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other like matters which is the personal law of persons of that description”; and Section 18(4)(c) identifies customary law as exempt from evaluation according to Section 18(1). Section 26(1) calls for Lesotho to adopt “policies aimed at promoting a society based on equality and justice for all its citizens regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Section 30 of the Constitution provides for just and favorable conditions of work for women and calls for the creation of particular policies toward the completion of this end, including fair and equal pay, safe working conditions, equal promotion opportunities, and pregnancy and childbirth protections.



Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

Article 21 of the Constitution of Republic of Uganda prohibits gender discrimination generally and enshrines the principle of equality before the law, regardless of sex, race, color, ethnicity, tribe, religion, political belief, or social or economic standing. Article 31 sets the minimum age for marriage at 18 and provides for equal rights between men and women during marriage and divorce. Article 33 pertains specifically to the rights of women and requires that (1) the government must provide opportunities to enhance the welfare of women and enable them to reach their full potential, (2) women have rights equal to men in areas including political, economic, and social activities, and (3) laws, customs, traditions, and cultures that are "against the dignity of women" are prohibited by the Constitution. Article 22 enshrines protection for the right to life and allows for abortion in accordance with the law.



Employment (Amendment) Act of 2010 (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Sections 113-118 of the Employment (Amendment) Act pertain to the rights of women to maternity leave from their employers. The amendment compels employers to pay employees on maternity leave not less than 50% of their salary, establishes the right to maternity allowance unaffected by notice of termination of contract of employment, and prohibits serving notice of termination of contract of employment during maternity leave. It establishes in Section 117 that female employees are entitled to only one maternity allowance per woman. Section 118 mandates that an employer permit a female employee for a half hour twice a day to “suckle her child or otherwise feed him herself” for “six months immediately after her return to work.”



Customary Law Act (1969)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The Customary Law Act aims to reconcile potential conflicts arising between customary Botswana law and Botswana’s common law. The Act pursues this aim by specifying that customary law is to be applied in customary courts only when it “is not incompatible with the provisions of any written law or contrary to morality, humanity or natural justice.” The Act thus makes presumptively invalid customary law that does not comply with common law legislation, leaves such law inapplicable in customary courts, and upholds the supremacy of the common law in Botswana.



The Abolition of Marital Power Act 34 of 2004 (2004)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The full title of the Abolition of Marital Power Act 34 of 2004 is “An Act to provide for the abolition of marital power, to amend the matrimonial property law of marriages, to provide for the domicile of married women, to provide for the domicile and guardianship of minor children and to provide for matters incidental thereto.” The Act provides for equal powers in property ownership for spouses. It also gives women equal powers to assume guardianship of minor children and in determining the domicile of their children. Furthermore, it removes the common law position of the husband as head of the family. Its effect is limited to common law marriage; it has no effect on customary or religious marriages (couples may marry under customary or common law).



Penal Code (Amendment) Act of 1998 (1998)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

In 1998, the Penal Code Act was amended to make the offence of rape gender-neutral and to move away from a phallus-specific definition. The Amendment introduced a minimum sentence of 10 years to a maximum term of life imprisonment and made bail unavailable to persons accused of the offense. The amendment also made mandatory HIV testing for persons convicted of rape, and in the case wherein rape was accompanied by violence or the rapist was unaware of his or her HIV+ status, a minimum sentence of 15 years with corporal punishment was introduced. For cases wherein the convicted person was aware of his or her HIV status, the minimum sentence was set at 20 years imprisonment with corporal punishment. Excerpts of amended language available here.



Constitution of Botswana (2006)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

Section 6 of the Constitution of Botswana adopted in 1966, and amended in 2006, prohibits sexual slavery or trafficking. It includes the following provisions: 1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude. (2) No person shall be required to perform forced labour. Section 7 of the Constitution of Botswana adopted in 1966, and amended in 2006, prohibits sexual violence that constitutes torture. It includes the following provisions: (1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment. (2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question authorizes the infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful in the country immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution. Section 15 of the Constitution of Botswana adopted in 1966, and amended in 2006, prohibits the making of discriminatory laws



Decree with Rank, Value and Force of Law for the Creation of the Ministry of Women (2009)


Gender discrimination

On April 2, 2009, by Presidential decree, the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela created the Ministry of Popular Power for Women. The reasons announced by the President for the creation of such Ministry were (i) to reduce discrimination against women, (ii) to promote the welfare and social security of the women in Venezuela, (iii) to eradicate discrimination against women, and (iv) to equal women and men in all aspects of social life.



Política de Género e Estratégia da sua Implementação (Gender Policy and its Implementation) (2006)


Gender discrimination

Outlines a general plan for the creation of institutional mechanisms that will assist in the implementation of policies targeting gender inequality. Critical areas identified include economic empowerment, education, basic needs, and childbirth mortality.



Lei do Trabalho: Lei nº 27/2007 (Labor Act) (2007)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The law governs rights associated with labor. The law grants women the right to a 60-day paid maternity leave. In contrast, fathers receive a one-day paternity leave on the day immediately following the birth of the child. The law also provides that mothers have the right to up to 30 absences from work per year in order to care for minor children who are either sick or have suffered an accident.



Lei da Família: Lei nº 10/2004 (Family Code) (2004)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Employment discrimination, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The law defines family relationships and establishes certain “rights of the family.” The law prohibits various forms of discrimination against women, including through polygamy, inheritance, age at marriage and choice of children. The law defines marriage as a “voluntary union between a man and a woman”, which requires mutual consent. Coerced marriage is subject to annulment. The law provides that both husband and wife have the right to “represent the family”, to administer the family finances, and to work. The law also outlines provisions for divorce. Husbands are required to pay child support in case of divorce,



Constituição da República de Moçambique (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique) (2007)


Gender discrimination

Article 36 of Mozambique’s Constitution provides that “men and women are equal before the law in all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural life.” Article 120 recognizes and protects the roles of maternity and paternity. It acknowledges the importance of family to the development of children - socially, morally, and ethically - and so ensures an education to the future generation based on the country’s values, namely equality between men and women. Article 122 states a woman’s rights to participate in society. It specifically supports women’s participation in the struggle for national liberation and defense of sovereignty and democracy, as well as promotes women in their growing role in all spheres: political, economic, social, and cultural.

O Artigo 36 da Constituição de Moçambique prevê que “homens e mulheres são iguais perante a lei em todos os aspectos políticos, econômicos, sociais, e culturais." O artigo 120 reconhece e protege os papéis de maternidade e paternidade. Ele reconhece a importância da família para o desenvolvimento da criança – social, moral, e eticamente – e então garante uma educação para a próxima geração baseada nos valores do país, nomeadamente a igualdade entre homens e mulheres. O artigo 122 estabelece os direitos da mulher em participar da sociedade. Ele especificamente apoia a participação feminina no esforço pela liberação nacional e a defesa da soberania e democracia, assim como promove a mulher no seu papel crescente em todas as esferas: política, econômica, social, e cultural.



Mutterschutzgesetz (Maternity Protection Act) (1979)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Pregnant employees are prohibited from working during the eight-week period prior to giving birth and the eight-week period after giving birth. During this period, the mother is entitled to receive maternity pay, which is calculated as the employee’s average earnings during the three calendar months prior to the prohibition of work. After the prohibition period, women may take an additional period of parental leave (Karenz) until the child reaches the age of two. During this period, a mother (or father, if he has taken paternity leave, although both parents may not take leave concurrently) will not receive remuneration through her (or his) employer, although the parent taking leave may receive a child allowance through social insurance during this time. Pregnant employees and parents on parental leave may not be terminated from employment during that time and for a period of four weeks after returning to work. The Act also provides regulations for permissible types of work for pregnant women, women who are breastfeeding, and women who have recently given birth (i.e., prohibition of certain physical work and manual labor, handling of chemicals, work where the woman must sit or stand for long periods with no break, etc.) and regulations regarding the times pregnant and breastfeeding employees may work (i.e., must not work between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m., nor Sundays or public holidays).

Schwangeren Angestellten ist das Arbeiten während eines Acht-Wochen-Zeitraums vor der Kindesgeburt und nach der Kindesgeburt untersagt. Während des Zeitraums hat die Mutter einen Anspruch auf das sog. Wochengeld. Die Höhe dessen richtet sich nach dem Durchschnittsgehalt der Angestellten innerhalb der letzten drei Kalendermonate, bevor der Arbeitsuntersagung. Nach dem Zeitraum, in dem die Mutter nicht arbeiten darf, kann sie optional noch weitere Elternzeit, sog. Karenz, in Anspruch nehmen, bis das Kind ein Alter von zwei Jahren erreicht. In der Karenzzeit können Mutter oder Vater, je nachdem wer die Karenz in Anspruch genommen hat (niemals beide gleichzeitig), keine Vergütung von ihrem Arbeitnehmer verlangen, sie erhalten allerdings einen Kindesunterhalt von der Sozialversicherung. Schwangere Angestellte und Eltern in Elternzeit können während dieser Zeit und bis zu vier Wochen nach ihrer Rückkehr nicht gekündigt werden. Das MuSchG enthält darüber hinaus auch Regeln bezüglich der Arbeit, die schwangeren, stillenden und Frauen, die kürzlich gebärt haben, gestattet ist – insbesondere verboten: körperlich besonders anstrengende Arbeit, der Umgang mit Chemikalien, Arbeit, bei der die Frau ohne Pause lange sitzen oder stehen muss, etc. Außerdem enthält das MuSchG Regeln zur Arbeitszeit, die schwangeren und stillenden Angestellten gestattet ist – nicht zwischen 20 Uhr und 6 Uhr; nicht an Sonntagen und staatlichen Feiertagen.



Lei Federal Nº 13.811 - – Alterações no Código Civil relativa ao casamento precoce (Amendment to provisions regarding early marriage) (2019)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

This law amends Article 1,520 of the Civil Code in order to establish that only persons who have reached the age of marriage determined in article 1,517 of the Civil Code may marry. Article 1,517 of the Civil Code provides that a man and woman who have not reached the age of majority may marry at age 16 if they have received authorization from both of their parents or their legal representatives. (Article 5 of the Civil Code provided that minority ceases at the age of 18, when the person is entitled to practice all acts of civil life.) Before this amendment, Article 1,520 of the Civil Code established that those who had not yet reached the age of marriage according to Article 1,517 would be allowed to marry to avoid the imposition or enforcement of criminal penalties or in the case of pregnancy. This is no longer permitted as a reason to marry younger than the age of 16.

Referida Lei Federal alterou o artigo 1520 do Código Civil para estabelecer que apenas pessoas que atingiram a idade núbil poderiam contrair casamento. Nesse aspecto, o artigo 1517 do Código Civil estabelece que o homem e a mulher com dezesseis anos podem casar-se, exigindo-se autorização de ambos os pais, ou de seus representantes legais, enquanto não atingida a maioridade civil, que é de 18 anos, nos termos do artigo 5º. Antes dessa alteração, o artigo 1520 estabelecia que aqueles que ainda não tinham atingido a idade núbil poderiam se casar, para evitar imposição ou cumprimento de pena criminal ou em caso de gravidez.



Lei Nº 12.705/2012 (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law allowed women to serve in the Brazilian army. Article 7 allows women to enter into the military line of education within five years of the law being passed (therefore it allowed women to commence combat training in 2016).

Referida lei federal permitiu que as mulheres servissem ao exército brasileiro. O artigo 7º da lei dispõe que as mulheres poderiam ingressar na educação militar em até 5 anos após a publicação da lei (o que foi efetivado em 2016).



The Constitution of Grenada (1973)


Gender discrimination

The Constitution of Grenada (1973) is the supreme law. It guards the human rights of all persons within the country, including the right to life and security of the person. Gender-based violence threatens women’s rights to life and security of the person. Specifically, Chapter 1 of the Constitution, entitled “Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,” defines discriminatory treatment and provides for fundamental rights and freedoms for all, regardless of sex, race, place of origin, political beliefs, color, or creed, subject only to the rights and freedoms of others, and the public interest.

La Constitución de Granada (1973) es la ley suprema. Protege los derechos humanos de todas las personas dentro del país, incluyendo el derecho a la vida y la seguridad de la persona. La violencia de género amenaza los derechos de la mujer, a la vida, y la seguridad de la persona. Específicamente, el Capítulo 1 de la Constitución, titulado "Protección de los derechos y libertades fundamentales", define el trato discriminatorio y establece los derechos y libertades fundamentales para todos, independientemente del sexo, raza, lugar de origen, creencias políticas, color o credo, sujeto sólo a los derechos y libertades de los demás y al interés público.



The Women (Employment of) Act (1942)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This Act prohibits the employment of women in night work save in certain circumstances. Night work is recognized in the Act as “work in an industrial undertaking during the night.” The total hours of employment of women for both day and night work shall not exceed 10 hours in a 24 hour period. To ensure compliance with the Act and that no exploitation of women occurs, the Act provides for powers of inspection in industrial undertakings, and where it is found that an industrial undertaking obstructs any inspection or is guilty of an offence under this Act, it will be liable to a fine for summary conviction and in a default of payment thereof, imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. If a proprietor or manager of an industrial undertaking is found to be in contravention of the provisions of the Act, such person will be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.

Esta ley prohíbe el empleo de mujeres en el trabajo nocturno, salvo en determinadas circunstancias. El trabajo nocturno se reconoce en la ley como "trabajo en una empresa industrial durante la noche." El total de horas de empleo de las mujeres, tanto de día como de noche, no excederá de 10 horas en un período de 24 horas. Para asegurar el cumplimiento de la ley y que no se produzca ninguna explotación de mujeres, la ley establece poderes de inspección en las empresas industriales, y cuando se determine que una empresa industrial obstruye cualquier inspección o es culpable de un delito en virtud de esta ley, será sancionable con multa por condena sumaria y en su defecto de pago, pena privativa de la libertad de hasta tres meses. Si un propietario o gerente de una empresa industrial se encuentra en contravención de las disposiciones de la ley, esa persona será condenada a prisión por un período máximo de seis meses.



2011 Amendments to the Constitution of Jamaica (2011)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The 2011 Amendments to the Jamaican Constitution specifically enumerated a “right to freedom from discrimination on the ground of . . . being male or female.” The amendments also guaranteed a number of fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment and torture, and protection of the right to own property, receive an education, vote, and speak freely.



Article 164 of the Swiss Civil Code: Allowance for Personal Use (2019)


Gender discrimination

This article provides that a spouse who looks after the household, cares for the children, or supports the career or business of the other spouse is entitled to receive from the latter a reasonable allowance for his or her own personal use. In determining the allowance, “account must be taken of the personal resources of the receiving spouse and the need to provide conscientiously for the family, career and business.” Unofficial English translation available here.



The Marriage Act of 1961 (2017)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

Section 11 sets the marriage age at 18. Section 12 allows authorization of marriage of persons under 18 but above 16 years of age in exceptional circumstances, after obtaining authorization from a Judge or Magistrate. Furthermore, section 13 provides that a marriage of a minor is not to be solemnized without consent of parents and other administrative steps.



Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Section 5 prohibits sex discrimination. The Act specifies that a person has committed sex discrimination if they treat someone less favorably because of their sex. Section 6 further prohibits discrimination based on marital or relationship status and section 7 prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy or potential pregnancy. Further, section 7AA prohibits breastfeeding discrimination . Moreover, section 7B deals with indirect discrimination and specifies that if an imposition of a condition, requirement, or practice has or is likely to have the disadvantaged effect, it is only allowed if such condition, requirement or practice is reasonable. Finally, pursuant to section 7D a person may take special measures for the purpose of achieving substantive equality. Such measures are not discriminatory.



Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 (2009)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

The Act abolishes the customary rule of primogeniture in as far as it applies to the law of succession and further extends the application of the Intestate Succession Act to the deceased estates of Africans who die intestate (without a will) and provides guidelines for interpreting the Intestate Succession Act in order to give effect to the new provisions and to ensure the protection of the rights of women to inherit.

Die Wet op Hervorming van die Gewoontereg van Opvolging en Regulering van Verwante Aangeleenthede 11 (2009)

Geslags diskriminasie, Skadelike traditionele gebruike, Eiendom en erfenisregte​

Die Wet skaf die gebruiklike rëel van primogeniture af vir sover dit van toepassing is op die erfreg en brei die toepassing van de Wet op Intestate Opvolging verder uit op die afgestorwe boedels van Afrikane wat intestaat sterf (sonder ‘n testament) en bevat riglyne vir die inerpretasie van die Intestate Opvolgingswet om uitvoering te gee aan die nuwe bepalings en om die beskerming van die regte van vroue om te erf te verseker.



Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000)


Employment discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape

The purpose of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act is to give effect to section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, read in conjunction with item 23(1) of its sixth schedule. The effect of this is to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination and harassment; to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination; to prevent and prohibit hate speech; and to provide for matters connected therewith. Section 8 expands on the provisions of Section 9 by setting out, without limitation, the following specific examples of such prohibited discrimination: (a) gender-based violence; (b) female genital mutilation; (c) the system of preventing women from inheriting family property; (d) any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-being of the girl child; (e) any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other resources; (f) discrimination on the ground of pregnancy; (g) limiting women’s access to social services or benefits, such as health education and social security; (h) the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons; and (i) systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual division of labor. The Act further regulates which party will bear the burden of proof in discrimination cases and further sets out which factors should be taken into account in determining whether discrimination is fair or unfair.

Wet op die Bevordering van Gelykheid en die Voorkoming van Onbillike Diskriminasie (2000)

Diskriminasie op werksgeleenthede, verminking van vroulike geslagsorgane of sny van vroulike geslagsdele, geslagsdiskriminasie, geslagsgebaseerde geweld in die algemeen, skadelike tradisionele praktyke, regte op erf en erfenis, seksuele geweld en verkragting​

Die doel van die Wet op die Bevordering van Gelykheid en die Voorkoming van Onbillike Diskriminasie is om uitvoering te gee aan artikel 9 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, in samewerking met artikel 23(1) van die Grondwet se sesde skedule. Die effek hiervan is om onbillike diskriminasie en teistering te voorkom en te verbied; om gelykheid te bevorder en onbillike diskriminasie uit te skakel; om haat-spraak te voorkom en te verbied; en om voorsiening te maak vir aangeleenthede wat daarmee verband hou. Artikel 8 brei die bepalings van Artikel 9 uit, sonder beperking, deur die volgende spesifieke voorbeelde van sodanige verbode diskriminasie uiteen te sit: (a) geslagsbaseerde geweld; (b) geslagtelike verminking van vroulike geslag; (c) die stelsel wat voorkoom dat vrouens familie-eiendom erf; (d) enige praktyk, met inbegrip van tradisionele, gebruiklike of godsdienstige praktyk, wat die waardigheid van vrouens belemmer en die gelykheid tussen vrouens en mans ondermyn, insluitend die ondermyning van die waardigheid en welstand van die meisie-kind; (e) enige beleid of optrede wat vrouens se toegang to grondreg, finansies en ander hulpbronne beperk; (f) diskriminasie op grond van swangerskap; (g) beperking van vrouens se toegang tot maatskaplike dienste of voordele soos gesondheidsopvoeding en sosiale sekuriteit; (h) die weierig van toegang tot geleenthede, insluitende toegang tot dienste of kontraktuele geleenthede vir die lewering van dienste vir oorweging, of versuim om stappe te neem om die behoeftes van sulke persone redelik te voorsien; en (i) sistematies ongelykheid van toegang tot geleenthede van vroue as gevolg van die seksuele verdeling van arbeid. Die Wet reguleer verder watter party die bewyslas in diskriminasiesake sal dra en lê verder uit watter faktore in ag geneem moet word by die bepaling of die diskriminasie billik of onbillik is.



The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)


Gender discrimination

Section 9 of the Constitution provides for the right to equality. Section 9(1) provides that "Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law." Section 9(3) states that "The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth". Section 9(4) provides that "No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination." Finally, subsection (5) provides that "Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair." This includes discrimination on the basis of gender, sex or pregnancy.

Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika (1996)

Geslags diskriminasie​

Artikel 9 van die Grondwet maak voorsiening vir die reg op gelykheid.​ Artikel 9(1) bepaal dat “Almal gelyk is voor die Wet en het die reg op gelyke beskerming en voordeel van die Wet”. Artikel 9(3) bepaal dat “die Staat nie onbillik direk of indirek mag diskrimineer teen iemand op een of meer gronde nie, insluitend ras, geslag, seksuele orientasie, swangerskap, huwelikstatus, etniese of sosiale oorsprong, kleur, ouderdom, gestremdheid, godsdiens, gewete, geloof, kultuur, taal en geboorte nie“. Artikel 9(4) bepaal dat “Geen persoon mag regstreeks of onregstreeks onbillik teen iemand diskrimineer op een of meer gronde ingevolge subartikel (3) nie. Nasionale wetgewing moet verorden word om onbillike diskriminasie te voorkom of te belet” Ten slotte bepaal subartikel (5) dat “ Diskriminasie op grond van een of meer van die gelystes in subartikel (3) onbillik is, tensy daar vasgestel word dat die diskriminasie wel billik is.” Dit sluit in diskriminasie op grond van geslag of swangerskap.



中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法 (Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests) (2005)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests was adopted by the National People’s Congress on April 3, 1999 and amended on August 28, 2005. This Law stipulates that women have equal rights with men “in all aspects of political, economic, cultural, social and family life.” It also establishes the State’s responsibility to prevent domestic violence. Article 1 provides that “this Law is formulated to protect women’s lawful rights and interests, promote equality between men and women and allow full pay to women’s role in socialist modernization.” Article 7 provides that “[t]he All-China Women’s Federation and women’s federations at various levels shall, in accordance with the laws and charter of the All-China Women’s Federation,” uphold women’s rights and protect the rights and interests of women. Article 12 provides that the State shall “actively train and select female cadres” and “pay attention to the training and selection of female cadres of minority nationalities.” Article 23 provides that “[w]ith the exception of the special types of work or post unsuitable to women, no unit may, in employing staff and workers, refuse to employ women because of sex or raise the employment standards for women.” Article 23 also provides that “[t]he labor (employment) contract or service agreement shall not contain restrictions on her matrimony and child-bearing.” Articles 24 and 25 stipulate equal pay and equal opportunity for promotion for men and women. Article 26 provides that all units shall “protect women’s safety and health during their work or physical labor, and shall not assign them any work or physical labor not suitable to women,” and that “[w]omen shall be under special protection during menstrual period, pregnancy, obstetrical period and nursing period.” Article 27 provides that “[n]o entity may, for the reason of matrimony, pregnancy, maternity leave or breast-feeding, decrease a female employee’s wage, dismiss her or unilaterally terminate the labor (employment) contract or service agreement.” Article 45 prohibits husbands from applying for a divorce “within one year after childbearing or within 6 months after termination of pregnancy” of a woman. Article 46 prohibits domestic violence. Article 51 provides that “[w]omen have the right to child-bearing in accordance with relevant regulations of the state as well as the freedom not to bear any child.”

堕胎与生育权、家庭暴力、性别歧视、财产与继承权

1992年4月3日,全国人民代表大会通过了中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法并于2005年8月28日对此法进行了修正。本法规定妇女在政治的、经济的、文化的、社会的和家庭的生活等各方面享有同男子平等的权利。本法规定了国家预防和制止家庭暴力的责任。第一条阐述了“为了保障妇女的合法权益,促进男女平等, 充分发挥妇女在社会主义现代化建设中的作用,根据宪法和我国的实际情况,制定本法。”第七条规定,中华全国妇女联合会和地方各级妇女联合会依照法律和中华全国妇女联合会章程,代表和维护各族各界妇女的利益,应做好维护妇女权益的工作。第十二条规定, 国家积极培养和选拔女干部,并有适当数量的妇女担任领导成员, 国家重视培养和选拔少数民族女干部。第二十三条规定,各单位在录用职工时,除不适合妇女的工种或者岗位外,不得以性别为由拒绝录用妇女或者提高 对妇女的录用标准。第十三条还规定,劳动(聘用)合同或者服务协议中不得规定限制女职工结婚、生育的内容。第二十三和二十四条规定了男女同工同酬和晋升、晋级等方面男女平等。第二十六条规定,任何单位均应根据妇女的特点,依法保护妇女在工作和劳动时的安全和健康,不得安排不适合妇女从事的工作和劳动,妇女在经期、孕期、产期、哺乳期受特殊保护。第二十七条规定任何单位不得因结婚、怀孕、产假、哺 乳等情形,降低女职工的工资,辞退女职工,单方解除劳动(聘用)合同或者服务协议。第四十五条规定女方在怀孕期间、分娩后一年内或者终止妊娠后六个月内,男方不得提出离婚。第四十六条禁止家庭暴力。第五十一条规定 妇女有按照国家有关规定生育子女的权利,也有不生育的自由。



中华人民共和国婚姻法 (Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China) (2001)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted by the National People’s Congress on September 10, 1980 and amended on April 28, 2001. Article 2 provides that the marriage system is “based on the free choice of partners, on monogamy and on equality between man and woman.” Article 3 prohibits interference by a third party, mercenary marriage and exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage. Article 6 provides the minimal marriage age is twenty-two for men and twenty for women. Article 13 provides that husband and wife shall have equal status in the family. Article 34 provides that “a husband may not apply for a divorce when his wife is pregnant, or within one year after the birth of the child, or within six months after the termination of her gestation.” Article 43 provides that neighborhood committee, villagers committee or the unit[1] to which the family belongs have an obligation to deter domestic violence. English version available here.

离婚、家庭暴力、包办婚姻与早婚、性别歧视

本法于1980年9月10日第五届全国人民代表大会通过,于2001年4月28日修正。第二条规定中国实行婚姻自由、一夫一妻、男女平等的婚姻制度。第六条禁止包办、买卖婚姻和其他干涉婚姻自由的行为,禁止借婚姻索取财物。第六条规定结婚年龄,男不得早于二十二周岁,女不得早于二十周岁。第十三条规定夫妻在家庭中地位平等。第三十四条规定女方在怀孕期间、分娩后一年内或中止妊娠后六个月内,男方不得提出离婚。第四十三条规定居民委员会、村民委员会以及所在单位应当予以劝阻、调解家庭暴力。

[1] “Unit” is a term of art with strong communist connotations, which refers to the company/organization/group to which a person belongs.



中华人民共和国宪法(第四十八-四十九条)(The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Articles 48-49)) (2004)


Employment discrimination, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted by the National People’s Congress and promulgated for implementation on December 4, 1982. It has been amended several times, with the most recent amendment occurring on March 14, 2004. Article 48 provides that women and men have equal rights. It states that “[w]omen in the People’s Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, in political, economic, cultural, social and family life. The State protects the rights and interests of women, applies the principle of equal pay for equal work to men and women alike and trains and selects cadres from among women.” Article 49, moreover, provides that “violation of the freedom of marriage is prohibited. Maltreatment of old people, women and children is prohibited.” English version available here.

就业、包办婚姻与早婚、性别歧视、财产与继承权

第五届全国人民代表大会于1982年12月4日通过中华人民共和国宪法。宪法经过几次修正,其中最近一次修正发生于2004年3月14日。第四十八条规定妇女享有同男子平等的权利。第十四条规定“中华人民共和国妇女在政治的、经济的、文化的、社会的和家庭的生 活等各方面享有同男子平等的权利。国家保护妇女的权利和利益,实行男女同工同酬,培养和选拔妇女干部。” 第四十九条规定禁止破坏婚姻自由,禁止虐待老人、妇女和儿童。



Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 20) (2013)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

Zimbabwe’s new 2013 Constitution addressed women’s rights and gender equality, and its bill of rights addressed damaging cultural and discriminatory practices. A gender commission was also established to accelerate the implementation of provisions related to women. More specifically, the Constitution recognized gender equality and women’s rights among Zimbabwe’s founding values and principles. It mandated that the State and all its institutions consider gender equality in laws and policy, to implement measures that provide care and assistance to mothers, and to grant women opportunities to work. The State must also prevent domestic violence, ensure marriages are consensual, and that there are equal rights in marriages. In the event of dissolution of marriage, the State must provide for the rights of spouses and children. The state is also obliged to afford girls and boys equal educational opportunities. The bill of rights specifically stipulates that women are equal to men, including deserving equal opportunities in political, economic, and social activities. Provision was also made for legislative seats reserved for women in the National Assembly. Finally, gender equality must be considered in making judicial appointments.



Labor and Labor Relations: Wage Discrimination Based on Sex (General Laws of Rhode Island)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

To prevent wage discrimination, Rhode Island’s equal pay law provides that no employer shall discriminate between the sexes in the payment of wages. However, merit-based variations in pay including, but not limited to, those based on skill, experience, and number of hours worked are not prohibited. Any attempt to contract around the equal pay law will be void.



Code of Virginia: Property Rights of Married Women (Va. Code § 55-35)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

This Virginia law provides that a married woman shall have the right to acquire, hold, use, control and dispose of property as if she were unmarried.



Code of Virginia: Equal Pay Irrespective of Sex (Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-28.6)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This Virginia law prohibits employers from discriminating between employees on the basis of sex by paying less wages to employees of a certain sex than employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any other factor other than sex.



Virginia Human Rights Act (Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.2-3900-03) (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Virginia’s Human Rights Act outlines the policy of the Commonwealth to “[s]afeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status, or disability, in places of public accommodation,” including in education, real estate, and employment. The Act defines the “unlawful discriminatory practice” and “gender discrimination” as conduct that violates any Virginia or federal statute or regulation governing discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status, or disability. The terms “because of sex or gender” or “on the basis of sex or gender” or similar terms in reference to discrimination in the Code and acts of the General Assembly include pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all purposes as persons not so affected but similar in their abilities or disabilities.



Offenses Pertaining to Schools (Title 16, Chapter 38, General Laws of Rhode Island)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Discrimination on the basis of sex is prohibited in all public colleges, community colleges, universities, and all other public institutions of higher learning in the state that are operated by the board of governors for higher education. This prohibition applies to employment, recruitment, and hiring practices, employment benefits, admissions, curricular programs, extracurricular activities including athletics, counseling, financial aid including athletic grants-in-aid, student medical, hospital, and accident or life insurance benefits, facilities, housing, rules and regulations, research, and all other school functions and activities. Notwithstanding these prohibitions, schools may do the following: (i) maintain separate but comparable restrooms, dressing, and shower facilities for males and females, including reasonable use of staff of the same sex as the users of these facilities; (ii) provide separate teams for contact sports or for sports where selection for teams is based on competitive skills, provided that equal athletic opportunities which effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of both sexes are made available; (iii) maintain separate housing for men and women, provided that housing for students of both sexes is as a whole both proportionate in quantity to the number of students of that sex that apply for housing and comparable in quality and cost to the student; and (iv) permit the establishment and operation of university based social fraternities and sororities.



Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act (Title 34, Chapter 37, General Laws of Rhode Island)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Property and inheritance rights

The Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act prohibits housing practices that discriminate based on gender identity or expression, which is defined to include a person’s actual or perceived gender, as well as a person’s gender identity, gender-related self-image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression; whether or not that gender identity, gender-related self-image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression is different from that traditionally associated with the person's sex at birth.



Local Authorities Act (1992)


Gender discrimination

The Local Authorities Act establishes local authority councils within local government and defines their powers, duties and functions. The Act provides that the slate of candidates from any given political party up for election in a municipal, village or town council election must contain at least three female persons where the council consists of 10 or fewer members and at least five female persons where a council consists of 11 or more members, in an attempt to increase the presence of women in decision making positions.



Social Security Act (1994)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Social Security Act provides maternity benefits to women through a compulsory combined scheme for sickness, maternity and death benefits through matching employer and employee contributions. The Act establishes the National Medical Benefit Fund to administer the payments for such benefits and the National Pension Fund for pension benefits for those who have retired. The Act also makes a provision for the funding of training programs for disadvantaged and unemployed persons through a Development Fund.



Communal Land Reform Act (2002)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

The Communal Land Reform Act 2002 aims to regulate the allocation of customary land rights in communal lands and to establish Communal Land Boards. Communal land that previously belonged to indigenous communities is now vested in the state, which then distributes and allocates the land among the rural communities. This Act takes precedence over customary law and is much more favorable to women’s rights. Under the Act, four women must be appointed to the Communal Land Boards. Furthermore, the Act provides that a customary land right that was allocated to a particular holder of such right shall upon the death of such holder be re-allocated to the surviving spouse. This provides protection to a surviving wife who may now remain on the communal land where previously she would lose the rights to such land upon the death of her husband.



Affirmative Action (Employment) Act (1998)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The aim of this Act is to achieve equal employment opportunities through affirmative action plans to redress the conditions of designated persons in the Act who have been previously disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws and practices with the aim of eliminating discrimination in the workplace. The Act also establishes an Employment Equity Commission. Women are specifically mentioned as a designated group. An affirmative action plan achieves its purpose by obliging employers to make equitable efforts to accommodate and further the employment opportunities of those in designated groups. Employers must also fill positions of employment by giving priority and preferential treatment to those in designated groups. Where employers do not adhere to the Act, they may be referred to the Commission or to mediation, and may be placed under review. Furthermore, any person who discriminates against a person who has participated in the proceedings provided for in the Act, or obstructs or prevents compliance with the Act by any party, or fails to comply with certain provisions of the Act can be held criminally liable and on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding N$16,000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 4 years or both.



Co-Operatives Act (1996)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This Act states that where a co-operative has more than five female members, or if more than one-third of its members are women (whichever is the lesser) and no woman has been elected as a member of its board, the board must appoint a woman as a board member within its first meeting to increase the representation of women in management positions. A similar provision is provided for sub-committees of boards.



Labour Act (2007)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The Labour Act (the “Act”) establishes protections for employees and regulates the employer/employee relationship. In particular, this Act prohibits any form of child labor, forced labor, or discrimination and/or sexual harassment in the workplace. The Act also provides for basic conditions of employment to which an employer must adhere, including maternity leave for female employees. An employer may not provide disadvantageous terms in an employment contract or promote unfair labor practices. Violations of this Act expose employers to various penalties. Employees may refer disputes to the Labour Commissioner or the Labour Court to obtain relief.



Maintenance Act (2003)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

The Maintenance Act (the “Act”) imposes equal rights and burdens in relation to the payment of child support (and enforcement of child support orders) on both parents and abolishes customary laws to the contrary. The Act also states that husbands and wives are equally responsible for each other’s maintenance.



Children's Status Act (2006)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Among other things, the Children’s Status Act gives children born out of wedlock the same legal privileges as children born to married couples (e.g., inheritance rights, custody, guardianship, etc.) and provides various legal mechanisms (e.g., court orders) to protect these rights.



Married Persons Equality Act (1996)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

The Married Persons Equality Act (the “Act”) abolishes the marital power of the husband over his wife and her property and amends community property laws. It further provides women with the power to register immovable property in their own name, gives them legal capacity to litigate and contract, and allows them to act as directors of companies. The Act also establishes that the minimum age for marriage is 18, thereby prohibiting child marriages.



The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (1990)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Employment discrimination, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

The Constitution serves as the fundamental law of Namibia and establishes the Republic of Namibia as an independent, secular, democratic, and unitary state safeguarding the rights to justice, liberty, dignity, and equality. Chapter 3 of the Constitution protects fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to equality and freedom from discrimination, including on the grounds of sex. It also bans child marriages and mandates equal rights for men and women entering into marriage, during the marriage, and at the dissolution of the marriage. Additionally, Parliament may not make any laws that contravene the Constitution, nor can the Executive take any action that abolishes or contravenes Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Any such laws or actions would be invalid.



Decreto Legislativo 26 marzo 2001, n. 151 (Legislative Decree No. 151/2001) (2001)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This legislative decree protects maternity and paternity, and prohibits discrimination on the basis of either. It regulates parental leave, leave for the illness of a child, rest, and the treatment of pregnant workers to protect their health. (Note: PDF is the consolidated text only. Follow the external link for the entire text of the decree.)

Il presente decreto legislativo tutela la maternità e la paternità e proibisce le discriminazioni basate su di esse. Il decreto disciplina i congedi parentali, i congedi per la malattia dei figli, i riposi e la tutela delle lavoratrici incinta. (Nota: il PDF è il solo testo consolidato. Seguire il link esterno per l’intero testo del decreto).



Codice Civil (2019)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Italian Civil Code provides for succession and inheritance, each of which require equal treatment of male and female children, including adopted children (Book II, Title I art. 56). In cases in which the conduct of a spouse or co-habitant causes serious physical or mental harm to the other spouse or co-habitant, but the conduct does not constitute a criminal act, the court may issue a family order of protection. A judge may order the party concerned to stay away from the home, the spouse's place of work, the residences of extended family members, and the children's school (Book I, Title IX, art. 342). The judge can also order the intervention of social services or a family mediation center.

Il codice civile italiano disciplina le successioni e l’eredità e dispone il pari trattamento per i figli e le figlie, anche qualora siano adottivi (Libro II, Titolo I, art. 536). Nel caso in cui la condotta di un coniuge o convivente causi seri danni fisici o morali all’altro coniuge o convivente, ma la condotta non sia penalmente rilevante, il giudice può emettere un ordine di protezione familiare. Il giudice può ordinare al coniuge o convivente che ha tenuto la condotta abusiva di non avvicinarsi alla casa, al posto di lavoro del coniuge, al domicilio deii membri della famiglia, e alla scuola dei figli (Libro I, Titolo IX, art. 342 ter). Il giudice può anche disporre l’intervento dei servizi sociali o di un centro di mediazione familiare.



Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana (Constitution of the Republic of Italy) (1947)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Italian Constitution provides for equality before the law without consideration of sex, race, religion, political affiliation, language, and personal and social conditions (art. 3). It also recognizes the moral and legal equality of spouses (art. 29). Finally, Iit mandates equal employment opportunity for men and women (art. 37). Finally, the Constitution provides that both men and women can access public offices and elected offices, without discrimination. In this regard, the Italian Republic shall promote equal opportunities between men and women through appropriate measures (art. 51).(English translation available through RefWorld.)

La Costituzione italiana prevede che tutti i cittadini siano eguali di fronte alla legge senza distinzione di sesso, razza, religione, opinione politica e condizioni personali e sociali (art. 3). Essa riconosce anche l’eguaglianza morale e legale fra i coniugi (art. 29). La Costituzione impone pari opportunità lavorative per uomini e donne (art. 37). Infine, la Costituzione prevede che gli uomini che le donne possano accedere alle cariche pubbliche ed elettive senza discriminazioni. A tal scopo, la Repubblica italiana promuove, con appositi provvedimenti, eguali opportunità fra uomini e donne (art. 51).



Código Civil (Civil Code) (2010)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Section 1577 of the Portuguese Civil Code provides for the right of marriage, regardless of gender, to anyone over the age of 16, provided that whoever wishes to marry before the age of 18 must also present an authorization of their parents or legal guardians. The Civil Code also provides that marriage requires free will of both parties, and therefore any marriage that is performed without the consent of both spouses is void.

A seção 1577 do Código Civil Português prevê o direito ao casamento, independente de gênero, para qualquer pessoa acima de 16 anos, prevendo que qualquer pessoa que desejar se casar antes dos 18 anos deve apresentar uma autorização dos pais ou responsáveis legais. O Código Civil também prevê que o casamento requer a livre vontade das duas partes, e então qualquer casamento que acontecer sem a vontade de ambos os cônjuges é nulo.



Código do Trabalho (Lei n.º 7/2009) (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Section 29 of the Portuguese Labor Law ensures equal opportunity in labor and and prevents gender discrimination. The Code also guarantees maternity and paternity leave, bans harassment, establishes universal preschool for children until the age of five, and requires children to attend school.

A seção 29 do Código do Trabalho Português garante oportunidades iguais de trabalho e impede a discriminação de gênero. O Código também garante as licenças de maternidade e paternidade, proíbe o assédio, estabelece pré-escola universal para crianças até os cinco anos, e requer que as crianças frequentem a escola.



Código penal (Penal Code) (1999)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

Chapter VI of Title 8 (Crimes against Life and Physical Integrity) delineates the circumstances under which abortion is illegal and establishes the penalties performing illegal abortions. Pursuant to Article 267 of the Criminal Code, anyone who, without complying with public health regulations established in respect of abortions, performs an abortion or in any way destroy the embryo, with the consent of the pregnant woman, is subject to a penalty of imprisonment for three months up to one year or a fine of 100 to 300 cuotas. If an abortion is performed (1) for profit, (2) outside of official institutions or (3) by a person that is a physician, such person is subject to an increased punishment of imprisonment for two to five years. Pursuant to Article 268, an individual who purposefully destroys the embryo (a) without using any force or violence on the pregnant woman, but without her consent, is subject to two to five years’ imprisonment or (b) with the use of any force or violence on the pregnant woman, is subject to three to eight years’ imprisonment. If concurrently with the occurrence of (a) or (b), any of the circumstances described in (1), (2) or (3) also exist, the punishment is increased to imprisonment for four to ten years. If a pregnant woman dies as a result of any of the above actions, the offending person is subject to imprisonment for a period of five to twelve years. Articles 270 and 271, respectively, prescribe the punishments for those who, without intending to do so, cause an abortion and for those who prescribe any abortion-inducing substance to destroy the embryo.

Chapter I of Title XI covers crimes against the normal development of sexual relations. Article 298 prescribes a penalty of four to ten years imprisonment for anyone who rapes a woman (either through vaginal intercourse or contra naturam) if during the criminal event any of the following circumstances occurs: (a) use of force or sufficient intimidation in order to achieve the goal or (b) if the victim is in a mentally disturbed state or suffers from temporary insanity, or the victim is deprived of reason or sense for any reason, or unable to resist, or lacks the ability to understand the consequences of her actions or to conform her conduct. Article 298 prescribes a term of imprisonment of 7 to 15 years if (a) the event is carried out with the participation of two or more persons, (b) if the perpetrator dresses up in military uniform or purports to be a public official, in each case, to facilitate consummating the act or (c) if the victim is over 12 and under 14 years of age. Finally, the Article prescribes a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years or the death penalty if (a) the event is carried out by a person who has previously been sanctioned for the same crime, (b) as a result of the act, the victim suffers serious injuries or illness, or (c) if the perpetrator knows that he is infected with a sexually transmitted disease. Anyone who rapes a minor who is under 12 years of age will be punished with either a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years or the death penalty, even if none of the circumstances described in the preceding sentence occur. Article 299 of the Criminal Code sanctions individuals guilty of “active” pedophilia. Any person who commits an act of “active” pedophilia using violence or intimidation, or by taking advantage of the fact that the victim is deprived of reason or sense or unable to resist, will be punished with imprisonment for seven to 15 years. Such penalty increases to 15 to 30 years or death if (a) the victim is a minor under 14 years of age, even if the circumstances set forth in the immediately preceding sentence are not present, (b) if, as a consequence of the criminal act, the victim suffers serious injuries or illness or (c) if the perpetrator has been previously sanctioned for the same crime.

Article 295 imposes a punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years or a fine of 200 to 500 cuotas, or both, to anyone who discriminates, or promotes or incites, discrimination, against another person, with manifestations in an offensive manner, on account of sex, race, color or national origin, or with actions to obstruct or impede, with motives relating to sex, race, color or national original, the exercise or enjoyment of rights of equality set forth in the Constitution. Any person who spreads ideas based on the superiority of races or racial hatred or commits, or incites, acts of violence against any race or group of people of another color or ethnic origin, shall be subject to the same punishment as indicated above.

El Capítulo VI del Título 8 (Delitos contra la vida y la integridad física) describe las circunstancias bajo las cuales el aborto es ilegal y establece las sanciones por realizar abortos ilegales. En conformidad con el artículo 267 del Código Penal, cualquier persona que, sin cumplir con las normas de salud pública establecidas con respecto a los abortos, realice un aborto o destruya de cualquier modo el embrión, con el consentimiento de la mujer embarazada, está sujeta a una pena de prisión. Por tres meses hasta un año o una multa de 100 a 300 cuotas. Si se realiza un aborto (1) con fines de lucro, (2) fuera de las instituciones oficiales o (3) por una persona que es un médico, dicha persona está sujeta a un aumento de la pena de prisión de dos a cinco años. En conformidad con el Artículo 268, una persona que destruye a propósito el embrión (a) sin usar ninguna fuerza o violencia contra la mujer embarazada, pero sin su consentimiento, está sujeta de dos a cinco años de prisión o (b) con el uso de cualquier fuerza o violencia en la mujer embarazada, está sujeto de tres a ocho años de prisión. Si concurrentemente con la ocurrencia de (a) o (b), cualquiera de las circunstancias descritas en (1), (2) o (3) también existen, el castigo se incrementa a la prisión de cuatro a diez años. Si una mujer embarazada muere como resultado de cualquiera de las acciones anteriores, la persona ofensora está sujeta a prisión por un período de cinco a doce años. Los artículos 270 y 271, respectivamente, prescriben los castigos para aquellos que, sin la intención de hacerlo, causan un aborto y para aquellos que prescriben cualquier sustancia inductora del aborto para destruir el embrión.

El Capítulo I del Título XI cubre los delitos contra el desarrollo normal de las relaciones sexuales. El artículo 298 prescribe una pena de cuatro a diez años de prisión para toda persona que viole a una mujer (ya sea por coito vaginal o contra naturam) si durante el evento criminal ocurre alguna de las siguientes circunstancias: (a) uso de la fuerza o suficiente intimidación para: lograr la meta o (b) si la víctima está en un estado mentalmente perturbado o sufre de locura temporal, o si la víctima está privada de razón o sentido por cualquier razón, o no puede resistirse, o carece de la capacidad de entender las consecuencias de las acciones o para conformar su conducta. El artículo 298 prescribe un período de prisión de 7 a 15 años si (a) el evento se lleva a cabo con la participación de dos o más personas, (b) si el perpetrador se viste de uniforme militar o pretende ser un funcionario público, en en cada caso, para facilitar la consumación del acto o (c) si la víctima es mayor de 12 años y menor de 14 años. Finalmente, el artículo prescribe un período de prisión de 15 a 30 años o la pena de muerte si (a) el evento es llevado a cabo por una persona que ha sido sancionada previamente por el mismo delito, (b) como resultado del acto, la víctima sufre lesiones o enfermedades graves, o (c) si el autor sabe que está infectado con una enfermedad de transmisión sexual. Cualquier persona que viole a un menor de edad menor de 12 años será castigada con una pena de prisión de 15 a 30 años o con la pena de muerte, incluso si no ocurre ninguna de las circunstancias descritas en la oración anterior. El artículo 299 del Código Penal sanciona a las personas culpables de pedofilia "activa". Cualquier persona que cometa un acto de pedofilia "activa" mediante el uso de la violencia o la intimidación, o aprovechando el hecho de que la víctima está privada de razón o sentido o no puede resistir, será castigada con pena de prisión de siete a 15 años. Dicha penalización aumenta a 15 a 30 años o fallece si (a) la víctima es menor de 14 años, incluso si las circunstancias establecidas en la oración inmediatamente anterior no están presentes, (b) si, como consecuencia de la acto criminal, la víctima sufre lesiones graves o enfermedad o (c) si el autor ha sido previamente sancionado por el mismo delito.

El artículo 295 impone una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años o una multa de 200 a 500 cuotas, o ambas, a cualquier persona que discrimine, promueva o incite a la discriminación de otra persona, con manifestaciones de manera ofensiva. , debido al sexo, raza, color u origen nacional, o con acciones para obstruir o impedir, con motivos relacionados con el sexo, raza, color u origen nacional, el ejercicio o disfrute de los derechos de igualdad establecidos en la Constitución. Cualquier persona que difunda ideas basadas en la superioridad de las razas o el odio racial o cometa, o incite, actos de violencia contra cualquier raza o grupo de personas de otro color u origen étnico, estará sujeta al mismo castigo que se indicó anteriormente.



Código de Trabajo (Labor Code - Law No. 116 of December 20, 2013) (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Chapter 1 of Cuba’s Labor Code sets forth the basic principles of the Labor Code, with specific reference to providing women with positions that are compatible with their physical and physiological characteristics and allowing women to incorporate themselves in the workforce, and entitlements to maternity leave for women, before and after childbirth, including medical services, free of cost, required by maternity. Additionally, Chapter 8 of the Labor Code is devoted to promoting policies conducive to women’s labor, including requirements that (1) the workplace create and maintain labor and sanitary conditions that are adequate for the participation of women in the labor process (Section 2); (2) labor conditions are consistent with the physical and physiological characteristics of women, taking into account, inter alia, women’s elevated functions as mothers (Section 4); and (3) single mothers be provided with stipends to help them care for their children until they return to work (Section 4).

El Capítulo 1 del Código de Trabajo de Cuba establece los principios básicos del Código de Trabajo y hace referencia específica los temas: brindar a las mujeres puestos que sean compatibles con sus características físicas y fisiológicas, permitir que las mujeres se incorporen a la fuerza laboral, y el derecho a la licencia de maternidad para las mujeres antes y después del parto, incluidos los servicios médicos, gratuitos, exigidos por la maternidad. Además, el Capítulo 8 del Código Laboral está dedicado a promover políticas que favorezcan el trabajo de la mujer, incluyendo requisitos que (1) el lugar de trabajo cree y mantenga condiciones laborales y sanitarias adecuadas para la participación de la mujer en el proceso laboral (Artículo 2); (2) las condiciones laborales sean compatibles con las características físicas y fisiológicas de la mujer, teniendo en cuenta, entre otras cosas, las funciones elevadas de la mujer como madre (Sección 4); y (3) las madres solteras recibirán estipendios para ayudarlas a cuidar a sus hijos hasta que regresen al trabajo (Sección 4).



Republic of Cuba Constitution of 1976 (amended 2002; English) (1976)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 44 of Cuba’s Constitution states that women and men enjoy equal economic, political, cultural, social and familial rights and that Cuba (the “State”) “guarantees that women will be offered the same opportunities and possibilities as men to achieve their full participation in the development of the country.” Article 44 further states that the State grants working women paid maternity leave before and after childbirth, and temporary work options compatible with their maternal function.

El Artículo 44 de la Constitución cubana establece que las mujeres y los hombres gozan de iguales derechos económicos, políticos, culturales, sociales y familiares y que Cuba (el “Estado”) “garantiza que las mujeres tendrán las mismas oportunidades y posibilidades que los hombres para lograr su plena participación en el desarrollo del país.” El Artículo 44 establece además que el Estado otorga a las trabajadoras licencia de maternidad remunerada antes y después del parto y opciones de trabajo temporal compatibles con su función materna.



Law No. 13 of 2003 Concerning Manpower (2003)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The prevailing Indonesian labor laws reflect anti-discrimination principles. Each employee shall have equal opportunity without discrimination to obtain work and shall be entitled to equal treatment from the employer without discrimination (Articles 5 and 6 of the Labor Law). The Labor Law stipulates that termination of an employment relationship shall not be permitted if it is based on the ideology, religion, political inclination, ethnic group, race, social group, gender, physical condition or marital status of the employee (Article 153 (i) of the Labor Law).



Penal Code of Indonesia (1999)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

Article 260 punishes spouses who conceal from their spouse a legal barrier to marriage with a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Article 284 punishes adulterous spouses and their partners, regardless of their marital status. The penal code only criminalizes acts of rape outside marriage unless the wife is underage and incurs injuries as a result. Articles 285 prohibits forcing or threatening force a woman to have sexual intercourse outside of marriage and punishes violators with a maximum penalty of 12 years. Article 286 punishes sexual intercourse with an unconscious or helpless woman with a maximum of nine years imprisonment. If there is a complaint, Article 287 imposes a maximum sentence of nine years imprisonment for “carnal knowledge” of a girl outside of marriage when the man knows or reasonably should presume that she is less than 15 years of age. Prosecutions are triggered automatically when the girl is less than 12 years of age. Article 288 punishes husbands that have “carnal knowledge” of their wives who “are not yet marriageable” if it results in injury (four years imprisonment), serious injury (eight years), or death (12 years). Article 292 punishes adults that have carnal knowledge of those they know to be or reasonably should know to be minors of the same sex with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Article 293 punishes sexual abuse of a minor with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Incest is punishable by a maximum of seven years imprisonment pursuant to Article 294. Article 297 prohibits trafficking in woman and boys, which carries a maximum sentence of six years imprisonment. Article 299 imposes a four-year maximum sentence for abortion and provides for a one-third increase in sentencing for professionals (e.g., doctor, midwife) who perform abortions.



Law No. 7 of 1984 on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1984)


Gender discrimination, International law

This law ratifies the UN treaty on the convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted by the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1979 (resolution 34/180)) to help prevent any gender-based discrimination against women and ensuring that women will have equal rights and opportunities in all fields of life.



Law No. 1 of 1974 Marriage Law (1974)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

This law sets the legal age of marriage without parental consent at 21 years of age. With parental consent, girls may marry at age 16 and men may marry at age 19. Marriages under the legal age are void and there are penalties for knowingly entering into or authorizing child or early marriage. The law also sets the requirements for polygamy, which include the first wife’s inability to fulfill her spousal duties (e.g., bearing children), the permission of the man’s current wife or wives, permission from the local Court, and proof that the man will treat all of his wives and children fairly and provide for them equally. Women are prohibited from marrying a second husband. The law also provides the conditions for the cancellation (annulments and divorce) of a marriage, the obligations of husbands and wives, property rights of spouses, the obligations of parents to their children, the legitimacy of children, the requirements of guardianship, foreign marriages, and the children of mixed-religion marriages.



Law No. 68 of 1958 (1970)


Gender discrimination, International law

This law ratifies the UN treaty on the convention on Political Rights of Women (Convention on the Political Rights of Women open for signature on 31 March 1953) recognizing that everyone has a right to take part in the government of their country and recognizing women’s right to vote and participate in the political process of the country. This law gives the same rights to Indonesian women as is provided under the convention and protects those rights under Indonesian Law.



Law on Employment and Work of Foreigners (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Article 4(6) of the Law on Employment and Work of Foreigners provides that when employing a foreigner, the employer must not put the job seeker in less favourable position due to race, color of skin, gender, age, health condition, that is, disability, religious, political or other convictions, trade union membership, national or social background, family status, property status, sexual orientation, or due to other personal circumstances. (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)



Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (2012)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (the “LEOWM”) is specialized legislation that prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex and gender. Articles 3(3), 4, 5 and 7 expressly mention that prohibition of sex discrimination is an essential part of the law. The LEOWM further provides that “gender-based sexual harassment is any type of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical behaviour of sexual nature, aimed at or resulting in violation of the dignity of a person, especially when an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive atmosphere is created.” (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)



Law on Prevention of and Protection from Discrimination (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia nos. 50/2010, 44/2014, 150/2015, 31/2016 and 21/2018) (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The Law on Prevention of and Protection from Discrimination (the “LPPD”), which entered into force in 2011, introduced the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination (Article 6), instruction to discriminate (Article 9) and harassment and sexual harassment (Article 7). The LPPD covers almost all grounds of discrimination as covered by EU law i.e. “ sex, race, colour, gender, belonging to a marginalized group, ethnic origin, language, nationality, social background, religion or religious beliefs, other types of beliefs, education, political affiliation, personal or social status, mental and physical impediment, age, family or marital status, property status, health condition or any other basis anticipated by a law or ratified international agreement." However, the LPPD does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation. Article 9 of the LPPD also covers sexual harassment, which states that “sexual harassment shall be unwanted behavior of sexual nature, manifested physically, verbally or in any other manner, aimed at or resulting in violation of the dignity of a person, especially when creating a hostile, intimidating, degrading or humiliating environment." Article 4 of the LPPD covers a wide scope on the prohibition on harrassments, which includes: (a) labour and labour relations; (b) education, science and sport; (c) social security, including the area of social protection, pension and disability insurance, health insurance and health protection; (d) judiciary and administration; (e) housing; (f) public information and media; (g) access to goods and services; (h) membership and activity in unions, political parties, citizens’ associations and foundations or other membership-based organizations; (i) culture, and (j) other areas determined by law. (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)



Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia of 1991 (1991)


Gender discrimination

Article 9 of the Constitution provides that all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are equal in their freedoms and rights, regardless of “sex, race, colour of skin, national and social origin, political and religious belief, property and social status”. Article 110 of the Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination among citizens on the ground of sex, race, religion or nation, social or political affiliation. (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)



Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945)


Gender discrimination

The Indonesia Constitution does not discuss gender or women specifically, but instead guarantees rights to “him/her.” The 1945 Constitution is the basis for the government of Indonesia and it carries the highest legal authority. Article 27 of the 1945 Constitution states that: “(i) all citizens shall have equal status accorded by law and the government, and are obliged to respect the law and government without exception; and (ii) each citizen shall be entitled to work and to have a reasonable standard of living.” Article 28I of the Constitution adopted in 1945, and amended in 2002, includes the following provisions: “The rights to life, freedom from torture, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of religion, freedom from enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and the right not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect are all human rights that cannot be limited under any circumstances.” Article 28B of the Constitution adopted in 1945, and amended in 2002, includes the following provisions: “Every child shall have the right to live, to grow and to develop, and shall have the right to protection from violence and discrimination.” Article 28G of the Constitution adopted in 1945, and amended in 2002, includes the following provisions: “Every person shall have the right to be free from torture or inhumane and degrading treatment, and shall have the right to obtain political asylum from another country.” (External link includes unofficial English translation.)



Constitution of Belize (2011)


Gender discrimination

Section 3 of the Constitution of Belize (the “Constitution”) provides that every person in Belize is “entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual” regardless of sex. Section 16 of the Constitution also prohibits any laws that are discriminatory or have discriminatory effect and defines “discriminatory” to include discrimination based on sex.



Anti-Discrimination Act of 1992 (Northern Territory) (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in certain settings on the grounds of any designated attribute, including sex, sexuality, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, and breastfeeding. Unlike in other Australian jurisdictions, “gender identity” and “sex characteristics” are not included as designated attributes in the Northern Territory. The settings in which discrimination based on a designated attribute is prohibited include: education, work, accommodation, provision of goods, services and facilities, clubs, and superannuation. Discrimination includes any distinction, restriction, or preference made based on a designated attribute that has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity, and harassment based on a designated attribute. Certain exceptions from the prohibition of discrimination exist, including: certain religious circumstances; provision of rights or privileges connected to childbirth; and discrimination aimed at reducing disadvantage. Alleged victims of prohibited discrimination can lodge a complaint against the discriminating person or entity, which will trigger a conciliation. If the matter is not resolved through conciliation, the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Commissioner may assess the complaint. If the Commissioner finds that the complaint is substantiated, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal can order that the discriminator pay compensation to the victim, discontinue the discriminating behavior, or do any other act specified by the Tribunal.



Revised Family Code (2000)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

The current family law in Ethiopia provides that there must be, inter alia, consent by both spouses to constitute a valid marriage (Article 6); respect and support between spouses (Article 49); equal rights in the management of the family (Article 50); fidelity owed by both husband and wife (Article 56). This is a substantial step forward in Ethiopian law.



Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, International law

Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution provides that all international treaties ratified by Ethiopia are integral parts of the law of the land. Similarly, Article 13.2 provides that fundamental rights and freedoms shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has ratified many of these treaties including ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW. Article 35 of the FDRE Constitution pertains to the Rights of Women. The article provides for equal rights under the constitution, equal rights with men in marriage, entitlement to affirmative measures, protection from harmful traditional practices, the right to maternity pay, the right to consultation, property rights (including acquiring and controlling and transferring property), employment rights, and access to family planning education. It is worth noting that this article explicitly imposes an obligation and accountability on the state to protect women from violence at Article 35.4: “The State shall enforce the right of women to eliminate the influences of harmful customs. Laws, customs and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women are prohibited.”



Social and Economic Development Policy Act (2006)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

This Act provides policies that address the improvement of the quality of life of individuals and the reduction of the growth rate of the population. (§§ 1-3). §7 sets forth that the Ministry of Gender Development and women’s organizations shall implement gender policy to achieve gender equity, specifically, to increase women’s participation in the work force and in political institutions, to protect women’s property rights in statutory law and customary practices, and to prevent various forms of violence against women, including female genital mutilation, early marriage, teenage pregnancy. §5 sets forth that the family planning facilities shall actively involve the participation of women in deciding family size. §10 states that marriage of young girls before 18 years old, and marriage of boys before 21 years old should be discouraged.



HIV Control of the Disease and Related Issues (Amending Title 33) (2010)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The Act regulates sexually transmitted diseases including HIV, provides information for treatment of HIV, and provides punishment for violations. §18.3 of the Act provides that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports shall provide education on the prevention and control of HIV. §18.4-18.5 provide that educating the public regarding HIV and AIDS is part of the national response, and the government shall train all relevant personnel. While §18.7 provides that all employees shall receive the HIV training regarding the prevention and control of HIV and AIDS. Several portions of the act speak to the rights of women and girls specifically. §18.9(a) of the Act notes that when providing HIV and AIDS service to women and girls differences in sex and gender should be considered. §18.9(b) directs the government agencies, when implementing the strategies, policies and programs to address the following issues: protection of the equality of women in private and public life, to address their rights to refuse sex and to access reproductive services independently, to address men’s equal responsibilities in sexual and reproductive health, to increase educational, economic, and employment opportunities to women, to reduce inequalities in laws regarding marital issues, and to protect women’s rights in religious contexts. §18.9(c) covers pregnant women with HIV and grants them the right to marry. The government shall provide them with consultation and information regarding future pregnancy decisions and the protection of future children from HIV. Section 18.9(d) requires the government to implement national education and training to health care providers to reduce HIV infection caused by sexual assault, protect the confidentiality of the HIV test result, report the sexual violence, and assist the investigation of such violence, and to develop and implement education and training for security personnel and prosecuting authorities in conducting investigations and prosecutions about the sexual violence. §18.27 provides that willful transmission of HIV by an infected person who knows his or her HIV test constitutes first degree felony. §18.28 prohibits discrimination on the basis of HIV status.



Offenses Against the Family, Chapter 16: Penal Law - Title 26 - Liberian Code of Laws Revised (1978)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

Under Section 16.1 of the Penal Law, bigamy, and polygamy are illegal unless a legal defense is provided. Such defenses include a defendant’s belief that his or her former spouse is dead. Under Section 16.3, abortion beyond the 24th week of pregnancy is illegal. An abortion is legal if it occurs only after a licensed physician determines there is a substantial risk that continuing the pregnancy would gravely impair the mother’s physical and/or mental health. An abortion may also be justified if the child would be born with grave physical or mental defects or if the pregnancy was the result of illegal intercourse such as rape. Additionally, the abortion must be sanctioned by two physicians who have certified in writing the reasons why the abortion is necessary. The Penal Law also prohibits a woman from carrying out an abortion herself by any means once beyond the 24th week of pregnancy.



Equal Rights of the Customary Marriage Law of 1998 (1998)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Dowry-related violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

This law defines “customary marriage” as the marriage between a man and a woman performed according to the tribal tradition of their locality and provides that a wife’s rights and duties within a customary marriage are the same as a wife’s rights and duties in a statutory marriage (a statutory marriage is a civil marriage license under the Domestic Relations Law). §2.1 provides that all customary marriages are legal, and the duties and liabilities of the statutory wife shall be accorded to all customary wives. §2.2 provides that the husband shall not recover the dowry from the wife or her parents; while §2.3 provides that a customary wife receives one-third of her husband’s property upon marriage. §2.6 provides that a customary wife has exclusive right to the properties she receives before or during the marriage, but she needs the husband’s consent to conduct business in her own name. §2.6 also states, however, that if the husband attempts to control his wife’s property he will have committed theft of property and he will be subject to a fine for such theft. §2.9 establishes that the minimum age for a tribal woman to enter into a customary marriage is 16, while §2.10 provides that the parents shall not choose the husband for their daughter against her will. Various sections provide for the rights of women on the event of her husband’s death: §3.2 states that a widow in a customary marriage is entitled to one-third of her deceased husband’s property; §3.3 provides that the widow has the freedom to enter into a new marriage upon the death of her husband; §3.5 provides that the widow has the right to petition to the probate court to administer the property of the decedent; §3.4 prohibits the husband’s family from compelling a widow to marry her deceased husband’s relative; and §3.7 establishes that the living spouse retain the right to custody of the minor children.



Federal Act on Gender Equality (1996)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Article 1 of this act states that it is intended to promote equality between men and women. Article 3 prohibits discrimination against employees based on sex. Article 4 prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace. Article 5 provides for relief, including injunctive relief and lost salary. Article 10 protects against retaliation against complainants.



Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Art. 8 of the Constitution provides that all people are equal and no person may be discriminated against because of gender. The Constitution also states that men and women have equal rights and the law shall ensure their equality. Art. 35 provides for protection of fundamental rights even in private relationships.



Lei Federal Nº 11.770/2008 (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law created a tax benefit available for private companies that (1) offer an additional 60 days of maternity leave in addition to the mandatory 120 days set forth in Decree No. 5.452/1943; (2) offer an additional 15 days of paternity leave in addition to the mandatory five days. The tax benefit is the deduction of the employee's full remuneration paid on the days of the extension of their leave. The benefit also applies for adoptions.

Referida lei federal criou um benefício fiscal para as denominadas “Empresas cidadãs”, que são as empresas que oferecem: (i) 60 dias extras de licença maternidade, em adição aos 120 dias estabelecidos na CLT; e (ii) 15 dias adicionais de licença paternidade, em complemento aos 5 dias mandatórios por lei Referidas extensões também são conferidas às adoções. As “empresas cidadãs”, em contrapartida, podem deduzir o valor integral da remuneração paga ao empregado relativo aos dias de prorrogação de sua licença-maternidade e de sua licença-paternidade.



Resolução nº 175/2013 - do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ) – Casamento homoafetivo (Same-sex Marriage Resolution) (2013)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

On May 14, 2013, the National Justice Council issued a resolution stating that competent authorities are not allowed to refuse (a) to celebrate same-sex civil marriages nor (b) to convert same-sex common-law marriages (stable union) into civil marriages. The National Justice Council is a public administrative body that aims to advance the work of the Brazilian judicial system. The resolution was issued after the Supreme Court declared in 2011 that it is unconstitutional to apply a different legal treatment to same-sex common-law marriages (stable union), from the one applied to heterosexual common-law marriages (stable union).

Em maio de 2013, o Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ), que é o órgão da administração pública que visa aperfeiçoar o trabalho do sistema judiciário brasileiro, emitiu resolução estabelecendo que as autoridades competentes não poderiam se recursar a habilitar e celebrar casamento civil entre pessoas do mesmo sexo ou se recusar a converter a união estável entre pessoas do mesmo sexo em casamento civil. Referida resolução foi emitida após o Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF declarar, em 2011, que é inconstitucional a aplicação de tratamento jurídico distinto aos casamentos e união estável entre pessoas do mesmo sexo.



On the Local Elections (No. 595-VIII) (2015)


Gender discrimination

This act, the Local Election Act of Ukraine, was superseded and replaced by the 2019 Electoral Code of Ukraine. The Local Election Act established quotas for female representation in legislative bodies at local level elections. required that representation of persons of one sex in the electoral lists of candidates for members of local councils in multi-mandate constituencies should be at least 30% of the total number of candidates in the electoral roll.



Про політичні партії в Україні (On the Political Parties in Ukraine (No. 2365-III)) (2001)


Gender discrimination

This act regulates the procedure of creation and operation of political parties. It requires a 30% gender quota for all party lists. (i.e., the minimum percentage of men and women in the list). It also entitled political parties to ideological, organizational, and material support for the creation of women's and other associations of citizens. If a political party violates citizens' equality based on their gender or other grounds, the authorized central body of the executive power should immediately file an administrative lawsuit requesting that the court ban the political party.

Закон регулює порядок створення та діяльності політичних партій. Цей закон встановив 30% гендерну квоту для всіх партійних списків (мінімальний рівень представництва жінок і чоловіків у виборчому списку кандидатів). Закон України "Про політичні партії" надав політичним партіям право на ідейну, організаційну та матеріальну підтримку створення жіночих та інших об'єднань громадян. У разі вчинення політичною партією дій, що порушують рівноправність громадян за ознакою статі чи за іншими ознаками, уповноважений центральний орган виконавчої влади повинен невідкладно подати до суду адміністративний позов про заборону політичної партії.



Про засади запобігання та протидії дискримінації в Україні (On Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine (No. 5207-VI)) (2012)


Gender discrimination

The law's purpose is to ensure equal opportunities for the realization of human and civil rights and freedoms. The law defines “discrimination” as a situation in which an individual or a group of individuals suffers from the restriction of the recognition, exercise, or enjoyment of rights and freedoms in any form established in this Law based on sex or on other grounds (“particular grounds”), except for cases when such restriction has a legitimate, reasonably justified aim, which is achievable in an appropriate and necessary way. The Act defines the principles of non-discrimination in the legislation of Ukraine. In addition, the Act defines forms of discrimination, for example, direct, indirect, and otherwise. The Act provides that (i) all forms of discrimination are prohibited in Ukraine, (ii) all persons should have equal rights and freedoms as well as opportunities for their implementation, and establishes civil, administrative, and criminal liability for the violation of anti-discrimination legislation (including under the Act).

Метою закону є забезпечення рівних можливостей для реалізації прав та свобод людини і громадянина. Закон визначає поняття “дискримінація” як ситуацію, в якій особа чи група осіб зазнають обмеження у визнанні, реалізації або користуванні правами і свободами в будь-якій формі, встановленій цим Законом, за ознакою статі або іншими ознаками (“певні ознаки”), крім випадків, коли таке обмеження має правомірну, об’єктивно обґрунтовану мету, способи досягнення якої є належними та необхідними. Закон визначає принципи недискримінації в законодавстві України. Крім того, Закон визначає форми дискримінації, наприклад, пряму, непряму та інші. Закон передбачає, що (i) усі форми дискримінації в Україні заборонені, (ii) усі люди повинні мати рівні права і свободи, можливості їх реалізації, а також встановлює цивільну, адміністративну та кримінальну відповідальність за порушення антидискримінаційного законодавства (у тому числі, цей Закон).



On the Amendments to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of Ukraine in order to implement the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (2017)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Forced sterilization, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) adopted in 2011. As a result of these amendments, forced marriage (i.e. forcing a person to marry or to continue being in a forced marriage, or to enter into a cohabitation without official registration of marriage, or to continue such cohabitation) is punishable by restraint of liberty for up to three years or imprisonment for the same period and domestic violence (i.e. deliberate systematic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or other person with whom the perpetrator is in family or intimate relationship, leading to physical or psychological suffering, disorder of health, disability, emotional dependence) is punishable with a sentence of public work for up to 240 hours, detention for up to six months, restraint of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. In addition, the amendments: (i) introduce new crimes, such as “illegal abortion or sterilization” (i.e., performed by a person without medical education or without consent of the victim) which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years; (ii) establish punishment for rape of a spouse or ex-spouse or other person with whom the perpetrator is in a family or intimate relationship (imprisonment for up to 10 years); and (iii) increase punishment for sexual violence to up to 15 years, if such acts resulted in serious consequences.



Про забезпечення рівних прав та можливостей жінок і чоловіків (No. 2866-IV) (On Ensuring the Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men) (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The Equal Opportunities Act of Ukraine (the “Act”) provides the legal framework for men and women’s parity in all spheres of social life through providing legal support for equal rights and opportunities, removal of gender-based discrimination, and prevention of imbalance between women’s and men’s opportunities in implementing the rights granted to each of them by the Constitution and other laws. The Act defines “equal rights” as the absence of gender-based restrictions or privileges. The Act provides that government regulatory bodies must ensure equal rights for men and women in elections, civil service, employment and career, social security, entrepreneurial activity, and education. The Act prohibits gender-based violence (which is defined as “actions directed at persons through their sex, stereotyped widespread customs or traditions or actions that relate predominantly to persons of a determined sex and create physical, sexual, psychological or financial damage or suffering”) and sexual harassment (defined as "sexual actions of a verbal or physical nature, which may humiliate or insult the person who is dependent on the perpetrator for work, official, financial or other reasons"). Exceptions to the prohibition of gender discrimination include when restrictions or privileges have a legitimate, objectively justified goal achieved with appropriate and necessary methods. Violation of the Act can result in the issuance of a limitation order to temporarily restrict the rights of the offender and protect the rights of the victim, including prohibiting the offender from residing with the victim, approaching the victim within a certain distance, and restricting telephone calls or other communication with the victim.

Закон України «Про рівні можливості» («Закон») створює правові основи рівності чоловіків і жінок у всіх сферах суспільного життя шляхом правового забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей, усунення дискримінації за ознакою статі та запобігання дисбалансу між можливостями жінок та чоловіків у реалізації прав, наданих кожному з них Конституцією та іншими законами. Відповідно до Закону «рівність прав» означає відсутність обмежень або привілеїв за ознакою статі. Закон передбачає, що рівні права чоловіків і жінок забезпечуватимуться у виборчому процесі, державній службі, працевлаштуванні та кар’єрі, соціальному забезпеченні, підприємницькій діяльності та освіті. Рівність забезпечується через відповідні державні/регулюючі органи. Закон забороняє гендерне насильство (діяння, спрямовані проти осіб через їхню стать, або поширені в суспільстві звичаї чи традиції (стереотипні уявлення про соціальні функції (становище, обов’язки тощо) жінок і чоловіків), або діяння, що стосуються переважно осіб певної статі чи зачіпають їх непропорційно, які завдають фізичної, сексуальної, психологічної або економічної шкоди чи страждань, включаючи погрози таких дій, у публічному або приватному житті) та сексуальні домагання (дії сексуального характеру, виражені словесно (погрози, залякування, непристойні зауваження) або фізично (доторкання, поплескування), що принижують чи ображають осіб, які перебувають у відносинах трудового, службового, матеріального чи іншого підпорядкування). Винятки, в яких можлива законна неріівність: коли обмеження чи привілеї мають законну об’єктивно виправдану мету, методи досягнення якої є доцільними та необхідними. Порушення Закону тимчасового обмеження прав правопорушника (цивільна, адміністративна та кримінальна відповідальність згідно із законом) та захисту прав потерпілого, у тому числі заборони потерпілому проживати з потерпілим за місцем проживання, наближатися до потерпілого до певна дистанція та обмеження телефонних розмов чи іншого спілкування з жертвою.



Конституція України (No. 254к/96-ВР) (Constitution of Ukraine) (1996)


Employment discrimination, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

Article 24 of Ukraine’s Constitution prohibits privileges and restrictions based on sex (and other grounds), and requires equal opportunities for women and men in socio-political and cultural activities, access to education, work and remuneration, and pension privileges. It also mandates special measures for labor protection, women’s health, and creating conditions enabling women to combine work and maternity. Article 51 provides that marriage is based on the free consent of a woman and a man. Each spouse has equal rights and responsibilities in marriage and family. Consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, with consideration of attending circumstances.

Статтею 24 Конституції України встановлено, що не може бути встановлено привілеїв чи обмежень за статтю чи за іншими ознаками, а також гарантується, що рівність прав жінки і чоловіка забезпечується: наданням жінкам рівних з чоловіками можливостей у громадсько-політичній і культурній діяльності, у здобутті освіти і професійній підготовці, у праці та винагороді за неї; спеціальними заходами щодо охорони праці і здоров'я жінок, встановленням пенсійних пільг; створенням умов, які дають жінкам можливість поєднувати працю з материнством; правовим захистом, матеріальною і моральною підтримкою материнства і дитинства, включаючи надання оплачуваних відпусток та інших пільг вагітним жінкам і матерям. Статтею 51 встановлено, що шлюб ґрунтується на вільній згоді жінки та чоловіка. Кожен із подружжя має рівні права та обов’язки у шлюбі та сім’ї. Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.



Civil Code of Iran (Inheritance) (1969)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

With regards to inheritance law (Arts. 906-915), a widow inherits less than a widower in Iran. A widow inherits one-quarter of her deceased husband’s property if the deceased husband left no children behind, and one-eighth if he did leave children behind. In contrast, a surviving husband inherits half of his deceased wife’s property if she left no children behind and one-quarter if she did leave children behind (Art. 913). Consistent with this pattern, under Iranian Civil Code Article 907, sons inherit twice as much as daughters when a parent is deceased.



Civil Code of Iran (Citizenship) (1969)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Article 976 states that children born to Iranian fathers are considered Iranian subjects. No clause exists extending the same rights to children born of Iranian mothers where the child’s father is not Iranian. This provision demonstrates that Iranian women cannot pass on their Iranian nationality to their children.



Civil Code of Iran (Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage) (1969)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The Iranian Civil Code also reflects deep gender inequalities in its divorce law (Arts. 1120-1157). With only a few exceptions, a husband can divorce his wife “whenever he wishes to do so” (Art. 1133). However, women may only seek divorce by making a request before an Islamic judge and in only a limited number of circumstances in which the husband has created “difficult and undesirable conditions” in the marriage (Art. 1130). If this criteria has been satisfied, the Islamic judge can compel the husband to divorce his wife.



Civil Code of Iran (Marital Duties) (1969)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape

According to Iranian law, the husband is the exclusive holder of the position of “head of the family” (Art. 1105). As such, the husband provides his wife with the cost of maintenance (Art. 1106), “which includes dwelling, clothing, food, furniture, and provision of a servant if the wife is accustomed to have servant or if she needs one because of illness” (Art. 1107) Article 1108 creates a duty on the part of women to satisfy the sexual needs of their husbands at all times. This is the tamkin (submission) requirement of Sharia law. If a wife refuses to fulfill her duties, she may be barred from receiving maintenance payments. The husband determines his wife’s place of residence and thus controls her freedom of movement (Art. 1114). If the dwelling of the wife and husband in the same house involves the risk of bodily or financial injury or that to the dignity of the wife, she can choose a separate dwelling. If the alleged risk is proved, the court will not order her to return to the house of the husband and, so long as she is authorized not to return to the house, her cost of maintenance will be on the charge of her husband (Article 1115). In addition, the husband may prevent his wife from exercising a certain profession if he deems it “incompatible with the family interests or the dignity of himself or his wife” (Art. 1117).



The Islamic Penal Code of Iran, Book 5 (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

Articles 623-624 of Book Five of the Islamic Penal Code of Iran ban abortion and proscribe prison sentences for, respectively, "anyone" and doctors, midwives, and pharmacists. Article 630 of the Iranian Penal Code allows a man who witnesses his wife in the act of having sexual intercourse with another man (zina) to kill both of them if he is certain that his wife is a willing participant. If the husband knows that is wife was the subject of coercion, he is justified in murdering only the other man. Under Article 638 of the Iranian Penal Code, women who appear in public without the Islamic hijab may be sentenced to ten days to two months in prison or fined fifty thousand (USD $1.50) or five hundred thousand Rials (USD $15.00). (Full Persian version: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=103202)



The Islamic Penal Code of Iran, Books 1 & 2 (2013)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, LGBTIQ

Article 147 of the Islamic Penal Code specifies that the age of maturity triggering criminal responsibility is 15 Islamic lunar calendar years for boys, but only nine Islamic lunar calendar years for girls. This signifies that young girls can be charged as criminally responsible adults in Iran before they reach the age of puberty. Articles 237-239 forbid same-sex kissing and touching, which will be punished by 31-74 lashes. Female genital touching (musaheqeh) is punished by 100 lashes. Article 225 mandates the death penalty for adultery (zina), which international commentators have noted is disproportionately applied to women (e.g., UN Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women report: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/A-68-340.pdf). Article 199 describes the number and gender of witnesses needed to prove various crimes; no crimes may be proven with female witnesses alone and any female witness requires corroboration of a man and another woman. (Full Persian version of the Penal Code available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=103202)



Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Pursuant to the Pay Gap Law of 22 April 2012, a mediator may be appointed to generate an action plan for gender neutrality or to intercede with employees who feel victimized by unfair treatment at work. This Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 determines the role and the qualifications of the mediator, enumerates the deontological rules s/he must respect, and describes the mediation procedures.



Pay Gap Law of 22 April 2012 (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Pay Gap Law of 22 April 2012 seeks to reduce the wage gap between men and women through various measures. For example, the social balance sheet has to be submitted by certain enterprises in their financial statements and must be broken down according to the gender of the employees. Functional classifications of employees must be gender-neutral. In addition, every enterprise employing at least 50 people has to prepare an analysis every two years in order to determine whether or not the enterprise applies a gender neutral remuneration policy. Such enterprises can also, at the request of the works council or of the Committee on Prevention and Protection at Work, appoint a mediator to generate an action plan for gender neutrality or to intercede with employees who feel victimized because of unfair treatment. A Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 determines the role and the required qualifications of this mediator as well as the deontological rules he/she needs to respect, and describes the mediation procedure.


Royal Decree of 11 January 2009 (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Royal Decree of 11 January 2009 makes Collective Labor Agreement No. 95 of 10 October 2008, established by the National Labor Council, on equal treatment at all stages of the employment relationship, binding in law. Equal treatment implies the absence of discrimination based on several factors, including gender and sexual orientation. The principle of equal treatment must be complied with at every stage of the labor market, e.g., the employment relationship, the conditions for access to employment, conditions for employment, and termination of employment.


Law of 16 December 2002 Creating the Institute for Equality of Men and Women (2002)


Gender discrimination

Interest groups of the Institute for Equality of Men and Women, created by the Law of 16 December 2002 to monitor gender equality and to fight any form of gender-based discrimination, may bring legal action in cases of gender discrimination. The Institute is responsible for (i) guaranteeing and promoting equality between men and women, (ii) combating all forms of discrimination or inequality based on sex, and (iii) creating and implementing a proper legal framework of appropriate structures, instruments, and measures. More information on the Institute and the rights it protects is available on its website (available in English, Français, Nederlands, and Deutsch).


Gender Law of 10 May 2007 (2007)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law, LGBTIQ, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual harassment

The Gender Law of 10 May 2007 combats discrimination between women and men (thereby implementing European Union legislation) and prohibits every form of discrimination based on gender, change of gender, gender identity, gender expression, pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood. Direct and indirect discrimination, giving orders to discriminate, intimidation and sexual intimidation are all explicitly prohibited. Discrimination is prohibited with regard to access to goods and services, social security, social benefits, membership of professional organizations, and employment relations and conditions. Differences (in terms of access to certain goods or services, or employment conditions) are only allowed if it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and if the restrictions are appropriate and necessary to achieve this aim. Differences are also allowed on a temporary basis in the context of positive action to prevent or compensate for gender-related disadvantages. Victims of discrimination can submit a reasoned complaint or take legal action. If the plaintiff has produced facts which indicate that there has been discrimination, the burden of proof is on the defendant to demonstrate that there was no gender-based discrimination.


Constitution of Belgium (2014)


Gender discrimination

Article 10 of the Constitution lays down the basic principle of equality and explicitly guarantees equality between men and women. Article 11 provides the legal basis for the adoption of legislation ensuring that there is no discrimination, while Article 11bis ensures equal access to elected mandates and public mandates.


雇用の分野における男女の均等な機会及び待遇の確保等に関する法律(昭和47年法律113号)(Act on Securing, Etc., of Equal Opportunity between Men and Women in Employment (Act No. 113 of 1972)) (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law, Sexual harassment

The Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment ("the Act") aims to promote equal opportunities and treatment of men and women in the workplace. The Act falls under Article 1 of the Constitution’s mandate for the government to ensure equality under law and promote measures to ensure the health of working women during pregnancy and after childbirth. Japan enacted the Act in 1985 upon the United Nation’s ratification of Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. The Act prohibits employment discrimination based on sex at each stage of recruitment, assignment, and promotion. It also prohibits discriminatory treatment based on marriage status, pregnancy, and childbirth. In addition, an Amendment to the Act in 2017 obligates employers to take steps to prevent harassment based on a protected status. To ensure its effectiveness, the Act requires that employer violations of the statute be publicly announced, and a fine imposed on employers who violate the reporting obligation.

「雇用の分野における男女の均等な機会及び待遇の確保等に関する法律」は、職場における男女の均等な機会及び待遇を促進することを目的としている。本法は、憲法第1条の「法の下の平等を確保し、働く女性の妊娠中及び出産後の健康を確保するための措置を推進すること」に該当します。 日本は、国連の女性差別撤廃条約の批准を受けて、1985年に本法を制定した。 同法は、採用、配置、昇進の各段階において、性別に基づく雇用差別を禁止した。また、婚姻関係、妊娠・出産に基づく差別的取り扱いも禁止している。2017年、同法改正により、雇用主は保護されるべき地位に基づくハラスメントを防止するための措置を講じることが義務付けられた。 その実効性を確保するため、同法では、雇用主が法令に違反した場合にはその違反を公示し、罰金を課すことができる。



日本国憲法 (Constitution of Japan) (1945)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution, “all citizens of Japan are equal under the law, and shall not be discriminated against in political, economic or social relations on the basis of sex.” Article 24 of the Constitution states that marriage can only be formed through the mutual consent of both sexes, and it must be maintained through mutual cooperation of husband and wife. Furthermore, Article 24 provides that “husband and wife have equal rights” under the law. Based Article 14 and Article 24, the following laws were enacted: the Basic Act for a Gender Equal Society requires the state and local public entities to take steps towards the formation of a gender-equal society; the Act on Securing of Equal Opportunity and Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment prohibits employers from discriminating based on gender; and the Act on the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims etc., and the Stalker Control Law protect women from gender-based violence.

日本国憲法第14条では、「すべて国民は、法の下に平等であって、人種、信条、性別、社会的身分又は門地により、政治的、経済的又は社会的関係において、差別されない」とある。憲法第24条では、「婚姻は、両性の合意のみに基いて成立し、夫婦が同等の権利を有することを基本として、相互の協力により、維持されなければならない」とある。第14条と第24条に基づき、国や地方公共団体が男女共同参画社会の形成に向けて取り組むことを定めた「男女共同参画社会基本法」、事業主が性別による差別を行うことを禁止した「雇用の分野における男女の均等な機会及び待遇の確保等に関する法律」、女性を性暴力から守るための「配偶者からの暴力の防止及び被害者の保護等に関する法律」や「ストーカー規制法」などの法律が制定された。



Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(1)(h) International Criminal Court (1998)


Gender discrimination

Article 7(1)(h). Persecution on the basis of gender. Under the Rome Statute, persecution on the basis of gender is specifically included as a crime against humanity. This means that the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes involving the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law against a group targeted on the basis of gender. Although the ICC has not yet brought a prosecution in respect of this crime, there are crimes under preliminary examination. For example, the Prosecutor has found a reasonable basis to believe that gender-based persecution has been committed in Nigeria by Boko Haram. The Prosecutor’s Office has identified that, by reason of their religion or for attending school, Boko Haram has carried out sexual violence against women and girls, including abductions, sexual slavery, and forced marriages. This offence is significant in being the only sexual and gender-based crime that requires discriminatory intent, as the Prosecutor must prove the crime was based on gender grounds. The crime is also an important recognition of the need to combat impunity for systematic persecutions on the basis of gender.



Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court International Criminal Court (1998)


Femicide, Forced and early marriage, Forced sterilization, Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

The intention behind the Rome Statute of 2002 (“Rome Statute” or “Statute”) in establishing the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern and to end impunity. The Rome Statute is significant in being the first international criminal law instrument that recognises forms of sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, and enforced sterilization, as distinct war crimes. This legal instrument is also novel in prescribing gender-based crimes as the basis of war crimes or crimes against humanity committed during armed conflicts. In particular, the Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over gender-based crimes if they constitute acts of genocide. In this case the crimes, such as rape, can be an integral part of the destruction inflicted upon the targeted groups and may be charged as genocide. The Prosecutor must further apply and interpret the Statute in line with internationally recognised human rights, including women’s human rights and gender equality. The States Parties should also consider the need to appoint judges with legal expertise on violence against women or children.



Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Article 14 - Law n°15/013 of August 1st, 2015)


Gender discrimination

The DRC Constitution asserts the country’s commitment to gender equality under the law. The preamble references the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and commitment to conventions pertaining to the rights of women, particularly toward gender equality in domestic and international institutions. Article 14 gives legal effect to the commitment asserted in the preamble, stipulating that public authorities shall ensure elimination of discrimination against women and promote women’s rights. More specifically, Article 14 requires authorities to take appropriate measures to ensure participation of women in the development of the nation and to take steps to combat all forms of violence against women in their public and private lives, and guarantees implementation of gender equality and fair representation at national, provincial and local government institutions. The Law sets forth the application procedures of these rights. Subsequently, Law n°15/013 of August 1st, 2015 was passed to establish specific procedures to implement Article 14 (link to full Constitution, pdf to Article 14 implementation law).



Succession Act (Amendment) Decree 22/72 of 1972 (1972)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Uganda allows for customary law to govern many situations, but the Succession Act restricts their applicability in inheritance cases. It enshrines women’s right to inherit from husbands, but also privileges men because 1) the property of a married woman who dies intestate automatically will go to her spouse, unlike a man who dies intestate; 2) the matrimonial home will go to the legal heir, the determination of which prioritizes male relatives; 3) a widow (or widows in polygamous marriages, who must share) may only inherit 15% of her husband’s estate; and 4) maintenance and occupancy rights of widows terminate if they remarry.

Original Act (1906)



National Women's Council Act of 1993 (amended 2010, 2015) (1993)


Gender discrimination

The National Women’s Council Act (“NWCA”) creates women’s councils to coordinate and promote the organization of “the women of Uganda in a unified body; and to engage the women in activities that are of benefit to them and the nation.” There are village, parish/ward, subcounty/division/town, county, and district women’s councils, each of which is comprised of all of the women in the geographical region. Each council elects a six-member leadership committee, members of which may only serve on one at a time (e.g., if a woman is on the village committee and is then elected to the parish committee, her seat on the village committee is vacated). The National Women’s Council must be comprised of one elected representative from each district, two representatives from NGOs, and two elected female student representatives.

2010 Amendments

2015 Amendments



Customary Marriage (Registration) Act of 1973 (1973)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The Customary Marriage Act (CMA) sets parameters for acceptable customary marriages and requirements for registration and dissolution. Customary marriages are prohibited if the female party is younger than 16 years old or the male party is younger than 18 years old, either party is of unsound mind, they are too closely related, the marriage is otherwise prohibited by one of the parties’ customs, or one of the parties is still in an existing monogamous marriage. Subsequent monogamous or Muslim marriages will not be recognized and are void if there was a pre-existing customary marriage.



Anti-Pornography Act of 2014 (2014)


Gender discrimination, Statutory rape or defilement

The Anti-Pornography Act (“APA”) bans creation, publication, distribution, and abetting of pornography and child pornography. It also creates a nine-member council to handle pornography issues, including public education, maintaining a registry of offenders, and destruction of seized materials. Human rights groups have expressed concerns that the language defining pornography as “any representation through publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent show, information technology or by whatever means, of a person engaged in real or stimulated [sic] explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual excitement” is overly broad and could lead to confusion. For example, some organizations have nicknamed it Uganda’s “mini-skirt ban” because “any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual excitement” could be interpreted as applicable to revealing clothing.



Domestic Case Law

Mwanamanga v. Malamulo Mission Hospital Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The defendant employed the plaintiff as a librarian in 1995, but dismissed her from her position in 2000 because she married a polygamist. The plaintiff challenged the dismissal as unfair and asked for an order that her former employer, the defendant, pay compensation and long service pay. In siding with the plaintiff, the Court considered the anti-discrimination provisions of the Constitution, given that the facts underlying the offence took place prior to the Employment Act coming into effect. The Court concluded that the termination of the plaintiff qualified as discrimination. The reasoning underlying the termination effectively prevented the plaintiff from marrying a man of her choice, and from engaging in economic activity through employment, both fundamental constitutionally-protected rights. The Court emphasized that it did not matter that the defendant’s conditions of service prohibited polygamous marriages among its workforce, as such a prohibition contravened the Constitution. In closing, the Court ordered the parties to produce documents and other material relevant to the assessment of compensation for the plaintiff.



R. v. State President & Another High Court of Malawi (2015)


Gender discrimination

The plaintiffs, four members parliament, sought judicial review before the High Court of a decision of the State President to appoint a woman, Mrs. Fiona Kalemba, as the Clerk of Parliament. This occurred against the recommendation of the Parliamentary Service Commission, which had submitted a male candidate who they believed to be the best candidate for the position. The State President wanted three short-listed names for the position, and specified that a woman should be included. The Court affirmed the State President’s decision primarily on the grounds that a recommendation is an advisory action that does not have any binding effect. The Court further considered the possibility that if the President wanted a woman for the position, “reverse” or “positive” discrimination is allowed in Malawi and internationally, and hence would not be a violation of law. There is no requirement of merit as the deciding factor in presidential appointments. The Court denied the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that gender and empowerment of minority groups are relevant considerations that may be taken into account in making presidential appointments.



R. v. Yusuf Willy (Criminal Review No. 6 of 2021/Criminal Case No. 183 of 2021) High Court of Malawi (2022)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The defendant was charged the defilement of the complainant, a 17-year-old girl. In his defence, the accused claimed that he could not get an erection (albeit, apparently, only after the magistrate raised the question himself). During the proceedings, a woman stood up in court and volunteered to ascertain whether the accused could obtain an erection. One week later, the magistrate, prosecutor, court interpreter, accused, complainant, and the woman who had volunteered met in the magistrate’s chambers to witness whether the woman could touch the defendant sexually until he obtained an erection. The magistrate observed, after approximately 30 minutes of sexual contact, that the accused’s “penis got a bit hard but not very hard.” Following a complaint from the complainant’s parent, the High Court was requested to review the conduct of the magistrate to determine the veracity of the complaint. At this point, the magistrate had not reached a verdict. By way of a preliminary conclusion, the High Court noted that “this illegal show seemed to come out of the blue” and found that the manner of investigation into the accused’s ability to obtain an erection was “raised by the magistrate, thereby making the [High] Court conclude that there were extra judicial discussions” between the accused and the magistrate. The Court also expressed serious concern about secondary victimisation, given that the sexual act occurred in the presence of the complainant. The Court then outlined its reasons for arriving at its ultimate decision, focusing on two matters: the existence of bias and judicial stereotyping. Regarding the first issue, the Court cited caselaw from across common law jurisdictions and the European Court of Human Rights relating to actual or perceived bias. Regarding the second issue, the Court highlighted the significant dangers associated with gender stereotyping on the part of the judiciary. The Court emphasised that judges should be alive to the concerns of victims of sexual offences, specifically that gender stereotypes harm such victims and contribute to further violations of their rights. Presiding officers are obliged to ensure that the courts offer equal access to men and women. In this context, it was emphasised that it matters not only how judges conduct themselves, but also how their conduct could be perceived during a trial. A judicial officer has to be aware of the negative results of displaying condescension toward women in court. In this case, the complainant was concerned about judicial bias, corruption, and/or collusion with the accused. The decision implied that the magistrate’s conduct could have arisen from his bias against, and stereotyping of, the complainant as a complainant in a sexual offence case. The Court highlighted that the judiciary could not condone the perpetuation of “structural gender-based violence, where courts instill fear in women and girls who are victims of sexual offences, using the criminal justice system.” Therefore, in order to create a discrimination-free judicial system that victims can rely on, it is incumbent on the judiciary to remain cognisant of its own biases and stereotypes, especially in the context of victims of sexual offences, and conduct cases in a manner which counteracts such biases and stereotypes. In conclusion, the High Court ordered a retrial under a different magistrate, and that the complainant and her family be provided with the resources needed to ensure her attendance at court. The Court referred (i) the magistrate’s conduct in the trial and (ii) the wider question of gender bias among judicial officers to the Judicial Service Commission. Finally, the Court recommended that the Chief Justice, through the judiciary’s training committee, should develop training programmes to avoid a matter like this re-occurring in the future.



R. v. Banda & Others High Court of Malawi (2016)


Gender discrimination

A Fourth Grade Magistrate convicted the appellant and 18 other women for knowingly living on prostitution earnings, a misdemeanor that carries a maximum sentence of 24 months in prison. In Malawi, Fourth Grade Magistrates’ jurisdiction is limited to cases in which the maximum sentence is 12 months. This jurisdictional limit was the appellants’ first ground of appeal. Despite finding that the appellants succeeded in proving their convictions null and void due to the magistrate’s jurisdictional overreach, the appellate court found it “imperative” to address the appellants’ other arguments because of “the prevalent misuse of section 146 by law enforcement.” The appellants’ second ground of appeal was that Penal Code Section 146, the offence of a woman living on the earnings of prostitution, does not target the sex worker herself, but rather restricts women from exercising influence over the movements of sex workers for monetary gain. Section 145 of the Penal Code addresses men’s criminal behavior toward sex workers. The High Court again agreed with the appellants, concluding that Section 146 of the Penal Code was clearly aimed at targeting those who exploit sex workers, rather than a punitive measure applicable to sex workers themselves. The High Court pointed out that the lower court’s conclusion that the appellants’ convictions rested on the fact that they had booked rooms in a rest house, “conduct which was not criminal at all.” The High Court also expressed concern about how the government obtained the women’s confessions to prostitution, “especially after reading the caution statements.” As a result, the High Court held the trial and convictions of the appellants unconstitutional and predicated on discrimination against women in the sex trade. In conclusion, the judge called for Malawi to have “a frank discussion” about the fact that prostitution-related offences in Malawi “remain an area of blatant discrimination, unfairness, inequality, abuse as well as bias from law enforcement as well as the courts as evidenced in this case.”



McKinley v Minister for Defence Supreme Court of Ireland (1997)


Gender discrimination

The plaintiff’s husband suffered serious injuries in an explosion, one of which impaired his ability to have sex. In the plaintiff’s claim against her husband’s employer, the Minister for Defence, she claimed compensation for loss of consortium at common law. In the past, this action was available only to a husband. The question asked by the plaintiff was whether this was inconsistent with the Constitution, and in particular its guarantee of equality and implied guarantee of spousal equality. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that restricting a claim of loss of consortium to husbands only was inconsistent with the Constitution, but disagreed on how to respond to the inconsistency. A majority took the view that the defect should be remedied in a positive manner, by extending the action to wives, while the minority thought that the solution was to abolish the action of loss of consortium entirely. Thus, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the effect of the principle of equality of spouses was to extend the benefit of the common law rule to the wife.



Mohan v Ireland Supreme Court of Ireland (2019)


Gender discrimination

Section 17(4B) of the Electoral Act 1997 introduced a provision aimed at addressing a significant disparity in the sex of members of parliament in Ireland (“TDs”). Only 15.1% of TDs elected in 2011 were women. The figure has never exceeded 20%. The 2012 Act tried to solve this problem via candidate selection; it tied the level of political funding allocated to a political party to the gender balance of its candidates. From the first general election after the section came into force, a party would lose 50% of its public funding if at least 30% of its candidates in that election were not women (or if 30% of its candidates were not men). Seven years after that, the minimum requirement for each gender would increase to 40% or the same penalty would apply. The Act deals only with candidature, not election. It also does not compel a party to select any particular candidate, but instead penalises the party with a withdrawal of public funds for non-conformity. In this case, a member of a political party challenged the constitutionality of this measure on several grounds after his party did not select him as a candidate and informed him that their candidate “must be” a woman. He claimed that this was a result of the 2012 Act, in violation of several constitutional provisions, including the equality guarantee in Article 40.1; the right to free speech and association under Article 40.6; and the Article 16.1.1° guarantee that every citizen without distinction of sex is eligible for the Irish parliament. The High Court rejected these claims due to lack of standing; the plaintiff could not show ‘any, or any sufficient, causal nexus between the direction of the party excluding his nomination from consideration at the relevant candidate selection convention and the operation of that provision’. The court was not satisfied that the party would not, without the influence of the 2012 Act, have implemented gender quotas of its own motion. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had standing, but also acknowledged that this sophisticated piece of legislation was pursuing an important social goal through “positive discrimination” on gender grounds and controlling public funding for political representation. Therefore, the court found that the case could be addressed on its merits rather than decided on the basis of standing and remitted it to the High Court for a full hearing.



McD. v L. Supreme Court of Ireland (2009)


Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

The appellant, a gay man, entered into an agreement with the respondents, a lesbian couple in a civil partnership, to donate sperm to the respondents so they could have a baby. It was agreed that the respondents would have full care and custody of the child, effectively as parents. They were to be fully responsible for the child’s upbringing, and the appellant, the sperm donor, would be, at most, considered a “favourite uncle.” It was explicitly agreed that the appellant would not have any responsibility for the child’s upbringing and would not seek to influence it. However, following the child’s birth, he attempted to assert rights as the father. While not seeking custody, he sought to be appointed as a guardian of the child and to have rights of access. The respondents opposed his application, and it was their intention to move to Australia, which the appellant sought an injunction to prevent. This case constituted the first time in which the superior courts of Ireland dealt with the matter of parenthood in assisted reproduction, and both the High Court and Supreme Court took different views of the case. McD’s application to be appointed guardian under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 was unsuccessful in the High Court, which found that the donor had acted dishonestly and deliberately misled them as to his intentions. Emphasising the child’s best interests, the High Court, while acknowledging the importance of the blood link between donor and child, found that this was a rare case in which it was not in the best interests of the child to have a relationship with both of his biological parents. The High Court rejected the applications for guardianship and access, finding that granting them would result in too great a cost to the child: the “loss of a tranquil and calm upbringing.” The Supreme Court took a different approach, however, sympathising with the donor’s perspective. Importantly, the Supreme Court ruled that, under Irish law, the lesbian couple was not a family. There was a strong rejection of the idea of ‘de facto families’ having any legal status or rights in Irish law. This concept was relied on by the High Court, where weight was afforded to the position of the ‘de facto family’ consisting of the couple and the child. In this vein, the Supreme Court rejected the applicability of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Supreme Court agreed that it was not in the best interests of the child that McD. be appointed guardian, but held that he should have access rights, and remitted the matter to the High Court for determination of the terms of such access. The case is also important regarding the relationship between Irish law and the ECHR, with the Supreme Court highlighting that the Convention is not directly applicable in Irish law and taking a restrictive approach in relation to its interpretation and application. The Supreme Court also warned against domestic courts ‘outpacing’ the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.



1 BvR 684/14 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) (2019)


Gender discrimination

The 51-year-old claimant, a female employee, argued that the age limit on her employer’s pension fund discriminated against her based on, among other things, her gender, . The age limit only provided for pension claims for employees who were not older than 50 at the beginning of their employment. However, the claimant had stopped working after the birth of her child and did not return to the work force until she was 51. Her child was already 25 years old at that time and had fully completed his vocational training. The court confirmed the earlier decision of the Federal Labor Court (3 AZR 356/12 (available here: https://www.bag-urteil.com/12-11-2013-3-azr-356-12/)) that the age limit does not constitute indirect discrimination against women. In its decision, the Federal Labor Court had expressly recognized the general principle that an employer must prevent indirect discrimination on the basis of gender when introducing an age limit in its company pension scheme. In particular, it had to factor in that many women interrupt their careers to raise and care for their children, and that an age limit should not in principle prevent these women from receiving benefits from a pension fund. However, the Federal Labor Court found that women typically return from this interruption before reaching age 50 and therefore ruled that the claimant's rights were not indirectly violated by the age limit. The claimant argued that there was no general principle that women are finished raising children before age 50. The Court affirmed the Federal Labor Court’s judgment and held that the general principle of equality was not violated by this age cap as there was no evidence that the age limit posed a greater risk for women than for men of not being able to benefit from the pension fund after a certain age. The Court also brought up that the claimant's child was already 25 years old and had completed her vocational training, so the claimant could not claim that her fundamental rights had been violated because she could have returned to work before the age of 51.

Die 51-jährige Klägerin, eine Arbeitnehmerin, machte geltend, dass sie durch eine Altersgrenze der betrieblichen Altersversorgung ihres Arbeitgebers unter anderem aufgrund ihres Geschlechts diskriminiert wurde. Diese Altersgrenze berechtigte nur Arbeitnehmer, die zum Zeitpunkt des Eintritts in ein Arbeitsverhältnis mit dem Arbeitgeber nicht älter als 50 Jahre waren, zu etwaigen Rentenansprüchen. Die Klägerin hatte jedoch nach der Geburt ihres Kindes aufgehört zu arbeiten und kehrte erst mit 51 Jahren in ihr Berufsleben zurück. Ihr Kind war zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits 25 Jahre alt und hatte seine Berufsausbildung vollständig abgeschlossen. Das Verfassungsgericht bestätigte die frühere Entscheidung des Bundesarbeitsgerichts (3 AZR 356/12), dass die Altersgrenze keine mittelbare Diskriminierung von Frauen darstellt. Das Bundesarbeitsgericht hatte in seiner Entscheidung ausdrücklich den allgemeinen Grundsatz anerkannt, dass ein Arbeitgeber bei der Einführung einer Altersgrenze in seiner betrieblichen Altersversorgung eine mittelbare Diskriminierung wegen des Geschlechts verhindern muss. Insbesondere sei zu berücksichtigen, dass viele Frauen ihre Berufstätigkeit unterbrechen, um ihre Kinder zu erziehen und zu betreuen, und dass eine Altersgrenze diese Frauen nicht grundsätzlich daran hindern dürfe, Leistungen aus einer Pensionskasse zu beziehen. Das Bundesarbeitsgericht stellte jedoch fest, dass Frauen in der Regel vor Erreichen des 50. Lebensjahres aus dieser Unterbrechung zurückkehren, und entschied daher, dass die Rechte der Klägerin durch die Altersgrenze nicht mittelbar verletzt werden. Die Klägerin argumentierte vor dem Verfassungsgericht, dass es keinen allgemeinen Grundsatz gebe, wonach Frauen ihre Kindererziehungszeit vor dem Alter von 50 Jahren abschließen. Das Das Verfassungsgericht bestätigte die frühere Entscheidung des Bundesarbeitsgerichts und vertrat die Auffassung, dass der allgemeine Gleichheitsgrundsatz nicht durch diese Altersgrenze verletzt wird, da es keine Anhaltspunkte dafür gibt, dass die Altersgrenze ein größeres Risiko für Frauen darstellt als für Männer, ab einem bestimmten Alter keine Leistungen aus der Rentenkasse mehr beziehen zu können. Das Gericht fügte hinzu, dass das Kind der Klägerin bereits 25 Jahre alt war und seine Ausbildung abgeschlossen hatte, so dass die Klägerin nicht geltend machen konnte in ihren Grundrechten verletzt worden zu sein, weil sie gehindert worden sei, vor dem Alter von 51 wieder erwerbstätig zu werden.



8 AZR 488/19 Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labor Court) (2021)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The claimant, a female employee, exercised her right under the Transparency in Wage Structures Act (available here: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/entgtranspg/BJNR215210017.html) to obtain information from her employer about the average salary in the group of colleagues who performed the same or equivalent work as she did as a head of department. She found that her compensation was below average. The average salary of comparably employed male department heads at the claimant’s employer was 8% higher than that of female department heads, although the person with the highest remuneration within this group was a woman. The claimant’s employer justified the compensation disparity on the basis of the difference of the duration of employment between the individual employees serving as heads of department. The Court held that the employer bears the burden to prove that the reason for the pay disparity is not due to gender discrimination and that the mere assertion that the lower pay is based on other reasons is not sufficient. According to the Court, demonstrating a pay disparity between comparably employed male and female colleagues creates a rebuttable presumption of gender discrimination. This decision is an important step towards equal pay for women and men in Germany, as it places the burden of proof on the employer to prove that a pay disparity is justified by non-discriminatory reasons. This decision effectively promotes the enforcement of the law because an employee often will not be able to prove the actual reason for a disparity in compensation.

Die Klägerin, eine Arbeitnehmerin, machte von ihrem Recht nach dem Entgelttransparenzgesetz (EntGTranspG) Gebrauch, um von ihrem Arbeitgeber Informationen über das Durchschnittsgehalt in der Gruppe der Kollegen zu erhalten, die die gleiche oder eine gleichwertige Arbeit wie sie als Abteilungsleiterin verrichteten und stellte fest, dass sie unter dem durchschnittlichen Vergütungsniveau bezahlt worden war. Das Durchschnittsgehalt der vergleichbar beschäftigten männlichen Abteilungsleiter bei dem Arbeitgeber der Klägerin war 8% höher als das der weiblichen Abteilungsleiter, obwohl die Person mit der höchsten Vergütung innerhalb dieser Gruppe eine Frau war. Der Arbeitgeber des Klägers begründete den Gehaltsunterschied mit der unterschiedlichen Dauer der Beschäftigung der einzelnen Mitarbeiter/innen in der Abteilungsleiterstelle. Das Gericht stellte fest, dass der Arbeitgeber die Beweislast dafür trägt, dass der Grund für die niedrigere Vergütung nicht auf eine Diskriminierung aufgrund des Geschlechts zurückzuführen ist, und dass die bloße Behauptung, dass die niedrigere Vergütung auf andere Gründe zurückzuführen ist, nicht ausreicht. Nach Ansicht des Gerichts schafft der Nachweis von Lohnunterschieden zwischen vergleichbar beschäftigten männlichen Kollegen des Arbeitnehmers/der Arbeitnehmerin eine widerlegbare Vermutung für eine Diskriminierung aufgrund des Geschlechts.



Cour de Cassation, civile, (Chambre Sociale), 6 Juillet 2010, No. 09-40.021 Cour de Cassation civile (Chambre Sociale) (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The complainant was the Human Resources manager of her company and claimed back-pay arising out of the company’s alleged gender discrimination and gender-pay gap. She contested the pay disparity in comparison to her male colleagues who performed similar tasks, had similar responsibilities, had a similar classification, and occupied a similar place in the company hierarchy. Before this decision, a pay gap could not ground an allegation of discrimination on the basis of sex where the relevant employees exercised different functions. In this decision, the Court of Cassation, overturning the Court of Appeals of Paris’ decision, held that a gender-based pay gap between members of the board of directors of a company constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. Therefore, the Court of Cassation found that, although the female claimant and the male members of the board of directors exercised different functions, their seniority, responsibility, and role classification and importance were equivalent, making the pay gap discriminatory. The female claimant had also been at the company longer than the male members of the board of directors, and had a similar level of education. Finally, the Court was of the view that the claimant’s work was of equal value to her male counterparts’ work, and as such, there was no justification for the inequality of pay.

Le plaignant était la Responsable des Ressources Humaines de son entreprise et réclame du salaire rétroactif, revendiquant la discrimination de genre, et l’inégalité de rémunération fondé sur son genre, pendant son travail à l’entreprise. Elle conteste l’inégalité salariale en comparaison à ses collègues, des hommes membres du comité de direction, quand ils avaient tous des responsabilités comparables, une identité de niveau hiérarchique similaire, et une classification semblable. Avant cette décision, une inégalité salariale ne pouvait pas fonder des allégations de discrimination sur la base du genre, quand les employés exercent des fonctions différentes. La Cour de Cassation renverse la décision de la cour d’appel de Paris, et trouve qu’une inégalité salariale entre membres du comité de direction fondé sur le genre qualifie comme de la discrimination. La Cour de Cassation trouve que même si la plaignante, une femme, avais une fonction différente des autres membres du comité de direction, elle avait une identité comparable au niveau hiérarchique, en termes de classification, de responsabilités, et d’importance comparable, par rapport au fonctionnement de l'entreprise. La plaignante était aussi à l’entreprise plus longtemps, et avait un niveau d’éducation comparable. Finalement, la Cour de Cassation trouve que le travail de la plaignante était de valeur équivalente aux autres membres du comité de direction, et qu’il n’y avait donc aucune justification pour l’inégalité de salaire.



Decisión 609 de marzo 6, 2010 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República de Paraguay (2010)


Gender discrimination

This decision approved the creation of the specialized office referred to as ‘Secretaría Judicial de Género,’ depending upon the Supreme Court of Justice. Since discrimination can sometimes prevent women from accessing justice, the decision adopted measures designed to facilitate access to justice for women. The measures protect women’s rights and legitimate interests with the goal of achieving effective equality. The Court stated that the effective administration of justice requires the creation of such office, as a specialized, highly technical, and competent institutional mechanism with adequate resources to promote a gendered approach on matters of equality and non-discrimination.

Esta decisión aprobó la creación de la oficina especializada denominada “Secretaría Judicial de Género”, dependiente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Dado que la discriminación a veces puede impedir que las mujeres accedan a la justicia, la decisión adoptó medidas diseñadas para facilitar el acceso a la justicia de las mujeres. Las medidas protegen los derechos e intereses legítimos de las mujeres con el objetivo de lograr la igualdad efectiva. La Corte señaló que la efectiva administración de justicia requiere la creación de dicha oficina, como un mecanismo institucional especializado, altamente técnico, competente y con recursos adecuados para promover el enfoque de género en materia de igualdad y no discriminación.



Decisión 633 de junio 1, 2010 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República de Paraguay (2010)


Gender discrimination

This decision ratified the content of the "100 Rules of Basel" on access to justice for people in vulnerable conditions. The incorporation of such rules guarantees equality and non-discrimination rights, facilitating the participation of people in conditions of vulnerability before the Judicial System. The decision also creates a multidisciplinary commission, to be operated under the supervision of the ‘Human Rights Directorate’ Ministry, whose main responsibility is the promotion, in a plural and coordinated manner, of these rules, so that they are generally known and adopted.

Esta decisión ratificó el contenido de las “100 Reglas de Basilea” sobre el acceso a la justicia de las personas en condiciones de vulnerabilidad. La incorporación de tales normas garantiza los derechos de igualdad y no discriminación, facilitando la participación de las personas en condiciones de vulnerabilidad en el Sistema Judicial. La decisión también crea una comisión multidisciplinaria, que funcionará bajo la supervisión del Ministerio “Dirección de Derechos Humanos”, cuya responsabilidad principal es la promoción, de manera plural y coordinada, de estas normas, para que sean conocidas y adoptadas en general.



Decisión 657 de noviembre 9, 2010 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República de Paraguay (2010)


Gender discrimination, International law

This decision established the guidelines for the institutional policy on gender for the Paraguayan Judicial Branch. The Supreme Court agreed on: i) ensuring that users of judicial services receive communications (with an emphasis on gender) in a timely manner that are both easily accessible and understandable; ii) providing information on gender and gender rights; raising awareness on the importance of reporting events that violate individuals’ rights and dignity; iii) publicizing case law that studies gender issues; iv) digitizing the rulings (with a focus on gender issues) issued by different courts; complying with international standards; creating a framework for decision-making that incorporates a gender approach; v) hiring trained personnel to handle gender-related claims.

Esta decisión estableció los lineamientos de la política institucional de género del Poder Judicial de Paraguay. La Corte Suprema acordó: i) asegurar que los usuarios de los servicios judiciales reciban comunicaciones (con énfasis en género) en tiempo y forma que sean de fácil acceso y comprensión; ii) brindar información sobre género y derechos de género; sensibilizar sobre la importancia de denunciar hechos que vulneran los derechos y la dignidad de las personas; iii) difundir jurisprudencia que estudie temas de género; iv) digitalizar las sentencias (con enfoque de género) emitidas por diferentes tribunales; cumplir con los estándares internacionales; crear un marco para la toma de decisiones que incorpore un enfoque de género; v) contratación de personal capacitado para atender reclamos relacionados con el género.



Decisión 845 de octubre 1, 2013 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República de Paraguay (2013)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, International law

This decision resolved to implement the content of the ‘United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders,’ known as the ‘Bangkok Rules.’ The incorporation of such rules seeks for the creation of public policies aimed to eliminate discrimination against convicted women, establish legal protection of women’s rights in courts, and promote equality between women and men before the Justice Administration System. The decision also provided for a multidisciplinary commission composed of the Secretariat for Gender, the Directorate of Human Rights, the Directorate of International Affairs and the Penitentiary Monitoring Unit. Such commission is responsible of promoting the Bangkok Rules and raising awareness of all components of the Judiciary branch.

Esta decisión resolvió implementar el contenido de las 'Reglas de las Naciones Unidas para el Tratamiento de Reclusas y Medidas no Privativas de la Libertad para Mujeres Delincuentes', conocidas como 'Reglas de Bangkok'. La incorporación de dichas reglas busca la creación de políticas públicas dirigidas eliminar la discriminación contra las mujeres condenadas, establecer la protección legal de los derechos de las mujeres en las cortes y promover la igualdad entre mujeres y hombres ante el Sistema de Administración de Justicia. La decisión también dispuso una comisión multidisciplinaria integrada por la Secretaría de Género, la Dirección de Derechos Humanos, la Dirección de Asuntos Internacionales y la Unidad de Seguimiento Penitenciario. Dicha comisión es responsable de promover las Reglas de Bangkok y sensibilizar a todos los componentes del Poder Judicial.



Sentencia de unificación (Sentencia SU070-13; Expedientes acumulados: T-2.361.117 y 32 más) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This decision unified court’s criteria regarding issues of protection of motherhood and employment rights for pregnant women. The Constitutional Court analyzed 33 cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers after learning of their pregnancy status. The court ruled in favor of reinforced protection of motherhood in the workplace. Such doctrine must be duly applied in all those cases in which a woman is pregnant or during her lactation period. In relation to the dismissal of female workers, the court established criteria that takes into consideration the knowledge of the pregnancy status by the employer. It is argued that in order to dismiss a woman under such circumstances, the employer shall demonstrate (i) that a fair motive can be argued and (ii) that permission from the competent administrative authority has been granted. The required protection measures in cases where the employer dismissed the worker without the aforementioned procedure are as follows: (i) recognition of health benefits, up to the moment the woman acquires the right to claim the economic maternity leave benefit; (ii) reinstatement of the pregnant woman or the renewal of her contract, whenever possible; (iii) in some cases, compensation as provided for in article 239 of the Labor Code.

Esta sentencia unificó los criterios de la Corte Constitucional en temas de protección de la maternidad y derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas. La Corte Constitucional analizó 33 casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores después de conocer su estado de embarazo. El tribunal falló a favor de una protección laboral reforzada de la maternidad en el lugar de trabajo. Tal doctrina debe ser debidamente aplicada en todos aquellos casos en los que una mujer se encuentre embarazada o lactando. En relación con el despido de trabajadoras, la Corte estableció criterios que toman en consideración el conocimiento del estado de embarazo por parte del empleador. Se argumenta que, para despedir a una mujer embarazada, el empleador deberá demostrar (i) que se puede alegar una justa causa y (ii) que se ha otorgado el permiso de la autoridad administrativa competente. Las medidas de protección requeridas en los casos en que el empleador despida a la trabajadora sin el procedimiento antes mencionado son las siguientes: (i) reconocimiento de beneficios de salud, hasta el momento en que la mujer adquiera el derecho a reclamar el beneficio económico de licencia por maternidad; (ii) la reincorporación de la mujer embarazada o la renovación de su contrato, cuando sea posible; (iii) en algunos casos, la indemnización prevista en el artículo 239 del Código del Trabajo.



Sentencia de unificación (Sentencia SU075-18, Expedientes acumulados: T-6.240.380, T-6.318.375, T-6.645.503) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This decision unified the court’s criteria regarding employment rights for pregnant women and their special labor protections. The Constitutional Court analyzed three cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers, who were not aware of the workers’ pregnancy status at the time of dismissal. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed the importance of guaranteeing job security for pregnant workers, especially during the lactation period, as a measure to avoid discrimination against women at work. Consequently, in order to dismiss a worker whose pregnancy status was known by the employer, an employment inspector must grant permission beforehand. However, the court ruled by elaborating on previous jurisprudence, that it was excessive to oblige a former employer to readmit an employee and pay social security contributions for a worker who was dismissed without prior knowledge of her pregnancy status. In the study of those cases, the court held that when the employer has no knowledge of the pregnancy status and terminates a pregnant employee’s employment contract, no discrimination can be argued and therefore no protection of motherhood can be granted.

Esta sentencia unificó el criterio de la Corte Constitucional respecto de los derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas y su protección laboral reforzada. La Corte Constitucional analizó tres casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores, quienes desconocían el estado de embarazo de las trabajadoras al momento del despido. La Corte Constitucional reafirmó la importancia de garantizar la estabilidad laboral de las trabajadoras embarazadas, especialmente durante el período de lactancia, como medida para evitar la discriminación laboral de las mujeres. En consecuencia, para despedir a una trabajadora cuyo estado de embarazo era conocido por el empleador, un inspector de trabajo debe otorgar un permiso previo. Sin embargo, la Corte Constitucional dictaminó, con base en fuentes jurisprudenciales, que era excesivo obligar a un ex empleador a readmitir a una empleada y pagar las contribuciones a la seguridad social de una trabajadora que fue despedida, si no tenían conocimiento previo de su estado de embarazo. En el estudio de esos casos, la Corte Constitucional sostuvo que cuando el empleador no tiene conocimiento del estado de embarazo y termina el contrato de trabajo de una empleada embarazada, no se puede alegar discriminación y, por lo tanto, no se puede otorgar protección laboral reforzada.



Persona Protegida vs Juzgado Primero Promiscuo de Familia de Filadelfia e Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (Sentencia T-468-18 - Acción de Tutela; Expediente T-6.607.437) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2018)


Gender discrimination

The case concerned the capacity and dignity of mothers with disabilities. The court ultimately reinstated the mother’s custody of her child, who was given for adoption by the state as a result of the mother’s disability in violation of her rights. The court’s decision served two purposes: (i) to protect the best interests of the child, guarantee their right to have a family, and not be separated from it; and (ii) compliance with all of the state’s obligations towards persons with disabilities and their right to form a family with dignity. The court ordered the Ombudsman’s Office to compose a committee consisting of a doctor, psychologist, and a social worker in order to follow-up with the mother and identify the obstacles and specific problems that she may have in the exercise of her responsibilities when raising her child.

El caso se refería al derecho de la dignidad humana de las madres con discapacidad. La Corte decidió restablecer la custodia de la madre sobre su hijo. El tribunal encontró que existió una violación de los derechos de una madre en situación de discapacidad cuyo hijo fue dado en adopción por el Estado como resultado de la discapacidad de la madre. La decisión de la Corte atendió a dos propósitos: (i) proteger el interés superior del niño y garantizar su derecho a tener una familia y a no ser separado de ella; y (ii) el cumplimiento de todas las obligaciones del Estado hacia las personas con discapacidad y el derecho de las personas en situación de discapacidad a formar una familia en condiciones dignas. Adicionalmente, la Corte ordenó a la Defensoría del Pueblo conformar un comité integrado por un médico, un psicólogo y una trabajadora social con el fin de hacer seguimiento a la madre e identificar los obstáculos y problemas específicos que pueda tener en el ejercicio de sus responsabilidades al criar a su hijo.



Esperanza y otros vs el Ministerio de Defensa (Sentencia T-594-16 -Acción de Tutela-; Expediente T-5.596.207) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This case concerned issues of personal freedom and the discrimination against sex workers. The ruling resulted in the protection of two sex workers’ fundamental rights: to be treated equally and not be discriminated because of their profession. The events that triggered such protection concerned a police raid against sex workers in Bogotá under the excuse of regaining a public space. At that time, the Government was working on the implementation of a special protection program, including special training for police, to promote the importance of the dignified treatment of sex workers and the prohibition of verbal and physical abuse. The decision ultimately further reinforced constitutional protections for sex workers’ rights to freedom, work, free movement, and non-discrimination.

Este caso se refería a cuestiones de libertad personal y discriminación contra las trabajadoras sexuales. El fallo otorgó la protección de los derechos fundamentales de dos trabajadoras sexuales a ser tratadas por igual y a no ser discriminadas por su profesión. Los hechos que desencadenaron tal protección se referían a un allanamiento policial en contra de trabajadoras sexuales en Bogotá bajo el pretexto de la recuperación del espacio público. En ese momento, el Gobierno estaba trabajando en la implementación de un programa de protección especial, incluida la capacitación especial para policías para promover la importancia del trato digno de las trabajadoras sexuales y la prohibición del abuso verbal y físico contra ellas. La decisión finalmente reforzó aún más que los derechos de las trabajadoras sexuales a la libertad, el trabajo, la libre circulación y la no discriminación están protegidos constitucionalmente.



Lais vs Pandemo Club propiedad del Sr. Zoto (Lais vs Pandemo Club owned by Mr. Zoto) (Sentencia T-629-10 - Acción de Tutela; Expediente T-2384611) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The case concerned labor rights and protection of sex workers. The plaintiff, a sex worker, sued her former employer for firing her after she became pregnant. Under articles 236 and 239 of the Colombian Labor Code, a pregnant woman is subject to special labor protection, and therefore cannot be fired without cause and without authorities’ permission. The court consisdered whether pregnant sex workers should have the same labor protection as other professions. Article 13 of the Constitution provides the right of all citizens to be treated equally, as such, the court held it necessary to provide the aforementioned labor protection to sex workers. This conclusion was achieved by virtue of comparative law and legislation, where the protection shall be provided in connection with the right to motherhood. Sex workers, whether men or women, shall not be discriminated and should hold the same rights as any other worker. In this regard, court acknowledged the plaintiff’s right to the financial compensation she was entitled to.

El caso se refería a los derechos laborales y la protección de las trabajadoras sexuales. La demandante, una trabajadora sexual, demandó a su antiguo empleador por despedirla después de quedar embarazada. De conformidad con los artículos 236 y 239 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, la mujer embarazada es sujeto de una protección laboral reforzada, por lo que no puede ser despedida sin justa causa y sin permiso de las autoridades competentes. El tribunal analizó si las trabajadoras sexuales embarazadas deberían tener la misma protección laboral que otras profesiones. El artículo 13 de la Constitución establece el derecho de todos los ciudadanos a ser tratados por igual, por lo que el tribunal consideró necesario extender la mencionada protección laboral a las trabajadoras sexuales. Esta conclusión se logró en virtud de análisis de derecho comparado y de la legislación local, donde la protección nace del estado de embarazo. Los trabajadores sexuales, ya sean hombres o mujeres, no deben ser discriminados y deben tener los mismos derechos que cualquier otro trabajador. En este sentido, el tribunal reconoció el derecho de la demandante a la compensación económica a la que tenía derecho.



H.A.H v S.A.A and Others Supreme Court of Ireland (2017)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, International law

The applicant was given refugee status and had successfully applied for permission for his second wife to join him in Ireland. The present case arose when he sought to have his first wife join him. In considering the legal consequences of a polygamous marriage entered into in another country, the Supreme Court ruled that, where a man had married two wives under the laws of Lebanon, the first marriage is valid under Irish law but the second is not. The appellant (husband) had married two women in a manner permissible under the laws of Lebanon (their previous state of domicile). He sought a declaration, pursuant to Section 29 of the Family Law Act 1995, that his marriage to his first wife was valid on the date of its inception. The High Court found the polygamous marriage entirely invalid. On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that: (a) rules of private international law require the State to recognize a marriage validly contracted under a foreign system of law unless such recognition is prohibited by public policy; (b) the Constitution and Irish public policy envisage a marriage as a union between two people based on the principles of equality and mutual commitment; (c) there is therefore no bar to recognizing a marriage “that is in fact monogamous, where the only objection is that the system of law under which the couple married would permit more than one marriage;” and (d) Irish law and the Irish Constitution preclude the recognition of a second or subsequent marriage while the first marriage is valid, although that does not mean that a subsequent marriage can never have legal consequences. The Court granted the declaration of the validity of the first marriage because it was valid when contracted and the husband’s subsequent marriage should not preclude that.



Foy v. Registrar General & Attorney General High Court of Ireland (2007)


Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

In 2007, the High Court held that the failure to allow the applicant, a transgender woman who had undergone gender-affirming surgery, to obtain a new birth certificate recording her gender as female violated her rights under Article 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which had been made part of Irish law, despite having found in previous proceedings involving the same applicant that her constitutional right to privacy was not disproportionately or excessively infringed. The Court agreed with the applicant that existing Irish law barred the effective recognition of her Article 8 and 12 rights in Ireland as they rendered her without the power to correct or vary the original entry on her birth certificate. The High Court considered the European Court of Human Right’s 2002 decisions in Goodwin v. United Kingdom and I. v. United Kingdom, in which the Court held that the State’s failure to have a system of law in place affording proper respect for a trans person’s Convention rights violated Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention.



Nr. 7/2017 „Dėl Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo nario Kęstučio Pūko, kuriam pradėta apkaltos byla, veiksmų atitikties Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucijai“ (No. 7/2017 on the Compliance of the Actions of Kęstutis Pūkas) Konstitucinis Teismas (Constitutional Court) (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

In this case, a member of the Parliament was accused of sexually harassing women who applied to become his secretary. The Constitutional Court held that sexual harassment is a gross violation of the Constitution and the breaking of the oath of a Parliament member. The Court explained that sexual harassment is defined as “undesirable behavior related to sex intended to degrade or degrade human dignity and create a hostile, humiliating or offensive environment.” It emphasized that harassment infringes on a person’s physical, psychological, and spiritual integrity and intellectual and creative freedom. English translation available here.

Šioje byloje Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo narys buvo apkaltintas seksualiniu priekabiavimu prie moterų, kurios ėjo jo padėjėjos-sekretorės pareigas bei pokalbių dėl šios darbo vietos metu. Konstitucinis Teismas konstatavo, kad seksualinis priekabiavimas yra šiurkštus Konstitucijos pažeidimas ir Seimo nario priesaikos sulaužymas. Teismas paaiškino, kad seksualinis priekabiavimas yra apibrėžiamas kaip „nepageidaujamas elgesys, susijęs su lytimi, kuriuo siekiama pažeminti ar yra žeminamas žmogaus orumas“ sukuriant, ar siekiant sukurti, priešišką, žeminančią ar žeidžiančią aplinką. Be to, pabrėžta, kad priekabiavimas pažeidžia asmens fizinę, psichologinę ir dvasinę neliečiamybę bei intelektinę ir kūrybinę laisvę.



L. Š. prieš Rumunijos ambasadą Lietuvos Respublikoje (L.Š. v. Romanian Embassy in Lithuania) Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas (Court of Appeal of Lithuania) (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The applicant, a translator for the Romanian Embassy, was terminated without explanation the day after officially informing the employer of her pregnancy. She argued that her dismissal was based on gender discrimination, while the employer stated that it was because of unsatisfactory results during the contractual probationary period. The Court ruled in favor of the applicant awarding LT 50,000 in pecuniary and LT 10,000 in non-pecuniary damages to be paid by the Romanian Embassy in the Republic of Lithuania.

Pareiškėja, vertėja Rumunijos ambasadoje, buvo atleista iš darbo be paaiškinimo dieną po to, kai oficialiai informavo darbdavį apie savo nėštumą. Ji grindė šį atleidimą diskriminacija dėl lyties, bet darbdavys nurodė, kad priežastis buvo nepatenkinami rezultatai bandomuoju sutarties laikotarpiu. Teismas priėmė sprendimą ieškovės naudai priteisdamas 50 000 LT turtinės žalos ir 10 000 LT neturtinės žalos, kurią turi sumokėti Rumunijos ambasada Lietuvos Respublikoje.



Dėl leidimo laikinai gyventi Lietuvoje užsieniečiui šeimos susijungimo pagrindu Nr. 16/2016 (On the Law “Legal Situation of Foreigners” Compliance with the Constitution) Konstitucinis Teismas (Constitutional Court) (2018)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

A Belarusian citizen and a Lithuanian registered their same-sex marriage in Denmark. In the same year, the Belarusian citizen applied for a Residency Permit on grounds of Family Reunification in Lithuania. However, it was denied by the Migration Department because neither same-sex marriage nor same-sex partnership is legal in Lithuania. The District Court affirmed the Migration Department’s decision; however, upon appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court decided to refer the case to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court reiterated their 2011 decision that a family is formed on the basis of “continuous emotional affection, mutual understanding, responsibility, respect, co-parenting, and the like” rather than solely by the institution of marriage. Therefore, the Court concluded that the State must not discriminate based on gender and/or sexual orientation in granting Residence Permits to foreign nationals reuniting with their spouses in Lithuania (see case No. 21/2008). English translation available here.

Danijoje tos pačios lyties asmenų santuoką įregistravo Baltarusijos pilietis ir lietuvis. Tais pačiais metais šis sutuoktinis iš Baltarusijos kreipėsi dėl leidimo gyventi Lietuvos Respublikoje šeimos susijungimo pagrindu. Tačiau, Migracijos departamentas prašymą atmetė, nes Lietuvoje nėra įteisintos nei tos pačios lyties asmenų santuoka, nei tos pačios lyties asmenų partnerystė. Apygardos teismas patvirtino Migracijos departamento sprendimą, tačiau Vyriausiasis administracinis teismas nusprendė perduoti bylą Konstituciniam Teismui, kuris pakartojo savo 2011 metų sprendimą, kad šeima kuriama remiantis „nuolatine emocine meile, tarpusavio supratimu, atsakomybe, pagarba, bendru auklėjimu ir panašiais dalykais“, o ne vien santuokos institucija. Todėl Teismas padarė išvadą, kad valstybė negali diskriminuoti dėl lyties ir (ar) seksualinės orientacijos, atsisakydama suteikti leidimą gyventi Lietuvoje užsienio piliečiams, kurie siekia šeimos susijungimo su savo sutuoktiniais.



Dėl Valstybinės šeimos politikos koncepcijos Nr. 21/2008 (On the Concept of State Family Policy) Konstitucinis Teismas (Constitutional Court) (2011)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Property and inheritance rights

Amongst other things, this case sets out that the constitutional concept of family is not only derived from the institution of marriage. According to the Court, a family formed on the basis of “continuous emotional affection, mutual understanding, responsibility, respect, co-parenting, and the like” is also protected by the Constitution. The significance of such family definition for same-sex partners was proven years later by the Constitutional Court case No. 16/2016. The Court affirmed that the State must not discriminate based on gender and/or sexual orientation in granting Residence Permits to foreign nationals reuniting with their spouses, even if same-sex marriage or same-sex partnership is not legal in Lithuania.

Šioje byloje nustatyta, kad konstitucinė šeimos samprata kyla ne tik iš santuokos institucijos. Pasak Teismo, šeima, sudaryta remiantis „pastoviais emocinio prieraišumo, tarpusavio supratimo, atsakomybės, pagarbos, bendro vaikų auklėjimo ir panašiais ryšiais“ taip pat yra saugoma Konstitucijos. Tokio šeimos apibrėžimo reikšmė tos pačios lyties partneriams po daugelio metų įrodyta byloje Nr. 16/2016, kurioje Konstitucinis Teismas patvirtino, kad valstybė negali diskriminuoti dėl lyties ir (ar) seksualinės orientacijos, suteikdama užsieniečiui sutuoktiniui leidimą laikinai gyventi Lietuvos Respublikoje šeimos susijungimo atveju, net jei tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokos ar partnerystė Lietuvoje nėra teisėta.



In der Beschwerdesache der Susanne T. (In the Matter of Susanne T.) [B 1186/11-6] Österreichischer Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian Constitutional Court) (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The female appellant, a civil servant of the Office of the Austrian Labor Market, applied for a position as head of the relevant regional office with three other male candidates. One of the men was chosen for the position. The plaintiff claimed that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of sex, among other reasons, because she was equally qualified for the position and the interviewer asked her why women could not find fulfilment in educating children during the application process. The Equal Treatment Commission, which the appellant appealed to first, found that the employer violated the directive to promote women. After considering all expert reports, interim judgments and other evidence in the case, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately agreed with the appellant and awarded her compensation. The Court found the decision of the Office to be arbitrary as it was considering facts contrary to the content in the files. Furthermore, the Court found the application process discriminatory because of the question about why women could not find fulfillment in educating children.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, eine Beamtin des österreichischen Arbeitsmarktservice, bewarb sich zusammen mit drei anderen männlichen Bewerbern um eine Stelle als Leiterin des zuständigen Regionalbüros. Einer der Männer wurde für diese Stelle ausgewählt. Die Klägerin behauptete, sie sei unter anderem deshalb wegen ihres Geschlechts diskriminiert worden, weil sie für die Stelle gleich qualifiziert war und der Interviewer sie während des Bewerbungsverfahrens fragte, warum Frauen keine Erfüllung in der Kindererziehung finden könnten. Die Gleichbehandlungskommission, die die Beschwerdeführerin zuerst angerufen hatte, stellte fest, dass der Arbeitgeber gegen das Frauenförderungsgebot verstoßen hatte. Nach Prüfung aller Sachverständigengutachten, Zwischenurteile und sonstiger Beweise in diesem Fall gab der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof der Beschwerdeführerin schließlich Recht und sprach ihr eine Entschädigung zu. Das Gericht befand die Entscheidung des Amtes für willkürlich, da es Fakten berücksichtigte, die im Widerspruch zum Inhalt der Akten standen. Darüber hinaus befand das Gericht das Antragsverfahren als diskriminierend, da es um die Frage ging, warum Frauen keine Erfüllung in der Kindererziehung finden können.



G 16/2013-16, G 44/2013-14 Österreichischer Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian Constitutional Court) (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

The local court denied the petitioner’s motion to certify the approval of her female partner to conduct in vitro fertilization with a third person’s semen. The regional court denied the appeal. It held that the wording of the Austrian Reproductive Medicine Act (FMedG) aims to exclude same-sex parenthood. The Supreme Court decided to bring this question to the attention of the Austrian Constitutional Court. The Austrian Constitutional Court decided that certain sections of the FMedG were unconstitutional. Referencing the European Court of Human Right’s judgements, the Court stressed that same-sex partnerships can fall under the protection of Article 8 of the EHRC as a family. Even though the legislature has discretion in the implementation of new rules, the FMedG is missing sufficient grounds for a differential treatment of same sex couples and heterosexual couples. The impact of this decision was far-reaching because it made it immediately permissible for lesbian couples to receive sperm donations and reproductive medication. Before this decision, these medical treatments were solely available to heterosexual couples.

Das Amtsgericht lehnte den Antrag der Antragsstellerin ab, die Zustimmung ihres weiblichen Partners zur Durchführung einer In-vitro-Fertilisation mit dem Samen einer dritten Person zu bescheinigen. Das Landgericht wies die Berufung zurück. Es vertrat die Auffassung, dass der Wortlaut des österreichischen Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzes (FMedG) darauf abziele, gleichgeschlechtliche Elternschaft auszuschließen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof beschloss, den österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof mit dieser Frage zu befassen. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof entschied, dass bestimmte Abschnitte des FMedG verfassungswidrig sind. Unter Verweis auf die Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte betonte das Gericht, dass gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften als Familie unter den Schutz von Artikel 8 der EMRK fallen können. Auch wenn der Gesetzgeber bei der Umsetzung neuer Regelungen einen Ermessensspielraum hat, fehlt es dem FMedG an einer ausreichenden Begründung für eine unterschiedliche Behandlung von gleichgeschlechtlichen und heterosexuellen Paaren. Die Auswirkungen dieser Entscheidung waren weitreichend, da sie es lesbischen Paaren sofort erlaubte, Samenspenden und reproduktionsmedizinische Behandlungen in Anspruch zu nehmen. Vor dieser Entscheidung waren diese medizinischen Behandlungen ausschließlich heterosexuellen Paaren vorbehalten.



In der Revisionssache der B (In the Matter of B.) [10 ObS 115/17k] Österreichischer Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff lost a portion of her salary because she could not work overtime during her pregnancy. In deciding whether she was entitled to maternity leave payments, the Austrian Supreme Court considered the overtime work element rather than regular wage elements. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, causing a general improvement in the financial position of Austrian maternity benefit recipients.

Die Klägerin verlor einen Teil ihres Gehalts, weil sie während ihrer Schwangerschaft keine Überstunden machen konnte. Bei der Entscheidung, ob sie Anspruch auf Mutterschaftsurlaubszahlungen hatte, berücksichtigte der österreichische Oberste Gerichtshof das Element der Überstundenarbeit und nicht die regulären Lohnbestandteile. Der Oberste Gerichtshof entschied zugunsten der Klägerin, was zu einer allgemeinen Verbesserung der finanziellen Lage der österreichischen Bezieherinnen von Mutterschaftsgeld führte.



In der Beschwerdesache der A (In the Matter of A.) [E 1948/2018-13] (2019)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The appellant, a Somali girl, applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection due to her precarious situation in Yemen. The appellant’s family fled to Yemen when she was four years old because her family was discriminated against in Somalia due to their affiliation with a Madhibaan minority clan. The plaintiff’s brother and father were killed and no other family remained in Somalia. Further, female genital mutilation is a common practice in Somalia. The appellant’s application for asylum and international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that the nature of the persecution was found to be insufficiently intense or severe. It was further decided that the appellant’s genital mutilation had already happened , so the international protection against threatened genital mutilation could not apply. However, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of this case were not given sufficient consideration, in particular, the disregard of the fact that women of minority clans in the relevant geographic areas were particularly vulnerable to risks of torture, rape, murder, and forced marriages. The lower court also failed to consider sufficiently the possibility of repeated genital mutilation. Finally, the Court referred to UNHCR’s finding that prior genital mutilation was an equally reasonable justification for the application for asylum and international protection because the victim suffered life-long physical and mental damages.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, ein somalisches Mädchen, beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz aufgrund ihrer prekären Situation im Jemen. Die Familie der Klägerin floh in den Jemen, als sie vier Jahre alt war, weil ihre Familie in Somalia aufgrund ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu einem Clan der Madhibaan-Minderheit diskriminiert wurde. Der Bruder und der Vater der Klägerin wurden getötet, und keine andere Familie blieb in Somalia. Außerdem ist die weibliche Genitalverstümmelung in Somalia eine gängige Praxis. Der Antrag der Klägerin auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, dass die Art der Verfolgung nicht ausreichend intensiv oder schwer sei. Außerdem wurde festgestellt, dass die Genitalverstümmelung der Beschwerdeführerin bereits stattgefunden hatte, so dass der internationale Schutz gegen drohende Genitalverstümmelung nicht zur Anwendung kommen konnte. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf, da er (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) feststellte, dass die Umstände dieses Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt wurden, insbesondere die Tatsache, dass Frauen von Minderheitenclans in den betreffenden geografischen Gebieten besonders gefährdet sind, gefoltert, vergewaltigt, ermordet und zwangsverheiratet werden. Die Vorinstanz hat auch die Möglichkeit wiederholter Genitalverstümmelung nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt. Schließlich verwies das Gericht auf die Feststellung des UNHCR, dass eine frühere Genitalverstümmelung eine ebenso angemessene Begründung für den Antrag auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz sei, da das Opfer lebenslange körperliche und seelische Schäden erleidet.



In der Beschwerdesache der A (In the Matter of A.) [E 1043/2020-10] Österreichischer Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian Constitutional Court) (2020)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, International law

The appellant, a 22-year-old Somali woman, applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection, stating that she was abducted by the Al-Shabaab Militia and her uncle arranged a forced marriage for her. Her application for asylum and international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that the reasons stated by the appellant were not credible, too vague, and contradictory. In addition, the fact that she still had family (including her uncle) in Somalia was deemed as sufficient proof that she could lead a life without undue hardship. However, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of this case were not given sufficient consideration, particularly, the fact that it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to return to her family. The court did not sufficiently investigate and consider that the appellant’s uncle appeared to have beaten her several times, robbed her, locked her up, forced genital mutilation upon her and arranged for a forced wedding. The Court found the appellant’s right to equal treatment violated.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, eine 22-jährige Somalierin, beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz mit der Begründung, sie sei von der Al-Shabaab-Miliz entführt und von ihrem Onkel zwangsverheiratet worden. Ihr Antrag auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, die von der Beschwerdeführerin angegebenen Gründe seien nicht glaubwürdig, zu vage und widersprüchlich. Darüber hinaus wurde die Tatsache, dass sie noch Familie (einschließlich ihres Onkels) in Somalia hatte, als ausreichender Beweis dafür angesehen, dass sie ein Leben ohne unzumutbare Härten führen konnte. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf, weil er (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) feststellte, dass die Umstände dieses Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt worden waren, insbesondere die Tatsache, dass es für die Klägerin unzumutbar wäre, zu ihrer Familie zurückzukehren. Das Gericht hat nicht ausreichend untersucht und berücksichtigt, dass der Onkel der Rechtsmittelführerin sie offenbar mehrfach geschlagen, ausgeraubt, eingesperrt, ihr eine Genitalverstümmelung aufgezwungen und eine Zwangshochzeit arrangiert hat. Das Gericht stellte fest, dass das Recht der Beschwerdeführerin auf Gleichbehandlung verletzt wurde.



Kambalame v. Republic High Court of Malawi Criminal Division (2017)


Gender discrimination, Statutory rape or defilement

The appellant pleaded guilty to raping and impregnating a 12-year-old girl for which he was originally sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with hard labor. On appeal, the appellant argued that his sentence was excessive in light of mitigating factors. While recognizing the victim’s age and pregnancy as aggravating factors, the appeals court reduced his sentence to nine years imprisonment. The court articulated several rules regarding mitigation in favor of this outcome based on the citation of cases from the appellant. First, the court stated that guilty pleas should reduce a sentence by one-third, even in the case of serious crimes. Second, citing in Rep v. Bamusi Mkwapatira, the court stated that all first-time offenders, regardless of the severity of the offense, should benefit from mitigation. Finally, the court identified the appellant, who was 33 years old at the time of the offense, as “youthful,” asserting that “men especially grow slowly mentally and at 35 they are at their prime experimenting with life.” Cautioning against mitigating too significantly, however, the court explicitly recognized the victim’s pregnancy, which “disturbed [her] life […] physically and psychologically,” and her very young age as aggravating factors. Thus, the court reduced the sentence by one-quarter, resulting in a nine-year sentence, rather than one-third or more.



Bostock v. Clayton County United States Supreme Court (2020)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The plaintiff, a gay man, participated in a gay recreational softball league. Subsequently, he received criticism at his job as a welfare services coordinator for Clayton Country, Georgia, for his sexual orientation and participating in the league. Previously he had received positive professional evaluations. In 2013, Clayton County conducted an internal audit of the funds the plaintiff managed and then dismissed him for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” The plaintiff filed a case with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His case was dismissed by the district court and such dismissal was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court had to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompassed discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court held that it was a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fire an employee for being gay or transgender. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” was that firing an employee based on sex was a violation of the Act. This, in turn, applied to one’s homosexuality or transgender status as discrimination on the basis of this required employers to discriminate against employees based on their sex.



司法院大法官會議第452號解釋 (J.Y. Interpretation No. 452) Constitutional Court of Taiwan (1998)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Article 1002 of the Civil Code in 1998 stipulated," The residence of the wife shall be that of the husband…; nevertheless, in case there is an agreement that the residence of the husband shall be that of the wife…, the agreement shall be upheld." This article was against the principle of equality and proportionality of the Constitution. Though the article allows the husband or wife to make an agreement about their residence, it failed to take into consideration that if a husband refuses to make such an agreement with his wife or if an agreement cannot be made, the wife has no choice but to accept her husband's domicile as hers. This article also failed to consider the wife's freedom to choose her residence; thus, it is unconstitutional.

1998年民法第1002條規定:「妻以夫之住所為住所…,但約定夫以妻之住所為住所…,從其約定。」此一規定因違反平等原則及比例原則而違憲。雖該條賦予夫妻一方得另行約定住所,但如夫拒絕為約定或雙方協議不成時,妻即須以夫之住所為住所。該條規定亦未考慮妻應有選擇住所之自由,故而違憲。



Quartson v Quartson Supreme Court (2012)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

This divorce case involved a couple that was married for 25 years. The petitioner-wife filed for divorce due to unreasonable behavior and adultery. She requested custody of their minor child, property rights as the court deemed fit, and that the respondent-husband vacate the marital home, pay a dissolution settlement, and cover court costs. The respondent, who was the family’s primary source of financial support, funded the construction of the parties’ marital home. Despite her inability to contribute financially, the wife oversaw construction of the home and took care of the couple’s children while the husband was away for years, both for work and in prison. The Supreme Court determined that, despite her failure to contribute financially to the parties’ acquisition of the marital home, the wife’s in-kind contributions to the family entitled her to a share of the marital home. Specifically, the court held that “principles of general fundamental human rights require that a person who is married to another and generally supervises the home, such that the other partner has a free hand to engage in economic activities, must not be discriminated against in the distribution of properties acquired during the marriage when the marriage is dissolved.”



Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus 28 December 2011 No. P-672/2011 Конституционного Суда (Constitutional Court of Belarus) (2011)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality of the law “on Amendments and Additions to the Code of the Republic of Belarus on Marriage and Family” dated 2011. The Court noted that the Constitution protects marriage, family, motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood. It further noted that the protection and strengthening of the family institution is an integral part of the State’s social policy and held that amendments to the Code are aimed at protecting the family. The Court further noted that the Constitutional guarantee on the equality of both spouses means equal rights and obligations, including the obligation, financially, to support the other spouse. This constitutional guarantee is implemented by the amendments to the Code as it expands the list of circumstances when one spouse can apply to a court for maintenance, including when that spouse is caring for a disabled common child. The Court also held that amendments to the Code establishing that certain contracts between the spouses, such as a prenuptial agreement and agreement on payment of alimony if they contain conditions regarding immovable property, have to be registered with the appropriate State organs, are aimed at ensuring legal certainty and consistency of legal regulation of marriage and family relationships. The Court held that the law “on Amendments and Additions to the Code of the Republic of Belarus on Marriage and Family” dated 2011 was constitutional as it was aimed at strengthening marriage and family institutions, and increasing the spouses’ awareness of their rights and responsibilities.



Decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court No. 7 dated 27 September 2012 on Judicial Practice in Cases involving Crimes against Sexual Inviolability or Sexual Freedom (Arts. 166-170 of the Criminal Code) Supreme Court of Belarus (2012)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The Plenum of the Supreme Court explained (i) that rape (Art. 166 of the Criminal Code) can be committed against women only, while violent sexual acts (Art. 167 of the Criminal Code) can be committed against both women and men, and (ii) that the victim’s circumstances, for example previous commission of a crime, lifestyle, or marital relationship to the offender, do not prohibit conviction of the offender for these crimes. The Plenum further held that “violence,” which is one of the conditions for commission of rape or violent sexual acts, shall be understood as a physical act against the victim (or relatives of the victim in case of rape). Examples of violence include tearing the victim’s clothes, causing physical pain, beating, strangulation, making the victim take alcohol or drugs against his or her will, restricting the victim’s freedom by tying, or locking the doors. Threat of violence shall be understood as specific words, actions, or gestures showing the intention of the offender to harm the victim. The Plenum noted that non-violent acts, such as obtaining consent by deception or abuse of trust (such as the promise to marry or to reward sexual favors) do not qualify under Arts. 166-167 of the Criminal Code. The Plenum further explained that “using the helpless state of the victim,” which is the alternative condition to violence or threat of violence for the commission of rape or violent sexual acts, shall mean that the victim due to young age, mental disorder, loss of consciousness, alcohol or drug intoxication could not understand the nature of actions performed with him or her or that due to a physical disability could not oppose it. The Plenum noted that it does not matter whether the offender made or witnessed the victim take alcohol or drugs or other intoxicating substances, rather the offender simply has to be aware of the intoxication that renders the victim helpless. The Plenum also explained that a person is not guilty of attempted rape or commission of violent acts of sexual nature if that person voluntary abandons the commission of the crime. Abandonment caused by circumstances beyond the control of the offender, such as resistance by the victim, third party interference, or physiological inability to commit the crime is not voluntary.



Argüição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 54 (Claim of non-compliance with fundamental precept No. 54) Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2012)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

In 2004, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) considered a claim brought by the National Trade Union of Health Workers and ANIS (Institute of Bioethics, Human Rights, and Gender) to determine whether terminating a pregnancy in which the fetus suffers from anencephaly (absence of major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp) violates the prohibition on abortion as set forth in Brazil’s Penal Code. On April 12, 2012, the STF rendered an 8-2 decision (with one abstention) that abortion in the circumstance of anencephaly is not a criminal act under the Penal Code. The majority extended a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy to cases of anencephalic fetuses because the fetus does not have the potential for a viable life outside of the womb, and to force a woman to carry such a pregnancy to term is akin to torture. Justice Marco Aurelio and the majority held that to interpret the Penal Code to prohibit such abortions would violate a woman’s constitutional guarantees of human dignity, autonomy, privacy, and the right to health. A woman therefore may seek and receive treatment to terminate the anencephalic pregnancy without risk of criminal prosecution and without judicial involvement.

Em 2004, a Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, quando da análise do Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 54 formalizada pela Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Saúde – CNTS, determinou que a interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico não viola as proibições de realização de aborto trazidas no Código Penal. Em abri de 2012, o Pleno do STF entendeu, por 8-2 votos (com uma abstenção), pela descriminalização do aborto realizado em razão da anencefalia do feto. A maioria estendeu o direito da mulher de interromper sua gravidez a casos de fetos anencefálicos porque o feto não tem potencial para uma vida viável fora do útero, e forçar uma mulher a levar tal gravidez adiante é semelhante a tortura. O Juiz Marco Aurélio e a maioria dos juízes sustentou que interpretar o Código Penal para proibir tais abortos violaria as garantias constitucionais de dignidade humana, autonomia, privacidade e o direito à saúde da mulher. Assim, a mulher poderá procurar e receber tratamento para interromper a gravidez anencefálica sem risco de processo criminal e sem envolvimento judicial.



司法院大法官會議第457號解釋 (J.Y. Interpretation No. 457) Constitutional Court of Taiwan (1998)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Regulations for the Handling of the Government Owned Housing and Farmlands Vacated by Married Veterans after Their Hospitalization, Retirement or Death distributes plots of state farmland to veterans. Section 4-III of the Regulations provides, “If the surviving spouse of the deceased veteran remarries but without issue or has only daughter(s), the land and housing shall be reclaimed unconditionally upon the marriage of the daughter(s); and the rights of the veteran may be inherited by his son, if any.” The Court explained that the government can allow a veteran’s surviving dependents to continue using and farming the state land distributed to veterans, and can extend the term “dependents” to a veteran’s children. In doing so, however, the government should consider the children’s ability to earn a living and cultivate the land, and must keep in mind the principle of gender equality enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution and Article 10-VI of the Amendments to the Constitution. The Court held that Section 4-III of the Regulations violates this principle because it limits the right of inheritance of a deceased veteran to the veteran’s son without regard to the son’s ability or marital status. Thus, the Court held that Section 4-III of the Regulations discriminates against a specific group of women on the premise of marital status and sex. As such, the Court held that the government must revise Section 4-III of the Regulations to remove the discriminatory provision.

行政院國軍退除役官兵輔導委員會發布之「本會各農場有眷場員就醫、就養或死亡開缺後房舍土地處理要點」第4條第3項規定:「死亡場員之遺眷如改嫁他人而無子女者或僅有女兒,其女兒出嫁後均應無條件收回土地及眷舍,如有兒子准由兒子繼承其權利」。法院解釋認為,政府可以允許退除役官兵的遺眷繼續使用和耕種分配給該退除役官兵的國有土地,並可以將「遺眷」一詞擴大解釋至該退除役官兵的子女。然而,於此同時,政府應考慮該子女的謀生和耕種能力,並且必須謹記憲法第7條和憲法增修條文第10條第6項規定的性別平等原則。法院認為,該要點第4條第3項規定違反了此一原則,因為其將已故退除役官兵的繼承權限制在退伍軍人的兒子身上,且不考慮兒子的謀生和耕種能力或婚姻狀況。因此,法院認為,該要點第4條第3項規定以婚姻狀況和性別為前提,歧視特定婦女群體。於此情況下,法院認為,政府必須修正該要點第4條第3項規定以刪除歧視條文。



平成16(受)1968 (2004 (Ju) No. 1968) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2006)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

Two female members of a certain local community which have collective property rights to a common land (called a "common" or a "hamlet") petitioned the court to decide the unconstitutionality of a traditional practice which determined membership and property rights within the community. The court held that this custom which excludes female descendants who married outside of the community, is "contrary to public order and therefore null and void" under Article 90 of the Civil Code. The court held that "the male descendant requirement discriminates against female descendants only because they are females" and it is unreasonable and against the constitutional principle of "essential gender equality."

上告人らは、本件で問題となっている入会地について入会権を有していた者の女性直系卑属であった。本件は、上告人らが、本件における習慣のうち入会権者の資格を男性直系卑属に限ることが公序良俗に反して無効であるなどと主張した事案である。最高裁は、男性直系卑属要件は、民法第90条の下「公序良俗に反しており、したがって無効である」と判断した。 裁判所は、男の男性直系卑属要件は、専ら女子であることのみを理由として女子を男子と差別したものというべきであり、性別のみによる不合理な差別とし、男女の本質的な平等という日本国憲法上の基本的原則に反するとした。



戸籍登録変更に関する異議申立書:28212731 (Appeal Concerning an Application for Permission to Revise a Family Registration, ID 28212731) 最高裁第三小法廷(2013年)(Third Petit Branch of the Supreme Court) (2013)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Person X1 transitioned from female to male. X1 registered as a male and married a woman, X2, in 2008. In 2009, X2 bore a child. In 2012, X1 applied to have the family registry reflect that X1 was the child’s father and that the child was born while X1 and X2 were married. The ward mayor in charge of changes to family registries held that there was a problem with the application because Article 774 of the Civil Law was inapplicable to the child’s situation as the child was not related by blood to X1. X1 did not comply with the ward mayor’s request to fix the application, so the ward mayor filled in the family registry for the child with a blank for father and a note that the child was X2’s oldest son. X1 and X2 filed suit to have X1 added as the child’s father on the grounds that the child should be presumed to be a “legitimately” born child based on Article 772 of the Civil Law. The Supreme Court held that the child should be presumed to be the son of X1, overruling the lower court and the ward mayor’s decision. The court reasoned that under Article 3.1 of the Gender Identity Disorder Law, a transgender man should be treated for all purposes under the law as a man. The court held that this includes being able to marry and have a “legitimate” child. Following this decision, the Ministry of Justice issued a notification on 27 January, 2014 directing that this procedure be followed for any similarly situated families. Subsequently, the state changed the family registry for 45 such couples to reflect that both parents are their children’s parents.

X1は女性だったが、男性になるため、性転換手術を受けた。その後、彼は男性として登録し、2008年に女性のX2と結婚した。その翌年、X2は子どもを出産した。2012年、X1は、X1が子どもの父親であること、子どもがX1とX2の婚姻中に生まれたことを戸籍に反映させることを地方公共団体に請求した。戸籍変更を担当する区長は、子どもがX1と血縁関係にないことから、民法774条の適用を受けられないため、申請に問題があると、子の戸籍に父の欄を空欄にして、子がX2の長男であると記入した。X1とX2は、子が民法772条に基づいて「嫡出子」と推定されるべきであるとして、X1を子の父として加えることを要求し提訴した。最高裁は、X1の子と推定すべきであるとし、下級審および区長の判断を棄却し、「性同一性障害の性別の取り扱いの特例に関する法律」第3条第1項に基づき、トランスジェンダーの男性は、法に基づき、あらことで男性として扱われるべきであるとした。これには、結婚して「正当に」子どもを産むことができることも含まれるとした。この判決を受けて、法務省は2014年1月27日に、同様の状況にある家族に対してこの手続きを行うよう指示する通達を出した。その後、国は、そのようなカップル45組の戸籍を訂正した。



平成24年(受)2231 (2012 (Ju) No. 2231) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was a physiotherapist in a managerial position at her employer. She requested and was granted maternity leave but was not allowed to return to her position at the end of the maternity leave. She filed a lawsuit against her employer, asserting that there was a violation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law. The Supreme Court found in favor of the plaintiff because the Equal Employment Opportunity Law forbids disadvantaging employees based on the employee’s pregnancy, childbirth, request for maternity leave, or request for transfer to lighter work.

原告は、管理職にあった理学療法士で、育児休業の終了後、元の職に戻れなかったことから、被告の雇用主に対して、男女雇用機会均等法違反に基づいて損害賠償を求めた。最高裁は、男女雇用機会均等法は、妊娠・出産・産前産後休暇の申請・軽易な業務への転換の申請などを理由に従業員に不利益な扱いを禁じていることを理由に、原告を支持した。



平成10年(オ)576 (1998 (O) No. 576) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2001)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The plaintiff had breast cancer and sued her operating surgeon who conducted a mastectomy arguing that he had a duty to inform her in advance that there are other treatments that do not require complete breast removal. The Supreme Court determined that the surgeon had a legal obligation to give her an opportunity to make an informed decision about her treatment, in this case by providing the name and address of medical institutions that conduct breast cancer operations that do not remove the entire breast.

本件は、乳がんと診断され、乳房を完全切除した患者が、乳房を完全切除しなくても済む治療法があることの充分な説明を事前受けていなかったとして、医師を訴えた事案である。最高裁は、医師には原告に対して治療法についての十分な情報を与えた上で決定を行う機会を与える法的義務があると判断し、本件では、乳房を切除しない乳がん治療を行うことができる医療機関の名称及び所在などを説明する義務を負っていたとした。



File No. PL. ÚS 24/14 Ústavný súd Slovenskej republiky (Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic) (2014)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

In Slovakia, a petition signed by at least 350,000 voters may initiate a referendum as long as the questions relate to public interest. However, the subject of the referendum may not be basic rights and freedoms. The Constitutional Court reviews whether the subject of the referendum conforms to the Constitution. In 2014, 408,000 voters signed a petition asking the President to announce a referendum on the following questions: 1) Do you agree that the term “marriage” may not be used to designate any other form of cohabitation of persons other than the union between one man and one woman?; 2) Do you agree that pairs or groups of persons of the same sex may not be allowed to adopt children and subsequently to bring them up?; 3) Do you agree that no other form of cohabitation of persons other than marriage should be accorded the special protection, rights and obligations which are accorded solely to marriage and spouses by the legal system as at 1 March 2014?; and 4) Do you agree that schools may not require children to attend lessons in the field of sexual behavior or euthanasia, if their parents and the children themselves do not agree with the teaching content? The President asked the court to consider whether the first, second, and third questions were admissible as they related to the right to privacy, and whether the last question was admissible as it might interfere with the right to education. The Constitutional Court balanced the inalterability of constitutional provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms with the impossibility of rejecting every question which might minimally affect a right or freedom. The court held that the irrevocability of human rights means the standard of human rights is as set in the constitutional text. Any referendum questions that would lead to a broadening of human rights would be constitutionally acceptable, and any that would reduce human rights would not be constitutionally acceptable. Thus, the first, second, and fourth question were declared acceptable, and the third unacceptable. This case is available through the search function on the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic website here by searching for the case file number (PL. ÚS 24/2014).



司法院釋字第791號解釋摘要 (J.Y. Interpretation 791) Taiwan Constitutional Court (2020)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

Article 239 of the Taiwan Criminal Code stipulates, "Anyone who has a spouse and commits adultery with another person shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. The same applies to those who commit adultery." This Interpretation overrules J.Y. Interpretation No. 554 (2002), which affirmed the constitutionality of the Criminal Code’s restriction on individual sexual freedom on the grounds that such freedom was subject to restriction for the purpose of protecting the marriage and family. In this Interpretation, the Court expanded the scope of sexual autonomy under Article 22 of the Constitution and held that the infringement of the rights to sexual autonomy and of individual privacy by the criminalization of adultery fail the proportionality test in the Constitution’s Article 23. The Court found Article 239 unconstitutional because it restricted an individual's freedom to decide whether and with whom to engage in sexual activity. However, the state should generally limit the punishments for illegal acts to those detrimental to social order or public welfare. Therefore, while adultery is undoubtedly detrimental to the obligation of fidelity in a marriage and the feelings and expectations of the other party, it is not clearly detrimental to the social order or public welfare. Further, adultery mainly occurs in private. The process of discovery, prosecution, and trial inevitably interferes with personal privacy, driving the state's public power straight into the very private space of the people. Therefore, the Court found that the regulation causes more significant damage than the interest it intends to protect. This case is important not only in its recognition of a constitutionally-protected right to sexual autonomy and its emphasis on individual privacy but also because the Criminal Code provisions on adultery reportedly had been applied disproportionately against women and also to pressure women not to pursue sexual assault charges, which could lead to the woman becoming charged with adultery.

刑法第239條規定:「有配偶而與人通姦者,處1年以下有期徒刑。其相姦者亦同。」本解釋推翻司法院第554號解釋(2002),關於保障婚姻和家庭而限制個人性自主權利之合憲性解釋。憲法法庭認憲法第22條所保障性自主權之限制,與憲法第23條比例原則不符,應自本解釋公布之日起失其效力;於此範圍內,本院釋字第554號解釋應予變更。因而宣告此一規定違憲。此規定立法目的係限制個人得自由決定是否及與何人發生性行為之性行為自由。然基於刑法謙抑性原則,國家原則上應以侵害公益或大眾福祉之違法行為為限。因此,通姦行為固已損及婚姻關係中之忠誠義務及對方之感情與對婚姻之期待,但尚不致明顯損及公益或大眾福祉。再者,通姦行為多發生於個人之私密空間內,其發現、追訴、審判過程必然侵擾個人生活私密領域,致國家公權力長驅直入人民極私密之領域。因此,系爭規定所致之損害大於其目的所欲維護之利益,而有失均衡。本案宣告違憲之重要性不僅在於對於憲法上所保障的性自主權及隱私權的再次確認,更是因為刑法通姦罪適用上對於女性比例上多於男性被告,及適用上經常迫使女性放棄追溯之實證結果,而不符合憲法所保障之意旨。



J.Y. Interpretation 748 Taiwan Constitutional Court (2017)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Taiwan Constitutional Court held in this interpretation that the provisions of the Taiwan Civil Code on marriage and family, which did not contemplate same-sex marriage, violated the guarantees of freedom of marriage and right to equality under Articles 22 and 7, respectively, of the Taiwan Constitution. The case involved consolidated appeals by (i) the Taipei City Government, arguing that the relevant Civil Code provisions and a related directive of the Ministry of the Interior required it to deny registration for same-sex marriages in violation of the Constitution and (ii) an individual seeking a constitutional interpretation after exhausting other judicial remedies for the denial of his applications for a same-sex marriage. The Court concluded that an individual’s “decisional autonomy” as to whether and whom to marry is a fundamental right protected by Article 22 of the Constitution and that extending this right to same-sex couples would not affect the application of the Civil Code provisions on betrothal, conclusion of marriage, general effects of marriage, marital property regimes, and divorce with regard to opposite sex couples and also would not undermine or alter the social order. The Court also concluded that the classifications of impermissible discrimination under Article 7 of the Constitution are only illustrative rather than exhaustive and that different treatment based on other classifications, such as disability or sexual orientation, are also governed by the constitutional right to equality. The Court applied a heightened standard under Article 7, and concluded that the societal interest in procreation was not an essential element of marriage and that the “basic ethical orders” relating to traditional marriage (e.g., minimum age, monogamy, prohibition of marriage between close relatives, obligation of fidelity, and mutual obligation) would not be affected by legal recognition of same-sex marriages. The Court further stated that leaving the determination of the issue of same-sex marriage to the legislative process would indefinitely prolong the unfair treatment and ordered the legislative authorities to amend or enact laws to reflect this interpretation within two years. The Act for Implementation of J.Y. Interpretation 748 was enacted in 2019 to enforce this Interpretation.

台灣憲法法庭認為台灣民法親屬篇中未考量納入同性婚姻,有違反台灣憲法第22條及第7條之婚姻自由及平等權之保障。本案為共同聲請案件,聲請人之一臺北市政府為戶籍登記業務主管機關(戶籍法第22條參照),因所轄戶政事務所於辦理相同性別二人民申請之結婚登記業務,適用民法第4編親屬第2章婚姻(下稱婚姻章)規定及內政部函示,函轉法務部函,發生有牴觸憲法第7條、第22條及第23條規定之疑義,經由上級機關內政部層轉行政院,再由行政院轉請本院解釋。另一聲請人於窮盡司法途徑後,向憲法法庭聲請解釋。憲法法庭認為是否結婚及與誰接婚,皆屬個人憲法第22條所保障之自由意志,且該權利亦為同性伴侶所適用。現行婚姻章有關異性婚姻制度之當事人身分及相關權利、義務關係,不因本解釋而改變。憲法法庭也指出,憲法第7條規定:「中華民國人民,無分男女、宗教、種族、階級、黨派,在法律上一律平等。」本條明文揭示之5種禁止歧視事由,僅係例示,而非窮盡列舉。是如以其他事由,如身心障礙、性傾向等為分類標準,所為之差別待遇,亦屬本條平等權規範之範圍。是以性傾向作為分類標準所為之差別待遇,應適用較為嚴格之審查標準,以判斷其合憲性,除其目的須為追求重要公共利益外,其手段與目的之達成間並須具有實質關聯,始符合憲法第7條保障平等權之意旨。故以不能繁衍後代為由,未使相同性別二人得以結婚,顯非合理之差別待遇。倘以婚姻係為維護基本倫理秩序,如結婚年齡、單一配偶、近親禁婚、忠貞義務及扶養義務等為考量,其計慮固屬正當。惟若容許相同性別二人得依婚姻章實質與形式要件規定,成立法律上婚姻關係,且要求其亦應遵守婚姻關係存續中及終止後之雙方權利義務規定,並不影響現行異性婚姻制度所建構之基本倫理秩序。有關機關應於本解釋公布之日起2年內,依本解釋意旨完成相關法律之修正或制定。至於以何種形式達成婚姻自由之平等保護,屬立法形成之範圍。逾期未完成相關法律之修正或制定者,相同性別二人為成立上開永久結合關係,得依上開婚姻章規定,持二人以上證人簽名之書面,向戶政機關辦理結婚登記。



Shayara Bano v. Union of India Supreme Court of India (2017)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The petitioner was divorced by her husband after 15 years of marriage by means of the talaq-e-biddat declaration. She filed a writ petition arguing that the declaration was unconstitutional. Talaq-e-biddat is a practice whereby a Muslim man can divorce his wife upon saying “talaq-e-baddat” thrice in one sitting. The wife’s consent is not required in this practice. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India declared the practice unconstitutional by a majority vote of 3:2 and injuncted Muslim husbands from pronouncing “Talaq-e-biddat” as a means for severing the marital ties. The court reasoned that the practice is unconstitutional because it is manifestly arbitrary in nature. There was also a concurring opinion which held that the practice of talaq-e-biddat is against the holy Quran and thus lacks legal sanction. In its judgement, the Court also directed the Parliament of India to take appropriate measures to bring related legislation into effect. Consequently, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act came into effect on 31st of July 2019.



De Burca and Anderson v. Attorney General Supreme Court of Ireland (1975)


Gender discrimination

The plaintiffs were two female criminal defendants who chose to be tried by a jury and objected to the Juries Act of 1927, which excluded all women from jury pools except those who opted to be part of the potential jurors list. The Supreme Court ruled the Juries Act unconstitutional because it constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of sex.



Mayelane v. Ngwenyama Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2013)


Gender discrimination

The issue in this case was to what extent, in Xitsonga customary law, the absence of a first wife’s consent to her husband’s subsequent polygamous marriages affects the validity of those marriages. In this case, the applicant entered into a customary marriage with the deceased in 1984. The applicant objected to the respondent’s claim that she entered a valid customary polygamous marriage to the deceased in 2008, 13 months before the deceased’s death. The Court held that, in accordance with its obligation to develop living customary law in a manner consistent with the Constitution’s protection of human dignity and equality, Xitsonga customary law had to be developed to include a requirement that the first wife’s consent is necessary to validate any of her husband’s subsequent customary marriages. Guided by this principle, the Court held invalid the marriage of the decedent to the respondent.



Ramuhovhi and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2018)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

In this case, the Constitutional Court held that §7(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RMCA) was inconsistent with 172(2) of the Constitution, and therefore invalid, because it unfairly discriminated against women in polygamous customary marriages entered into before the enactment of the RMCA on the bases of gender and race, ethnic, or social origin. This case followed Gumede v. President of the Republic of South Africa, in which it was held that §7(1) was invalid as to monogamous customary marriages, but left the question of polygamous customary marriages for Parliament. The effect of this ruling was that pre-RCMA marriages continued to be governed by customary law, while post-RCMA marriages were automatically out of community of property. The Court declared that, in the interim until Parliament changes the RCMA, a husband and his wives in pre-RCMA polygamous customary marriages must share equally in the right of ownership of, and other rights attaching to, family property, including the right of management and control of family property.



Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Eighteen Others v. Minister of Home Affairs Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2006)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The issue in this case was whether the fact that no provision was made for same-sex couples to marry denied those parties equal protection of the law and was thus unfairly discriminating against them because of their sexual orientation, contrary to the Constitution’s protection of sexual orientation. The common law and the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 defined marriage as between man and woman. The Court stated that the exclusion of same sex couples from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage was not a “tangential inconvenience” but a “harsh … statement by the law that same-sex couples are outsiders.” The Court held that the common law and §30(1) of the Marriage Act were inconsistent with §§ 9(1) & (3) of the Constitution to the extent that they did not allow same sex couples to enjoy the status, entitlements, and responsibilities that heterosexual couples enjoyed. The Court held that Parliament should remedy this exclusion and, if it does not, courts should read §30(1) of the Marriage Act to include the words “or spouse” after the words “or husband” as they appear marriage vows.



Rahube v. Rahube Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2019)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

In this case, the Constitutional Court declared §2(1) of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (Upgrading Act) unconstitutional. §2(1) of the Upgrading Act automatically turned land tenure rights into rights of property ownership, without providing other occupants or affected parties an opportunity to make submissions. The Court held §2(1) unconstitutional because it had a discriminatory effect on women’s property rights. During apartheid, only men could be the head of the family and hold Certificates of Deed and Grant. This had the effect of excluding women from holding land tenure rights. The Court determined that because §2(1) of the Upgrading Act was based on this apartheid position, it indirectly differentiated between men and women in a way that amounted to gender discrimination.



Shilubana and Others v. Nwamitwa Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2009)


Gender discrimination

The issue in this appeal was whether traditional leaders of a community can develop their customs and traditions to promote gender equality in the succession of traditional leadership in accordance with the Constitution. The dispute was about the right to succeed as Chief to the Valoyi community in Limpopo, where the Chief’s daughter, Ms. Shilubana, could not succeed to the Chief position after her father’s death because the principle of male primogeniture governed succession. Her uncle succeeded the deceased Chief instead, but, during his reign, he and the Royal Family unanimously resolved to confer the chieftainship to Ms. Shilubana when the current Chief died because it aligned with the new Constitution. This was also communicated to and accepted by the Commission for Traditional Leaders of the Northern Province. When Ms. Shilubana’s uncle, the Chief, died, a dispute arose between Ms. Shilubana and the Chief’s son as to who should succeed to Chieftainship. The Court held that where there is a dispute over the legal position under customary law, a court must consider both the traditions and the present practice of the community. If there is a new development within the community, the court must strive to recognize and give effect to that development, to the extent it is consistent with protecting rights. The Court found that the customary law of the Valoyi community did not permit a woman succeeding without amendment, but that the Royal Family had power to amend the customs and that their actions represented a development of law consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. Thus, it was a valid legal change, vesting Ms. Shilubana with the right to succeed to Chieftainship.



González Pino, Alejandra v. Ortúzar Novoa, Graciela y otro (Case Nº 38238-2016) Supreme Court (2017)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The plaintiff, a councilwoman in the Comune of Lampa, identified as a woman and presented herself to society as a woman, filed a discrimination complaint against the defendant, claiming arbitrary discrimination for failure by the Mayor, as representative of the State, to respect her gender identity. She sued, claiming a violation of Anti-Discrimination Law No. 20.069 (“the Law”). The court, on appeal, reversed the trial court judgment and imposed a fine, finding that the Mayor of the Comune of Lampa had arbitrarily discriminated against plaintiff by failing to respect her gender identity as a woman. The court held that arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made by agents of the State or individuals that lacks reasonable justification, and that causes deprivation, disturbance, or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Constitution or international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and in effect, including gender identity as defined by the LGBTI Unit of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which includes transgender identity. Therefore, the right to an identity is constitutionally protected, including the right to identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexual. Any deprivation, disturbance or threat to such identifying rights constitutes an arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of Article 2 of Law No. 20,609.

La demandante, vecina de la comunidad de Lampa, identificada como mujer y presentada a la sociedad como mujer, interpuso una denuncia de discriminación contra la imputada, alegando discriminación arbitraria por incumplimiento del Alcalde, como representante del Estado, de respetar su identidad de género. Ella demandó, alegando una violación de la Ley contra la Discriminación No. 20.069 (“la Ley”). El tribunal, en apelación, revocó la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia e impuso una multa, al considerar que el alcalde de la comuna de Lampa había discriminado arbitrariamente a la demandante al no respetar su identidad de género como mujer. El tribunal sostuvo que “discriminación arbitraria” significa toda distinción, exclusión o restricción realizada por agentes del Estado o personas que carece de justificación razonable, y que ocasiona privación, alteración o amenaza en el legítimo ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución o en las normas internacionales, tratados de derechos humanos ratificados por Chile y en vigencia, incluida la identidad de género según la definición de la Unidad LGBTI de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que incluye la identidad transgénero. Por lo tanto, el derecho a la identidad está protegido constitucionalmente, incluido el derecho a identificarse como lesbiana, gay, bisexual, transgénero e intersexual. Cualquier privación, alteración o amenaza a tales derechos identificativos constituye una discriminación arbitraria en el sentido del artículo 2 de la Ley N ° 20.609.



Odamtten and Others v. Wuta-Ofei Supreme Court (2018)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

This case concerns the ability of women to pass on their life interest in an estate to their children under customary law. In this case, the deceased, the grandfather of the appellants, died intestate. According to the customary law of the Ga people of Osu, the deceased’s female descendants only have a life interest in the estate rather than ownership rights. The first respondent, having outlived his siblings, claimed the right as the head of the family to sell one piece of the estate’s property. The appellant, the daughter of the deceased’s daughter, sought to set aside the sale of said property by the first respondent on the grounds that she was not consulted before the sale, and additionally sought an order of perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from dealing with the property. The appellant contended that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the customary law of Gas prevent a female child who inherits property from a deceased parent to pass on her interest to her children. However, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that the Court of Appeal stated the true position of customary law and practice of the devolution of property in Osu and other parts of Ghana, and that this customary property system is backed by judicial precedents on patrilineal forms of inheritance. The appellants’ argument that the Intestate Succession Law banned this patrilineal inheritance practice failed to take into account that it is not retroactive and thus does not apply to estates that have already been distributed. Thus, the sale of the property was deemed valid.



Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers Supreme Court of Canada (1996)


Gender discrimination

The complainant applied for membership of the Yukon Order of Pioneers and was rejected on the ground that she was female. According to its constitution, the Order is dedicated to, among other things, the advancement of the Yukon territory, the mutual protection of its members and the collection and the preservation of literature and incidents of Yukon’s history. The historical materials and details of members are made available to the public, which is the only public-service related activity of the organization. The Board of Adjudication, constituted by the Yukon Human Rights Commission, concluded that the Order was offering or providing services to the public and concluded that the discrimination was prohibited under section 8 of the Yukon Human Rights Act. The Yukon Supreme Court set aside that decision and concluded that the complainant’s exclusion did not amount to discrimination and the Yukon Court of Appeal agreed. The Supreme Court, with two dissenters, also found in favour of the Order of Pioneers, stating that section 8 prohibits discrimination in membership of certain types of organizations that provide public services and that the Order did not provide public services.



Canadian National Railway Co.v. Canada (Human Rights Comm.) and Action travail des femmes Supreme Court of Canada (1987)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

A Human Rights Tribunal constituted under s.39 of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1976-77 found that the recruitment, hiring, and promotion policies at Canadian National Railway Company (“CN”) prevented and discouraged women from working on blue collar jobs and as a result it imposed a special employment programme on CN. The programme required CN to increase to 13% the proportion of women working in non-traditional occupations and until that goal was achieved to hire at least one woman for every four non-traditional jobs filled in the future. On appeal, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the Tribunal has the power to impose upon an employer an “employment equity program” to address the problem of systematic discrimination in the hiring and promotion of a disadvantaged group, in this case women. The Supreme Court found that the order was within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.41(2)(a) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. It said that an employment equity program such as the one in question is an attempt to ensure that future applicants and workers from the affected group will not face the same barriers and that the order in question was the only means by which the purpose of the Canadian Human Rights Act could be met.



Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd Supreme Court of Canada (1989)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The respondent’s group insurance plan provided weekly benefits for loss of pay due to accident or sickness. The plan covered pregnant women subject to an exclusion from coverage during the period commencing on the tenth week prior to the expected week of childbirth and extending to six weeks after it (even if the accident or sickness was unrelated to the pregnancy). The appellants, who all became pregnant in 1982, alleged that the differential treatment of pregnancy in the respondent’s plan constituted discrimination on the basis of sex contrary to s.6(1) of the Human Rights Act of Manitoba. The Supreme Court ruled that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination and that the respondent had discriminated against the appellants on the basis of sex. It said that bearing children benefits society as a whole and women should not be economically or socially disadvantaged due to childbearing.



British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU Supreme Court of Canada (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Government of British Colombia established minimum physical fitness standards for fire fighters. The claimant, a woman, had previously performed her work satisfactorily but failed to meet the aerobic standard. The arbitrator found that the aerobic standard constituted adverse discrimination based on sex because men as a group have a higher aerobic capacity than women and therefore are more able to reach the standard. The Court of Appeal overturned the ruling. Disagreeing with the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court held that the aerobic standard used to test fitness of fire fighters discriminates on the basis of sex and that the Government of British Colombia failed to show that the discriminatory standard is justified as a bona fide occupational requirement.



Skills Development Scotland Co Ltd v Buchanan & Anor Employment Appeal Tribunal (Scotland) (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Here, the Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the appeal of the respondent employer and rejected a prior holding of the Edinburgh Employment Tribunal that found the respondent employer liable for having violated Section 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act for having given a male staff member a more favorable employment contract than two female co-workers and having done so without genuine, material, and sex-neutral factors accounting for this disparity. The claimants in this appeal were two female employees of Scottish Enterprise, a non-departmental public body of the Scottish Government focused on economic development. The women alleged that a male co-worker doing work of equal value had a more favorable employment contract, and that there were no genuine, material, and sex-neutral factors accounting for this disparity. The Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted respondent’s argument that the reason for the disparity in compensation between the claimants’ contracts and that of their male comparator was due to the fact that the terms of the male comparator’s contract were protected under Scotland’s Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE) regulations. These regulations protect an employee’s contract from modification in the case of a business transfer. While the lower tribunal had accepted that this explanation for the disparity was genuine, it held that the respondent should have frozen the male comparator’s salary and not granted him pay increases after a certain period to keep his pay equal to that of the claimants. The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected this holding and granted the appeal, noting that it was not the respondent’s practice to freeze salaries for any employees. Furthermore, the Employment Appeal Tribunal stated that the lower tribunal had made “no finding that the Claimants suffered discrimination on grounds of sex.” Neither had it made any finding that respondent committed any form of “culpable inactivity” motivated by sex. Finally, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the respondent established a valid defense under the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay Act states that an employer must show that “that the difference in pay or other conditions is explained by something that has nothing to do with sex.” The Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the respondent made a “causal link between a non gender related explanation and the difference in pay complained of,” and that, therefore, respondent had established a defense. Therefore, it rejected the decision of the Edinburgh Employment Tribunal, upheld the appeal, and dismissed the claims.



A. v. Bonmarche Ltd. (in administration) Employment Tribunal (Scotland) (2019)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Here, the employment judge found that the claimant was entitled to lost wages for the period between her resignation in December 2018 and the start of her new position in September 2019 on the grounds that the claimant “suffered a substantial reduction in her mental wellbeing” as a result of improper treatment and discrimination from her employer in relation to the claimant’s onset of menopause and was thereby entitled to damages emanating from injury to feelings. The claimant alleged that her store manager discriminated against her for being a woman of menopausal age. The claimant had a long work history in retail, had received multiple awards for her excellent performance, and had gotten along with her store manager until the claimant’s onset of menopause. At that point, the store manager would frequently harass and humiliate the claimant in front of her colleagues and customers, specifically commenting about her menopause. The store manager’s disparaging treatment of the claimant weakened her mental state, resulting in a nervous breakdown in November 2018 that required her to begin anti-depressant treatment. Her doctors recommended that she work reduced hours. The store manager ignored this request and told the claimant that if she could not work her full hours, she would be forced to use vacation and sick time to account for the remainder of time. The store manager continued his harassment of the claimant until she resigned on December 4, 2018. After her resignation, the claimant continued to suffer from severe mental distress and anxiety as a result of her treatment and could not find employment until she accepted a part-time position at a charity shop in September 2019. The respondent employer did not contest the evidence presented by the claimant and was absent from the proceedings. The Employment Judge “found it established on the facts that the respondent, by the actings of [the store manager] for whom they were liable, had treated the claimant less favourably than he would treat someone who was not a female of menopausal age.” Furthermore, while the claimant had not made a constructive dismissal claim, the Employment Judge accepted claimant’s position that she “resigned as a result of the discrimination against her.”



Re Castlemaine Steiner School Ltd. Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal: Human Rights Division (2015)


Gender discrimination

The students enrolled at Castlemaine Steiner School Ltd (“Castlemaine”) for kindergarten and prep were originally approximately 75% boys and 25% girls. Castlemaine wished to offer more places to female students in order to maintain gender balance in their classes. Such conduct would constitute discrimination on the basis of gender in the provision of education and services under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (“EO Act”), unless an exemption applies. Castlemaine sought an exemption under section 89 of the EO Act, contending that an exemption would enable it to promote social cohesion and gender balance, and would provide boys and girls opportunities to be with a meaningful number of children of their own gender. In assessing the application, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“VCAT”) noted that they were required to interpret the law, so far as it is possible to do so, compatibly with section 32(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). In addition, VCAT was required to consider whether the interests served by the exemption are sufficient to justify taking the relevant conduct out of the prohibitions of the EO Act. Ultimately, VCAT granted the exemption for the maximum period of five years, on the basis that the proposed exemption offered a reasonable chance of to achieving gender balance.



Christian Youth Camps Ltd. v. Cobaw Community Health Service Ltd Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal (2014)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

This decision concerned the appeal by Christian Youth Camps (“CYC”) against the decision of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“VCAT”) that CYC had unlawfully discriminated against Cobaw, an organisation concerned with youth suicide prevention. CYC, the operator of a camping facility at Phillip Island, had been established by the Christian Brethren Church and was opposed to homosexual activity on religious grounds. Cobaw had sought to rent CYC’s camping resort for the purposes of a weekend camp to be attended by homosexual young people. CYC had refused Cobaw’s request for accommodation. VCAT found that by refusing to accommodate Cobaw, CYC had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in the provision of accommodation or services. CYC asserted that its refusal to accommodate the youths was necessary to comply with its religious beliefs or principles, and sought to invoke the religious exemption in sections 75(2) and 77 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic). VCAT found that CYC could not rely on the religious exemption as they were not a body established for religious purposes. While CYC had been established by the Christian Brethren Church, VCAT found that the CYC’s purposes and activities were not religious. The Court of Appeal dismissed CYC’s appeal and upheld VCAT’s decision. The Court of Appeal affirmed VCAT’s finding that the refusal to accommodate was made in the course of the conduct of a secular and commercial accommodation business. The Court of Appeal also upheld VCAT’s finding that CYC’s opposition to homosexual activity was a “rule of private morality,” which “carried with it no obligation to convince others to adopt the same rule.”



Tillsyn avseende könsseparerade öppettider i sim- och idrottshallar Stockholm och Malmö (Case No. GRA 2016/8 and Case No. GRA 2016/9 – Decision on gender separation in swimming and sports halls - Stockholm and Malmö) Diskrimineringsombudsmannen (Discrimination Ombudsman) (2016)


Gender discrimination

The Swedish Equality Ombudsman ruled that separate opening hours in public swimming pools for women and men can constitute discrimination, but that separate opening hours can be legal if the discrimination is a result of achieving a permissible and legal purpose. As such, it is permissible for a public swimming pool to have female-only hours in the event that the group of women using the swimming pool do not bathe with men due to their religious beliefs, and would not be able to learn how to swim otherwise. In the decisions, the Swedish Equality Ombudsman stressed that such permissible discrimination justifications are exceedingly rare, and that the ground rule is that public swimming pools should be open to both women and men at all times.



Case No. B 1041-01 – the Prosecutor v. M.N. Hovrätten över Skåne och Blekinge (Court of Appeal of Skåne and Blekinge) (2002)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

M.N. was convicted for attempting to purchase sexual services from a woman, which is a criminal act under Chapter 6 Section 11 and Chapter 23 Section 1 of the Swedish Penal Code. The court considered whether the “attempt point” had been reached, which is a prerequisite for the attempt to be punishable. To constitute a criminal attempt, it is required that the offender begin the crime without reaching its completion. There must also be a risk that the act will lead to the completion of the crime. For purchases of sexual services the attempt point is reached when an offer of payment has been made. Here, the parties agreed to have sex in the woman’s apartment and agreed on the price. M.N. had access to money and they were on their way to the woman’s apartment when the police stopped them. Therefore, the Court ruled that M.N. had begun the crime and that the attempt point had been reached. The Court also found that the danger of completing the crime was imminent. Thus, M.N. was sentenced to 40 daily fines for his attempt to purchase sexual services.



Case No. T 3905-15 – the Swedish Equality Ombudsman v. the Kingdom of Sweden through Karolinska Institutet Stockholms tingsrätt (Stockholm Municipal Court) (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

A Swedish dental student was during her dental clinic required to work with bare under-arms. Due to the student’s religious convictions, she asked for permission to wear disposable underarm protection, but her request was denied. The student filed a complaint with the Swedish Equality Ombudsman, who decided to bring an anti-discrimination case to civil court against the education provider Karolinska Institutet. Both parties agreed that working with bare underarms constituted a higher burden on Muslim women, and the case came down to conflicting expert testimony regarding how sanitary the arm covers were in practice. The court found that the education provider had the burden of proof to provide objective justification for an indirect discrimination and that both experts provided equally strong arguments. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the student. The student was awarded SEK 5000 as compensatory damages.



Case No. GRA 2017/56 – The Swedish Equality Ombudsman v. “the Foundation”: Decision from the Swedish Equality Ombudsman regarding gender -based separation on school bus and in gymnastics classes Diskrimineringsombudsmannen (Discrimination Ombudsman) (2017)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Five notifications regarding discrimination of students by a Foundation were made to the Equality Ombudsman after the broadcast of a TV program. In the program, the students of a school owned by the Foundation were separated by gender on the school bus. The Equality Ombudsman’s investigation noted that a gender-based separation was also made in the gymnastics classes. According to Chapter 2 Section 5 of the Swedish Discrimination Act, it is prohibited for an education provider or an employee of the provider to discriminate against any child or student that participates in the school’s operations. For gender-based separations not to constitute discrimination, either the activities of the groups must be equivalent, without any student finding it disfavoring to be separated by gender, or the separation must be limited to moments where the students’ gender is of such importance that they are not in a comparable situation. The Equality Ombudsman ruled that the separation of the students in the gymnastics classes constituted a risk of one or more students being discriminated against for gender and transgender identity or expression. However, the separation on the school bus was not found to constitute a risk of violation of the Discrimination Act.



Case No. A 46/17 – the Swedish Equality Ombudsman v. Almega Tjänsteföretagen and Semantix Tolkjouren AB Arbetsdomstolen (Swedish Labor Court) (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

A Muslim woman refused to shake a male interviewer’s hand for religious reasons during a job interview. She placed her hand over her heart and explained her reasons. The recruitment process was then canceled, as the company had a policy which required employees to shake hands with both men and women. The Swedish Equality Ombudsman claimed that the cancellation was an indirect discrimination of Muslims who refuse to shake hand with a person of an opposite sex. The Swedish Labor Court first established that the right to refuse a handshake on religious grounds is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. The court further found that the handshake policy was neither appropriate nor necessary to achieve its justified purpose (promoting gender equality at the workplace). The court ordered the company to pay the woman SEK 40,000 in damages.



Property Center Bienes Raíces y Taylan Ozdemir, Sentencia Núm. 870 Tercera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The respondent was employed by the appellant, Property Center Bienes Raíces, as the secretary of the owner, Taylan Ozdemir, for approximately four years. When the respondent was three months pregnant, she experienced a health issue threatening her pregnancy and presented a doctor’s note to her employer stating that she could not work for 10 days and had to rest at home. Four days later, she returned to her office to return a work laptop for the use of her co-worker who was filling in while she was absent. According to the co-worker’s testimony, the appellant-owner began to yell at the respondent, stating she was uneducated, that there was “too much risk” in having a pregnant employee, and that she was fired. When the respondent began to cry, informing the owner-appellant that he could not terminate a pregnant employee, he said that he did not care if he was brought before the courts because he had enough money to pay any penalty. He then practically dragged the respondent physically from the premises. The lower court found that the appellant and his business illegally discriminated against the respondent. The Supreme Court agreed and rejected the appeal. Article 233 of the Employment Code (Código de Trabajo) clearly states that a woman cannot be dismissed from her employment because of her pregnancy (“La mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo por el hecho de estar embarazada.”). The Supreme Court found that witness testimony and medical documentation clearly established that 1) between the parties a contract of employment existed, 2) that the respondent was pregnant; and 3) that at the time of her dismissal, her pregnancy was known to her employer. The Supreme Court ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the legal proceeding and the appropriate back pay to the respondent.

La demandada era empleada del demandante, Property Center Bienes Raíces, como secretaria del propietario, Taylan Ozdemir, por aproximadamente cuatro años. Cuando la demandada tenía tres meses de embarazo, sufrió un problema de salud que amenazó su embarazo y presentó una nota del médico a su empleador indicando que no podía trabajar durante 10 días y tenía que descansar en casa por ese período. Cuatro días después, regresó a su oficina para devolver una computadora portátil del trabajo para que la usara su compañera de trabajo que la estaba reemplazando mientras ella estaba ausente. Según el testimonio de la compañera de trabajo, el apelante comenzó a gritarle a la demandada, diciendo que no tenía educación, que había "demasiado riesgo" en tener una empleada embarazada y la despidió. Cuando la demandada comenzó a llorar, informando a el apelante que no podía despedir a una empleada embarazada, éste le dijo que no le importaba si lo llevaban ante los tribunales porque tenía suficiente dinero para pagar cualquier multa. Luego, prácticamente arrastró físicamente a la demandada fuera del local. El tribunal de primera instancia determinó que el apelante y su negocio discriminaron ilegalmente a la demandada. La Corte Suprema estuvo de acuerdo y rechazó la apelación. El Artículo 233 del Código de Trabajo establece claramente que una mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo debido a su embarazo (“La mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo por el hecho de estar embarazada”). La Corte Suprema determinó que el testimonio de testigos y la documentación médica establecían claramente que 1) existía un contrato de trabajo entre las partes, 2) que la demandada estaba embarazada; y 3) que al momento de su despido, su empleador tenía conocimiento de su embarazo. La Corte Suprema ordenó a los recurrentes que pagaran las costas del proceso judicial y el correspondiente pago atrasado a la demandada.



KI 155/17 Gjykata Kushtetuese (Constitutional Court) (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The applicant was a judge on the Court of Appeals and was a candidate in the election for the President of the Court of Appeals. She received the highest number of points among the three candidates in the candidate evaluation commissioned by the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC, the body which administers the judiciary). During the voting by the KJC, the applicant was voted on first, but did not receive the necessary majority of votes. The voting then moved on to the second-ranked candidate, who won the overwhelming share of votes and was elected. Upon losing, the applicant submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging various constitutional violations, including violation of the principle of gender equality under Article 24 (Equality before the Law) of the Constitution of Kosovo. The KJC responded that the principle of gender equality consisted of equal treatment of every candidate using the same standards, and that it had done so irrespective of the candidates’ gender or ethnic background. The Constitutional Court noted that Article 24 of the Constitution implies that general principles of equality of treatment apply to all actions of public authorities in their dealings with individuals. The tribunal explained that in a voting process, a fundamental aspect of the principle of equality is that each candidate shall benefit from the opportunity to be considered fairly and equally. The panel then held that the KJC’s vote did not provide equal opportunities to the candidates, because it did not provide for procedural safeguards pertinent to the guarantee of equality of treatment. Each candidate was voted on in succession, and so KJC members could vote in favor or against all three candidates. Members could also abstain from the voting selectively and arbitrarily. Thus, it was impossible to know which candidate actually had the support of the majority of the KJC. The court therefore declared the vote incompatible with the Constitution, and ordered the KJC to conduct a new vote. (Also available in Srpski and English.)



KI 52/12 Gjykata Kushtetuese (Constitutional Court) (2013)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law

The applicant (wife), her husband, and their children lived in Austria and held dual Austrian and Kosovar citizenship. After marriage problems arose between the couple, the husband took the children away from the wife while they were in Kosovo and kept them away from her. The husband’s family wanted to resolve the matter according to Albanian tradition, causing the wife to fear that the children would stay with the father. She thus initiated legal proceedings for the children’s return to Austria. Pursuant to The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Children Abduction, the Austrian Ministry of Justice requested the Kosovar Ministry of Justice to assist in the children’s return, and the Kosovar authorities initiated proceedings in the country’s courts for such an order. The District Court held hearings in the presence of the husband but without the wife or prosecutor, and ruled for the husband, finding that no abduction had taken place. The Supreme Court quashed the decision and remanded the case for retrial. Following retrial, the District Court again ruled that, under The Hague Convention, returning the children was unnecessary, as it would have a negative impact on the children because they had developed a strong emotional bond with their father, they were attending school in Kosovo, and the couple had marital problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the return of the children might cause them psychological damage. The wife then filed a request for repetition of procedure, arguing that she and the prosecutor were not given the opportunity to participate in the session in which the District Court reviewed the request to return the children. The Supreme Court rejected the request, stating that the procedural parties were the Ministry of Justice and the husband, not the wife, and that the participation of the prosecutor was not legally obligatory. The wife appealed to the Constitutional Court, alleging that her rights guaranteed under Article 31 of the Constitution of Kosovo (Right to Fair and Impartial Trial), and under Article 6 (Right to Fair Trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, had been violated. The Constitutional Court held that by not being present at the session, the wife was unable to refute her husband and was deprived of the possibility of convincing the District Court that the children should be returned. The wife was thus placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis her opponent, in violation of the principle of equality of arms, which is one aspect of the right to fair trial under European Court of Human Rights case law. Finding the wife’s right to a fair trial violated, the Constitutional Court accordingly invalidated the Supreme Court’s decisions and ordered the District Court to repeat the proceedings and invite the wife to participate. (Also available in Srpski, English, and Türkçe.)



KO 13/15 Gjykata Kushtetuese (Constitutional Court) (2015)


Gender discrimination

The applicant, President of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, referred to the Constitutional Court an amendment to the Constitution proposed by numerous deputies, and requested the court to make a prior assessment whether the proposed amendment diminishes any rights or freedoms under the Constitution. The amendment stipulates that no gender can be represented less than 40% in the positions of ministers and deputy ministers in the government. The proponents argued that a gender quota was needed because women represented no more than 10-15% in ministerial positions and the Law on Gender Equality had not been implemented. The Constitutional Court noted that the principle of gender equality was already included in many provisions of the Constitution and held that the introduction of gender-based quota to ministerial and deputy ministerial positions narrows the applicability of the constitutional safeguards for gender equality and diminishes the rights to gender-balanced participation in public bodies. The court further expressed concern that the proposed amendment may diminish the rights of deputies or qualified persons – from whom ministers are nominated – to become part of the government, and cited case law from the European Court of Justice and the French Constitutional Council against gender quota in government positions. In the court’s opinion, the principle of equal opportunity for both women and men should be applied instead, and positive discrimination whereby preference is automatically and unconditionally granted to a gender, notwithstanding the requirement of professional merit, is not supported by constitutional practice. The court also observed that the proponents of the amendment have not submitted any supporting evidence showing that the current constitutional safeguards of gender equality are insufficient. The implementation of the Law on Gender Equality is the responsibility of the government, controlled by the Assembly. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court concluded that the proposed amendment diminished constitutional rights and was therefore unconstitutional. (Also available in Srpski and English.)



KI 82/16 Gjykata Kushtetuese (Constitutional Court) (2017)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

The applicant, a local employee of the UN mission in Kosovo, was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses, including facilitating or compelling prostitution (Article 241 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo). The Basic Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the guilty verdict. The applicant filed a request for protection of legality with the Supreme Court, which rejected the request. The applicant then submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging, among other things, that he was discriminated against on the grounds of gender in violation of Article 24 of the Constitution because the trial court found credible the statement of a victim and a witness because they were women. The Constitutional Court explained that, in the applicant’s circumstance, equality before the law should be understood as a right of a party to impartial treatment and equal opportunity to exhaust legal remedies despite personal status. Under European Court of Human Rights case law interpreting Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification – that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim, or there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means and aim. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation of gender discrimination as “manifestly ill-founded,” finding that he failed to prove how and why the trial court treated him in an unequal way in relation to the victim and witness at issue, only because they were women. The tribunal rejected the applicant’s other claims and concluded that he had not substantiated his allegations of a violation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the applicant’s referral was declared inadmissible. (Also available in Srpski and English.)



1 BvR 774/02 Bundesverfassungsgericht Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Court held that it was unconstitutional to require an attorney without earnings to continue to make compulsory pension contributions during time taken off to care for children (up to the age of three years). The Court found that requiring such compulsory pension contributions was a breach of the right to equal treatment enshrined in the German constitution because it disproportionately affected women, who are the parent taking time off to care for small children in the vast majority of cases.

Der Gerichtshof hielt es für verfassungswidrig, dass eine Rechtsanwaltskammer von einer Rechtsanwältin weiterhin Pflichtbeiträge zur Rentenversicherung verlangt, obwohl die Rechtsanwältin während der Freistellung zur Kinderbetreuung (bis zum Alter von drei Jahren) kein Einkommen hat. Eine solche Beitragspflicht wurde als Verstoß gegen das im Grundgesetz verankerte Gleichbehandlungsgebot angesehen, da sie Frauen, die in der überwiegenden Zahl der Fälle derjenige Elternteil sind, der eine Auszeit zur Betreuung von Kleinkindern nimmt, unverhältnismäßig stark belastet.



1 BvR 1409/10 Bundesverfassungsgericht Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Court held that it was in breach of the right to equal treatment enshrined in the German constitution that periods of maternity leave (which affects women only) were not counted towards certain pension benefits whereas periods of sick leave (which affects both men and women) were. English translation of 1 BvR 1409/10 available here.)

Der Gerichtshof stellte fest, dass es gegen das im deutschen Grundgesetz verankerte Recht auf Gleichbehandlung verstößt, wenn Zeiten des Mutterschaftsurlaubs (der nur Frauen betrifft) nicht auf bestimmte Rentenleistungen angerechnet werden, längere Krankheitszeiten (die sowohl Männer als auch Frauen betreffen) hingegen schon.



BVerwG 6 C 25.12 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) (2013)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The Court rejected the appeal and upheld the decision of the lower court that a female Muslim high school student was not exempt from compulsory swimming lessons on the grounds of her religion. In the circumstances, there was not sufficient reason to undermine compulsory school attendance of children. The girl's parents had applied to the school for an exemption from swimming lessons on the grounds that Islamic dress custom did not allow their daughter to participate in co-educational swimming lessons. The school had rejected the application but permitted the girl to wear swimwear in accordance with Islamic custom (a burkini).


Das Gericht wies die Revision zurück und bestätigte die Entscheidung der Vorinstanz, dass eine muslimische Schülerin nicht aufgrund ihrer Religion vom obligatorischen Schwimmunterricht befreit werden kann. Unter den gegebenen Umständen gab es keinen ausreichenden Grund, die Schulpflicht von Kindern zu umgehen. Die Eltern des Mädchens hatten bei der Schule eine Befreiung vom Schwimmunterricht mit der Begründung beantragt, dass die islamischen Bekleidungsvorschriften ihrer Tochter die Teilnahme am koedukativen Schwimmunterricht nicht erlaube. Die Schule lehnte den Antrag ab, erlaubte dem Mädchen jedoch, eine dem islamischen Brauch entsprechende Badekleidung (einen Burkini) zu tragen.



Khaki v. Rawalpindi Supreme Court of Pakistan (2009)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the social status and injustices caused to the transgender population. The Court noted that under the Constitution of Pakistan, transgender individuals are entitled to enjoy constitutional rights like every other citizen of Pakistan. Over the years, transgender individuals in Pakistan have been deprived of inheritance, other property rights, voting rights, education, and employment due to the stigma and exclusion they have suffered. The Court directed the National Database and Registration Authority to adopt a strategy for recording exact status in the electoral list and the Federal and Provincial Governments to ensure that transgender individuals receive childhood education. The Court directed the Chief Secretaries/Commissioners to consult with the Social Welfare Department to implement the order and prepare a policy that would allow transgender individuals to vote during elections.



Director of Immigration v. Q.T. Court of Final Appeal (2018)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The plaintiff, a British national, applied for a Hong Kong visa as a dependent of her same-sex partner, who was in Hong Kong on a work visa. The plaintiff and her partner had entered into a civil partnership in England. The Director of Immigration rejected the plaintiff’s application on the grounds that the term “spouse” in the spousal dependent visa policy was limited to the concept of marriage as defined under Hong Kong law, recognizing only the union of a man and a woman. The court found that the director acted unlawfully by not granting dependent visas to the same-sex spouses of holders of work visas. It did not, however, hold that Hong Kong law recognized same-sex marriage.



Leung Chun Kwong v Secretary for the Civil Service Court of Appeal (2018)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The plaintiff, a gay man, challenged the government’s denial of spousal benefits to his husband. The couple had been married in New Zealand. The court observed that Hong Kong law does not recognize same-sex marriage; the Marriage Ordinance defines marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.” The court concluded that the government’s denial of spousal benefits therefore did not violate the Basic Law, Bill of Rights, or common law. The plaintiff plans to appeal to Hong Kong’s highest court, the Court of Final Instance.



Chan Wah v. Hang Hau Rural Community and Others Court of Final Appeal (2000)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The plaintiffs were non-indigenous villagers who sought declarations that their local village election laws were unlawful for restricting the participation of non-indigenous villagers in the election of village representatives. According to the plaintiff’s complaint, non-indigenous females married to indigenous villagers could vote, but non-indigenous males married to indigenous villagers could not vote. The court found that this distinction violated the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.



Lam Wing Lai v. Y t Cheng (Chingtai) Ltd. District Court (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Plaintiff worked as a secretary for the defendant. The plaintiff was experienced and had a history of good performance reviews. However, her relationship with the defendant deteriorated after she became pregnant. The plaintiff shared her pregnancy news with human resource and one colleague only, but then more colleagues learned about her pregnancy. According to the plaintiff, colleagues threatened to force her to have an abortion and suggested that she take only a four-week maternity leave despite her preference for an eight-week maternity leave. Plaintiff later learned that the defendant had hired a permanent replacement for her during her maternity leave. Subsequently, the plaintiff was fired. The court found that the plaintiff had showed that, on a balance of probabilities, she had been discriminated against by the defendant on the basis of her pregnancy.



Chan Choi Yin v. Toppan Forms (Hong Kong) Ltd. District Court (2006)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was the defendant’s employee. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s management began treating her poorly after her pregnancy, culminating in her eventual dismissal. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s actions were prohibited by the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. The court found that management had, among other things, had made derogatory remarks to the plaintiff, reduced her income, compelled her to transfer teams, and failed to investigate her internal complaints about her treatment. The court further found that the plaintiff had showed that, on a balance of probabilities, she had been discriminated against by the defendant’s management on the basis of her pregnancy.



Wong Lai Wan Avril v. Prudential Assurance Co Ltd District Court (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant along with her husband, who was her direct supervisor. The defendant fired the plaintiff’s husband. Subsequently, the defendant informed the plaintiff that because of her marital relationship with her husband, she would have to be fired too, despite the lack of any wrongdoing on her part. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim, but the Court refused to, finding that there were credible allegations of violations of the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance and the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.



Sit Ka Yin Priscilla v. Equal Opportunities Commission Court of Appeal (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was a former employee of the defendant. She alleged that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated against her because of her gender. Following poor performance reviews, the plaintiff had been fired by the defendant. She pointed to disparate treatment of her versus a male colleague, who despite having had multiple complaints made against him (while there were none against her) had received better performance reviews than the plaintiff. The court denied the plaintiff’s claims, relying in part on nine allegations of substandard performance that had been made against her.



Lau Hoi Man Kathy v. Emaster Consultants Ltd, District Court (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The defendant was an employment consultancy company that worked on behalf of various Hong Kong government agencies. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, who worked under a one-year contract. The plaintiff’s contract was renewed, with a start-date immediately following the end-date of the original contract. The plaintiff subsequently informed the defendant that she was pregnant. The defendant rescinded the renewal of the contract, on the grounds that the plaintiff had been dishonest in informing the employer of her pregnancy. The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Opportunities Commission, claiming that the defendant had violated the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. To resolve the complaint, the defendant proposed a new contract, which the plaintiff accepted. The plaintiff later applied for maternity leave, but was denied by the defendant, who informed her that she did not satisfy the requirement of continuous employment prior to the request (due to a one-day gap between the original contract’s end-date and the new contract’s start-date). The court found that the defendant’s imposition of a one-day gap was a discriminatory act that was prohibited by Sections 8 and 11 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.



Mokhele and Others v. Commander High Court of Lesotho (2018)


Gender discrimination

The applicants were female soldiers who were discharged from the army by the Commander of the Lesotho Defence Force on the grounds of pregnancy. The reason listed for the discharge of the applicants was pregnancy and a contravention of the army’s Standing Order No. 2 of 2014, which states that a soldier may not become pregnant during the first five years of service. The High Court stated that case before it was a “challenge to the culture of patriarchy in the military and an assertion of sexual and reproductive rights in military service. What is being contested is the idea that female soldiers are incapable to bear arms and babies at the same time and, on that account, are not fit for military purpose.” The court stated that to allow the dismissal from work on the grounds of pregnancy would amount to discrimination on the basis of sex because pregnancy affects only women. The Standing Order had profound effects on the reproductive rights, freedoms, and careers of female soldiers, and the five-year prohibition period was arbitrary in nature. The court held that the applicants must be reinstated back to their positions and ranks in the Lesotho Defence Force without any loss of benefits.



Makafane v. Zhongxian Investment Pty Ltd. Labour Court of Lesotho (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The applicant was dismissed by her employer, the respondent, because of operational requirements. The applicant was employed by the respondent from 1 November 2007 until her dismissal on 24 October 2012. The applicant claimed that she was dismissed unfairly because she was pregnant. Prior to her dismissal, the applicant delivered a letter from the Qacha’s Nek Hospital stating that she was pregnant and would be required to attend monthly clinics until she delivered her baby. The respondent then dismissed the applicant, claiming that her employment could not continue because of her pregnancy. The Labour Court referred to subsection 3(d) of the Labour Code Order 24 of 1992, which provides that pregnancy, among others, does not constitute a valid reason for terminating employment. The court stated that this type of dismissal carried an element of discrimination, the freedom against which is protected by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the highest law of the land. The court held that the dismissal of the applicant was unfair, that the respondent must reinstate her to her former position, and that the respondent pay for her lost earnings following dismissal.



Uganda v. Hamidu and Others High Court of Uganda (2004)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

Here, the Court rejected defendant’s argument that his mistaken belief that the complainant was his wife was a sufficient defense against a conviction of rape. The Court, relying on Article 31 of the Constitution, stated that both husband and wife enjoy equal rights in marriage and stated that the complainant’s dignity was trampled upon. The Court thus extends access to justice by construing the existing law on rape through the reasoning that the constitutional provisions on equality in marriage and the recognition of the equal dignity of women and men had effectively amended Sections 9 and 123 of the Penal Code. These sections at face exclude husbands from being held criminally liable for marital rape.



Motshidiemang v. Attorney General Botswana High Court of Botswana (2019)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Here, the High Court of Botswana held in a unanimous opinion that Section 164(a)/(c), 165, and 167 of the Botswanan Penal Code were unconstitutional. These sections criminalized same-sex relations. The Court held that 164(a)/(c), 165, and 167 violated Sections 3 (liberty, privacy, and dignity), 9 (privacy), and 15 (prohibiting discrimination) of the Botswanan Constitution. The Court modified Section 167, which criminalized the offence of gross indecency, to remove reference to private acts. The case overturned Kanane v State.



Decision No. 16-0357: Sentencia Familia Homoparentales por reproduccion asistida El Tribunal Supreme de Justicia (Venezuela Supreme Court of Justice) (2016)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The plaintiff, a female Venezuelan citizen married to a female Venezuelan citizen, got married in Argentina, where LGBT marriage rights are fully granted to homosexual couples. In the following years, they tried to validate their marriage in Venezuela through a judicial homologation process. Such homologation was denied on the basis that the marriage regulations in Argentina did not comply with the provisions of Article 44 of the Venezuelan Civil Code, which regulates marriage rights in Venezuela and provides that “marriage cannot be entered into except between one single man and one single woman.” Thereafter, the couple conceived a child through the assisted reproduction method in Argentina, who was born and presented for registration as their son in Argentina. Immediately after the baby was born, the couple moved back to Venezuela, where they tried to present the newborn as their son to the Venezuelan competent authorities, requiring that the baby carried the surnames of both mothers. The registration was denied. The couple introduced a complaint before the competent court and the judge decided the registration of the boy was inadmissible. The plaintiff appealed this decision until it reached the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (“TSJ”), Venezuelan’s highest judicial body, which decided to annul the decision of the lower court. The TSJ overruled the lower court’s decision on the basis that the decision violated the plaintiff’s right to present the child as an LGBTIQ couple’s child. Likewise, the TSJ stated that this action violated the child’s constitutional right to have an identity. The TSJ final decision was to allow the registration of the child with both mothers’ surnames.



Douglas v. CTML Pty Ltd. Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2018)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The decision of the tribunal was only in relation to whether to approve the respondent’s application to dismiss the complaint. The respondent’s application was denied because there were real factual issues in dispute. It appears that the substantive trial has not yet commenced (or alternatively a settlement was reached). In any case, this case is relevant as it illustrates the discrimination women may face in Australia when seeking to establish themselves in a secure environment and raise their children. The complainant was a single mother who sought to rent an apartment from the respondent. The complaint rested upon the allegation that the complainant’s tenancy application had been rejected (and she was not even allowed to see the property) as a result of the complainant intending on having her young son live with her in the rental property.



R.A. v. N.C. Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2018)


Gender discrimination

The complainant was a Muslim woman who wore a hijab covering her hair. While the complainant and the respondent were in a residential elevator, the defendant made disrespectful remarks to the complainant about the complainant’s presumed religion.The two did not know each other – the complainant’s hijab was the only way for the defendant to identify her religion. The complainant sought an apology. Video evidence was submitted at trial from CCTV. Importantly, there was an additional individual in the lift. As a result of this witness, the tribunal was able to find that the defendant had committed a “public act” for the purposes of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). However, the tribunal ultimately did not find for the complainant as the words used were determined by the tribunal to not, in fact, result in religious vilification as the additional individual in the lift did not react to the words. This case is relevant as it goes directly to ongoing discrimination women may face in Australia as a result of expressing their religion (through, for example, wearing a hijab).



J.M. v. Q.F.G. and G.K. Anti-Discrimination Tribunal Queensland (1997)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The complainant was a woman in an exclusive lesbian relationship for four years. The complainant and her partner wanted to have child but learned that donor insemination in Queensland would not be available for them, so the complainant traveled out of state to seek this treatment. She found the experience to be emotionally and financially draining, so she stopped the treatment. Thus, the complainant decided to try and ask the clinics in Queensland for the donor treatment. She found a clinic at which the respondent was a director. She obtained a referral from her general practitioner and scheduled an appointment with the respondent. At the appointment, the complainant informed the respondent that she was in a long-term lesbian relationship. The respondent’s position was clear that the clinic only provided treatment to heterosexual couples with infertility problems. Nevertheless, he requested blood tests of the complainant which showed that her ovaries were functioning normally and proceeded to give her a form to fill out and sign for herself and her “husband” in order to start the treatment. The complainant asked the respondent if she could fill only the wife part and sign, but he insisted that it should be signed by the husband. Since this was not possible in her case, the respondent refused to provide her with the treatment. The claimant then sought treatment outside Brisbane for a while without success. The claimant had a baby by private donation, ultimately bearing risks of possible HIV infection of the semen. The claimant suffered emotional distress from humiliation and discrimination based on her sexual orientation, in addition she had to defer her university degree for all the time she had to spend traveling to clinics outside Queensland. Subsequently, the claimant filed this claim before the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal seeking compensation from the respondent and his clinic. The respondent argued that there was an agreement with the government on artificial insemination by donation in relation to treatment of infertility, and that treatment is to be provided only to heterosexual couples. The Tribunal confirmed that there was no such agreement in place. The respondent also argued the definition of infertility only describes the incapability of heterosexual couples of conceiving because of medical reasons caused by one or both of them. The Tribunal also refused this limitation of the definition and held that the fact that scientifically two females are incapable of conceiving a child is a medical reason that makes them eligible for the same treatment as any heterosexual couple seeking this treatment. Accordingly, the Tribunal found the act of the respondent to be discriminatory against the complainant because she is a lesbian, which is unlawful under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, and ordered the clinic to pay the claimant a compensation sum for the humiliation and offence she suffered.



Du Bois-Hammond v. Ariel Anti-Discrimination Tribunal Queensland (2004)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The complainant worked as a Reservations Manager at the Raging Thunder Pty where both respondents, Cole and Ariel, were directors. The complainant became pregnant and went on maternity leave in agreement with the directors that she would return to the company at the same position after her maternity leave. Closer to the date when the complainant was about to return back from her maternity leave, she contacted Mr. Cole and discussed the possibility of returning on a part-time basis, but Mr. Cole informed her it was not possible for a managerial position to be part-time. The complainant tried to contact Mr. Cole again to inform him that she was willing to work full-time, but could not reach him, so she sent him the message through the receptionist. After several calls with Mr. Cole and without a definitive answer on her return date to work, Mr. Ariel called the complainant to inform her of a company restructuring and that her position was no longer available and that the two newly introduced positions were already filled by her colleagues. The complainant asked if they were going to offer any similar positions, but Mr. Ariel told her they had no more positions and he would not create one for her. The complainant suffered emotional distress and financial loss due to becoming redundant, therefore filed for this complaint seeking compensation. The complainant alleged that, due to her pregnancy and maternity leave, the respondents (i) failed to discuss the terms of her returning to work; (ii) failed to discuss her offer to work part-time;(iii) failed to appoint her in the new position of Call Center Manager and appointed Ms. S. instead; (iv) failed to appoint her in the new created position of 2IC and appointed Ms. G.; and, (v) failed to offer her an alternative position. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal did not find the respondents liable for all of the complainant’s allegations, but ruled that the company and Mr. Ariel failed to offer the complainant the 2IC position after restructuring even though she was more experienced and familiar with this role than Ms. G., who was only covering for the complainant during her maternity leave. Thus, the Tribunal found that the reason for not offering this position to the complainant was due to her maternity leave. The company and Mr. Ariel also failed to offer the complainant any alternative position, again due to her maternity leave, and therefore her return was not considered while planning the restructuring of the company. The Tribunal found that respondents did not discriminate against complainant in conversations about her returning to work, in not discussing her offer to work part-time, in choosing to restructure, or in failing to appoint her in the Call Center Manager position under the Anti-Discriminatory Act 1991. However, the Tribunal did find that if complainant had not been on maternity leave at the time of the restructuring, she would have been offered the 2IC position, and that decision constituted pregnancy discrimination on the part of the first and third respondents. Also, the Tribunal found the failure to offer complainant a suitable alternative position constituted pregnancy discrimination. Therefore, the Tribunal ruled a compensation sum to be paid the complainant.



McRostie v. Boral Resources Anti-Discrimination Tribunal Queensland (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The complainant was an employee of the respondent company. The complainant filed this complaint against the respondent primarily for appointing a man, J., in the position of Administration Manager without advertising the position and therefore not giving the complainant an opportunity to compete for the position. The complaint rested on the following: (i) discriminating in complainant’s salary because J., even though he held positions of similar ranking and job descriptions over the years, always received a higher salary than the complainant by at least $5,000; (ii) removing complainant’s name from the list of attendees to the Perth Conference of the Institute of Quarrying; (iii) not giving her the opportunity to relieve her line manager from his duties during his absence and giving this task to J.; (iv) deciding not to give her the task of delivering a presentation even though she was the project coordinator and instead giving it to J.; (v) placing J. on the Archipegalo Project and denying complainant’s request for leave time; and (vi) selecting J. to conduct a computer training when complainant had expertise in the area. The complainant suffered from emotional distress and subsequently resigned from her position. The complainant sought compensation for the ongoing financial loss caused by not finding a full-time employment since her resignation. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal did not find discrimination on the part of respondent based on complainant’s allegations, except for two years of salary discrimination. Accordingly, the Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the complainant a compensation sum for the difference in the salaries within 30 days.



Brown v. Moore Supreme Court of Queensland (1996)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The respondent was a married aboriginal woman employed at the The Black Community Housing Service as a bookkeeper since 1985 and later as an Administrator until her resignation in August 1992. The first appellant became the director of the Housing Service in December 1990, and the second appellant was the employer, The Black Community Housing Service. The respondent started receiving calls from the appellant where he expressed his love to her and made inappropriate sexual remarks. The appellant also made inappropriate sexual remarks to the respondent when attending meetings together, on other occasions he gifted her “sexually explicit figurines,” and “touched her sexually suggestively on numbers of occasions.” The respondent did not confront the appellant in fear of losing her job, but she did complain to the board of directors who took no action against the appellant. Respondent filed a complaint against the appellant on the basis of sexual harassment and discrimination, and ultimately resigned when the board of directors would not remove appellant from his position while the investigation was underway. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal found the claims of the respondent to be true. The Tribunal also learned that the employer did not have any policies on discrimination or sexual harassment, nor provided its employees with a training regarding the same. Since these are considered unlawful acts under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, the Tribunal ordered the employer and the appellant pay the respondent compensation for damages caused by the discrimination and sexual harassment. The first appellant filed this appeal stating that the Tribunal had no evidence that the respondent suffered any hurt and/or humiliation, nor that the respondent’s resignation was due to the behaviour of the appellant. The first appellant also objected on the compensation amount being “excessive in the circumstances.” The second appellant appealed, stating that the employer was not vicariously liable for the acts of the first appellant. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the orders of the Tribunal.



Mount Isa Mines, Ltd. v. Hopper Supreme Court of Queensland (1998)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The respondent was employed as an apprentice by the first appellant, the second appellant was her supervisor, and the third, fourth, and fifth appellants were her co-apprentices. Over the course of the respondent’s employment with the first appellant, she was subject to unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment by the third, fourth, and fifth appellants (among others). The complaint by the respondent included her receiving sexual comments and unequal treatment by her superiors and co-workers because she was a female, and many of her peers told her that she was not fit for her job because she was a female. Examples of these acts were a display of pictures and posters of half-dressed women in various parts of the workplace, addressing the respondent in the presence of others at a training with inappropriate comments, not giving the respondent the same work opportunities as her male peers, and providing her with unfavourable report cards that included clear comments against her as a female. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal in the first instance found that the first appellant was negligent in providing the proper training to its employees on anti-discrimination and sexual harassment at the work place, subsequently allowing the other appellants to act in a discriminatory way towards the respondent because of her gender. Since these are considered unlawful acts under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, the Tribunal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent compensation for damages caused by discrimination and sexual harassment. The appellants’ filed this appeal objecting to the Tribunal’s findings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the orders of the Tribunal.



Habeas Corpus 124.306 Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2016)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF) revoked the pretrial detention order issued against staff and patients of a clinic that was alleged to have been performing clandestine abortions. The 2ND Panel of STF found that criminal laws against abortion were unconstitutional with respect to the case in hand, and the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy during the first three months was incompatible with the protection of multiple fundamental rights of women. The decision set an important precedent for the sexual and reproductive rights of women in Brazil. The court also discussed that the criminalization of abortion disproportionately affected women living in poverty who do not have access to private or public abortion clinics. Justice Barroso stated that while the potential life of the fetus is important, the criminalization of abortion before the end of the first three months of pregnancy violated several fundamental rights of women granted by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (personal autonomy, physical and mental integrity, sexual and reproductive rights, and gender equality). This decision does not decriminalize abortion in all circumstances, and it is not bidding. This is perhaps a softening of the law regarding abortion in Brazil.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF desconstitui prisão de ofício emitida contra funcionários e donos de clinica de aborto presos em flagrante em razão de suposta prática de aborto clandestinos. A 2ª turma do STF entendeu que as leis criminais contra a prática do aborto são inconstitucionais em relação ao caso em análise, estabelecendo ainda que a criminalização do aborto voluntário durante os 3 (três) primeiros meses de gravidez era incompatível com múltiplos direitos fundamentais garantidos às mulheres. Nesse aspecto, trata-se de um precedente importante para os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos das mulheres no Brasil. Ainda a 2 turma do STF discutiu que a criminalização do aborto afeta, desproporcionalmente, as mulheres pobres que não têm acesso a clínicas privadas ou públicas. Ainda, o Ministro Barroso, relator do caso, estabelece que, enquanto a vida potencial de um feto é importante, a criminalização do aborto realizado dentro dos 3 meses iniciais da gravidez viola diversos direitos fundamentais garantidos constitucionalmente, como a autonomia, o direito à integridade física e mental, os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos, além da igualdade de gênero. Ressalta-se que essa decisão não descriminaliza o aborto em todas as circunstâncias, bem como não vincula o STF a emitir decisões com o mesmo posicionamento, apesar de se tratar de decisão favorável às mulheres no tocante a realização de aborto no Brasil.



Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade 4275 (Direct Action of Unconstitutionality) Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2009)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Brazil’s Supreme Court decided by a majority that transgender individuals could change their legal name and gender originally included in their civil registry, without the presentation of psychological or medical evaluation, hormonal treatment, transition surgery, or any other medical procedure. The majority understood that no judicial authorization is necessary for the amendment, stating only a self-written report of the trans person is sufficient to change his/her legal name.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF decidiu, por maioria de votos, que as pessoas transgêneros podem alterar seu prenome e sua classificação de gênero no registro civil, mediante auto-declaração, sendo desnecessária a apresentação de laudos psicológicos, tratamento hormonais ou procedimentos cirúrgicos ou de autorização judicial.



X. v. Y. Cour du travail de Bruxelles (Brussels Labor Court) (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

A woman informed her employer of the fact that she was pregnant. Two months later, her employer fired her due to alleged restructuring of the company. Subsequently, the appellant started proceedings before the Court to receive an indemnity. The appellant claims that she has a right of indemnity based on the right of pregnant women to be protected against redundancy or, following the right to be protected against discrimination. The court held for the appellant and ordered the previous employer to pay the appellant a sum of EUR 33,135.00 and EUR 703.24 and to deliver to the appellant requested social documents.



The State of New South Wales v. Amery High Court of Australia (2006)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The policy and practice of the New South Wales Department of Education and Training restricted pay scales of temporary teachers to level 8, which excluded temporary staff from the highest level of pay. The applicants, 13 female temporary teachers, sued, arguing that only permanent staff had access to the highest pay rates and that there was a gender imbalance between permanent and temporary teachers. Of the 13 female teachers, 11 took temporary rather than permanent positions due to family responsibilities and two applied for permanent positions, but those two, due to family reasons, limited the areas in which they could work. The court considered that making over-award payments to only women would be discriminatory against men, whereas the second option of making over-award payments to those who had family commitments would be difficult to formulate and to apply in practice. As such, the court held that there was no indirect discrimination.



Australian Iron & Steel Pty. Ltd. v. Banovic High Court of Australia (1989)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The case concerned a challenge to the employer’s retrenchment policy. The applicant alleged that the criterion was discriminatory as substantially higher proportion of men could comply than women. Although the retrenchment applied to both sexes, there were fewer women in positions of seniority who were immune from the retrenchment because the employer had a history of discriminating in its hiring decisions. As such, the court found indirect discrimination because the retrenchment policy unlawfully maintained discriminatory circumstances.



Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, Case 1708/2013 Constitutional Tribunal (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff in this action was an elected councilor in the municipality of Tolata. She was forced to sign a letter of resignation under pressure from a group of intruders who had entered the session room of the municipal building. The plaintiff alleged that her rights relating to legal security in the exercise of a public function under Articles 46 and 144 of the constitution were violated and sought constitutional protection and the return to the office of municipal councilor of Tolata. The Constitutional Tribunal granted these requests.

La demandante en esta acción era un concejal electo en el municipio de Tolata. Se vio obligada a firmar una carta de renuncia bajo la presión de un grupo de intrusos que habían entrado en la sala de sesiones del edificio municipal. La demandante alegó que sus derechos relacionados con la seguridad jurídica en el ejercicio de una función pública en virtud de los Artículos 46 y 144 de la constitución fueron violados y solicitó protección constitucional y el regreso a la oficina del concejal municipal de Tolata. El Tribunal Constitucional concedió estas solicitudes.



Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, Case 1961/2013 Constitutional Tribunal (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

The Constitutional Tribunal held that the conduct of the municipal authorities forcing a victim of gender violence to reconcile with her aggressor under the threat of taking her children to a shelter violates the right of women to live free from violence. The Tribunal held that this conduct constituted undue harassment.

El Tribunal Constitucional sostuvo que la conducta de las autoridades municipales, obligando a una víctima de violencia de género a reconciliarse con su agresor bajo la amenaza de llevar a sus hijos a un refugio es contra el derecho de las mujeres a vivir libres de violencia. El Tribunal sostuvo que esta conducta constituía indebida acoso.



Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, Case 0206/2014 Constitutional Tribunal (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, a member of the Bolivian Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of several articles of the Criminal Code on the basis that they discriminated against women. The Court held that some of the challenged articles were unconstitutional and upheld others. On the grounds of gender discrimination, the Court found unconstitutional Article 56, which prevented imprisoned women from being employed outside of prisons while allowing imprisoned men outside employment, and Article 245, which recognized as a defense to the offense of falsifying a birth record the motive of protecting the honor of one’s wife, mother, daughter, or sister. The Court declared unconstitutional the words “fragility” and “dishonor” in Article 258 regarding infanticide also due to gender discrimination, although this did not affect the operation of the offense. The final unconstitutional issue was that Article 250 criminalized an unmarried man abandoning a woman who became pregnant with him, but did not criminalize a married father’s abandonment of his pregnant wife. The Court was unwilling to hold restrictions on abortion unconstitutional. As such, receiving an abortion remains prohibited under Articles 263 and 264, and the performance of abortion is prohibited under Article 269. However, the Court did declare unconstitutional the requirements in Article 266 that a woman inform the police and obtain judicial authorization in order to obtain an abortion in the case of rape or incest (article 266).

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, quien es miembro del Parlamento boliviano, cuestionó la constitucionalidad de varios artículos del Código Penal sobre la base de que eran discriminatorios contra las mujeres. El Tribunal sostuvo que varios de los artículos impugnados eran inconstitucionales: el Artículo 56, que impedía que las mujeres encarceladas fueran empleadas fuera de las cárceles mientras que los hombres encarcelados, por otro lado, podían tener empleo y el Artículo 245, que reconocía la protección del honor de la esposa, la madre, la hija o la hermana de uno como defensa al delito de falsificar un registro de nacimiento. Ambos Artículos se consideraron inconstitucionales sobre la base de la discriminación de género. La Corte declaró que las palabras "fragilidad" y "deshonra" contenidas en el Artículo 258 en asociación con el infanticidio eran inconstitucionales por la misma base, aunque esto no afecta el funcionamiento del delito. Además, la distinción dentro del Artículo 250 que penalizaba el abandono por parte de un padre de una mujer que no es su esposa después de dejarla embarazada pero que no se aplicaba a la esposa de un padre también se consideró inconstitucional. La Corte no estaba dispuesta a mantener las restricciones sobre el aborto como inconstitucionales. Como tal, recibir un aborto sigue prohibido según los Artículos 263 y 264, y el aborto está prohibido según el Artículo 269. Sin embargo, la Corte declaró inconstitucional los requisitos del Artículo 266 de que una mujer informe a la policía y obtenga la autorización judicial para obtener un aborto en caso de violación o incesto (artículo 266).



Moosa N.O. and Others v. Harnaker and Others High Court of South Africa: Western Cape Division ( Hooggeregs Hof van Suid Afrika: Weskaap Afdeling) (2017)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The deceased was married to the second and third applicant under Islamic law. The marriage of the deceased and the third applicant was entered into before the marriage between the deceased and the second applicant. However, the deceased and the second applicant entered into a civil marriage to qualify for a home loan. Following the death of the deceased, The Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town, refused to register the title deed to the family home in the name of the third applicant. The Registrar’s refusal was premised on the meaning of the term “surviving spouse” as contemplated in terms of section 2C(1) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 (the “Wills Act”). According to the Registrar, the only recognised surviving spouse of the deceased is the second applicant as they entered into a civil marriage. The Court declared section 2C(1) of the Wills Act unconstitutional as it does not recognise the rights of spouses married under Islamic law nor multiple female spouses married to a deceased testator in polygynous Muslim marriages.

Die oorledene is volgens die Islamitiese Wet met ‘n tweede en derde applikant getroud. Die huwelik van die oorledene en die derde applikant is aangegaan voor die huwelik tussen die oorledene en die tweede applikant. Die oorledene en die tweede applikant het egter ‘n siviele huwelik aangegaan om te kwalifiseer vir ‘n huislening. Na die afsterwe van die oorledene het die Registrateur van Aktes, Kaapstad, geweier om die titel-akte van die gesinshuis in die naam van die derde aansoeker te registreer. Die weiering van die registrateur is gegrond op die betekenis van die term “oorlewende gade” soos beoog in terme van artikel 2C(1) van die Wet op Testamente 7 van 1953 ( die “Testamente Wet”). Volgens die registsrateur is die enigste erkende oorlewende gade van die oorledene, die tweede aansoeker aangesien hulle ‘n siviele huwelik aangegaan het. DIe hof het artikel 2C(1) van die Wet op testamente ongrondwetlik verklaar aangesien dit nie die regte van gades wat kragtens die Islamitiese wet getroud is, erken nie asook nie veelvuldige vroulike eggenote wat met ‘n oorlede testateur in ‘n poligamiese moslemhuwelik verbind is nie.



Hassam v. Jacobs NO Constitutional Court (Konstitusionele Hof) (2009)


Gender discrimination

The applicant was in a polygamous Muslim marriage. After her husband died intestate, the respondent, the executor of the deceased’s estate, refused the applicant’s claims on the basis that polygynous Muslim marriages were not legally recognised under the Intestate Succession Act. The court held that precluding the applicant from an inheritance unfairly discriminated on the grounds of religion, marital status, and gender, and was therefore inconsistent with section 9 of the Constitution. The court found that section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it did not include more than one spouse in a polygynous Muslim marriage in the protection afforded to “a spouse.” Accordingly, the applicant could inherit from her late husband’s estate.

Die applikant was in ‘n poligame Moslem-huwelik. Nadat haar man intestaat gesterf het, het die respondent, die eksekuteur van die oorledene se boedel, die applikant se eise geweier op grond daarvan dat poligame Moslem huwelike nie wettiglik erken word onder die Intestate Erfreg Wetgewing nie. Die hof het bevind dat daar onbillik gediskrimineer was teen die applikant op grond van godsdiens, huwelikstatus en geslag, was dus strydig met Artikel 9 van die Grondwet. Die hof het bevind dat Artikel 1 van die Intestate Wet strydig was met die konstitusie (Grondwet) en ongeldig is tot die mate dat dit nie meer as een gade in ‘n poligame Moslem-huwelik insluit tot die beskerming wat aan ‘n eggenoot gegee word nie. Gevolglik kon die applikant uit die boedel van haar oorlede man erf.



Daniels v. Campbell and Others Constitutional Court (Konstitusionele Hof) (2004)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

The applicant was a woman married according to Muslim rites and whose husband had died intestate. The marriage was not solemnized by a marriage officer under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. The house in which the applicant and her husband had lived was transferred to the deceased’s estate. The applicant was told that she could not inherit from the estate of the deceased because she had been married according to Muslim rites, and therefore was not a “surviving spouse.” A claim for maintenance against the estate was rejected on the same basis. The Court held that the word “spouse” as used in the Intestate Succession Act includes the surviving partner to a monogamous Muslim marriage and that the word “survivor” as used in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990, includes the surviving partner to a monogamous Muslim marriage.

Die applikant was ‘n vrou wat volgens Moslem tradisie getroud is en wie se eggenoot intestaat gesterf het. Die huwelik is nie volgens die huwelikswet 25 van 1961 deur ’n huweliks beampte bekragtig nie. Die huis waarin die applikant en haar man gewoon het is na die oorledene se boedel oorgeplaas. Die applikant is meegedeel dat sy nie uit die boedel van die oorledene kon erf nie omdat sy getroud was volgens die Moslem tradisie en is dus nie 'n "oorlewende gade" nie. ’n Eis vir onderhoud teen die boedel is op dieselfde basis verwerp. Die hof het beslis dat die woord "gade" soos gebruik word in die Wet op Intestate Erfopvolging, die oorlewende maat van ’n monogame moslem-huwelik insluit. Die woord "oorlewende” wat gebruik word vir die Wet 27 van 1990 vir die onderhoud van oorlewende eggenote, sluit die oorlewende eggenoot in van 'n monogame Moslem huwelik



Bhe and Others v. Khayelitsha Magistrate Constitutional Court (Konstitusionele Hof) (2004)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

This judgment constituted three related cases (Bhe, Shibi and SAHRC), which were decided together and concerned the African customary law rule of primogeniture. In Bhe, a mother brought an action to secure the property of her deceased husband for her daughters. In Shibi, the applicant was denied the right to inherit from her deceased brother’s intestate estate under African customary law. In SAHRC, the South African Human Rights Commission and the Women’s Legal Centre Trust brought an action in the public interest to declare the rule of male primogeniture contained within section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 invalid. The Constitutional Court declared section 23 invalid, meaning that all deceased estates were to be governed by the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987, under which widows and children can benefit regardless of their gender or legitimacy. The Court also ordered the division of estates in circumstances where the deceased person was in a polygamous marriage and was survived by more than one spouse and ordered that, in such instances, a surviving spouse shall inherit a child’s share of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount fixed by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development by notice in the Gazette.

Hierdie uitspraak het bestaan uit drie verwante sake (BHE, Shibi en SARK) wat saam beslis is en het betrekking op die Afrika gebruiks regsreël van eersgeboortereg. In BHE het 'n moeder 'n saak gemaak om die eiendom van haar oorlede man vir haar dogters te verseker. In Shibi is die applikant volgens die Afrika gewoontereg, die reg ontsê om van die intestate boedel van haar broer te erf. In SAHRC het die Suid-Afrikaanse Menseregte Kommissie en die "Women’s Legal Centre Trust" 'n saak in die openbare belang gebring om die reël van manlike eersgeboortereg wat in artikel 23 van die Swart Administrasie Wet 38 van 1927 ongeldig te verklaar. Die Konstitusionele Hof het artikel 23 ongeldig verklaar wat beteken dat alle boedels van oorledenes onderworpe sal wees aan die Intestaat Opvolgwet 81 van 1987 waaronder weduwees en kinders voordeel kan trek ongeag hul geslag of wettigheid. Die Hof het ook gelas dat boedels onderverdeel word in omstandighede waar die oorledene in ’n poligame huwelik was en deur meer as een eggenoot oorleef word. In welke geval ’n oorlewende eggenoot ’n kind se deel van die intestate boedel erf of ’n waarde van die intestate boedel wat nie die bedrag wat deur die Minister vir Justisie en Grondwetlike Ontwikkeling vasgesteld is, oorskry word soos die kennisgewing in die Staatskoerant nie.



Women's Legal Centre Trust v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others High Court of South Africa: Western Cape Division (Hooggeregshof van Suid Afrika: Wes Kaap Afdeling) (2018)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The plaintiff petitioned to bring three consolidated actions directly to the Constitutional Court. They sought a declaratory order that the President recognize Muslim marriages as valid for all purposes in South Africa. The Constitutional Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ plea for direct access and instead directed them to the High Court. The High Court held that the State’s failure to enact legislation recognising religious Muslim marriages violated the rights of Muslim women based on religion, marital status, gender, and sex. The court directed the President, Cabinet, and Parliament to prepare and bring into operation legislation to recognise marriages performed in accordance with Sharia law.

Die eiser het 'n versoek om drie gekonsolideerde aksies direk na die Konstitusionele Hof te bring. Hulle het 'n verklarende-bevel aangevra dat die President, Moslem-huwelike as geldig vir alle doeleindes in Suid-Afrika erken. Die Konstitusionele Hof het die eisers se pleit vir direkte toegang van die hand gewys en het hulle eerder aan die Hooggeregshof verwys. Die Hooggeregshof het bevind dat die staat se versuim om wetgeving te aanvaar wat erkenning gee aan huwelike wat godsdienstig Moslem is, die regte van Moslemvroue gekend het op grond van godsdiens, huwelikstatus, geslag en seks. Die hof het die President, die Kabinet, en die Parlement oprag gegee om wetgeving voor te berei en in werking te stel om huwelike wat volgens die sharia-wetgewing uitgevoer is, te erken.



邓亚娟邓与北京手挽手劳务派遣有限责任公司一般人格权纠纷,北京市第三中级人民法院 (Deng v. Beijing Shouwanshou Co. Ltd.) No. 3 Intermediate People's Court of Beijing Municipality (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff sued the defendants for infringing on her equal employment rights. The plaintiff alleged that the job description for the courier position included: “Eligibility: Men.” When Deng went for an interview, she was advised that “we never have women couriers.” She was subsequently informed that Beijing Postal could not authorize an employment contract for her because she is female. The plaintiff requested relief of, among other things, an official apology and 50,000 Chinese yuan as compensation of for mental distress. The court of first instance held that the defendants infringed upon the plaintiff’s right of employment equality under the People’s Republic of China’s Employment Law. The Court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the courier position fit within the statutory exceptions under “Special Regulations on Protection of Female Workers,” which prohibits female workers from working in certain fields involving heavy manual labor. The Court of first instance awarded 2,000 Chinese yuan as compensation for mental distress but denied the request for an official apology. Both the plaintiff and defendants appealed. The Intermediate People’s Court affirmed the lower court’s determination that a courier does not fit within the statutory exceptions for positions “unsuitable for women.” The court also held that compensation of 2,000 Chinese yuan was commensurate with the damages suffered by the plaintiff, and that there was insufficient ground to require an official apology from the defendants to the plaintiff.

就业歧视、性别歧视

原告诉称被告侵犯了她与男子平等的就业权利。原告称被告公司招聘快递员广告的任职资格为“男”。在原告到被告公司面试时,被告人事部称:“我们这儿从来没有过女快递员。”之后被告公司称因为原告是女性所以总公司(邮政公司)不批准签合同。原告的诉讼请求包括被告进行书面赔礼道歉和精神损害抚慰金人民币50000元。原审法院认为根据《中华人民共和国劳动法》,被告侵犯了原告与男子平等的就业权利。被告辩称快递员职位属于《女职工劳动保护特别规定》下禁止女性从事的体力劳动。原审法院驳回了被告的辩解。原审法院判决被告赔偿原告精神损害抚慰金2000元,并驳回了原告要求被告赔礼道歉的诉讼请求。原告与被告均不服原审判决并提起上诉。中级人民法院维持了原审法院的判决,认为快递员职位不属于法律禁止女性从事的体力劳动。中级人民法院认为精神损害抚慰金2000元和原告受到的伤害程度能够匹配,而书面赔礼道歉的要求依据不足。



梁海媚与广东惠食佳经济发展有限公司、广州越秀区名豪轩鱼翅海鲜大酒楼人格权纠纷,广东省广州市中级人民法院 (Liang v. Guangdong Huishijia Economic Development Co. Ltd.) Intermediate People's Court of Guangzhou Municipality (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff sued the defendants for infringing upon her right to employment equality. The plaintiff alleged that the online advertisement posted by the defendants, to which Liang responded, required kitchen apprentices to be “men between the ages of 18 and 25.” The plaintiff further alleged that when she went to the restaurant, the receptionist informed her of the restaurant’s policy that “all employees in the kitchen should be men, even if a woman possesses the qualifications of a chef.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ behavior violates Articles XII and XIII of the People’s Republic of China’s Employment Law, which provide that potential employees should not be discriminated against on the bases of ethnicity, race, sex, and religious beliefs. As relief, the plaintiff requested (1) an official apology from the defendants; (2) 21 Chinese yuan in damages for costs incurred by responding to the advertisement; and (3) 40,800 Chinese yuan in damages for emotional distress. The court of first instance held that the defendants’ actions constituted gender-based discrimination against the plaintiff. However, it found insufficient evidence for the plaintiff’s emotional distress and awarded 2,000 Chinese yuan in damages. It also denied Liang’s request for an official apology. Both the plaintiff and defendants appealed. Relying on the explicit requirement in the advertisement and the receptionist’s explanations that the candidate be a man, the Intermediate People’s Court held that the defendants’ exclusion based on the plaintiff’s gender was unlawful and unreasonable and constituted gender-based employment discrimination. With respect to relief, the Intermediate People’s Court held that under the Supreme People’s Court’s interpretations, emotional distress normally should not be compensated in monetary terms unless there are severe consequences. The Intermediate People’s Court held that compensation of 2,000 Chinese yuan was within the discretion of the lower court, and thus upheld the amount. The Intermediate People’s Court, however ordered the defendants to issue an official apology to the plaintiff in newspapers in the Guangzhou area.

就业歧视、性别歧视

原告诉称被告侵犯了她与男子平等的就业权利。原告称自己对被告的网上招聘广告进行了应聘。招聘广告要求厨房学徒须为“男性,18-25岁”。原告称在她去被告酒楼时,被告知公司规定厨房不找女工,即使具备厨师证也不行。原告称被告违反了《中华人民共和国劳动法》第十二条和第十三条的规定。法律规定,劳动者就业,不因民族、种族、性别、宗教信仰不同而受歧视。原告的诉讼请求包括(1)判决被告书面赔礼道歉;(2)判决被告连带赔偿原告因应聘产生的经济损失21元;(3)判决被告赔偿原告精神损害抚慰金40800元。原审法院判决被告的行为构成了对被告的性别歧视,但原告提交的证据不足以支持原告精神损害抚慰金的诉讼请求,并判决被告支付原告经济损失2000元。原审法院还驳回了原告要求被告书面赔礼道歉的诉讼请求。原告与被告均不服原审判决并提起上诉。根据被告招聘广告和前台工作人员对只招聘男性厨师的解释,中级人民法院认定被告对原告进行限制及排斥的行为不具有合法性,并且损害了女性应聘者的就业平等权。就赔偿问题,中级人民法院判决,在最高法院的解释下,因侵权致人精神损害,但未造成严重后果,受害人请求精神损害赔偿的,一般不予支持。原审法院酌情由被告赔偿原告精神损害2000元,属于原审法院自由裁量权范围,中级人民法院予以维持。中级人民法院判决被告向原告作出书面赔礼道歉。



Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2003)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff’s employee health benefit plan denied coverage for certain infertility procedures that can only be performed on women, including in vitro fertilization (“IVF”). She sued her employer for unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and state law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer. On the plaintiff’s appeal, the Second Circuit analyzed the issue differently than the district court but ultimately affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding that the health plan’s exclusion of coverage for surgical implantation procedures limited its infertility procedures for male and female employees equally and as a result did not amount to unlawful discrimination.



Lavin-McEleney v. Marist College United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2001)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff, a female professor sued the defendant, alleging that her salary raises were less than those of comparable male professors in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. At trial, both parties’ experts provided statistical evidence based on multiple regression analyses controlled to eliminate any observed gender disparity, including rank, years of service, division, tenure status, and degrees earned. Both experts found a difference in pay between comparable men and women, but disagreed about the statistical significance of that difference. The District Court for the Southern District of New York entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to make a case for discrimination because she had not identified a specific higher-paid male professor in her department and that she had impermissibly compared herself to a male employee statistical composite rather than an actual male employee. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff had identified a specific male comparator since only two other professors were comparable in each of the five categories identified by the expert witnesses, and one of them was a male professor who received higher pay. The Second Circuit further held that it was proper for the professor to introduce



Raniola v. Bratton United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2001)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff, a female police officer sued a police department, alleging hostile work environment, sexual harassment, and retaliation claims under Title VII. The plaintiff alleged that she suffered years of abuse because she was a woman, including derogatory remarks, disproportionately burdensome assignments, sabotage of her work, threats, and false accusations of misconduct. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Second Circuit reviewed all the evidence in the light most favorable to the officer and found that a reasonable jury could have arrived at a different conclusion than the district court. The Second Circuit determined that the evidence presented by the officer formed a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that she was subjected to hostile work environment because she was a woman and that she was suspended, put on probation, and then terminated in retaliation for having complained about her treatment. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the claims for retrial.



Spann v. Abraham Court of Appeals of Tennessee (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff, a cook and assistant manager at the defendant’s pizza franchise, informed her employer that she was pregnant. The defendant offered her the position of a backup night driver—a position she had held before—and proposed that his son replace her as the assistant manager while she took maternity leave. When she refused, the defendant informed her that if she did not accept the temporary reassignment, he had no other position for her. She quit soon after and sued in the Davidson County Circuit Court for pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). The Court entered a directed verdict in favor of her employer, and the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed, finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case that the defendant discriminated against her because she was pregnant.



Keeton v. Hill Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Nashville (2000)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff was fired for falsifying documents related to her work time. She sued in the Davidson County Chancery Court, alleging sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). The plaintiff alleged that her supervisors made sexually derogatory remarks to her, and that she was fired shortly after she complained about these comments. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed because the employer had established the affirmative defense of exercising reasonable care.



Bundy v. First Tennessee Bank National Association Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Jackson (2007)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff, a 59 year-old male employee, was fired following his failure to disclose documents he received from a customer. He filed suit in the Shelby County Circuit Court alleging both age and sex discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. He asserted that a female employee in a similar situation was treated more favorably and that the firing was a pretext for replacing him with a younger female employee. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of his employer, and the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed because the plaintiff was neither replaced by a younger female employee nor was he similarly situated to a younger female employee.



Smith v. City of Chattanooga Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Knoxville (2007)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was a police officer with the Chattanooga Police Department. After repeated sexual harassment from a fellow officer, she filed a sexual harassment complaint against the officer. The officer was transferred to a different team, but still worked in close physical proximity to the plaintiff, which made the plaintiff uncomfortable. She filed suit against the officer and her supervisor for creating a hostile work environment and sexual harassment in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"). The Hamilton County Chancery Court granted a directed verdict in favor of the police department, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee vacated the verdict, finding that reasonable minds could differ on whether the employer established the affirmative defense that it took appropriate corrective action. The appellate court also affirmed that the supervisor was not liable as an accomplice under the THRA because he did not encourage the officer nor prevent him from taking corrective actiion.



Bellomy v. Autozone, Inc. Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Knoxville (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was the defendant’s employee. She applied for the position of store manager, but the promotion was given to a younger male employee with less experience. She sued her employer in the Hamilton County Chancery Court alleging sex discrimination and other tort claims. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed and remanded her sex discrimination claims, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was qualified for the store manager position.



Hartman v. Tennessee Board of Regents Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Nashville (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was a long-time employee of Tennessee Tech University’s facilities department, where she managed inventory and was required to make purchases of supplies and equipment. After she made a purchase that exceeded her $5,000 purchasing authority, and even though she had recruited multiple bids for the product and chose the best supplier, her employment was terminated. The plaintiff filed suit in the Putnam County Chancery Court for gender discrimination. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed, finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that a similarly-situated male employee was treated more favorably, even though she had named a male employee who was not fired after making a purchase that exceeded his purchasing authority.



Castro v. TX District Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Jackson (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff worked at-will as a sales representative for the defendant. Shortly after she started working there, she discovered she was pregnant and informed her supervisor. Shortly after that, her supervisor informed her that her yearly salary would be halved, allegedly because she had failed to meet sales quotas. When she contacted the CEO (with whom she had interviewed) about her pay reduction, her supervisor met informed her that it was inappropriate to go over his head. After renegotiating the terms of her employment, her employment was soon terminated, again allegedly for failing to meet sales quotas. The plaintiff filed suit in the Shelby County Chancery Court for of sex and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, holding that the defendant did not establish that there were no male comparators that were treated more favorably than the plaintiff.



Pierce v. City of Humboldt Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Jackson (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was a police officer with the Humboldt Police Department. While off duty, she ran into an ex-boyfriend against whom she had a protective order. Based on this encounter, she filed a criminal charge against him for violating the order. The chief of police commenced an internal affairs investigation into her charges, and her ex-boyfriend filed a criminal charge against her for filing a false charge. While both charges were pending, the plaintiff informed the chief of police that she was pregnant. Once the internal affairs investigation was completed, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated. She filed suit in the Gibson County Circuit Court for discrimination based on gender and pregnancy in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that she was treated differently than similarly situated male police officers.



Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island (1982)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

This case struck down provisions of the Rhode Island “Informed Consent for Abortion” Act for failure to demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify its interference with women’s rights to abortion including: (i) a provision that required women be informed of “all medical risks” associated with the abortion procedure, including “psychological risks to the fetus,” as such a provision was unconstitutionally vague; (ii) a provision requiring a woman seeking abortion to give written consent to the procedure at least 24 hours prior to her scheduled operation, as such a provision imposed a legally significant burden on a woman’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, and the state did not demonstrate a compelling state interest necessitating such waiting period. However, the Court upheld a provision requiring that an abortion patient be informed of the “nature of her abortion,” i.e., that the abortion will irreversibly terminate her pregnancy.



Bergaust v. Flaherty Court of Appeals of Virginia (2011)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The plaintiff, a mother, brought a petition for child support against the putative father. The two met during a trip to France and had a long-distance relationship for 18 months. After returning to Virginia from another visit to the defendant in France, the plaintiff learned she was pregnant. Because the defendant was her only sexual partner during the relevant time period, she informed the defendant that the child was his. The defendant said he would help in any way he could and called twice a week during the pregnancy. Their child was born in Alexandria, Virginia, and the defendant continued to call regularly during this time. When the child was seven months old, the defendant came to Virginia to meet and spend time with the child. Following this visit, the defendant’s contact with the plaintiff decreased and ultimately ceased. Several years later, the plaintiff learned of the defendant’s whereabouts and brought a petition for child support. The circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction. The question before the Virginia Court of Appeals was whether the defendant had fathered a child in Virginia pursuant to the long-arm statute that provided, in part, that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person when it is shown that the person “conceived or fathered” a child in Virginia. The statute does not define the terms “conceived or fathered.” In finding no personal jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s interpretation of the term “fathered” to mean “to beget or to procreate as father,” rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the term encompassed “the acknowledgment of parentage” while in Virginia. Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the ordinary meaning of “fathered” includes “to make oneself the father…by acknowledgment,” the court concluded that if the state legislature had intended this broader meaning of the term, it “presumably would have included the word ‘mothered’ along with ‘conceived or fathered’ to encompass the non-custodial mother of a child living in [Virginia].” Therefore, per Virginia law, the child was not fathered in Virginia and the long-arm statute could not grant personal jurisdiction over the matter.



Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance Co. Supreme Court of Virginia (1994)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff sued her former supervisor and former employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress due to her supervisor’s harassment, which consisted of sexist and belittling remarks over an extended period of time. The lower courts held that her claim was barred by the Virginia’s Workers Compensation Act, which supplies remedied for injuries by accident, arising out of and in, the course of the employment or occupational disease but excluded any other remedies for such injuries. The issue before the Court was whether a pattern of harassment constituted the type of injury for which a lawsuit had to be filed under the Workers Compensation Act only. In reversing the lower courts’ decision, the court overruled its prior decision in Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 389 S.E.2d 712 (Va. 1990), which held that a pattern of sexual harassment constituted an “injury by accident” and thus could only be brought under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Court reasoned that Haddon was irreconcilable with long-established precedent holding that a “gradually incurred” injury over an extended period of time did not constitute an “injury by accident” and was thus not covered by the Act’s exclusion of other remedies. The Court’s decision allowed for a tort cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a pattern of sexual harassment in the workplace.



Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems Corp. Supreme Court of Virginia (1994)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Two plaintiffs, A and B, sued their former employer for wrongful termination, one based on racial discrimination and the other based on gender discrimination. Plaintiff B alleged that her supervisor touched her sexually without her consent and, when she complained, he fired her. The lower courts dismissed the actions, concluding that, pursuant to the employment-at-will doctrine, the plaintiffs were at-will employees who could be terminated for any or no reason at all. The issue before the Court was whether workplace discrimination could constitute a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and whether the availability of federal statutory remedies precluded state tort lawsuits. In reversing lower courts’ decision, the Court cited its precedents recognizing a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and concluded that it is “[w]ithout question” that it is the public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia that individuals within the state are “entitled to pursue employment free of discrimination based on race or gender.” The Court rejected the employer’s argument that the availability of federal statutory remedies should preclude a state tort cause of action based on wrongful discharge, explaining that it is not uncommon for injuries resulting from the same set of operative facts to give rise to multiple remedies.



Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas Supreme Court of Texas (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Physicians and clinics sued the Commissioner of Health sued, claiming that Texas Medical Assistance Program’s (“TMAP”) abortion funding restrictions for indigent women violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Rights Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution, and their rights to privacy. TMAP was prohibited from authorizing abortion services without matching federal funds. The relevant federal law, the Hyde Amendment, prevented TMAP from funding abortions unless the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or placed the woman in danger of death. The plaintiffs argued that the restriction constituted sex discrimination because the state funded virtually all medically necessary services for men while refusing to fund abortions that are medically necessary even though the woman is not at risk of death. The Supreme Court held that although any restriction related to abortion would only affect women, TMAP’s restriction was not “on the basis of sex,” but rather due to the nature of abortion as a medical procedure involving potential life, which has no similar treatment method. The Court noted that other than medically necessary abortions, TMAP funded virtually all other medical treatment for women, and funded abortions to the extent that matching federal funds were available. The Court held that the discouragement of abortion through funding restrictions cannot, by itself, be considered purposeful discrimination against women as a class. The Court recognized the state’s interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion and held that the right to choose an abortion does not translate into a state obligation to subsidize abortions. The Court thus held that the funding restrictions did not violate the Texas Constitution, reversing the Court of Appeals and entering judgment for the defendant.



Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Brown Supreme Court of Rhode Island (1995)


Gender discrimination

In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court set out the standard of scrutiny with which to view the constitutionality of laws that discriminate based on gender: “If an act employs a gender-based classification, it is subject to a middle-tier scrutiny in which the classification must be substantially related to the achievement of the statutory objective.”



Williams v. General Motors Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff-appellant, who worked for General Motors for more than 30 years, sued the company for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that she experienced a hostile work environment and retaliation. She alleged that she suffered a variety of sexually harassing comments, as well as other slights such as being the only employee denied a break and the only employee without a key to the office. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer on both her hostile work environment and retaliation claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, but reversed and remanded the lower court’s ruling on her hostile work environment claim, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her allegations were sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to violate Title VII.



Smith v. City of Salem United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2004)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff-appellant a trans woman lieutenant in the Salem, Ohio, Fire Department, sued the City of Salem, alleging discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. According to the plaintiff’s complaint, after she began expressing a more feminine appearance at work on a full-time basis, her co-workers informed her that she was not acting masculine enough. She then notified her immediate supervisor that she had been diagnosed with gender identity disorder and that she planned to physically transition from male to female. The plaintiff’s supervisor met with the City of Salem’s Law Director and other municipal officials, who required the plaintiff to undergo three psychological evaluations. The plaintiff retained legal counsel, received a “right to sue” letter from the U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, and was shortly thereafter suspended for one 24-hour shift, allegedly in retaliation for retaining counsel. The district court dismissed his complaint, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently plead a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, as well as claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.



Barnes v. City of Cincinnati United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff-appellant, a trans (“a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual”) police officer, applied to be promoted to sergeant within the Cincinnati Police Department. The plaintiff passed the sergeants exam but failed a rigorous training program and was denied promotion. The plaintiff sued the City of Cincinnati, alleging that the denial of her promotion was due to sex-based discrimination and failure to conform to male sex stereotypes, such as wearing makeup, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $320,511 as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff met all four requirements of a claim of sex discrimination: that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she applied and was qualified for a promotion, that she was considered for and denied a promotion, and that other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions.



Thornton v. Federal Express Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff-appellant, a former employee of FedEx, the defendant, was discharged when she did not return from work after a 16-month leave of absence. She took this leave because of stress she suffered after being sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor, and she did not return to work because her health care providers had not released her from treatment for panic disorder and fibromyalgia. The plaintiff sued for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as discrimination based on disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of FedEx, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff did not establish either that she was disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act or that she suffered an adverse employment action.



Gilbert v. Country Music Association, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

After the plaintiff-appellant, a theater professional who was openly homosexual, complained that a coworker had threatened him based on his sexual orientation and a union hiring hall of which the plaintiff was a member refused to provide him with work. Gilbert sued his union and a collection of various employers, alleging, among other claims, discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court observed that, while Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, and that this prohibition includes “sex stereotyping” whereby a plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action due to his or her nonconformity with gender stereotypes. The court held that Gilbert had not plead a sex stereotyping claim since other than his sexual orientation, the plaintiff fit every male stereotype, and sexual orientation did not suffice to obtain recovery under Title VII: “[f]or all we know,” the Court stated, “Gilbert fits every ‘male stereotype’ save one—sexual orientation—and that does not suffice to obtain relief under Title VII.”



Kalich v. AT&T Mobility United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff-appellant sued his employer, AT&T, in state court under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and AT&T removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff alleged that his immediate supervisor made a series of sexually inappropriate comments to him over the course of a year that created a hostile work environment. These comments included calling him by a girl’s name and telling him he looked like a girl. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his supervisor’s conduct toward him was because of his gender. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff stated in his deposition that he believed that his supervisor made these derogatory comments because he knew or suspected that the plaintiff was gay and that sexual orientation discrimination was not a protected classification under Title VII or Michigan law.



Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hospital, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff-appellant worked as a mental health technician for the defendant, Detroit Receiving Hospital’s Mental Health Crisis Center. Her duties included assisting registered nurses with treating psychiatric patients. A few days after assisting a nurse with the mistaken discharge of a patient who should not have been discharged, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, even though she consistently received high ratings on her performance evaluations. The plaintiff sued the defendant for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, in part because two men committed “nearly identical” infractions of “comparable seriousness” and were not terminated like the plaintiff. The appellate court remanded the case for trial proceedings.



Simpson v. Vanderbilt University United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff-appellant was a professor at the Vanderbilt University School of Medicine who solicited clients for her own private business, which the defendant, Vanderbilt University, considered to be a violation of its Conflict of Interest Policy, its By-Laws, and its Participation Agreement. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment and she sued the defendant, alleging that her termination was due to gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that the plaintiff failed to identify a suitable male comparator and thus did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding key differences between the plaintiff’s conduct and that of the male comparator she identified, including most notably the fact that the male comparator had disclosed his work outside of Vanderbilt University on his conflict of interest form.



Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board v. E.F. and Another Supreme Court of Namibia (2001)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The respondent, a German national, was denied permanent residence in Namibia despite being in a committed relationship with a Namibian woman, residing in Namibia for many years, and having a highly skilled job in Namibia. The respondent claims that the only reason her application was denied is because she was a lesbian woman in a homosexual relationship. She therefore filed suit against the Immigration Selection Board (“ISB”), arguing that it had discriminated against her in denying her application. The lower court found in favor of the respondent and ordered the ISB to grant the respondent’s application. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision, finding that the respondent had not proven discrimination and that the ISB had wide discretion to deny applications. However, the Supreme Court judge explicitly stated: “I must emphasize in conclusion: Nothing in this judgment justifies discrimination against homosexuals as individuals, or deprive [sic] them of the protection of other provisions of the Namibian Constitution.”



Life Office of Namibia Ltd. (NamLife) v. Amakali Labour Court of Namibia (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The respondent was charged with two counts of sexual harassment of female coworkers and with the verbal abuse of another female coworker. His employer (the “company”) found that he had violated the company’s policies and fired him. The respondent brought a claim for wrongful termination to the Office of the Labour Commissioner, and the dispute was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator found in favor of the respondent and ordered the company to reinstate him and pay him N$102,000 in lost wages. The company appealed the decision to the courts. The judge overturned the arbitrator’s decision, finding that he overlooked numerous relevant facts in making his conclusions, which “no reasonable court or tribunal court have reached.” The court held that the company acted appropriately in terminating the respondent’s employment because sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace are serious offenses that create obstacles to equality in employment.



Paschke v. Frans Supreme Court of Namibia (2015)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The respondent in this appeal is the biological daughter of the deceased. The respondent’s mother was not married to the deceased, and thus, the respondent was considered an “illegitimate child” under Namibian law. The appellant is the sister of the deceased and the respondent’s aunt. The deceased died intestate on May 30, 1991, and his estate was administered per Namibian law on intestate succession. Because the respondent was classified as an illegitimate child, she was not entitled to inherit from her father’s estate. The respondent challenged the constitutionality of this common-law rule, which the High Court had declared unconstitutional in July 2007. The Supreme Court confirmed the High Court’s finding.



Causa Nº 4.792/13 Ex Juzgado de Instrucción Formal Quinta Nominación (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Defendant Mr. H.R.A was convicted of aggravated homicide based on his prior ties and relationship with the victim, Ms. N.A. (his partner), whom he murdered with a gun. Mr. H.RA. was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to Law No. 26,791, Article 80, which provides that “[l]ife imprisonment or confinement shall be imposed upon a person that murders an ascendant, descendent, spouse or ex-spouse or a person that kills another with whom he or she maintains a relationship, irrespective of whether they maintained a joint household.” The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it violates principles of equal protection because it does not afford (or it is not clear that the statute affords) equal protection to similarly situated homosexual couples. In rejecting the defendant’s challenge, the court notes (1) Supreme Court precedent making clear that holding legislation unconstitutional is a grave act that should be taken as a last resort and when it is clear that the legislation is clearly unconstitutional, and (2) the legislation in question sought to introduce as aggravating circumstances factors that had previously been ignored, extending the definition of the concept of “family” to include different family realities.

El acusado, el Sr. H.R.A fue condenado por homicidio con acciones agravadas debido a sus vínculos anteriores y su relación con la víctima, la Sra. N.A. (su pareja), a quien asesinó con un arma. El Sr. H.RA. fue condenado a cadena perpetua con conformidad con la Ley Nº 26.791, Artículo 80, que dispone que “se impondrá la reclusión o el encarcelamiento a una persona que asesine a un ascendiente, descendiente, cónyuge o ex cónyuge o una persona que asesine” otro con quien él o ella mantiene una relación, independientemente de si mantuvieron un hogar conjunto ”. El acusado impugnó la constitucionalidad de la ley, argumentando que violaba los principios de protección igualitaria porque no permite (o no está claro si el el estatuto otorga igual protección a las parejas homosexuales en situación similar). Al rechazar la impugnación del acusado, el tribunal señala (1) el Tribunal Supremo precedente, dejando en claro que mantener la legislación inconstitucional es un acto grave que debe tomarse como último recurso y solamente cuando está claro que la legislación es claramente inconstitucional, y cuando (2) la legislación en cuestión buscaba introducir como circunstancias agravantes factores que anteriormente se habían ignorado, extendiendo la definición del concepto de "familia" para incluir diferentes realidades familiares.



González de Delgado and Others v. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Supreme Court of Argentina) (2000)


Gender discrimination, International law

Parents of students enrolled at Colegio Nacional de Monserrat, a private all-male high school, filed suit to prevent the implementation of an order of the High Council of the National University of Córdoba (Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba) mandating that the high school admit female applicants. They argued that parents have the right to choose the type of education their children receive. The court of first instance found partially in favor of the parents, which was overturned by the appellate court. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court ruling on the basis that (1) the High Council of the National University of Córdoba acted within its statutory authority, (2) the Argentine constitution does not guarantee the right to enroll children in schools limited to a specific gender, (3) mixed gender schools do not infringe on the rights of parents to elect the type of education their children receive, and (4) establishing a mixed gender school is the only alternative compatible with the constitutional principles of equality and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to which Argentina is a signatory.

Los padres de los estudiantes matriculados en el Colegio Nacional de Monserrat, una escuela secundaria privada exclusivamente masculina, presentaron una demanda para evitar la implementación de una orden del Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba que ordenaba que el la escuela secundaria admitiera mujeres solicitantes. Argumentaron que los padres tienen derecho a elegir el tipo de educación que reciben sus hijos. El tribunal de primera instancia falló parcialmente decidiendo a favor de los padres, lo que fue anulado por el tribunal de apelaciones. Entre otras razones, la Corte Suprema confirmó la sentencia de la corte de apelaciones sobre la base de que (1) el Consejo Superior de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba actuó dentro de su autoridad estatutaria, (2) la constitución argentina no garantizaba el derecho a matricular a los niños en las escuelas limitadas a un género específico, (3) las escuelas mixtas no infringen los derechos de los padres a elegir el tipo de educación que reciben sus hijos, y (4) establecer una escuela mixta es la única alternativa compatible con los principios constitucionales de igualdad y la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer de la que Argentina es signataria.



De Sousa v. Administración de Parques Nacionales Camara Federal de San Martin (Federal Court of San Martin) (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

On July 6, 2016, the plaintiff notified the defendant-employer of her pregnancy and intention to take maternity leave. As of the date of notification, the plaintiff held a temporary executive position. On July 11, 2016, the defendant notified the plaintiff that her temporary designation as an executive was of no effect. The defendant subsequently provided a maternity compensation package beginning on the date her temporary designation was revoked, but it did not reflect her higher earnings as a temporary executive. The court of first instance granted the plaintiff maternity leave at a salary corresponding (1) to her executive status as from the date she provided notice until 30 days before the probable date of birth and (2) to her non-executive status during the 100 days following the birth of the plaintiff’s child. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the trial court’s ruling denying her executive pay for the 100-day period following the birth of her child, while the defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling granting the plaintiff executive pay from the date of notice of her pregnancy because of the subsequent cancellation of the plaintiff’s executive status on July 11, 2016. The appellate court found in favor of the plaintiff, noting that (1) the Argentine Constitution provides for the full protection of women during pregnancy and breastfeeding, (2) the International Treaty for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (to which Argentina is a signatory) requires the adoption of laws that prevent discrimination based on marriage or pregnancy, and (3) the failure to award the plaintiff maternity compensation corresponding to her executive status would result in a failure to ensure employment stability. The appellate court ruled against the plaintiff’s request to return to her executive position following maternity leave on the basis that the designation was temporary in nature and that laws protecting women during maternity leave cannot alter the fundamental nature of the relationship prior to maternity.

El 6 de julio de 2016, la demandante notificó a su empleador que estaba embarazada y que tenía intención de tomar la baja por maternidad. En la fecha de notificación, la demandante ocupaba un cargo ejecutivo temporal. El 11 de julio de 2016, el empleador notificó a la demandante que su designación temporal como ejecutiva no surtía efecto. Adicionalmente, el empleador le proporcionó un paquete de compensación por maternidad a partir de la fecha en que se revocó su designación temporal, pero este no reflejaba sus mayores ingresos como ejecutiva temporal. El Juzgado de Primera Instancia otorgó a la demandante licencia de maternidad con un salario correspondiente (1) a su condición de ejecutiva a partir de la fecha de notificación hasta 30 días antes de la fecha probable de nacimiento y (2) a su condición de no ejecutiva durante el 100 días después del nacimiento del hijo del demandante. La demandate apeló esta decisión, citando como error del tribunal de primera instancia el que se le negara la paga ejecutiva durante el período de 100 días después del nacimiento de su hijo. El empleador discutió que la orden inicial le otorgaba a la demandante paga ejecutiva desde la fecha de notificación de su embarazo debido a la subsiguiente cancelación de la condición de ejecutivo de la demandante el 11 de julio de 2016. El tribunal de apelaciones decidió a favor de la demandante, señalando que (1) la Constitución Argentina prevé la protección total de la mujer durante el embarazo y la lactancia, (2) el Tratado Internacional para la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (de la cual Argentina es signataria) requiere la adopción de leyes que prevengan la discriminación por matrimonio o embarazo, y (3) la falta de adjudicación a la demandante de una compensación por maternidad correspondiente a su condición de ejecutiva sería resultar en un fracaso para asegurar la estabilidad del empleo. El tribunal de apelación decidió en contra de la solicitud de la demandante de regresar a su puesto ejecutivo después de la licencia de maternidad sobre la base de que la designación era de carácter temporal y que las leyes que protegen a las mujeres durante la licencia de maternidad no pueden alterar la naturaleza fundamental de la relación antes de la maternidad.



Sisnero, et al. v. Taldelva SRL, et al. Corta Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiffs, Mirtha Graciela Sisnero and the Women’s Foundation (Fundación Entre Mujeres), filed suit against the Automotive State Transportation Company (Sociedad Anònoma del Estado del Transporte Automotor), the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Autoridad Metropolitana de Transporte), and seven companies that provided public transportation services in the city of Salta. The plainiffs alleged, citing Ms. Sisnero’s failure to obtain a bus driver position despite having met the job requirements, that defendants refuse to hire female drivers in violation of equal rights and anti-discrimination laws. The plaintiffs demanded that (1) the defendants cease to discriminate based on gender, (2) Ms. Sisnero be hired as a bus driver, and (3) the defendants set aside a certain number of positions to be filled exclusively by women until such time as the composition of drivers reflected gender integration. The court of first instance found in favor of the plaintiffs, mandating that 30% of openings for bus drivers be set aside exclusively for women. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision based on the plaintiff’s failure to prove that the defendants failed to hire Ms. Sisnero solely because she was female, further noting that the defendants’ failure to accept Ms. Sisnero’s multiple applications for employment were insufficient to sustain a claim of discrimination because the defendants were under no constitutional obligation to hire her. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, noting that the appellate court failed to adequately consider the evidence provided by the plaintiffs. The lower court should have considered (1) the fact that the defendants had not hired any female bus drivers after receiving complaints from Ms. Sisnero and (2) discriminatory statements made by representatives of the defendants (e.g., “women should focus on demonstrating their culinary abilities”). The Supreme Court further noted that once the claimant has proven the existence of acts that are allegedly discriminatory, it is the defendant’s burden to disprove the existence of the alleged discrimination.

Las demandantes, Mirtha Graciela Sisnero y la Fundación Mujeres (Fundación Entre Mujeres), demandaron conjuntamente a: la Empresa Estatal de Transporte Automotor (Sociedad Anònoma del Estado del Transporte Automotor), la Autoridad Metropolitana de Transporte (Autoridad Metropolitana de Transporte) y siete empresas que proporcionaron servicios de transporte público en la ciudad de Salta. Los demandantes alegaron, citando que la Sra. Sisnero no consiguió un puesto de chofer de autobús a pesar de haber cumplido con los requisitos laborales y que los acusados ​​se niegan a contratar chóferas mujeres en violación de la igualdad de derechos y las leyes contra la discriminación. Los demandantes exigieron que (1) los imputados dejaran de discriminar por motivos de género, (2) la Sra. Sisnero fuera contratada como conductora de autobús y (3) los imputados apartaron un cierto número de puestos para ser ocupados exclusivamente por mujeres el tiempo necesario para que la composición de los impulsores reflejara la integración de género. El tribunal de primera instancia decidió a favor de los demandantes, ordenando que el 30% de las vacantes para conductores de autobuses se reservaran exclusivamente para mujeres. El tribunal de apelaciones revocó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia debido a que el demandante no demostró que los acusados ​​no contrataron a la Sra. Sisnero únicamente porque era mujer, y señaló además que el hecho de que los acusados​​no aceptaran las múltiples solicitudes de empleo de la Sra. Sisnero eran insuficientes para sustentar una denuncia de discriminación porque los acusados​​no tenían la obligación constitucional de contratarla. La Corte Suprema revocó la decisión de la Corte de Apelaciones, señalando que la corte de apelaciones no consideró adecuadamente las pruebas proporcionadas por los demandantes. El tribunal de primera instancia debería haber considerado (1) el hecho de que los acusados ​​no habían contratado a ninguna conductora de autobús después de recibir las quejas de la Sra. Sisnero y (2) evidencia de declaraciones discriminatorias hechas por representantes de los acusados ​​(por ejemplo, “las mujeres deberían centrarse en demostrar su habilidades culinarias ”). El Tribunal Supremo señaló además que, una vez que el demandante ha probado la existencia de actos supuestamente discriminatorios, es responsabilidad del acusado refutar la existencia de la supuesta discriminación.



Sentenza n. 6575/2016 Corte di Cassazione: Sezione Lavoro (Supreme Court: Labor Section) (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

An employer fired a woman after learning of her intention to start an assisted reproduction process. The local court and the court of appeal stated that such dismissal was substantially due to gender discrimination against the employee who wanted to start the assisted reproduction process. Such decisions were challenged by the employer who argued that the dismissal of the employee was not connected to any gender discrimination but rather to the absences for illness that would have affected the efficient management of the work. The Italian Supreme Court confirmed that the dismissal was null and void due to a gender discrimination, irrespective of the fact that the assisted reproduction process had been commenced or not and sentenced the employer re-hire the employee and to pay her the relevant salaries as if she had never been fired.

Un datore di lavoro aveva licenziato una donna dopo aver appreso della sua intenzione di iniziare un processo di riproduzione assistita. Il Tribunale e la Corte d’Appello avevano stabilito che tale licenziamento era sostanzialmente dovuto alla discriminazione di genere contro la dipendente che voleva iniziare il processo di riproduzione assistita. Tali decisioni erano state contestate dal datore di lavoro che aveva sostenuto che il licenziamento della dipendente non era legato ad alcuna discriminazione di genere, ma piuttosto alle assenze per malattia che avrebbero influenzato la gestione efficiente del lavoro. La Corte di Cassazione italiana ha confermato che il licenziamento era nullo a causa di una discriminazione di genere, indipendentemente dal fatto che il processo di riproduzione assistita fosse stato avviato o meno e ha condannato il datore di lavoro a riassumere la dipendente e a pagarle il rilevante stipendio come se non fosse stata licenziata.



Sentenza n. 937/2017 La Corte d'Appello di Torino: Sezione Lavoro (Court of Appeal of Turin: Labor Section) (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Court of Appeal of Turin upheld the lower court’s judgment deeming a clause of a collective agreement negotiated at the enterprise level to be discriminatory because it infringed on Articles 3 and 37 of the Constitution, Article 25, para 2bis, of Decree No. 198/2006 and Article 3 of Decree No. 151/2001. Under the relevant clause the “real presence at work” was as an eligibility criterion to receive an additional remuneration, it being understood that any family-related leave, including any compulsory maternity leave, parental leave, and/or leave for illness, could affect the employees’ level of performance in that respect. The Court maintained that even though the criterion was formally neutral, it resulted in an indirect pay discrimination since female workers usually take more family-related leave than male workers. Moreover, during the trial, the company failed to provide a permissible justification regarding the requirement of “real presence at work.” Therefore, the employer was ordered to (1) cease the discrimination by computing leave as actual time worked for the purposes of achieving the real presence requirement and becoming eligible for the additional remuneration, (2) to pay the additional remuneration incentive to the plaintiffs, and (3) to enhance a plan to remove the discrimination by avoiding the inclusion of the above criterion in any future collective bargaining at the enterprise level. The latter was promoted by the intervention of the Regional Equality Adviser as a case of collective discrimination.

La Corte d’Appello di Torino ha confermato la sentenza del Tribunale di primo grado che considerava discriminatoria una clausola di un contratto collettivo negoziato a livello di impresa in quanto contraria agli articoli 3 e 37 della Costituzione, all’articolo 25, paragrafo 2 bis, del decreto n. 198/2006 e all’articolo 3 del decreto n. 151/2001. Ai sensi della clausola rilevane, l’“effettiva presenza in servizio” era un criterio di ammissibilità per ricevere una retribuzione aggiuntiva, fermo restando che qualsiasi congedo per motivi familiari, compresi i congedi di maternità obbligatori e i congedi parentali e/o congedi per malattia, avrebbero potuto influire sul livello di prestazioni dei dipendenti a tale riguardo. La Corte ha sostenuto che, pur essendo la clausola formalmente neutrale, il criterio comportava una discriminazione retributiva indiretta, in quanto le lavoratrici prendono generalmente un numero di congedi familiari superiore a quello dei lavoratori di sesso maschile. Inoltre, durante il processo, l’azienda non aveva fornito una giustificazione ammissibile per quanto riguarda il requisito dell’“effettiva presenza in servizio”. Pertanto, al datore di lavoro è stato ordinato di (1) cessare la discriminazione calcolando il congedo come tempo effettivo di lavoro ai fini del raggiungimento del requisito di presenza effettiva in servizio e quindi di poter essere ammessi al percepimento della remunerazione aggiuntiva, (2) versare l’incentivo retributivo supplementare ai ricorrenti, e (3) implementare un piano per rimuovere le discriminazioni evitando l’inclusione della clausola di cui sopra in qualsiasi futura contrattazione collettiva a livello di impresa. Quest’ultimo obiettivo è stato promosso dall’intervento del Consigliere regionale di Parità al fine di far cassare un caso di discriminazione collettiva.



Decision No. 265/Pid.Sus/2015/PN Btm District Court of Batam (2015)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Defendant regularly verbally abused his wife (the victim) shouting at her, insulting and cursing her, demeaning her status and causing her deep embarrassment at in front of other employees. The Defendant also joked that he should just divorce the victim and get a new younger wife instead. These verbal abuses were not isolated incidents. The court viewed them as a form of psychological abuse which resulted in psychological suffering, a deep sense of helplessness, and the victim experiencing fear, losing confidence, and losing the will to act. The court found that the Defendant was guilty of domestic violence under Article 45 of Law No. 23 2004 and sentenced the Defendant to seven months imprisonment.



Gandhi v. Perak, et al. Federal Court of Malaysia (2018)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, International law

The appellant, Pathmanathan (husband), and the respondent, Indira Gandhi (wife), were married and had three children. In March 2009, the husband converted to Islam. In April 2009, the husband obtained certificates of conversion to Islam issued by the Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak over all three children as well as an ex-parte interim custody order over the children. In September 2009, he obtained a permanent custody order from the Syariah Court. In 2013 and 2014, the mother obtained orders from the High Court annulling the unilateral conversions and the Syariah Court’s custody order, inter alia, on the grounds that vesting equal rights to both parents to decide on a minor child’s religious upbringing and religion would be in accordance with international human rights principles, specifically the convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and CEDAW. The first appeal in this case concerned the validity of the conversion of the children to Islam. The majority in the Court of Appeal allowed the husband’s appeal and held that the Syariah Court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of the children’s conversion to Islam. Dealing with the issue of whether the conversions violate international norms, the Court noted that international treaties do not form part of domestic law unless those provisions have been incorporated into domestic law and that the High Court’s approach of following very closely the standard of international norms in interpreting the Federal Constitution is not in tandem with the accepted principles of constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal did not declare that the conversions of the children were invalid. The Federal Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions on appeal, reasoning that the children had not met the statutory requirements of conversion. Specifically, the Court found that the children did not state the two clauses of the Affirmation of Faith in Arabic as the Perak Enactment requires for a valid conversion to Islam. In addition, the Federal Court held that mothers have parental rights equal to fathers, so the permission of both parents is required for a child’s religious conversion.



Barclay v. Digen Supreme Court of Liberia (2011)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The appellant filed a complaint to divorce her husband and an action of summary proceedings to recover her property from the appellee. The appellee-husband claimed he was entitled to a property acquired during the marriage because a married woman cannot acquire property in her own name solely for herself. The Court held that, under the 1986 Constitution, (a) there is no legal significance of a woman choosing to use her husband’s surname; it does not affect the right of a woman to own property while married; (b) a woman can purchase property in her maiden name during marriage; (c) unless freely consented to, property which is owned solely by a husband’s wife cannot be controlled by her spouse. The Court ruled that the appellant proved her title to the property by a preponderance of evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the verdict and directed the lower court to enter judgment to evict the appellee.



Application by Tuğba Arslan Constitutional Court (2014)


Gender discrimination

A judge removed Tuğba Arslan, a member of the Ankara Bar Association, from a hearing because Arslan was wearing a headscarf while representing a party. The judge postponed the hearing and ordered alternate counsel in Arslan’s place. Turkish Bar Association rules prohibit attorneys from wearing headscarves during hearings. Arslan appealed to the Constitutional Court, claiming that because no legislation prohibited headscarves during hearings, her rights to freedom of religion and equal treatment had been violated. The Court agreed, holding that women may wear headscarves in accordance with Islam and the practice is common in Islamic society; therefore, the Arslan’s religious right was violated. Further, the Court stated that some limitations could be placed on rights but that such limitations, among other requirements, must be prescribed by law. Moreover, the Court reasoned that Arslan’s removal violated the non-discrimination principle, since on the one hand, women attorneys who do not wear headscarves are permitted to attend hearings while Arslan, on the other hand, is not.



Application by Gülsim Genç Constitutional Court (2013)


Gender discrimination, International law

Gülsim Genç petitioned the court of first instance to allow her to use her maiden name only, which the Turkish Civil Code prohibits. The court had previously filed an unsuccessful application to the Constitutional Court to annul this provision and, therefore, dismissed Genç’s petition accordingly. Genç appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed the court of first instance’s dismissal. Genç then filed an application to the Court. The Court referred to Article 17 of Turkish Constitution, which reads as follows: “every person has the right to preserve and improve one’s existence, both materially and spiritually.” Genç asserted that her surname formed part of this spiritual existence. The Court acknowledged that rights and freedoms may be limited under certain conditions, and when a limitation is placed on those rights, the Court should assess whether such limitation is permitted by law. Under Turkish law, if a contradiction exists between Turkish codes and international agreements on fundamental rights and freedoms, such international agreement shall prevail and apply to the case at hand. The European Court of Human Rights’ rulings indicate that forbidding women to use their maiden name violates the European Convention of Human Rights’ non-discrimination article. The Court remanded the case to the court of first instance for proceedings consistent with the Convention to the extent that the Turkish code violates the Convention. The Court repeatedly referenced the application by Sevim Akat Eşki, which is an indication that similar future rulings may result.



Application by Sevim Akat Eşki Constitutional Court (2013)


Gender discrimination, International law

The applicant petitioned the court of first instance to allow her to use her maiden name only, which the Turkish Civil Code prohibits. The court had previously filed an unsuccessful application to the Constitutional Court to annul this provision and, therefore, dismissed Eşki’s petition accordingly. Eşki then filed an individual application to the Court asserting discrimination and other violations. The Court referred to Article 17 of Turkish Constitution, which reads as follows: “every person has the right to preserve and improve one’s existence, both materially and spiritually.” Eşki asserted that her surname formed part of this spiritual existence. The Court acknowledged that rights and freedoms may be limited under certain conditions, and when a limitation is placed on those rights, the Court should assess whether such limitation is permitted by law. Under Turkish law, if a contradiction exists between Turkish codes and international agreements on fundamental rights and freedoms, such international agreement shall prevail and apply to the case at hand. The European Court of Human Rights’ rulings indicate that forbidding women to use their maiden name violates the European Convention of Human Rights’ non-discrimination article. The Court remanded the case to the court of first instance for proceedings consistent with the Convention to the extent that the Turkish code violates the Convention.



Applications by Various Courts of First Instance to Annul a Certain Civil Law Constitutional Court (2011)


Gender discrimination

The Turkish Civil Code permits a married woman to use her maiden name only if the maiden name is used in conjunction with her husband’s surname. Three applicants, each in separate petitions to courts of first instance, sought to use their maiden names only. The courts of first instance applied to the Constitutional Court, which denied the request because the legislature did not abuse its discretion in determining that the husband’s surname should be the family surname, and this did not violate the Constitution’s equality principle. The Court reasoned that surnames are important for identifying not only the individual, but also the family and ancestry. Consequently, the law requiring women to take their husbands’ surnames benefits public welfare and order. The Court also reasoned that having (the husband’s) surname is a personal right that cannot be renounced or alienated. Moreover, the fact that the surname is an individual right does not mean that the legislature cannot act to ensure public welfare and order. The Constitution states that the family is the foundation of the Turkish society and requires the State to promulgate necessary regulations to preserve the family.



Application by Court of First Instance to Annul the Surname Act in Part Constitutional Court (2012)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

In 2001, a mother divorced her husband, who was her child’s father, and the court of first instance granted custody to the mother, who then filed a lawsuit to change the child’s name and surname because both names were causing the child problems in his social environment—his friends were making fun of him. The Surname Act provides that the husband, as the leader of the marriage union, shall choose the child’s surname, even after divorce. The court of first instance held that this provision violated the Constitution’s equality principle and requested that the Constitutional Court annul the provision. The Constitutional Court unanimously agreed, holding that the Constitution, Article 41, establishes the equality between husband and wife; moreover, the right to choose a surname for the child was an element of custody. The Court noted that the Turkish Civil Code, Number 4721, had introduced material changes in husband–wife equality, and more importantly, articles that did not comply with the equality principle had been excluded from the law, such as the husband being the leader of the marriage union. The Court referenced the European Court of Human Rights, which held that any differing treatment based on gender, except for valid reasons, breaches the non-discrimination principle. According to the Constitutional Court, the wife and the husband were in the same position regarding their rights and obligations, both during marriage and in divorce; therefore, granting the right to choose the child’s surname exclusively to the father would have violated the Constitution’s equality principle.



L.W.L. v. Y.T. Cheng, Inc. District Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2006)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Plaintiff was employed as secretary of the Director by the Defendant in 2001. In February 2002, the Plaintiff suffered a threatened miscarriage, and was admitted to the hospital several times thereafter. From June to August 2012, she took sick leave frequently for treatment of her pregnancy complications. During that period, a permanent secretary was hired by the Defendant. The Plaintiff returned to work after expiry of her maternity leave in November 2012 as agreed with the Defendant, but was moved to a new work station which was not properly equipped, and was not given her original duties. Shortly after she resumed her work after maternity leave, she was dismissed by the Defendant. She sued the Defendant for her dismissal on the grounds of discrimination due to pregnancy, family status and victimization. The Court applied the “but for” and “less favorable treatment” test, and held that the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove discrimination on a balance of probabilities – once the Plaintiff can show that a possibility of discrimination can be inferred from the primary facts, the Court will look to the employer for an explanation, with which or if such explanation is not enough, the Court will infer the existence of discrimination. Based on the facts and evidence in this case, the Court found that the Plaintiff has established the primary facts on her claims on the grounds of discrimination due to pregnancy and family status, and found that the Defendant failed to establish the unsatisfactory performance of the Plaintiff and there were no significant enough reasons for the Defendant to dismiss the Plaintiff. On a balance of probabilities, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff was dismissed because of her pregnancy and family status, and held the Defendant liable. Damages for injury to feelings and loss of income were awarded to the Plaintiff.



Tsang v. Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. District Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2001)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff, Helen Tsang, was employed by Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. (“Cathay”) as a flight attendant in 1979. According to the retirement policy at the time of her employment contract, the retirement age for a female attendant was 40, while the retirement age for a male attendant was 55. Ms. Tsang was required to retire in 1992 when she reached 40. Cathay offered consecutive one year extensions of her employment thereafter till 1997 when she reached the age of 45. During that period, Cathay adopted a new retirement policy in 1993, which changed the retirement age of both the female and male cabin crew to the age of 45 and provided that female employees already on extension may choose to further extend the employment with Cathay till the age of 45 if Cathay agreed so. After 1997 (when Ms. Tsang was 45), Cathay did not offer Ms. Tsang any extension of her employment. Ms. Tsang sued Cathay alleging that the retirement policy implemented by Cathay was discriminatory and that she was discriminated on the ground of her sex. The court held that it constituted direct sex discrimination against Ms. Tsang because a male employee in the similar situation would be in a much better position than Ms. Tsang as he would have been entitled to remain employed with Cathay until the age of 55, or would at least have had the option to retire at 45 if he chose so and would have received more favorable benefits than Ms. Tsang had. In reaching such conclusion, the court upheld the view that the employment contract does not form the basis of a discriminatory claim and the discrimination is continuing and actionable if the discriminatory policy has been in place and implemented during subsequent extension(s) of employment.



Waliyah v. Yip Hoi Sun Terence District Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The complainant, an Indonesian domestic helper, was asked by her employer’s wife to urinate for a home-pregnancy test. After the result showed positive and was subsequently confirmed by a physician, the employer terminated her employment by a month’s notice. Ultimately, the complainant was required to move out of the couple’s home before the notice period ran out. She sued the couple for damages based on, among others, sex and pregnancy discrimination. The court held the couple liable for the act of sex discrimination against the complainant by asking her to take the pregnancy test, despite the fact that she voluntarily participated in the test and wanted to know the result. The court took the view that whether the employee had consented or voluntarily cooperated to take the pregnancy test is not determinative as to deciding the nature of the employer’s request to take the pregnancy test, and that the lack of intent or motive to discriminate by the employer is a factor to assessment of damages but would not bar an act from being determined as discriminatory. The court held that the employer has no right to know about a female employee’s pregnancy status, which is a private matter of the employee. The court determined that requesting a female employee to take a pregnancy test without giving her a choice not to disclose the result to the employer constitutes a “less favorable treatment” to that employee because of her gender, for the reason that a male employee would not be requested to take such a test or reveal such private information to his employer.



P.O. v. Board of Trustees, A.F., et al. Industrial Court at Nairobi (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual harassment

The claimant accompanied one of respondents, a co-worker “J.”, on a work-related trip. Throughout the business trip, J. made sexual innuendos towards the claimant and when his advances failed, he physically beat her. He booked a single hotel room, while the claimant believed she would have her own room. As a result, the claimant was forced to sleep on the floor and returned to Kenya two days later, while J. continued to the conference. Upon the claimant’s return, she received multiple threatening emails from J. and her employment was terminated as of May 24, 2010 for alleged “misconduct” for not travelling to the conference. Her salary for May was unpaid. Although there were numerous legal issues decided in this case, including jurisdiction, the key issue was whether the claimant was subjected to gender-based discrimination and thus unlawfully terminated, and what, if any, entitlement is due to her. The Industrial Court determined that J.’s conduct toward the claimant, no matter where it had occurred, clearly amounted to gender-based violence against an employee, and that his conduct “had the effect of nullifying or impairing the equality of opportunity or treatment in employment, based on her sex.” The Industrial Court awarded P total compensation of Kshs 3,240,000, which included general damages for sexual harassment, and unfair and wrongful termination of Kshs 3,000,000. This case is important to demonstrate Kenyan courts afford protection against sexual violence in multiple ways, including equal opportunity and human rights legislation, labor legislation, civil remedies and criminal law. In addition to Kenyan employment law, the Industrial Court also relied on the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, the International Labour Organization, as well as other forms of jurisprudence to support eradicating violence and sexual discrimination against women in the workplace. The decision noted that while the Constitution of Kenya was not yet in effect and thus not directly applicable when the case was tried, Articles 1, 3 and 5 of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights were included in the Kenyan Constitution and thus were applicable at the time the case occurred.



De Lange v. Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of South Africa for the Time Being (Voortsittende Biskop van die Metodiste kerk van Suid Afrika vir tyd en wyl) Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2015)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

After a Methodist Church minister (applicant) announced to her congregation her intention to marry her same-sex partner, the Methodist Church (respondent) suspended and subsequently discontinued her role as an ordained minister in early 2010. In March 2010, the applicant referred the matter to arbitration according to the Laws and Discipline of the Church. The parties could not agree on the applicant’s procedural rights and the arbitration convener proceeded with the process as provided by the Laws and Discipline of the Church. On her behalf, the convener then entered into a final agreement with the Church in May 2011. In 2012, the applicant approached the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town seeking an order to set aside the arbitration agreement in terms of the Arbitration Act. She contended that she was unfairly discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation. The High Court held that the applicant had not shown good cause to set aside the arbitration agreement. She then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The majority judgment of that Court agreed with the finding of the High Court. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. In a unanimous judgment, the Constitutional Court made four findings. First, the applicant had not shown good cause to set aside the arbitration agreement. Because the issue related to interpretation of religious doctrine, arbitration would be the appropriate forum. Second, since the applicant had unequivocally disavowed her unfair discrimination claim before the High Court, she was not free to raise the claim for the first time on appeal. Third, pursuant to the principle of constitutional subsidiarity, the applicant should have first brought her unfair discrimination claim to the Equality Court. Finally, the applicant failed to file a notice in terms of the Uniform Rules of the High Court, an omission that deprived other interested parties including religious communities of the opportunity to intervene as parties to the dispute or seek admission as amicus curiae in the High Court. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Nadat ’n predikant van die Metodiste Kerk (applikant) aan haar gemeente aangekondig het dat sy van voorneme is om met haar maat van dieselfde geslag te trou, het die Metodiste Kerk (respondent) vroeg in 2010 haar rol as ’n geordende predikant opgeskort en daarna gestaak. In Maart 2010 het die applikant die saak na arbitrasie verwys volgens die Wette en Dissipline van die Kerk. Die partye kon nie saamstem oor die prosedurele regte van die applikant nie en die arbitrasie- sameroeper het voortgegaan met die proses soos bepaal deur die Wette en Dissipline van die Kerk. Die sameroeper het namens haar in Mei 2011 ’n finale ooreenkoms aangegaan met die Kerk. In 2012 het die applikant die Wes-Kaapse hooggeregshof, Kaapstad, genader om ’n bevel aan te vra om die arbitrasie ooreenkoms ingevolge die Wet op Arbitrasie tersyde te stel. Sy het aangevoer dat daar onbillik teen haar gediskrimineer word op grond van haar seksuele oriëntasie. Die Hooggeregshof het beslis dat die applikant nie goeie rede vir die arbitrasie-ooreenkoms getoon het nie. Sy het toe appél aangeteken by die Hoogste Hof van Appèl. Die meerderheidsuitspraak van daardie Hof het saam gestem met die bevinding van die Hooggeregshof. Die applikant het verlof gevra om tot die Konstitusionele Hof te appelleer. In ’n eenparige uitspraak het die Konstitusionele Hof vier bevindings gemaak. Eerstens het die applikant nie goeie gronde getoon om die arbitrasie-ooreenkoms ter syde te stel nie. Omdat dit die kwessie rakende die interpretasie van godsdienstige leerstellings is, sou arbitrasie die gepaste forum wees. Tweedens, aangesien die applikant haar onbillike diskriminasie-eis voor die hooggeregshof onomwonde verwerp het, was sy nie vry om die eis vir die eerste keer op appèl aanhandig te maak nie. Derdens moes die applikant volgens die beginsel van grondwettige subsidiariteit haar eis op onbillike diskriminasie eers by die gelykheidshof ingedien het. Uiteidelik het die applikant versuim om ’n kennisgewing in te dien ingevolge die eenvormige Reëls van die Hooggeregshof, ’n versuim wat ander belanghebbende partye, waaronder godsdienstige gemeensappe, die geleentheid ontneem het om as partye tot die geskil in te gryp of om toelating as amicus curiae in die Hooggeregshof te verkry. Die hof het die appèl gevolglik van die hand gewys.



National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice (Nasionale Koalisie vir Gay en Lesbiese Gelykheid v Minister van Justisie) Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (1998)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The case concerned a referral for confirmation to the Constitutional Court of an order made by the Witwatersrand High Court. The referral sought to affirm that the following laws are unconstitutional and invalid (a) the common law offence of sodomy, and (b) the inclusion of sodomy in schedules to, inter alia, the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which prohibits sexual conduct between men in certain circumstances. Although technically the Constitutional Court only had to decide on the constitutionality of the inclusion of sodomy in the schedules and of the section of the Sexual Offences Act, it could not do so without also considering the constitutionality of sodomy as a common law offence. The Constitutional Court found that the offences, all aimed at prohibiting sexual intimacy between gay men, violated the right to equality by unfairly discriminating against gay men on the basis of sexual orientation. Such discrimination is presumed to be unfair since the Constitution expressly includes sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination.

Die saak het betrekking op ’n verwysing ter bevestiging van die Konstitusionele Hof van ’n bevel wat deur die Witwatersrandse hooggeregshof gemaak. is. Met die verwysing word bevestig dat die volgende wette ongrondwetlik en ongeldig is (a) die gemeenregtelike misdryf van sodomie en (b) die insluiting van sodomie in skedules vir, inter alia, onder meer die Stafproseswet 51 van 1977, wat seksuele gedrag tussen mans in sekere omstandighede verbied. Alhoewel die Konstitusionele Hof slegs tegnies moes besluit oor die grondwetlikheid van die insluiting van sodomie in die skedules en die afdeling van die Wet op seksuele misdrywe, dit sou dit nie kon doen sonder om die grondwetlikheid van sodomie as ’n gemeenregtelike oortreding te beskou nie. Die konstitusionele hof het bevind dat die misdrywe wat daarop gemik is om seksuele intimiteit tussen homoseksuele mans te verbied, die reg op gelykheid geskend het deur op ’n onbillike wyse te diskrimineer teen homoseksuele mans op grond van seksuele oriëntatse. Daar word bevind dat die tipe diskriminasie onbillik is aangesien die Grondwet uitdruklik bepaal dat diskriminasie teen seksuele oriëntasie, verbode grond is.



Mgolozeli v. Gauteng Department of Finance Labour Court of South Africa (Arbeidshof van Suid Afrika) (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The applicant, a male, applied for a senior managerial position previously occupied by a woman. After undergoing a psychometric assessment, he was recommended for appointment. The recommendation was turned down “due to the gender imbalance at SMS level”. The applicant claimed that he had been unfairly discriminated against on the basis of his sex because the target, set by the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, did not comply with the provisions of the Employment Equity Act (EEA), 55 of 1998. The respondent contended that, although it had not adopted an equity plan, it had set itself a target of 50% females in senior management positions. The Court noted that when the second respondent took the decision not to appoint the applicant, there was great confusion regarding the actual gender balance at the senior management level. However, the Court was prepared to accept that, at the time, females filled only 29% senior management posts. The EEA requires that equity plans must provide objectives for each year, their duration, and procedures for evaluating their implementation. The Court noted that, in SA Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union as amicus curiae [2014] 11 BLLR 1025 (CC)), the Constitutional Court had confirmed that competent courts must ensure that validly adopted equity plans are applied lawfully. Apart from the fact that the respondent had no plan, it had no mechanism to track the levels of gender representation. The second respondent had applied the target without considering the panel’s reasons for its recommendation. Affirmative action had been applied ad hoc, in a haphazard, arbitrary, and random manner. The responsible official had applied a quota system and raised an absolute barrier, both of which were impermissible. The affirmative action measure applied by the respondents conflicted with both the Constitution and the EEA. Accordingly, the measure had unfairly discriminated against the applicant. The respondents were directed to appoint the applicant to the post concerned and pay him compensation equal to the difference between the salary he had earned and the salary he should have earned, with retrospective effect.

Die applikant, 'n man, het aansoek gedoen vir 'n senior bestuurs-posisie wat voorheen deur 'n vrou beset was. Nadat hy 'n psigometriese assessering ondergaan het, is hy vir aanstelling aanbeveel. Die aanbeveling is afgekeur "as gevolg van die geslagswanbalans op SMS-vlak". Die applikant het daarop aanspraak gemaak dat hy op grond van sy geslag onregverdig gediskrimineer is omdat die teiken, wat deur die Gautengse Provinsiale Wetgewer gestel is, nie voldoen het aan die bepalings van die Wet op Gelyke Indiensneming (EEA), 55 van 1998 nie. Die respondent het beweer dat, hoewel dit nie 'n ekwiteitsplan aangeneem het nie, het dit 'n teiken van 50% vroue in senior bestuursposte gestel. Die Hof het opgemerk dat toe die tweede respondent die besluit geneem het om nie die applikant aan te stel nie, was daar groot verwarring oor die werklike geslagsbalans op die Senior bestuursvlak. Die hof was egter bereid om te aanvaar dat vrouens slegs 29% senior bestuursposte gevul het. Die EEA vereis dat ekwiteitsplanne doelwitte moet gee vir elke jaar, hulle duur en prosedures om die implementering daarvan te evalueer. Die Hof het opgemerk dat, in SA Polisiediens v Solidariteit nms Barnard (Polisie en Gevangenisse Burgerregte-Unie as amucus curiae [2014] 11 BLLR 1025 (CC)), het die Konstitusionele Hof bevestig dat bevoegde howe moet verseker dat aanvaarde ekwiteitsplanne wettig toegepas is. Afgesien van die feit dat die respondent geen plan gehad het nie, het dit geen meganisme gehad om die vlakke van geslagsverteenwoordiging op te spoor nie. Die tweede respondent het die teiken toegepas sonder om die paneel se redes vir die aanbeveling te oorweeg. Regstellende aksie is in 'n lukrake, arbitrêre, en willekeurige wyse toegepas. Die verantwoordelike amptenaar het 'n kwota-stelsel toegepas en 'n absolute versperring geopper wat albei ontoelaatbaar was. Die regstellende aksie maatreël wat deur die respondente toegepas is bots met beide die Grondwet en die EEA. Gevolglik het die maatreël teen die aansoeker onregverdig gediskrimineer. Die respondente is gerig om die aansoeker aan die betrokke pos toe te stel en vergoeding gelyk te skenk aan die verskil tussen die salaris wat hy verdien het en die salaris wat hy moes verdien het, met 'n terugwerkende effek.



Ekhamanzi Springs Ltd. v. Mnomiya Labor Appeal Court of South Africa (Arbeidsappèlhof van Suid Afrika) (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The respondent was employed by the appellant to bottle Aquelle spring water. The appellant’s plant was located on property belonging to a religious mission, and to gain access to the workplace, the appellant’s employees had to cross the mission’s property. The mission’s security guards were instructed to bar entry to any persons who did not comply with its code of conduct; one provision, for example, prohibited “amorous relationships between any two persons outside of marriage”. The respondent and a colleague were denied access because they became pregnant outside of marriage. Consequently, the respondent and her colleague were not able to access the workplace, as they were refused access to the mission’s property. They were subsequently fired. The court ruled that the dismissal of the respondent employee was automatically unfair because she had been dismissed for her pregnancy. The court noted that all persons have a constitutional right to equality. Discriminatory dismissals, such as this one, are accordingly automatically unfair and higher compensation is allowed in such cases. Employers are obliged to avoid discriminating against employees directly or indirectly ̶ protection against being discriminated against on the ground of pregnancy is not a preserve of married women. An agreement that denies pregnant employees access to the workplace is accordingly prima facie unenforceable unless it can be justified on grounds consistent with constitutional norms. The mission’s code of conduct interfered with the employment relationship between the appellant and its employees and created a situation in which breaches could lead to dismissal. Such provisions blurred the line between the appellant’s terms and conditions of employment and the mission’s code. That the employee was not a party to the mission’s code proved decisive. As lessee, the appellant had legal remedies to compel the mission to allow full use and enjoyment of the leased property. The appellant’s faint plea of operational necessity could not serve as a defense because it had failed to exercise its rights as lessee to protect its pregnant employees. The employee had tendered her services, and the appellant’s refusal to accept the tender constituted a breach of contract. The court further held that the appellant’s acquiescence in the mission’s discriminatory practice of barring unwed pregnant women from the leased premises violated the appellant’s constitutional duty to treat its employees fairly and was a breach of its common law duty to accept the employees into service. The court, therefore, confirmed that the employee had been dismissed and that her dismissal was automatically unfair. The court also confirmed the remedy of 12 months’ compensation.

Die respondent is in die diens van die appêlant om Aquelle water te bottel. Die appêlant se aanleg was op eiendom wat aan 'n godsdienstige sending behoort, en om toegang tot die werksplek te verkry, moes die appêlant se werknemers die sending se eiendom oorsteek. Die sending se sekuriteitswagte is opdrag gegee om toegang te verbied aan enige persone wat nie aan hul gedragskode voldoen het nie; een bepaling, byvoorbeeld, het "verliefde verhoudings tussen enige twee persone buite die huwelik" verbied. Die respondent en 'n kollega is toegang geweier omdat hulle buite die huwelik swanger geraak het. Gevolglik was die respondent en haar kollega nie in staat om toegang tot die werksplek te verkry nie. Aangesien hulle toegang tot die missie se eiendom geweier is is hulle is daarna afgedank. Die hof het beslis dat die ontslag van die respondent werknemer outomaties onregverdig was omdat sy vir haar swangerskap ontslaan is. Die hof het kennis geneem dat alle persone 'n grondwetlike reg tot gelykheid het. Diskriminerende afdankings, soos hierdie een, is dienooreenkomstig outomaties onregverdig en hoër vergoeding word toegelaat in sulke gevalle. Werkgewers is verplig om te verhoed dat daar diskriminasie is teen werknemers, direk of indirek - beskerming teen diskriminasie op die grond van swangerskap is nie 'n bewaar van getroude vrouens nie. 'n ooreenkoms wat verwagtende werknemers se toegang tot die werksplek ontken is gevolglik prima facie-onafdwingbaar tensy dit geregverdig kan word op grond wat met grondwetlike norme bestaanbaar is. Die sending se gedragskode het met die werksverhouding tussen die appêlant en sy werknemers ingemeng en 'n situasie geskep waarin oortredings tot ontslag kan lei. Sodanige bepalings vervaag die lyn tussen die appêlant se bepalings en voorwaardes van indiensneming en die sending se kode. Dat die werknemer nie 'n party tot die sending se kode was nie, was beslissend. As huurder het die appêlant regsmiddels gehad om die sending te dwing om volle gebruik en genot van die gehuurde eiendom toe te laat. Die appêlant se dowwe pleidooi van operasionele noodsaaklikheid kon nie dien as 'n verdediging nie omdat dit versuim het om sy regte as huurder om sy swanger werknemers te beskerm uit te oefen. Die werknemer het haar dienste aangebied, en die appêlant se weiering om die aanbod te aanvaar het 'n skending van die kontrak saamgestel. Die hof het verder bevind dat die appêlant se vrywaring in die diskriminerende praktyk van die missie om ongewenste swanger vroue van die gehuurde perseel te belet. Die appellant se grondwetlike plig om sy werknemers billik te behandel is geskend en dat dit ‘n oortreding van sy gemeenregtelike plig was om die werknemers in diens te neem. Die hof het dus bevestig dat die werknemer ontslaan is en dat haar ontslag outomaties onregverdig was. Die hof het ook die regsmiddel van 12 maande se vergoeding bevestig.



South African Police Service v. Barnard Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitutionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The South African Police Service (“SAPS”) had adopted the Employment Equity Plan (“EEP”), which sets numerical goals to produce gender and racial diversity. The appellant, Ms. Barnard, applied twice for a position in the National Evaluation Service of the SAPS in 2005. Despite being shortlisted, interviewed, and recommended as the best-suited candidate, she did not get the position on either occasion. This case concerns her second attempt, where the National Commissioner did not appoint Ms. Barnard on the grounds that it would not enhance racial representation at that salary level and that it was not necessary to fill the vacancy immediately because the post was not critical. While the Labor Court found that SAPS had unfairly discriminated against the appellant, the Labor Appeal Court found in favor of SAPS. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) reversed the Labor Appeal Court’s decision and held that Ms. Barnard had been the victim of unfair discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of Section 9(3) of the Constitution and Section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act (the Act). The Constitutional Court granted SAPS leave to appeal and unanimously reversed the SCA’s ruling in favor of Ms. Barnard. As the Court noted, the SCA found that SAPS had failed to rebut the presumption that the discrimination against Ms. Barnard was unfair. But, since the EEP was a valid affirmative action measure, the issue was not whether the Plan could overcome such presumption, but whether the decision the National Commissioner made under it was open to challenge. The Court found that the Commissioner properly exercised his discretion. Appointing Ms. Barnard would have aggravated the overrepresentation of white women at that salary level. And, the decision did not bar Ms. Barnard from future promotions.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens ("SAPD") het die Indiensnemingsplan ("EHOU") aangeneem, wat numeriese doelwitte stel om geslags-en rassediversiteit te produseer. Die appêlant, Me. Barnard, het twee keer aansoek gedoen vir 'n pos in die Nasionale Evalueringsdiens van die SAPD in 2005. Ten spyte van op die kortlys wees, ondervra, en aanbeveel as die beste geskik kandidaat, het sy nie die posisie op beide geleenthede gekry nie. Hierdie saak gaan oor haar tweede poging, waar die Nasionale Kommissaris nie Me. Barnard aangestel het nie op die grond dat dit nie rasseverteenwoordiging op daardie salarisvlak sou verbeter nie en dat dit nie nodig was om die vakature onmiddellik te vul nie omdat die pos nie krities was nie. Terwyl die Arbeidshof bevind het dat SAPD teen die appêlant onbillik gediskrimineer het, het die Arbeidsappèlhof ten gunste van die SAPD bevind. Op verdere appèl het die Hoogste Hof van Appèl ("SCA") die Arbeidsappèlhof se besluit omgekeer en gehou dat Me. Barnard die slagoffer van onbillike diskriminasie op grond van ras was, in die skending van artikel 9(3) van die Grondwet en artikel 6(1) van die Wet op Billike Werksgeleenthede (die Wet). Die Konstitusionele Hof het die SAPD laat appelleer en die SCA se beslissing ten gunste van Me. Barnard omgekeer. Soos die Hof opgemerk het, het die SCA bevind dat die SAPD versuim het om die vermoede dat die diskriminasie teen Me. Barnard onregverdig was te weerlê. Maar aangesien die EHOU 'n geldige regstellende aksieplan was, was die kwessie nie of die plan so 'n vermoede kon oorkom nie, maar of die Nasionale Kommissaris se besluit daaronder oop was om te daag. Die hof het bevind dat die Kommissaris sy diskresie behoorlik uitgeoefen het. Die aanstelling van Me. Barnard sou die oorverteenwoordiging van wit vroue op daardie salarisvlak vererger het. Die besluit het nie Me. Barnard van toekomstige promosies belet nie.



平成19年(行ツ)164 (2007 (Gyo-Tsu) No. 164) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2008)


Gender discrimination

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a part of a provision in the Japanese Nationality Act conformed with Article 14.1 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on race, belief, sex, social status, or lineage. The provision at issue did not grant Japanese nationality to a child born out of wedlock to a non-Japanese mother and a Japanese father––even if the father formally declares and recognizes the father-child relationship––unless the child obtains legal recognition as a child of the man and the woman through their marriage. The Supreme Court first noted that the Japanese Nationality Act does not grant Japanese nationality to a child in the aforementioned situation although it recognizes a parent-child relationship and grants Japanese nationality to a child born out of wedlock if (1) the child’s mother was Japanese or (2) the child’s Japanese father filed for the recognition of the father-child relationship before the child’s birth. The Court found that, while creating this distinction was reasonable at the time of the legislation, such a distinction amounted to unjustifiable discrimination in present day Japan. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the part of the provision at issue was unconstitutional and invalid. In its reasoning, the majority opinion stated, inter alia, “under the Japanese Nationality Act that adopts the principle of jus sanguinis, maintaining a distinction in terms of eligibility to have Japanese nationality based on whether the Japanese parent is the mother or the father of the child at issue does not accord with the basic principle of equality of the sexes.”

本件の争点は、当時の日本の国籍法の一部の合憲性である。当時の国籍法は日本国民である父の非嫡出子について、父母の婚姻により嫡出子たる身分を取得した者に限り日本国籍の取得を認めている。同じく日本国民である父から認知された子でありながら父母が法律上の婚姻をしていない非嫡出子は、その余の同項所定の要件を満たしても日本国籍を取 得することができないという区別が生じていた。最高裁は、このような区別を設けることは、立法当時は合理的であったが、現在の日本では合理的理由のない差別であると判断し、問題となった規定の一部を違憲・無効とした。その理由として、「日本国民である母の非嫡出子が出生により日本国籍を取得するにもかかわらず,日本国民である父から出生後に認知されたにとどまる非嫡出子が届出による日本国籍の取得すら認められないことには,両性の平等という観点からみてその基本的立場に沿わない」と述べた。



平成25年(受)233 (2013 (Ju) No. 233) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2014)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

A mother, on behalf of her infant child, filed a lawsuit for a declaratory judgment for absence of parent-child relationship with the appellant––a man to whom the mother was married when the child was born. The request for the judgment was based on the fact that a DNA test result showed that, with 99.99 percent probability, the infant was a child of a different man, with whom the mother was having an affair. By the time of the trial, the wife and the child had left the appellant to live with the child’s biological father. Article 772 of the Japanese Civil Code, in general, presumes a man to be the father of a child if the man is married to the mother of the child at the time of conception. While Article 774 allows the husband to file a proceeding to rebut such a presumption, the wife or the child does not have standing to initiate such a proceeding. The Supreme Court, stressing the importance of maintaining legal stability pertaining to familial status, found that the facts that (i) there was scientific evidence that clearly denied a biological father-child relationship and that (ii) the child was currently raised––without any problem––by the biological father does not negate the presumption of the father-child relationship under Article 772 of Japanese Civil Code, as the importance of maintaining the legal stability pertaining to familial status would not be undermined by such factors. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that there was no legal ground to deliver the requested declaratory judgment.

本件は、母親が子供を代理して、子供が生まれたときに母親が結婚していた男性である上告人に対して、親子関係不存在の確認の訴えを提起した事件である。本件において、DNA鑑定の結果、99.99%の確率で子供が上告人の生物学上の子ではないことは明白であった。裁判当時までに、母親と子供は上告人の下で監護されておらず、生物学上の父の下で成長していた。民法772条では、妻が婚姻中に懐胎した子は、夫の子と推定するとしている。また、同774条は、夫が父子関係の推定を覆すための手続きを行うことを認めているが、妻や子にこのような手続きを開始する資格を認めていない。最高裁は、家族的地位に係る法的安定性を維持することの重要性を強調した上で、(1)生物学的な父子関係を明らかに否定する科学的証拠があり、(2)子が現在何の問題もなく生物学上の父に育てられているという事実があっても、そのような要因によって家族的地位に係る法的安定性を維持することの重要性が損なわれることはないとして、民法772条の父子関係の推定を否定するものではないとした。



Resolution U.No. 137/2013 Constitutional Court (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

A legal scholar and four non-governmental organizations filed an initiative with the Constitutional Court of Macedonia for the commencement of a procedure to review the constitutionality of the Law on Termination of Pregnancy ((“Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia”, nos.87/2013, 164/2013 and 144/2014”) (the “LTP”) and its compatibility with international law, on the basis that the LTP created “a possibility of state interference into the right of choice and free decision-making of the women (which was contrary to Article 41 paragraph 1 and Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia)”. Further, the applicants stated that the LTP contravenes Articles 11 paragraph 1, Article 39 paragraph 2 and Article 41 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides that female citizens had sovereignty over themselves, their life, physical integrity and health. The applicants pointed out, inter alia, that the requirement to submit a written request, mandatory counselling, and waiting period were incompatible with the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of choice regarding childbirth. In addition, given that those provisions in the LTP did not exist for any other medical intervention, they represented a discrimination against women. All but one of the judges stated that they do not consider the LTP to be problematic and fully rejected the initiative.



Decision U.No. 104/2016 Constitutional Court (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

A 65-year-old woman working in a state institution requested to continue her employment for two more years was denied on the basis that, according to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 104 of the Labour Law of Macedonia (the “Contested Provisions”), the age limit to which women can work is 65 years of age, while this limit for men is 67 years of age. The Union-National Council for Gender Equality and the Macedonian Women’s Lobby initiated proceedings in the Constitutional Court of Macedonia (the “Court”) challenging the constitutionality of the Contested Provisions on grounds that they contravene Articles 9 and 32 of the Constitution. The Court held that the Contested Provisions are not in accordance with the established constitutional principle of equality of citizens on grounds of sex per Article 9 of the Constitution, on the basis that the Contest Provisions impose termination of employment of female employees under different conditions than male employees. The Contested Provisions are thereby repealed.



Applicants McEwan, Clarke, et al. v. Attorney General High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature (2013)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

On February 6, 2009, four transgender individuals (A, B, C, D) identifying as female were arrested and charged with both Loitering and Wearing Female Attire. The police detained the Applicants for the entire weekend without explaining the charges against them. Wearing Female Attire is prohibited under Section 153(1)(XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act, chapter 8:02. At the hearing on February 9, 2009, the Chief Magistrate commented that the Applicants were confused about their sexuality and told them they were men, not women, and needed to give their lives to Jesus Christ. The Applicants, who were all unrepresented at the time, pleaded guilty to the charge of Wearing Female Attire. Applicants A, B and D were fined $7,500, and Applicant C was fined $19,500 (Guyanese dollars). The loitering charges were eventually dismissed. The Applicants contacted the Society Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination (SASOD), the Equal Rights Trust’s Guyanese partner, about the case. SASOD agreed to represent Applicants and filed a Notice of Motion challenging the Magistrate’s Court decision and seeking redress. The Applicants argued that the police violated the Constitution because the officers failed to inform them of their arrest and did not permit the Applicants to retain counsel. They also argued that Section 153 (1) (XLV11) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act 1893 is: (1) vague and of uncertain scope; (2) irrational and discriminatory on the ground of sex; and (3) a continuing threat to their right to protection against discrimination on the ground of sex and gender under the Constitution. Applicants further argued that, by instructing the Applicants to attend Church and give their lives to Jesus Christ, the Chief Magistrate discriminated against them on the basis of religion, which violated a fundamental norm of the Co-operative of the Republic of Guyana as a secular state in contravention to the Constitution. The Court upheld the Applicants’ claims in relation to their fundamental right to be informed of the reason for their arrest under Article 139 of the Constitution, but rejected all of their other claims. The Court found that the prohibition of cross-dressing for an improper purpose was not unconstitutional gender or sex discrimination, impermissibly vague, or undemocratic. The Court also struck SASOD’s application in full, finding that SASOD did not have standing to be an applicant in the case.



Institutional Violence Against Women (Docket XXVII.1o.3 C (10a.)) Mexico Supreme Court (2016)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria issued may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará,” states that violence against women is an offense against human dignity, which constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. In addition, Article 18 of the General Law for Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence establishes that any public servant’s conduct, whether by act or omission, which is discriminatory or which impairs the woman’s human rights is considered institutional violence. Therefore, if a governmental authority deprives a woman of any right in the context of family law, the court shall acknowledge the authority’s intention to discriminate or impair the plaintiff’s human rights in its ruling. Further, any court ruling seeking to restore the woman’s rights shall identify the authority responsible for the violation. (Amparo Directo: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=462/04620000174646210006004.d...)

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, los criterios emitidos pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer "Convención de Belém do Pará", afirma que violencia contra la mujer es un delito contra la dignidad humana y constituye una violación de los derechos fundamentales. Además, el artículo 18 de la Ley General para el Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia establece que la conducta de cualquier servidor público, ya sea por acto u omisión, que sea discriminatoria o que perjudique los derechos humanos de la mujer se considera violencia institucional. Por lo tanto, si una autoridad gubernamental priva a una mujer de cualquier derecho en el contexto del derecho de familia, el tribunal reconocerá la intención de la autoridad de discriminar o menoscabar los derechos humanos del demandante en su decisión. Además, cualquier fallo judicial que busque restaurar los derechos de la mujer deberá identificar a la autoridad responsable de la violación.



Femicide (Docket 1a/LIV/2016 (10a.)) First Collegiate Tribunal of the Twenty-Seventh Circuit (2016)


Femicide, Gender discrimination

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria issued may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Mexican Supreme Court has determined that in order to determine whether a law is discriminatory a court must evaluate the following: (i) whether the purpose of such law is objective and not contrary to the Constitution; (ii) the means; (iii) that the purpose of the law and the means are proportional. The Mexican Supreme Court has determined that the state legislator can develop any mechanism to protect human rights. Therefore, given that femicide, as a felony, is designed to protect a disadvantaged segment of the population, any special treatment inherent to this felony cannot be interpreted as contrary to the human right to equality.

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son relevantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, los criterios emitidos pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. El Tribunal Supremo de México ha determinado que para determinar si una ley es discriminatoria, un tribunal debe evaluar lo siguiente: (i) si el propósito de dicha ley es objetivo y no contrario a la Constitución; (ii) los medios para enforzarla; (iii) que el propósito de la ley y los medios sean proporcionales. La Corte Suprema de México ha determinado que el legislador estatal puede desarrollar cualquier mecanismo para proteger los derechos humanos. Por lo tanto, dado que el femicidio, como delito grave, está diseñado para proteger a un segmento desfavorecido de la población, cualquier tratamiento especial inherente a este delito grave no puede interpretarse como contrario al derecho humano a la igualdad.



Access to Justice in Equal Conditions (Docket 1a.J. 22.2016 (10a.)) Mexico Supreme Court (2016)


Gender discrimination

This jurisprudential thesis is a relevant example of case law, as the criteria issued by the Mexican Supreme Court is binding on all courts in the country. Every court shall rule based on a gender perspective. Therefore there should be a test to determine whether there is a gender violence case before the court. This test shall be performed by the court regardless of whether a party makes such a petition. The court shall take into consideration the following points: (i) if the particular case involves gender violence, taking into account the facts and the evidence, excluding any stereotype that the court may have; (ii) in the event that the evidence is insufficient to determine whether the case involves gender violence, the court shall request more evidence to make a determination; (iii) if the court determines that the case involves gender violence, it shall apply the relevant law to the particular case and issue a ruling; (iv) human rights shall be taken into consideration at all times during the process and; (v) the use of inclusive language to ensure access to justice that is free of gender-based stereotypes.

Esta tesis jurisprudencial es un ejemplo relevante de jurisprudencia, ya que los criterios emitidos por el Tribunal Supremo de México son vinculantes para todos los tribunales del país. Cada tribunal decidirá con una perspectiva de género. Por lo tanto, debe haber una prueba para determinar si hay un caso de violencia de género ante el tribunal. Esta prueba será realizada por el tribunal, independientemente de si una parte hace tal petición. El tribunal deberá tener en cuenta los siguientes puntos: (i) si el caso en particular involucra violencia de género, teniendo en cuenta los hechos y las pruebas, excluyendo cualquier estereotipo que el tribunal pueda tener; (ii) en el caso de que la evidencia sea insuficiente para determinar si el caso involucra violencia de género, el tribunal deberá solicitar más evidencia para tomar una decisión; (iii) si el tribunal determina que el caso involucra violencia de género, aplicará la ley pertinente al caso particular y emitirá un fallo; (iv) los derechos humanos se tendrán en cuenta en todo momento durante el proceso y; (v) el uso de un lenguaje inclusivo para garantizar el acceso a la justicia sin estereotipos o discriminación sexual.



Adequate Defense of Pregnant Women in Labor Matters (Docket 3.o.2 L (10a.)) Third Collegiate Tribunal in the Assistant Center of the Tenth Region (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

ADEQUATE DEFENSE OF PREGNANT WOMEN IN LABOR MATTERS. PREGNANT WOMEN ARE CONSIDERED A VULNERABLE GROUP AND THEREFORE THE JUDGE SHALL RULE BASED ON A GENDER PERSPECTIVE.

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria issued may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The labor law states that every person shall have an appropriate defense. In addition, this right acquires different considerations when the claimant is a pregnant woman. Historically, women in Mexico have been fired solely for being pregnant. Pregnant women are consequently considered a vulnerable group. Therefore, this isolated thesis requires the courts to inform the claimant of her right to have an attorney, and in those cases where the claimant cannot afford one, the court shall appoint one for her. (Amparo Directo Laboral: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=484/04840000187544100005005.d...)

DEFENSA ADECUADA DE LAS MUJERES EMBARAZADAS EN ASUNTOS LABORALES. LAS MUJERES EMBARAZADAS SON CONSIDERADAS EN UN GRUPO VULNERABLE Y, POR LO TANTO, EL JUEZ REGIRÁ BASADO EN UNA PERSPECTIVA DE GÉNERO.

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, los criterios emitidos pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La ley laboral establece que cada persona tendrá una defensa apropiada. Además, este derecho adquiere diferentes consideraciones cuando el reclamante es una mujer embarazada. Históricamente, las mujeres en México han sido despedidas de sus empleos por estar embarazadas. En consecuencia, las mujeres embarazadas son consideradas un grupo vulnerable. Por lo tanto, esta tesis aislada requiere que los tribunales informen al reclamante de su derecho a tener un abogado, y en aquellos casos en que el reclamante no pueda pagar uno, el tribunal le asignará uno.



Public Safety (Isolated Thesis Docket XVI.1o.A.115 A (10a.)) First Collegiate Tribunal in Administrative Matters of the Sixteeth Circuit (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Mexican Supreme Court has previously determined the social benefits to which a former public safety employee is entitled at the time of her termination. The social benefits and salary must be paid upon termination and must account for both the period before and after an unjustified termination for pregnancy. The Mexican Constitution (Article 123, section B, item XI, subparagraphs (a) & (c)) recognizes the rights of pregnant women. These include social benefits during pregnancy. Consequently, the impairment that results from the termination must be paid and includes: (a) medical bills and payments made to private medical institutions due to the lack of social security benefits and (b) the payment of the full salary from the last month before birth as well as the two months after it, unless there is a court ruling in relation to unpaid wages. This provision of the Mexican Constitution, as well as other provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment And Eradication Of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará” compels the courts to rule with a gender perspective in order to ensure justice for this historically vulnerable social group. (Amparo Directo Administrativo 121/2016: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=1320/13200000186095880003003....)

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son relevantes a todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, dichos criterios pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La Corte Suprema de México ha determinado previamente los beneficios sociales a los que tiene derecho un ex-empleado de seguridad pública en el momento de su despido. Los beneficios sociales y el salario deben pagarse a la terminación y deben tener en cuenta tanto el período antes como el de después de una terminación injustificada por embarazo. La Constitución mexicana (Artículo 123, sección B, artículo XI, subpárrafos (a) y (c)) reconoce los derechos de las mujeres embarazadas. Estos incluyen beneficios sociales durante el embarazo. En consecuencia, el deterioro que resulta de la terminación debe pagarse e incluye: (a) facturas médicas y pagos realizados a instituciones médicas privadas debido a la falta de beneficios de seguridad social y (b) el pago del salario completo del último mes anterior al nacimiento, así como los dos meses posteriores al mismo, a menos que exista un fallo judicial en relación con los salarios impagos. Esta disposición de la Constitución mexicana, así como otras disposiciones de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW) y la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer "Convención de Belém do Pará" obliga a los tribunales a gobernar con una perspectiva de género para garantizar la justicia para este grupo social históricamente vulnerable.



Ruling with a Gender Perspective (Isolated Thesis Docket XXI.2o.P.A.1 CS (10a.)) Second Collegiate Tribunal in Criminal and Administrative Matters of the Twentieth Circuit (2017)


Gender discrimination

“RULING WITH A GENDER PERSPECTIVE. THE COURT MUST DETERMINE IF THE RELEVANT PARTY IS IN A VULNERABLE STATE THAT RESULTS IN A REAL DISADVANTAGE OR CLEAR IMBALANCE VIS-À-VIS THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE CASE.”

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. Each case that is brought to court must be analyzed in order to determine whether there is a degree of vulnerability for each woman. Without such scrutiny, courts cannot provide a gender perspective analysis to a controversy, as gender perspective does not depend solely on gender but on other considerations, such as social vulnerability, which must be proven. In order to determine if a woman finds herself in a disadvantaged situation, the following issues must be taken into consideration: (a) if one or more parties find themselves in one of the categories identified in the Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People; (b) the gender disadvantage and the violence that prevails in the place of residence or the social core in which the parties may be involved, in order to clarify the possible existence of structural inequality; (c) education level, age, socioeconomic situation, and the particular characteristics of all of the people involved in the trial, in order to determine if a inequality actually exists; and (d) all proven facts in the docket, in order to identify the power relationships. Taking the aforementioned considerations into account, it must be determined if in the particular case it is optimal to order measures seeking to balance one or more differences and vulnerabilities that prevent the disadvantaged party from the enjoyment of its human rights. (Amparo Directo Agrario 163/2016 here: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=752/07520000188524300006005.d...)

“REGLA CON UNA PERSPECTIVA DE GÉNERO. "EL TRIBUNAL DEBE DETERMINAR SI LA PARTE PERTINENTE ESTÁ EN UN ESTADO VULNERABLE QUE RESULTA EN UNA DESVENTAJA REAL O UN CLARO DESBALANCE VISE-VISE CON RESPECTO A LAS OTRAS PARTES DEL CASO."

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son relevantes a todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, dichos criterios pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. Cada caso que se lleva ante el tribunal debe analizarse para determinar si existe un grado de vulnerabilidad unico para cada mujer. Sin tal control, los tribunales no pueden proporcionar un análisis de perspectiva de género a una controversia, ya que la perspectiva de género no depende únicamente del género, sino de otras consideraciones, como la vulnerabilidad social, que deben probarse. Para determinar si una mujer se encuentra en una situación de desventaja, se deben tener en cuenta los siguientes temas: (a) si una o más partes se encuentran en una de las categorías identificadas en el Reglamento de Brasilia sobre el acceso a la justicia para personas vulnerables ; (b) la desventaja de género y la violencia que prevalece en el lugar de residencia o el núcleo social en el que pueden participar las partes, a fin de aclarar la posible existencia de desigualdad estructural; (c) el nivel de educación, la edad, la situación socioeconómica y las características particulares de todas las personas involucradas en el ensayo, a fin de determinar si realmente existe una desigualdad; y (d) todos los hechos comprobados en el expediente, con el fin de identificar las relaciones de poder. Teniendo en cuenta las consideraciones mencionadas anteriormente, se debe determinar si, en el caso particular, es óptimo ordenar medidas que busquen equilibrar una o más diferencias y vulnerabilidades que impidan que las partes desfavorecidas disfruten de sus derechos humanos.



Gumede v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitutionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2008)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, International law, Property and inheritance rights

Mrs. and Mr. Gumede, both domiciled in KwaZulu-Natal, entered into a monogamous customary marriage in 1968 and four children were born during their marriage. Because she was forbidden by her husband to take up employment, Mrs. Gumede never worked and could not contribute to the accumulation of the family’s estate, which included two family homes. She was always the primary caregiver of the children. After forty years, the marriage broke down irretrievably. Mrs. Gumede had no family and was dependent for financial support upon her children and her old-age pension. In 2003, Mr. Gumede instituted divorce proceedings before the Divorce Court. Mrs. Gumede also approached the High Court and obtained an order invalidating the discriminatory legislative provisions on which the Divorce Court could rely. The Constitutional Court subsequently was approached by the Minister of Home Affairs and the KwaZulu-Natal Member of the Executive Council for Traditional Leaders and Local Government Affairs who resisted the order, for the reevaluation of the order of the High Court declaring constitutionally invalid certain sections of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, of the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 and certain sections of the Natal Code of Zulu Law (Proc R155 of 1987), which regulate the proprietary consequences of customary marriages. In a lengthy judgment, the Constitutional Court took great pains to explain that any distinction between the consequences of customary marriages entered into before and after the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act came into operation is discriminatory, inconsistent with the Constitution, and invalid. The Constitutional Court noted the international instruments that South Africa has ratified that prohibit forms of discrimination against women, including CEDAW. It held that the two provisions are patently discriminatory, unfair, and not justifiable. In terms of the judgment, all monogamous customary marriages entered into before the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act came into operation are now ipso facto in community of property, excluding customary marriages which had been terminated by death or by divorce before the date of the judgment. The Constitutional Court further held that the constitutional invalidity of Section 7(1) was limited to monogamous marriages and should not concern polygynous relationships or their proprietary consequences, determining that polygynous marriages should continue to be “regulated by customary law until parliament intervenes.”

Mev. en Mnr. Gumede, beide in KwaZulu-Natal gedomisilieer, het 'n monogame huwelik in 1968 aangegaan en vier kinders is tydens hulle huwelik gebore. Omdat sy deur haar man verbied is om te werk, het Mev. Gumede nog nooit gewerk nie en kon nie bydra tot die bydrae van die familie se boedel nie, wat twee familie-huise ingesluit het. Sy was altyd die primêre versorger van die kinders. Na veertig jaar het die huwelik onherstelbaar verbrokkel. Mev. Gumede het geen familie gehad nie en was afhanklik van finansiële steun van haar kinders en haar pensioen. In 2003 het Mnr. Gumede egskeiding verrigtinge voor die Egskeidingshof ingestel. Mev. Gumede het ook die Hooggeregshof genader en 'n bevel verkry wat die diskriminerende wetgewende bepalings waarop die Egskeidingshof op kon staatmaak, ongeldig maak. Die Konstitusionele Hof is vervolgens deur die Minister van Binnelandse Sake en die KwaZulu-Natal lid van die Uitvoerende Raad vir Tradisionele Leiers en Plaaslikeregeringsake wat die bevel teengestaan het, vir die herevaluering van die bevel van die Hooggeregs Hof wat sekere afdelings van die Wet op die Erkenning van Gebruiklike Huwelike, van die KwaZulu- Wet op die wet op Zoeloe Wetgewing 16 van 1985 en sekere afdelings van die Natalse wet op Zulu regte (B.proc R155 of 1987), wat die gevolge van gebruiklike huwelike reguleer, ongrondwetlik verklaar het. In 'n lang uitspraak het die Konstitusionele Hof baie moeite gedoen om te verduidelik dat enige onderskeid tussen die gevolge van gebruiklike huwelike wat voor en na die inwerkingtreding van die Wet op Erkenning van Gebruiklike huwelike aangegaaan is, diskriminerend, strydig is met die Grondwet en ongeldig is. Die Konstitusionele Hof het kennis geneem van die internasionale instrumente wat Suid-Afrika bekragtig het wat vorme van diskriminasie teen vroue verbied, insluitend CEDAW. Dit het beslis dat die twee bepalings oorwegend patriminerend, onbillik en nie regverdigbaar is nie. Ingevolge die uitspraak is alle monoggame gebruiklike huwelike aangegaan voor die Erkenning van Gebruiklike Huwelike Wet in werking gekom het, tree nou ipso facto binne gemeenskap vangoedere op, uitsluitend gebruiklike huwelike wat beëindig is deur die dood of deur egskeiding voor die datum van die vonnis. Die Konstitusionele Hof het verder bevind dat die grondwetlike ongeldigheid van artikel 7(1) beperk was tot monogame huwelike en behoort nie poligame huwelike of hul eie gevolge te bemoei nie, met die bepaling dat poligame huwelike steeds gereguleer word deur gewoontereg totdat die Parlement ingryp.



Regina v. Gua High Court of Solomon Islands (2012)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, International law, Sexual violence and rape

Macberth Gua was charged with the rape of his estranged wife of ten years. The victim had not filed any divorce proceedings and there was no formal separation. The defendant dragged the victim into his vehicle under the threat of violence and drove her to a remote location where he forced himself on her. The defendant’s defense relied upon the antiquated common law maxim that a husband could not be liable for involuntary sexual intercourse with his wife (the “marital rape exception”), as her agreement to wed constituted an irrevocable consent to marital relations. Moreover, Section 136 of the Penal Code of the Solomon Islands provides an excessively narrow definition of rape: “Any person who has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman or girl, without her consent, or with her consent if the consent is obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of bodily harm, or by means of false representations as to the nature of the act, or in the case of a married woman, by impersonating her husband, is guilty of the felony termed rape.” The question before the High Court was whether a husband could be held criminally liable for raping his wife. The answer provided by the High Court was in the affirmative, which ruled that marriage is now regarded as a partnership of equals, and that this principle of equality has been reflected not only in international conventions to which the Solomon Islands is a party, but is also entrenched in the provisions of the Constitution. In its rationale, the High Court noted that one of the international conventions to which the Solomon Islands is a party is CEDAW, which, in Article 15, calls on all State parties to accord women equality with men before the law and, in Article 16, calls for the same personal rights between husband and wife. As for the Constitution, Sections 3 and 15 of the Constitution guarantee women equal rights and freedoms as men and afford them protection against all forms of discrimination, including discrimination on the ground of sex. The High Court thus held that the rule exempting husbands from liability for rape on their wives is no longer applicable, that it is no longer supported by common law, and that it is offensive to modern standards and principles of equality found in international conventions and the Constitution. Notwithstanding the foregoing, unfortunately in the sentencing decision following Regina v. Gua, the sentencing judge stated that “this is a case which has occurred as a result of domestic problems between a husband and his wife. It is not an offence that has been committed to gratify one’s own sexual desires. There is an underlying cause for the commission of the offence – the termination by the victim of her marriage to the accused. Hence, the accused is not solely to be blamed for this incident. The complainant must also share the blame.”



TC/0003/17 Constitutional Court (2017)


Femicide, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape

Due to the increase of femicide crimes in the Dominican society, the Constitutional Court proclaimed the termination of violence against women in all its forms as it is a violation of the Constitution. The proclamation was made in commemoration of the murder of Mirabal, Minerva, Patria and María Teresa, political opponents of the regime of Rafael Trujillo, and in accordance with the international agreements executed in defense of women's rights, as well as the laws issued against gender violence, sexual violence and femicide.

Debido al aumento de los delitos de femicidio en la sociedad dominicana, el Tribunal Constitucional proclamó el cese de la violencia contra la mujer en todas sus formas, incluyéndolo como una forma de violación de la Constitución. Dicha proclamación se realizó en conmemoración del asesinato de Mirabal, Minerva, Patria, y María Teresa, quienes fueron opositores políticos del régimen de Rafael Trujillo. La proclamación está en conformidad con los acuerdos internacionales celebrados en defensa de los derechos de las mujeres y con las leyes emitidas contra la violencia basada en género sexual, violencia sexual en sí, y femicidio.



Sentencia TC/0070/15 Constitutional Court (2015)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

Mrs. Angela Merici Mendoza Minier challenged the constitutionality of Article 35 of Law number 1306-Bis published on May 21st, 1937, which provided that a divorced woman could not marry within 10 months after the divorce. Mrs. Angela argued that Article 35 contravened the gender equality provision provided in Article 39 of the Constitution because the 10-month waiting period to remarry did not apply to men. Article 35 thus conferred a privilege only to men. The attorney-general disregarded the action on the basis that the petitioner lacked legitimate interest. However, the Constitutional Court determined that as a woman, Mrs. Angela could be affected by Article 35 and ruled that she therefore had a legitimate interest in challenging Article 35. The Constitutional Court subsequently admitted the action and nullified Article 35 on the basis that it no longer fulfilled its aim to prevent a woman from remarrying when already pregnant with her former husband’s child because it could have negative consequences for the child or the newly formed couple. As technology now allows women to know their state of pregnancy at an early stage, the restriction is no longer needed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that it is a woman’s decision to remarry, pregnant or not.

La Sra. Angela Merici Mendoza Minier desafió la constitucionalidad del artículo 35 de la Ley número 1306-Bis publicada el 21 de mayo de 1937, la cuál establecía que una mujer divorciada no podría casarse por un período de 10 meses posteriormente a un divorcio. La Sra. Angela sostuvo que el artículo 35 era contrario a la disposición de igualdad de género garantizada en el artículo 39 de la Constitución porque el período de espera de 10 meses para volver a casarse no se aplicaba a los hombres. Ella propuso que el artículo 35 confería un privilegio único a los hombres. El fiscal general ignoró la acción basándose en que la peticionaria no tenía un interés legítimo en la acción. Sin embargo, el Tribunal Constitucional determinó que, como mujer, la Sra. Angela podría verse afectada por el artículo 35 y dictaminó que, por lo tanto, esto era un interés legítimo suficiente para impugnar el artículo 35. Posteriormente, el Tribunal Constitucional admitió la acción y anuló el artículo 35 sobre la base de que no cumplía su objetivo inicial de evitar que una mujer se volviera a casar mientras ya estaba embarazada con el hijo de su ex esposo, lo cual podría tener consecuencias negativas para el niño o para la pareja recién formada. Como la tecnología ahora permite a las mujeres conocer su estado de embarazo desde una etapa temprana, dicha restricción ya no es necesaria. Además, el Tribunal Constitucional agregó que es una decisión personal de la mujer volver a casarse, embarazada o no.



Advisory Opinion No. 2008/64 Fatwa & Contracts Department (2008)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This legal advisory opinion found that a divorced woman is not entitled to the typical social allowance provided to married individuals by their employers. The woman, unnamed in the opinion, applied for the allowance because she has custody of her minor son. The opinion states that the allowance can be only provided to married women with children whose husband is unemployed, jobless, or incapacitated. A divorced woman cannot benefit from this support even if she is the sole custodian of her child. Nonetheless, this Advisory Opinion requests that the Qatar Legislator revisit this situation a “with a view to cure the unreasonable position of a divorcee employee who has children, because her situation resembles the situation of a widow in jurisprudence.”



Ruling with Gender Perspective (Isolated Thesis Docket: VII.2o.C.127 C (10a.)) Second Collegiate Tribunal in Civil Matters of the First Circuit (2017)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

“RULING WITH A GENDER PERSPECTIVE. IN ORDER TO PROPERLY ASSESS THE EVIDENCE, THE COURT MUST IDENTIFY A VULNERABLE SITUATION IN CASES WHERE A FAMILY CRISIS IS EVIDENT.”

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. As a reference, the Mexican Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed all Mexican courts to take gender perspective into account when ruling, even if the plaintiff does not formally request it. As background, the precedent that culminated in this isolated thesis arose from a dispute over a lease. The plaintiff, a housewife, offered testimonial evidence but was required to have her testimony corroborated by certain family members. Due to the plaintiff’s poor relationship with these family members, the family members provided false testimony in order to harm her. The Court ruled that this testimony should have been suppressed. In this case, the judge was required to take gender perspective into account, as the plaintiff was found to be in a vulnerable situation, given her status as a housewife. It is important to note that it has been proven that, historically, housewives have frequently been in a disadvantageous position. As a result, the Court was required to consider the plaintiff’s relationship with her family members in order to assess the evidence based on a gender perspective.

Original case available: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=205/02050000198348990005005.pdf_1&sec=DIANA_HELENA_SANCHEZ_ALVAREZ&svp=1

“VEREDICTOS CON UNA PERSPECTIVA DE GÉNERO. "PARA PODER EVALUAR ADECUADAMENTE LA EVIDENCIA, EL TRIBUNAL DEBE IDENTIFICAR UNA SITUACIÓN VULNERABLE EN CASOS EN QUE UNA CRISIS FAMILIAR SEA EVIDENTE."

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia con la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, dichos criterios pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. Como referencia, la Corte Suprema de México ha ordenado en repetidas ocasiones a todos los tribunales mexicanos que tengan en cuenta la perspectiva de género cuando dictaminen, incluso si el demandante no lo solicita formalmente. Como antecedentes, el precedente que culminó en esta tesis aislada surgió de una disputa sobre un contrato de arrendamiento. La demandante, ama de casa, ofreció pruebas testimoniales, pero se le exigió que su testimonio fuera corroborado por ciertos miembros de la familia. Debido a la mala relación del demandante con estos miembros de la familia, ellos proporcionaron un testimonio falso para hacerle daño. El tribunal dictaminó que este testimonio debería haber sido suprimido. En este caso, se requirió que el juez tomara en cuenta la perspectiva de género, ya que se descubrió que la demandante estaba en una situación vulnerable, dada su condición de ama de casa. Es importante tener en cuenta que se ha demostrado que, históricamente, las amas de casa con frecuencia han estado en una posición desventajosa. Como resultado, se requirió que la Corte considerara la relación de la demandante con los miembros de su familia para evaluar las pruebas basadas en una perspectiva de género.



Employment Termination (Jurisprudential Thesis Docket: 2a./J.66/2017 (10a.)) Supreme Court of Mexico (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

“EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION. WHEN EMPLOYMENT IS TERMINATED DURING AN EMPLOYEE’S PREGNANCY, THE EMPLOYER BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SUCH TERMINATION WAS NOT DISCRIMINATORY.”

This jurisprudential thesis is a relevant example of case law, as the criteria issued by the Mexican Supreme Court is binding on all courts in the country. Mexico recognizes labor matters as independent from other matters of law, with a unique set of courts, legislation, and doctrine. This case law in particular comes from two different isolated theses, as settled by two different federal courts. The first case was settled by the Third Collegiate Tribunal in Labor Matters of the Third Circuit, and the second case was settled by the Third Collegiate Tribunal of Circuit in the Assistant Center of the Tenth Region. Both court resolutions contained contradictory substantive issues, which prompted the Supreme Court to settle these discrepancies. The Supreme Court acknowledged that all pregnant women should enjoy certain specific rights resulting from pregnancy. The Court also found that these rights should be extended to the postnatal period. The Supreme Court recognized that most pregnant women will likely face a lack of job security given the costs that maternity leave implies for most employers. The Supreme Court determined that pregnant women require certain social security benefits in order to eliminate the barriers and obstacles that they may face during the pre- and postnatal periods. When a pregnant employee is terminated and argues that the termination was discriminatory, the employer bears the burden of proving that such termination was not due to the woman’s pregnancy or any other discriminatory reason. In such scenarios, the courts must take a gender perspective approach in deciding such controversies in order to be able to effectively guarantee the rights of women recognized under the Mexican Constitution and international treaties to which Mexico is a signatory.

“TERMINACIÓN DEL EMPLEO. "CUANDO EL EMPLEO SE TERMINA DURANTE EL EMBARAZO DE UN EMPLEADO, EL EMPLEADOR ASUME LA CARGA DE PROBAR QUE DICHA TERMINACIÓN NO FUE DISCRIMINATORIA".

Esta tesis jurisprudencial es un ejemplo relevante de jurisprudencia, ya que los criterios emitidos por el Tribunal Supremo de México son de relevancia para todos los tribunales del país. México reconoce que los asuntos laborales son independientes de otros asuntos de la ley, con un conjunto único de tribunales, legislación y doctrina. Esta jurisprudencia en particular proviene de dos tesis diferentes, según lo resuelto por dos tribunales federales diferentes. El primer caso fue resuelto por el Tercer Tribunal Colegiado en Asuntos Laborales del Tercer Circuito, y el segundo caso fue resuelto por el Tercer Tribunal Colegiado de Circuito en el Centro Asistente de la Décima Región. Ambas resoluciones judiciales contenían cuestiones sustantivas contradictorias, lo que llevó a la Corte Suprema a resolver estas discrepancias. La Corte Suprema reconoció que todas las mujeres embarazadas deberían disfrutar de ciertos derechos específicos derivados del embarazo. El Tribunal también determinó que estos derechos deberían extenderse al período postnatal. La Corte Suprema reconoció que la mayoría de las mujeres embarazadas probablemente enfrentarán una falta de seguridad laboral, dado los costos que la licencia de maternidad implica para la mayoría de los empleadores. La Corte Suprema determinó que las mujeres embarazadas requieren ciertos beneficios de seguridad social para eliminar las barreras y obstáculos que pueden enfrentar durante los períodos pre y postnatal. Cuando una empleada embarazada es despedida y argumenta que la terminación fue discriminatoria, el empleador tiene la responsabilidad de probar que dicha terminación no se debió al embarazo de la mujer ni a ninguna otra razón discriminatoria. En tales escenarios, los tribunales deben adoptar un enfoque de perspectiva de género al decidir tales controversias para poder garantizar de manera efectiva los derechos de las mujeres reconocidos en la Constitución mexicana y los tratados internacionales de los que México es parte.



Case of Clarisa Velázquez de Acosta Supreme Court (1995)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Quijote, S.R.L., (the “Company”) fired the plaintiff while she was pregnant. The Labor Appeals Court (the “Court”) found that the firing was illegal because the law seeks to protect pregnant women, and though the medical certificate is a guarantee for the employer, it is not a requirement. The Court ordered the company to reinstate the plaintiff to her position and pay her lost wages. The Company challenged the court order in 1993, but the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge as an unconstitutional action in 1995. Consequently, the Labor Appeals Court ruling remained in effect.

Quijote, S.R.L., (la “Compañía”) despidió a la demandante mientras estaba embarazada. La Corte de Apelaciones Laborales (la “Corte”) determinó que el despido era ilegal porque la ley busca proteger a las mujeres embarazadas y, aunque el certificado médico es una garantía para el empleador, no es un requisito. El Tribunal ordenó a la empresa que reinstalara a la demandante en su puesto y le pagara su salario perdido. La Compañía impugnó la orden judicial en 1993, pero la Corte Suprema desestimó la impugnación como una acción inconstitucional en 1995. En consecuencia, la sentencia de la Corte de Apelaciones Laborales se mantuvo vigente.



Nxumalo v. Ndlovu Supreme Court (2011)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The executor of the estate of a deceased man (the appellant) brought an application to the High Court for a declaration that the civil marriage to the respondent was bigamous and invalid because of a number of pre-existing customary marriages between the deceased and three other women. The deceased considered the marriages over when the women left him and never returned. The deceased had executed a will and later four codicils. The High Court found that the respondent’s civil law marriage was a lawful marriage in community of property, and the will was declared null and void. The appeal is of the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court heard testimony from one of the wives married to the deceased under customary law and from experts in Swazi law and custom relating to the dissolution of customary marriages. The Supreme Court found in favour of the appellant. The decision of the High Court was set aside and the Master of the High Court was to appoint a suitable and proper person to administer the deceased estate. This case is important as it illustrates the importance and status of Swazi law.



Dlamini v. The Quadro Trust & 8 Others Supreme Court (2016)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The appellant sought to set aside a lower court’s decision and remove his deceased paternal grandmother’s estate executors. The lower court found that the appellant had no locus standi to bring forth the application as he was not the lawful beneficiary of his grandmother’s estate—he was born out of wedlock and his father predeceased his now deceased paternal grandmother. Therefore, the appellant had no right of inheritance intestate. The Supreme Court found that Section 31 of the Constitution (the abolition of the common law status of illegitimacy of a person born out of wedlock) abolishes the principle that children cannot inherit from their father. The Court upheld the appeal and found that the applicant had locus standi to institute or defend legal proceedings relating the deceased estate.



Stapley v. Dobson High Court (2008)


Gender discrimination

This is a child custody case involving a father (the applicant) seeking custody of his minor child because the child’s biological mother, the respondent, sought to take the child to Sri Lanka without the applicant’s permission. The applicant and respondent were never legally married and the respondent had custody of the child. The Court found that Section 31 of the Constitution abolishes the status of illegitimacy of children but that Section 31 is silent on the status of the father of a child born out of wedlock. The Court held that until Parliament enacts the necessary laws under Section 29(7) of the Constitution (which specifically provides for the enactment of laws by Parliament to ensure children’s rights) the legal effects flowing from the fact that the child was born out of wedlock apply and the Court cannot grant guardianship of the minor child to the applicant. Section 31 of the Constitution relates, in part to the rights of children born out of wedlock to inherit from their father. The Court was satisfied that the mother showed careful preparation in her decision to move to Sri Lanka for better career opportunities. The application failed.



Mabuza v. Shongwe Supreme Court of Appeal of Swaziland (2006)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The appellant was the maternal grandfather of two minor children (the subject of the application). The appellant was appealing a decision of the trial court which ordered that the children be placed the custody of their biological father (the respondent). The children stayed with the appellant for a period of time while the respondent pursued his education in South Africa. Upon the respondent’s return, he fetched the children from the applicant’s residence. One of the appellant’s arguments was that because the marriage between the appellant’s deceased daughter and the respondent was invalid under Swazi law, the custody of the children should be with the maternal family (in accordance with Swazi law and custom). The Court stated that Section 29(4) of the Constitution removes the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children as it states that children whether born in or out of wedlock shall enjoy the same protection and rights. The Court found that the most important considerations were the welfare, interests and happiness of the children. The Court found that no evidence was adduced to prove that the respondent was not fit to have custody over the children and the appeal was dismissed.



Law of 5 May 2014 (2014)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Law of 5 May 2014 considers the determination of the descent of the co-mother amended the Civil Code to ensure that women in a lesbian relationship no longer have to adopt their child. For married couples, the wife of the biological mother is automatically recognized as co-mother, while for non-married couples, the partner, in order to be recognized, has to recognize the child officially before or after its birth. In case of dispute considering the recognition of the co-mother, the agreements and informed consents, signed in the center for medically assisted propagation will serve as evidence for recognition (or non-recognition) of the co-mother. It is noteworthy that in Belgium, the concept of co-father does not yet exist and men thus still have to adopt in order to become the father of their child.


B.M. v. R.C. Constitutional Court (2009)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Until 1976, the rules applicable on marriage and divorce originated in the Code Napoléon. At that time, the right to manage property within a marriage was held entirely by the man. To ensure that women would not suffer the negative consequences of bad management by their spouse (i.e., debts), in the event the marriage was dissolved they had the option to decline or to accept the division of assets and liabilities within a specified period. Silence meant that all matrimonial property rights and obligations were declined. The Civil Code was amended from mid-1976 by the Law of 14 July 1976 to remove this discrimination but contained transitional provisions requiring the old rules to continue to apply under certain circumstances. In the case at hand (in which the women failed to make a declaration within the old deadline), the Constitutional Court was asked if the old provisions still applied for marriages entered into before the amendments became applicable and dissolved after that date. The first court ruled that the deadline no longer applied (as there was no basis for it because men and women acquired equal rights to manage matrimonial property in 1976), but it took successive appeals, culminating in an appeal before the Belgian Supreme Court, to confirm this and annul the relevant transitional provisions.



Test-Achats Constitutional Court (2011)


Gender discrimination, International law

Following a proceeding brought by a Belgian consumer organization to seek the annulment of a law amending the Gender Law of 2007 in so far as it allowed certain differences in insurance premiums to be paid by men and women, the Constitutional Court (drawing on a judgment of the European Court of Justice as this concerned a question of the interpretation of a provision in a European Directive) ruled that such different treatment was permitted only for policies concluded before 21 December 2012.



L. Montre v. Institut national d'assurances Constitutional Court (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Mr. Montre brought proceedings before the Antwerp Labor Court because the law applicable at the time (Royal Decree No 72 of 10 November 1967 on the retirement and survivors' pension for self-employed persons) allowed him to benefit from a full pension only as of the age of 65 and obliged him to accept a 25% reduction in his pension if he chose to retire at the age of 60 (5% per year before 65), while self-employed women could retire at the age of 60 and enjoy a full pension. Upon referral, the Constitutional Court ruled that there was no discrimination in this particular case because at that time, there were still long-standing differences between self-employed men and self-employed women as regards working opportunities and conditions. These objectively and reasonably justified a distinction as to the age of retirement: (i) Women had fewer opportunities to work as self-employed persons and as a result had lower pension entitlements as these were based on the length of career and women generally had shorter careers; (ii) To balance this inequality, a younger retirement age had been attributed to women and a pension reduction applied to men who retired before their normal retirement age of 65; (iii) It would take time to redress the low level of opportunities for women in the self-employment sector, so only a progressive abolition of the retirement age difference could be appropriate. This in turn would bring Belgium, an EU Member State, into line with EU regulations and case law on this topic.



M.S. v. Markant Netwerk van Ondernemende Vrouwen Constitutional Court (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Labor Court of Ghent referred a number of prejudicial questions to the Constitutional Court in the context of a dispute between a woman who claimed that her employer dismissed her after having requested maternity leave, parental leave and the continuation of a related “time credit” contract. The Labor Court agreed that the company had not provided justification for the dismissal, but had questions about how to calculate the indemnity. The applicant claimed it should be calculated on the basis of full-time employment. The Constitutional Court, however, ruled that reducing an employee’s benefits proportionally for part-time workers (which disproportionately affects women) was not a form of discrimination as the regime applies equally to men and women.



X. v. X. Cour du Travail de Bruxelles (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

In November 2011, the applicant became pregnant and in February 2012 she was dismissed as part of a restructuring procedure in which 20% of employees were laid-off. She argued that the termination of her contract was due to her pregnancy. The Labor Court ruled in her favor and ordered the company to pay her an indemnity and to bear the costs of the legal proceedings because it failed to prove that the dismissal of the pregnant woman was based on reasons unrelated to her state of pregnancy.



H.N. v. E.Y.A. Labor Court of Brussels (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

On appeal of a judgment of a lower court, the Labor Court ruled that the protection of women from being fired by an employer for reasons related to their pregnancy (including pregnancy-related absences/illnesses) also applies during the trial period, regardless of legislation permitting employers to fire employees during their trial period when absent for a period exceeding seven days. As a result, a pregnant employee may only be fired during the pregnancy-related protection period (i.e., from the moment the employer is notified of the pregnancy until one month following the legal post-natal maternity leave) if the employer can prove that the laying-off is due to reasons unrelated to the pregnancy. In case of doubt, the court will rule in favor of the employee.



Masupha v. Senior Resident Magistrate for the Subordinate Court of Berea High Court of Lesotho (Constitutional Division) (2013)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law, Property and inheritance rights

The petitioner, Senate Masupha, is the firstborn, female child of a late principal Chief. Because there were no firstborn males in his immediate family, upon his death, the late Chief’s wife and the petitioner’s mother was appointed as a caretaker Chief in accordance with the Chieftainship Act. Following the death of the late Chief’s wife in 2008, the late Chief’s younger brother instituted a claim for inheritance of the chieftainship before a magistrate’s court, which was challenged by the late Chief’s son from a second wife, as well as that son’s mother. The petitioner, who had not been included in the proceedings before the lower court, subsequently intervened to request a change of venue to the Constitutional Court, so that she could challenge the constitutionality of the provision in the Chieftainship Act under which she was precluded from seeking to succeed to the chieftainship, as she was the first-born child. Masupha argued that the Chieftainship Act does not necessarily preclude her from inheriting the chieftainship and that, even if the Chieftainship Act in fact precludes her from doing so, it should be struck down, because it violates multiple provisions of the Constitution. The High Court highlighted the fact that, in acceding to CEDAW, Lesotho specifically excluded itself from the provisions of that Convention in so far as it concerns the customary practices relating to succession to the throne and to chieftainship. It therefore dismissed Masupha’s petition seeking to declare the Chieftainship Act provision preventing female offspring from inhering chieftainships discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional, finding that the Chieftainship Act was not discriminatory, because it allows the senior wife to inherit the title as a caretaker, if there are no living first-born males from any of the deceased’s marriages. The High Court concluded that, when a wife succeeds her husband as a caretaker, the right to inherit reverts back to the male line of the family upon the death of the female chief. The judgment was appealed to the highest court in the country, the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the High Court’s decision and upheld the customary law effectively denying women the ability to succeed to chieftainship.



Estate of Lerionka Ole Ntutu High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Family Division) (2008)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law, Property and inheritance rights

Lerionka Ole Ntutu was survived by multiple wives, sons, and daughters. After his sons filed an application asking the High Court to issue to them the letters of administration to administer their father’s estate, their sisters and stepsisters filed an objection and claimed their inheritance. The sons contested the objection, arguing that the distribution of their father’s estate was governed by Masai customary law, which did not recognize the right of daughters to claim an inheritance from their father’s estate. The judge in the first instance found that, because Ntutu was Masai and lived in an area excluded from the Succession Act, his estate should be divided accorded to Masai custom. The judge thus held that none of the daughters could inherit from their father’s estate. In ruling on the daughters’ appeal, the Court of Appeal invoked international treaties and covenants, including CEDAW, in finding that the daughters of the deceased person in that case were entitled to a share of his estate. On appeal before the High Court, the definitive question before Lady Justice K. Rawal was whether the Court should apply the Law of Succession Act or the customary law of the Masai community. The High Court was satisfied that, even if the Law of Succession Act allowed Ole Ntutu’s community to apply customary law in the distribution of his estate, any tenet of such customary law that would abrogate the right of daughters to inherit the estate of a father would be repugnant to justice and morality and could not be applied. The High Court thus ruled that Ole Ntutu’s daughters were entitled to inherit their father’s land.



Mmusi v. Ramantele Court of Appeal of Botswana (2013)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law, Property and inheritance rights

Edith Mmusi and her sisters, all over 65 years of age, brought a case against their nephew, Molefi Ramantele, who claimed to have rightfully inherited the home that was occupied by Mmusi and her sisters and tried to evict them. The sisters contested the eviction, arguing that they had paid for the home’s upkeep and expansion costs. The applicable customary law, that of the Ngwaketse tribe, dictated that the family home of a deceased individual was to be reserved to the last born male child. The rest of the property was to be divided among the children, regardless of gender. The Lower Customary Court found in favor of the nephew; the Higher Customary Court held in 2008 that the home belonged to all of the children; and the Customary Court of Appeal, to which both parties appealed, held that the home should be inherited by the nephew. The High Court noted that the issue of law being considered was whether the Ngwaketse customary law, to the extent that it denied the applicants the right to inherit the family residence intestate, "solely on the basis of their sex, violate[d] their constitutional right to equality under section 3(a) of the Constitution. In 2012, the High Court awarded the home to the sisters, ruling that the local customary laws prioritizing male inheritance were not in keeping with the promise of gender equality enshrined in the Constitution of Botswana and in international conventions such as CEDAW, thereby recognizing for the first time the right of women in Botswana to inherit property. In 2013, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court, observing that “Constitutional values of equality before the law, and the increased leveling of the power structures with more and more women heading households and participating with men as equals in the public sphere and increasingly in the private sphere, demonstrate that there is no rational and justifiable basis for sticking to the narrow norms of days gone by when such norms go against current value systems.” This case was a landmark case that effectively ended the patriarchal inheritance system in Botswana. The High Court decision is available here.



Public Ministry v. Busudu Tina Court of Greater Instance of Bukavu (1995)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Busudu Tina (“the accused”) was prosecuted by the State for having aborted her pregnancy, punishable under Articles 165 and 166 of the Congolese Penal Code. She attempted to abort her pregnancy using different methods, including ingesting quinine, manioc infusion, and a product described as ‘cloveganol’, and admitted to the Tribunal that she had aborted a previous pregnancy in 1991. The Tribunal became aware of the abortion when an acquaintance, worried for the accused’s health, sought assistance despite being sworn to secrecy by the accused. The fetus was hidden in a laundry bag, which found its way to the prosecutor’s office. The Tribunal applied the minimum sentence of five years imprisonment, taking into account as a mitigating factor that she and her husband were estranged after six months of pregnancy. (Available at pages 128-130 on the linked website.)



Request to access conformity with the Constitution of procedural rules of the Provincial Assembly of Tanganyika (Requête en appréciation de la conformité à la constitution du Règlement intérieur de l’Assemblée provinciale du Haut-Uélé R.Const. 172) Constitutional Court (2015)


Gender discrimination

The Constitutional Court considered a challenge to the internal provincial government’s procedural rules which included, among other claims, that one Article of the procedural rules violated the gender equality requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court found the procedural rules to conform to Article 14, provided that they must be understood and interpreted in light of line four of Article 14, which requires equitable representation of women in provincial institutions (available at pages 46-50 on linked site).



McBain v. State of Victoria Federal Court of Australia (2000)


Gender discrimination

Dr. John McBain, a Melbourne doctor specialising in reproductive technology, was consulted by Ms. Lisa Meldrum, a single woman wishing to conceive through in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) using donor sperm. Dr. McBain told Ms. Meldrum he was prohibited by Victorian legislation (namely, the Infertility Treatment Act) from administering IVF treatment to her because she was single. He then commenced proceedings seeking a declaration that provisions of the Victorian legislation were inconsistent with the Sex Discrimination Act (in particular, section 22, which deals with discrimination in relation to the provision of goods and services), and hence inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. Justice Sundberg held that fertility treatments, including IVF, constituted “services” provided by medical practitioners within the meaning of section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act. Because the Infertility Treatment Act makes provision of IVF treatment contingent on a woman’s marital status (as well as her medical state), Justice Sundberg concluded that the Victorian legislation violated section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act and was unlawful under section 109 of the Australian Constitution. This case holds that women do not have to be married or in a de facto relationship to be eligible for infertility treatment.



CES v. Superclinics New South Wales Court of Appeal (1995)


Gender discrimination

The appellant, CES, brought a medical negligence case against the respondent, Superclinics, seeking damages for loss of the opportunity to terminate her pregnancy after a number of medical practitioners repeatedly failed to properly diagnose her pregnancy. The medical negligence claim aside, the Court of Appeal considered the decision of R v. Wald – namely that that an abortion is lawful if a doctor is able to say that, in the particular woman’s circumstances, an abortion is required to avoid a “serious danger to her life or to her physical or mental health” (including “the effects of economic or social stress”). Justice Kirby liberalized and extended the R v Wald decision by finding that when determining whether to perform an abortion, consideration should be given not only to the woman’s health during the pregnancy, but also after the child is born. Justice Kirby’s interpretation of the law now represents the legal position in New South Wales, Australia.



R. v. Davidson Supreme Court of Victoria (1969)


Gender discrimination

Dr. Charles Kenneth Davidson was a medical doctor charged with four counts of unlawfully using an instrument and one count of conspiring to use an instrument or other means with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman. The Court found that an abortion would be lawful if the accused held an honest and reasonable belief that the abortion was both “necessary” and “proportionate.” In this context, “necessary” means that the abortion was necessary to prevent serious harm to the woman’s life and/or physical or mental health, beyond the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth. “Proportionate” means the abortion was not out proportion with the danger to be averted. The jury applied Menhennitt J’s interpretation of the law and acquitted Dr. Davidson of the charges.

* This is a landmark decision, which has not been re-examined, despite several cases in which it could have been. Therefore, this decision continues to represent the legal position in Victoria, Australia.



Equal Remuneration Case Fair Work Australia (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Australian Services Union brought a claim against Fair Work Australia (FWA) on behalf of non-government workers in the Social, Community and Disability Services (SACS) industry for gender-related underpayment. They argued because the majority of workers in the SACS industry were female, they were compensated less than other state and local government employees in more male-dominated fields. The Full Bench of FWA found that gender had an important influence on the alleged pay gap, even though it was not the sole cause. In a landmark decision, FWA ordered increases of between 19% and 41% to the award rate to remedy the part gender had played in inhibiting long-term wage growth in the SACS industry – i.e., to prevent the SACS employees from suffering disadvantageous treatment for being predominantly female.



Poppy v. Service to Youth Council, Inc. Federal Court of Australia (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Plaintiffs, Ms. Stanley (case available here) and Ms. Poppy, each claimed that their employer discriminated against them due to their pregnancies. Both were made redundant from the same organization while on parental leave, about two years apart. Both of the Plaintiffs’ positions were eliminated by their employer due to a reorganization of the employer’s management structure. In both cases, the Plaintiffs’ absence from work caused their employer to conclude that their positions were no longer required. In particular, when Stanley and Poppy went on parental leave, their job duties were redistributed to colleagues. This caused their employer to decide that Stanley and Poppy’s positions were redundant. In both cases, the Federal Court found that the employer would not have restructured its management in this way if the Plaintiffs had not taken maternity leave. Because the restructuring involved only those employees working at the time it occurred, the fact that the Plaintiffs were on maternity leave (and thus not present) disadvantaged them. However, the Federal Court found that Plaintiffs’ dismissals did not constitute discrimination because neither Plaintiff could show that the employer treated them any differently than it would an employee who was not pregnant or on leave in similar circumstances.



Stanley v. Service to Youth Council, Inc. Federal Court of Australia (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Plaintiffs, Ms. Stanley and Ms. Poppy (case available here), each claimed that their employer discriminated against them due to their pregnancies. Both were made redundant from the same organization while on parental leave, about two years apart. Both of the Plaintiffs’ positions were eliminated by their employer due to a reorganization of the employer’s management structure. In both cases, the Plaintiffs’ absence from work caused their employer to conclude that their positions were no longer required. In particular, when Stanley and Poppy went on parental leave, their job duties were redistributed to colleagues. This caused their employer to decide that Stanley and Poppy’s positions were redundant. In both cases, the Federal Court found that the employer would not have restructured its management in this way if the Plaintiffs had not taken maternity leave. Because the restructuring involved only those employees working at the time it occurred, the fact that the Plaintiffs were on maternity leave (and thus not present) disadvantaged them. However, the Federal Court found that Plaintiffs’ dismissals did not constitute discrimination because neither Plaintiff could show that the employer treated them any differently than it would an employee who was not pregnant or on leave in similar circumstances.



Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v. SZONJ Federal Court of Australia (2011)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

The respondent was a victim of domestic violence at the hands of her husband for a number of years in her native country, Fiji. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain assistance from local police, she fled to Australia and applied for a protection visa. To be recognized as a refugee the respondent had to show that Fiji’s failure or unwillingness to protect her was motivated by a reason listed in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (Convention), in this instance, her membership in a particular social group. Respondent argued she belonged to the following social groups: women in Fiji, women in Fiji who have left their husbands, and women who refuse to conform to the social norms of Fijian Indo society. She argued that her membership in these groups meant that Fijian police would not protect her from her husband’s assaults if she returned to Fiji. The Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) found: (i) there was no evidence that the Fijian authorities withheld state protection from the respondent based on her membership in these particular social groups; (ii) Fiji has laws against domestic violence; and (iii) Fiji had a police force and judiciary to give effect to its domestic violence laws. On appeal, the Federal Magistrate’s Court overturned the Tribunal’s decision, finding that the Tribunal erred by failing to explicitly evaluate whether Fiji’s laws were sufficient to protect a person in the respondent’s position. The Full Federal Court overturned the Federal Magistrate’s Court’s decision and upheld the reasoning of the Tribunal, holding that the test for refugee protection is not satisfied where (i) the persecution is by a non-state agent (here, the respondent’s husband) for a reason that has no connection to the Convention, and (ii) the state fails to prevent the persecution due solely to its inability to implement relevant laws due to lack of resources.



Whitewood v. Wolf U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals) (2011)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

This case legalized same-sex marriage in Pennsylvania. Reviewing the state’s statutory ban on such marriages, the federal district court applied intermediate scrutiny and determined that the ban violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution. The ruling was not stayed and same-sex couples in Pennsylvania could request and receive marriage licenses immediately, and marry after a mandatory 3-day waiting period. The court’s decision made Pennsylvania the 19th state to recognize same-sex marriage.



Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey United States Supreme Court (1992)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

In light of the ruling in Roe v. Wade, which established a woman’s right to an abortion prior to fetal viability the plaintiffs challenged various abortion-limiting restrictions in Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act. The act restricted public funding to abortion clinics. It also required women to obtain informed consent, notify their husbands if married, wait 24 hours before proceeding with the surgery, and obtain parental consent if underage. In response, the Supreme Court created a new test that asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden,” which the Court defined as a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” Though the Court reaffirmed Roe pursuant to this test, the Court upheld nearly all of the restrictions in Pennsylvania’s state abortion law, including parental notification/consent requirements for minors and limitations on public funding of abortions. However, the Court did find that the statute’s husband notification requirement was unlawful.



Harmon v. GZK, Inc. Court of Appeals of Ohio (2002)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

The plaintiffs worked at a restaurant operated by GZK. They alleged that a cook who worked with them repeatedly made lewd and sexually violent comments toward them, as well as touched them inappropriately without consent. The plaintiffs also alleged that a supervisor also made inappropriate sexual comments and groped them as he pretended to accidentally brush against them. They testified that they had brought this behavior to the attention of the management. The plaintiffs filed suit in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, claiming sexual harassment, negligent supervision and retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and retaliatory discharge. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of their employer and the manager, but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed on all charges except the retaliatory discharge, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether evidence of the cook and the manager’s inappropriate behavior rose to the level of creating a hostile work environment.



Payton v. Receivables Outsourcing, Inc. Court of Appeals of Ohio (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Marilyn Payton worked for Receivables Outsourcing for six weeks, during which time she was sexually harassed by a fellow employee who was assigned to train her at her new job. The harassment consisted of inappropriate comments until one day the coworker pulled up to her car as she was driving away from work, asked her to roll down her window, and then offered her ten dollars to perform a sex act. She complained to her manager that she felt unsafe, and the manager said he would “take care of it.” When she returned to work to find the manager not there, she informed the company lawyer of the harassment and left work, stating that she felt unsafe without the manager there. The next day she was fired for leaving work. She filed suit against her employer in the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas for hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge, but the Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether the alleged harassment rose to the level of creating a hostile work environment and whether the employer negligently retained the alleged harasser.



Egli v. Congress Lake Club Court of Appeals of Ohio (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff -appellant was the “head golf professional” at the Congress Lake Golf Club. Despite her formidable golfing pedigree, the club’s board of directors requested her resignation, ostensibly because of her inability to manage various golf programs. She sued the defendant for sex discrimination in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding that there was an issue of fact as to whether the golf club’s proffered legitimate reason for her termination were pretextual.



Lascu v. Apex Paper Box Co. Court of Appeals of Ohio (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff-appellant had been employed at Apex for approximately 30 years before being fired in connection with Apex’s reduction in force. She filed suit in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that she was the victim of gender discrimination. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed, holding that her unsupported assertions of discrimination were insufficient to overcome the defendant's legitimate reduction-in-force justification.



Pitts-Baad v. Valvoline Instant Oil Chage Court of Appeals of Ohio (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff-appellant worked as an assistant manager of a Valvoline Instant Oil Change branch. She was on track for a promotion but did not pass all the required courses. When she was eight months pregnant, she tripped and fell at work. On the advice of her doctor, she reported the injury to her employer. Later, when she returned form maternity leave, she found the work environment distrusting, and she was often not permitted to take breaks to pump her breast milk for long periods of time. After she failed to follow correct procedures on an oil change, her employment was terminated. She sued Valvoline alleging gender discrimination and retaliation, but the Stark County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating her employment was not a pretext.



Jones v. MTD Consumer Group, Inc. Court of Appeals of Ohio (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The plaintiff was fired from his job with MTD Consumer Group after sexually harassing a coworker. He and the coworker had been in a romantic relationship, which had since ended, when the coworker complained that the plaintiff had made a threatening gesture to her and her new boyfriend outside of her home. The plaintiff was also verbally derogatory toward this coworker until his employment was terminated. He sued MTD in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, alleging reverse gender discrimination and negligent retention of his coworker. The Court granted the employer’s motion for a directed verdict, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed, holding that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim that he was treated differently form a similarly-situated coworker.



Mender v. Chauncey Court of Appeals of Ohio (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Ginger Mender, who was elected mayor of the Village of Chauncey, alleged that immediately after she took office, the Village conspired to force her to resign. She claimed that Village employees refused her an office, keys to Village buildings, basic office equipment, and disrupted her attempts to speak at Village council meetings with ridicule and laughter. After she refused a request to resign, three different petitions were filed in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. She filed suit for gender discrimination, among other claims, in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. The defendants argued that the disagreements were not gender discrimination but political power struggles. After a jury trial, the court granted the Village’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals for Ohio affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a prima facie case of gender discrimination; even though her successor was a man and thus outside the protected class, the voters of the Village rather than the Village government itself made the decision regarding her replacement.



Weber v. Ferrellgas, Inc. Court of Appeals of Ohio (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff-appellant worked as a customer service representative for Ferrellgas and received high marks on her employment evaluations. When her employer opened a position for which the plaintiff thought she was qualified, her supervisor discouraged her from applying, saying that it would be a difficult job for her because she had children. About six months later, she reported this conversation to the regional vice president, who mediated a meeting between the two. When another employee alleged that the plaintiff had suggested transferring funds owed to a customer to her personal account, she was fired for violating the company’s ethics policy. She filed suit against Ferrellgas for gender discrimination and retaliation, but the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed, holding that she had not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination.



Vogt v. Total Renal Care, Inc. (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff-appellant worked as a regional operations director for Total Renal Care, Inc., which operated dialysis centers. The plaintiff received positive reviews by her coworkers and supervisors, but following Total Renal Care’s acquisition, she was transferred to a different group than the one she had previously worked in, which came with a reduced bonus and fewer stock awards. In addition, her employer filled her previous position with a male and promoted another male to a position for which she was potentially eligible. She brought suit in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for gender discrimination and retaliation, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer. The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed on all counts except the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim, finding that there was a fact issue as to whether the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action necessary for sustaining a gender discrimination claim.



Allen v. Totes Isotoner Corp. Supreme Court of Ohio (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff-appellant, an employee of Totes/Isotoner Corporation, had for two weeks taken breaks without her employer’s knowledge to lactate. After the defendant fired her “for her failure to follow directions,” the plaintiff filed suit alleging wrongful termination on the basis of her pregnancy. The Butler County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio also affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that employer's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for employee's termination, i.e., failure to follow directions, was pretext for pregnancy discrimination.



M.B. v. D.W. Kentucky Court of Appeals (2007)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

The new husband of a divorced mother of three children filed a petition seeking to adopt the remaining minor child without the consent of her biological father, effectively terminating her parental rights. After the divorce, appellant-father underwent gender reassignment surgery and now lives as a woman. The children discovered this when they visited their father in Florida and told her afterward that they no longer wanted to see her. The minor child testified that she did not want to see her father, wants to be adopted by her stepfather, and is in psychological counseling. The Hardin County Circuit Court granted the petition, finding that the children suffered psychological harm because they were not adequately prepared for their father’s transition. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed, largely on the justification that circuit courts have broad discretion in determining whether, in parental rights actions, termination is in the child’s best interest due to abuse or neglect. The Court of Appeals and trial court both noted that the appellant's sex reassignment was not the basis for terminating her parental rights. They explained that she failed to prepare her children or ex-wife at all for her transition, her minor child suffers from ongoing psychological harm, she did not meet her financial obligations for her minor child’s medical care, and her minor child wanted to be adopted by her stepfather.



McBrearty v. Kentucky Community and Technical College System Kentucky Court of Appeals (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Jenean McBrearty held an eleven-month tenure-track teaching contract with the Kentucky Community and Technical College System. One of her colleagues recommended that she include an opinion poll in her course materials, but McBrearty declined, and continued to decline when her colleague pressed. After she complained about what she considered to be harassment to her supervisors, she learned that her contract would not be renewed. She filed claims of sex and disability discrimination in the Fayette County Circuit Court, but the court dismissed her claims. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed, holding that she was unable to demonstrate a prima facie case of either form of discrimination.



Murray v. Eastern Kentucky University Kentucky Court of Appeals (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Phyllis Murray was a part-time and later full-time faculty member of Eastern Kentucky University. When she was hired to a full-time position, one of the terms of her contract was that she would obtain her doctorate within five years. During that period, she was diagnosed with breast cancer, and she received an extension on her doctoral requirement. Her request for a second extension was denied and subsequently she was fired for failing to obtain her doctorate. She brought suit against the university for gender and disability discrimination in the Madison County Circuit Court, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, finding that she failed to establish a prima facie case of either claim. Specifically, the court found that she failed to demonstrate that she was qualified for the position and that a similarly situated male colleague was treated more favorably. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed.



Withrow v. Calgon Carbon Corp. Kentucky Court of Appeals (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Connie Withrow was employed as a floater technician at an industrial plant. One day she and a male coworker were assigned to light a furnace, but when they attempted to do so, there was an explosion. When Withrow was fired but her male coworker only received a 30-day suspension, she sued her employer, alleging that she was terminated because of her gender in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Boyd Circuit Court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that her employer had good cause to terminate her and that she was not similarly situated to her male colleague because she had a different role with more control during the explosion, was uncooperative during the investigation, and had more disciplinary issues on her record. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, though the trial court erred in finding that Withrow was not qualified for her job, her employer’s reason for firing her was not pretextual and that there was no evidence that the decision was based on her gender.



Thompson v. Louisville Metro Government Kentucky Court of Appeals (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Dawn Thompson, an employee with the Louisville Department of Corrections, was approached by her immediate supervisor, Kevin Sidebottom, who wanted to begin a romantic relationship with her. After she rebuffed his advances, Thompson began to hear rumors that the two were romantically involved, which she denied. She was later denied a promotion to captain. Instead, the two promotions went to a woman who had the highest test scores and a man with lower test scores than Thompson. Thompson claimed that Sidebottom denied her promotion because she declined his romantic advances two years earlier. However, a higher-ranking officer claimed that he made the promotion decisions alone and declined to promote Thompson because of a recent EEO complaint against her, which was eventually dropped. Two months later, Thompson received a promotion to captain despite again hearing rumors about her romantic involvement with Sidebottom in addition to rumors that he had tried to prevent her promotion. After Thompson filed an EEO complaint, the department found that Sidebottom did not retaliate against her because he did not make the promotion decision. Thompson then sued the Louisville government and Sidebottom individually and in his professional capacity for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, but the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that she was unable to demonstrate that the legitimate reason for her initial failure to be promoted was not the real reason she was denied, and in addition, failed to show that she suffered an adverse employment action.



Philpot v. Best Buy Kentucky Court of Appeals (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Several Best Buy employees alleged that their supervisor sexually harassed them on three separate occasions. During the ensuing investigation, the three appellant-employees submitted a letter supporting their supervisor and stating that they had never seen him engage in improper conduct. While investigating the supervisor, Best Buy discovered allegations from five other employees that the three appellant-employees had also behaved in sexually inappropriate ways while at work. Best Buy hence suspended them pending an investigation and later terminated their employment after concluding the investigation. The employees brought suit against Best Buy for, among other claims, gender discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Bullitt Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Best Buy, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the employees had not sufficiently established the elements of a prima facie case of either gender discrimination or sexual harassment.



Gray v. Kenton County Kentucky Court of Appeals (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Three employees of the Kenton County Clerk’s office brought claims of sexual harassment in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act against the County Clerk’s Chief Deputy in the Kenton County Circuit Court. The Chief Deputy had made a number of inappropriate comments to each employee over the course of their employment. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, holding that even though the deputy had made inappropriate comments—the county had in fact asked him to resign over them—his comments were neither severe not pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed.



Ransom v. B.F. South, Inc. Kentucky Court of Appeals (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Jacques Ransom was employed at one of several Wendy’s restaurants owned by B.F. South, but quit after one of her coworkers, “T.J.”, made several comments to other coworkers about Ransom’s gender reassignment surgery. When Ransom reported the comments to her supervisor, the store manager, the store and regional mangers met to discuss the situation and transferred T.J. to another Wendy’s location. Ransom was not fired or retaliated against; instead, she was promoted to crew leader and given a raise after lodging her complaint. She filed claims of hostile work environment and retaliation under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Jefferson County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Ransom’s employer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the conduct of which Ransom complained did not rise to the level of actionable harassment because no adverse action was taken against her.



Tucker v. Bluegrass Regional Mental Health Retardation Board Kentucky Court of Appeals (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Angela Tucker, a licensed clinical social worker, requested salary increases from her employer after five years, and again after seven years, of employment, but was denied both times. She informed the director of human resources that male staff members had received large raises, and her pay was subsequently increased fifteen percent, but soon she began to be harassed by her employer and to receive additional scrutiny without justification. After her employer determined that she had inappropriately filed an involuntary hospitalization form for one of her patients, her employer required her to complete a three-month correction plan; when she refused, her employment was terminated. She filed suit against her employer for gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, but the Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that she had failed to demonstrate a causal connection between her termination and her protected action (filing an EEOC complaint).



Commonwealth v. Solly Supreme Court of Kentucky (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Donna Solly was employed as a limited-status teacher at Caldwell Area Technology Center. Her employment was not renewed. The reason her employer gave for her non-renewal was that she had had an affair with a male colleague. Solly filed suit in the Franklin County Circuit Court, alleging sex discrimination. The Circuit Court found in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed and remanded, holding that she had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding both that she had not established that her male colleague with whom she had had an affair was not similarly situated, and that her employer’s stated justification for firing her was not pretextual.



Banker v. University of Louisville Athletic Association, Inc. Supreme Court of Kentucky (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Mary Banker, an assistant track coach at the University of Louisville, made a series of complaints about the conduct of male track coaches which she believed to be deprecating to women. When her contract was not renewed, she filed suit for retaliatory discharge, gender discrimination, and hostile work environment. The Jefferson County Circuit Court found for the university on the latter two counts, but awarded Banker damages for her retaliatory discharge. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed on the retaliatory discharge claim, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that Banker had established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, albeit in part through circumstantial evidence of causation.



Asbury University v. Powell Supreme Court of Kentucky (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Deborah Powell was the women’s basketball coach at Asbury University who brought numerous complaints over several years to the university’s athletic director that the men’s team was receiving preferential treatment. Later, the university placed Powell on administrative leave allegedly for her having an inappropriate relationship with a female assistant coach. Powell brought suit under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act claiming that Asbury discriminated against her based on gender, defamed her, and retaliated against her for her complaints about her team receiving inferior treatment. The Jessamine Circuit Court ruled in Asbury’s favor regarding the discrimination and defamation, but in Powell’s favor on the retaliation claim. Both the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the school had not engaged in gender discrimination, it had engaged in retaliation against Powell for her complaining about alleged gender discrimination, which is in itself unlawful.



The Board of Regents of Northern Kentucky University v. Weickgenannt Supreme Court of Kentucky (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Andrea Weickgenannt was a faculty member at Northern Kentucky University who was denied tenure, despite receiving high marks in her employment evaluations. She was the only female accounting professor considered for tenure by the university in fifteen years. She brought suit alleging gender discrimination in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Campbell County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the university, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Circuit Court ruling. The Supreme Court held that Ms. Weickgenannt had failed to demonstrate sufficiently that a male candidate was similarly situated.



Eubanks & Marshall, PSC v. Commonwealth Supreme Court of Kentucky (2016)


Gender discrimination

Kentucky law requires abortions to be performed at healthcare facilities licensed by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, but private physicians’ practices are exempt from this licensing requirement. The Cabinet brought suit against EMW Women’s Clinic of Lexington, Kentucky, to force it to comply with the licensing requirement and requested a temporary injunction to prevent the clinic from performing abortions until the courts determined its legal status as either an abortion provider, which would require the license, or a private physician’s officer. The Fayette Circuit Court denied the Cabinet’s request for an injunction, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and imposed the requested injunction, finding that the Cabinet was entitled to a presumption of irreparable injury because it demonstrated a “reasonable probability” of injury without the injunction. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Court of Appeals had not abused its discretion.



Vizzi v. State Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal (1986)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

Vizzi, an assistant public defender, was defending his client charged with sexual battery, kidnapping, and false imprisonment and referred to the victim as “a woman who’s trash, gutter filth.” After being admonished by the court, Vizzi proceeded to call the victim “a whore, a two-bit whore.” The prosecutor petitioned the court to instruct Vizzi not to call the victim a prostitute again and the trial court ruled, based on Florida’s Rape Victim Shield Statutes, that Vizzi was not permitted to attack the character of the victim by delving into her prior sexual behavior (other than prior sexual activity that the victim had with the defendant) or by calling the victim a prostitute, whore, or words of similar meaning. Vizzi later called the victim an “exhibitionist” and questioned the victim with respect to her “perform[ing] tricks with customers.” The trial court held Vizzi in contempt for violating its prior order and sentenced him to 5 days of jail time. The appellate court upheld the contempt order based on Vizzi’s failure to comply with the trial court’s ruling.



O'Loughlin v. Pinchback Florida 1st District Court of Appeal (1991)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

After disclosing her pregnancy to her employers, Pinchback, a correctional officer at a county jail, was terminated. As a reason for the termination, Sheriff O’Loughlin explained that while pregnant, Pinchback could not perform the duties of a correctional officer and was placing her baby’s health in danger. Pinchback petitioned Florida’s Human Rights Commission for relief pursuant to Florida’s Human Rights Act (which is patterned after Title VII). The Sheriff argued that Pinchback’s dismissal was based on the affirmative defense of “bona fide occupational qualification” (“BFOQ”), which requires that the employer demonstrate that the discrimination based on sex, religion, or national origin is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation” of the place of employment. The trial court found that the Sheriff violated Pinchback’s rights, which the appellate court upheld. The Court of Appeal explained that O’Loughlin’s actions were indefensible as there was no evidence that Pinchback (or any pregnant employee) could not perform her work as before. As a result, the court found Pinchback entitled to back pay and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the back pay and benefits award.



Gainesville Woman Care LLC, et al. v. Florida, et al. Supreme Court of Florida (2017)


Gender discrimination

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s grant of temporary injunction blocking enforcement of the state’s Mandatory Delay Law. The law imposed a 24-hour waiting period on women seeking abortions. The Court explained that since the law implicated the fundamental right of privacy, it was automatically subject to strict scrutiny review. It found that the court of appeals had improperly put a burden on the challengers to establish that the law imposed a “significant restriction” on the right to privacy before applying strict scrutiny. The Florida Supreme Court observed that the state had presented no evidence of a compelling state interest or that the law served that interest through the least restrictive means.



司法院大法官會議第728號解釋 (J.Y. Interpretation No. 728) Constitutional Court (2015)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The court petitioner, the eldest daughter of a registered successor of an “ancestor worship guild,” was prohibited from inheriting the status of successor after her father’s death due to internal regulations of the guild, which only allow male heirs.” The lower courts dismissed the petitioner’s claims, and the Constitutional Court affirmed. The court held that the internal regulation of the guild was not a “statute” or “administrative regulation” and was therefore ineligible for a petition of interpretation on constitutionality under the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act. The court also found that Article 4 of the Statutes Governing Ancestor Worship Guilds, which stipulates that “for the guilds that existed before the promulgation of the Statutes, whether a person is a qualified successor to a guild should be determined by its internal regulations,” was not unconstitutional because the provision does not provide gender as a criterion for determining the status of the successor, and the objective is to preserve the stability of the law and to uphold the principle of prohibiting retroactive law. Moreover, the enactment of internal regulations for guilds should be respected based on freedom of association, property rights, freedom of contract, and the autonomy of private law. Therefore, even though the disputed provision may constitute differential treatment in substance, because it is not arbitrary it is not in conflict with the principle of gender equity nor does it infringe women’s right to property. However, the Constitutional Court urged relevant government agencies to review the related law to ensure that they are keeping pace with the times, taking into consideration the State’s positive duty to protect women under the Constitution, the principle of stability of law, changes in social conditions, and the adjustment of functions within an ancestor worship guild, so as to conform to the principle of gender equality and the constitutional intent to safeguard the people's freedom of association, property rights, and freedom of contract.

聲請人是一個 「祭祀公業」登記派下員的長女,由於該祭祀公業的內部規約只允許男性繼承人,因此在其父親去世後被禁止繼承派下權。下級法院駁回了聲請人的請求,憲法法院維持原判決。法院認為,祭祀公業內部規約並非「法律」或「行政法規」,因此不符合司法院大法官審理案件法規定的聲請釋憲要件。法院還認為,祭祀公業條例第4條規定:「本條例施行前已存在之祭祀公業,其派下員依規約定之。」並不違憲,因為該規定並未以性別作為決定繼承人身份的標準,其目的是為了維持法律安定性及禁止法律溯及既往的原則。此外,基於結社自由、財產權、契約自由和私法自治,祭祀公業內部規約之制定應予尊重。因此,即使該爭議條款在實質上可能構成差別待遇,但由於其並非恣意,因此與性別平等的原則沒有衝突,也沒有侵犯女性的財產權。然而,憲法法院敦促相關政府機關審查相關法律,以確保它們與時俱進,將國家依憲法規定保護婦女的積極義務、法律穩定性原則、社會環境的變遷以及祭祀公業內部功能的調整等納入考量,從而符合性別平等原則和保障人民的結社自由、財產權和契約自由的憲法目的。



Jumbo v. Banja La Mtsogolo Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (2002)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The applicant, Salome Jumbo, claimed she was dismissed as a result of her pregnancy. In 1999, the applicant started as a temporary nurse aid at a clinic and continued in that position until 2001. In 2001, the manager of the clinic assured the applicant that her job had become permanent. On April 4, 2001, the manager discovered that the applicant was pregnant. He immediately warned the applicant that he would not allow her to keep her job if she remained pregnant, as they wanted a permanent nurse aid. The manager also enquired into the applicant’s private affairs and made inappropriate sexual remarks. On June 1, 2001, the manager terminated the applicant’s employment explicitly informing her that her termination was due to her pregnancy. The applicant asked for a reference letter, but the manager refused saying that she was a temporary employee and did not deserve one. The Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (the “Court”) ruled that the termination was contrary to the spirit of the Employment Act and ordered that the clinic immediately re-instate the applicant. The Court found that the respondent specifically violated the applicant’s rights under §31(1) of the Employment Act, which requires employers to provide a reference if the employee requests one on termination of an employment contract. In addition, the respondent violated § 49 (1) of the Employment Act, which dictates that “terminating a woman’s employment because of pregnancy amount[s] to an offence [that is] punishable with a fine of K20,000 and imprisonment of five years” (p. 3). The Court also found that the manager’s inquiries into the applicant’s private affairs with her husband amounted to sexual harassment. This case is notable in Malawi because it set the precedent that inquiring into a married woman’s private affairs with her husband is an unfair labor practice.



Mwanza v. World Vision Malawi Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (2007)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The respondent employed the applicant on a fixed term contract as a data entry clerk. The applicant’s contract term was four years expiring on January 10, 2005. However, the respondent terminated her on December 22, 2003. The reason given for her termination was that she had become pregnant out of wedlock. The applicant challenged the dismissal and took legal action against the respondent. The respondent conceded that the reason for termination was invalid and asked the court to decide on a remedy. The applicant asked for reinstatement as the remedy. The Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (the “Court”) found that reinstatement was an inappropriate remedy because the applicant’s fixed contract had already lapsed in time. Instead, the Court awarded the applicant compensation for the employment benefits lost between the effective date of her termination (March 22, 2004) and the expiration of her contract (January 10, 2005). The Court cited § 63 (4) of Malawi’s Employment Act, which “provides that compensation shall be just and equitable” (p. 2). The Court awarded additional compensation to the applicant pursuant to §§ 63(5)(d), 57(3) and 49 of the Employment Act. Section 57(3) “prohibits discrimination on the basis of one’s sex, marital status or other status;” whereas, § 49 prohibits “dismissal on grounds of pregnancy (p. 3).”



Kaunda v. Tukombo Girls Secondary School Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (2007)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The applicant and her husband were both employed by the respondent as an accounts clerk and teacher, respectively. After the applicant’s husband resigned to join the Public Service, the respondent terminated the applicant’s employment contract noting that her employment was tied to her husband’s. The applicant challenged the dismissal alleging that it was invalid. The Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (the “Court”) found that the respondent discriminated against the applicant on the basis of her marital status. The Court reasoned that “the effect of the reason used by the respondent was to prevent the applicant from entering and sustaining an employment contract and pursuing a livelihood in her own right because she was married” (p. 2). In reaching its decision, the Court consulted § 5 of Malawi’s Employment Act and §§ 20, 24(1)(i), 24(2)(b) and 31 of Malawi’s Constitution. The Court held that the applicant’s termination was invalid because the reason for her termination “denied her right to engage in economic activity through employment” and “her right to fair labor practices” (p. 2). Therefore, the applicant’s termination was also prohibited under section 57(3)(a) of Malawi’s Employment Act. The Court awarded the applicant compensation for the unfair dismissal and discrimination.



The Republic v. Banda, et al. High Court of Malawi (2016)


Gender discrimination, Trafficking in persons

On February 23, 2016, 19 women were arrested by police and jointly charged “for the offence of living on the earnings of prostitution” in violation of § 146 of the Penal Code of Malawi (the “Penal Code”) ( ¶ 1.1). A Fourth Grade Magistrate in Dedza convicted them “on their own plea of guilt” and fined them MK 7,000.00 each (¶ 1.2). The police lacked evidence to prove the charge against them. In addition, the women did not have legal representation during the proceedings, including when their guilty plea was recorded. The women challenged the conviction on July 28, 2016 on numerous grounds including (i) that the Fourth Grade Magistrate did not have jurisdiction, (ii) that the women were charged together when they should have been charged separately, (iii) that the High Court should not have accepted a unanimous plea, (iv) that “the charge was wrong in law as living on the earnings of prostitution does not target the sex worker herself” but those who live parasitically and exploitatively off her earnings, and (v) that the plea of guilty should not be accepted because the court did not comply with mandatory procedures regarding the defendants’ knowledge. The High Court found that the Fourth Grade Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. In addition, the Court held that the arrest of the women was unconstitutional and not based on evidence. Citing the legislative history of the offense, the Court clarified that § 146 of the Penal Code did not criminalize sex work but was mainly intended to protect sex workers from those who would exploit them. The High Court held that even though sex workers may be arrested in circumstances under this section, the arrest must be properly supported by evidence. Consequently, the High Court vacated the convictions and ordered that fines be repaid to the women.



平成26年(オ)1023 (2014 (O) No. 1023) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan (Grand Bench)) (2015)


Gender discrimination

The Civil Code requires a husband and wife to both adopt the surname of either the husband or the wife at the time of marriage. The plaintiffs in this case were five women who had either chosen to continue using their pre-marriage surnames, or who had had their notifications of marriage rejected for failing to choose a surname. The plaintiffs sued the State pursuant to the State Redress Act, arguing that the provision violated the Constitution and therefore the failure to take legislative measures to amend or abolish the provision was illegal. The District Court and the High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court found that 1) there is no constitutional right to freedom from being forced to change one’s surname upon marriage, 2) the provision does not formally create inequality between the sexes and the fact that the overwhelming majority of married couples choose the husband’s surname is not a direct consequence of the substance of the provision, and 3) the provision does not lack reasonableness nor restrict the individual dignity or the essential equality of the sexes. However, the Supreme Court also noted that while the current provision may not be unconstitutional, it does not mean that allowing married couples to choose separate surnames would be constitutionally unreasonable.

民法では、夫婦が同姓となることが義務付けられている。本件の原告らは、結婚前の姓を使い続けることを選択したか、1つの姓を選択しなかったために婚姻届を却下された5人の女性である。原告らは、国家救済法に基づき国を訴え、同規定が憲法に違反しており、修正または廃止するための立法措置を取らなかったことは違法であると主張した。地裁と高裁は原告らの請求を棄却し、最高裁も同じくその請求を棄却した。最高裁は、(1)婚姻に伴って姓の変更を強制されることを免れる憲法上の権利はない、(2)夫婦同制自体は男女間の不平等を生じさせるものではなく、夫の氏を選択する夫婦が圧倒的多数でも、これは夫婦同制から生じた結果だとは言えない、(3)同規定は合理性を欠き、個人の尊厳と両性の本質的平等を制限するものではない、と判断した。ただし、最高裁は、同規定は違憲ではないが、夫婦が別々の姓を選択することを認めることが憲法上不合理ではないとも指摘している。



平成25年(オ)1079 (2013 (O) No. 1079) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2015)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff, who had divorced her former husband and remarried seven months later, sued the State claiming that she had suffered mental distress due to a provision in the Civil Code which barred women from remarrying until six months after the dissolution or rescission of her previous marriage. Both the District Court and the High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument, saying that the restriction was not necessarily unreasonable because it was meant to avert confusion over the paternity of any children born immediately after a divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that the provision violated the Constitution only to the extent that the restriction exceeded 100 days, because 1) the Civil Code already provided that a child born more than 200 days after the formation of a marriage or less than 300 days after the dissolution/rescission of a marriage would be presumed to have been conceived within the marriage, and 2) advances in medical technology and societal changes made it difficult to justify a restriction lasting beyond 100 days. However, the Supreme Court also affirmed the District Court and High Court in finding that the State was not liable in this case for failing to abolish the regulation, as this did not constitute an exceptional case that might incur liability under the State Redress Act. Shortly after this judgment, the Civil Code was amended to decrease the six-month waiting period to 100 days.

前夫と離婚し、7か月後に再婚した原告が、民法に基づく6か月の再婚禁止期間により精神的苦痛を受けたとして、国家賠償法に基づき損害賠償を求めた事案である。地裁、高裁ともに、再婚禁止期間に関する規定は、父子関係をめぐる紛争の発生を防ぐことにあり、直ちに過剰な制約であると言えないと判断し、原告の請求を棄却した。一方、最高裁は、民法では、婚姻の成立の日から200日を経過した後又は婚姻の解消の日から300日以内に生まれた子を当該婚姻に係る夫の子と推定していること、また、医療の発達及び社会の変化により、100日を超える制限を正当化することは困難であることなどから、100日を超える制限については憲法違反であるとした。しかし、最高裁は、国家賠償法の適用の観点から見た場合には、国家賠償法は適用されないとする地裁および高裁の判断を支持した。本判決直後、民法が改正され、6か月の再婚禁止期間が100日に短縮された。



Individual Application of Şükran İrge Constitutional Court (2016)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination

Şükran İrge directly applied to the Constitution Court claiming that she and her two infants (one four months old and the other two years old) were illegal detained in a penal institution in unhealthy conditions in violation of the constitutional “prohibition of torture and mal-treatment.” The applicant requested the deferral of the execution of her punishment. The Constitutional Court decided that the institution she was held in, Diyarbakir, was not suitable for children or the applicant based on the incidents that Ms. İrge described and the fact that Diyarbakir, as the only penal institution for women in the region, was severely overcrowded. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court ordered the public authorities to take measures to protect the rights and interests of the applicant and her children and left the nature of those measures (i.e. improving the conditions of the penal institution, deferral of the execution of the punishment, or alternative measures) to the discretion of the public authorities.



Individual Application of Ayla (Şenses) Kara Constitutional Court (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The applicant, Ayla (Şenses) Kara, filed a complaint against a male co-worker, H.A., who insulted her. After filing her complaint, the applicant’s employer terminated her employment contract notwithstanding the fact that she had been the one who had been insulted. The Court of First Instance accepted the applicant’s complaint because her employment contract had been terminated “without any valid reason” and ruled that she should be re-hired. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Despite being ordered to re-hire the applicant, the employer failed to employ her. The applicant filed a lawsuit before the Court of First Instance to address her employer’s violation of that order. She claimed that she was dismissed as a result of gender discrimination while the male employee who should have been dismissed was allowed to stay on, which was a violation of her rights to equal treatment and a fair trial. The Court of First Instance rejected the lawsuit because it had already ruled on her termination and it was not possible for her to claim compensation based on the same event. The Court of Appeals also rejected her appeal which led to her individual application to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court set aside the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for re-trial. The Constitutional Court rejected her claim that her right to equal treatment had been violated because there was inadequate evidence to find discriminatory intent. However, the Constitutional Court held that he right to a fair trial had been violated because of an unjustified judgement. The court found an unjustified judgement in her case because the lower courts had failed to properly assess her claim of gender discrimination.



Individual Application of Hayriye Özdemir Constitutional Court (2015)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

Ms. Özdemir had a child with her husband. After the finalization of her divorce and custody proceedings, gave her custody of the child, she petitioned the Court of First Instance to change the child’s last name to her maiden name. The Court of First Instance accepted the lawsuit on the grounds that the Constitutional Court had invalidated Article 4 of Surname Act, which said that a “the child would carry the surname that the father chose or will choose even if the custody of the child has been transferred to the mother following the divorce.” However, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision citing Article 321 of the Turkish Civil Code No. 4721 which states that a child should carry the family name of the father, that a child’s name could only be changed in the father consented or if the child, when he/she reached lawful age, duly petitioned for such a change, and that the transfer of custody to the mother does not give the mother power to change the child’s last name. The Court of First Instance complied with the appellate court’s decision and rejected the lawsuit, leading to Ms. Özdemir’s individual application to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court set aside the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for re-trial. The Constitutional Court dismissed that the applicant’s claim that her right to a fair trial had been violated by an unjustified judgement because of inadequate evidence. However, the Constitutional Court accepted her claim that her right to private family life had been infringed. The Constitutional Court noted that marriage partners have equal legal standing pertaining to rights and responsibilities during marriage and after divorce. Consequently, the Constitutional Court held that giving the male partner the right to determine the child’s last name within the scope of custodial rights but withholding that right from the female partner with custody constituted discriminatory treatment without reasonable justification. Consequently, the Court of First Instance’s decision to deny Ms. Özdemir the right to determine the last name of a child over whom she had custody was a violation of the prohibition on discrimination provided in Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution in regards to a right provided to her in Article 20 of the Constitution.



Individual Application of Mesude Kırıklı and Asil Akça Constitutional Court (2015)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Ms. Kirikli and Mr. Akça (the “Petitioners”) brought a land registration case against their uncle A.S requesting the annulment of a land transfer between their grandfather M.S. and A.S. The Petitioners claimed that M.S. had conducted a dubious transaction where he sold his land to A.S. in return for a very low price in order to prevent his late daughter’s children, the Petitioners, from inheriting the land. The Court of First Instance rejected their case on the grounds that whether M.S.’s motive was to cut his heirs off from their inheritance could not be proven and that it was reasonable that M.S., who had financial troubles at the time, sought to quickly relieve those troubles by selling his only asset for a considerably low price. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court, which led to the Petitioners’ application to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court refused to hear the case because of a time limitation.



Individual Application of Nurcan Yolcu Constitutional Court (2015)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

Ms. Yolcu had a child with her husband. After the finalization of her divorce and custody proceedings, which gave her custody of the child, she petitioned the Court of First Instance to change the child’s last name to her maiden name. The Court of First Instance found that a child’s last name could only be changed if the father consented or if the child, when he/she reached a lawful age, duly filed a petition for such change. The Court of Appeals approved the lower court’s decision upon appeal, which led to Ms. Yolcu’s individual application to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court set aside the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for retrial. The Constitutional Court accepted Ms. Yolcu’s claim that her right to private family life had been infringed. The Constitutional Court noted that marriage partners have equal legal standing pertaining to rights and responsibilities during marriage and after divorce. Consequently, the Constitutional Court held that giving the male partner the right to determine the child’s last name within the scope of custodial rights but withholding that right from the female partner with custody constituted discriminatory treatment without reasonable justification. Consequently, the Court of First Instance’s decision to deny Ms. Yolcu the right to determine the last name of a child over whom she had custody was a violation of the prohibition on discrimination provided in Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution in regards to a right provided to her in Article 20 of that same Constitution.



Individual Application of Gülbu Özgüler Constitutional Court (2014)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

Ms. Özgüler had a child with her husband. After the finalization of her divorce and custody proceedings, which gave her custody of the child, she petitioned the Court of First Instance to change the child’s last name to her maiden name. The Court of First Instance rejected her petition on the grounds that the transfer of custody to the mother was not grounds for changing a child’s last name. The Court of First Instance found that a child’s last name could only be changed if the father consented or if the child, when he/she reached a lawful age, duly filed a petition for such change. The Court of Appeals approved the lower court’s decision. After Ms. Özgüler’s individual application, the Constitutional Court set aside the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for retrial. The Constitutional Court dismissed that the applicant’s claim that her right to a fair trial had been violated by an unjustified judgement because of inadequate evidence. However, the Constitutional Court accepted her claim that her right to private family life had been infringed. The Constitutional Court noted that marriage partners have equal legal standing pertaining to rights and responsibilities during marriage and after divorce. Consequently, the Constitutional Court held that giving the male partner the right to determine the child’s last name within the scope of custodial rights but withholding that right from the female partner with custody constituted discriminatory treatment without reasonable justification. Consequently, the Court of First Instance’s decision to deny Ms. Özgüler the right to determine the last name of a child over whom she had custody was a violation of the prohibition on discrimination provided in Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution in regards to a right provided to her in Article 20 of that Constitution.



Individual Application of Albina Kiyamova Constitutional Court (2016)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The applicant, Albina Kiyamova, was arrested at Atatürk Airport in Istanbul for infringing an order that prohibited her entry into Turkey. She submitted a complaint to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office (the “CPPO”), asserting that the police subjected her to treatment incompatible with human dignity while she was in custody. Specifically, the applicant said that the police subjected her to a naked body search and other inhuman and degrading treatment charged by race and gender discrimination. The CPPO requested permission from the relevant authority to investigate the officers of the applicant’s treatment. However, the relevant authority denied the CPPO’s request. The applicant appealed the authority’s decision, but her appeal was rejected. She then appealed to the Constitutional Court, claiming that her constitutional right to protection from treatment incompatible with human dignity was infringed. The Constitutional Court partially rejected some of the applicant’s claims due to lack of evidence but accepted her claim that it was unjust for the relevant authority to reject her claims without conducting an investigation.



Individual Application of Gülşah Öztürk, et al. Constitutional Court (2016)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

In response to statements by the Turkish Prime Minister regarding abortion, the applicants demonstrated outside of the Ministry of Family & Social Policies of Turkey. The applicants asked for the Prime Minister and the Minister of Family & Social Policies to apologize for the statements. When police officers told the applicants that the Minister was not present in the Ministry building, the applicants tried, unsuccessfully, to enter the building using force. Following their failed attempt to enter the building, the Applicants headed to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and blocked the road in front of it. At this point, the applicants were arrested by police. The applicants allege that during the arrests they were injured and sexually harassed. They were held in custody for seven hours. Medical reports indicate that when they were released, each of the activists had several bruises on their bodies. The Office of Public Prosecutor (the “OPP”) failed to investigate the activist’s allegations of abuse, did not take the testimony of the police officers regarding this incident, and decided to not prosecute this case. The applicants appealed the OPP’s decision claiming gender discrimination, but their appeal was dismissed by the lower court. The Constitutional Court ruled that the force exerted by the police officers while they arresting the applicants was proportionate because the applicants had used force against the police officers. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court concluded that the bruises mentioned in the medical report indicate that police officers only used force to capture the applicants. Because of this, the Constitutional Court found that bruises were not evidence of sexual harassment. This case is important because it demonstrates that the Constitutional Court relies on the medical reports to judge allegations of sexual harassment.



Oloka-Onyango & 9 Others v. Attorney General Constitutional Court of Uganda (2014)


Gender discrimination

Petitioners sued, claiming the Speaker of Parliament allowed a vote to pass Anti-Homosexuality Act (“AHA”) of 2014 without the mandated quorum (alternatively “Coram”), which requires the presences of one-third of all voting Members of Parliament. Petitioners also claimed the AHA was unconstitutional because it violated LGBTQ people’s right to privacy and freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. The Court held that the Petitioners demonstrated that the vote proceeded without the necessary quorum, which meant Petitioners prevailed without the Court reaching the issues regarding the substance of the AHA.



Nabagesera & 3 Others v. Attorney General & Another High Court at Kampala (2014)


Gender discrimination

Members of Freedom and Roam Uganda (“FARUG”) sued the Attorney General and Minister of Ethics and Integrity Simon Lokodo for violating their constitutional rights to freedom of assembly, right to participate in peaceful civil society activity, and right to equal treatment before the law. In February 2012, Minister Lokodo personally appeared at and ordered closed down a FARUG-hosted “project planning, advocacy, human rights, leadership, and business skills” workshop in 2012 on the grounds that the workshop was an “illegal gathering of [h]omosexuals.” The respondents argued that Uganda Penal Code (sec. 148) prohibits homosexual acts, which includes the prohibition of direct or indirect encouragement, incitement, and conspiracy to commit the offense. Citing the Uganda Penal Code, Constitution of Uganda, and African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Court held that individual human rights are not absolute and may be restricted in the public interest as long as the restrictions do not amount to political persecution. Calling the workshops “a pretext for human rights advocacy to promote homosexual acts which are prohibited by the Ugandan laws,” the Court rejected Applicants’ freedom of expression arguments because their activities constituted “offenses against morality” and “prejudicial to the public interest.” In response to Applicants’ use of international human rights law, the Court held that Uganda’s “different laws and moral values” require different definitions and protections of the public interest than those cited in precedent from the UN, South Africa, the European Court of Human Rights, Hong Kong, etc. The Court also rejected the suit against the Minister of Ethics and Integrity in his individual capacity because he was acting in his official capacity, meaning the Attorney General was the only proper respondent.



Mifumi (U) Ltd. & Another v. Attorney General & Another Supreme Court (2015)


Gender discrimination

On appeal from the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Uganda held that the practice of asking for a bride price is constitutional but seeking a refund of the bride price as a precondition for the dissolution of a customary marriage is unconstitutional. The Court did not agree with Appellants that bride prices promote inequality in marriage or hamper free consent to marry.



Re Namugerwa & 2 Others High Court at Jinja (2010)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

The aunt of three children applied for guardianship of the children and the land they inherited following the death of their father. The Court was unable to determine some critical information, including whether the children had a surviving parent and the source of the funds the aunt used to care for the children. The Court was also concerned that the children’s mother might be alive and the automatic guardian, but that the aunt was chosen because she was related to the children’s male parent. Under most customary community traditions in Uganda, being a paternal ancestor would give the aunt guardianship priority over the mother. The Constitutional Court found these practices unconstitutional.



Uganda v. Kafuruka High Court at Mbarara (2006)


Gender discrimination

The defendant injected a young woman with the intention to administer an abortion. The woman and her fetus died. The Court found the defendant guilty of murder of the deceased because the defendant had the intent to kill the fetus. The Court reasoned that the intent to abort the fetus was sufficient to establish the mens rea element of murder.



Ragen, et al. v. Ministry of Transport, et al. Supreme Court (2011)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The petitioners sued the defendants for operating “mehadrin” bus lines for orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jews. Petitioners argue that these bus lines discriminate based on gender by allowing men to board and sit in the front of the bus while requiring that women board by the rear door, sit in the back, and dress modestly. Petitioners claim these restrictions violate their fundamental and constitutional rights to equality, dignity, freedom of religion, and freedom of conscience. Petitioners refused to comply with the gender restrictions, which respondents claimed were not compulsory but voluntary and thus legal. Petitioners, however, countered that the gender separation on mehadrin lines is not voluntary and that they were subjected to verbal harassment, threatened with physical violence, humiliated, and forced to leave the bus when they declined to observe the gender separation. After the respondents agreed to an examination of public transportation arrangements on lines serving the ultra-orthodox sector by an independent committee and the committee delivered its analysis, the Court ordered respondent 1 to instruct respondent 2 to publicize the cancellation of the separation arrangements (within 10 days of the date on which the judgment was rendered), and ordered respondent 2 to carry out its instructions within 30 days of the judgment. Within that period of time, respondents 2 and 3 were to post signs regarding the cancellation in all buses formerly subject to “mehadrin” arrangements, without exception.



Israel v. Ben-Hayim Supreme Court (2005)


Gender discrimination

The respondent, the manager of the Postmen Department at the Benei Berak branch of the Postal Authority, was acquitted of sexually harassing and victimizing a temporary employee, but convicted of unbecoming conduct. The Civil Service Disciplinary Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) found that the respondent promised to a promotion to the complainant, that he had conducted a sexual relationship with the complainant, and that he tried to prevent the complainant from making a complaint against him, which stated that he visited her apartment for several months and had sexual intercourse with her against her will. As a result, the complainant felt exploited and humiliated. The Tribunal held that the State failed to prove that the respondent abused his authority. The Tribunal then approved the sentencing agreement that the parties reached, although it admitted it was lenient. On appeal by the state, the Supreme Court held that the respondent’s power to influence the professional future of the workers was considerable and that he held a position of considerable power over the complainant, who was 22 years old at the time of the conduct while the respondent was 20 years older than her, which added to the his control. It follows that the complainant consented to the sexual acts was given because the respondent abused his authority over her, and therefore it was not a voluntary and genuine consent but instead “prohibited consensual intercourse.” The Court stated that “abuse of authority” need not involve a direct threat; in sexual harassment cases such abuse may be “express or implied, direct or indirect” and is no less potent if it is “in a veiled manner.” The Court added a one-year suspension from any managerial position to the sentence imposed by the lower Tribunal, explaining that this still amounted to a lenient punishment for the offense committed.



E.S. v. A.C. Supreme Court of Namibia (2015)


Gender discrimination

The appellant, E.S., was a 38-year-old mother of three. She was practicing Jehovah’s Witness who consistently maintained that blood transfusions were against her religion. She told her obstetrician at her last pre-delivery appointment that she would refuse a blood transfusion if complications arose during delivery. After that appointment, E.S. gave her husband, also a Jehovah’s Witness, Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care. Nonetheless, her brother, A.C., filed an ex parte application to serve as her “curator to the person,” for the purpose of authorizing medical procedures on E.S., including blood transfusions after she suffered complications including a hysterectomy after giving birth. In support of his application, E.S.’s brother argued that, as a parent, E.S.’s individual autonomy had to be weighed against the interests of her family. He also offered testimony from her doctor, who explained that her blood and oxygen levels were too low to support full brain function. The trial court granted the application. The Supreme Court addressed three issues: whether the matter was moot after E.S.’s medical recovery, whether the lower court erred in granting A.C.’s application to be appointed his sister’s curator and have blood transfusions administered, and whether young children’s right to be raised by their parents supersedes the right of an individual to refuse a blood transfusion in life-threatening circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that “written advanced directives which are specific, not compromised by undue influence, and signed at a time when the patient has decisional capacity construe clear evidence of a patient’s intentions regarding their medical treatment” (¶56) and “the right to choose what can and cannot be done to one’s body, whether one is a parent or not, is an inalienable right” (¶ 71). The court made clear that a woman’s status as a mother does not restrict her right to liberty and privacy, especially where decisions of medical treatment are involved.



Ts'epe v. Independent Electoral Commission Court of Appeal of Lesotho (2005)


Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was a male citizen who planned to run for office. The electoral commission advised him that the seat he desired was reserved only for female candidates pursuant to the electoral quota instituted by the Local Government Election Act of 1998. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the electoral commission’s refusal to register his candidacy based on his sex. The High Court acknowledged that the Election Act disadvantaged men by reason of their sex alone. It also noted that, although 51% of the population of Lesotho was female, only 12% of the seats in the National Assembly were held by women. The Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the Election Act as a carefully designed measure intended to achieve the important national goal of increasing the number of women in the National Assembly.



Antrag an die Bundes-Gleichbehandlungskommission (Petition to Equal Treatment Commission) B-GBK I/178/16 Bundes-Gleichbehandlungskommission (Equal Treatment Commission) (2016)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

After a restructuring of the Austrian Armed Forces, the petitioner lost her position, which was instead awarded to an older male with comparable experience but without the petitioner’s special training. Representatives from the Austrian Armed Forces (“AAF”) claimed that for reasons of economy, efficiency, and expediency, the reorganization sought to retain employees who were above age 50 and with presumably the shortest period of service remaining. The Equal Treatment Commission found this to be a violation of Section 4 no. 5 of Austria’s Federal Equal Treatment Act (Bundesgleichbehandlungsgesetz), which prohibits direct or indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex in the context of professional advancement. In addition, the AAF did not conduct an assessment of technical competencies and personal suitability. Furthermore, the AAF focused solely on avoiding additional costs, but did not take into account the principles of equal treatment and the statutory imperative to advance women.

Nach einer Reform in der Organisation des Österreichischen Bundesheeres hat die Antragstellerin ihre Arbeitsstelle verloren. Anstelle der Antragstellerin wurde ein älterer männlicher Bediensteter mit ähnlicher Berufserfahrung - allerdings ohne die speziellen Anforderungen, welche die Antragstellerin erfüllt - auf diese Stelle berufen. Die Vertreter des Bundesheeres haben angegeben, dass die Reform aus Gründen von Wirtschaftlichkeit, Effizienz und Zweckmäßigkeit bezweckt, Angestellte zu erhalten, die älter als 50 Jahre alt sind und daher voraussichtlich die kürzeste Dienstzeit, bis zum Renteneintrittsalter haben. Die Gleichbehandlungskommission erachtete diese Entscheidung als Verletzung von § 4 Ziff. 5 des Österreichischen Bundesgleichbehandlungsgesetzes, das die unmittelbare und/oder mittelbare Diskriminierung aufgrund des Geschlechts im Rahmen des beruflichen Fortkommens verbietet. Des Weiteren hat das Bundesheer keine Beurteilung der Fachkompetenz und persönlicher Geeignetheit durchgeführt. Vielmehr hat es sich nur auf die Vermeidung zusätzlicher Kosten konzentriert, ohne die Gleichbehandlungsprinzipien sowie das gesetzliche Frauenförderungsgebot einzubeziehen.



A gg. Bundesasylamt (A. v. Federal Asylum Agency) [C16 427.465-1/2012] Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) (2012)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, International law

The minor applicant, a member of the Hazara ethnic group, illegally immigrated to Austria with her parents and four minor siblings from Afghanistan when she was approximately nine years old. The Federal Asylum Agency of Austria (“FAAA”) denied her and her family’s petitions for asylum. The Asylum Court reversed the denial, finding that the FAAA erred in summarily denying asylum based on the applicant’s statements without considering outside credible reports or sources relevant to the applicant’s asylum claim. The Asylum Court found that the applicant belonged to a particular social group based on her gender, age, and cultural and religious origins, and that she would have to live in accordance with the family’s conservative values if she returned to Afghanistan. As such, the applicant would not have the opportunity to pursue any goals outside the religion and customs of her community nor would she be able to protect herself against violence or undesired restrictions. Furthermore, a return would mean that the applicant would be raised to be a homemaker and married to a man chosen by her father and grandfather. The Court concluded that, if returned to Afghanistan, the applicant would find herself in a situation of permanent latent threats, structural violence, and immediate restrictions that would practically make it impossible for her to exercise her human rights. In granting the applicant’s asylum claim, the Court considered both gender-specific and child-specific factors that were not brought forth by the applicant, but rather gathered from credible investigative sources.

Die minderjährige Beschwerdeführerin ist afghanische Staatsbürgerin und Angehörige der Volksgruppe der Hazara. Sie wanderte gemeinsam mit ihren Eltern und vier minderjährigen Geschwistern illegal nach Österreich ein, als sie ungefähr neun Jahre alt war. Das Österreichische Bundesasylamt lehnte ihren Asylantrag und den ihrer Familie ab. Der Asylgerichtshof hat der Beschwerde der Beschwerdeführerin stattgegeben und ihr den Status einer Asylberechtigten zuerkannt. Nach Auffassung des Asylgerichtshofs lehnte das Bundesasylamt fehlerhaft den Antrag aufgrund der Angaben der Beschwerdeführerin ab, ohne weitere externe Berichte oder sonstige Quellen in Betracht zu ziehen, die ebenso relevant für die Beurteilung des entsprechenden Asylantrags sind. Der Asylgerichtshof stellte fest, dass die Beschwerdeführerin einer bestimmten sozialen Gruppe aufgrund ihres Geschlechts, Alters und kultureller oder religiöser Herkunft angehört, sodass sie in Übereinstimmung mit den konservativen Werten ihrer Familie leben müsste, sollte sie nach Afghanistan zurückkehren. Unter diesen Umständen würde ihr das Verfolgen von Zielen außerhalb der Religion und den Gepflogenheiten ihrer Gemeinschaft verwehrt. Sie wäre des Weiteren nicht in der Lage, sich gegen Gewalt oder ungewollte Restriktionen zu wehren. Außerdem würde eine Rückkehr für sie bedeuten, als Hausfrau und Mutter erzogen zu werden, bis sie an einen Mann verheiratet würde, den entweder Vater oder Großvater für sie aussuchen. Der Gerichtshof hat daher festgestellt, dass die Beschwerdeführerin, sollte sie nach Afghanistan zurückkehren, sich in einem Klima ständiger latenter Gefahr, struktureller Gewalt und unmittelbarer Einschränkungen wiederfinden würde, die es ihrer praktisch unmöglich machen, ihre Menschenrechte auszuüben. Indem der Gerichtshof, dem Antrag der Beschwerdeführerin stattgab, hat er sowohl geschlechtsspezifische und kind-spezifische Faktoren erwogen, die nicht von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgebracht wurden, allerdings aus glaubwürdigen investigativen Quellen stammen.



Eternal World TV Network v. Sec’y of the United States HHS United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff, the Eternal World TV Network—a Catholic network with 350 employees—was required to provide health insurance for its employees, which would include coverage for contraceptives, under the Affordable Care Act. Plaintiff contended that using or providing contraceptives violated a deeply-held tenant of its belief system and that the accommodation provided to religious nonprofit organizations under the Affordable Care Act still amounted to government coercion to change its beliefs. Plaintiff brought suit against the federal government, claiming that the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which protects religious groups. The Eleventh Circuit found that the accommodation did not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because, despite the plaintiff’s right to strict scrutiny review, the accommodation did not substantially burden the exercise of religious tenants and was the least restrictive method of furthering the compelling interest of reducing the rate of unplanned pregnancies. Plaintiff also argued that the accommodation violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the United States Constitution, which the court denied, reasoning that the contraceptive mandate was generally applicable: it did not target specifically religious groups or particular denominations.



Videckis v. Pepperdine University United States District Court for the Central District of California (2015)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiffs were women’s basketball players for Pepperdine University, a university receiving state funding from California. Plaintiffs allege that when the basketball coach became aware of their lesbian relationship, they were harassed and forced by the athletic coordinator to end their relationship or quit the team. Defendant motioned to dismiss, citing Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court denied the motion, determining that sexual orientation discrimination claims are a subcategory of gender stereotyping and are therefore actionable claims under Title VII and Title IX.



Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

Plaintiff was a transgender woman from Mexico who was subjected to sexual assault and rape by Mexican police and military throughout her life. In 2006, she was arrested in America for driving under the influence. In 2007 she was deported to Mexico. After suffering more mistreatment in Mexico, Avendano-Hernandez returned to the U.S. and appealed for asylum under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. She reentered the United States in May 2008 and was arrested three years later for violating the terms of probation imposed in her 2006 felony offense for failing to report to her probation office. Plaintiff applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture but the immigration judge denied her request for failing to show that the Mexican government would more likely than not consent to or acquiesce in her torture, which was confirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision with respect to the Convention Against Torture application because it was enough for Avendano-Hernandez to show that she was subject to torture at the hands of local officials. Additionally, the immigration judge relied on recent anti-discrimination legislation; however, the judge did not consider the legislation’s effectiveness. Therefore, Plaintiff should be given relief under the Convention Against Torture.



福建林某某、楼某某强制污辱妇女案,福建光泽县人民法院 (Fujian Province v. Lin, Lou) People’s Procuratorate of Guangzhe District Court (2013)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

In 2013, a teenage girl name Lin gathered two other girls to get revenge on another girl, C., at Guangze senior high school, Fujian Province, for insulting her. C. hid and so their plan for revenge was unsuccessful. Later that day, Lin asked someone else to take C. to a quiet neighborhood. Lin and her friend slapped C.'s face, broke her nose, pulled her hair, and made C. take off all her clothes. C. was too frightened to say no and took off all her clothes. Lin and her friend took pictures of the naked C. and shared the photos. Guangzhe District Court found that Lin and her friends assaulted the victim C. According to Article 237, Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, Lin and her friend were convicted of humiliating a woman with force and coercion. Lin was sentenced to two-years’ imprisonment, with a full suspension of the sentence. Lin’s friend, Lou, was sentenced to one-year jail time with a full suspension of the sentence. The court said that because both the defendants and the victim were under age of 18, and because the defendants were willing to cooperate with the police, tell the truth, and plead guilty, the court under Article 63, Article 67, Article 72, and Article 73 of Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China to give the two defendants a mitigated punishment of community service. The court demanded that the defendants delete all the naked photos of the victim. After the crime, the defendants’ families compensated the victim and the victim forgave the defendants.

性别歧视、性暴力、性骚扰

2013年,被告人林某某认为其被陈某某辱骂,纠集楼某某、 黄某某(均为未成年女性),到福建省光泽县某中学找该校学生陈某某(女, 未成年)欲行报复。因陈某某警觉躲藏,林某某等人寻找未果。当日晚, 林某某通过他人将陈某某约出并带到光泽县某超市后面的巷子里。

林某某与楼某某先后对被害人实施打耳光、拉扯头发等殴打行为,致使被害人鼻子流血, 并叫被害人“把衣服脱光”。陈某某因害怕哭泣而不敢反抗,遂将衣裤脱光。林某某与楼某某及在场的另二名女学生对被害人围观取笑。其间楼某 某使用手机对陈某某的裸体拍摄了十余张照片并将照片传送给他人。法院经审理认为,被告人楼某某、林某某伙同他人聚众以暴力方法强制侮辱妇女,根据中华人民共和国刑法第二百三十七条,其行为已构成强制侮辱妇女罪。法院院综合考虑被告人作案时均不满十八周岁,主动归案并如实供述犯罪事实,根据刑法第六十三、六十七、七十二和七十三条,决定依法对被告人减轻处罚并适用缓刑。以强制污辱妇女罪判处林某某有期徒刑二年,缓刑二年;判处楼某某有期徒刑一年,缓刑一年。 法院要求被告人删除被害人裸照。被告人家庭案发后积极赔偿并取得对方谅解。



Stuart v. Camnitz Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination

North Carolina passed a law, the Right to Know Act, which required physicians in North Carolina to show a woman seeking an abortion a live-feed of her ultrasound between four and seventy-two hours before an abortion and to describe the fetus in detail including dimensions and location of the fetus. A coalition of doctors and Planned Parenthood sued the President of the North Carolina Medical Board, the Secretary of Health and Human Services for North Carolina, the American Medical Association, and other similar entities. The district court granted summary judgment and an injunction for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, citing that the requirement that doctors perform and display real-time ultrasounds was unconstitutional as it did pass intermediate scrutiny. Additionally, the requirement violated the doctor’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech as the state is delivering a message that the woman should reconsider having an abortion, albeit compelling speech through the third-party doctors.



Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Development Co., LLC Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Twenty-one former employees of the defendant’s hotel and casino alleged sexual discrimination, gender stereotyping, and disparate treatment and impact as a result of their employer’s standards for appearance. The casino instituted a standard weight applicable to men and women (which was 7% above a base rate adjusted for gender). The women’s job was to bring drinks to casino patrons, and to do so wearing a revealing costume. The plaintiffs reported incidents of sexual harassment by casino patrons to their employers, who did not address the incidents. The lower court granted summary judgment to the casino on the complaints of facial discrimination citing the statute of limitations. However, the appellate court determined that the summary judgment was in error, as it did not take into consideration that the plaintiffs’ claim that the employer ignored sexual harassment by casino patrons, creating a hostile work environment was a continuing violation. Because one of the alleged acts occurred within the two years prior to filing the case, the case is thus not time-barred.



Nese Aslanbay Akbiyik Basvurusu, Case Application Number: 2014/5836 Constitutional Court of Turkey (2015)


Gender discrimination

The petitioner filed a claim to the Turkish Constitutional Court stating that trial and appellate courts’ refusal to allow her use her pre-marriage surname after marriage violated her right to protection of her private life and discriminated against her based on her gender. Article 187 of the Turkish Civil Code requires married women to use their husband’s surname after marriage, which created complications in the petitioner’s professional life since she was known by her pre-marriage name. On appeal, the Constitutional Court applied both Turkish law and international law to find that a person’s right to a name, including their surname, is an inalienable right. The Court looked to precedent from the European Court of Human Rights in finding that protection of a person’s name including person’s surname is covered by Article 8 (respect for private and family life). The Court also found that the protections afforded by Article 17 of the Turkish Constitution overlapped with the protections in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Consequently, the Court concluded that, since the right to one’s name is protected in the Turkish Constitution and within the scope of international agreements to which Turkey is a party—including the European Convention of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—men and women are entitled to equal rights to use their pre-marriage last name.



Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Washington Dept. of Corrections Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

Female prisoners in Washington prisons alleged sexual abuse by the prison guards. As a remedial remedy, the Department of Corrections designated 110 positions as female-only. These female-only positions include observing female prisoners in sensitive locations, such as showers, as well as performing pat downs. The union of correctional officers sued the Department for Title VII violations for sexual discrimination in employment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department. The Circuit Court affirmed citing sex as a bona fide occupational qualification for those positions given that sexual abuse is present in prisons and positions which require observing prisoners in sensitive areas or tasks can be performed by females only in order to protect female prisoners from abuse.



Roe v. Patton United States District Court for the District of Utah (2015)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiffs Kami and Angie Roe sued the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Health in his official capacity and sought a preliminary injunction seeking a court order to enjoin the defendants from applying sections of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act differently to male and female spouses of women who become pregnant via sperm donation. The provisions of the Utah statute provide that a married man can become the legal parent to a child conceived by his wife through sperm donation by filing mutual consent in writing, but defendants have declined to apply this same rule to a married woman in respect to her wife. Instead, they have required that she undergo a step-parent adoption process. The court balanced the failure of defendants to provide a rational basis for the unequal treatment with the fact that the plaintiffs and similarly situated wives would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction to compel the defendants to equally apply the statute was not granted. As such, the court granted the preliminary injunction.



Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma Supreme Court of India (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

Ms. Indra Sarma, an unmarried woman, left her job and began a “live-in” relationship with Mr. V.K.V. Sarma for a period as long as 18 years, despite knowing that he was married. Mr. Sarma abandoned Ms. Sarma in a state where she could not maintain herself. Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, failure to maintain a woman involved in a “domestic relationship” amounts to “domestic violence.” Two lower courts held that Mr. V.K.V. committed domestic violence by not maintaining Ms. Sarma, and directed Mr. Sarma to pay a maintenance amount of Rs.18,000 per month. Thereafter, on appeal, the High Court of Karnataka set aside the orders of the lower courts on the ground that Ms. Sarma was aware that Mr. Sarma was married and thus her relationship with him would fall outside the protected ambit of “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. On further appeal, the Supreme Court, while affirming the High Court’s order, created an exception to the general rule. The Supreme Court clarified that a woman who begins to live with a man who is already married to someone else, without knowing that he is married, will still be considered to be in a “domestic relationship” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; thus, the man’s failure to maintain her will amount to “domestic violence” within the meaning of the Act and she will be eligible to claim reliefs such as maintenance and compensation. This case is important because it established for the first time such an exception and calls for legislative action to protect women like Ms. Sarma whose contributions in a joint household are often overlooked.



Wilcox v. Corrections Corp. of America Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Wilcox worked as a corrections officer at McRae Correctional Facility with her husband. After her husband was fired, Wilcox alleged that she was subject to sexual harassment by her supervisor. She alleged that her supervisor caressed her, touched her thighs and referred to them in evocative language, slapped her buttocks in front of other employees, and discussed his female friend’s genitalia with her. Wilcox complained to the EEOC that her supervisor’s actions created a hostile work environment. The Circuit Court agreed, citing that all five requirements for hostile work environment were met: 1) that the complainant belong to a protected group 2) that the complainant was subject to sexual harassment 3) the harassment was based on the sex of the complainant 4) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe to change the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment 5) a basis for holding the employer liable.



Doe v. Hagenbeck United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (2015)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

The plaintiff is a female former cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point, where she claimed that she was forced to resign after her third year due to rampant sexual hostility. In May 2010, she was raped while at West Point after she took sleeping pills and she also cites several other instances of sexual assault and harassment, claiming that members the Sexual Assault Review Board at West Point failed to punish the perpetrators. The District Court found that the plaintiff had properly stated an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, affording women the same protections under the law as men. The District Court also found that hearing the claim was not precluded by Feres Doctrine, which typically bars tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and constitutional claims against superior officers incident to military service, since the rape was not a service-related injury and hearing the claim would not compromise the legislative or executive functions of government, including the disciplinary role of the Executive Branch over the nation's military. Therefore, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.



Ross v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Supreme Court of Kentucky (2015)


Gender discrimination

Cole Ross was convicted of murder and arson. He appealed his conviction claiming, among other things, that the Commonwealth of Kentucky used its preemptory challenges to dismiss female jurors on the basis of gender. Seven out of the nine peremptory challenges used by the Commonwealth to remove prospective jurors were used to dismiss women. The trial court found that the Commonwealth’s justifications were gender neutral and non-pretextual. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found that the disproportionate striking of women jurors and the Commonwealth’s admission during jury selection that they wished to dismiss female jurors created the inference of gender discrimination. The Supreme Court of Kentucky found that this inference was not rebutted by a gender-neutral justification, thereby constituting a Batson violation. Accordingly, the Commonwealth violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying the women the right to be on a jury on the basis of their gender and thus the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings



Hema Vijay Menon v. State of Maharashtra Bombay High Court (2015)


Gender discrimination

Mrs. Hema Vijay Menon, a married woman and a highly qualified lecturer, lost her only son who was 15 years old. She and her husband decided to have a child through the means of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF). On the failure of the IVF procedure, she and her husband decided to have a child through surrogacy. On the birth of her baby through a surrogate, Mrs. Menon applied for maternity leave. The concerned government authorities disapproved her leave on the grounds that there was no provision of granting maternity leave to a mother who begets a child through surrogacy. The Bombay High Court held that a mother is entitled to avail of maternity leave under Maharashtra Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1981, even though she begets the child through surrogacy, on the basis that the right to motherhood is a fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and cannot be violated. This case is important because it recognized for the first time in explicit terms that the right to motherhood is a fundamental tenet of the right to life and thus deserves protection under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.



Edwards v. Beck Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (2015)


Gender discrimination

Abortion-providing physicians in Arkansas filed a 18 USC §1983 action in District Court seeking a permanent injunction against Arkansas Code Ann §20?16?1203(a), which revokes the license of physicians who perform abortions of fetuses beyond the point when the fetal heartbeat can be detected, about 12 weeks. The physicians were granted the injunction, and the State appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction, finding that this statute violated women’s right to terminate pregnancy as set out in Roe v. Wade, which allows for abortion up to the point of fetal viability. The court also notes that viability should be determined on a case-by-case basis and that viability is being pushed sooner and sooner with advancing medical research.



Morales-Santana v. Lynch United Court of Appeals (2015)


Gender discrimination

Morales-Santana sought review of a decision made by the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings to evaluate his claim of derivative citizenship. Morales-Santana’s derivative citizenship claim was based on the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (18 U.S.C. §1409). The 1952 Act differentiates how fathers and mothers can confer citizenship to their children. An unwed citizen mother confers citizenship on her child as long as she had been resident in the United States for a year continuously before the child’s birth. An unwed citizen father, however, cannot transfer citizenship to his child born abroad if he was not present in the United States before the child’s birth for a total of ten years. Additionally, five of the father’s ten years in the United States must be after his fourteenth birthday. Therefore, it was impossible for a father under the age of eighteen to confer citizenship to a child born abroad of a non-citizen mother. In this case, Morales-Santana’s father satisfied the requirements for transmitting citizenship applicable to unwed mothers but not the more stringent requirements applicable to unwed fathers. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found this disparate treatment a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection and reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals decision.



Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India Supreme Court of India (1999)


Gender discrimination, International law

The petitioner, who was married with a son, applied to the respondent, the Reserve Bank of India ("RBI"), for bonds to be held in the name of their minor son and had signed off as his guardian. The respondent sent back the application to the petitioner, advising her to either produce the application signed by her son's father or produce a certificate of guardianship from a competent authority in her favor. The respondent was of the opinion that the petitioner's husband was the natural guardian on the basis of Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMGA). That provision stated that the father is the natural guardian of a Hindu minor child and the mother is the guardian “after” the father. The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of this provision in the Supreme Court on grounds that it violated the right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court, relying on gender equality principles enshrined in the Indian Constitution, CEDAW and UDHR, widely interpreted the word “after” in the provision and upheld the constitutional validity of Section 6(a) HMGA, 1956. It held that both the father and mother are natural guardians of a minor Hindu child, and the mother cannot be said to be natural guardian only after the death of the father as that would not only be discriminatory but also against the welfare of the child, which is legislative intent of HMGA, 1956. This case is important because it established for the first time that a natural guardian referred to in the HMGA, 1956 can be a father or a mother: whoever is capable of and available for taking care of the child and is deeply interested in the welfare of the child, and that need not necessarily be the father.



Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India Supreme Court of India (2013)


Gender discrimination

The Parliament of India enacted the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition on Sex-Selection) Act of 1994 as a measure of preventing female feticides and as a form of affirmative action for women and girls to end discrimination against girl children in furtherance of the constitutional principle of equality under Article 15 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court in 2001 and 2003 noticed a lack of effective implementation and misuse of the Act and thus had issued directions to the Union Government and the State Governments for its proper implementation. Having noticed a decline in the female child sex ratio as reported in the 2011 Census, the Court directed personal appearance of the Health Secretaries of the States of Punjab, Haryana, NCT Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Maharashtra, to examine steps undertaken for effective implementation of the provisions of the Act as well as the various directions issued by the Court. The Court emphasized that women have the equal right of thinking, participating and becoming leaders in the society, stating that the purpose of the Act can only be realized when government authorities carry out their functions with commitment to and awareness about the role of women in a society. After a detailed analysis of the steps undertaken by the Union and the State Governments, the Court issued directions—including regular monitoring and reporting by authorities under the Act, faster disposal of cases filed under the Act, and suspension of licenses to practice for convicted doctors—to ensure implementation.



MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination

Red River Women’s Clinic, a subsidiary of MKB Management Corp. was the only abortion provider in the state of North Dakota. MKB Management Corp. challenged a North Dakota law which prohibited abortions following determination of fetal heartbeat. The District Court ruled that the North Dakota law infringed a woman’s constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to terminate pregnancy before viability which was established in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.



Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum Supreme Court of India (1985)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

Ms. Shah Bano Begum was married to a lawyer named Mr. Mohd. Ahmed Khan. They lived together for 43 years and had five children. In 1978, Mr. Khan threw Ms. Begum out of the shared household and Ms. Begum applied for maintenance from Mr. Khan under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C, 1973). Pending her application, Mr. Khan dissolved the marriage by pronouncing a triple talaq (divorce on the triple utterance of the word “talaq” by a Muslim husband) and paid Ms. Begum 3000 rupees as mahr (money/valuable property promised to a Muslim woman for her financial security under the marriage contract) and a further sum of maintenance for the iddat period (a period of 3 months that a Muslim woman has to observe before she can remarry after her divorce). Mr. Khan argued that Ms. Begum’s claim for maintenance should be dismissed as Ms. Begum had received the amount due to her on divorce under the Muslim personal law. The lower court granted Ms. Begum’s claim for maintenance, which was set at 179 rupees per month by the High Court in a revision application. Mr. Khan appealed to the Supreme Court in 1985 and the Court held that a payment made pursuant to personal laws cannot absolve a husband of his obligation to pay fair and reasonable maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C, 1973 and a husband can be liable to pay maintenance beyond the iddat period.



Yousuf v. Fairview Health Services Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff Khadara-Ayan Yousuf, a U.S. citizen and a Muslim woman of Somali national origin, sued her former employer, Fairview Health Services for discrimination based on race, sex, pregnancy, religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Fairview Health Services, her former employer, alleged that they terminated her employment when she allegedly did not return from a leave of absence. Plaintiff claimed discrimination as violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §1982. She appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Court of Appeals partially vacated the judgment with respect to the sex and pregnancy discrimination citing that Title VII has been amended via the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to prohibit employers from discriminating against a woman for her capacity to become pregnant, not merely because she is pregnant.



Latifi v. Union Of India Supreme Court of India (2001)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWPRDA, 1986) seemed to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum. Pursuant to a prima facie reading of the MWPRDA, 1986, a Muslim husband was responsible to maintain his divorced wife only for the iddat period and after such period the onus of maintaining the woman would shift on to her relatives. The matter resurfaced before the Supreme Court in Danial Latifi v. Union Of India when the constitutional validity of the MWPRDA, 1986 was challenged on the grounds that the law was discriminatory and violative of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution as it deprived Muslim women of maintenance benefits equivalent to those provided to other women under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Further, it was argued that the law would leave Muslim women destitute and thus was violative of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court, on a creative interpretation of the MWPRDA, 1986, upheld its constitutionality. It held that a Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of his divorced wife extending beyond the iddat period. The Court based this interpretation on the word “provision” in the MWPRDA, 1986, indicating that “at the time of divorce the Muslim husband is required to contemplate the future needs [of his wife] and make preparatory arrangements in advance for meeting those needs” (at 11). This case is important because, it established for the first time that a Muslim husband’s liability to provide maintenance to his divorced wife extends beyond the iddat period, and he must realize his obligation within the iddat period, thereby striking a balance between Muslim personal law and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.



Rosati v. Igbinoso Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination

Pro se plaintiff Rosati, a transgender female, was imprisoned in California and suffering from Gender Dysphoria. Prison officials refused to provide the medically necessary gender reassignment surgery. The prison officials denied the gender reassignment surgery on the recommendation of a physician’s assistant who had no experience in transgender medicine and in spite of the plaintiff attempting repeated self-castrations. The district court dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal citing that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical need of the inmate and that such conduct was a violation of the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that a plausible claim for relief was stated.



Mensah v. The Republic Court Martial Appeal Court (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

In 2008, Mr. Mensah married ABI Dosu Theresa when they were both members of the Ghana Armed Forces. Because Mr. Mensah was an officer and Theresa was a female of a different rank, the marriage violated the Armed Forces Act, which requires that for a male officer to marry a lower-ranked woman, the woman must first resign and obtain the “requisite prior approval for her release from the Ghana Armed Forces.” Mr. Mensah was thus dismissed from the Armed Forces. The Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the law was not discriminatory and was a justified means that the Armed Forces used to maintain discipline.



Kennedy v. Cain Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (2015)


Gender discrimination

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape of a child. In his appeal he argued that the state of Alabama had systemic sex discrimination in the selection of jury forepersons. In a ten year period of time, there were nineteen jury forepersons: twelve were male while seven were female. The petitioner brought a habeas corpus claim citing improper jury foreman election. The Fifth Circuit determined that the petitioner had shown substantial underrepresentation of female forepersons and that no specific disparity percentage was sufficient enough to show substantial underrepresentation but that factors such as disparity, population size, demographics of selection population should be taken into account.



Amponsah v. Nyamaah Superior Court of Judicature (2009)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Mrs. Amponsah filed for divorce from her husband Mr. Nyamaah. She asked that a property the couple held be partitioned and that she receive her portion of its value. Mr. Nyamaah asserted that the house belonged to his father, who then granted the land to him. He argued that Mrs. Amponsah had no interest in the house, relying on a precedent which held that “a wife by going to live in a matrimonial home, the sole property of the husband, did not acquire any interest therein. She only had a right to live in the matrimonial home as long as the marriage subsisted.” The court held that Mr. Nyamaah’s father was the owner of the house because the papers were in his name, and rejected the evidence that both parties paid water and electric bills as a rebuttal to the presumption. As such, the house was not subject to a partition by the court, because it “did not belong to the couple so it could not be settled on either of the parties.”



Planned Parenthood of the Heartland Inc. v. Iowa Board of Medicine Supreme Court of Iowa (2015)


Gender discrimination

The Iowa Board of Medicine (“Board”) passed a rule of professional practice that prohibited telemedicine abortions, which are non-surgical abortions overseen by a medical practitioner via audio-visual connection. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland brought a claim against the Board citing that the prohibition of telemedicine abortions violated the equal protection clause by placing an undue burden on women seeking to exercise their right to terminate a pregnancy. The Iowa Supreme Court determined that the Board’s prohibition of telemedicine abortions would unduly limit rural women in Iowa from exercising their right to terminate a pregnancy. Additionally, the Court determined that the Board’s actions were politically motivated and did not constitute sound public policy given that trained professionals administered a physical examination and follow-up appointments were mandatory.



State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel & Restaurants Association Supreme Court of India (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Bombay Police Act, 1951 was amended in 2005 with the object of securing public order, morality, dignity of women, and reducing exploitation of women including trafficking of minor girls. Section 33A was inserted that prohibited performance of all types of dance in eating houses or permit rooms or beer bars. Section 33B was inserted that permitted three star hotels and Government associated places of entertainment to hold dance performances. The Indian Hotel & Restaurants Association filed a writ petition challenging Section 33A of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 before the Bombay High Court on the grounds that such prohibition: (a) discriminates against women employed to dance in eateries and bars and those employed to dance in three star hotels and government establishments; (b) interferes with their right to work and right to earn a livelihood, and thus is violative of the Indian Constitution. The Bombay High Court held that Section 33A is violative of Articles 14 (equality) and 19(1)(g) (right to work), of the Indian Constitution. The Government of Maharashtra filed an appeal before the Supreme Court and prayed that the terms “All dance” found in Section 33A be read down to mean “dances which are obscene and derogatory to the dignity of women” instead of striking it off altogether to ensure that the right to work of women is not interfered with. The Supreme Court upheld the judgement of the Bombay High Court. It declared that Section 33A violates Article 14 the Constitution of India on the ground that such law is based on an unacceptable presumption that the so-called elite (i.e. rich and the famous) have higher standards of decency, morality or strength of character than their counterparts who have to content themselves with lesser facilities of inferior quality in the dance bars. It declared that Section 33A violates Article 19(1)(g) on the ground that it interferes with the right of women to work and that, contrary to the ban’s purpose, it resulted in forcing some women into prostitution. The Court further urged the government to take affirmative action to ensure the safety and improve the working conditions of the persons working as bar dancers who primarily constitute of women.



Case of Lucia Sandoval Prosecution Appeal Court (Fiscalía apelará del tribunal) (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

On August 27, 2014 Lucia Sandoval was acquitted after the court found insufficient evidence of her involvement in her husband’s death. In 2011, Sandoval was charged for the intended homicide of her husband. She subsequently spent over three years in prison awaiting trial. The incident that formed the basis for the charges took place on February 11, 2011, when Lucia Sandoval informed her husband that she had filed a complaint of domestic violence and had obtained a restraining order against him, which required him to leave their home. Sandoval’s husband responded violently and threatened her with a gun. When Sandoval tried to escape, a physical fight ensued and the gun was fired, resulting in her husband’s death. Amnesty International Paraguay, the Committee of Latin America and the Caribbean for the Defense of Women’s Rights (CLADEM) and Catholics for the Right to Decide (CDD Paraguay) helped advocate as to Sandoval’s innocence. These organizations claimed that “the first failure of the judicial system was that protection measures [for] . . . Sandoval were not applied. The court gave the [restraining] order to Sandoval, instead of sending the notice to the Police for it to be given to [her] husband.” The organizations noted that Paraguay had passed a law against domestic violence in 2000 but contended that the law “does not comprehensively address the problem, no[r] does it allow for a coordinated and coherent system in the country to collect data about gendered violence.” It should be noted that in 2013, the Human Rights Commission at the United Nations recommended that Paraguay implement a law to “prevent, punish, and eradicate gender violence, as well as assure that complain[t]s of domestic violence are effectively investigated, with perpetrators being punished appropriately and the survivors receiving attention and compensation.” Background information available at http://blog.amnestyusa.org/americas/victory-in-paraguay-is-a-big-step-fo... http://www.cladem.org/paraguay/Lucia-Sandoval-absuelta.pdf http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/amnesty_international/2014/Peru.pdf https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hk6bjsNKmrM

El 27 de agosto del 2014, Lucía Sandoval fue absuelta luego de que el tribunal no encontrara pruebas suficientes de su participación en la muerte de su esposo. En el 2011, Sandoval fue acusada del supuesto homicidio de su esposo. Posteriormente, pasaron más de tres años en prisión en espera de juicio. El hecho que sirvió de base a los cargos se produjo el 11 de febrero de 2011, cuando Lucía Sandoval informó a su esposo que había presentado una denuncia por violencia intrafamiliar y que había obtenido una orden de alejamiento en su contra, que le obligaba a abandonar su domicilio. El esposo de Sandoval respondió violentamente y la amenazó con un arma. Cuando Sandoval intentó escapar, se produjo una pelea física y se disparó el arma, lo que provocó la muerte de su esposo. Amnistía Internacional Paraguay, el Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (CLADEM) y Católicos por el Derecho a Decidir (CDD Paraguay) ayudaron a defender la inocencia de Sandoval. Estas organizaciones alegaron que “la primera falla del sistema judicial fue que las medidas de protección [para]. . . Sandoval no se aplicaron. El tribunal le dió la orden [de restricción] del marido a Sandoval, en lugar de enviar la notificación a la Policía para que se la entregue a [su] esposo” y así le informaran que no podía acercarse a ella. Las organizaciones señalaron que Paraguay aprobó una ley contra la violencia doméstica en el 2000, pero sostuvieron que la ley “no aborda el problema de manera integral, ni permite un sistema coordinado y coherente en el país para recopilar datos sobre violencia de género." Cabe señalar que en el 2013, la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas recomendó a Paraguay implementar una ley para “prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia de género, así como asegurar que las denuncias de violencia intrafamiliar sean efectivamente investigadas, con los perpetradores siendo castigados adecuadamente y los sobrevivientes recibiendo atención e indemnización.” Información de antecedentes disponible en el sito web.



Sentencia T-627/12 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2013)


Gender discrimination

A group of 1280 Colombian women filed a writ of constitutional challenge for the protection of their fundamental rights to information, dignity, autonomy, free development of the individual, health, education, reproductive rights, and the right to benefit from scientific progress. They claimed that the Inspector General’s Office had breached their rights by misrepresenting the Constitutional Court’s order by, inter alia, making statements contrary to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, contrary to determinations made by the World Health Organization, and making false assertions about the existence of a right to life of the unborn and the public’s demand for protection of the unborn by the civil servants. The Court held that the Inspector General had issued false information about the Court’s order in sentence T-388 of 2009 (asserting that the Court’s decision promoted abortion where in fact it promoted access to information on sexual and reproductive rights, including information on abortion) and thus had violated his duty to provide accurate information. The Court held that the Inspector General’s statement that emergency contraceptives are abortive contradict the WHO’s findings and ordered the official position of the Inspector General’s Office be rectified accordingly. The Court held that Deputy Inspector General Hoyo’s letter, which relieved health clinics of the obligation to remove obstacles to abortion, was a violation of the duties of that office and ordered the letter be rectified. The Court also found for the Applicants the right to receive accurate information with respect to: (1) institutions’ rights to claim conscientious objection or the possibility of its collective exercise regarding abortion; and (2) the inclusion in the Compulsory Health Plan of misoprostol, a drug which was authorized by the Food and Drug Surveillance Institute and the WHO in voluntary interruption of pregnancy but was inaccurately alleged by the Deputy Inspector’s letter as dangerous for women’s health. The Court for the first time held that it was the obligation and duty of public servants to provide accurate, reliable and timely information to women regarding their rights to sexual and reproductive health. This decision is significant not only within Colombia but in the Latin American region with respect to women’s access to the sexual and reproductive health services.

Un grupo de 1280 mujeres colombianas interpuso una demanda constitucional en la Corte Superior exigiendo la protección de sus derechos fundamentales a la información, la dignidad, la autonomía, el libre desarrollo de la persona, la salud, la educación, los derechos reproductivos y el derecho a beneficiarse del progreso científico. Alegaron que la Procuraduría General había violado sus derechos al tergiversar la orden del Tribunal Constitucional, entre otras cosas, haciendo declaraciones contrarias a la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional, contrarias a las determinaciones de la Organización Mundial de la Salud, y haciendo afirmaciones falsas sobre la existencia del derecho a la vida de los no nacidos y la demanda pública de protección de los no nacidos por parte de los funcionarios públicos. La Corte sostuvo que en efecto el Inspector General había emitido información falsa sobre la orden de la Corte en la sentencia T-388 de 2009 (afirmando que la decisión de la Corte promovió el aborto donde de hecho promovió el acceso a información sobre derechos sexuales y reproductivos, incluyendo información sobre el aborto) y por lo tanto había violado su deber de proporcionar información verdadera. El Tribunal sostuvo que la declaración del Inspector General de que los anticonceptivos de emergencia son abortivos contradecía las conclusiones de la OMS y ordenó que se rectificara a favor de la posición oficial de la Oficina del Inspector General. La Corte sostuvo que la carta del Subinspector General Hoyo, que eximía a las clínicas de salud de la obligación de eliminar los obstáculos al aborto, violaba los deberes de esa oficina y ordenó que se rectificara la carta. La Corte también decidió a favor de los Demandantes el derecho a recibir información veraz con respecto a: (1) el derecho de las instituciones a reclamar la objeción de conciencia o la posibilidad de su ejercicio colectivo con respecto al aborto; y 2) la inclusión en el Plan Obligatorio de Salud del misoprostol, una medicina que había sido autorizada por el Instituto de Vigilancia de Medicamentos y Alimentos y la OMS para la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo, pero que la carta del Subinspector alega erróneamente como peligroso para la salud de la mujer. La Corte por primera vez sostuvo que era obligación y deber de los servidores públicos brindar información veraz, confiable y oportuna a las mujeres sobre sus derechos a la salud sexual y reproductiva. Esta decisión es significativa no solo en Colombia sino en la región de América Latina con respecto al acceso de las mujeres a los servicios de salud sexual y reproductiva.



Sentencia T-636/11 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2011)


Gender discrimination

In 2011, Ms. Tenjo Hernandez discovered that she was six weeks pregnant and requested voluntary termination of pregnancy based on information provided by the medical staff that her epilepsy medications could cause congenital deformities in the fetus. The doctor refused to perform the procedure unless a court order was issued. Ms. Hernandez filed a writ of constitutional challenge to enforce her rights, which the Courts of first and second instance denied based on the reasoning that Ms. Hernandez’s grounds for relief did not fall under any of the prongs of Decision C-355 of 2006 which permitted Colombian women and girls the right to voluntary termination of pregnancy. The Constitutional Court reviewed the case, despite the fact that there were not any deformities in the fetus and Ms. Hernandez had withdrawn her request for relief. The Court held that women do not carry the burden of establishing their health conditions and the status of their pregnancy; healthcare facilities and doctors are responsible to determine any fetal deformities incompatible with life outside the womb. Therefore, the Court ruled that healthcare facilities should comply with the Constitutional Court’s rulings in Decision C-355 of 2006, should not make value judgments of women who request voluntary termination of pregnancy and are prohibited from requesting court orders to perform voluntary termination of pregnancy.

En 2011, la Sra. Tenjo Hernández descubrió que tenía seis semanas de embarazo y solicitó la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo en base a la información proporcionada por el personal médico de que sus medicamentos para la epilepsia podrían causar deformidades congénitas en el feto. El médico se negó a realizar el procedimiento a menos que se emitiera una orden judicial. La señora Hernández presentó una demanda constitucional para hacer valer sus derechos, el cual los Juzgados de primera y segunda instancia denegaron con base en el razonamiento de que los motivos de reparación de la señora Hernández no se encuadran en ninguno de los extremos de la Decisión C-355 del 2006 que permitió a las mujeres y niñas colombianas el derecho a la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. La Corte Suprema Constitucional revisó el caso, a pesar de que no había deformidades en el feto y la Sra. Hernández había retirado su demanda. La Corte sostuvo que las mujeres no tienen el peso probatorio de establecer sus condiciones de salud y el estado de su embarazo, sin embargo, los centros de salud y los médicos son responsables de determinar cualquier deformidad fetal incompatible con la vida fuera del útero. Por tanto, la Corte decidió que los establecimientos de salud deben cumplir con las sentencias de la Corte Constitucional en la Sentencia C-355 de 2006, no deben emitir juicios de valor sobre mujeres que soliciten la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo y tienen prohibido solicitar órdenes judiciales para realizar la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo cuando la mujer ha expresado su voluntad de hacerlo.



Sentencia T-841/11 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2011)


Gender discrimination

A twelve-year-old girl requested voluntary termination of pregnancy after having consensual sex with her boyfriend on the grounds that her mental and physical health, particularly with respect to the effects from obstetric complications, were in jeopardy as a result of the pregnancy. The healthcare provider denied her request, despite the fact that the request fulfilled legal requirements, on the grounds that the medical certificate to the girl’s health conditions was issued by a doctor who did not belong to the same healthcare provider network as the girl’s healthcare network. The pregnancy was carried to term and the girl’s mother filed a writ of constitutional challenge to enforce the girl’s right to abortion when the girl was not yet five months pregnant. After nearly a month, the Court of First Instance denied the writ, finding that the girl’s life was not in danger. The Constitutional Court ruled, however, that insurance providers and healthcare providers should not erect improper obstacles to the performance of voluntary termination of pregnancy except for the conditions established by Decision C-355 of 2006, and that they have a duty to take all necessary measures to ensure that women meeting the legal requirements under Decision C-355 of 2006 may have the procedure performed. In this case, one medical certificate would have been sufficient to clear the girl for the performance of voluntary termination of pregnancy as there was no requirement under Decision C-355 of 2006 that the medical certificate must come from doctors in the network of the healthcare provider of the girl or women requesting the procedure. The Court also ruled that the healthcare provider violated its duty to provide timely and clear diagnosis when they took almost a month to deny the request. The Court ordered the healthcare provider to pay restitution damages to the girl including all damages caused by its improper refusal to perform the procedure and any medically necessary services resulting from the birth.

Una niña de 12 años solicitó la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo después de haber mantenido relaciones sexuales consensuales con su novio alegando que su salud mental y física, en particular con respecto a las complicaciones obstétricas, estaba en peligro como consecuencia del embarazo. El proveedor de atención médica denegó su solicitud, a pesar de que la solicitud cumplía con los requisitos legales, con el argumento de que el certificado médico de las condiciones de salud de la niña fue emitido por un médico que no pertenecía a la misma red de proveedores de atención médica que la red de atención médica de la niña inicialmente. El embarazo llegó a término y la madre de la niña interpuso una demanda constitucional para hacer cumplir el derecho de la niña al aborto cuando la niña aún no tenía cinco meses de embarazo. Después de casi un mes, el Tribunal de Primera Instancia denegó el pedido, considerando que la vida de la niña no corría peligro. La Corte Constitucional dictaminó, sin embargo, que los proveedores de seguros y los proveedores de salud no deben presentar obstáculos indebidos para la realización de la interrupción voluntaria de un embarazo salvo las condiciones establecidas por la Decisión C-355 de 2006, y que además, tienen el deber de tomar todas las medidas necesarias como asegurar que las mujeres que cumplan con los requisitos legales de la Decisión C-355 de 2006 puedan realizar el procedimiento. En este caso, un certificado médico habría sido suficiente para autorizar a la niña a realizar la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo, ya que la Decisión C-355 de 2006 no exige que el certificado médico provenga de médicos de la red del proveedor de atención médica de la niña o mujeres que solicitan el procedimiento. La Corte también dictaminó que el proveedor de atención médica violó su deber de brindar un diagnóstico oportuno y claro cuando demoraron casi un mes en denegar la solicitud. El tribunal ordenó al proveedor de atención médica que pagara indemnización por daños y perjuicios a la niña, incluyendo todos los daños causados ​​por su negativa indebida a realizar el procedimiento y cualquier servicio médicamente necesario que resultara en el nacimiento.



Decision T-946/08 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2008)


Gender discrimination

The plaintiff’s daughter suffered from Prader Willi syndrome or Down Syndrome and was mentally disabled. The mother noticed changes in her daughter’s body and discovered that she had been pregnant as a result of rape. The mother asked the healthcare provider to terminate pregnancy and filed a writ of constitutional challenge after her request was denied by the healthcare provider on conscientious objection. The Court of First instance denied the writ on the grounds that there was no medical certificate showing that the daughter’s life was jeopardized by the pregnancy, that the fetus had deformities, or that a crime had been reported. The mother appealed the decision and stated that Decision C-355 of 2006 specifically contained a rape prong as a ground for requesting voluntary termination of pregnancy. The Court of Second Instance also denied abortion on the grounds that even though a rape may have occurred, the pregnancy had reached an advanced gestational age (25 or 26 weeks). The Constitutional Court found for the plaintiff mother and held that the healthcare provider violated the rights of the daughter, a victim of a violent sex crime. The Court ruled that conscientious objections must be made with sufficient number of professionals in a network and may only be claimed by natural persons, that the healthcare provider must provide the service in a timely manner, i.e., within five days of request (so as to not let the pregnancy be carried to term), failure to perform the procedure under discriminatory circumstances carry the consequence of investigations by the disciplinary bodies of both the healthcare provider and the lower court judges, which the Constitutional Court ordered.

La hija de la demandante padecía síndrome de Prader Willi, o más conocido como Síndrome de Down y estaba mentalmente discapacitada. La madre notó cambios en el cuerpo de su hija y descubrió que había estado embarazada como resultado de una violación. La madre le pidió al proveedor de atención médica que interrumpiera el embarazo y presentó una demanda constitucional después de que el proveedor de atención médica denegara su solicitud por objeción de conciencia. El Juzgado de Primera Instancia desestimó el recurso alegando que no existía certificado médico que demostrara que la vida de la hija estaba comprometida por el embarazo, que el feto presentaba deformidades o que se había denunciado un delito. La madre apeló la decisión y manifestó que la Decisión C-355 de 2006 contenía específicamente un caso de violación como motivo para solicitar la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. El Tribunal de Segunda Instancia también denegó el aborto, argumentando que, aunque pudo haber ocurrido una violación, el embarazo había alcanzado una edad gestacional avanzada (25 o 26 semanas). La Corte Suprema Constitucional decidió a favor de la madre demandante y sostuvo que el proveedor de atención médica había violado los derechos de la hija, pues ella había sido víctima de un delito sexual violento. La Corte dictaminó que las objeciones de conciencia deben realizarse con un número suficiente de profesionales en una red y solo pueden ser reclamadas personalmente por personas que el proveedor de atención médica debe brindar el servicio en tiempo y forma, es decir, dentro de los cinco días siguientes a la solicitud (para no permitir que el embarazo llegue a término), la falta de realización del procedimiento en circunstancias discriminatorias conlleva a las investigaciones de los órganos disciplinarios tanto del proveedor de salud como de los jueces de primera instancia, que ordenó el Tribunal Constitucional.



司法院大法官會議第666號解釋 (J.Y. Interpretation No. 666) Constitutional Court of Taiwan (2009)


Gender discrimination

Article 80, Section 1, Sub-section 1 of the Social Order Maintenance Act establishes administrative penalties of detention and a fine for any person who engages in sexual conduct or cohabitation with the intent of obtaining financial gain. The Court noted that a transaction for sexual conduct necessarily involves two people: the person engaging in the conduct with the intent of obtaining financial gain, and the other person who provides consideration for the conduct. The law at issue only punishes the former party by focusing on the subjective intent of the person seeking financial gain from the sexual transaction. The Court also noted that the former party is more likely to be female. Thus, the Court held that the law essentially targets and punishes females who participate in financial transactions for sex. As such, the Court held that the law’s focus on the subjective intent for financial gain violates the principle of gender equality in Article 7 of the Constitution. The Court decreed that the provision would become ineffective upon two years after the issuance of the decision.

社會秩序維護法第80條第1項第1款規定,任何以獲取經濟利益為目的之性行為或同居行為者,應處以拘留和罰鍰等行政罰。法院指出,性交易行為必然涉及兩個人:以獲取經濟利益為目的之行為人,以及為該行為提供對價的另一個人。此一規定只針對主觀上從性交易中尋求經濟利益的前者進行處罰,且前者更可能是女性。因此,法院認為,此一規定實質上是針對並懲罰那些參與性交易的女性。在這種情況下,法院認為,此一規定針對主觀上從性交易中尋求經濟利益者,與憲法第七條之平等原則有違,應自本解釋公布之日起至遲於二年屆滿時,失其效力。



Decision T-420/92 Constitutional Court of Colombia (1992)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff dropped out from her high school in 1990 due to pregnancy after attending from 1985 to 1989. After giving birth, she requested re-admission and was denied based on moral grounds by the principal, including the fact that she was a single mother. The plaintiff filed a writ of constitutional challenge for readmission. The trial court granted relief and the Constitutional Court affirmed. The Court found that the school violated the plaintiff’s right to education by denying re-admission on moral basis and without due process. The Court also held that the plaintiff’s right to equality was violated because she was discriminated against based on her status as a single mother. The Court also ruled that the plaintiff’s right to free development of personality was violated as this right includes the path of motherhood.

La demandante abandonó la escuela secundaria en 1990 debido a un embarazo después de haber asistido desde 1985 hasta 1989. Después de dar a luz, ella solicitó la readmisión a la escuela y el director se la negó por motivos morales, incluyendo el hecho de que era madre soltera. El demandante presentó una demanda constitucional por su readmisión. El tribunal de primera instancia otorgó el pedido y el Tribunal Constitucional lo afirmó. El Tribunal determinó que la escuela había violado el derecho de la demandante a la educación al negarle la readmisión sobre una base moral y sin el debido proceso. El Tribunal también sostuvo que se violó el derecho a la igualdad de la demandante porque fue discriminada por su condición de madre soltera. La Corte también dictaminó que se violó el derecho de la demandante al libre desarrollo de la personalidad ya que éste derecho incluye decidir ser madre.



Noorfadilla Binti Ahmad Saikin (Plaintiff) v. Chayed Bin Basirun et al. (Defendants) High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

The Plaintiff interviewed with the education officers of the Education Office of the Hulu Langat District to become an untrained teacher. During the interview, the Plaintiff was asked questions pertaining to her general knowledge, personal details, problem solving skills and residential address. She was not asked about her pregnancy status. The Plaintiff was accepted for the position and presented herself at an instructional meeting as instructed. At the meeting, she was told to report for duty immediately. Subsequently, an education officer asked whether anyone at the meeting was pregnant. Once the Plaintiff admitted that she was pregnant, her placement memorandum was withdrawn. The High Court held that it was not relevant whether or not there was a binding contract, as the the Defendants’ decision interfered with the Plaintiff’s right to be employed, which is contrary to Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution, which provides that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of gender in the appointment of any office or employment under a public authority. This Article of the Federal Constitution was adopted to comply with Malaysia’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The High Court declared that using pregnancy as a factor in employment is a form of gender discrimination under the Malaysian Constitution, applying CEDAW in interpreting Article 8(2) of the Constitution, because of the basic biological fact that only a woman has capacity to become pregnant.



The Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Turkey: Head-scarf Ban Constitutional Court of Turkey (2014)


Gender discrimination

The phrase “bare-headed” in Article 20 of the Code of Conduct, which entered into force on 26 January 1971 by the decision of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, abolished on 5 November 2012 with the decision of the Council of State, number 2012/5257. After that, Tu?ba Arslan, who is a lawyer admitted to the Ankara Bar Association, started to attend to hearings while her headscarf is on. On 4 December 2012, Ankara 11st Family Court’s judge stated that Tu?ba Arslan cannot perform her profession while her headscarf is on and adjourned the hearing on the grounds that headscarf is a strong religious and political symbol of anti-secularism. On that occasion Tu?ba Arslan applied to the Constitutional Court of Turkey individually. In its judgment of 25 June 2014 the Constitutional Court examining the case found that the acts of the public power that impose restriction on the location and style of the right to wear a headscarf as a religious belief constitute a violation of freedom of thought and faith. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that wearing a headscarf is neither constitute an impediment to the use of the rights and freedoms of others nor trigger a social conflict or tension, therefore Tu?ba Arslan decreased at a disadvantage compared to those not wearing headscarf and that constitute a violation of prohibition of discrimination.



Ts’epe v. Independent Electoral Commission and Others Court of Appeal of Lesotho (2005)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

In 2004 an amendment was introduced to the Local Government Elections Act 1998 (the “Amendment”) that reserved one third of all seats in every local council for women, the remainder was open to both men and women alike. The constitutionality of the electoral quota was challenged by a man whose candidacy for local government was rejected on the single ground that the electoral division at issue was reserved for women. The appellant argued that these measures are unconstitutional since women’s participation in local governments could have been achieved without debarring men from the same. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the court a quo, dismissed the appeal and held that the Amendment was not unconstitutional, among others, since the impugned measures were carefully designed to achieve its objective, they were rationally connected to the objective and impaired the appellant’s rights in question as little as possible.



Supreme Court Decision 2009Do3580 Supreme Court of South Korea (2009)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

The Victim, born a male, identified as a female while growing up and was diagnosed with gender identity disorder. At the age of twenty-four, the Victim underwent a sex-change operation and was diagnosed as a transsexual by a psychiatrist. The Victim had cohabited with a male for ten years and had lived as a female for the past thirty years after the operation. Under Korean law, the victim of the crime of rape must be female. Thus, the central issue of the case pertained to the appropriate standard in determining the legal gender of a rape victim. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Victim was a female under the law. In making this decision, the court noted that it must conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the biological, psychological and social factors, rather than merely relying on biology. Thus, in determining an individual’s gender, the Supreme Court noted that lower courts must consider the individual’s own sense of identity, including an individual’s behavior, attitude and characteristics. Additionally, courts must look to factors such as the individual’s discomfort regarding his or her biologically assigned gender, the individual’s sense of belonging and identity, whether the individual wants to obtain the genitals and other sexual characteristics of the opposite sex, whether a psychiatrist has diagnosed the individual as having transsexualism and whether the individual has received psychiatric treatment and hormone therapy, which failed to cure such symptoms. Lastly, courts must look at factors such as whether the individual has adapted to the opposite sex mentally and socially, has undergone sex reassignment surgery, identifies with such gender, wears the clothes and carries him or herself as the opposite sex, and whether others accept the changed gender. In this case, the Victim identified herself as a female and did not associate herself as a male, underwent a sex-change operation, and lived her life as a female for over thirty years after the operation. Thus, the court concluded the Victim was a female, and a rape was committed with knowledge that the Victim was a female.



Gilroy v. Angelov Federal Court of Australia (2000)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Leoni Gilroy made allegations of sexual harassment against a co-worker, Branko Angelov, who is the respondent in this case. Gilroy sought damages against her employers, Craig and Toni Botting, the second respondents. Gilroy reported the sexual harassment to Mr. Botting, who told Gilroy that he didn’t believe Angelov would act in such a way. Nevertheless, Bottling agreed to keep Angelov away from her at work. Later, Mr. Botting terminated Gilroy’s employment, stating that Mrs. Botting believed that Mr. Botting and Gilroy were having an affair. The Court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Gilroy for $24,000 against the Bottlings, highlighting the emotional and financial difficulties experienced by Ms. Gilroy.



Hayward v. Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd [1988] A.C. 894 17 House of Lords (1988)


Gender discrimination

The applicant, a woman, was employed at a shipyard canteen as a cook and was classified as unskilled for the purposes of pay. She claimed that she was doing work of equal value to male comparators who were shipyard workers paid at the higher rate for skilled tradesmen in the yard. The industrial tribunal, at a further hearing, rejected the applicant's contention that, in considering whether her contract of employment should be modified, it was sufficient to compare her basic pay and overtime rates with that of the male comparators and held that without a comparison of all terms and conditions of employment she was not entitled to a declaration that she should receive a higher rate of pay. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the applicant's appeal and, on her appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. When deciding whether a woman’s contract is equal to a man’s it is sufficient for certain terms to be less advantageous for the woman for the contract to be unfair. It is not necessary for the overall woman’s contract to be less advantageous than the overall man’s contract.



Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1980] 3 W.L.R. 929 Court of Appeal [United Kingdom and Northern Ireland] (1980)


Gender discrimination

Mr. M., the manager of the stockroom in one of the warehouses of the employers left his employment. After four months of the post remaining vacant the employee, Mrs. Smith, was appointed as the manageress of the stockroom. Her duties differed slightly from Mr. M's duties. She was paid about £10 less than he was. She argued that this breached the UK’s Equal Pay Act 1970. The Court of Appeal held that that Act does not allow comparisons with former colleagues; however, the ECJ held that EU law allows such comparison, reversing that Court of Appeal’s judgment. The ECJ decided that article 119 of the Treaty was directly applicable in the national courts of each country. It was submitted that under article 119 of the Treaty there was no requirement that the man and the woman should be employed contemporaneously at the same time and that, under that article, the woman was entitled to equal pay even though the man had left before she joined and the woman had taken his job afterwards.



Wijesundera v. Heathrow 3PL Logistics Ltd [2014] I.C.R. 523 Employment Appeal Tribunal (2014)


Gender discrimination

The claimant, a Sri Lankan national, was working in England with a valid work permit when she was made redundant. The claimant claimed that she had been subjected to sex discrimination and harassment on numerous occasions. She also claimed that her dismissal was a further act of sex discrimination. In this case it was held that a worker knowingly employed under an illegal employment contract could bring a sex discrimination claim as the claim was not so inextricably bound up with her employment as to be defeated by a defence of illegality.



Supreme Court Decision 2008Da89712 Supreme Court of South Korea (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

The Plaintiff worked as an employee for a corporation in which the Defendant served as a supervisor. The Defendant, who had the authority to hire and fire employees, singled out the Plaintiff frequently for her passive nature and alleged inferior job skills. On numerous occasions, the Defendant forced the Plaintiff to touch his penis and engaged in other various acts of sexual misconduct. The lower court found that the Defendant’s sexual misconduct constituted an invasion of the Plaintiff’s right to self-determination. Additionally, the lower court found the employer, the Defendant-Corporation, liable for the supervisor’s sexual misconduct. The Supreme Court of Korea affirmed, finding the supervisor and employer liable. Under Article 756 of the Civil Act, an employer can be held liable for an employee’s action if the act is “related to the employee’s execution of the undertaking (for which he is employed).” Thus, the Supreme Court noted that when an employee injures another intentionally, even if the act is not related to the employee’s undertaking of his job responsibilities, employer liability still attaches if the misconduct is “apparently and objectively related” to the employer’s work. Additionally, if an employee commits an intentional act such as sexual misconduct, the court noted employer liability attaches where the misconduct was objectively related to the execution of the employer’s work. Noting the Defendant-employee’s authority to fire and hire employees, as well as his ability to punish the Plaintiff for resisting his unwelcome sexual advances, the Supreme Court held that the Defendant-employee took advantage of his superior position over the Plaintiff and therefore committed the sexual misconduct in a situation proximate, in terms of time and place, to his job responsibilities. Therefore, the court found the lower court correctly applied the law in finding employer liability, as the sexual misconduct was objectively related to the Defendant’s job duties.



Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Human Rights Commission Court of Appeals Second District (1999)


Gender discrimination

Ms. McQueary was discharged from Wal-Mart and alleged that her employer violated the Illinois Human Rights Act by discharging her on the basis of gender. Her employer claimed that it discharged her after she left her shift early, which she had done due to harassment from her male co-workers. After the administrative judge recommended liability, the Illinois Human Rights Commission (HRC) sustained the complaint and ordered the award of damage and reinstatement of Mrs. McQueary. Wal-Mart argues that the employee failed to prove the fourth prong of a prima facie cause of unlawful discrimination—that employees in a similar situation who were not members of a protected group were not discharged. The Court of Appeals ruled that this was met though when they examined Wal-Mart’s treatment of similar employees and found that the male employees who also left their shift early were not automatically discharged. The Court affirmed the judgment of the HRC.



郭晶与杭州市西湖区东方烹饪职业技能培训学校一般人格权纠纷,杭州市西湖区人民法院 (Guo Jing v. East Cooking Vocational Skills Training School) West Lake District Court of Hangzhou (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff alleged that in June 2014, she saw the recruiting advertisement of the respondent on the Internet, knowing that the respondent want to recruit two copywriters. Guo submitted her resume accordingly. However, Guo has not got reply since then. With the certainty that she is capable of the position, Guo called the School, asking about the job. Guo was told that since the position requires many business trips, only male can be considered. Guo emphasized that she can adjust to those business trips but was still refused by the same reason. Guo therefore brought this lawsuit on the basis that the respondent’s action is in violation of Article 3 of Employment Promotion Law of the People's Republic of China, which requires that “Workers shall be entitled by law to enjoy the right to equal employment and to seek their own employment. No worker seeking employment shall suffer discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, race, gender or religious belief.” The respondent argues that because of the specialty of the position, the copywriter should live in the same room with the president of the school, all of whom are male, while during the business trips. It is out of the consideration and care to the plaintiff that they did not recruit her. The court finds that since the respondent did not provide any evidence to prove the specialty of the position and the legal reasons for the unsuitability of female worker, it violates the accorded rule: Article 3, 12, 13 of Labor Law, which states “Labourers shall have equal right to employment and choice of occupation”, “Labourers, regardless of their ethnic group, race, sex, or religious belief, shall not be discriminated against in employment”, “Women shall enjoy the equal right, with men, to employment”.

性别歧视,就业歧视

原告称,2014年6月,自己在网上看到被告要招两名文案的招聘信息。原告在网上投递了简历。原告一直没有等来被告的回复。原告认为自己的各项条件均符合其工作所需,于是打电话询问应聘情况。被告工作人员答复说,他们的文案职位仅招男性,因为需要出差。原告告知自己完全可以胜任出差,于是不甘心又到被告招聘现场去应聘,依然被以同样理由拒绝。原告称,依据中华人民共和国就业促进法第三条,劳动者享有平等就业的权利,国家保障妇女享有与男子平等的劳动权利,而被告违反了这项法律。被告称该次招聘的岗位具有特殊性,出差住宿时必须与校长住一间标准间,而被告校长均为男性。基于公序良俗,被告没有录取原告。法院认为,被告未举证证明该岗位属于法律、法规所规定的女职工禁忌从事的工作,被告违反了《中华人民共和国劳动法》第三条、第十二条、第十三条劳动者享有平等就业权利的规定。



Economic Cooperatives of Yongxinnansha Shares v. Subdisctrict Office of Chancheng District of Foshan City Intermediate Court of Foshan City, Guangdong Province (2014)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

In 2012, the plaintiff claims their shareholder status in Nansha economic cooperative, and alleged the local subdisctrict office to affirm their qualification. The subdisctrict office affirmed and granted certificate. Nansha economic cooperative thereby sued the Subdistrict office for its administrative decision. Nansha alleged that according to article 15 of the Article of Stockholding of the Precinct of Yongxin: women married before December 31, 1992 shall be regarded as “out-married” women and shall not be given the right to share dividends, nor their shareholder qualification. The trial court finds that according to Article 61, section 3 of Law of the People's Republic of China on the Organizations of Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments, Article 27, 36 of Law of the People's Republic of China on the Organization of the Villagers Committees; and Article 4 of rural collective economic organization regulation of Guangdong Province, the distribution of rural collective property shall not violate other laws and regulations of China, and shall not infringe other people’s legal rights. Article 15 of the Stockholding Article is in violation of the equal right of women and therefore invalid. The intermediate court affirmed the judgment.


Public Prosecutor v. Billy Metussin High Court of Brunei (1993)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The defendant pleaded not guilty to one charge of attempted rape of an 11 years and 10 months old female, under section 376(1) of the Penal Code. The court found that the complainant gave different versions as to the events that occurred. It found the complainant’s evidence unreliable. The court concluded that the complainant was the initiator of the events that led to the attempted intercourse. The court found that there was an attempt at sexual intercourse. In view of medical evidence that revealed that the hymen was intact and that ejaculation may have occurred outside the complainant, the court found doubt as to whether penetration occurred. The court highlighted that consent was not a defense to rape as the complainant was under the age of 14 at the time at issue. Nonetheless, consent becomes relevant to punishment, as a minimum sentence is prescribed for rape which occurs “without the consent of the victim”. The court found that the complainant gave her consent to the defendant’s attempt to have sexual intercourse with her and that she gave a real consent, not vitiated by immaturity or by any of the other factors specified in section 90 P.C. The court convicted the defendant of attempted rape and imposed sentences of one year imprisonment and three strokes.



Nombuyiselo Siholongonyane v. Mholi Joseph Sihlongonyane High Court of Swaziland (2013)


Gender discrimination

Husband challenged his wife’s capacity to initiate legal proceedings without his consent. The common law permitted a married woman to sue without the consent of her husband only if the woman attained approval from the court first. The High Court held that this common law requirement was unfair discrimination because it applied only to women and not to men, a violation of Sections 20 and 28 of the Constitution, which respectively state that “all persons are equal before and under the law” and that “women have the right to equal treatment with men.”



Attorney General v. Aphane Supreme Court of Swaziland (2010)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

Wife and husband married in community of property, where all property of either spouse is combined in a joint estate regardless of whether it was acquired before or during the marriage and regardless of how much each spouse contributed. Despite marrying in community of property, the couple was not permitted to register newly purchased land in both of their names because the wife had continued to use her maiden name. Section 16(3) of the Deeds Registry Act only permitted land to be registered by the husband and wife if the wife used her husband’s name; otherwise, the Act permits the land to be registered in the name of the husband only. Because the Section 16(3) of the Deeds Registry Act only affected the rights of wives and not husbands, the Supreme Court held that is invalid as it amounts to unfair discrimination and a violation of Section 20 and 28 of the Constitution.



KKO 2010:74 Supreme Court of Finland (2010)


Gender discrimination

The issue here was whether the crime of discrimination, as set forth in Section 9 (currently Section 11) of Chapter 11 of the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the “Criminal Code”), could be committed in connection with the practice of religion by way of a refusal to participate in public worship with a female priest. In the case, A, a male priest and a member of a traditionalist evangelist association that was against women serving as pastors, was invited by B, the chairman of the local chapter of this association, to preach at a parish church. C, a female priest, had been scheduled to participate in the worship by assisting in the communion. Prior to the commencement of the worship, A and B had announced to C that, because of their conviction, C could not join A in the worship, after which C had left the church. In its ruling, the Supreme Court noted that Section 11 of the Finnish Constitution (731/1999, as amended) sets forth that everyone has the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The Court, however, clarified that this right is not absolute and that one cannot plead this right to justify actions that violate human dignity or other basic human rights or that are against the principles of the Finnish legal system. The Court further noted that, under the Finnish fundamental rights system, the prevention of discrimination can justify limiting the rights of the autonomous authority of religious organizations and their right to determine the methods of practicing religion. The same reason, prevention of discrimination, is also a justifiable reason to limit the rights of an individual in connection with the practice of religion. On this basis, the Court held that the elements of the crime of discrimination are generally applicable and do not exclude discrimination based on gender or discrimination that takes place within a parish in connection with the practice of religion. The Court also found that the elements of the crime, including a person having, without a justified reason, in the arrangement of a public function placed someone in a clearly unequal or otherwise essentially inferior position owing to his or her gender, were present in the case. Therefore, A was sentenced to pay 20 days-fine. While it found B also guilty, due to B’s level of guilt being determined to be lower than that of A as well as because of certain mitigating circumstances, the Court decided to waive the punishment of B.



HelHo 2009:10 Court of Appeal of Helsinki (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The issue here was whether a representative of an employer can be guilty of work discrimination, as set forth in Section 3 of Chapter 47 of the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the “Criminal Code”), by temporarily laying off an employee on the employee’s return from family leaves, and whether a justifiable cause for such discrimination existed in the case. In the case, B, who had been working at a company since 1998, had been on a two-year maternity leave between 2004 and 2006 and on a subsequent nursing leave after the maternity leave ended. During these family leaves, the company had, initially temporarily and subsequently on a permanent basis, employed C to carry out tasks that B had been responsible for before the family leaves. Upon her return to work in early 2007, B was temporarily laid off by A, the CEO of the company. A claimed that the work that C had been tasked with doing had changed while B was on the family leaves and that B could therefore not return to her old position. A further stated that the company was not able to offer B another position due to the company’s financial difficulties, and more specifically, that the company was not able to simultaneously employ both B and C. According to the Criminal Code, an employer, or a representative of the employer, that during employment without an important and justifiable reason puts an employee in an inferior position because of the employee’s gender, is guilty of criminal work discrimination. The Court of Appeal held that B had under the Finnish Employment Act (55/2011, as amended) the right to return to her old position after her family leaves ended or, if this was not possible, be offered other work in accordance with her employment contract. The Court further held, in accordance with A’s own statement, that the company could have trained B for the new type of work within only a brief period of time and, therefore, that laying off B and continuing to employ B’s substitute C (that had been made a permanent employee just before B’s return) was based on B’s gender and her family leaves. Due to these reasons, and despite the company’s financial difficulties, the Court held that there was no justifiable reason for the discrimination and, therefore, found A guilty of criminal employment discrimination. A was sentenced to pay 30 days-fine and damages to B of 1,200 Euros.



In re M Insa, Decision No. 12/PUU-V/2007 Constitutional Court of Indonesia (2007)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

Petitioner, an Indonesian male, challenged the constitutionality of a marriage law requiring monogamy with an exception that allows polygamy only with the consent of the wife and the permission of the court (Law Number 1 Year 1974 regarding Marriage). The law requires the husband to submit an application to the court of his domicile with his wife’s consent in order to engage in polygamy. Petitioner argued that because the law required the husband to obtain consent from his wife and the court before engaging in polygamy, it violated his right to freely exercise his religion because the teachings of Islam allow polygamy. The government argued that Islamic principles encourage monogamy and only allow polygamy when a wife allows her husband to re-marry for the benefit of their marriage. The court held that the practice of polygamy historically had degraded the status of women and the teachings of Islam required the preservation of the dignity of women. In addition, since the purpose of marriage is to “achieve peacefulness (sakinah),” men are required to first obtain their wives’ consent before engaging in polygamy, thus respecting their wives as legally equal partners. Therefore, the Court rejected petitioner’s claims and held the laws constitutional as they guarantee the recognition of women’s rights and allow husbands to exercise polygamy in accordance with the teachings of Islam.



Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) Court of Appeals Seventh District (2013)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

Cece, a young Albanian woman fled Albania to avoid trafficking and prostitution rings which target young women living alone. While living alone in Korce, Cece caught the attention of one of the leaders of a well-known prostitution ring. He followed, harassed, and threatened Cece. Her reports of the assault to the authorities were perfunctorily dismissed. Thereafter, Cece fled to the United States (“U.S.”) using a fraudulently procured Italian passport, whereupon she filed for asylum and withholding of removal within the one-year statutory period. Her claim was based on fear of returning to Albania as a young woman living alone. The immigration judge granted Cece’s asylum claim finding that her fear of returning to Albania was well founded because she belonged to a particular social group composed of “young Albanian women who are targeted for prostitution by traffickers” and that the government of Albania was unable or unwilling to protect such women. The Board of Immigration Appeals vacated the judge’s decision, holding that the judge erred in finding that Cece had established membership in a particular social group. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Cece was a member of particular social group cognizable under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) and therefore eligible for asylum. Specifically, the Court found that the particular social group identified by the immigration judge – young Albanian women living alone and thus vulnerable to being trafficked – met the immutability requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a) because it is based on common characteristics that members of the group either cannot change or should not be required to change.



KHO 2013:46 Supreme Administrative Court (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The issue here was whether the concept of presumption of discrimination, as set forth in the Finnish Equality Act (609/1986, as amended) (the “Equality Act”), applied in the case where a less-merited male applicant had been appointed over two female applicants, and whether there was a justifiable reason for discrimination. In the case, the Regional Council of Lapland, a politically steered joint municipal board, had appointed V, a male applicant, as its director of development. Two female applicants, E and H, had disputed the council’s decision to appoint V on the basis that the appointment was based on V’s political affiliations and also because the decision breached the Equality Act. The Supreme Administrative Court considered (i) whether the threshold for presumed discrimination had been exceeded and, if this were the case, (ii) if there were grounds for the rebuttal of the presumption. The Court found that both E and H had been adequately qualified for the position and had more merits relevant to the position than V. On this basis, the Court held that E and H had sufficiently shown that they had not been appointed because of their gender and that, as a result, a presumption of discrimination, as set forth in Section 8 of the Equality Act, had arisen. Under the Equality Act, to rebut a presumption of discrimination an employer must show that its actions are attributable to a justifiable reason not connected to gender or that the actions were based on weighty and acceptable grounds related to the nature of the job or the task. The Regional Council of Lapland claimed that, in this case, the justifiable reason not connected to gender was V’s having more socio-political experience. The Court, however, held that socio-political experience was not specifically mentioned in the pre-established selection criteria for the position and was, therefore, part of the general merit assessment of the applicants. As discussed, the Court had found that, based on this assessment, both E and H had more merits relevant to the position than V. Therefore, the Court held that V’s socio-political experience was not a justifiable reason for his appointment. For these reasons, the Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the earlier holding of the Administrative Court of Rovaniemi that the decision of the Regional Council of Lapland to appoint V as its director of development was made in breach of the Equality Act and, therefore, ordered the decision to be annulled.



Sentencia Numero 740/06 High Court of the Basque Country Contentious-Administrative Chamber (2004)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

During a staff selection process for the Basque Health Service, in particular for the substitution of the chief of psychiatry services in the Santiago de Vitoria Hospital for a period of six (6) months, Mrs. Elena who had had a baby fifteen (15) days before the above mentioned selection process, was obliged by the Basque Health Service authority to renounce to the post she had the right to. The Basque Health Service authority deprived Mrs. Elena from a post that corresponded to her by the position she had in the list of temporary recruitment. The Basque Health Service authority forced Mrs. Elena to renounce to the post because of her recent maternity when she had expressly said that she wanted to accept that job. Art. 48 of the Statute of Workers Right (Estatuto de los Trabajadores) damage the worker depriving them from an appointment that corresponds to the worker. The maternity leave is not equal to a lack of capacity for the performance of their duties for the post under Spanish law. Law 30/1999 of 5th October of selection of temporary workers of the Health Service, does not exclude the recruitment of a person during the maternity leave. The decision of the High Court of the Basque Country was to appoint Mrs. Elena as temporary worker for the Basque Health Service (in particular for the substitution of the chief of psychiatry services in the hospital Santiago de Vitoria) for the remaining period until the fulfillment of the six (6) months period of the vacant position.

Durante un proceso de selección de personal para el Servicio de Salud Vasco, en particular para la sustitución del jefe de servicios de psiquiatría en el Hospital Santiago de Vitoria por un período de seis (6) meses, la Sra. Elena, que había tenido un bebé quince (15) días antes del proceso de selección mencionado anteriormente, fue obligada por la autoridad del Servicio Vasco de Salud a renunciar al cargo al que tenía derecho. La autoridad del Servicio Vasco de Salud privó a la Sra. Elena de un puesto que le correspondía y le otorgó la posición a alguien en la lista de reclutamiento temporal. La autoridad del Servicio Vasco de Salud obligó a la Sra. Elena a renunciar al cargo debido a su reciente maternidad cuando había dicho expresamente que quería aceptar ese trabajo. Artículo 48 del Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Estatuto de los Trabajadores) establece un daño al trabajador que ha sido privado de una cita que le corresponde. La licencia de maternidad no es igual a la falta de capacidad para el desempeño de sus funciones para el puesto bajo la ley española. La Ley 30/1999, de 5 de octubre, de selección de trabajadores temporales del Servicio de Salud, no excluye el reclutamiento de una persona durante la licencia de maternidad. La decisión del Tribunal Superior del País Vasco fue designar a la señora Elena como trabajadora temporal del Servicio Vasco de Salud (en particular para la sustitución del jefe de servicios de psiquiatría en el hospital Santiago de Vitoria) por el período restante hasta el cumplimiento del período de seis (6) meses del puesto vacante.



Cole, et al. v. Dixon Supreme Court of Liberia (1938)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

This case established that a wife’s dower is not an asset of her husband’s estate. After Mr. Dixon died intestate, his widow claimed that she held title to real property that had been conveyed to her as a deed of gift from her husband. The executor, appointed by the county, argued that the property was an asset of the estate because the right of dower accrues only after the death of the husband. The court disagreed, holding that “[the] inchoate right of dower is so vested in the wife as against the husband immediately on the marriage that no conveyance or act of the husband can deprive her of it,” including any creditors’ claims against the husband.



Williams v. Wynn Supreme Court of Liberia (1914)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

This case established a precedent for property rights of a widow when her husband dies intestate. On appeal, the Supreme Court excluded from probate ten acres of land to which Ms. Williams claimed title. Ms. Williams’ husband died intestate and the executor of his estate, appointed by the Probate Court, included all real and personal property from the marriage in determining the assets of the estate. Ms. Williams claimed that she held title to ten acres of property that her husband had purchased through a third party, with title vesting in the wife. The executor argued, and the trial court held, that all property acquired through the husband could be made liable for his debts. The trial court relied upon the Constitution of Liberia, which states “The property of which a woman may be possessed at the time of her marriage and also that of which she may afterwards become possessed, otherwise than by her husband shall not be held responsible for his debts.” The court reasoned that this clause implies that property acquired through her husband could be held liable for his debts. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that if a husband acquires property in the name of a third party, who becomes the medium through which title vests in the wife, the wife has an absolute right in that property and is not liable for the claims of the husband’s creditors. The court failed to apply this holding to personal property of the marriage, however, stating that instead personal property procured and owned by the deceased for the common use of the household is an asset of the estate.



Dlyon v. Lambert, et al. Supreme Court of Liberia (1884)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

This early case established the precedent that a married woman may own and convey property independent of her husband. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision denying ownership of a half-acre of land. Ms. Dlyon bought the property from a sheriff’s auction after it was repossessed for the payment of the owner’s debts. The Lamberts argued both that the previous possessor of the land never gained title of the property because he failed to obtain a fee simple deed so could not be used to pay his debts, and that even if he did have title, a married woman could not purchase land. On the first point, the court held that while the previous possessor did not have perfect title to the land, it could still be reached by creditors. On the second point, the court unambiguously declared that Ms. Dlyon had the right to purchase the property: “Under the Constitution, a femme couverte [married woman] may convey property she is possessed of otherwise than through her husband and this fact admits the inference that she may also bargain and buy property independent of her husband.”



Equal Opportunities Comm’n v. Dir. of Educ. High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2001)


Gender discrimination

The Equal Opportunities Commission (the “Commission”), which is an entity formed pursuant to Hong Kong’s Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Chapter 480 (the “Ordinance”), brought a challenge against the Director of Education (the “Director”), alleging that the system for transferring students from primary to secondary school (the “SSPA System”) discriminated against students on the basis of sex in violation of the Ordinance. The discrimination affected both sexes, but it primarily affected females. There were three structural elements of the SSPA system that allegedly discriminated against students: (1) A scaling mechanism, which scaled the scores of all primary students in their school assessments to ensure that they could be fairly compared with scores given by other primary schools; (2) a banding mechanism, which banded all students into broad orders of academic merit; and (3) a gender quota, which ensured that a fixed ratio of boys and girls were admitted to individual co- educational secondary schools. Though the structural elements were facially neutral, they were being employed on a gender basis. The Director argued that there were legitimate differences between boys and girls at younger ages, which justified the SSPA’s contested elements and, therefore, the SSPA simply removed initial gender bias inherent in the system. The High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region held that all three allegedly discriminatory elements of the SSPA system were in fact discriminatory and contrary to the Ordinance. The Court ordered—as requested by the Commission—that the Director eliminate sex discrimination against girls within a reasonable time and that a user-friendly mechanism be put in place to deal with and remedy complaints of sex discrimination by individual parents on behalf of their children.



Supreme Court Decision 2009Da19864 Supreme Court of South Korea (2011)


Gender discrimination

The Supreme Court upheld lower court’s decision finding that the Seoul Young Men’s Christian Associations (“YMCA”), a private organization, violated the Constitution when it excluded female from general membership. The Supreme Court found sexual discrimination, which excludes women from general membership qualification, to be against “social order exceeding tolerable limits in light of our community’s sound common senses and legal sentiment.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court found YMCA to have violated the Constitution despite its private organization status.



Hickie v. Hunt & Hunt Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1998)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Marea Hickie, a solicitor, claimed unlawful discrimination by her employer, the partnership of Hunt & Hunt, during and after her maternity leave. Shortly after returning from maternity leave, the firm decided not to renew Hickie's contract. At issue was a requirement that Hickie work full-time to maintain her position at the firm. Hickie claimed that the firm’s non-renewal constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, pregnancy, potential pregnancy and family responsibility. Upon review of the case, the Commission noted that such a requirement was “likely to disadvantage women” and therefore the firm’s non-renewal resulted from “an act of [indirect] discrimination.” The respondent firm was ordered to pay Hickie $95,000 in compensation.



Corneau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (2011)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

This case concerns a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. In response to an application for protection by Ms. Corneau, who sought protection from domestic violence perpetrated by her partner in Saint Lucia, the Board held that authorities in Saint Lucia were “capable of providing the applicant with adequate protection.” The applicant sought review of this determination. The Federal Court held that the Board’s finding was unreasonable, noting that “[t]he good intentions of a state to protect its citizens do not constitute state protection where in practice protection does not exist.” The Court stated that the Board failed to give adequate weight to contrary evidence and further noted that applicants for state protection are “not required to seek protection or assistance from non-governmental organizations or administrative agencies in order to rebut the presumption of state protection.”



Nawakwi v. Attorney General High Court of Zambia (1991)


Gender discrimination

Ms. Nawakwi was an unmarried mother of two who applied to have her children included in her passport. For her first child, the Passport Office required a birth certificate, which could only be obtained by Ms. Nawakwi swearing by affidavit that (1) she was the mother of the child and (2) the child was born out of wedlock. When the passport was then issued, she was required to swear a new affidavit to the same effect. However, the inclusion of her second child was approved immediately because his Tanzanian father had completed the relevant documents abroad. Ms. Nawakwi challenged this practice as discriminatory, because it recognized a foreign father, and not a Zambian mother, as the parent of a child. The High Court found that the mother of a child was not regarded by the government as equal to the father with respect to the passport application process. Accordingly, the High Court ruled that Ms. Nawakwi had been discriminated against on the grounds of sex. In addition to the foregoing, the High Court also held that (1) a single parent family headed by a male or female is a recognized family unit in the Zambian society and (2) a mother of a child does not need the consent of the father to have her children included in her passport or for them to be eligible to obtain passports or travel documents.



Terranova Homes & Care Ltd v Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc Court of Appeal of New Zealand (2014)


Gender discrimination

The work of caring for the elderly is “predominately performed by women.” Caregivers employed by Terranova alleged that both male and female caregivers were being paid less “than would be the case if caregiving of the aged were not work predominantly performed by women.” Terranova appealed the judgment of the Employment Court. On appeal, Terranova argued that the Act referred specifically to equal pay, rather than pay equity. The Court of Appeal rejected their argument, stating that “Pay equity is about equal pay. It is equal pay for work of equal value.” The Court relied on 3(1)(b) of the Equal Pay Act which “requires that equal pay for women for work predominantly or exclusively performed by women, is to be determined by reference to what men would be paid to do the same work abstracting from skills, responsibility, conditions and degrees of effort as well as from any systemic undervaluation of the work derived from current or historical or structural gender discrimination.” Terranova’s appeal was dismissed.



Ayoub v. AMP Bank Limited Court of Appeal of Australia (2011)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Ms. Ayoub claimed harassment and discrimination following a performance appraisal after which her position was made redundant. She also sought worker’s compensation for anxiety/distress caused by the alleged conduct. An arbitrator found for Ms. Ayoub on the basis that the company had failed to consult her on the redundancy decision and mishandled the performance appraisal and these actions caused her mental injuries. A court overturned the arbitrator, finding that first, while it would be unreasonable for an employer to inform a worker of her redundancy in a callous way, the redundancy decision was unrelated to Ms. Ayoub’s performance, and second, Ms. Ayoub’s position was such that she did not legally have to be consulted ahead of time. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Acting Deputy President’s decision, finding no error of law.



Gaylene Jessica Helen Main v. Kim Richards Topless Human Rights Review Tribunal (2004)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff was a milker employed by a dairy farm. The plaintiff complained that she was not considered for promotion or training opportunities because she was female. The plaintiff also alleged sexual harassment, in the form of unwelcome comments and jokes. The court found that the plaintiff did not establish that she had been a victim of unlawful discrimination on the ground of her sex. The court was satisfied that the plaintiff had made out her claim for sexual harassment and that the employer was vicariously liable for the acts of the employees because it had failed to take any adequate steps to prevent sexual harassment in the work place.



Jesus C. Garcia v. The Honorable Ray Alan T. Drilon, et al. Supreme Court of Philippines (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The plaintiff successfully sought a Temporary Protection Order against her husband under Republic Act No. 9626 Against Women and Their Children. The husband appealed, claiming the Act to be unconstitutional and the order therefore invalid because the Act favored women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. The Supreme Court held that the Act was valid, highlighting the unequal power relationship between women and men; that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women, which all make for real differences justifying the law.



Patricia Halagueña, et al. v. Philippine Airlines Incorporated Supreme Court of Philippines (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

Female flight attendants employed by Philippine Airlines alleged their collective bargaining agreement was discriminatory due to unequal grooming standards and a compulsory retirement requirement at fifty-five years of age for women but sixty years of age for men. At issue was whether the claim was a labor grievance such that the Regional Trial Court would lack jurisdiction to hear the claim. The Supreme Court held that the regional court had jurisdiction, because the action was not a grievance, but instead a civil action to annul a provision of the contract, and that the question for decision did not involve any determination of labor or union actions.



NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths, and Marriages v. Norrie High Court of Australia (2014)


Gender discrimination

After undergoing a sex affirmation procedure, Norrie registered as “non-specific” with the NSW Registrar. After initially approving this registration, the NSW informed Norrie that the registration was invalid. The Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales agreed with this determination, and the Tribunal’s appeal panel dismissed Norrie’s appeal. At this point, Norrie appealed to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, which remitted the matter to the Tribunal for determination of Norrie’s sex classification. The Registrar appealed to the High Court. The issue on appeal to the High Court was whether the NSW Registrar was in fact confined to registrations of “male” or “female,” which would preclude Norrie’s registration as “non-specific.” The High Court noted that the Transgender (Anti-Discrimination and Other Acts Amendment) Act of 1996, which amended the Births, Deaths, and Marriages Registration Act of 1995, recognized “ambiguities.” Furthermore, the Court pointed to its holding in AB v. Western Australia, where it stated that "the sex of a person is not ... in every case unequivocally male or female." On this basis, the High Court held that individuals do not have to affirmatively select “male” or “female” following a sex affirmation procedure, and may instead register as “non-specific” with the NSW Registrar.



Richardson v. Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd Federal Court of Australia (2014)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Rebecca Richardson brought a sexual harassment suit against a former co-worker, Randol Tucker. Before Richardson left the company, Richardson and Tucker were colleagues at Oracle Corporation Australia. At trial, Ms. Richardson prevailed and was awarded $18,000 in damages for which Oracle Corporation Australia was vicariously liable. Ms. Richardson appealed, arguing that the award was inadequate. The High Court highlighted the difficulty in formulating awards of general damages in sex discrimination cases, but acknowledged that harassment can cause severe physical and mental strain. The Court noted that more significant awards were granted to the victims of workplace bullying than the victims of sexual harassment despite “comparable” damage caused by both types of conduct. Based on the distress Richardson experienced because of Tucker’s conduct, the Federal Court found that the $18,000 award was inadequate and substituted an award of $100,000 to compensate Ms. Richardson for psychological injury caused by the sexual harassment.



Midwa v. Midwa Court of Appeal of Kenya at Nairobi (2000)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

A woman was being divorced by her husband on the grounds that her testing HIV-positive endangered his life. Although her salary contributed to the mortgage payments for the house, the High Court ordered that she be consigned to the servants’ quarters and denied custody of her children, pending the hearing for her husband’s petition for divorce. She sought a stay of execution of the High Court’s order in her application. The Court of Appeal noted that it is trite law that children be placed with their mother unless there were good reasons not to do so. It also ruled that it was inconceivable that a woman be turned out of a house for which she is a 50% holder. The Court decided in favor of the application and granted a stay of execution.



Claimants (on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children) v. the Secretary of State for Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service District Court of the Hague (2010)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Honor crimes (or honour crimes), Sexual violence and rape

The claimants, on behalf of themselves and their two minor daughters, sought residence permits under the Aliens Act 2000. The claimants stated that if they returned to Afghanistan, the mother and daughters would be subjected to inhuman treatment under Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights. The claimants noted that women were systematically disadvantaged and discriminated against in Afghanistan. Women were subject to violence throughout the country, including the claimants’ area of origin, and had no protection from the government (if they even had the opportunity of access to the courts). Women suffer domestic violence, sexual violence, honor crimes, and arranged marriage. Women do not have the same rights as men (even though the constitution states that men and women are equal), are seen as property, and have little to no access to education or health care. The District Court found the mother’s and daughters’ appeals well-founded and ordered the government to consider the applications.



Kalulu v. Mahirima High Court of Tanzania (2011)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The father of the deceased objected to the appointment of his son’s wife as an administratrix of the will. He claimed that there was no evidence that a customary marriage had taken place between his son and the respondent or that the couple had not been divorced in the interim. He also contended that Chagga customary law on succession and inheritance barred women from administering wills. The Court dismissed his appeal. It noted even if there had not been a customary marriage between the deceased and the respondent, the duration and nature of their relationship satisfied the requirements for a presumed marriage. Furthermore, the Court cited Article 12 and 13 of the Constitution and Article 1 of CEDAW to emphasize its commitment to ending gender-based discrimination. It decided that following Chagga customary law would be discriminatory and that the deceased wife would remain as an administratrix of the will.



Constitucionalidade da Lei Maria da Penha (ADC 19 e ADI 4424) (Constitutionality of Lei Maria da Penha (Federal Domestic Violence Law) Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (2012)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

Following a request to Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) by then-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the STF reviewed and upheld the constitutionality of the Lei Maria da Penha (“LMP”). The LMP is Brazil’s first law to address the problem of domestic violence against women on a national scale. The law’s provision for the creation of special courts, as well as the law’s differentiated protection of women, had come under scrutiny in many of Brazil’s lower courts as unconstitutional. The STF, however, has previously held that those articles were constitutional. President Silva argued that the LMP was constitutional due to Article 226, § 8 of the Federal Constitution, and Brazil’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women. The Justices agreed that the LMP does not create a law of unequal treatment between men and women, but addresses the reality of longstanding discrimination and aggression directed at women, and offers substantive mechanisms to promote equality without infringing on the rights of males. The Court also found that the provision of specialized courts is constitutional and not in conflict with state control of the local courts. Finally, with a majority vote of 10-1, the Justices held that the office of the public prosecutor can prosecute domestic violence cases even when the victim fails to appear or file a complaint against her aggressor. The majority reasoned that state intervention is necessary to guarantee the victim’s protection from the risk of ongoing violence, which may be aggravated by the victim appearing in the action against her aggressor.

O Presidente do Brasil em 2012, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, ajuizou pedido de revisão da constitucionalidade da Lei Maria da Penha (LMP) ao Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, sob a ótica do tratamento diferenciado conferido pela Lei aos homens e as mulheres. Em breve retrospecto, a LMP é o primeiro dispositivo legal enderençando o problema da violência doméstica sofrida pelas mulheres em nível nacional. Em razão da referida lei prever a instituição de Juizados Especiais de violência doméstica e familiar contra a mulher, bem como diferenciar a proteção conferida às mulheres vítima de violência doméstica, diversas varas de primeira instância passaram a julgar os dispositivos das leis como inconstitucionais, muito embora o STF já tivesse firmado entendimento pela constitucionalidade da LMP. No pedido encaminhado pelo então presidente Lula argumentou que o parágrafo 8º do artigo 226 da Constituição Federal (o qual prevê que o Estado assegurará a assistência à família na pessoa de cada um dos que a integram, criando mecanismos para coibir a violência no âmbito de suas relações), bem como a ratificação do Brasil a Convenção sobre a Eliminação de todas as Formas de Discriminação contra a Mulher (CEDAW) e a Convenção Interamericana para Prevenir, Punir e Erradicar a Violência contra a Mulher garantiriam a constitucionalidade da LMP. Os Ministros do STF, quando da análise do assunto, entenderam a LMP não criou tratamento desigual em relação aos homens e mulheres, tendo endereçado apenas os problemas de discriminação e agressões dirigidas às mulheres, oferecendo, portanto, mecanismos de proteção que auxiliam na promoção da igualdade, sem retirar qualquer direito dos homens. O STF entendeu ainda que as provisões relativas à criação de Juizados Especiais são constitucionais, não havendo conflitos entre o controle jurisdicional estadual e local. Finalmente, a maioria dos Ministros (10-1) entendeu que as Promotorias Públicas têm competência para denunciar casos de violência doméstica, a inda que a vítima desista de aparecer em juízo ou prosseguir com a denúncia contra o agressor. A maioria justificou que a intervenção estatal se faz necessária para a garantia de proteção à vítima em razão do risco iminente de violência, a qual poderia ser agravada caso a vítima denunciasse seu agressor.



Case Number E.2006/156, K.2008/125 Constitutional Court of Turkey (2008)


Gender discrimination

The Constitutional Court found that a Labour Law that states that an employer must pay severance to a woman who requests to terminate her employment contract within a year of getting married is constitutional and not discriminatory. Under Article 14.1 of the Turkish Labour Law, an employer must pay severance to a woman who requests to terminate her employment contract within a year of getting married. The Izmir 6th Labour Court found that this provision is discriminatory under the Constitution as it treats male and female workers differently. Using Article 41 and Article 50 of the Turkish Constitution, the Constitutional Court, however, ruled that the law is not discriminatory and does not violate the Constitution. Under Article 41, Turkey has the power to “take necessary measures” to ensure the “peace and welfare” of the family, specifically in regards to the protection of mothers and children. Article 50 allows women, and other protected groups, to enjoy “special working conditions.” The Court found that the goal of the Labour Law to protect both female workers and the family union aligned with these two Articles, and thus was neither discriminatory nor in violation of the Constitution.



Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade 1946 MC/DF Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2003)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) reviewed the constitutionality of the 1998 Amendment 20 of the Federal Social Security Law. The amendment imposed a maximum value on the amount of social security benefits that could be paid to a beneficiary under the general social security system at R$1,200 per month. On its face, the R$1,200 maximum applied equally to a number of eligible benefit categories, including maternity or pregnancy-related leave. The amendment was challenged on the grounds that, when read together with Article 7, Section XVIII, of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the amendment had a discriminatory effect on women. This provision essentially guarantees that an employee is paid her full salary during maternity leave. By imposing a cap on social security coverage during maternity leave, Amendment 20 would require the employer to cover the difference between the R$1,200 cap and the employee’s full pay. The party challenging the amendment argued that this created a negative incentive to employers who would discriminate in hiring women or in setting women’s salary by paying women less in order to stay under the R$1,200 cap. The Court agreed that Amendment 20 was discriminatory in its effect. In a unanimous decision, the STF held that the effect of Amendment 20 conflicted with the Brazilian Constitution’s equal protection provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court therefore ordered that Amendment 20 be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Article 7 of the Constitution such that implementation of the social security cap does not extend to maternity and pregnancy-related leave.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, ao analisar a constitucionalidade da Emenda Constitucional n. 20/1998 que modificou as regras da previdência social brasileira. Referida Emenda Constitucional estabeleceu um limite máximo para os benefícios da previdência social em R$ 1.200,00 por mês. Nesse sentido, o teto de R$ 1.200,00 se aplicava igualmente a várias categorias de benefícios elegíveis, incluindo licença maternidade ou relacionadas à gravidez. A emenda foi contestada com base no fato de que, lida em conjunto com o artigo 7, inciso XVIII, da Constituição Brasileira de 1988, a emenda teve um efeito discriminatório sobre as mulheres. Esta disposição garante essencialmente que uma funcionária receba seu salário integral durante a licença-maternidade. Ao impor um teto à cobertura da seguridade social durante a licença-maternidade, a Emenda 20/98 exigiria que o empregador cobrisse a diferença entre o teto de R$ 1.200 e o salário integral da empregada. A parte que contesta a emenda argumentou que isto criou um incentivo negativo para empregadores que discriminariam na contratação de mulheres ou na fixação do salário das mulheres, pagando às mulheres menos para permanecerem abaixo do teto de R$ 1.200. O Tribunal concordou que a Emenda 20/98 era discriminatória em seu efeito. Em uma decisão unânime, o STF considerou que o efeito da Emenda 20/98 conflitava com as disposições de proteção igualitária da Constituição brasileira, que proíbe a discriminação com base no gênero. Portanto, o STF determinou que a Emenda 20/98 fosse interpretada de forma coerente com o artigo 7 da Constituição, de modo que a imposição do teto da previdência social não se estendesse à licença maternidade e à licença relacionada à gravidez.



Israel Women’s Network v. Government Supreme Court of Israel (1994)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Three men were appointed to the boards of directors of Government corporations when neither board was comprised of any women members at the time of appointments. The court found each appointment unlawful under s. 18A of the Government Corporations Law (Amendment No. 6) (Appointments), which required ministers to appoint, “in so far as it is possible in the circumstances of the case, directors of the sex that is not properly represented at that time on the board of directors of the corporation.” As a result, the court set aside each of the three appointments without prejudice.



Migdal Insurance Company Ltd v. Abu-Hana Supreme Court of Israel (2005)


Gender discrimination

The court held that loss of earnings damages for minor children should be based upon the national average wage. Factors that might warrant deviation from this presumption include the child’s age, when there is a real chance the child would have worked in another country, and other concrete characteristics of the injured child. Here, because the child in question was injured when she was only five months old, assumptions regarding her future were inappropriate.



Mme Florence B…/IBM, RG 02/00504, Arret n. 635 2003 Cour d’appel de Montpellier (2003)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Florence B, an employee of SA IBM France, was promoted to the rank of “coefficient 285” in March 1986. She remained in this position for a total of 12 years. Company statistics demonstrated that the average period of employment for male employees of the company in this position was only 4.11 years. Florence B claimed that the company failed to promote her based on grounds of sexual discrimination. IBM France SA was unable to justify Florence B’s lack of career advancement and refused to provide documentation to show that Florence B’s lack of advancement was justified. Florence B was awarded damages of 30,000 euros to compensate her for the lack of career advancement and the court ordered her promotion to “coefficient 114.” The costs of the case were to be determined in accordance with Article 700 of the New Civil Code of Procedure, in favor of the appellant.

Florence B, une employée chez SA IBM France a été promue au rang “coefficient 285” en mars 1986. Elle a resté à ce rang pendant 12 ans. Les statistiques de la compagnie démontrait que les employés mâles restaient à ce rang pour une moyenne de 4.11 ans avant d’être encore promus. Florence B prétendait que la compagnie ne l’a pas promue en conséquence de sexisme. IBM France SA n’a pas pu justifier la manque d’avancement de Florence B et a refuse de fournir des preuves démontrant que cette manqué était justifiée. La cour a ordonné que Florence B reçoit 30,000 euros comme recompension pour la manqué d’avancement. La cour a aussi ordonné qu’elle soit promue au rang “coefficient 114.” Les coûts de litige devaient être determines en accordance avec l’Article 700 de la nouvelle code civile de procedure, en faveur de l’appelant.



Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs Supreme Court of Israel (1988)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The petitioner, a female resident of Yerucham and an Orthodox Jew, was disqualified from the local religious council because of a tradition of not appointing women as members of religious councils. The court found, however, that although the religious council provided services that were religious in character, the qualifications of the council were solely dictated by the general legal system. Thus, the exclusion of the petitioner based upon her gender was discriminatory.



Dr. Naomi Nevo v. National Labour Court Supreme Court of Israel (1990)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The petitioner challenged a pension rule requiring women to retire at age 60 while requiring men to retire at age 65. The court held that the rule was discriminatory, because it treated women differently from men where there was no relevant difference between men and women such that the rule served a legitimate purpose. In addition, the fact that the Male and Female Workers (Equal Retirement Age) Law, which corrected the difference, came into force subsequent to the judgment of the lower court did not preclude a showing of discrimination prior to the law coming into effect.



Cour de cassation, N. de pourvoi: 02-44904, 2004 Cour de Cassation, chambre sociale (2004)


Gender discrimination

Contract of employment – dismissal – sexist and racist remarks – real and serious cause. Mr. X, employed as a chef by the company “Pavillion Montsouris”, was dismissed by a letter dated 4 June 1999 for gross negligence following several instances of alleged sexist and racist remarks made at the workplace towards several members of staff. The Court of Appeal of Paris dismissed the case, interpreting the comments made by Mr. X as “out of place” and “of bad taste” but not serious enough to warrant his dismissal. The Court of Cassation rejected this decision, reaffirming that Mr. X’s actions were nonetheless very serious and real (although this was not considered to amount to gross negligence, which only applies if there is an intention to harm towards an employer and cannot be applied between co-workers). The court confirmed that the severity of Mr. X’s sexist and racist comments were such that his dismissal was justified. This case marks the courts’ rejection of the trivialization of serious sexist and racist remarks towards female employees at the workplace.

M. X a été démis de son travail suivant plusieurs allegations d’instances de commentaires sexists et racists qu’il a fait dans son milieu de travail envers plusieurs collègues. La cour d’appel de Paris a rejeté l’affaire, trouvant les commentaires simplement hors de propos et de mauvais goût mais pas aussi sérieux pour justifier son démis. Par la suite, la cour de cassation a rejeté cette decision, affirmant que les actions de M. X ont étés très sérieux (mais pas au niveau de negligence grave, ce qui est seulement applicable s’il existe l’intention de faire mal à un employeur, mais pas à un collègue. La cour a confirmé que la sévèrité des commentaires de M. X envers les employés femelles dans le milieu de travail étaient tells que son démis était justifié.



Barriya v. The Kadi of the Sharia Moslem Court Supreme Court of Israel (1955)


Gender discrimination

The aunt of three children applied to a Moslem Religious Court to be appointed as their guardian. The children’s mother argued that she was entitled to the guardianship under the Women’s Equal Rights Law. The mother, believing that the religious judge (the Kadi) would apply religious law and disregard the Women’s Equal Rights Law, applied for an order staying or setting aside the proceedings of the religious court. The court held that the issue was not ripe for review, as there was no indication that the Kadi would disregard civil law and rely only upon religious law. The order in which the Kadi decided to proceed was a matter of procedure with which the court would not interfere.



Ali v. State & Ors Delhi High Court (2013)


Gender discrimination

The court declared the current gate pass regime, which required litigants to provide a photo identification when entering the court premises, unconstitutional, because it violates the open court principle by restricting court access to only parties to cases listed on particular day or parties who seek to inspect the record in their cases. The Court noted that the gate pass application would disproportionately affect the economically weak, inter alia, women and children, to access courts.



Delhi High Court Bar Association v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi Delhi High Court (2013)


Gender discrimination

The court held that the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi lacked the power to amend central statutes, thereby declaring the Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act of 2012, through which the Delhi government had sought to increase court fees payable in Delhi, as void. The court reaffirmed that only the Parliament is empowered to amend or repeal central statutes by virtue of Article 246(4), and the procedure prescribed under the Constitution for obtaining presidential assent must be strictly followed. In addition, the court observed that the Amendment Act adversely impacts fundamental rights and results in violation of Article 38 and 39A of the Constitution of India on various count, such as reducing women’s access to court.



Decriminalization of Abortion in Cases of Anencephaly: Claim For Disobeying a Fundamental Constitutional Dispositive No. 54/2004 Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2012)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

In 2004, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) considered a claim brought by the National Trade Union of Health Workers and ANIS (Institute of Bioethics, Human Rights, and Gender) to determine whether terminating a pregnancy in which the fetus suffers from anencephaly (absence of major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp) violates the prohibition on abortion as set forth in Brazil’s Penal Code. On April 12, 2012, the STF rendered an 8-2 decision (with one abstention) that abortion in the circumstance of anencephaly is not a criminal act under the Penal Code. The majority extended a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy to cases of anecephalic fetuses because the fetus does not have the potential for a viable life outside of the womb, and to force a woman to carry such a pregnancy to term is akin to torture. Justice Marco Aurelio and the majority held that to interpret the Penal Code to prohibit such abortion would violate a woman’s constitutional guarantees of human dignity, autonomy, privacy, and the right to health. A woman therefore may seek and receive treatment to terminate the anencephalic pregnancy without risk of criminal prosecution and without judicial involvement.

Em 2004, a Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, quando da análise do Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 54 formalizada pela Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Saúde – CNTS, determinou que a interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico não viola as proibições de realização de aborto trazidas no Código Penal. Em abri de 2012, o Pleno do STF entendeu, por 8-2 votos (com uma abstenção), pela descriminalização do aborto realizado em razão da anencefalia do feto. A maioria estendeu o direito da mulher de interromper sua gravidez a casos de fetos anencefálicos porque o feto não tem potencial para uma vida viável fora do útero, e forçar uma mulher a levar tal gravidez adiante é semelhante a tortura. O Juiz Marco Aurélio e a maioria dos juízes sustentou que interpretar o Código Penal para proibir tais abortos violaria as garantias constitucionais de dignidade humana, autonomia, privacidade e o direito à saúde da mulher. Assim, a mulher poderá procurar e receber tratamento para interromper a gravidez anencefálica sem risco de processo criminal e sem envolvimento judicial.



R. v. Morgentaler Supreme Court of Canada (1988)


Gender discrimination

Prior to this case, a woman had to get the approval from the therapeutic abortion committee of an approved hospital before she could get an abortion in Canada. Abortions performed without this approval were illegal. Three doctors, including Dr. Morgentaler, set up a clinic to perform abortions for women who did not have the necessary approval and the doctors were criminally charged. They argued that the abortion laws violated a woman’s right to security of the person. The Supreme Court of Canada decided that the Criminal Code’s restrictions on abortion were unconstitutional because they increased health risks to women, depriving them of the right to security of the person. Since this decision, no abortion laws have been enacted. Therefore, this decision has had the practical effect of giving women the freedom of choice.



Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. Supreme Court of Canada (1989)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Three female Safeway employees filed a complaint with the Manitoba Human Rights Commission stating that the company plan discriminated based on sex and family status by denying benefits for loss of pay due to accident or sickness during a 17-week period during pregnancy (even if the accident or sickness at issue was unrelated to the pregnancy). The Commission’s adjudicator dismissed the claims, and this decision was upheld by the Court of the Queen’s Bench and the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada decided that Safeway’s plan did discriminate against pregnant women. Noting that “it cannot be said that discrimination is not proven unless all members of a particular class are equally affected,” the Supreme Court of Canada determined Safeway discriminated against the employees on the basis of sex under the Manitoba Human Rights Act.



Sapana Pradhan Malla and Others v, Office of Prime Minister and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2006)


Gender discrimination

The Women, Law and Development Forum of Nepal won a petition calling for the Supreme Court to order revision of a law setting the legal age for marriage at 18 years for women and 22 years for men. The Court held that this law promoted gender inequality in contradiction of Article 11 of the Constitution and acknowledged that it can cause significant harm in a country where female literacy rates are low and there are high levels of gender discrimination. The Court also ordered for better enforcement of these laws in light of the continued prevalence of child marriage. Here the Supreme Court of Nepal has once again heeded a petition from a civilian organization and privileged gender equality in reformulating laws, showing a willingness to uphold women’s rights, promote social change, and respond to activism from groups such as the Women, Law, and Development Forum.



Chile v. Rodrigo Gacitua Escobar, Criminal Court of Viña del Mar, 2013 Criminal Court of Viña del Mar (2013)


Gender discrimination

The Criminal Court of Viña del Mar sentenced Rodrigo Gacitúa Escobar to life imprisonment for a series of robberies, rapes, and other crimes committed between 2010 and 2012. The prosecutor, Vivian Quiñones, expressed satisfaction at the result, and pointed out the impact of the testimony from the victims. The defense unsuccessfully attempted to discredit the victims’ testimony, including using postings on social media.

El Juzgado de lo Penal de Viña del Mar condenó a Rodrigo Gacitúa Escobar a cadena perpetua por una serie de robos, violaciones y otros delitos cometidos entre 2010 y 2012. La fiscal, Vivian Quiñones, expresó satisfacción por el resultado y señaló el impacto del testimonio de las víctimas para la conclusión legal. La defensa intentó sin éxito desacreditar el testimonio de las víctimas por medios que incluyeron el uso de publicaciones en las redes sociales.



Jit Kumari Pangeni (Neupane) and Others v. Prime Ministers and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2008)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

A woman who had been a repeated victim of marital rape petitioned the Supreme Court of Nepal to make sentencing for marital rape on par with sentencing for other types of rape. The Court found that punishing marital rape differently from other forms of rape violated equal rights provisions in the Interim Constitution and international law, especially considering that prior sentencing guidelines of three to six months put the victim in danger of repeated violence and rape. Although the Court did not have the power to change sentencing terms on existing offences, it directed the legislative authorities to change sentencing terms for marital rape, showing recognition of the gravity of rape as a violation of rights and dignity while also exhibiting a proactive will to reform legal codes in the name of equality.



In Re Estate of Lerionka Ole Ntutu (Deceased) High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Family Division) (2008)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law, Property and inheritance rights

The sons of Lerionka Ole Ntutu filed to prevent Ntutu’s married daughters from receiving their inheritance of his estate Section 82(4) (b) of the Kenyan Constitution. Under Kikuyu customary law, only unmarried daughters were allowed an inheritance. The presiding judge held that this claim was illegitimate, stating that the law cannot deprive a person of their rights only on the basis of sex and marital status. The judge followed the precedent set by the ruling in Rono v. Rono, Kenya Court of Appeal, 2005, in circumscribing customary law to prevent violations of justice, morality, and other written law. This case marked another important step in upholding women’s rights and human rights law over harmful customary practices towards women.



Achyut Prasad Kharel v. Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2008)


Gender discrimination

A petition to require consent from the woman’s husband in a law in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal allowing women to have an abortion on fetuses of less than 12 weeks cited CEDAW conventions mandating equality between men and women on matters relating to family planning. The Court dismissed the petition emphasizing that CEDAW is intended to promote and protect women’s rights and to consider the wording of equality in such absolute terms would, in fact, be contrary to this original intent. With this ruling, the Supreme Court of Nepal shows remarkable dedication to protecting and empowering women as the primary goal in interpreting legal conventions on women’s rights.



Tek Tamrakar and Others v. HMG Cabinet Secretariat and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2005)


Gender discrimination

Women of Badi origin, an ethnic minority subjected to social and economic exclusion in Nepal, are often forced into prostitution and become single mothers. The petition sought to rectify the common practice of denying citizenship and other rights to Badi children when the father cannot be found. The Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to deny citizenship on such claims and, furthermore, amended a law that gave men precedence over women in birth and death registrations. Finally, in light of the range of abuses suffered by the Badi, the Court ordered a study on problems faced by the Badi community directed that all recommendations produced be implemented. This case is remarkable not only in recognizing the impacts of ethnic and gender discrimination but also in going beyond the petitioners request to proactively address the wider range of related rights abuses.



Pun Devi Maharjan v GoN, Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2008)


Gender discrimination

A petition claimed that the traditional practice of electing young girls as Kumaris, or “goddesses”, who are expected to follow certain social restrictions and appear at religious festivals violated the rights of the child. After ordering a study the Court found that this practice did not prevent the Kumari from getting an education or qualify as child labor. Rather, the Court found Kumaris to be an important cultural and religious institution and ordered compensation for former Kumaris who had not been socially reintegrated and ordered a study to find recommendations for preserving the rights, interests, and social security of current and ex-Kumaris. This case shows an astute consideration of the balance between cultural preservation and child’s rights in a country with deep cultural and religious traditions. Additionally, it sets the important precedent of considering the practical well-being and rights of the child before implementing human rights reforms.



Meera Dhungana v Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2007)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The petitioner filed to amend a provision in pension payments by the Nepalese Army that withheld payments from married daughters. The Court ruled to invalidate this measure based on the grounds that pension payments to children were stopped at 18 years, before the legal age of marriage, making it obsolete. However, the Court also acknowledged that this provision was contrary to Article 11 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal which guarantees equal rights to all, in particular highlighting that equality is meant in practical terms sometimes necessitating positive discrimination. By interpreting Article 11 of the Constitution to include positive discrimination, this case opens the door to proactive human rights defense measures.



Prakash Mani Sharma and Others v GON, Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (1999)


Gender discrimination

Citing the prevalence of uterus prolapse in pregnant women in Nepal, the petitioner filed that the government should be responsible for providing infrastructures to support women’s reproductive health under Article 20 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal which guarantees the right to reproductive health for all women. The Court ruled that reproductive health was a right tied to all other basic human rights but that, unlike freedom of speech and others, it requires positive infrastructures to be upheld, therefore ordering that a bill be passed providing reproductive health services to pregnant women. In this ruling the Court emphasized that proactive measures must be taken to ensure that women, who face different societal and health challenges, are given the same rights as men; this marks an important distinction between guaranteeing rights and practicing equality.



Sapana Pradhan and Others v. Prime Minister and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2008)


Gender discrimination

The Forum for Women, Law and Development in Nepal petitioned the Supreme Court to revise a law allowing men to take second wives if their first wife is significantly ill or handicapped and gives consent. The Court found that this law was inconsistent with Article 11 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, which guarantees equal rights for women, and with international women’s rights conventions, including CEDAW. In its ruling, the court stated that a husband should care for a sick or handicapped spouse and that requiring consent could promote domestic violence. By taking action to change this law the Court showed a dedication to real reform based on the Constitutional mandate for gender equality, crucially recognizing that accepted traditional practices must be reappraised.



Punyabati Pathak and Others v Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2005)


Gender discrimination

The Court upheld a petition to quash a provision of the Nepalese Passport Act that requires women under the age of 35 to procure a letter of consent from a guardian before obtaining a passport. The Court ruled that the provision was contrary to Article 11 of the Constitution because it infringed on equal treatment between men and women, was contrary to the mandate for positive discrimination to ensure equality for women, and inhibited a woman’s right to enjoy the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and international human rights treaties. Thus, the Court quashed this provision and directed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue passports to Nepali women without a letter of permission, putting an end to a highly prejudiced practice that had prevented women from accessing education, employment, and cultural enrichment outside of Nepal.



Meera Dhungana and Others v. Office of the Prime Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2004)


Gender discrimination

After hearing a petition from the Forum for Women, Law and Development in Nepal, the Supreme Court ruled to invalidate a law allowing men to seek a second wife if, after 10 years of marriage, they have not had a child with their first wife. The Court recognized that this law gave unequal treatment to women and men by not giving comparable recourse to women and implying that infertility was the fault of the woman. The law was therefore inconsistent with Article 11 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal and with international gender rights conventions including CEDAW. This ruling represents an important step in reevaluating widely accepted laws from a gender equality standpoint. In addition, the Court acknowledged that it was constitutional to employ positive discrimination to guarantee equal rights for women, allowing for proactive defense of women’s rights in Nepal.



Meera Dhungana v Prime Minister and Office of Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2005)


Gender discrimination

Meera Dhungana, an important women’s rights advocate in Nepal, petitioned the government to deem void a provision of the Bonus Act in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal that prevents married daughters of a deceased from receiving compensation upon his death. The petitioner claimed that this provision discriminates against women based on their gender and marital status, thus contradicting the Constitution and international gender rights conventions. The Court denied the petition, finding that the Bonus Act treats male and female successors equally unless a daughter is married, in which case she has equal inheritance rights with her husband. This case marks the limitations to legal reforms that the Supreme Court will consider in the defense of gender equality, showing a consideration of Constitutional law, international conventions, and practical outcomes for women.



Meera Dhungana v. Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2006)


Gender discrimination, International law

A petition on behalf of the Forum for Women, Law and Development in Nepal called for revision of a law prohibiting dowries. The law imposed a much stricter sentence on the bride’s family than the grooms, making it inconsistent with the equal rights provisions in Article 11 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal and international human rights standards. The Court’s decision to revise the law, which cited earlier rulings based on Article 11, shows a continued dedication to transforming the Nepalese legal code in the interest of gender rights and equality.



Sapana Pradhan Malla v Office of Prime Minister and Council of Minister and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2007)


Gender discrimination

The Forum for Women, Law and Development in Nepal brought a petition to the Supreme Court filing for an exhaustive law ensuring privacy for vulnerable groups; particularly women, children, and persons living with HIV/AIDS. The Court ruled that enforcing the right to privacy for these and other sensitive parties in legal proceedings is inextricable from other Constitutional rights, including life and dignity, and vital to ensuring justice. Therefore, the Court ordered a directive for a law to be passed ensuring the right to privacy and set forth detailed guidelines for maintaining privacy to be followed in the interim. This ruling guarantees a crucial right to victims of gender violence and other abuses, opening a window for them to seek justice without fearing further injury from social stigma, discrimination, or retaliation. Furthermore, the ruling acknowledges that certain Constitutional rights much be positively enforced through legal codes.



Rama Panta Kharel and Others v. Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2008)


Gender discrimination

A petition to replace the existing limitations on dowry size in the Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) with a prohibition of all dowries based on the mandate for gender equality in Article 11 of the Constitution and international conventions such as CEDAW was quashed on grounds that there was not sufficient proof that allowing limited dowries was discriminatory. However, in recognition of the social harm caused by large dowries including impoverishment, competitiveness, and negative views of women, the Court directed that current laws limiting dowries be enforced more effectively and that sensitization on the harmful aspects of dowries be implemented. This ruling demarcates the limits of petitioning for gender equality against traditional and constitutional law while still showing the willingness of the Court to promote women’s rights through means outside the Constitution.



C.K. & 11 Others v. Commissioner of Police High Court of Kenya at Meru (2013)


Gender discrimination, International law, Statutory rape or defilement

The petitioners are eleven minors and the non-governmental organization that shelters, educates, and cares for the eleven minors. Each child claims to have been subjected to child abuse and defilement in Meru County, where police "neglected...or otherwise failed" to investigate or protect the children in any way. The High Court of Kenya held that the police have a duty to investigate allegations of sexual abuse made by female complainants, stating that “by failing to enforce existing defilement laws, the police have contributed to the development of a culture of tolerance for pervasive sexual violence against girl children and impunity.”



Bebb v. Law Society Court of Appeals of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (1914)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Gwyneth Bebb, upon being denied admission to the Law Society to take the preliminary examination to become a solicitor, took the matter to court. In Bebb v. Law Society, the Court of Appeal stated that the question of whether the gender-neutral language of the statutes meant that women could gain admission to the bar was settled through “long usage” in the common law and found that women were not included under “persons” in the Solicitor’s Act of 1843. Additionally, women were considered to have an additional disability at common law, namely that after marriage they are not able to enter into contracts with third parties. As every woman held the potential of being married, this disability was also applied to unmarried women.



Bradwell v. The State United States Supreme Court (1872)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Myra Bradwell petitioned to be admitted to the bar and to be allowed to practice law, but was denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The United States Supreme Court upheld this decision, noting that a woman’s freedom to pursue the occupation of a lawyer was not a “privilege and immunity” of Untied States citizenship that was protected from state restriction by the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus the court found that excluding women from the bar did not violate the U.S. Constitution.



Hall v. Incorporated Society of Law Agents Court of Sessions (1901)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Margaret Hall appealed to the Court of Sessions regarding the decision of the Society of Law Agents in Scotland to deny her permission to take the preliminary examination for the Society. Hall argued that she should be given permission because the statute permitted “persons” to become law agents and so, by its terms, did not exclude women. The Society had found that women did not have a legal right to practice law given that “[a]ccording to inveterate usage and custom in Scotland, that practice has in all departments of the law been hitherto confined exclusively to men.” Upon Hall’s appeal, the Court of Sessions also refused to grant her permission because the statute did not explicitly include women, even though it did not explicitly exclude them either. In support of its decision, the court stated that the word “persons” had to be interpreted according to its customary usage; because women had been ineligible to become law agents when the statute was enacted in 1873, the court found the customary usage of “persons” to mean “male persons” and accordingly refused Hall’s appeal.



Incorporated Law Society v. Wookey, 1912 AD 623 Appellant Division (Appêlant Afdeling) (1912)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

A firm of attorneys was willing to enroll Madeline Wookey as an articled clerk, but Wookey met with opposition from the Cape Law Society, which refused to register her articles. Wookey submitted an application to the Cape Supreme Court, which ordered the Society to register her. The Law Society appealed this decision to the Appellate Division, arguing that Wookey could not be admitted as an attorney because she was a woman. The Appellate Division was called upon to decide whether the term “persons” used in the statute governing admission of attorneys to the bar included only “male persons” or also included women. They determined that “persons” included only male persons, thus excluding women from the legal profession.

'n Prokureurs firma was bereid om Madeline Wookey as 'n geartikelde klerk in te skryf, maar Wookey het teenkanting van die Kaapse Regsvereniging ontvang, wat geweier het om haar artikels te registreer. Wookey het 'n aansoek by die Kaapse Hooggeregshof ingedien, wat die Vereniging beveel het om haar te registreer. Die Regsvereniging het hierdie besluit aan die Appel-afdeling beroep en geargumenteer dat die Wookey nie as 'n prokureur toegelaat kon word nie omdat sy 'n vrou is. Die Appélaat Afdeling was ontbied om te besluit of die term "persone" wat in die statuut wat die toelating van prokureurs tot die balie hanteer slegs "manlike persone" insluit het of ook vroue ingesluit het. Hulle het vasgestel dat "persone" slegs manlike persone ingesluit het, en het dus vroue by die regsprofessie uitgesluit.



In re Maddox Maryland Court of Appeals (1901)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This case addressed the claims of Etta Haynie Maddox that she should be allowed to sit for the bar examination and receive admission to the bar despite a Maryland state statute limiting bar admission to “male citizens of Maryland.” The Maryland Court of Appeals denied her application, stating that the court did not have the power to enact legislation. Thus until the legislative branch declared that women could be admitted to the bar, the court did not have any power to admit Maddox.



Schlesin v. Incorporated Law Society, 1909 TSC 363. Transvaal Supreme Court (Transvaal Hoofgeregs Hof) (1909)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

In 1909, Judge Bristowe of the Transvaal Supreme Court presided over Schlesin v. Incorporated Law Society, the first case in South Africa to consider whether women had a right to enter the legal profession. The Transvaal Supreme Court held that women were barred from admission to legal practice based on historical practice in South Africa, Holland, and England. Judge Bristowe explained that the Interpretation of Laws Proclamation 15 of 1902 provided that “words of the masculine gender shall include females…unless contrary intention appears” and found that given long historical practice, it was evident that contrary intention did indeed appear in the legislation governing admission to the bar.

In 1909 het Regter Bristowe van die Transvaal se Hooggeregs Hof oor Schlesin v. Geinkorporeerde Regsvereniging voorgesit. Die hof het beslis dat vroue toegang tot die regspraktyk verbied word op grond van die historiese praktyk in Suid-Afrika, Holland en Engeland. Regter Bristowe het verduidelik dat die interpretasie van Wette- Proklamasie 15 van 1902 met dien verstande dat "woorde van die manlike geslag, vroulikes sal insluit ... tensy daar ‘n teenstrydige bedoeling is" en het gevind dat die gegewe lang historiese praktyke, was dit duidelik dat ‘n teenstrydige voorneme inderdaad verskyn in die wetgewing wat toelating tot die balie toelaat.



In re Goodell Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1875)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

In Goodell, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to include women within the construction of the word “person” and denied Goodell admission to the bar because she was a woman. Judge Ryan noted that that extending the meaning of “person” to include females as well could result in perverse interpretations of the law, and provided examples of the ridiculous results he foresaw, including the “prosecution [of a woman] for the paternity of a bastard…” In support of his conclusion that a gender-neutral statute did not mean that women could be admitted to the bar, Judge Ryan also maintained that the admission of women to the bar was not something contemplated by the state legislators who enacted of the legislation in question; thus he found “no statutory authority for the admission of females to the bar of any court of [Wisconsin].”



In re Lockwood United States Supreme Court (1894)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Supreme Court stated that a woman could not be admitted to the bar because she was under a common law disability: she did not have the right to enter into contracts with third persons without the permission of her husband.



Mashita Katakwe v. Hakasenke High Court of Zambia (2006)


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

Rosaria, a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl, was raped by defendant teacher, and consequently contracted a venereal disease. The rape occurred in the defendant's home, which Rosaria entered with the intent of picking up some past school papers that the defendant had failed to bring to school on multiple occasions. After bringing this incident to the Head Teacher's attention, it was uncovered that the defendant had done this before, that measures had been taken to warn or protect students from the defendant, that the defendant had only received a verbal warning, and that the previous student victim had transferred to another school. In his defense, the defendant claimed that he was in a relationship with Rosaria, to which she consented, as evidenced by a Valentine's Day card that Rosaria had given him. The High Court held that the defendant breached the duty of care that he owed to his pupils and was therefore negligent, noting that it is the duty of a school teacher to care for his pupils, as would a father for his family. The Court reasoned that school teachers are in a position of moral superiority, and a young schoolgirl's "consent" is fictitious in light of the ethics compelling a teacher to not engage in sexual relations with schoolgirls, a young girl's cognitive inability to truly consent, as well as Section 138 of the penal code, which states that defilement of a girl under the age of 16 is an offense. Notably, the Court held that society's indignation of this type of behavior ought to be reflected in the amount of damages awarded. The Court entered a judgment in favor of Rosaria for K 45,000,000 for her pain and suffering, medical expenses, aggravated damages, and mental torture. Furthermore, the Court held that the School, Ministry of Education, and the Attorney General are vicariously liable for this judgment, noting that the government is responsible for all school going children in the care of its agents, including teachers like the defendant.



Talleys Fisheries Ltd. v. Lewis High Court of New Zealand (2007)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This case concerns the application of §§22(1)(b) and 21(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act of 1993 (‘the Act’). It was first heard before the Human Rights Review Tribunal. The plaintiff, Ms. Lewis, claimed that the defendant, Talleys Fisheries, had engaged in employment discrimination on the basis of gender, alleging that they offered her less favorable terms than her male counterparts who had substantially similar capabilities for substantially similar work. At the defendant’s fish processing plant, there was a noticeable divide between the roles for which male employees were hired and those for which female employees were hired. The roles of male employees included that of filleter, which was more difficult and had a higher rate of pay. Female employees were rarely hired for this role, despite being qualified for it. The Tribunal held that this disparity amounted to gender discrimination. Expert witness for the defendant testified that such gender disparity among roles in fish processing plants was standard industry custom, and, therefore, that the defendant had not engaged in gender-based employment discrimination. The Tribunal rejected both the factual finding of the existence of industry custom, as well as the conclusion that industry custom would be dispositive in this case. It held that mere existence of an industry custom of gender-based hiring practices would not justify gender-based employment discrimination. On appeal, the High Court of New Zealand affirmed.



Easton v. Broadcasting Commission High Court of New Zealand (2008)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff sought to challenge what he saw as state-sponsored and supported gender bias against men. He alleged that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990 is discriminatory because it specifically requires that a range of broadcasts be available to provide for the interests of women while failing to include men, and that in doing so, the Act implicitly discriminates against men. The High Court dismissed the case based on the defendant agencies’ lack of standing to defend the claim, and therefore lack of jurisdiction by the High Court to hear the case.


D.S. Grewal v. Vimmi Joshi Supreme Court of India (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Vimmi Joshi was the principal of a public school who alleged her superior had sent her love letters and made sexual advances towards her. She brought a complaint to the School Managing Committee and was asked to bring the complaint in writing. Subsequently, the Committee received two anonymous complaints against Joshi and her employment was terminated. She challenged the termination claiming sexual harassment. The High Court held that this was a clear case of sexual harassment and ordered disciplinary actions to be taken. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the High Court’s decision because the Supreme Court had previously laid out guidelines for sexual harassment complaints in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan; a complaint committee must have been formed to inquire into the complaint further. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court did not fully look into the matter, they could not have found that this was a clear-cut case of sexual harassment. The High Court was directed to appoint a three-member committee, which must be headed by a woman, to hear the case.



In re A-T United States Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) (2011)


Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law, Sexual violence and rape

After over six years in immigration court, an immigration judge reversed his previous judgment to give a woman from Mali asylum protection in the United States. As a child in Mali, the woman was subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM). She studied in the United States; her father then ordered her back to Mali to marry her first cousin, despite the fact that she already had three children in the U.S. Fearing forcible marriage and rape for herself and forced FGM for her daughters, the woman applied for asylum. The immigration court denied her request initially in 2004. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals reasoned that FGM is a one-time occurrence, making future persecution unlikely. However, in 2008, the Attorney General intervened, pointing to the interconnectedness of sexual violence and the possibility of future persecution. The Attorney General directed that the case be reconsidered, and after a new trial, the judge granted the woman asylum, indicating that the threat of spousal rape alone was enough to constitute persecution. The case is important for asylum applicants, because violent acts like FGM are no longer to be considered isolated events unlikely to lead to further persecution.



Joseph v. Canada Federal Court of Canada (2006)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Ms. Joseph is a citizen of Grenada who fled to Canada in order to escape a violent common law relationship she had been involved in for 15 years. During Ms. Joseph’s relationship with her common law spouse, she tried to leave him several times; however, he always found her and the abuse would continue. She applied for protection in Canada pursuant to the Gender-Related Guidelines of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which aids determination of the risk facing women who are fleeing gender-specific persecution. Ms. Joseph based her claim on the ground that there is a substantial risk that she would face torture and cruel and unusual treatment at the hands of her former common law spouse, and there is more than a mere possibility that she would face gender-based persecution, if forced to return to Grenada. Despite the fact that the officer reviewing Ms. Joseph's application found her testimony and evidence to be credible, her application for protection was denied on the ground that she had failed to rebut the presumption of state protection in Grenada. When Ms. Joseph was informed that removal arrangements had been made, she brought a motion for a stay of removal, which was granted. The court ordered that Ms. Joseph’s application for judicial review be allowed, due to “discrepancies in logic” regarding the officer’s estimation of her evidence and his decision on her application, and remitted the matter to a different state officer for redetermination of her application for protection.



Hat Six Homes, Inc. v. State Wyoming Supreme Court (2000)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Appellant-employer challenged the decision from the District Court, affirming findings of appellee, Wyoming Department of Employment, Unemployment Insurance Commission, holding, among other things, that appellee employee had quit her employment with appellant employer for good cause under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-311(a)(i) (1997).  In this case, appellee-employee left her employment because of sexual harassment and hostile work environment. This included the president of appellant-employer touching her under her shirt and behind her knees in an unwelcome manner and continuing this behavior after appellee employee asked him to stop. Additionally, conduct of the vice-president created a tension that “could [be] cut . . . with a knife . . .” On several occasions, the vice-president threw around staplers and cellular phones and yelled at customers and other employees. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the District Court’s decision and held that this conduct on the part of appellant-employer sufficed for the determination that appellee-employee had quit her employment for good cause.


Allegheny County v. Wilcox Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court (1983)


Gender discrimination

The defendant-appellant, the Court of Common Pleas, appealed a ruling by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”). The PHRC had ruled that the defendant discriminated against female secretaries with respect to compensation and directed them to upgrade the secretaries’ wages and to pay them back pay. The defendant argued that the PHRC could not require it to increase the wages and also that it was not considered an “employer” under 43 P.S. § 954(b). The defendant argued that the definition of employers does not include a reference to courts and that any application of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act violates the doctrine of separation of powers by allowing the executive and legislative branches to interfere upon the judicial branch. The court found that the defendant failed to show how its authority was encumbered by the Human Relations Act. The court also found that compelling the upgrade or equalization of pay was proper where, inversely, a court could compel a legislative body to spend money that is reasonably necessary for the body’s proper operation and administration. Thus, the court affirmed the PHRC’s finding and ruled that the PHRC could require the defendant to increase the female secretaries’ wages and order back pay.



Scuncio Chevrolet, Inc. v. Salandra Rhode Island Superior Court (1988)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Plaintiff worked for the defendant and sold cars. Following termination of her employment, she filed a complaint with the Humans Rights Commission. The Commission found she was entitled to back pay, fringe benefits, interest, and that the defendant was to cease and desist its unlawful employment practices. In response to defendant’s appeal, the court found that the plaintiff’s testimony that she was never confronted for unsatisfactory work performance, and she neither received formal evaluations, nor written or oral warnings was credible. Notwithstanding her positive performance, the plaintiff was terminated. The defendant argued that she was “laid-off,” and that the Commission failed to take into account that the defendant did not hire a male replacement for the plaintiff’s position. However, the defendant did hire a male employee a day before it fired the plaintiff. The court found that the Commission was entitled to reject the defendant’s testimony and find that it was clear that the plaintiff was replaced by a male employee. Thus, the Commission’s finding of liability was affirmed.



Allen v. Dep't. of Employment and Training Vermont Supreme Court (1992)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits by the Employment Security Board because prior to quitting her job, she did not notify her business manager that she was being sexually harassed by her supervisor. The plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff worked as a secretary for housekeeping and maintenance. For several months during her employment, the plaintiff’s supervisor made repeated sexual advances towards her by grabbing her, kissing her, and apologizing thereafter. Plaintiff complained once, but otherwise never complained to anyone other than her supervisor, and eventually quit her job out of fear of further unwanted sexual advances. She testified that she had never received a personnel policy, never knew of the existence of such a policy, and believed that she was to complain to her immediate supervisor. Notwithstanding, the Board found the plaintiff did not show that she had “good cause” to quit her job, since her business manager had no knowledge of the harassment. Under 21 V.S.A. § 1344(a)(2)(A), a party may not receive unemployment benefits where she quits voluntarily unless she shows she quit with “good cause.” On appeal, the court found that if there were a personnel policy in effect, there was no evidence that it was ever made known or available to the defendant’s employees. The court found that the plaintiff could not adhere to a policy (to notify a manager) that is not “sufficiently disseminated by the employer to employees.” Thus, the court reversed the Board’s conclusion and remanded the matter.



In re Grievance of Butler Vermont Supreme Court (1997)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Plaintiff worked for the defendant as a police officer. During training where plaintiff was one of three women amongst twenty-four participants, plaintiff started to feel that she could never raise complaints because of her gender as a result of comments such as how the male troopers had better “watch out” or she would charge them with sexual harassment, or about another female trooper whose sex discrimination complaint had been dismissed by the Board. Plaintiff also received lewd and sexually inappropriate comments from a male officer in training who also attacked her in a kick-boxing fashion, and ridiculed her when she protested. After completing training, plaintiff was the only female full-time officer in her department and continued to experience more harassment, including exposure to openly-displayed pictures of semi-nude women, an officer telling his girlfriend that plaintiff was his sex slave, personnel and supervisors frequently discussing plaintiff’s marital difficulties, and interfering with her personal relationship with a former police officer. During the plaintiff’s first evaluation, she received a good score for her work performance but her overall score was lowered due to comments from others. Further, when it was a male colleague’s birthday, he demanded the plaintiff kiss him and when she refused, he made fun of her appearance. When plaintiff’s supervisor did not respond to her complaints regarding these incidents, she met with the Commissioner, setting forth her sexual harassment claims. She was offered an unfeasible transfer far from her home and children as the only alternative. When the plaintiff failed to report to the transfer location, she was terminated. Plaintiff subsequently filed claims for sexual harassment and hostile work environment with the Board. The Board found there was discrimination and ordered her reinstatement and reimbursement of back pay. In response to the state’s appeal, the court agreed with the Board and found that the plaintiff’s work environment, characterized by her colleagues’ and supervisor’s attitudes towards her as a woman, established that she was judged more harshly than her male colleagues. The court found the evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that there existed a hostile work environment and that the plaintiff was sexually harassed.



Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-Ft, Inc. Oregon Court of Appeals (2007)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Plaintiff, who was employed for fourteen months by defendant as a part-time receptionist, alleged that she was subjected to repeated acts of sexual harassment by several male employees. Plaintiff also alleged that her employment was terminated in part as retaliation for reporting this sexual harassment to management. Plaintiff brought a wrongful termination action against the employer, alleging claims of sexual harassment under Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(a), retaliation under Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(f), wrongful discharge, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court denied defendant's petition to abate the proceeding pending arbitration, ruling that the arbitration clause contained in plaintiff's employment contract with defendant was unenforceable because it constituted an unconscionable contract of adhesion. The appellate court found that the employee did not show that the contract formation carried indicia of procedural and substantive unconscionability other than an unequal bargaining power. Consequently, the Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed and remanded the case.



Ettner v. City of Medford Oregon Court of Appeals (2001)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Although plaintiff had satisfactorily completed her firefighter-training year and had been highly recommended for advancement, she was found to have allegedly failed five final task tests and her employment was terminated shortly thereafter. Plaintiff filed an action against defendant City of Medford for unlawful employment practice alleging she was unlawfully discharged as a firefighter on the bases of gender and of perceived impairment in violation of ORS 659.030 which provides, in pertinent part, “(1) It is an unlawful employment practice: (a) For an employer, because of an individual's . . . sex, . . . to . . . discharge from employment such individual. However, discrimination is not an unlawful employment practice if such discrimination results from a bona fide occupational requirement reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business.” Plaintiff was required to prove only that she was treated less favorably than male candidates because of sex, which is sufficient to establish a discriminatory motive. The Circuit Court found for the employee on the gender discrimination claim, and the appellate court affirmed. Here, the grading was unfair to plaintiff because it was highly subjective and allowed for too much internal bias. Furthermore, because two of the evaluators were officers who had previously expressed reservations regarding a gender-integrated department on behalf of other firefighters, it was a permissible inference that those evaluators attempted to give effect to the line firefighters' animus by giving plaintiff lower scores than she deserved. These testing problems existed within a context, revealing a general animosity toward female firefighters as firemen had told plaintiff that they were having problems with their wives over the hiring of a woman and had expressed concerns about plaintiff’s ability to ably assist the other firefighters during a fire despite plaintiff’s proven physical ability. Finally, plaintiff's success as a firefighter before and after her experience in Medford provided circumstantial evidence of discriminatory treatment. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff satisfied her burden in proving that gender was a substantial and impermissible factor in the city's decision to discharge her.



A.L.P. Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus. Oregon Court of Appeals (1999)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Here, petitioner, a male employer, sought review of a final order of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries, which found petitioner had created an intimidating, hostile and offensive working environment based on respondent’s gender, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.030(1), which provides, “(1) [i]t is an unlawful employment practice: (B) [f]or an employer, because of an individual's . . . sex . . . to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” The statute does not require that the unlawful employment practice be “sexual” in nature to be actionable. It requires only that the practice have occurred “because of” the employee’s sex. Furthermore, no independent corroboration of a complaining witness is required to establish an unlawful employment practice claim. Petitioner, the owner of a store selling adult toys and gifts, only referred to his employee, respondent Theresa Getman, using derogatory terms. Petitioner also frequently passed derogatory comments on the appearance of female customers and directed a number of sexually inappropriate remarks towards Getman. Additionally, petitioner frequently threatened Getman that he was going to “bitch slap” her and on several occasions slapped Getman on the top of her head and across her face. Throughout the duration of the employment, Getman was physically ill. She had a stomach ache and found herself unable to sleep because of the stress. The appellate court affirmed the finding that respondent was the victim of gender discrimination in her employment, as there was substantial evidence to support the finding that all of petitioner’s offensive conduct had occurred because respondent was a woman.



Roberts v. Dudley Washington Supreme Court (2000)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Appellant-employer filed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed a ruling entered in the Superior Court, granting appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment and dismissing appellee-employee’s wrongful discharge claim. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that appellee properly stated a cause of action for the tort of wrongful discharge based on the clearly articulated public policy against sex discrimination in employment. When appellee was on unpaid maternity leave, appellant discharged appellee, claiming that the position was no longer available due to a business slowdown. Appellant re-advertized the position one year later, but when appellee applied she was refused reemployment. Appellee claims the reason given for her discharge (i.e., economic slowdown) was pretextual, whereas the real reason for her discharge was that she was pregnant. Appellee filed a claim for common law wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against sex discrimination. Although an indefinite employment contract is generally terminable at will, an exception to the at-will rule exists in the form of a common law cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge of an employee where the discharge contravenes a clear mandate of public policy. In this case, public policy against gender discrimination is grounded in the constitution, statute, and prior court decisions. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, as appellee properly stated a cause of action for the tort of wrongful discharge based on the clearly articulated public policy against sex discrimination in employment.



Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry Washington Supreme Court (1995)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Plaintiff-ex-employee challenged the jury instruction given by the Superior Court, which directed the jury to find in plaintiff’s favor in a discrimination case brought pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(2), only if it concluded, inter alia, that gender was the determining factor in the decision by defendant ex-employer to discharge plaintiff. RCW 49.60.180(2) provides that “[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer . . . (2) [t]o discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained guide dog or service dog by a disabled person.” The Supreme Court of Washington declined to read the “because of” language of the statute, as requiring proof that one of the attributes enumerated in RCW 49.60.180(2) was a “determining factor” in the employer’s adverse employment decision. Rather, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that in order to prevail on a discrimination claim brought pursuant to RCW 49.60.180(2), plaintiff only needed to prove that her gender was a “substantial factor” in defendant’s decision to terminate her employment.



FBG Serv. Corp. v. Anderson Nebraska Court of Appeals (1993)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Anderson worked the night shift at FBG Service Corp (“FBG”). A review conducted in November 1988 stated that Anderson’s work was “excellent.” In early or mid-July 1989, a coworker recommended Anderson for the recently vacated job of daytime supervisor, and Anderson expressed interest. The person with hiring authority told coworkers that he preferred a man for the job as it involved heavy lifting. A month later, the firm hired a man with 21 years of experience in the military and 18 years of experience in repairing machinery for a “janitorial” position at a rate of $4 an hour.



Mancini v. Township of Teaneck New Jersey Supreme Court (2004)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Plaintiff was hired as a police officer. Since the beginning of her employment she felt that other members of the Department were unhappy because they felt it was not a job for women. Plaintiff also suffered sexual harassment. During her first four years there, plaintiff had a locker in the men’s room as there were no women’s locker rooms, and male co-workers would shower and walk around naked in the locker room. Plaintiff’s boss told her that he did not expect her to make it as an officer, that he did not want women on the job, and that he would not accommodate her, but that he had a mattress waiting for her in his closet. The plaintiff interpreted this as a sexual advance. Plaintiff also received other inappropriate remarks, for example, in response to plaintiff’s complaint about not having a shower, her boss told her several times that he would wash her. Officers also kept pornographic magazines and pinups both at work and in patrol cars. The plaintiff also received in her mailbox at work panties, a motel key, and a note reading, “back stabbing c-t.” There were also sexual cartoons, some pertaining to her and others to other women. Plaintiff ultimately sued for sexual harassment and sex discrimination. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $1 million in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The trial court vacated the punitive damages and reduced the compensatory damages. The defendant appealed, asserting laches – that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in filing the suit. The court found the defendant did not make an adequate factual record in this defense and it otherwise affirmed the holding finding the defendant liable.


Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (2009)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Here, the plaintiff worked as a staff pharmacist for the defendant for ten years. At a subsequent point, she became temporary pharmacy manager. Until the plaintiff was terminated thirteen months later, she was paid at a lower rate as a pharmacy manager than her male counterparts. She was told by the defendant that she would receive the difference in pay but never did. She complained numerous times and finally received a check for the pharmacy manager bonus that others received, but never received the thirteen months’ worth of additional pay. Prior to her termination, the plaintiff was questioned about two prescriptions that were fraudulently written—one while she was on duty and the other was written while a male pharmacist was on duty. The pharmacy technician immediately admitted that she falsified the prescription from when the plaintiff was on duty. The plaintiff denied knowledge of the fraud, but she was terminated based on her failure to secure the pharmacy. The pharmacy technician was also terminated. The male pharmacist however was not fired or disciplined for failing to secure the pharmacy area. At the time of the plaintiff’s termination, twenty of the twenty-one managers above the pharmacy manager level were male and all pharmacy technicians were female. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff in terminating her. The court reasoned that a reasonable jury could have disbelieved the defendant’s reason for terminating the plaintiff; that the plaintiff’s base wage was lower than her male counterparts, and that there was discrimination based upon the fact that the male pharmacist on duty when another prescription was falsified was not disciplined or terminated. The court found an award of compensatory damages was supported by the evidence, but that punitive damages amounting to $1 million were not warranted because the defendant’s conduct was not so outrageous or egregious.



College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (1987)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Here, an employer appealed the superior court’s decision that it discriminated against an employee on the basis of sex. A few weeks after College-Town hired the employee, Rizzi, Rizzi’s supervisor began making sexually suggestive comments to her. Once he touched her back, and another time he put his hand over a slit in her dress and told her to fix her skirt. On one occasion, Rizzi asked her supervisor to review her performance in a meeting and he told her that she handled it well and that he “liked the way [her] tits stood out in the red shirt.” Once, he asked her if she was a good f----. Rizzi then spoke to the director of manufacturing, who told her he was “not qualified to go into these things,” and refused to talk to her. Rizzi had to wait several days before she could tell someone else at work. A College-Town executive finally spoke with the supervisor about the allegations, which were denied. A meeting was held to determine the truth of the allegations, which the supervisor and all other women in the department attended except for Rizzi. She was not asked to the meeting or notified of its occurrence. At the meeting, the supervisor explained the allegations and Rizzi’s co-workers were generally supportive of the supervisor. College-Town made no further investigation. Prior to that meeting, Rizzi sought a promotion to a position in another department. After the meeting was held, Rizzi was informed she was not qualified for the promotion and College-Town hired someone with more knowledge and experience. Soon thereafter, College-Town attempted to transfer Rizzi as tension in the office was affecting productivity and she declined. Rizzi was never told the transfer was mandatory, and within weeks of her denial, she was discharged. The trial court found that College-Town’s supervisor created a sexually harassing work environment, it failed to remedy the situation, and it retaliated against the employee in its attempt to transfer her and discharge her once she declined the transfer. Id. at 158. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the decision and found that sexual harassment may constitute discrimination under Gen. L. C. 151B, §4(1), which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of gender.



Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education United States Supreme Court (2005)


Gender discrimination

Mr. Jackson, a teacher and basketball coach, brought suit against the Birmingham Board of Education (“Board”), alleging that the Board retaliated against him because he had complained about sex discrimination in the high school’s athletic program. Specifically, Mr. Jackson complained to his supervisors that the girls’ basketball team was not receiving equal funding and equal access to athletic equipment and facilities. After the Board terminated Mr. Jackson’s coaching duties, he filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. He alleged that the Board violated Title IX by retaliating against him for protesting the discrimination of the girls’ basketball team. The district court dismissed Mr. Jackson’s complaint on the ground Title IX did not cover claims retaliation, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Unites States Supreme Court reversed, holding: “We conclude that when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.” The Court reached this conclusion, in part, because “[r]eporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report went unpunished.” In response to the Board’s claim that it had no notice that Title IX prohibited retaliation, the Supreme Court held that Title IX itself supplied sufficient notice to the Board, as did previous Courts of Appeals decisions that had considered the issue.



Strickland v. Prime Care of Dothan United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division (2000)


Gender discrimination, Employment discrimination

Ms. Strickland sued her former employer, Prime Care of Dothan, on the theory Prime Care terminated her employment as a medical assistant because of her pregnancy. Prime Care filed a motion for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether Ms. Strickland had sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact on the question of pretext. In order to rebut the inference of discrimination, Prime Care was required to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Ms. Strickland. To this end, Prime Care asserted that it based its termination decision on violation of work rules, including that Ms. Strickland was rude and/or unprofessional on several occasions, was frequently tardy, and failed to return to work after attending a doctor’s visit. Because, if true, the reasons asserted by Prime Care were nondiscriminatory, the burden shifted back to Ms. Strickland to show that the proffered reasons were really pretext for unlawful discrimination. Ms. Strickland achieved this by showing her conduct did not violate Prime Care’s established policies, and presenting circumstantial evidence that, if true, demonstrated her supervisor harbored a discriminatory animus toward unmarried pregnant women. Prime Care also argued that even if it did discriminate against unmarried, pregnant women, such discrimination did not violate Title VII because the differential treatment was not based on sex. Rather, Prime Care claimed such a policy was neutral toward women, since women were both members of the group of married pregnant women and unmarried pregnant women. The court held that Congress and the Supreme Court had expressly rejected this argument, finding that the terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include because of or on the basis of pregnancy. Thus, an employer violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act when it premises an employment decision, in whole or in part, on the fact that one of its female employees or applicants was pregnant out of wedlock. For these reasons, the court denied Prime Care’s motion for summary judgment.


Kopenga v. Davric Maine Corp. Maine Supreme Court (1999)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff applied for a job to work at the defendant’s race track as a security officer. The defendant’s director of security informed the plaintiff that he normally did not hire women and instead employed her in the dispatch hour to answer telephones and complete paper work. The plaintiff had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and experience in security work. The plaintiff subsequently requested to work the late night security shift at the stable gate to work additional hours. Her request was denied as the director did not hire women for this position. When the general manager learned of the incident, he informed the director that he violated company policy and directed him to change his discriminatory practices. Ultimately, the plaintiff left the company due to disputes over her work assignments and she filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission and sued the defendant. The trial court determined that but for the director’s gender discrimination, the plaintiff could have worked an additional sixteen hours each week for thirty-three weeks and that she would have earned overtime. The Supreme Court of Maine held that the plaintiff was entitled to back pay for these lost wages under 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613.



Hill v. Ford Motor Co. Missouri Supreme Court (2009)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Cynthia Hill worked under the supervision of various people including Kenny Hune. Mr. Hune often made sexual comments to Ms. Hill and asked her inappropriate personal questions. Ms. Hill told Mr. Hune that she was offended by his comments and she repeatedly rejected his sexual advances. Upon receiving a complaint about Mr. Hune from Ms. Hill and another female employee, group leader Pete Wade raised these complaints with Mr. Hune. A few months after this, Ms. Hill was assigned to Mr. Hune’s supervision, where Mr. Hune refused to work with her, branded her a hostile worker, and created problems over small or non-issues. When Ms. Hill sought to bring a complaint to Mr. Edds, the labor relations supervisor, Mr. Edds told Ms. Hill to get psychiatric help and not return to work until she had done so. Upon receiving such treatment Ms. Hill resorted to the company’s 24-hour “Hotline” to report Mr. Edds and Mr. Hune. An hour later, Mr. Edds had suspended Ms. Hill from work for three days for a minor mistake. Upon Ms. Hill’s return to work, Mr. Edds told her she had been fired. The Missouri Supreme Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact to preclude the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. There was enough evidence for a jury to find that Mr. Hune had created a hostile work environment through his constant sexual harassment, which would constitute gender discrimination under MHRA 213.055.


Lacey v. State Nebraska Supreme Court (2009)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Lacey worked at the Department of Correctional Services as a temporary employee. Lacey’s supervisor was known for “creating a fun atmosphere” by “giving each other a hard time in a joking manner.” The supervisor’s jokes and questions were often sexual in nature, including inquiring Lacey about the frequency, locations, and types of sex she and her boyfriend had. Towards the end of Lacey’s temporary placement, the jokes and questions were made daily and became increasingly vulgar. Supervisor also subjected Lacey to unwanted touching. Lacey eventually complained and the supervisor was ordered to stay away from here. Soon after, Lacey was terminated under questionable circumstances. Lacey filed a complaint against the Department of Correctional Services on June 7, 2006, alleging, among other things, sexual harassment in violations of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFERA). The trial court awarded Lacey $60,000 in damages for her sexual harassment claim. The State appealed.



AD 1996 nr 79 Supreme Court of Sweden (1996)


Gender discrimination

"An employer may not discriminate against a person who, with respect to the employer,1. is an employee; 2. is enquiring about or applying for work; 3. is applying for or carrying out a traineeship; 4. is available to perform work or is performing work as temporary or borrowed labour. (…)"]. In AD 1996 nr 79 the Swedish Labour Court (Sw: Arbetsdomstolen) ruled that a municipality was applying a salary development system that constituted gender-based discrimination. A female head of department had received, for four time periods, a lower wage than a male head of department who was employed by the same municipality. The municipality argued that the differences in salary were justified by differences in the two jobs. However, the court rejected this claim, finding that during the last two time periods, the employees' jobs had in effect been equivalent.



Craine v. Trinity College Supreme Court of Connecticut (2002)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Here, the plaintiff was hired by the defendant as an assistant professor. Throughout her employment, she was reappointed and complimented by the appointments and promotions committee. In her positions, the plaintiff taught, researched, and participated in service efforts for the defendant. Id. at 629-30. Despite that the plaintiff published several articles, taught students and supervised student research, during her tenure review in her sixth year of employment, she was denied tenure. Id. at 632-33. The tenure committee found the plaintiff was a “good teacher but not an extraordinary one,” and found her service to the school to be adequate. However the committee found her research and scholarship was inadequate, since she had only published one article in a refereed professional journal (notwithstanding that she had other publications). Id. at 634. The plaintiff claimed that the tenure process as it applied to her was discriminatory. The court noted that to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination in the work environment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she was discharged; and (4) the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Id. at 225-26. The court noted to meet the fourth element, the plaintiff must show that “she was treated less favorably than comparable male employees in circumstances from which a gender-based motive could be inferred.” Id. at 638. Once a prima facie case is established, to succeed on a gender discrimination claim, the plaintiff must go further to show that the defendant was motivated by an intent to discriminate against the plaintiff in its acts.



Okun v. Misiewicz Connecticut Superior Court (2001)


Gender discrimination

Here, the plaintiff filed a claim of sexual harassment against the defendant under Gen. Stat. § 46a-60, alleging that the harassment caused low self esteem, damage to the plaintiff’s career and reputation, lost wages, lost insurance, lost fringe benefits, and physical and mental pain and suffering. The defendant argued that the plaintiff could not bring a claim for a hostile working environment because under § 46a-82, the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking redress in court. Id. at *1. Specifically, the plaintiff was required to file a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and obtain a release from the Commission to file an action in court. Id. at *2. The plaintiff failed to do either of these and claimed she was exempt; she claimed the Commission’s remedies were inadequate because the Commission has no authority to award compensatory and punitive damages, both of which the plaintiff sought. Id. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint as it found that the Commission’s authority is not based upon a plaintiff’s preferred remedy; she must still file a complaint with the Commission and obtain a release to bring an action in court. Id. at *4.



Gallucio’s v. Kane Delaware Superior Court (1995)


Gender discrimination

Here, the defendant-employer appealed the decision of the Equal Employment Review Board that it had discriminated against the plaintiff because of her sex, in violation of 19 Del. C. § 711. The plaintiff was a waitress for almost four years when she requested maternity leave to the restaurant’s owner and general manager. She was granted maternity leave and told she could return to work to her previous schedule when physically able. Id. at *1. When the plaintiff attempted to return to work three months later, she was told there were no positions available, but at that time, six part-time waitresses were hired. Id. When the plaintiff applied for unemployment compensation, she was offered a position but with a reduced schedule, and which gave her less time serving on the patio, where greater tips could be yielded than inside. The plaintiff was never replaced by a male employee but did lose income as a result of her reduced schedule. Id. The Equal Employment Review Board found the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff. On appeal, the court noted that to prove a prima facie case of gender discrimination, a plaintiff must satisfy a four-prong test as articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. Under the test, the plaintiff was required to show that she “(1) was within the protected group; (2) that [she] was qualified for the position in question; (3) that despite [her] qualifications, [she] was rejected or discharged; and (4) that after [her] rejection, the employer continued to seek applicants from persons with the same qualifications, or that [she] was replaced by a person outside of the protected group.” Id. However, if at that point, the employer could show a reason for its actions that were non-discriminatory, a plaintiff may not necessarily prevail on a gender discrimination claim. The court found that the Board did not consider the employer’s rebuttal of the plaintiff’s showing of gender discrimination—testimony from five witnesses that the defendant often switched waitresses from the patio to the inside of the restaurant, and that other employees who returned after a leave of absence returned on a reduced pay arrangement. Id. Thus, the court remanded the case to the Board to more carefully review the defendant’s rebuttal.



Madam F v SA Schenk Labour Court of Appeal Brussels (2009)


Gender discrimination

A female employee was dismissed with severance pay due to a period of incapacity resulting from two consecutive miscarriages. In the circumstances of the case, it was not possible to apply article 40 (protection against dismissal for pregnant women) of the Labour Law of 16 March 1971, because the employer was not informed of the pregnancy. However, because the dismissal followed right after the second miscarriage, the female employee was discriminated against based on her sex. This was not refuted by the employer. Given the timing of the events and the timing of the termination of the employment relationship, the dismissal violated the law of 7 May 1991 on equal treatment for men and women with regard to working conditions, access to employment, and promotion, access to independent professions and supplementary social security schemes. This law does not provide for a fixed amount of damages. The moral damages were estimated at EUR 5,000.



ARY v International Association of the European Labor Institute Labor Court of Appeal (2004)


Gender discrimination

A female employee claimed that she was discriminated against with regard to her salary at the time of her recruitment and subsequently as she became more senior in the company. She argued that she was granted a lower salary at the beginning of her employment than male employees with equal qualifications and that she was not later granted a higher salary in the same way as male employees who received such higher salary only based on their seniority.The Court of first instance rejected the claims of the female employee. On appeal however, the Court applied the case “Danfoss” (Court of Justice, 109/88 of 17.10.1989) to the case at hand. Regarding her salary at the time of the beginning of the employment, it ruled that there was no discrimination. However, in terms of the subsequent increase of the salary, the Court held that there was indeed discrimination.



KKO 2010:1 Supreme Court of Finland (2010)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

The issue here was whether A, the CEO of a company for which the victims worked, was guilty of sexual abuse, of a work safety offense, and of employment discrimination. A had performed sexual acts on his subordinates while they were resting in the break room. These acts included touching intimate parts such as breasts and bottom. The District Court and the Court of Appeal held A guilty of these charges, and A appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered whether the public prosecutor had a cause of action given that the injured party had not reported the offense within the statute of limitations period. According to Chapter 20 Section 11 of the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the "Criminal Code"), the public prosecutor may not bring charges for the offenses referred to in Sections 3 or 4 or Section 5(1)(2) or 5(1)(4), unless the injured party reports the offense for the bringing of charges or unless a very important public interest requires that charges be brought.The Court held that since A was the victim's supervisor, important public interest required the case to be brought to court by the prosecutor. Turning to the merits of the case, the Court found that A had abused his position in violation of Chapter 20 Section 5(1) of the Criminal Code. It therefore held A guilty of sexual abuse towards B, C, D and E. In addition, the Court upheld A's convictions for a work safety offense under Chapter 47 Section 1(1) of the Criminal Code and Section 27 of the Finnish Occupational Safety and Health Act (738/2002, as amended). Finally, the Court upheld A's conviction for employment discrimination in violation of Section 8(2)(4) of the Finnish Equality Act (609/1986, as amended), in accordance with Chapter 47 Section 3(1) of the Criminal Code.



KKO 1995:152 Supreme Court of Finland (1995)


Gender discrimination

The issue here was whether the employer was allowed to lay off an employee returning from maternity leave due to a change of duties. During Ms. Mari Karjanoja's maternity and parental leave, her duties as a product manager had changed as a result of the company restructuring, and the employment relationship of her substitute, Ms. Tuulia Pärkö, had been made permanent. When Ms. Karjanoja returned from maternity leave, she was not offered back her duties as a product manager as the employer regarded Ms. Pärkö to be better qualified to take care of such duties in the changed situation. Later, for financial and production related grounds, the employer laid off Ms. Karjanoja. Section 34 h of the Old Finnish Employment Contracts Act (320/1970, as amended) (the "Old Employment Contracts Act") prevented the displacement of an employee returning from maternity and parental leave on the basis that a substitute to the employee would be able to carry out the work duties better than the employee. Therefore, the Supreme Court considered that the employer should have offered Ms. Karjanoja the changed work duties of the product manager which were comparable to her previous duties. Since the ground of Ms. Karjanoja's termination was the employer acting against Section 34 h of the above-mentioned Old Employment Contracts Act, the employer did not have sufficient grounds for the termination. On these grounds, the Supreme Court, upholding the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeal, ordered the employer to pay damages to Ms. Karjanoja.



KKO 1992:7 Supreme Court of Finland (1992)


Gender discrimination

The issue here was whether the employer company was guilty of discrimination in working life. Marja-Liisa Laukkanen had been working at Oy Kolmeks Ab. During her four months trial period, she got pregnant on which she informed her employer. Soon after that, she was dismissed on the grounds that she was on her trial period. Ms. Laukkanen claimed that her pregnancy was the ground for the dismissal which was against Section 8 of the Finnish Equality Act (609/1986, as amended) (the "Equality Act") on the basis of discrimination in work life. In addition, Ms. Laukkanen claimed that the dismissal was against Section 3 of the Old Finnish Employment Contracts Act (320/1970, as amended) (the "Old Employment Contracts Act"), which states that employment cannot be revoked on inappropriate grounds. The District Court ruled against Ms. Laaukkanen but the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the dismissal of Marja-Liisa Laukkanen was against both the Old Employment Contracts Act and the Equality Act and ordered the company to pay damages. The grounds for the Court of Appeals' decision were that, when the employer and Ms. Laukkanen had negotiated on the employment, the employer had had significant interest on the fact if Laukkanen was planning to get pregnant. Further, the company had not been able to prove that Ms. Laukkanen had started neglecting her work duties as soon as she had found out about her pregnancy. The Supreme Court agreed with the opinion of the Court of Appeals and held that the dismissal violated Section 3 of the Old Employment Contracts Act. However, it did not consider the dismissal to be against the Equality Act because, according to the government proposal (57/1985) for the Equality Act, discrimination in working life only means discrimination based on the gender and, therefore, gender has to be the immediate reason behind the dismissal.



KKO 1991:14 Supreme Court of Finland (1991)


Gender discrimination

The issue here was whether the Finnish State was guilty of 4 in selecting an applicant for a job. Ms. Risse Serén claimed that she was more qualified for the position of the head of the office at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry than Mr. Paavo Mäkinen, who had been selected for the position. She claimed that she had been discriminated during the application process because of her gender. According to Section 8 of the Finnish Equality Act (609/1986, as amended) (the "Equality Act"), an action of an employer is deemed to constitute discrimination if, inter alia, the employer selects a less qualified person of the opposite sex for the position unless there is a justifiable reason for such selection other than the applicant's gender or the selection was based on weighty and acceptable ground related to the job or the task. The District Court evaluated the assessment of education, work experience, and other qualifications of the both applicants prepared by the Ombudsman for Equality and concluded that Ms. Serén was more qualified for the position. Since the state of Finland did not show that there were any acceptable reasons described in the Equality Act, the District Court ordered the state pay damages to Ms. Serén for the discrimination. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the District Court.



S.A. v. I.G.R Bucharest Court of Appeal (2010)


Gender discrimination

Ms. S.A. was dismissed by I.G.R. based on the fact that she was reaching the standard age for retiring although she chose to continue working. The court of first impression held that the decision of the employer was illegal due to 4 given that it has decided to terminate the employment contract of the claimant solely due to the fact that she had exceeded the standard age for retiring in case of women (58 years) while a man born on the same year could work until the age of 64. The first court held that the national law may establish different ages for state pensions for women and for men, as a social protection measure, but women only have the right and not the obligation to retire at the respective age. Romanian Law No. 202/2002 regarding the equal treatment between women and men prohibits 4 by an employer. On appeal, the Appeal Court maintained the decision of the first court, considering that dismissal solely based on reaching the qualifying age for a state pension, for which the age is different under national legislation for men and for women, constitutes discrimination on grounds of sex. A general dismissal policy of an employer implying the dismissal of a woman having as sole reason the standard retiring age, which is different for women and men, is 4 prohibited by the national and European legislation. Given the priority of European legislation over the national legislation, the court cited in its reasoning the case, Marschall v. Southampton and South – West Hampshire Area Health Authority of the Court of Justice of the European Union dated 26 February 1986.



Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt Wisconsin Supreme Court (1992)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff Marquardt took eight weeks off for maternity leave and vacation. During that time, her supervisor reorganized the division in which she worked and redefined her responsibilities. He did not inform her of these changes. Included in the reorganization was the elimination of plaintiff’s position as credit manager. The position was divided into two positions, and Marquardt’s supervisory responsibilities decreased. Her new position also involved 25% clerical work, whereas in her old position, she had no clerical work. She received the same pay and benefits and had the same office as her prior position. The Court found that the plaintiff in this case was not returned to her equivalent employment position after her return from maternity leave, which is required under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). It held that although an employer may reorganize a department while an employee is on leave, and give an employee new job duties, it must still give the employee equivalent job duties. An equivalent employment position “means a position with equivalent compensation, benefits, working shift, hours of employment, job status, responsibility and authority.” It also held that the plaintiff was properly awarded back pay and that plaintiff’s “interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence should be considered when back pay is awarded under the FMLA.”



AD 2011 nr 2 Supreme Court of Sweden (2011)


Gender discrimination

"An employer may not discriminate against a person who, with respect to the employer, 1. is an employee, 2. is enquiring about or applying for work, 3. is applying for or carrying out a traineeship, or 4. is available to perform work or is performing work as temporary or borrowed labour. (…)" Chapter 2 Section 1 of the Swedish Discrimination Act.] A woman had applied for employment at the farm where she was doing an internship. During the internship the woman had had a miscarriage, which she told the farmer about. She was later denied employment. The farmer claimed that he denied her employment due to her insufficient capacity for work. However, the Swedish Labour Court (Sw: Arbetsdomstolen) found that the decision to deny the woman employment did not completely lack connection with a possible future pregnancy. Hence, Swedish Labour Court ruled that the denied employment constituted a violation of the Discrimination Act and granted the woman compensation for the damage suffered from the discrimination.



Menefee v. McCaw Court of Appeals of Texas – Dallas Division (2003)


Gender discrimination

Sherri Menefee filed an employment sex discrimination and retaliation case against her employer, McCaw Cellular. Sherri was hired as the manager of the IT department for the company’s southwestern region. She alleged that her boss discriminated against her and that she was subjected to a less favorable environment based on her sex and was terminated shortly after complaining about the discrimination. Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (Texas Labor Code § 21.051(1)), an employer commits an unlawful employment practice if, because of sex, the employer discriminates in any manner against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The Act is modeled after the federal Title VII and therefore Texas courts may look not only to cases involving the state statute but also to cases interpreting the analogous federal provisions. In discrimination cases based upon circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) she was a member of the protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position she held, (3) she was discharged or suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) she was replaced with a person who is not a member of the protected class or she was otherwise treated differently from persons outside the protected class. Once the plaintiff makes this “minimal” showing, the burden of production shifts to the employer to produce evidence that the plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Then the plaintiff must establish that the legitimate reason was a “pretext” by showing that a discriminatory motive move likely motivated the employer’s decision, such as through evidence of disparate treatment or that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence. In this case, Sherri established a prima facie case, and McCaw met its burden by producing evidence that Sherri was fired because she was not a “good fit” for her team. Sherri sufficiently evidenced that this reason for her termination was a pretext because the reason she could not create a cohesive team was due to the discriminatory conduct and disruptive behavior of her boss and the failure of her supervisors to take action when she complained; moreover, she presented evidence that she had been told she was doing a good job. Thus, Sherri sufficiently raised a factual issue to survive summary judgment.



Burton v. State Florida 1st District Court of Appeal (2010)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination

Dubreuil proceedings (state legal proceedings used to compel a pregnant woman to undergo medical confinement, treatment, and procedures against her wishes for the benefit of the unborn fetus) were initiated against Burton on a finding that she had ignored her physician’s recommendations, creating a high-risk pregnancy that may result in the death of her baby. A Florida circuit court ordered Burton to forced medial treatment and confinement in a hospital until delivery. Holding that such a determination was inappropriate, the Court reasoned that all individuals have a fundamental right to privacy. The Court explained that Dubreuil proceedings were insufficient to compel a pregnant woman to forcibly undergo medical detention and treatment for the benefit of her unborn child. To overcome Burton’s right to refuse medical intervention in her pregnancy, the State must show a compelling interest and a method for pursuing that interest that is narrowly tailored. The State had failed to do so.



O’Loughlin v Pinchback Florida 1st District Court of Appeal (1991)


Gender discrimination

After disclosing her pregnancy to her employers, Pinchback, a correctional officer at a county jail, was terminated. As a reason for the termination, Sheriff O’Loughlin explained that while pregnant, Pinchback could not perform the duties of a correctional officer and was placing her baby’s health in danger. Pinchback petitioned Florida’s Human Rights Commission for relief, resulting in a finding that O’Loughlin had wrongfully terminated Pinchback in violation of Florida’s Human Rights Act. The Court upheld the determination, explaining that O’Loughlin’s actions were indefensible as there was no evidence that Pinchback (or any pregnant employee) could not perform her work as before. As a result, the Court found Pinchback entitled to back pay.



Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department v. Illinois Human Rights Commission Iliinois Supreme Court (2009)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Donna Feleccia was a records clerk with the county sheriff’s department. A coworker sent her a letter that appeared to be from the Illinois Department of Public Health informing her that she may have been exposed to a sexually transmitted disease. When Feliccia read the letter, she became very upset and started shaking. The letter was sent by Yanor, a coworker of Feliccia’s, as a practical joke. Feliccia’s coworkers heard about the letter and/or that Feliccia had a sexually transmitted disease and Feliccia missed work and sleep over the incident. Yanor was only lightly disciplined and advised not to have any contact with Feliccia. Prior to the letter, Feliccia had endured several incidents of sexual harassment by Yanor, including once incident when he grabbed her and asked for a kiss and another when he asked her to go to a motel with him. Feliccia filed a charge of sexual harassment and retaliation against the sheriff’s department and Yanor. The court held that, under section 2-102(D) of the Illinois Human Rights Act, the sheriff’s department (i.e. the employer) was strictly liable for Yanor’s (i.e. a supervisory employee) “hostile environment” sexual harassment regardless of whether it was aware of the harassment or took measures to correct the harassment. It was irrelevant that Yanor did not have direct supervisory authority over Feliccia’s working conditions; in other words, an employer’s liability is not limited based on the harasser’s relationship to the victim. In addition, the court held that a sexual harassment claim is timely as long as it is filed within 180 days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment and that a factfinder may consider all of the conduct that makes up the hostile environment claim. Feliccia’s sexual harassment claim was meritorious because Yanor’s forged letter and other harassing conduct caused Feliccia to miss work and sleep.



Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co. Supreme Court of Michigan (1999)


Gender discrimination

The Supreme Court held that under the Michigan Contribution statute, M.C.L. § 600.2925a, an employer sued for sex discrimination due to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement can seek contribution from the union that is party to the agreement. Female employees brought a 4 claim against employer, Alpena Power Company, based on the collective bargaining agreement which created a new job classification for two female employees. Previously, the two females had the same classification as their male counterparts. Under this new classification, their pay was frozen. Defendant filed a third party complaint seeking contribution from the union because defendant negotiated the agreement with the union. The appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court allowing the third party complaint against the union, and the company and union appealed. The Court found that defendant could seek contribution from the union; nothing in the language of the Michigan Civil Rights Act prohibited this. Although generally, the statute was analogous to Title VII of federal law, the court noted that the state statute provided for a right to contribution, whereas federal law did not. It also found that allowing for contribution did not oppose the legislative policy behind the statute, which among others, is that “discrimination in employment on the basis of sex is forbidden.”



Aleem v. Aleem Maryland Supreme Court (2008)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

Court held that divorce obtained by husband under Islamic religious and secular Pakistani law would not be recognized and afforded comity in Maryland. Petitioner argued that because he performed “talaq,” (which under Islamic law, allows a husband to divorce his wife by stating “I divorce thee” three times) the Circuit Court for Montgomery County lacked jurisdiction “to litigate the division of the parties’ marital property.” “The trial court found that the marriage contract entered into on the day of the parties’ marriage in Pakistan specifically did not provide for the division of marital property and thus, for that reason alone, the agreement did not prohibit the Circuit Court for Montgomery County from dividing the parties’ marital property under Maryland law.” The Court of Special Appeals agreed and stated, “[t]hus, the Pakistani marriage contract in the instant matter is not to be equated with a premarital or post-marital agreement that validly relinquished, under Maryland law, rights in marital property.” It explained that the default under Pakistan law is that the wife does not have rights to marital property, while under Maryland law she does. Applying Pakistani law, according to the court, would violate Maryland public policy. The court also noted that a “procedure that permits a man (and him only unless he agrees otherwise) to evade a divorce action begun in this State by rushing to the embassy of a country recognizing talaq and, without prior notice to the wife . . . summarily terminate the marriage and deprive his wife of marital property, confers insufficient due process to his wife. Accordingly, for this additional reason the courts of Maryland shall not recognize the talaq divorce performed here.”



Kroh v. Continental General Tire, Inc. Supreme Court of Ohio (2001)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff Kroh filed a suit against Continental General Tire, Inc., claiming that it discriminated against her based on her gender, in violation of R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.99. After trial, the jury found for Kroh, awarding her $ 708,000 in damages. The appellate court reversed, finding that Kroh did not demonstrate that she was treated differently from similarly situated male employees. Kroh was promoted to cash manager after working for approximately twenty years for General Tire. Kroh was the only cash manager so she couldn’t compare herself to anyone with exactly the same duties. However, Ohio Supreme Court found that the male managers to whom she compared herself reported to the same boss, had similar titles, were at a similar level on the company’s organizational chart and had the same salary classification.” The court concluded that Kroh was similarly situated to non-protected employees in all relevant respects and concluded that therefore, there was credible evidence based on which reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, and thus did not reverse a jury verdict.



Roberson v. University of Tennessee Tennessee Supreme Court (1992)


Gender discrimination

Employee filed suit against her employer, the University of Tennessee, alleging sex discrimination under the Equal Pay Act and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). She also alleged that her employer retaliated against her for filing an EEOC charge. The Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict that she had suffered discrimination and that her employer retaliated against her. Plaintiff was an employee of the University’s Agricultural Extension Service since 1980. She was eligible for a promotion in 1986, but was not promoted. Her co-worker, however, who started in 1979, was promoted. Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge. She then brought an action for sex discrimination under the Equal Pay Act and THRA and alleged that defendant retaliated against her for filing the EEOC charge. The Court found sufficient evidence to uphold the jury verdict granting plaintiff $13,600 on her discrimination claim, $50,000 on her retaliation claim, and $26,000 in attorney’s fees. The Court noted evidence that plaintiff’s evaluation scores were adjusted downward after she signed off on them and before they were given to the Dean who made decisions regarding pay and promotion. There was also evidence that complaints against her were taken more seriously than complaints against her peers. One of her supervisors admitted that he stopped recommending her for promotions after she filed the EEOC charge, and that management took much more time and effort over small matters that related to the plaintiff.



Melani v. Bd. of Higher Educ., United States United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (1983)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiffs sued the board of trustees of the City University of New York (“CUNY”), alleging that CUNY discriminated against its female professors because it paid them less than its male professors, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. section 2000e (“Title VII”). As evidence, Plaintiffs provided statistics about the faculty’s pay that demonstrated that the female professors were paid less. Defendant argued in response that the female staff were paid less based on merit, specifically because women devoted more time to child-rearing, had fewer publications, and worked in academic fields for which the market demand was less. The court found that Defendant failed to successfully counter Plaintiffs’ claim because its testimony was little more than generalizations: its evidence did not relate to the CUNY female faculty and did not explain the salary disparity between the male and female faculty. Thus, the court found that Defendant violated Title VII by paying Plaintiffs a lower salary because of their sex.



Badih v. Myers California Court of Appeal (1995)


Gender discrimination

In 1987, Fatmeh Badih (“Badih”), a recent immigrant from Sierra Leone, was hired by the medical offices of Dr. Leonard Myers (“Myers”) as a medical assistant. Almost three years later, Badih told Myers she was pregnant. He immediately fired her. According to Badih, when she told Myers the news he replied, “If you told me you were going to get married and have babies, I wouldn’t have hired you in the first place. I need an office girl when I need her, not a person that has responsibilities the way you do now. . . . You’re going to have to go.” Badih filed a compliant against Myers and alleged pregnancy discrimination, among other claims. Myers denied that he fired Badih because she was pregnant. The jury found that Myers had terminated Badih because of her pregnancy, awarded her $20,226 in damages, and granted Badih’s motion for attorney fees. Myers appealed the judgment and attorney fees order. He argued that because he employed less than five people he was not subject to the pregnancy discrimination provisions of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). He also argued that no other constitutional or statutory provisions prohibited pregnancy discrimination. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment and attorney fees order. It held that pregnancy discrimination in employment was a form of sex discrimination. Because article I, section 8 of the California Constitution prohibits sex discrimination in employment regardless of the employer’s size, those who work for employers not covered by FEHA can maintain pregnancy discrimination claims under the California Constitution.



Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High School District United States District Court for the Southern District of California (2009)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against Sweetwater Union School District (the “District”) and several individuals, alleging unequal participation opportunities for females at Castle Park High School (“CPHS”). Plaintiffs argued that Defendants violated Title IX’s provision that prohibits excluding or discriminating against anyone on the basis of sex in educational programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance. The court applied a three-part test to determine whether the District complied with Title IX which included: (1) substantially proportionate athletic opportunities for females; (2) continuing practice of program expansion for females; and (3) the accommodation of females’ interest and abilities. First, the court held that Defendants failed to provide females with substantially proportionate opportunities to participate in athletics, as the number of female students denied the opportunity to participate could have sustained several viable competitive teams. Second, the court held that there was no steady increase in female athletic participation. Even though, as Defendants argued, athletic programs for girls had expanded over the past decade and CPHS had two more teams for girls than for boys, the number of female participants, not the number of teams, determined whether programs had expanded. Third, the court held that Plaintiffs demonstrated evidence of unmet interest and of the ability of CPHS females to participate in field hockey, tennis, and water polo. Defendants’ argument that they could not obtain coaches for the teams was not a valid excuse. The court held that Defendants allowed significant gender-based disparity in violation of Title IX and found for Plaintiffs on their claim of unequal participation opportunities for females.



State v. Human Rights Commission Court of Appeals Fourth District (1989)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Lynda Savage filed a complaint against the Illinois Department of Corrections alleging that she had been sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor, Nicholas Howell, and discharged in retaliation. Howell would describe women by their physical attribut


Northtown Ford v. Illinois Human Rights Commission Court of Appeals Fourth District (1988)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Illinois Human Rights Commission (HRC) filed a suit against Northtown Ford alleging discrimination against an employee who had been terminated with regard to sick leave benefits and salary, sex discrimination for reduction in salary, and retaliation. The administrative law judge entered a judgment in favor of the employee for salary claims and sick leave benefits, and the HRC affirmed. The Court of Appeals decided that the employee was allowed to amend the complaint because the amended claim was reasonably related to the original claim.



U.S. v. Virginia Supreme Court [United States] (1996)


Gender discrimination

The Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of Virginia's decision to only admit men to the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), asking women to instead enroll at the all-women Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL). In a 7-1 decision, the Court held that banning women from VMI was in violation of the 14th amendment. The Court held that Virginia had failed to give adequate reasoning for its decision to not admit women, and that women would not receive the same level of instruction at VWIL that they would receive at VMI.



McCormick v. School District of Mamaroneck United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2004)


Gender discrimination

Two school districts scheduled their girls’ high school soccer season in the spring and the boys’ high school soccer in the fall. The effect of that schedule was that boys but not girls were able to compete in the regional and state championship games. Parents of the female students sued the school districts pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 and 20 U.S.C. section 1681 (“Title IX”), which requires schools, among others, to provide equal athletic opportunities to its male and female students. The appellate court held that the schools violated Title IX when they scheduled girls’ soccer in the spring because it denied female students an equal athletic opportunity. The court noted that because the females could not compete in championship games, it implied that the schools did not value their athletic abilities as much as it valued the boys’ athletic abilities, which is illegal.



Gregory v. Daly United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2001)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and that when she complained, her employer fired her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Plaintiff argued that her executive director subjected her to sexual ridicule, advances, and intimidation. He also intensified his harassment in response to her complaints, deprived her of work responsibilities, undermined her ability to do her job, and ultimately fired her. The lower court dismissed her case. On appeal, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed that decision. It found that Plaintiff could reasonably have found her workplace to be both physically and sexually threatening, based on her allegations about the executive director. It reasoned that the alleged environment could have hurt Plaintiff’s job performance, discouraged her from remaining on the job, or kept her from advancing in her career. Thus, the court concluded, the conduct alleged was contrary to Title VII’s objective of promoting workplace equality. The appeals court also found that Plaintiff could proceed with her case against her employer for retaliation because he fired her after she complained about his behavior.



SONKE Gender Justice Network v. Malema Equality Court for the District of Johannesburg (Gelykheidshof vir die Distrik Johannesburg) (2009)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape

The respondent made comments at a political rally regarding the consent of the complainant in Jacob Zuma's rape trial. Specifically, he opined that a rape victim would leave early in the morning, but the complainant in this case had stayed for breakfast and requested money for a taxi. The plaintiff, a gender justice organization, sued him for hate speech, unfair discrimination, and harassment of women. The court found that the respondent's comments were based on prohibited grounds as outlined in South Africa's Equality Act, specifically sex and gender. The court also found the comments expressed by the respondent constituted "generalizations about women, rape, and consent which reinforce[d] rape myths." Moreover, the respondent's words suggested "that men need not obtain explicit [sexual] consent from women." The court found the respondent liable for hate speech and harassment. For these reasons, the court concluded the respondent infringed the rights of women and ordered him to pay a fine and make a public apology.

Die respondent het tydens 'n politieke saamtrek kommentaar gelewer rakende die toestemming van die klaer in die verkragtingsverhoor van Jacob Zuma. Spesifiek het hy gesê dat 'n verkragtingslagoffer vroegoggend sou vertrek, maar die klaer het in hierdie geval vir ontbyt gebly en geld gevra vir 'n taxi. Die eiser, 'n organisasie vir geslagsregverdigheid, het hom gedagvaar vir haatspraak, onbillike diskriminasie en teistering van vroue. Die hof het bevind dat die kommentaar van die respondent gebaseer is op verbode gronde soos uiteengesit in die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Gelykheid, spesifiek seks en geslag. Die hof het ook bevind dat die opmerkings deur die respondent uitgespreek 'veralgemenings oor vroue, verkragting en toestemming wat verkragtingsmites versterk'. Verder het die respondent se woorde voorgestel "dat mans nie eksplisiete [seksuele] toestemming van vroue hoef te verkry nie." Die hof het bevind dat die respondent aanspreeklik is vir haatspraak en teistering. Om hierdie redes het die hof tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die respondent die regte van vroue geskend het en hom beveel het om 'n boete te betaal en 'n openbare verskoning te doen.



Case on the House Head System Constitutional Court of South Korea (2005)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

The petitioners requested the constitutional review of Civil Code provisions which establish the traditional "house head system" (Ho-jue jae-do) which holds that a household is formed around the male, and passes down only through direct male descendants serving as successive house heads. Under this system, male members are always recorded as the head of family in the Family Registry, and hold superior inheritance rights over female members. The Court held that the provisions which establish the "house head system" are unconstitutional. The Court held that this system is a "statutory device to form a family with male lineage at the center and perpetuate it to successive generations." Furthermore, the system discriminates both men and women because it determines the order of succession, and effects marital relations and parent-children relationships. The Court held that family relationships are changing, from authoritarian to democratic relationships, where "all family members are equally respected as individuals with dignity regardless of sex."



Use of Paternal Family Name Case Constitutional Court of South Korea (2005)


Gender discrimination

Petitioners applied for constitutional review of Article 781(1) of the Civil Code which stated that "a child shall follow the family name of the father." The Constitutional Court held that the civil code provision requiring a child to follow the father's family name is unconstitutional. The court held that "such unilateral requirement to follow the father's family name and disallow use of the mother's name violates individual dignity and sexual equality." In addition, the court held that "forcing one to use only his original father's family name and not allowing a name change infringes on the individual's right to personality." The concurring opinion stated that the civil code provision also results in discrimination against women, and found no legislative purpose for such discrimination. (Article 36(1) of the South Korean Constitution guarantees individual dignity in marriage and family.)



司法院大法官會議第365號解釋 (J.Y. Interpretation No.365) Constitutional Court of Taiwan (1994)


Gender discrimination

Article 1089 of the Civil Code, which stipulates that in situations of parental disagreement in exercising parental rights over a minor, the father has the right of final decision, is in violation of both Article 7 of the Constitution (stating that both sexes are equal under the law) and Article 9 of the Amendment (eliminating sexual discrimination). Therefore, Article 1089 should be examined and amended. The current Article is void within two years of this interpretation.

民法第1089條規定,在父母對未成年人行使親權有分歧的情況下,父親有最終決定權。該規定既違反了憲法第7條(兩性在法律上平等),也違反了憲法增修條文第9條(消除性別歧視)規定。 因此,民法第1089條應進行檢驗並修正,並應自本解釋公布之日起至遲於二年屆滿時,失其效力。



司法院大法官會議第410號解釋 (J.Y. Interpretation No.410) Supreme Court of Taiwan (1996)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

A Supreme Court precedent from 1966 held that property obtained by a wife during the continuance of a marriage, but which cannot be proved separate property or contributed property, belongs to the husband. The amendment of the Civil Code in 1985 under the authority of Article 7 of the Constitution emphasizes gender equity and invalidates this Supreme Court precedent.

最高法院1966年的一個判例認為,妻子在婚姻存續期間獲得的財產,如果不能證明該財產是與原有財產分離的或妻子對其有貢獻,則該財產屬於丈夫。依憲法第7條規定,1985年修正後的民法強調性別平等,並不再援用最高法院此一判例。



Ephrahim v. Pastory and Kaizingele High Court of Tanzania (1990)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The respondent, Ms. Pastory, inherited clan land from her father by a valid will and sold the land to a man who was not a member of her clan. The next day, the appellant, Mr. Ephrahim, filed suit seeking a declaration that the sale of land by Ms. Pastory was void under the customary law that a woman has no power to sell clan land. The Court held that the customary law regarding women's property rights discriminated on the ground of sex in violation of CEDAW, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the ICCPR as well as the Tanzania Constitution.



Uganda Association of Women Lawyers and 5 Others v. The Attorney General Constitutional Court of Uganda (2004)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination

The petitioners sued to have several provisions of the Divorce Act declared void on the grounds that they discriminated on the basis of sex. The Court held that sections 4, 5, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26 of the Divorce Act are void in so far as they discriminate on the basis of gender, so the grounds for divorce as listed are available to both sexes and the compensation for adultery, costs against a co-respondent, alimony, and settlement are applicable to both sexes.



Exp. No. 018-96-I/TC Constitutional Tribunal (2007)


Gender discrimination

A public defender challenged the constitutionality of Article 337 of the Civil Code, which stated that in domestic disputes, a judge could take into consideration the education, custom and conduct of both spouses when dealing with cases of cruelty, dishonest behavior or grave injury. He argued that such a law violated the constitutional right of equality before the law. The Constitutional Tribunal agreed in part and disagreed in part, holding that such considerations could only be examined when dealing with cases of grave injury.



Media 24 Ltd. & Another v. Grobler Supreme Court of Appeal (Hoogste hof van Appèl) (2005)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The respondent won a judgment against the appellant for 13 by a manager trainee employed by the appellant. On appeal the appellant claimed (1) it could not be held liable for its employee's actions that occurred off work premises, (2) it had no knowledge of the harassment incidences, and (3) the employee was not acting within the scope of employment. The court held that employers have a legal duty to protect their employees from physical and psychological harm caused by co-employees.

Die respondent het 'n vonnis teen die appellant vir 13 gewen deur 'n bestuurder-leerling in diens van die appellant. Op appèl het die appellant beweer dat (1) dit nie aanspreeklik gehou kan word vir die optrede van sy werknemer wat nie op die perseel plaasgevind het nie, (2) hy het geen kennis van die voorvalle van teistering gehad nie, en (3) die werknemer het nie binne die omvang van indiensneming opgetree nie . Die hof het beslis dat werkgewers 'n wetlike plig het om hul werknemers te beskerm teen fisiese en sielkundige skade wat medewerkers veroorsaak.



Andrew Manunzyu Musyoka (Deceased) High Court of Kenya at Machakos (2005)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law, Property and inheritance rights

The applicants are the sons and wife of the deceased and are seeking to apply the Kamba customary law that would not permit a daughter to inherit her father's estate if she is married. The Court held that the Kamba customary law is discriminatory insofar as it seeks to prevent a married daughter from inheriting her father's estate under the Succession Act. It specifically noted that although the Kenyan constitution specifically provides for customary law to take precedence over the Constitution in matters dealing with property inheritance after death and other personal issues, Kenya is also obligated to end discriminatory practices under CEDAW and the UDHR.



Nkabane v. Nkabane High Court of Lesotho (1987)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Property and inheritance rights

The plaintiff wife sought a decree of divorce on the grounds of the defendant's desertion on the grounds that the defendant abused her and drove her out of the matrimonial home to live with another woman. The Court found that the defendant was previously married through Lesotho customary law to the other woman at the time of the marriage to the plaintiff; thus, the defendant's marriage to the plaintiff was null and void. However, the Court declared that the relationship was a "putative marriage" for the purposes of dividing the plaintiff and defendant's joint property.



Vaux v. Vaux High Court of Malawi (2007)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, International law, Property and inheritance rights

The petitioner-wife sought dissolution of her marriage on the grounds of abuse by the respondent-husband, who repeatedly physically abused her and threatened her with physical force when she tried to stop him from drinking. She also asked for maintenance for the couple's daughter. The Court granted the dissolution of marriage and noted that the types of mistreatment the petitioner suffered at the hands of her husband constituted gender-based violence as defined by the Declaration of the Elimination of Violence Against Women because it was based on the unequal power relations between the husband and wife and caused the petitioner serious psychological suffering.



Uke v. Iro Court of Appeal of Nigeria (2002)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Court of Appeal held that the Nnewi Customary Law that precluded a woman from giving evidence in land matters was unconstitutional because it discriminated against women. The respondent sued the appellant over a piece of land on Ikoponkwo, claiming that the appellant made an ingress into that land. The respondent claimed that he inherited it from his father who inherited from the respondent’s grandfather. The appellant argued that the respondent’s “Kingman,” who binds the respondent, gave the land to the appellant as a gift. The appellant argued that a woman cannot give evidence in relation to the title of the land. The court then rejected the appellant’s argument and held that under section 41(1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, “any laws or custom that seek to relegate women to the status of a second-class citizen thus depriving them of their invaluable and constitutionally guaranteed rights are laws and customs fit for the garbage and consigned to history.” The court reasoned that because some of the laws and customs the appellant relied upon treated women as a “second-class” citizen, they must not be given credence. Under this holding, the court then decided to dismiss the appeal because it found no merit in the appellant’s arguments.



Sentencia T-877/07 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2007)


Gender discrimination

The Court affirmed that an employer is not only constitutionally-required to provide adequate maternal leave for pregnant workers, but also bound by regional and international treaties to which Colombia is a signatory, such as the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador").

La Corte afirmó que un empleador no solo está obligado constitucionalmente a otorgar una licencia materna adecuada a las trabajadoras embarazadas, sino que también está sujeto a los tratados regionales e internacionales de los que Colombia es signataria, como el Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos ("Protocolo de San Salvador ").



Sentencia 10341, Expediente: 04-006937-0007-CO Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (2004)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff claimed that she was dismissed from her employment as a psychologist because she was pregnant, thereby violating her constitutional rights. The Court disagreed, finding that her position was of a temporary nature, her employer replaced her with a more qualified psychologist, and that plaintiff's dismissal was not based on her pregnancy.

La demandante discutió que fue despedida de su empleo de psicóloga porque estaba embarazada, lo cual es una violación de sus derechos constitucionales. La Corte no estuvo de acuerdo, al descubrir que su posición era de carácter temporal, su empleador la reemplazó con un psicólogo más calificado, y el despido de la demandante no se basó en su embarazo.



Sentencia 14572, Expediente: 05-002606-0007-CO Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (2005)


Gender discrimination

Plaintiff, a pregnant school teacher, asked the Court to order the General Director of Personnel of the Department of Public Schools to rehire her after her employment was not renewed when she became pregnant. Plaintiff had been employed in that position for six years. Plaintiff argued that failing to rehire her violated her right to employment stability and motherhood. The Court ordered the defendant to rehire the plaintiff and to provide her with paid maternity leave.

La demandante es una maestra de escuela embarazada que solicitó a la corte que le ordene a la Directora General de Personal del Departamento de Escuelas Públicas que la vuelva a contratar, pues a la expiracion del contrato, este no fue renovado cuando quedó embarazada. La demandante había estado empleada en ese puesto durante seis años. Ella demandante argumentó que no revar su contrato violó su derecho a la estabilidad laboral y la maternidad. El tribunal ordenó a la Directora que volviera a contratar a la demandante y ademas le proporcionara una licencia de maternidad pagada.



Affaire B.S. C/ Comission de P Court of Appeal of Burkina Faso at Ouagadougou (2003)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Court found that the employer had acted inconsistently in offering Mrs. B.S. one-month extensions on her fixed term contract and then ending her contract at a time when she would otherwise have begun maternity leave on the grounds that there were no more project-related funds to cover her employment. This inconsistent behavior supported the finding that Mrs. B.S. had been unfairly dismissed because of pregnancy. Under Article 33 of the Labor Code, the Court awarded damages to Mrs. B.S. for unfair dismissal. Furthermore, the Court faulted the employer for having violated Article 84 of the Labor Code which states that pregnant employees must enjoy maternity benefits under the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale, including 14 weeks of paid leave, and awarded Mrs. B.S. the maternity benefits that she would have received had she not been unfairly dismissed.



Sentencia: 01383, Expediente: 06-011087-0007-CO Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (2007)


Gender discrimination

The Court ordered defendant, a hospital, to rehire a pregnant worker who was fired one week after informing the hospital of her pregnancy. The Court reasoned that the short period of time between plaintiff's announcement and her firing established a causal relationship between her pregnancy and her firing, thereby violating plaintiff's constitutional right to remain employed while pregnant.

El tribunal ordenó a un hospital, el cual estaba bajo demanda, que volviera a contratar a una trabajadora embarazada que fue despedida una semana después de informarle al hospital sobre su embarazo. La Corte razonó que el corto período de tiempo entre el anuncio de la demandante y su despido estableció una relación causal suficiente para probar que el despido era consecuencia del embarazo, en violacion de su derecho constitucional a permanecer empleada durante el embarazo.



Affaire Zabsonre Asseta C/ Direction Regionale de la Santé de Tenkodogo Court of Appeal of Burkina Faso at Ouagadougou (2001)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Mrs. Z.A. contended that she had been unfairly dismissed for having refused sexual advances by the personnel manager. The Court found that Mrs. Z.A. did not have the obligation to prove that she had been the subject of sexual harassment. Her employer had the burden of proof to show that she had been dismissed fairly. The Court found that Mrs. Z.A. had been dismissed because she did not submit to her personnel manager's sexual advances, and therefore awarded her punitive damages in addition to six months pay.



Mandal v. Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital Supreme Court of India (2010)


Gender discrimination

A public interest litigation was initiated to urge the Indian government to address the issue of high levels of maternal mortality in the country. The Court ordered the government to correct discriminatory actions in programs intended to reduce maternal mortality, to report on what corrective steps will be taken to monitor and improve current programs, and to create additional programs if necessary.



Sentencia C-101/05 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2005)


Gender discrimination

Explaining that the right to marry or remarry is a fundamental right, the Court held that wills and testaments that required a woman to remain single or widowed were unconstitutional.

Al explicar que el derecho a contraer matrimonio o volver a casarse es un derecho fundamental, la Corte sostuvo que los testamentos que exigían que una mujer permaneciera soltera o viuda eran inconstitucionales porque abrogaban este derecho.



Sentencia C-507/04 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2004)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

The Court was asked to examine the constitutionality of Article 34 of the Colombian Civil Code, which established the minimum age of marriage for women as 12, while the minimum age for men as 14. The Court struck the wording from the Civil Code that differentiated in age based on gender, and set the minimum age of marriage at 14.

Se solicitó a la Corte que examinara la constitucionalidad del Artículo 34 del Código Civil colombiano, que establece la edad mínima para contraer matrimonio para las mujeres en 12 años, mientras que la edad mínima para los hombres en 14 años. La Corte eliminó la redacción del Código Civil que diferenciaba en edad basada en el género, y fijó la edad mínima para contraer matrimonio en 14 años.



Sentencia C-534/05 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2005)


Gender discrimination

The Court held that 4, while prima facie unconstitutional, is acceptable if done with the constitutional purpose of furthering the rights of women, considered a constitutionally-protected class, and not with the purpose of maintaining traditional societal roles. The Court held that "the special protection of women allows for discriminatory treatment with constitutional ends." The Court also affirmed that minors are a protected class, protected both by the Colombian Constitution but also by the international treaties to which Colombia is a signatory.

La Corte sostuvo que 4, aunque prima facie en violación a la constitución, es aceptable si se hace con el propósito constitucional de promover los derechos de la mujer, la cual es considerada una clase protegida constitucionalmente, y no con el propósito de mantener roles sociales tradicionales. La Corte sostuvo que "la protección especial de la mujer permite un trato positivamente discriminatorio con fines constitucionales." La Corte también afirmó que los menores son una clase protegida, amparada tanto por la Constitución colombiana como por los tratados internacionales de los que Colombia es signataria.



Sentencia C-667/06 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2006)


Gender discrimination

The Court held that existing legal provisions and international treaties that provide women with special rights and considerations were not in violation of the Colombian Constitution's equal rights provision. The Court reasoned that such provisions were not aimed at withholding rights from men, but instead were aimed at correcting any shortcomings in the rights owed to women.

La Corte sostuvo que las disposiciones legales existentes y los tratados internacionales que otorgan a las mujeres derechos y consideraciones especiales no violaban la disposición de igualdad de derechos de la Constitución colombiana. La Corte razonó que tales disposiciones no tenían por objeto privar de derechos a los hombres, sino que tenían como objetivo corregir cualquier deficiencia en los derechos que se les debían a las mujeres y expandir los derechos de las mismas.



Sentencia T-058/08 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2008)


Gender discrimination

Reversing an appellate court ruling and affirming a trial court ruling, the Court reaffirmed the rights to employment of pregnant and nursing women.

Revocando una decisión del tribunal de apelaciones y afirmando una decisión del tribunal de primera instancia, el Tribunal reafirmó los derechos al empleo de las mujeres embarazadas y lactantes.



Sentencia T-549/08 Constitutional Court of Colombia (2008)


Gender discrimination

Reversing a lower court's finding, the Court ordered defendant to reinstate plaintiff in her prior place of employment after it found that defendant had improperly fired plaintiff due to her pregnancy, thereby violating her rights as a pregnant woman.

Revocando la decisión de un tribunal inferior, el tribunal ordenó a la demandada que reintegrara a la demandante en su lugar de trabajo anterior después de encontrar que la demandada había despedido indebidamente a la demandante debido a su embarazo, violando así sus derechos como mujer embarazada.



Cour d'appel, Bruxelles No. 96AR1629 Court of Appeals of Belgium (1998)


Gender discrimination

With regard to the marriage of persons of different nationality Belgian courts will ordinarily look to the national statutes governing each person to determine whether the conditions of marriage have been met. Here, however, the Court refused to look to Algerian law to determine whether the conditions for marriage had been met when called upon to decide whether the marriage between an Algerian Muslim woman and an Italian non-Muslim man could be declared null. The Brussels Court of Appeal stated that Algerian law, which includes the prohibition for a Muslim woman marrying a non-Muslim, must be rejected as being contrary to international public policy as it results in discrimination regarding the freedom of marriage based on gender and/or their religion. The Court therefore refused to consider Algerian law with regard to the law applicable to both parties of the marriage.



Attorney General v. Unity Dow Court of Appeal of Botswana at Lobatse (1992)


Gender discrimination, International law

The respondent, Ms. Unity Dow, brought a case to the High Court of Botswana asserting that sections 4 and 5 of the Citizenship Act violated her right to equal protection of the law and protection from discrimination on the basis of sex because the sections of the Citizenship Act treated children differently depending on whether they were born to citizen mothers or to citizen fathers. The respondent had one child with an American man prior to their marriage and two children after. Botswana's citizenship requirements allowed only children born outside of marriage to inherit their mother's citizenship, so the respondent's first child was a citizen of Botswana while the two born during her marriage were not. Though not the central issue of the case, the Court noted that an immediate effect of the law could be the expulsion of the husband and non-citizen children from Botswana. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's decision in finding that the Citizenship Act discriminated on the basis of gender under both the Botswana Constitution and the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women because it punishes a female citizen for marrying a non-citizen male. In addition, the Court considered similar cases in different countries in reaching its opinion. (High Court decision available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/sites/www.law.cornell.edu/files/women-and-ju...)



Masusu v. Masusu High Court of Botswana at Lobatse (2007)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The appellant-wife sought and was granted a divorce from her husband on the grounds of domestic violence and that he did not financially support her or their two children. The wife appeals a decision by the Customary Court of Appeal granting the house to the respondent-husband on the grounds that under customary law, a wife who divorces her husband is at fault because a wife is supposed to remain in her marital home regardless of her husband's actions. The High Court found that the Customary Court's reasoning discriminated against women because it automatically faulted the wife for filing a divorce no matter what her husband did and ordered the marital home be sold and the profits given to the appellant-wife.



Sentence of the Constitutional Court 936-95 Constitutional Court [Guatemala] (1996)


Gender discrimination

Court held that a criminal law that punished female adultery more severely than male adultery was unconstitutional, in violation of the idea of equality among persons, as well as equality between married people.

El tribunal sostuvo que una ley penal la cual castigaba el adulterio femenino más severamente que el adulterio masculino era inconstitucional y violaba la idea de igualdad entre las personas, así como la igualdad entre las personas casadas.



Air India v. Nargesh Meerza Supreme Court of India (1981)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Air India, a state-owned company, required female flight attendants to retire under three circumstances: (1) upon reaching 35 years of age, (2) upon getting married, or (3) upon first pregnancy. The Court struck the rules down, holding that these requirements constituted official arbitrariness and hostile discrimination.



Ashok Kumar v. Birakishore High Court of India (2004)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

A father alleged that his son-in-law had kidnapped his daughter. The daughter showed that she was of age and had married of her own free will. The court held that a family can have no control over who an adult chooses to marry.



Thomas v. Union of India (2010)


Gender discrimination

Ms. Saumya Ann and Mr. Thomas, who were Christians by faith, had applied for a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act. The lower court rejected the application because the Divorce Act requires that the filing couple shall have lived in separate residences for a minimum period of two years, but Ms. And Mr. Thomas had been living apart for only one year. On appeal, the couple argued that the law was a violation of their right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. They also argued that such law was discriminatory and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution because Hindus and Parsis were entitled to divorce by mutual consent after living apart for only a year. The Government argued that the law in question pertained to Christians and was their personal religious law, granting it complete insulation from any form of interference by courts. The Kerala High Court rejected the government’s contention. The Court held that the couple was entitled to seek a decree of divorce by mutual consent, that the requirement of two years violated the right to seek a divorce as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and that the constitutional right to equality includes the right to divorce as persons from other religions are. Instead of declaring the law unconstitutional, the Kerala High Court read down the two-year requirement to one year, like the laws applicable to Hindu and Parsi divorces. This case is significant because it demonstrates that customs and laws, even if religious in nature, can be invalidated if they violate the fundamentals rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.



Reports

Report on the Gender Pay Gap 2020 (2020)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Report commences by highlighting that it deems the gender pay gap as a significant policy concern, and defines it as a metric that shows the difference in earnings of males and females in the labour market. It can be used to show the extent of gender inequalities in the labour market. As part of its analysis, the Report examined 2,600 employees in the Department of Justice, 60% of whom were women. It found that for department employees only (53% of the total figure, and not representing employees of agencies or bodies under the aegis of the Department of Justice), the unadjusted gender pay gap (comparing the pay of all men to all women) was 9%: in 2020, the average man earned €47,040, as opposed to the average female earning which stood at €42,953. The Report notes that 9% is lower than the Irish overall pay gap, which is 14.4%. It also compared the Department of Justice’s pay gap to other state departments, noting that some other gaps were lower. The difference was attributed to the make-up of the workforce in each organisation, levels of pay generally, the impact of senior appointments on organisations, the existence of targeted campaigns to recruit more women at senior management level, and/or the introduction of gender-related recruitment targets.



Report on pre-legislative scrutiny of the General Scheme of the 38th Amendment of the Constitution (Role of Women) Bill, Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on Justice and Equality (2018) (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice and Equality was requested by the Taoiseach to consider the General Scheme of the 38th Amendment of the Constitution (Role of Women) Bill in terms of pre-legislative scrutiny. Article 41.2.1º of the Constitution provides: “In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.” Analysing the history of the provision, the Committee recognised that it was largely symbolic and has had little practical value, but that the dominant view was that it is desirable to amend or repeal it on account of its patriarchal and stereotyping nature. The Committee considered that the only avenue forward was to decide whether to delete the article simpliciter or replace it with alternative wording that is more appropriate to the present day and that reflects the value and recognition that society wishes to place on the role of carers in society. The former would bring legal certainty but the latter could arguably achieve a greater societal role. The Committee took the view that replacement with alternative wording was the most appropriate means of reform. In light of some disagreement over whether the alternative wording should be merely symbolic or involve entrenchment of meaningful socio-economic rights, the Committee proposed two options. The first proposal included draft wording which contained gender-neutral language. The second proposal recommended further dialogue and public consultation on the role and value of care work. As of 2022, there has been no change in the "role of women" constitutional provision.



Report of the Task Force on Implementation of the Recommendations of the Second Report of the Convention on the Constitution 2013 (2013)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 41.2.1º of the Constitution provides: “In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.” This report was one of several conducted to examine the wording of Article 41 of the Constitution with a view to recommending whether any amendments were necessary by way of a referendum. The Task Force was established by the Minister for Justice and Equality and was charged with collaborating with other government departments and the Office of the Attorney General, with a view to completing its tasks so that the Minister could report back to the Government on the issues arising in relation to Article 41.2. One of its main tasks was to examine proposals made for the amendment of Article 41.2 to find the most appropriate wording to present in a forthcoming referendum, and to consider cost implications of such proposals. The Task Force concluded by making two alternative recommendations. The first is to replace the existing text of Article 41.2.1º with a provision which would read along the lines of the following: “The State recognises that home and family life gives to society a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. The State shall endeavour to support persons caring for others within the home as may be determined by law.” The second is to replace the text of the Articles 41.2.1º and 41.2.2º with the following: “The State recognises that home and family life gives to society a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.” This would be followed by another provision, reading: “The State shall endeavour to ensure that persons caring for others in the home and in the wider community receive support in recognition of the contribution they make to society.” In sum, the Task Force recommended that the Department of Justice and Equality, in consultation with the Office of the Attorney General, further examine recommendations that the Constitution as a whole be amended to express gender-neutral language throughout the text. A 2018 report from the Oireachtas (available here) examined these provisions and produced similar conclusions and recommendations. As of 2022, no constitutional referenda on any of these matters have been put to the people since the publication of the report.



Submission to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Ireland’s combined sixth and seventh periodic reports (January 2017) (2017)


Gender discrimination, International law

Ireland is a party to CEDAW, to which Ireland acceded in 1985. Ireland also committed to having its record under the Convention reviewed periodically by the UN’s CEDAW Committee. Ireland was examined by the CEDAW Committee in February 2017 for the first time since 2005. Accordingly, the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (‘IHREC’) prepared a detailed report on Ireland’s record under the Convention to help inform the CEDAW Committee’s assessment of Ireland, and to highlight gaps in the protection of women’s rights in Ireland, submitting it to the CEDAW Committee in advance of the latter’s examination of Ireland. IHREC conducted an extensive nationwide consultation on the implementation of the Convention, conducting focus groups with marginalised groups of women, research visits to women living in detention facilities, and research visits to women seeking asylum and women refugees living in direct provision centres. In its submission, it was recommended that Ireland develop structures both at Governmental and parliamentary level to ensure the full implementation of the recommendations of the UN treaty monitoring bodies. In order to assist with implementing human rights obligations, IHREC considered that improvements need to be made to data collection systems. One such area where more data are needed is in the context of training of public officials in relation to women’s rights and gender equality. IHREC also observed that there exist gaps in the State’s ratification of international treaties in relation to treaties which have particular relevance to women’s rights, such as the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention.



IV Plan Nacional de Igualdad (2018-2024): Allanar obstáculos para la igualdad Sustantiva (2018)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

The IV Equality Plan promotes effective equality by removing obstacles to equality and eliminating all forms of discrimination. In this regard, the Plan seeks to eliminate discrimination against women, promote equal access and participation of women in public decision-making, guarantee women a life free of violence, and create conditions that enable women to access justice free from sexist stereotypes.

El IV Plan Nacional de Igualdad promueve la igualdad efectiva removiendo los obstáculos y eliminando toda forma de discriminación. En este sentido, el Plan busca eliminar la discriminación contra las mujeres, promover la igualdad de acceso y participación de las mujeres en la toma de decisiones públicas, garantizar a las mujeres una vida libre de violencia y generar condiciones que permitan a las mujeres acceder a la justicia libres de estereotipos sexistas.



Proposta do Programa Quinquenal do Governo 2015-2019 (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plan outlines general goals for the Government to work towards in four years. It highlights a need for specific attention towards issues of gender inequality, protection and empowerment of women, and education for women and children so that they can develop a more active role in civil society. The plan sets out to promote measures that strengthen gender equality and the rights of vulnerable peoples, as well as to spread knowledge on the rights of women and children.

O plano esboça metas gerais para o Governo trabalhar nos próximos quatro anos. Ele destaca a necessidade de atenção especial aos problemas de desigualdade de gênero, proteção e empoderamento feminino, e educação para mulheres e crianças, para que elas possam desenvolver um papel mais ativo na sociedade civil. O plano se propõe a promover medidas que possam fortalecer a igualdade de gênero e os direitos das pessoas vulneráveis, assim como a espalhar conhecimento sobre os direitos das mulheres e crianças.



Akcioni plan za implementaciju UNSCR 1325 Žene, mir i sigurnost 2018-2022 (Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 Implementation of Women, Peace, and Security) (2018)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

A framework strategic document for inclusion of the principle of gender equality in all areas of social life, providing guidelines for development of operational plans of institutions at all levels of government in Bosnia. It is orientated around three key strategic goals. First, the development, implementation, and monitoring of the program of measures for advancement of gender equality within governmental institutions. This first goal refers to the following areas of gender inequality: (i) gender-based violence; (ii) public life and decision making; (iii) labor, employment, access to economic resources; (iv) education, science, culture, sport; (v) health, prevention, protection; (vi) social protection; (vii) security. The second goal is establishing and strengthening systems, mechanisms, and instruments to achieve gender equality. This goal (i) refers to coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the Gender Action Plan in Bosnia, as well as international and domestic gender equality standards; and (ii) considers raising awareness of gender equality, and monitoring and assessing progress in reaching gender equality. Finally, the third goal is to establish and strengthen co-operation and partnership, which (i) refers to cooperation at regional and international levels, and (ii) takes into account cooperation with civil society organizations and the academic community. English translation available here.



Eurasian Coalition on Male Health: National Report on the Violation of Human Rights of Gay Men, Other MSM and Trans People, in Particular the Right to Health, in Georgia 2018 (2019)


Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

This report by the Eurasian Coalition on Male Health (ECOM.ngo) discusses the status and treatment of LGBTQ people in Georgia, specifically gay men, other men who have sex with men (MSM), and trans people. It explains existing legal protections for LGBTQ people, societal attitudes, human rights violations, and recommendations for future progress. (PDF is in English. The External Link offers Russian, English, and Estonian.)



Приказ поступања образовно-васпитних установа у случајевима насиља над девојчицама и породичног насиља (Overview of The Procedure to be followed by Educational Institutions in Case of Violence Against Girls and Family Violence) (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

In accordance with the Law on the Basic Principles of Education, educational institutions are obliged to secure conditions for safe and encouraging growth and development of the child and pupil (girls and boys), protection from all forms of violence, abuse and neglect, and social reintegration of a child and pupil who committed or was exposed to violence, abuse or neglect. educational institution must (1) establish a team for protection from violence, abuse, and neglect and (2) adopt a protection program and to document, analyze, and report on the cases of violence against children and staff members in their institution. (See External URL for official English translation.)



Посебан протокол за заштиту и поступање са женама које су изложене насиљу (Special Protocol for The Protection and Treatment of Women Victims of Violence) (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law

Adopted by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy, this Protocol addresses how these ministries should respond to reports of domestic violence. The Special Protocol for the Protection and Treatment of Women Victims of Violence outlines procedures for risk-assessments, identifying violence, law enforcement response, and documenting incidents. (English translation available here.)



Analysis of the precedents of the Cantonal Courts on the Gender Equality Act (2017)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

The study is an in-depth analysis of 190 records of cantonal conciliation hearings and judgments under the Federal Gender Equality Act, 1996 (the “Act”) over the period of 2004 to 2015 by authors Karine Lempen (Law Professor, University of Geneva) and Aner Voloder (Lawyer, Office for Gender Equality of the Municipality of Zurich). Among the major findings and conclusions reached in the study are the following:

Proceedings under the Act are nearly always brought by private individuals (mainly women) and very rarely by organizations, notwithstanding the provision of the Act authorizing court actions relating to gender discrimination to be brought by organizations. Individuals bringing a case of gender discrimination to the courts most commonly complain of pay discrimination or discriminatory dismissal, and in the vast majority of cases employment has ceased before the court issues its judgment. Bringing an action under the Act very often entails losing one's job. Almost one-third of discrimination cases relate to pregnancy or maternity, with discrimination often occurring on return to work after maternity leave and the mother being dismissed by the employer. Discriminatory or constructive dismissal cases are often adjudged solely under Swiss employment laws rather than under the specific provisions of the Act. In some cases this has resulted in a failure to relax the plaintiff’s burden of proof as provided in the Act. Most persons bringing proceedings for gender-based discrimination do not win their cases, with the analysis showing that 62.5% of rulings enforcing the Act find mostly or entirely against the claiming employee. Similarly, it is not unusual for the employee in the action to be ordered to pay costs which may amount to several thousand Swiss francs. The protection in the Act against constructive dismissal has proved to be fairly ineffective in practice, with court actions rarely being brought under that provision and all but one of such actions failing. The failure rate is particularly high (82.8%) when the alleged form of discrimination is sexual harassment, with the courts often failing to recognize that the intention of procuring sexual favors is not necessary to a finding of a hostile working environment, and therefore of sexual harassment under the Act. Moreover, it is rare for judgments to assess the extent to which the employer has met its obligation to prevent harassment. The special compensation allowed under the Act for sexual harassment is rarely awarded.

Based on the conclusions reached in the study, the authors make a number of recommendations -- for amendments to the Act and other specific legislative changes, improved training of the judiciary with regard to the Act, actions by Swiss equality offices (including improved data collection, more in-depth study of maternity-based discrimination in Switzerland and actions to raise awareness generally of the Act and the rights it provides), and universities (to require study of the Act as part of the bachelor’s degree course of study in law) -- in order to improve access to justice for people discriminated against on grounds of gender in working life.



Our Time to Sing and Play: Child Marriage in Nepal, Human Rights Watch (2016)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Statutory rape or defilement

While there are certain legal protections in place, such as a law establishing the minimum age of marriage at 20, enforcement is weak. Police and local governments rarely intervene to prevent child marriages. Nepal’s Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 5, targets ending child marriage by 2030. Further developing the National Plan of Action to End Child Marriage would advance Nepal’s National Strategy to End Child Marriage. 37% of girls in Nepal marry before age 18, 10% percent marry before age 15, and many marry around the time they begin menstruating. Child marriage, mostly resulting from forced marriage arrangements, is most prevalent in marginalized and lower caste communities. The key factors contributing to child marriage include poverty, lack of access to education and reproductive healthcare, child labor, social pressures and gender inequality, and the institution of dowry, which is payment by a bride’s family to the husband’s family for the marriage. In Nepali society, girls are often seen as a burden to a family, because they are expected to live with the husband’s families, as opposed to staying with and financially providing for their own families. The negative impact of child marriage includes dropping out of school, bearing and raising children too early in a child’s life, and domestic violence by the husband or husband’s family.



Avon Global Center 2013 Women and Justice Conference Report (2014)


Acid violence, Gender discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Harmful traditional practices, Gender violence in conflict, Forced and early marriage, Gender-based violence in general

In December 2013, the Avon Global Center hosted its annual conference in New York, NY on "State Responsibility to End Violence Against Women: The Due Diligence Principle and the Role of Judges."


Gender Issues and International Legal Standards: Contemporary Perspectives (2010)


Gender discrimination, Employment discrimination



Lessons Learnt and Experiences Gained in the UNFPA Supported WPC Project on Addressing Sex Selection (2012)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

During a three-year project (2008-2011) in India, the WPC assessed the circumstances surrounding and methods to address growing sex selection in India. A systematic process was put into place to set up multiple local-level implementing partners to collect data; increase education and awareness; and launch and maintain programs to induce long-term change of the traditional practices that lead to sex selection.


Exclusion of women from the legal profession in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and South Africa (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

Although great strides have been made in breaking down the barriers that have previously kept women from being able to have the same rights and privileges to work in the legal profession that men enjoy, there is still progress to be made.



"They are Destroying Our Futures" Sexual Violence Against Girls in Zambia's Schools (2012)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

A report by the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice at Cornell Law School, Women and Law in Southern Africa-Zambia, and the Cornell Law School International Human Rights Clinic examining the problem of sexual violence against girls in school in Zambia.



GENDER 2010 Report Card on the International Criminal Court (2011)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Harmful traditional practices

Report by The Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice assessing the implementation by the ICC of the Rome Statute, Rules of Procedure, Evidence and Elements of Crimes, and in the gender mandates they embody.


Global Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Women: a Human Rights Perspective (2008)


Gender discrimination

Report by Programme on Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (PWESCR)on a South Asian Regional workshop hosted by PWESCR, UNWomen and Heinrich Boll Foundation, presenting a gendered view of human rights in South Asia (2010).


Global Gender Gap Report 2010 (2010)


Gender discrimination

Report published by the World Economic Forum presenting the scope of gender-based disparities and tracking their progress by providing benchmarks of national gender gaps on economic, political, education- and health-based criteria (2010).


Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women (2010)


Gender discrimination

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the Advancement of Women



Human Rights and Gender Equality in Health Sector Strategies: How to Assess Policy Coherence (2011)


Gender discrimination

Report providing a tool to consider practical options and posing critical questions for policy-makers to identify gaps and opportunities in the review or reform of health sector strategies as well as other sectoral initiatives. Developed by the World Health Organization, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (2011).


Minority Rights: International Standards And Guidance for Implementation (2010)


Gender discrimination

Report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)(2010).



Progress of the World's Women 2008/2009: Who Answers to Women? (2008)


Gender discrimination

UN Women report presenting innovative measures states and international institutions are taking to increase accountability to women, focusing on politics and governance, access to public services, economic opportunities, justice, and the distribution of international assistance for development and security (2008).


Nowhere to Turn: Failure to Protect, Support & Assure Justice for Darfuri Women (2009)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

By Physicians for Human Rights with Harvard Humanitarian Initiative.



The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Gender Justice in Africa (English) (2008)


Gender discrimination

Report of the Partners for Gender Justice Conference, Accra, Ghana 19-21 Nov. 2008. English version.


Hidden in the Mealie Meal (2007)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape

Human Rights Watch Report on the Zambian government's failure to meet its international obligations to combat violence and discrimination against women. The report documents abuses that obstruct women's ability to start and adhere to HIV treatment regimens, including violence against women and insecure property rights (2007).



The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Gender Justice in Africa (French) (2008)


Gender discrimination

Report of the Partners for Gender Justice Conference, Accra, Ghana 19-21 Nov. 2008. French version.


African Statistical Journal: A Special Issue on Gender (2010)


Gender discrimination

Special journal issue of the African Development Bank focused on gender statistics.


Women's Empowerment Principles: Equality Means Business (2010)


Gender discrimination

UNIFEM report offering practical guidance to business and the private sector on how to empower women in the workplace, marketplace and community (2010).


CEDAW and Muslim Family Laws (2010)


Gender discrimination

Report published by MUSAWAH for Equality in the Family on States' parties justifications for their failure to implement CEDAW with regard to family law and practices that discriminate against Muslim women.


You Dress According to Their Rules (2010)


Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual harassment

Report by Human Rights Watch documenting acts of violence, harassment, and threats against women in Chechnya to intimidate them into wearing a headscarf or dressing more "modestly."



In Pursuit of Peace (2010)


Gender discrimination

Launched in tandem with the June 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; includes recommendations for improving gender sensitivity at the ICC, and particular statements by activists from DR Congo, Central African Republic and Uganda.


Reference Guides

Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment 2012 (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

This code was prepared by the Equality Authority with the approval of the Minister for Justice and Equality and after consultation with relevant organizations representing equality interests. The code does not impose any legal obligations, nor is it an authoritative statement of the law. It aims to give practical guidance to employers, employers’ organizations, trade unions, and employees on what is meant by sexual harassment and harassment in the workplace, how it may be prevented, and what steps to take if it does occur to ensure that adequate procedures are readily available to deal with the problem and to prevent its recurrence. The provisions of this code are admissible in evidence and if relevant may be taken into account in any criminal or other proceedings before a court or other relevant bodies (Section 56(4) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015).



Platform Mano Teisės ("My Rights")


Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, LGBTIQ

The purpose of this platform, financed by the European Union and created by non-governmental organizations, is to report hate crimes based on age, gender, sexual orientation, disability, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, religion, belief, or opinion. The platform gives the option to forward the report to the police, non-governmental organizations, or to allow the Lithuanian Human Rights Center (“Lietuvos žmogaus teisių centras”) to anonymize the provided information for purposes of systematically informing governmental institutions and the media about the prevalence and circumstances of hate crimes.

Šios Europos Sąjungos finansuojamos ir nevyriausybinių organizacijų sukurtos platformos tikslas—pranešti apie neapykantos nusikaltimus dėl amžiaus, lyties, seksualinės orientacijos, negalios, rasės, tautybės, kalbos, kilmės, socialinės padėties, religijos, tikėjimo ar nuomonės. Platforma suteikia galimybę pranešti apie šio pobūdžio nusikaltimą policijai ir nevyriausybinėms organizacijoms, arba leisti Lietuvos žmogaus teisių centrui anonimizuoti pateiktą informaciją, siekiant sistemingai informuoti valdžios institucijas ir žiniasklaidą apie neapykantos nusikaltimų paplitimą ir aplinkybes.



Judicial System of Portugal (2019)


Gender discrimination

Portugal has a code-based civil law justice system, and its judiciary is divided between civil and administrative courts. The civil courts, which have jurisdiction over gender discrimination matters, are structured in a hierarchy. The lowest level civil court is the District Court (the Tribunal Judicial de Comarca), which is subordinate to the Appellate Court (the Tribunal da Relação), which is subordinate to the Superior Court of Justice (the Superior Tribunal de Justiça). The Judicial District Courts have the broadest jurisdiction, and issues initial judgments on the cases brought before it, after determining the findings of fact and rulings of law. Parties may appeal to the appropriate Appellate Court, which may review the findings of fact and rulings of law. Decisions rendered by the Appellate Court are final with respect to the findings of fact. However, should there still be dispute about the rulings of law, parties may file a final appeal before the Superior Court of Justice, and any judgment issued by the Superior Court of Justice is final and non-appealable.



International Case Law

Norris v. Ireland European Court of Human Rights (1988)


Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

The applicant was a gay man who challenged various provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which criminalized all sexual acts between men. He argued before the domestic courts that the relevant provisions penalizing homosexual acts between men were inconsistent with the Constitution, particularly the right to privacy, but was unsuccessful. He then sought judgment in the European Court of Human Rights. The applicant submitted evidence that he suffered from deep depression and loneliness upon realizing any overt expression of his sexuality would expose him to prosecution. The applicant had never faced prosecution, but nevertheless remained legally at risk of criminal liability. The ECtHR held that the relevant provisions of the 1861 Act violated Article 8 of the Convention, which guaranteed the right to respect for private and family life. The ECtHR had previously held that social legislation must be necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the pursuit of a legitimate aim. In this regard, Ireland failed to produce evidence showing why the relevant provisions should remain in force. The impugned legislation imposed harms upon certain people that far outweighed any potential social benefit. Following the ECtHR’s decision, the provisions in question were repealed by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993.



Keegan v. Ireland European Court of Human Rights (1994)


Gender discrimination, International law

The applicant’s child was adopted without his consent, but with the permission of the mother. After two years of domestic litigation and in consideration of his daughter’s best interests, he no longer sought to overturn the adoption, but requested damages from the government for the violation of his rights. The European Court of Human Rights found that the adoption of a child of unmarried parents without the father’s knowledge or consent was in accordance with Irish law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of the child. However, the Court found that the law violated the European Convention on Human Rights because it interfered with the applicant’s right to family life under Article 8(1), which would be permissible only if the interference were “necessary in a democratic society.” The Court found that the Irish Government had advanced no reasons relevant to the welfare of the child to justify such a departure from the principles governing respect for family ties. The Court also considered that Article 8 was not restricted to families based on marriage. Finally, because the applicant had no rights under Irish law to challenge the adoption decision either before the Adoption Board or in court, there was a violation of his right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6(1) of the Convention. The Court awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages as well as legal costs and expenses.



Šaltinytė v. Lietuva (Šaltinytė v. Lithuania) European Court of Human Rights (2021)


Gender discrimination, International law

The applicant was a low-income single mother whose request for housing assistance was refused because she was above the age threshold to qualify as a “young family.” The Court unanimously ruled that the limit of 35 years old for eligibility to receive housing subsidy did not violate Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides protection against discrimination, due to objective data showing that such age limitation was a proportional measure.

Pareiškėja buvo mažas pajamas gaunanti vieniša motina, kurios prašymas suteikti paramą būstui buvo atmestas, nes ji viršijo „jaunos šeimos“ amžiaus ribą. Teisingumo Teismas vienbalsiai nusprendė, kad 35 metų amžiaus riba gauti būsto subsidiją nepažeidžia Europos žmogaus teisių konvencijos 14 straipsnio, kuriuo užtikrinama apsauga nuo diskriminacijos, nes objektyvūs duomenys rodo, kad toks amžiaus apribojimas yra proporcinga priemonė. Šaltinį galima rasti lietuvių kalba (neoficiali versija): https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-215825



Cudak v. Lietuva European Court of Human Rights (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law, Sexual harassment

The applicant was a Lithuanian citizen working in an administrative role in the Polish Embassy in Vilnius. She filed a complaint against her male colleague for sexual harassment to the Lithuanian Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson and was later dismissed from her position. The Lithuanian courts declined jurisdiction citing the state-immunity rule. The European Court of Human Rights found that the courts erred in refusing access to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR and awarded the applicant EUR 10,000 of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to be paid by the respondent State.

Pareiškėja buvo Lietuvos pilietė, atlikusi administracines pareigas Lenkijos ambasadoje Vilniuje. Ji pateikė skundą Lietuvos lygių galimybių kontrolierei prieš kolegą vyrą dėl seksualinio priekabiavimo, o vėliau buvo atleista iš pareigų. Lietuvos teismai teigė neturintys jurisdikcijos spręsti šią bylą dėl valstybės imuniteto doktrinos. Tačiau, Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismas nustatė, kad teismai suklydo atsisakydami dalyvauti bylos nagrinėjime, kurį garantuoja EŽTK 6 straipsnis, ir priteisė ieškovei 10 000 EUR turtinės ir neturtinės žalos, kurią turi sumokėti valstybė atsakovė. Šaltinį galima rasti lietuvių kalba (neoficialus vertimas): https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172790



Beizaras ir Levickas prieš Lietuvą (Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania) European Court of Human Rights (2020)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, LGBTIQ

Two men published a Facebook post of them kissing, which sparked hundreds of homophobic comments. At their request, an LGBTQ rights advocacy organization complained to the prosecutor’s office, asking to launch an investigation for instigation of homophobic hatred and violence. Both the prosecutor’s office and court on appeal refused on the basis that the post was “eccentric” and the authors’ comments, even though obscene, did not contain actual criminal act and intent. The ECtHR unanimously ruled that Lithuania violated the right to an effective remedy (Article 13), awarding the applicants non-pecuniary damages.

Du vyrai susilaukė šimtų homofobinių komentarų socialiniame tinkle paskelbę įrašą, kuriame jie bučiuojasi. Jų prašymu LGBTIQ teisių gynimo organizacija pasiskundė prokuratūrai, prašydama pradėti tyrimą dėl homofobinės neapykantos ir smurto kurstymo. Tiek prokuratūra, tiek apeliacinis teismas prašymą atmetė, remdamiesi tuo, kad įrašas buvo „ekscentriškas“, o autorių komentaruose nebuvo rimto pagrindo ir visų nusikaltimo požymių. EŽTT vienbalsiai nusprendė, kad Lietuva pažeidė pareiškėjų teisę į veiksmingą teisinės gynybos priemonę bei priteisė pareiškėjams neturtinę žalą. Vertimas lietuvių kalba: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-203614



Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v. Kleist European Court of Justice (Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte) (2010)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

The plaintiff in the original proceeding was employed as chief physician for defendant, a pension insurance institution. She was terminated pursuant to a policy requiring termination of all employees, both men and women, upon reaching the age at which they could draw a public retirement pension (in the case of plaintiff: 60 years of age). The plaintiff argued that the termination policy was discriminatory because, under the pension statute, women were able to draw a pension at an age five years younger than men; thus, requiring their termination five years earlier. After proceedings in the lower courts, the Austrian Supreme Court referred to the European Court of Justice the question of whether the policy constituted prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sex. The Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that since the criterion used by such a policy is inseparable from the worker’s sex, there is a difference in treatment that is directly based on sex. Having found direct discrimination, the Court also held that the difference in treatment could not be justified by the objective of promoting employment of younger persons.

Die Klägerin im Ausgangsverfahren, C. Kleist, war als leitende Ärztin bei der Beklagten eingestellt. Die Beklagte fasste den Beschluss, allen Mitarbeitern – männlich als auch weiblich – zu kündigen, die ein Alter erreicht haben, in dem sie das Recht haben, eine gesetzliche Rente zu beziehen (im Falle der Klägerin 60 Jahre) und kündigten ihr entsprechend. Die Klägerin betrachtet diesen Beschluss der Beklagten als diskriminierend, denn nach dem entsprechenden Rentenrecht seien Frauen fünf Jahre früher als Männer berechtigt, eine Rente zu beziehen; daher ermögliche dies auch eine Kündigung fünf Jahre früher als bei den männlichen Kollegen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof legte dem EGMR im Vorabentscheidungsverfahren die Frage vor, ob dieser Beschluss eine verbotene geschlechterspezifische Diskriminierung darstelle. Dies bejahte der Gerichtshof. Er stellte fest, dass das Kriterium eines solchen Beschlusses untrennbar mit dem Geschlecht der Arbeitnehmerin einhergeht, also eine unmittelbare unterschiedliche Behandlung aufgrund des Geschlechtes darstellt. Die unmittelbare Diskriminierung kann, so der Gerichtshof, nicht durch das Ziel der Förderung einer Anstellung jüngerer Menschen gerechtfertigt werden.



M. gg. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [C-506/06] European Court of Justice (Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte) (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

The plaintiff was employed as a waitress with Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner, and was terminated while undergoing in vitro fertilization (“IVF”). She then filed suit to recover payment of her salary, claiming the termination was invalid under the Maternity Protection Act. She argued that from the date of her IVF treatment (two days before termination of her employment) she was entitled to national legislative protections against dismissal. After proceedings in the lower courts, the Austrian Supreme Court referred to the European Court of Justice the question of whether a female worker is entitled to protection from dismissal before IVF implantation. The European Court of Justice answered the question in the negative. However, the Court also held that EU Directives on the implementation of equal treatment for men and women regarding access to employment, vocational training, and working conditions preclude the dismissal from employment of a woman who is undergoing IVF where it is established that the dismissal was based on such treatment.

Die Klägerin war als Kellnerin bei der Beklagten angestellt. Ihr wurde gekündigt, während sie sich einer Behandlung zur in vitro Befruchtung unterzog. Aus Sicht der Klägerin war die Kündigung rechtswidrig nach dem Mutterschutzgesetz und sie klagte ihren Lohn ein. Sie argumentierte, dass ihr seit dem Tag der in vitro Behandlung (zwei Tage vor der Kündigung) der Kündigungsschutz unter dem Mutterschutzgesetz zustand. Nachdem die Parteien durch die unteren Gerichte zogen, legte der Oberste Gerichtshof die Frage dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte zur Vorabentscheidung vor. Die Frage lautete, ob einer weiblichen Arbeitnehmerin der vorgebrachte Kündigungsschutz zusteht, bevor die befruchteten Eizellen in die Gebärmutter eingesetzt wurden.



Abromchik v. Belarus Human Rights Committee (ICCPR) (2018)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, International law

Abromchik attended a peaceful assembly on 19 December 2010 with friends in Minsk following the announcement of presidential election results. After the event, when she and her friends were stopped by a special unit of riot police and tried to escape, they were blocked and beaten. An officer punched her on the leg with a rubber truncheon several times. She realized she had a broken leg and told the police officer. She was not taken to the hospital for several hours. She made a complaint to the prosecutor of Minsk about the unlawful actions of the police. She provided details about the incident and witnesses were questioned, but no other actions were taken to investigate the incident or to identify the police officer who had beaten her. The prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation, stating that it was impossible to find those responsible. The office resumed the investigation and then suspended it again on the same grounds. In her appeal to the Committee, Abromchik claimed that she was physically assaulted and affected mentally in violation of article 7 of the Covenant because authorities wanted her to feel helpless and to victimize her and that her age and gender should be taken into account when assessing the gravity of the ill treatment. She also noted that her complaint of ill-treatment was not investigated promptly and impartially by the authorities, contrary to article 7. The Committee found that, in the absence of any information from Belarus that it undertook to address the allegations made, due weight must be given to the allegations. On this basis, the Committee concluded that Belarus failed in its duty to adequately investigate the allegations made in violation of article 7, read in conjunction with article 2(3) of the covenant. The Committee determined that Belarus was required to provide an effective remedy, including conducting a full investigation of the ill treatment in order to prosecute the perpetrators and to punish them with appropriate sanctions, providing adequate compensation, including reimbursement of legal and medical expenses and non-pecuniary losses, and issuing a formal apology to Abromchik. Further, the Committee stated that Belarus was under an obligation to take necessary steps to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.



Hashi v. Denmark Human Rights Committee (ICCPR) (2017)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, International law

Hibaq Said Hashi left Somalia for fear of persecution by Al-Shabaab. She was divorced from one man and married to a second man, but her former husband claimed they were not divorced and she was having sexual relations with another man, which caused Al-Shabaab to call for her to be stoned. Her father helped her leave Somalia and then he was killed, and her current husband was sentenced to death. She traveled to Italy by boat, was registered and determined she was pregnant, but she faced poor conditions in Italy so she left for Sweden to have her baby. When she learned Swedish authorities planned to send her back to Italy, she and her son moved to Denmark where she applied for asylum. She claimed that if she returned to Somalia she would be persecuted and if she returned to Italy she would face harsh living conditions and would not be able to provide for her son’s basic needs. She was ordered to leave Denmark to return to Italy, which Denmark considered her first country of asylum. Upon appeal, the Committee, acting under article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, decided that the removal of Hibaq Said Hashi and her son to Italy without any assurances from Italy that it would receive her and her son in conditions suitable for her child’s age and family’s vulnerable status would violate their rights under article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee required Denmark to review her claim in consideration of its obligations under the Covenant and the need to obtain effective assurances from Italy. While considering her request for asylum, the Committee requested that Denmark not deport her and her son.



Гарнага проти України (Garnaga v. Ukraine) European Court of Human Rights (Європейський суд з прав людини) (2013)


Gender discrimination, International law

The applicant intended to change her patronymic (this term means a part of a personal name was traditionally derived from the name of the father of the person concerned) to disassociate herself from her biological father and associate herself more closely with her stepfather and half-brother. Despite the fact that the woman successfully changed her surname to the surname of her stepfather, she was not allowed to change her patronymic. The authorities' main argument was that new legislation prohibited such a change, which the applicant argued was an illegal and unjustified restriction of her rights. She appealed the decision to the local court, which concluded that the state authorities acted in accordance with the law, after which a change of a patronymic was only legally possible when the father of the person concerned had previously changed his forename. The appellate court and the Higher Administrative Court upheld the decision of the first-instance court. The woman appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), alleging that there was a violation of her right to private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR drew attention to the fact that the Ukrainian legislation regulating change of a forename or surname was flexible, but did not provide sufficient reasons for the restrictions on changing the patronymic. Thus, the ECtHR held that authorities failed to comply with their obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by denying her right to change the patronymic, which was an important aspect of woman`s private and family life. In the most recent version of the Civil Code, the right to change one`s patronymic is established without restriction.

Заявниця мала намір змінити своє по батькові (цей термін означає частину особистого імені, що традиційно походить від імені батька відповідної особи), щоб відмежуватися від свого біологічного батька та більш тісно пов’язати себе із вітчимом та неповнорідним братом. Незважаючи на те, що заявниця успішно змінила своє прізвище на прізвище свого вітчима, їй не дозволили змінити по батькові. Основним аргументом уповноважених осіб було те, що нове законодавство забороняло таку зміну, що, на думку заявниці, було незаконним та необґрунтованим обмеженням її права. Жінка оскаржила відмову до місцевого суду, який дійшов висновку, що державні органи діяли у відповідності до закону, який визначав, що зміна по батькові можлива тільки у тому випадку, коли батько такої особи попередньо змінив своє ім’я. Суди апеляційної інстанції та Вищий адміністративний суд залишили рішення суду першої інстанції без змін. Жінка звернулася до Європейського суду з прав людини (“ЄСПЛ”), стверджуючи, що мало місце порушення її права на приватне та сімейне життя відповідно до статті 8 Конвенції з прав людини. ЄСПЛ звернув увагу на те, що українське законодавство, яке регулювало зміну імені чи прізвища було гнучким, але не містило достатніх підстав для обмежень щодо зміни по батькові. Таким чином, ЄСПЛ постановив, що органи влади не виконали своїх зобов’язань за статтею 8 Європейської конвенції з прав людини, відмовивши їй у праві змінити по батькові, яке було важливим аспектом приватного та сімейного життя жінки. В останній редакції Цивільного кодексу право на зміну по батькові встановлено без обмежень.



International Planned Parenthood Federation – European Network (“IPPF EN”) v. Italy European Court of Human Rights (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

The Italian government’s failure to take measures to ameliorate the less favorable treatment suffered by women falling into certain vulnerable categories with respect to access to abortion services was a violation of Article E (prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination) of the Revised European Social Charter (the “Charter”) in conjunction with Article 11 (right to protection of health) of the Charter. IPPF EN complaint stated that the high number of medical personnel electing to be conscientious objectors resulted in the violation of the rights of women to have access to procedures for the termination of pregnancy, thus violating their right to protection of health. The committee found that certain categories of women in Italy are subject to discrimination in the form of impeded access to lawful abortion facilities as a combined effect of their gender, health status, territorial location, and socio-economic status. The committee held that Italian authorities should have adopted the necessary measures to compensate for deficiencies in service provisions caused by health personnel choosing to exercise their right to conscientious objection to performing abortions.

La mancata adozione da parte del governo italiano di misure volte a migliorare il trattamento meno favorevole subito dalle donne che rientrano in determinate categorie vulnerabili in materia di accesso ai servizi di aborto è stata considerata una violazione dell’articolo E (divieto di discriminazione diretta e indiretta) della Carta sociale europea riveduta (la “Carta”) in combinato disposto con l’articolo 11 (diritto alla protezione della salute) della Carta. Il ricorso di IPPF EN sosteneva che l’elevato numero di personale medico che sceglie di essere obiettore di coscienza ha portato alla violazione del diritto delle donne di avere accesso alle procedure per l’interruzione della gravidanza, violando così il loro diritto alla protezione della salute. Il Comitato ritiene che certe categorie di donne siano oggetto di discriminazione nella forma di impedimento all’accesso di centri per l’aborto legali come effetto combinato del loro genere, stato di salute, ubicazione territoriale e stato socio-economico. Il Comitato ritiene che le autorità italiane avrebbero dovuto adottare le misure necessarie per compensare le carenze nelle prestazioni dei servizi causate dal personale sanitario che sceglie di esercitare il proprio diritto all’obiezione di coscienza all’esecuzione degli aborti.



Case of María Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2001)


Gender discrimination

On February 22, 1995 petitioners, the Center for Justice and International Law and María Eugenia Morales de Sierra, brought a claim against the state of Guatemala alleging that certain articles of the Civil Code of the Republic of Guatemala contravened Articles 1(1), 2, 17 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The relevant articles of the Civil Code of the Republic of Guatemala conferred the power to represent the marital union to the husband, setting aside only exceptional instances when the wife might exercise this authority; imbued the husband with the right to administer marital property, again limiting the wife’s power to exceptional circumstances; delegated the duty to care for minor children and the home to women, permitting professional engagement outside the home only to the extent that it does not impede her primary role as a mother and homemaker; instilled in men the power to oppose their wife’s activities in court “as long as he provides for her and has justified reasons”; conferred upon men the authority to represent marital children in court and to administer their property; and prevented women from exercising certain forms of guardianship. The Guatemalan Court of Constitutionality upheld these laws using women’s protection and juridical certainty as justification. The Inter-American Court, however, held that these provisions in the Guatemalan Civil Code were not justifiable. The challenged Articles were found to violate the rights established under the American Convention and CEDAW. Articles 1(1), 2, 17 and 24 of the American Convention oblige the state to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Convention, to adopt legislative measures that protect those rights, to ensure gender equality within the institution of marriage and to ensure equal treatment before the law respectively. Articles 15 and 16 of CEDAW mandate that women have equal capacity in civil matters, especially those regarding contract and property rights, and that states take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination related to marital and family matters. The Articles in the Guatemalan Code deprived María Eugenia Morales de Sierra, and all Guatemalan women, of their rights as guaranteed in the American Convention, preventing them from advocating for their legal interests, reinforcing antiquated notions of gender roles within marriage and perpetuating systemic disadvantages that women in Guatemala face. The Court ordered Guatemala to conform its Civil Code to meet the standards enshrined in the American Convention and to compensate María Eugenia Morales de Sierra for her suffering.

El 22 de febrero de 1995, los peticionarios, el Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional y María Eugenia Morales de Sierra, presentaron una demanda contra el estado de Guatemala alegando que ciertos artículos del Código Civil de la República de Guatemala contradecían los artículos 1 (1), 2 , 17 y 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW). Los artículos relevantes del Código Civil de la República de Guatemala: le confieren a los esposos la facultad de representar a la unión marital, dejando de lado solo unos pocos casos excepcionales en los que las esposas podrian ejercer esta autoridad; le otorgan al esposo el derecho de administrar bienes conyugales, lo que en efecto limita el poder de la esposa a circunstancias excepcionales; delegan el deber de cuidar a los niños menores y el hogar a las mujeres, permitiendo el compromiso profesional fuera del hogar solo en la medida en que no impida su papel principal como madre y ama de casa; le dan a los hombres el poder de oponerse a las actividades de su esposa en la corte "siempre que él la cuide y tenga razones justificadas;" le confirien a los hombres la autoridad de representar a los hijos conyugales en los tribunales y administrar sus bienes; y le impiden a las mujeres ejercer ciertas formas de tutela. La Corte de Constitucionalidad de Guatemala confirmó estas leyes utilizando la protección de las mujeres y la seguridad jurídica como justificación. Sin embargo, la Corte Interamericana sostuvo que estas disposiciones del Código Civil de Guatemala no eran válidas. Se determinó que los Artículos impugnados violan los derechos establecidos en la Convención Americana y la CEDAW. Los artículos 1 (1), 2, 17 y 24 de la Convención Americana obligan al estado a garantizar los derechos consagrados en la Convención, a adoptar medidas legislativas que protejan esos derechos, a garantizar la igualdad de género en la institución del matrimonio, y a garantizar la igualdad de trato ante la ley. Los artículos 15 y 16 de la CEDAW exigen que las mujeres tengan la misma capacidad en materia civil, especialmente las relacionadas con los derechos contractuales y de propiedad, y que los estados tomen las medidas adecuadas para eliminar la discriminación relacionada con cuestiones maritales y familiares. Los artículos del Código de Guatemala privaron a María Eugenia Morales de Sierra (y a todas las mujeres guatemaltecas) de sus derechos garantizados en la Convención Americana, impidiéndoles defender sus intereses legales, reforzando las nociones anticuadas de los roles de género dentro del matrimonio, y perpetuando desventajas sistémicas a las que las mujeres guatemaltecas son sometidas. La Corte ordenó a Guatemala que cumpliera con su Código Civil para satisfacer los estándares establecidos en la Convención Americana y para compensar a María Eugenia Morales de Sierra por su sufrimiento.



LEVENTOĞLU ABDULKADİROĞLU v. TURKEY European Court of Human Rights (2013)


Gender discrimination

The case concerned the complaint by a woman that, under Turkish law, she was not allowed to keep just her maiden name in official documents after getting married, whereas married men kept their surname. The Court held that this difference in treatment on grounds of sex between persons in an analogous situation had no objective and reasonable justification. Accordingly, the obligation imposed on married women to bear their husband’s surname – even if they could put their maiden name in front of it – had no objective and reasonable justification, in breach of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14.



TUNCER GÜNEŞ v. TURKEY European Court of Human Rights (2013)


Gender discrimination

The applicant, Gülizar Tuncer Güne?, is a Turkish national who was born in 1966 and lives in Istanbul (Turkey). The case concerned her complaint that she had not been allowed to keep just her maiden name after her marriage in March 2005. She claimed in particular that the fact that Turkish law allowed married men but not married women to use only their own surname after marriage amounted to discrimination based on sex. She relied in particular on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention.



Boso v. Italy European Court of Human Rights (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

In 1984, a married Italian woman decided to have an abortion despite her husband’s, the applicant, opposition. The applicant initiated a suit against his wife claiming that the termination deprived him of his right to be a potential father and the unborn child of its right to life. He also challenged the constitutionality of Italian legislation which provided that women could unilaterally decide whether to have an abortion. The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the decision to grant the mother full responsibility on the abortion was logical given the effects of pregnancy, both physical and mental, on pregnant women. The applicant’s appeal to the Venice District Court alleging violations of the Italian Constitution and of the European Convention on Human Rights was also dismissed. The applicant’s appeal to the Court of Cassation, again on constitutional and convention grounds, was similarly dismissed. Finally, the applicant brought the case before the European Court of Human Rights. The Court dismissed the complaint, which alleged that the termination of a pregnancy by the applicant’s wife violated the right to life under the Convention and also his rights under Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention, as “manifestly unfounded.”

Nel 1984, la Sig.ra Boso, una cittadina italiana sposata, decideva di abortire nonostante l’opposizione del marito. Il Sig. Boso iniziava un procedimento contro la moglie ritenendo che l’aborto lo avesse privato del diritto a diventare padre e avesse privato il nascituro del diritto alla vita. Il Sig. Boso contestava inoltre la costituzionalità della legge italiana che prevedeva che la donna potesse unilateralmente decidere se abortire. La Corte Costituzionale rigettava il ricorso in quanto riteneva che dare alla madre piena responsabilità sulla possibilità di abortire era logico in quanto è sulla donna incinta che ricadono gli effetti della gravidanza, sia fisici che mentali. L’impugnazione del Sig. Boso di fronte al Tribunale distrettuale di Venezia, nella quale veniva contestata la violazione della Costituzione italiana e della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, veniva rigettata. Anche l’impugnazione di fronte alla Corte di Cassazione, di nuovo basta su violazioni della Costituzione e della Convenzione, veniva respinta. Infine, il Sig. Boso adiva la Corte Europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Quest’ultima rigettava il ricorso nel quale si contestava il fatto che l’aborto da parte della moglie del ricorrente violava il diritto alla vita e i diritti di cui agli articoli 2, 8 e 12 della Convenzione.



Seferovic v. Italy European Court of Human Rights (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

The detention pending deportation of a woman who had recently given birth found to be unlawful and violated Article 5 §1(f) and Article 5 §5 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In September 2000, the applicant, a woman from Bosnia and Herzegovina, applied to the Italian authorities for refugee status. The application was not forwarded to the competent commission because it contained formal defects. On September 26, 2003, the applicant gave birth to a child, who died a few days later at the hospital. Then, on November 11, 2003, the police served her with a deportation order and transferred her to a holding center. The European Court of Human Rights declared that the deportation order and the applicant's detention were in breach of Italian immigration law no. 286 of 1998, which provided that her deportation should have been suspended until six months after she had given birth (March 26, 2004), regardless of the fact that the baby had died. In March 2006, the Rome Civil Court granted the applicant refugee status. In addition, by way of just satisfaction, the government was required to pay the applicant 7,500 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage for her unlawful detention as there was no redress available under Italian law.

La detenzione di una donna che aveva da poco partorito, in attesa della sua deportazione, è stata ritenuta illegale e in violazione dell’articolo 5 § 1 (f) e dell’articolo 5 § 5 (diritto alla libertà e alla sicurezza) della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Nel settembre del 2000, la ricorrente, una donna della Bosnia-Erzegovina, richiedeva alle autorità italiane lo status di rifugiato. La richiesta non veniva inoltrata alla commissione competente in quanto conteneva delle irregolarità formali. Il 26 settembre 2003, la ricorrente dava alla luce un figlio, che moriva pochi giorni dopo in ospedale. In seguito, l’11 novembre 2003, la polizia emetteva nei confronti della donna un decreto di espulsione e la trasferiva in un centro di soggiorno temporaneo. La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo dichiarava che il decreto di espulsione e la detenzione fossero stati emessi in violazione della legge italiana n. 286 del 1998, che prevede che l’espulsione avrebbe dovuto essere stata sospesa fino a sei mesi dopo il parto (26 marzo 2004), indipendentemente dal fatto che il figlio fosse morto. Nel marzo 2006, il Tribunale civile di Roma accordava alla Sig.ra Seferovic lo status di rifugiato. Inoltre, come giusta compensazione, poiché la legge italiana non prevedeva alcun risarcimento, al Governo veniva imposto di pagare alla ricorrente 7,500 euro come danno non patrimoniale per la sua detenzione illegale.



Karen Tayag Vertido v. The Philippines CEDAW Committee (2008)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

Karen Tayag Vertido, an employee of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Philippines, was raped by a former President of the Chamber in 1996. The case remained at the trial court level for eight years before the Regional Court of Davao City acquitted the defendant in 2005. The Court scrutinized Vertido’s testimony with “extreme caution,” and challenged her credibility on the ground that “an accusation of rape can be made with facility.” The Court specifically declined to apply Filipino Supreme Court precedent cases establishing that failure to escape does not negate the existence of rape, stating that Vertido had ample opportunities to escape her attacker. In her complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Vertido argued that the Court’s actions subjected her to revictimization and violated articles 2(c), 2(f), and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and CEDAW General Recommendation 19, which obliges a State to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, and practices that constitute discrimination against women. The Committee held that the State Court erred in relying on gender-based myths and stereotypes about rape and rape victims in Vertido’s case, and stressed that there should be no assumption in law or practice that a woman gives her consent where she had not physically resisted unwanted sexual conduct. The Committee recommended that the State provide Vertido with appropriate compensation, review the definition of rape under existing law to ensure that lack of consent is a essential element of the crime of rape, remove any requirement that sexual violence be committed by violence or force, and require appropriate training for judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officers in understanding crimes of rape and other sexual offenses.



I.G. v. The Republic of Moldova European Court of Human Rights (2012)


Gender discrimination

A 14-year-old girl was allegedly raped by an acquaintance. She complained that the authorities had failed to investigate her allegations effectively and that the requirement of corroborative evidence of resistance had been discriminatory against her. The Court found a violation of Article 3 on effective investigation and ordered the State to pay the applicant just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage and awards the applicant EUR 10,000.



Elisabeth de Blok et al. v. The Netherlands CEDAW Committee (2014)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Elisabeth de Blok and five other nationals of the Netherlands are self-employed women who gave birth between 2005 and 2006. Until 31 July 2004, self-employed persons were compulsorily insured against the risk of loss of income as a result of incapacity for work under the Incapacity Insurance Act. Under the Work and Care Act, self-employed women were also entitled to a State maternity benefits. On August 1, 2004, the Discontinuation of Access to Incapacity Insurance Act entered into force, ending the entitlement of self-employed women to maternity benefits. The six self-employed women complained to the District Court of The Hague, claiming that the State should have ensured an adequate maternity benefit scheme in keeping with article 11(2)(b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women. The District Court declared the claim unfounded. The Court of Appeal of The Hague upheld the judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the provisions of article 11(2)(b) of the Convention were insufficiently precise, thus making them unsuitable for direct application by national courts. In their complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the six women argued that the State party violated their rights under article 11(2)(b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women by removing the existing maternity leave scheme applicable to self-employed women up to 2004. The Committee held that article 11(2)(b) is applicable also to self-employed women and not to female employees exclusively. Further, the Committee held that, contrary to the State party’s view, the provision was directly applicable. The Committee concluded that the State party’s failure to provide maternity benefits affected pregnant women adversely and therefore constituted direct sex and gender-based discrimination against women. The Committee recommended that the State party provide reparation, including monetary compensation, for the loss of maternity benefits to the six women. The Committee noted that the Sate party amended its legislation in June 2008 to ensure that a maternity leave scheme is available also to self-employed women. However, the Committee invited the State party to address and redress the situation of women similarly situated to the authors, who are self-employed and gave birth between 1 August 2004 and 4 June 2008, when no compensation scheme for self-employed women was in place.



R.P.B. v. The Philippines CEDAW Committee (2014)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

R.P.B., a Filipina national born in 1989 who is both deaf and mute, was raped by her 19-year-old neighbor in 2006. The case remained at the trial court level for five years before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City acquitted the defendant in 2011. Similar to a previous case from the Philippines heard by the CEDAW Committee in 2008, Karen Tayag Vetrido v. The Philippines, the Court again declined to apply Filipino Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the Court relied on gender-based myths and stereotypes about rape and rape victims, finding that the victim should have used every opportunity to escape or resist her attacker. In addition, State authorities did not provide any interpretation for R.P.B. In her complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, R.P.B. argued that the Court’s actions violated article 1, and article 2(c), (d), and (f) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In addition to relying on gender based myths and stereotypes, R.P.B. also argued that the Court failed to provided her with accessibility, on an equal basis with other victims, to the court, as a woman who is also deaf and mute. The Committee held that the provision of sign language interpretation was essential to ensure R.P.B’s full and equal participation in the proceedings, in compliance with article 2(c) and 2(d) of the Convention. Further, the Committee held that the State party erred in relying on gender-based stereotyping, which resulted in sex and gender-based discrimination and disregard for the individual circumstances of the case, such as R.P.B’s disability and age. The Committee recommended that the State provide R.P.B. with the appropriate compensation and free-of-charge counseling, review the existing law and remove any requirement that sexual assault be committed by force or violence, guarantee the free and adequate assistance of interpreters, ensure that all criminal proceedings involving rape and other sexual offences are conducted in an impartial and fair manner, free from prejudices or stereotypical notions regarding the victim’s gender, age and disability, and provide adequate and regular training on the Convention, the Optional Protocol and the Committee’s general recommendations.



Tanbay Tuten v. Turkey European Court of Human Rights (2013)


Gender discrimination

Ms. Tanbay Tuten, a university professor, was married and took her husband’s surname as required by law in 1992. She continued, however, to use her maiden name in her professional life, even though she could not use it in official documents. In 2007, she brought a proceeding in the Turkish Courts requesting that she be allowed to use only her maiden name, but was denied in the lower court and on appeal. Ms. Tuten brought her case to the European Court of Human Rights contending that the law is discrimination on ground of sex. The Court held that the difference in treatment on grounds of sex was in violation of Article 14 and Article 8 of the Convention and based its analysis on Tekeli v. Turkey.



W.H. v. Sweden European Court of Human Rights (2014)


Gender discrimination

A woman seeking asylum in Sweden was denied asylum by the Swedish Migration Board, the Migration Court, and denied an appeal of the previous decisions by the Migration Court of Appeals. The migration courts found that although the applicant belonged to a minority (Mandaean) in Iraq, the one threat she had received several years ago was not based on her minority beliefs but on her marital status (as she was divorced) and therefore her return to Iraq could not be deemed unsafe. The courts also found that the situation in Iraq did not constitute grounds for asylum nor that she was still being searched for in Iraq. Swedish law (the Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen, 2005:716)) states that “an alien who is considered to be a refugee or otherwise in need of protection is, with certain exceptions, entitled to a residence permit in Sweden.” Moreover, the Aliens Act continues, “if a residence permit cannot be granted on the above grounds, such a permit may be issued to an alien if, after an overall assessment of his or her situation, there are such particularly distressing circumstances (synnerligen ömmande omständigheter) to allow him or her to remain in Sweden (Chapter 5, section 6).” The applicant brought this suit complaining that her return to Iraq would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”) The applicant lost this suit as well, as the court held that her circumstances would not prevent her from settling safely and reasonably in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq once deported from Sweden. The evidence did not show that the applicant would face a risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 in the Kurdistan Region. The Court looked at precedent holding that the general situation in Iraq was not so serious as to cause, by itself, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in the event of a person’s return to that country (F.H. v. Sweden (no. 32621/06, § 93, 20 January 2009)). Taking into account the international and national reports available at the time of the decision, the Court saw no reason to alter the position taken four years before. The Court gave deference to the Swedish Migration Court’s decision and found no violation of Article 3. According to the Court, “Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens.”



Unal Tekeli v. Turkey European Court of Human Rights (2004)


Gender discrimination

The European Court of Human rights held that a Turkish Law preventing married women from keeping their own surname after marriage is unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex. As required under Turkish law, upon marriage Ms. Unal Tekeli took her husband’s last name. She continued to use her maiden name in her professional life and put it in front of her legal surname, but could not use her maiden name in official documents. She brought suit in the Turkish Courts requesting that she be able to use her maiden name and that the law was discriminatory, but her case was dismissed both at the trial court and upon appeal. After being dismissed, she brought suit in the European Court of Human Rights, alleging discrimination. The Court first determined that differential treatment did exist because under the law, married men were treated differently from married women. Next, it found that no objective and reasonable justification existed for such differential treatment. It acknowledged that Turkey has a goal of preserving the family unit, but noted that this goal was not defeated by allowing women to keep their surnames. Thus, preserving the family unit was not a justification for the unequal treatment of married men and married women. The Court held that the difference in treatment based on sex violated international law.



S.A.S. v. France European Court of Human Rights (2014)


Gender discrimination

S.A.S, a 23 year old French citizen, filed an application against France to challenge the ban on the full face veil. She argued that as a woman wearing a face veil, the ban constituted a violation of her right to private life, freedom of religion, freedom of expression and her right not to be discriminated against. The French Government recognised that the ban may represent a limitation on Article 9 of the Convention i.e. the freedom to manifest one’s religion, but argued, however, that the limitation pursued legitimate aims and was necessary in a democratic society for the fulfillment of those aims. The Government argued that the ban sought to protect equality between men and women, as to consider that women must conceal their faces in public places amounted to denying them the right to exist as individuals. The Government also argued that this forced them to express their individuality only in the private family space or in an exclusively female space. The Government indicated that the practice of wearing the veil was incompatible in French society with the fundamental rules of social communication, tolerance and the requirements of “living together”. The court held that the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 was to be regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of “living together” as an element of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” and thus no violation of Articles 8 or 9 of the Convention was found.



Dogru v. France European Court of Human Rights (2009)


Gender discrimination

Gender discrimination. The Muslim applicant, aged eleven at the material time, was enrolled in the first year of a state secondary school and wore a headscarf to school. On seven occasions in January 1999 the applicant went to physical education and sports classes wearing her headscarf and refused to take it off despite repeated requests to do so by her teacher, who explained that wearing a headscarf was incompatible with physical education classes. At a meeting on 11 February 1999 the school's pupil discipline committee decided to expel the applicant from the school for breaching the duty of assiduity by failing to participate actively in physical education and sports classes. The applicant's parents appealed against that decision to the appeal panel. The applicant claimed that expelling her for wearing the headscarf had amounted to an interference with her religious freedom under Article 9 of the Convention. The court however held that her rights were not infringed, following the Turkish case of Leyla Sahin (Leyla Sahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, ECHR 2005-XI) whereby it was found that secularism, as upheld by the French Government in that case, was of fundamental constitutional value in terms of the importance of the protection of women's rights. It was held that secularism was undoubtedly one of the fundamental principles of the State which was in harmony with the rule of law and respect for human rights and democracy. The court thus noted that secularism was the guarantor of democratic values, ensuring that all citizens are treated equally. The court confirmed that the freedom to manifest one's religion could be restricted in order to defend such values. It concluded that this notion of secularism was consistent with the values underpinning the Convention.



France v Stoeckel, Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1991 Court of Justice of the European Communities (1991)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Gender discrimination, employment discrimination. France had a long industrial and legal tradition prohibiting night work for women, accompanied by legislation which was aimed at protecting female workers. Alfred Stoekl, the manager of Suma SA, Obenheim, a business concerned with the packaging of audio and video cassettes, violated the ban by hiring female night workers and invoked the Equal Treatment Directive in his defense. The court held that in terms of protecting female workers, discrimination is only valid if there is a justified need for a difference of treatment as between men and women. However, whatever the disadvantages of night work may be, it does not seem that, except in the case of pregnancy or maternity, the risks to which women are exposed when working at night are, in general, inherently different from those to which men are exposed. Article 5 of Council Directive 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions is sufficiently precise to impose on the member-States the obligation not to lay down by legislation the principle that night work by women is prohibited, even if that is subject to exceptions, where night work by men is not prohibited. This case is important as its judgment led to France rejecting legislation prohibiting women from night work with effect from February 1993.



N. v. Sweden European Court of Human Rights (2010)


Gender discrimination

N and her husband X applied for asylum after arriving in Sweden, claiming persecution in Afghanistan because of X’s political position. The asylum application being rejected, N appealed claiming that, as she had in the meantime separated from her husband, she would risk social exclusion and possibly death if she returned to Afghanistan. Her appeal was also rejected. She applied for a residence permit three times, as well as for divorce from X., submitting that she was at an ever-heightened risk of persecution in Afghanistan, as she had started an extra-marital relationship with a man in Sweden which was punishable by long imprisonment or even death in her country of origin. All her applications were rejected. While being aware of reports of serious human rights violations in Afghanistan, the Court did not find that they showed, on their own, that there would be a violation of the Convention if N were to return to that country. Examining N.'s personal situation, however, the Court noted that women were at a particularly heightened risk of ill-treatment in Afghanistan if they were perceived as not conforming to the gender roles ascribed to them by society, tradition or the legal system there. The mere fact that N had lived in Sweden might well be perceived as her having crossed the line of acceptable behavior. The fact that she wanted to divorce her husband, and in any event did not want to live with him any longer, might result in serious life-threatening repercussions upon her return to Afghanistan. Among other things, the Court noted that a recent law, the Shiite Personal Status Act of April 2009, required women to obey their husbands' sexual demands and not to leave home without permission. Reports had further shown that around 80 % of Afghani women were affected by domestic violence, acts which the authorities saw as legitimate and therefore did not prosecute. Unaccompanied women, or women without a male "tutor", faced continuous severe limitations to having a personal or professional life, and were doomed to social exclusion. They also often plainly lacked the means for survival if not protected by a male relative. Consequently, the Court found that if N were deported to Afghanistan, Sweden would be in violation of Article 3.



B.S. v. Spain European Court of Human Rights (2012)


Gender discrimination

A Spanish woman of Nigeria origin was allegedly verbally and physically abused when she was stopped and questioned while working as a prostitute in the street on two occasions. She lodged a complaint with the investigating judge who asked the police headquarters to produce an incident report in which the identities of the police officers on patrol at the time of the incidents differed from those indicated by the applicant. The judge subsequently made a provisional discharge order and discontinued the proceedings on basis of insufficient evidence. The applicant applied for a review, asking to identify the police officers and obtaining witness statements, but the request was rejected. She lodged an appeal, leading to the reopening of the proceedings at which the police officers were acquitted on basis of the police headquarters’ report. The applicant was again stopped for questioning. Her criminal complaint, review request and subsequent appeal were all unsuccessful. The ECtHR considered that the investigative steps taken had not been sufficiently thorough and effective to satisfy the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, and found a violation of Article 3. With respect to allegations of ill-treatment, the Court was unable to find a violation in this respect due to inconclusive evidence. The Court considered that the domestic courts had not taken into account the applicant's special vulnerability inherent in her situation as an African woman working as a prostitute. The authorities had not taken all possible measures to ascertain whether or not a discriminatory attitude might have played a role in the events. The Court therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3.

Una mujer española de origen nigeriano fue supuestamente abusada verbal y físicamente cuando fue detenida e interrogada mientras trabajaba como prostituta en la calle en dos ocasiones. Presentó una queja ante el juez, el que pidió a la comisaría de policía que presentara un informe de incidentes en el que las identidades de los policías en patrulla en el momento de los incidentes no coincidieran con las indicadas por el solicitante. Despues, el juez dictó una orden de baja provisional e interrumpió el procedimiento por falta de pruebas. La solicitante solicitó una revisión, solicitando identificar a los oficiales de policía y obteniendo declaraciones de testigos, pero su solicitud fue rechazada. Ella presentó una apelación, lo que llevó a la reapertura de los procedimientos en los cuales los agentes de policía fueron absueltos con base en el informe de la sede de la policía. La solicitante fue nuevamente detenido para ser interrogada. Su denuncia penal, solicitud de revisión y posterior apelación fueron infructuosas. El TEDH consideró que las medidas de investigación tomadas no habían sido lo suficientemente exhaustivas y efectivas para satisfacer los requisitos del artículo 3 de la Convención, y encontró una violación del artículo 3. Con respecto a las denuncias de malos tratos, el Tribunal no pudo encontrar una Violación a este respecto debido a pruebas no concluyentes. El Tribunal consideró que los tribunales nacionales no habían tenido en cuenta la especial vulnerabilidad de la demandante inherente a su situación como mujer africana que trabajaba como prostituta. Las autoridades no habían tomado todas las medidas posibles para determinar si una actitud discriminatoria podría haber desempeñado un papel en los hechos. En consecuencia, el Tribunal concluyó que se había violado el artículo 14 en relación con el artículo 3.



Jallow v. Bulgaria CEDAW Committee (2012)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

J moved from the Gambia to Bulgaria after marrying A.P., a Bulgarian national. Once in Bulgaria, A.P. subjected J to physical and psychological violence, including sexual abuse, and attempted to force her to take part in pornographic films and photographs. He also abused their daughter, M.A.P. A.P. called the Child Protection Department to stop J from breastfeeding M.A.P, during which onsite visit the social workers learned of A.P’s abuse, called the police and advised J to seek refuge but provided no guidance about where or how to do so. J found refuge for several days in an NGO-run shelter, but A.P. later found her and forced her to return to the family home. Prosecutors refused to continue investigating the alleged domestic violence due to insufficient evidence. At no time did the authorities interview J. Later, A.P. filed an application with the Sofia Regional Court alleging him being a victim of domestic violence and requesting an emergency protection order. The Court granted the order, along with temporary custody of M.A.P, based solely on his statement and without consideration of the alleged domestic violence he committed against J. Authorities did not provide J with information about M.A.P’s whereabouts or her condition, despite repeated requests. The Court dismissed A.P.’s application for a permanent protection order but the emergency order remained effective. J later agreed to a divorce, including to numerous unfavorable conditions, to regain her custody of the daughter. J submitted a communication before the CmEDAW on behalf of M.A.P. and herself alleging violations by Bulgaria of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5 and 16 (1)(c), 16(1)(d), 16(1)(f) and 16(1)(g) of CEDAW by failing to provide effective protection against domestic violence and sanction A.P. for his behavior, to consider domestic violence as a real and serious threat, to adopt effective measures to address gender-based violence against women, gender discrimination and to provide illiterate migrant woman as herself to access justice. The Committee upheld all her claims, urged Bulgaria to compensate J and M.A.P, and recommended that the State Party adopt measures to ensure that women victims of domestic violence, including migrant women, have effective access to justice and other services. It also called on the State Party to provide regular training on CEDAW and the Optional Protocol and to adopt legislative and other measures to ensure that domestic violence is taken into account in determining custody and visitation rights of children.



Kell v. Canada CEDAW Committee (2012)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

K, an Aboriginal woman from the Rae-Edzo community in the Northwest Territories (N.W.T.) of Canada, bought a house from the N.W.T. Housing Corporation, with S her common law partner, as co-owners of the property. S subjected K to domestic violence, including economic abuse, over the subsequent three-year period. Following a request from S, a then board member of the Housing Authority, and without K’s knowledge, the N.W.T. Housing Corporation on instruction from the Rae-Edzo Housing Authority removed K’s name from the Assignment of Lease, making S the sole owner of the property. S then evicted her from the property while she sought protection in a shelter. K filed proceedings against S in the N.W.T. Supreme Court seeking compensation for domestic violence and loss of use of her home, fraudulently obtained by S, aided and abetted by the N.W.T. Government. S subsequently died, following which K’s lawyer initiated proceedings against his estate and the N.W.T. Housing Corporation. They offered K a monetary settlement but K refused as her key concern was regaining the property. The Supreme Court dismissed both proceedings for “want of prosecution.” Costs were imposed against K and subsequent appeals were unsuccessful. K filed a third action related to her interest in and right to the leasehold title and possession of the property. The property had then been sold and the Court dismissed the matter. K brought a communication to the CmEDAW alleging violations by Canada of Articles 1, 2(d), 2(e), 14(2)(h), 15(1)-15(4), 16(1)(h) of CEDAW by allowing its agents – the N.W.T. Housing Corporation and the Rae-Edzo Housing Authority – to discriminate against her on the grounds of sex, marital status and cultural heritage and failing to ensure that its agents afford women and men equal rights in respect of ownership and enjoyment of property. The Committee found that Canada was responsible for K losing ownership of the property, in violation of Articles 2(d), 2(e), and 16(1)(h) of CEDAW, read with Article 1. However, it found that Canada had not violated Articles 14(2)(h) or 15(4), as there was no evidence K had been discriminated against as a rural woman or prevented from residing in another property in the community. The Committee recommended that Canada compensate K and provide her with appropriate housing. It also recommended recruiting and training more Aboriginal women to provide legal aid and reviewing the legal aid system to ensure Aboriginal women who are victims of domestic violence have effective access to justice.



R.K.B. v. Turkey CEDAW Committee (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

R.K.B.’s employer dismissed her but not the male colleague whom she was accused of having an affair with, and threatened to “spread rumours about her relationships with other men” to pressure her to sign a document, attesting that she had been paid all her benefits upon termination. R.K.B. filed a claim to the Kocaeli 3rd Labour Court against her employer alleging unfair termination based on gender stereotypes. The Court decided that the termination of her contract was not justified but not dismissing the male colleague was not discriminatory. R.K.B. appealed to the Court of Cassation, which dismissed the appeal without reference to gender discrimination. The CEDAW held that the Turkish court violated Articles 5(a), 11(1a) and 11(1d) of CEDAW by basing their decisions on gender stereotypes, tolerating allegations of extramarital relationships by male employees but not by female employees. It recommended adequate compensation to be paid to R.K.B, issued the State to take measures to implement laws on gender equality in the work environment; and to provide training to judges, lawyers and law enforcement personnel on women’s rights and gender-based stereotypes. The decision is of particular importance in a country where almost 80% of women are unemployed (Richinick) and where women’s participation in the labor force has been declining. It also stresses that mere adoption of laws is not enough to protect rights – implementation is the key. The decision also emphasizes the role of the courts (and not the executive branch) as ultimately responsible for rights’ violation.



L.N.P. v. Argentina Human Rights Committee (2007)


Gender discrimination, Statutory rape or defilement

A 15-year-old girl, P, was allegedly sexually assaulted by three men. She immediately reported the attack to the police, but was kept waiting for hours at the police station and a medical center before being performed anal and vaginal palpations which caused her intense pain and despite complaining the sole anal nature of the attack. A social worker was sent to interview P's neighbors and relatives about her sexual history and morals during the investigation, leasing aside the three accused. The three accused were acquitted following a trial solely in Spanish despite the first language of P and several of the witnesses was Qom, and in which great reliance was placed on P's sexual history by the prosecution and the judge. P was not notified of her rights to participate in the trial nor of the outcome of the trial and she only became aware of the acquittal after two years and was unable to appeal. The Human Rights Committee found violations of Articles 2(3), 3, 7, 14(1), 17, 24, 26 of the Convention. The Committee found that the police, medical examiner and the court did not provide appropriate protections to P's age, discriminated against her in the emphasis that was placed on her sexual history, and denied her right of access to the courts when she was not informed of her legal rights. It also found that the events at the police station and the medical examination constituted inhumane or degrading treatment, and that the investigation had arbitrarily interfered with P's private life. The Committee called on the State to guarantee access for victims, including victims of sexual assault, to the courts in conditions of equality in the future. However the operative gender stereotypes, including that as a young women from a marginalized ethnic minority group, she was sexually promiscuous, which contributed towards the acquittal of the accused of the rape were unnamed, leaving the role of the stereotypes in discriminating against similar victims and their rights unaddressed.

Una niña de 15 años, P, presuntamente fue agredida sexualmente por tres hombres. Ella informó de inmediato del ataque a la policía, pero se mantuvo esperando durante horas en la estación de policía y en un centro médico antes de que se realizaran las palpaciones anales y vaginales, lo que le causó un dolor intenso, además ella especificó la naturaleza anal única del ataque. Se envió a una trabajadora social para entrevistar a los vecinos y familiares de P sobre su historial sexual y su moral durante la investigación, dejando a un lado a los tres acusados. Los tres acusados fueron absueltos después de un juicio únicamente en español a pesar del primer idioma de P y varios de los testigos era Qom, y en los que la fiscalía y el juez depositaron una gran confianza en la historia sexual de P. P no fue notificada de sus derechos a participar en el juicio ni del resultado del juicio y solo se enteró de la absolución después de dos años, cuando ya era muy tarde para apelar. El Comité de Derechos Humanos encontró violaciones de los artículos 2 (3), 3, 7, 14 (1), 17, 24, 26 de la Convención. El Comité determinó que la policía, el médico forense, y el tribunal no proporcionaron las protecciones adecuadas a la edad de P, la discriminaron por el énfasis que le pusieron en su historial sexual y negaron su derecho de acceso a los tribunales cuando no se le informó de sus derechos legales. También encontró que los eventos en la estación de policía y el examen médico constituían un trato inhumano y degradante, y que la investigación había interferido arbitrariamente en la vida privada de P. El Comité pidió al Estado que garantice el acceso de las víctimas, incluidas las víctimas de agresión sexual, a los tribunales en condiciones de igualdad en el futuro. Sin embargo, los estereotipos operativos de género, incluyendo que como mujeres jóvenes de un grupo minoritario étnico marginado, la tacharon como sexualmente promiscua, lo que contribuyó a la absolución de las acusadas de la violación no fue identificado, dejando el papel de los estereotipos en la discriminación contra víctimas similares y sus derechos no defendidos.



Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of Niger ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (2008)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

The applicant, who was born to a mother in slavery, was sold to a local chief at age 12. For the next nine years she was subjected to rape, violence, and forced labor without remuneration. When Niger’s Supreme Court failed to convict her "owner" under Article 270.1-5 of the Nigerien Criminal Code, which made slavery illegal in 2003, the applicant brought her case before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice under Article 9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05. The court ruled that the applicant had been a slave under the definition in Article 1 (I) of the Slavery Convention of 1926 and that in failing to convict her former "owner," Niger had not upheld its legal responsibility to protect her from slavery under international law. This case was the first ECOWAS ruling on slavery and only the second conviction made under Niger’s 2003 anti-slavery law. The case gained a high level of publicity, setting the precedent for women to fight back against the traditional slavery practices common to Niger and other ECOWAS nations. As of 2009, there had been approximately 30 more cases upholding the prohibition of slavery in Niger.



Maria Merciadri de Morini v. Argentina Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2001)


Gender discrimination

Maria Merciadri de Morini v. Argentina, Argentina, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2001. Gender Discrimination, Political Rights, Equal Protection, Due Process. Ms. Maria Merciadri de Morini’s political party produced an election ballot that violated Argentine law. The law required election ballots to include 30% of women candidates. Ms. Merciadri de Morini’s political party only placed one woman out of five candidates where, by law, there should have been at least two women on the ballot. Ms. Merciadri de Morini brought suit against the political party for the violation of the voting law. Ms. Merciadri de Morini attempted to exhaust domestic remedies but the Argentine domestic courts violated her rights to due process and equal protection by continuously rejecting her claim. Ms. Merciadri de Morini petitioned her case to IACHR. Argentina ultimately responded to the allegation and dictated to the IACHR that the two parties had come to a friendly settlement. Argentina changed the way it regulated the voting law and recognized the violations against all women including Ms. Merciadri de Morini. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights approved the friendly settlement between Ms. Merciadri de Morini and Argentina.

La señora María Merciadri, cuyo caso, "Morini contra Argentina," fue visto ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el 2001. Se analizó la discriminación de género, derechos políticos, igualdad de protección, y debido proceso. El partido político de la Sra. Maria Merciadri de Morini produjo una boleta electoral que violaba la ley argentina. La ley exigía que las boletas electorales incluyeran el 30% de las candidatas. El partido político de la Sra. Merciadri de Morini solo colocó a una mujer de cada cinco candidatas donde, por ley, debería haber al menos dos mujeres en la boleta electoral. La Sra. Merciadri de Morini presentó una demanda contra el partido político por la violación de la ley de votación. La Sra. Merciadri de Morini intentó agotar los recursos internos, pero los tribunales nacionales argentinos violaron sus derechos al debido proceso y la igual protección al rechazar continuamente su reclamo. La Sra. Merciadri de Morini solicitó su caso a la CIDH. Argentina finalmente respondió a la acusación y dictó a la CIDH que las dos partes habían llegado a un acuerdo amistoso. Argentina cambió la forma en que regulaba la ley de votación y reconoció las violaciones contra todas las mujeres, incluída la Sra. Merciadri de Morini. La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos aprobó el acuerdo amistoso entre la Sra. Merciadri de Morini y Argentina.



Carole Louise Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., United Kingdom European Court of Justice (1994)


Gender discrimination

Carole Louise Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., United Kingdom, European Court of Justice, 1994. Gender discrimination, employment discrimination. Mrs. Webb learned that she was pregnant two weeks after starting with EMO Air Cargo, where she was hired to cover for another employee, Mrs. Stewart, during her maternity leave. Mrs. Webb expected to stay with EMO Air Cargo after covering for Mrs. Stewart, but was dismissed from the company after notifying EMO of her pregnancy. A letter from EMO clearly stated pregnancy as the reason for her dismissal. An industrial tribunal and the Court of Appeal dismissed Mrs. Webb’s claims of direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex. An appeal to the House of Lords was referred to the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Justice determined that Mrs. Webb’s dismissal was contrary to Article 2(1) and Article 5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive. The ECJ also noted that Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive recognizes the importance of protecting women during pregnancy and after the birth of children, by allowing individual Member States to introduce protective legal provisions. Lastly, the ECJ acknowledged that the dismissal of pregnant women during pregnancy and maternity leave is prohibited, noting that exceptions to this prohibition are available only in exceptional cases in which the dismissal is unrelated to the pregnancy.



Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2010)


Gender discrimination

Karen Atala Riffo, a judge in Chile, and her husband separated in 2002 and agreed that she would retain custody of their three daughters. After a few years, Ms. Atala began to live with her female partner. In response, her husband filed for custody claiming that the mother’s homosexuality was detrimental to the children. The lower court confirmed the grant of custody to the mother, finding that there was no evidence that homosexuality was pathological conduct that would make Ms. Atala unfit as a mother. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Chile granted custody to the father, on the basis that the mother’s sexuality would cause irreversible harm to the children’s development. Ms. Atala took the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”), marking the first time that the IACHR heard a case related to LGBT rights. The IACHR held that sexual orientation is a suspect class and that the Chilean courts had discriminated against Atala in the custody case in violation of the American Convention’s right to equality and non-discrimination. In 2012, the court ordered Chile to pay Atala USD $50,000 in damages and $12,000 in court costs. The Chilean government agreed to abide by the IACHR’s ruling.

Karen Atala Riffo, juez de Chile, y su esposo se separaron en el 2002 y acordaron que ella conservaría la custodia de sus tres hijas. Después de unos años, la Sra. Atala empezó una nueva relación y empezó a vivir con su pareja femenina. En respuesta, su esposo solicitó la custodia alegando que la homosexualidad de la madre era perjudicial para los niños. El tribunal de primera instancia confirmó el otorgamiento de la custodia a la madre, encontrando que no había evidencia de que la homosexualidad fuera una conducta patológica que hiciera que la Sra. Atala no fuera apta como madre. Sin embargo, en apelación, la Corte Suprema de Chile otorgó la custodia al padre, sobre la base de que la sexualidad de la madre causaría un daño irreversible al desarrollo de los hijos. La Sra. Atala llevó el caso a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (“CIDH”), siendo la primera vez que la CIDH conoce un caso relacionado con los derechos HGB. La CIDH sostuvo que la orientación sexual es una clase sospechosa y que los tribunales chilenos habían discriminado a Atala en el caso de custodia en violación del derecho a la igualdad y no discriminación de la Convención Americana. En el 2012, la corte ordenó a Chile que pagara a Atala USD $ 50,000 en daños y $ 12,000 en costas judiciales. El gobierno chileno acordó acatar la sentencia de la CIDH.



V.K. v. Bulgaria CEDAW Committee (2011)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

Ms. V.K., a Bulgarian citizen residing in Poland, sought to obtain a divorce from her husband after years of physical, emotional and economic abuse. Following a series of incidents in which her husband physically abused and intimidated both mother and children, Ms. V.K. took her children and left Poland for Bulgaria in order to hide from her husband and to seek protection and support from her family and the State. Once in Bulgaria, Ms. V.K. filed an application pursuant to the State’s Law on Protection against Domestic Violence, asking for an immediate protection order against her husband, invoking the Convention (CEDAW) and other human rights treaties. The District Court issued the order for immediate protection, but rejected Ms. V.K.’s application for a permanent protection order. On appeal, the Regional Court upheld the decision of the District Court. After exhausting all available domestic remedies, Ms. V.K. lodged a complaint with the CEDAW Committee alleging that the State had failed to provide her with effective protection against domestic violence, in violation of the Convention. She further claimed that the absence of a special law regarding the equality of women and men in the State, and the lack of recognition of violence against women as a form of discrimination, interfered with her human rights. Upon consideration, the Committee found that the refusal of the State’s courts to issue a permanent protection order against Ms. V.K.’s husband, along with the unavailability of shelters for battered women, violated the State’s obligation to effectively protect her against domestic violence. The Committee further concluded that the refusal of the State’s courts to issue a permanent protection order against Ms. V.K.’s husband was based on discriminatory notions of what constitutes domestic violence.



Abramova v. Belarus CEDAW Committee (2011)


Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Ms. Abramova, a citizen of Belarus, is a journalist who was arrested for her activism on behalf of the “For Freedom” movement and convicted of “minor hooliganism.” She was held in a temporary detention facility for five days, where she shared a small, unheated cell with an unenclosed toilet area that lay in open view of the all-male staff. During her detention, the male prison staff directed numerous humiliating comments at Ms. Abramova, treatment that the male detainees at the facility did not receive. Upon her release, Ms. Abramova submitted a complaint of violation of her rights in detention to authorities at the Interior Department, who informed her that her allegations had not been verified. Ms. Abramova then filed a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office, again with a response that her claims had not been confirmed. Next, Ms. Abramova filed an application to the District Court under civil procedure, but the court claimed that it lacked jurisdiction and rejected her application. She appealed, and the Judicial Board rejected her appeal. Ms. Abramova proceeded to file a complaint to the District Court under administrative procedure, which again refused to initial civil proceedings. On appeal, the Judicial Board reversed the decision of the District Court and remanded the case for new consideration; on remand, the District Court dismissed Ms. Abramova’s complaint on procedural grounds. She submitted a complaint to the CEDAW Committee alleging that the conditions under which the State detained her constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, and that such treatment amounted to discrimination against her on the basis of gender. The Committee found that Ms. Abramova’s temporary detention in poor, unhygienic conditions, in a facility staffed exclusively by men, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and discrimination on the basis of her gender. Further, the Committee found that the State was in violation of its obligations under the Convention (CEDAW).



Teixeira v. Brazil CEDAW Committee (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

An Afro-Brazilian woman suffered a high-risk pregnancy and was repeatedly denied timely care at public health facility, before dying of a digestive hemorrhage following delivery of her stillborn fetus. Her death is not an isolated case; Brazil's maternal mortality rates are disproportionately high for a country of its economic status and the chances of dying in pregnancy and childbirth are greatest among indigenous, low-income, and Afro-descendant women. The husband of the deceased then filed a civil claim for material and moral damages, and twice requested the judicial mechanism of injunctive relief (tutela antecipada), which requests the judge to anticipate the protective effects of a decision. The first request was ignored and the second denied. The mother of the deceased then submitted a complaint to CEDAW Committee, alleging that the Rio de Janeiro State violated her daughter’s right to life and health under the Convention (CEDAW). The State contended that the evidence offered no link between the deceased’s gender and the possible errors committed, and that such errors therefore did not fall within the definition of discrimination set out in the Convention. Upon consideration, the Committee found that the death of the deceased must be regarded as maternal, that the deceased was denied appropriate services in connection with her pregnancy, that the State failed to fulfill its obligations under the Convention pursuant to the right to health, and that the State’s lack of appropriate maternal health services has a differential impact on the right to life of women. The Committee directed the State to take the following steps: compensate the deceased’s family, ensure women’s right to safe motherhood and affordable access to adequate emergency obstetric care, provide adequate professional training for health workers, ensure that private health care facilities comply with national and international standards on reproductive health care, and ensure that sanctions are imposed on health professionals who violate women’s reproductive health rights.

A vítima, uma mulher afro-brasileira que sofria com uma gravidez de risco, foi morta em razão do descaso do sistema público de saúde do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, após diversas negativas de atendimento apropriado a ela, ocasionando sua morte e de seu filho natimorto. Sua morte não se trata de um caso isolado. Com efeito, as taxas de mortalidade de gestantes são desproporcionalmente altas para um país com o status econômico do Brasil. Nesse aspecto, o risco de mortalidade durante a gravidez ou durante o parto é maior entre a população indígena, de baixa renda e afrodescendentes, o que explica o porquê desse caso ser relevante. O marido da vítima entrou com Pedido de Reparação de Danos Morais e Materiais e com dois pedidos de Tutela Antecipada, a fim de antecipar os efeitos da decisão. Contudo, o primeiro pedido de tutela antecipada não foi analisado pelo Judiciário, enquanto o segundo pedido foi negado. Em vista da ineficiência do Poder Judiciário brasileiro, a mão da vítima submeteu uma reclamação ao Comitê da CEDAW, sob o argumento de violação dos direitos à vida e à saúde de sua filha por parte do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. O Estado do Rio de Janeiro, por sua vez, argumentou acerca da inexistência de conexão entre o gênero da vítima e os possíveis erros médicos ocorridos, não sendo aplicável a definição de discriminação estabelecida pela CEDAW. Quando da análise do caso, o Comitê entendeu que: (i) a morte da vítima deveria ser considerada uma “morte materna” evitável, uma vez que foi negado atendimento apropriado relativo à gravidez da vítima; (ii) o Estado do Rio de Janeiro falhou em garantir o direito à saúde no termos da Convenção da CEDAW; e (iii) a ausência de atendimento médico adequado às gestantes por parte do Estado impacta diferentemente no direito à vida das mulheres. O Comitê ainda estabeleceu medidas a serem tomadas pelo Estado do Rio de Janeiro, tais como compensação à família da vítima, garantia do direito da mulher em ter uma gestação segura e atendimento obstétrico adequado, realizar atendimento adequado aos profissionais da saúde, garantir que o atendimento médico atenda o padrão nacional e internacional relativo à saúde reprodutiva, bem como garanta que as penalidades sejam imposta aos profissionais de saúde que violem os direitos reprodutivos das mulheres.



Karen Noelia Llantov Huaman v. Peru Human Rights Committee (2005)


Gender discrimination

Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán, a 17-year-old Peruvian, decided to terminate her pregnancy when she discovered that carrying her anencephalic fetus to term would pose serious risks to her health. When she arrived at Archbishop Loayza National Hospital in Lima to obtain the abortion procedure, the hospital director refused to allow the procedure because article 119 of the Criminal Code permitted therapeutic abortions solely when termination was the only way of saving the mother’s life or avoiding serious and permanent damage to her health. Huamán gave birth to an anencephalic daughter who died four days later, causing Huamán to fall into a deep depression. In her complaint to the Committee, Huamán asserted that by forcing her to continue her pregnancy, the hospital caused her not only physical pain but mental suffering in violation of article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibiting cruel and inhuman treatment. Huamán also cited a violation of article 17, which protects women from interference in decisions that affect their bodies, lives, and opportunity to exercise their reproductive rights. Finally, she claimed that Peru’s failure to adopt economic, social, and cultural measures to safeguard her rights under article 17 was tantamount to a violation of article 24 of the Covenant. The Committee concluded that the State’s refusal to allow Huamán to obtain a therapeutic abortion was the direct cause of the suffering she experienced, and that the protection from physical pain and mental suffering under article 7 is particularly important in the case of minors. The Committee noted that Huamán’s case presented the conditions for a lawful abortion, and the refusal to act in accordance with her wishes to terminate the pregnancy equated to a violation of article 17. Finally, in the absence of any information from Peru on Huamán’s claim that she did not receive the medical and psychological support necessary during her pregnancy, the Committee found that the facts presented reveal a violation of article 24 which guarantees State protection to minors.



A.S. v. Sweden CAT Committee (2000)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination

A.S.’s husband was mysteriously killed during training with the Iranian Air Force, and the Iranian government subsequently declared him to be a martyr. As the widow of a martyr, A.S. was required to submit to the rigid rules of the Bonyad-e Shahid Islamic society, a foundation which supported and supervised the families of martyrs. In accordance with the aims of Bonyad-e Shahid, a high-ranking leader forced A.S. to be his wife in a sigheh marriage, a temporary marital arrangement that requires no registration or witnesses and is used as a measure to prevent women from being sexually active outside of marriage. A.S. was forced to live with her sigheh husband and perform sexual services for him at his command. A.S. later fell in love with a Christian man, and when the two were discovered together by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, A.S. was taken into custody at the Ozghol police station in Tehran. A.S. was severely beaten by her sigheh husband for five to six hours. A.S. managed to obtain a visa to visit her sister in Sweden, and upon her arrival she applied for asylum; her application was rejected by both the Swedish Immigration Board and the Aliens Appeal Board. Since her departure from Iran, A.S. had been sentenced to death by stoning for adultery. In her complaint to the Committee, A.S. alleged that her forced return to Iran would constitute a violation of Sweden’s article 3 obligation not to expel or return a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee referred to the report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Iran which confirmed that Iran had recently sentenced several married women to death by stoning for adultery. Considering that A.S.’s account of events was consistent with the Committee’s knowledge about present human rights violations in Iran, the Committee held that in accordance with article 3 of the Convention, Sweden should refrain from forcing A.S. to return to Iran.



Salgado v. United Kingdom CEDAW Committee (2007)


Gender discrimination

Constance Ragan Salgado, a British citizen, moved to Colombia with her husband, a Colombian, and gave birth to a son. Salgado attempted to obtain British nationality for her son, but the British Consul in Bogotá stated that British nationality passed only though the paternal line. Although the British Nationality Act of 1981 amended British law to confer equal rights to men and women, Salgado’s son did not qualify because he was over 18. The Legislation again changed in 2002 with the passage of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act which allowed children born to British mothers between 1961 and 1983 to register as British nationals if they satisfied certain other conditions. Salgado’s complaint alleged sex-based discrimination under the British Nationality Act of 1948 which restricted nationality descent to British fathers. Salgado raised issues under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which calls for the elimination of all discriminatory laws, regulations and customs that discriminate against women, and article 9 paragraph 2 under which State parties must grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children. She claimed that the discrimination was ongoing because her son failed to qualify for citizenship under the various amendments to the Act. Although the Committee held that the complaint was inadmissible ratione temporis because the events occurred before the Covention’s entry into force in the United Kingdom, it based its decision on the fact that Salgado’s son had reached the age of majority, at which time he could have applied for British nationality on his own. The Committee noted that the United Kingdom had enacted the challenged legislation prior to the Optional Protocol’s entry into force. The Committee also recommended that Salgado challenge the legislation by way of judicial review in the British High Court before turning to the Committee for further redress.



Bullock v. Department of Corrections Human Rights Review Tribunal (2008)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

Ms. Bullock, the plantiff, was made to sit in a row behind the male employees and was not given a speaking role in a company event. The plantiff believed the her employer was participating in gender discrimination and attempting to justify this as a company policy that followed traditional Mauri customs. The tribunal ruled that Ms. Bullock's employer was in fact practicing gender discrimination according to the Human Rights Act of 1993.



Slovak Republic, Constitutional Court, Decision No. 10/2010-36, 2010 Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (2010)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

Ms M.V. (the claimant) was sterilized while giving birth to her second child. She was informed that sterilization would be performed on her shortly before delivery by C-section, to which she did not give her written consent. The day after giving birth, while inquiring about her own health and that of her child, she was informed that sterilization was performed due to health reasons, as another pregnancy could be dangerous. She was given a form to sign for the “sake of her health,” which she did without reading or inquiring due to her concerns about the well-being of her newborn child. The claimant only later found out that sterilization was not a “life-saving” procedure after speaking with a representative from a non-governmental organization. Her claim was dismissed by the district and regional courts based on hospital records which contained her written consent and the testimonies of the doctors and other staff members. She filed a claim with the Constitutional Court which held that the decisions of the district and regional courts did not sufficiently address the claimants claims, in breach of the claimants' right to a fair trial. The Constitutional Court awarded the claimant EUR 1,500 damages and ordered the re-examination of the matter by the district court.



Slovak Republic, Supreme Court, Decision No. 36/2005, File No. 2 Cdo 67/03 Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic (2005)


Gender discrimination

Ms X.Y. (the claimant) had worked as a nurse in the Hospital in the city of Velký Krtíš (the employer) since November 30, 1998. On April 11, 2002, the claimant received a notice of the termination of her employment due to her failure to take an oath in accordance with new legislation. The new legislation came into force on April 1, 2002, when the claimant was on maternity leave. The notification of the new legal prerequisite was posted in the halls of the hospital making it almost impossible for workers on maternity leave to be informed. The claimant sued the employer for unlawful termination of employment, arguing that the termination was discriminatory on the grounds of her gender. The district court ruled in favor of the claimant; however, on appeal the regional court quashed the decision and dismissed the case. The claimant appealed to the Supreme Court which held that the termination was unlawful for a number of reasons. Firstly, the employer failed to perform its legal obligations to enable the claimant to take the oath. Secondly, the acts of the employer with respect to the termination of employment were discriminatory. The employer had disadvantaged a certain group of its employees, in particular those on maternity leave, by failing to provide them with notice about the new requirement to take the oath, breaching the prohibition of discrimination established in labor relations. This was in breach of the prohibition of discrimination under Section 13 of the Labor Code of the Slovak Republic. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the employer had abused its rights as an employer, which is in violation of moral principals. The Supreme Court further held that the termination would have been lawful if the employer had duly informed the claimant about the new regulations and provided her with a chance to comply with them, and ordered a re-examination of the issue by the district court.



Case of Burghartz v. Switzerland European Court of Human Rights (1994)


Gender discrimination

Gender-based law on marital names. The Court found no legal justification for a law to require married women to take their husbands' surnames.



Case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights (1985)


Gender discrimination

Three lawfully and permanently settled residents of the UK challenged the Government's refusal to permit their husbands to join or remain with them on the basis of the 1980 immigration rules in force at the time. The rules applied stricter conditions for the granting of permission for husbands to join their wives than vice versa. These conditions did not apply to the wives of male permanent residents. The Court found that Article 8 encompassed the right to establish one's home in the State of one's lawful residence, and that being forced to either move abroad or be separated from one's spouse was inconsistent with this principle. On this basis the applicants claimed that, as a result of unjustified differences of treatment in securing the right to respect for their family life, based on sex, race and, in the case of Mrs. Balkandali, birth, they had been victims of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8. The applicants claimed there was no objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment, rather the Government's claims ignored the modern role of women and the fact that men may be self-employed and create rather than seek jobs, as in the case of Mr. Balkandali.



Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom European Court of Justice (1983)


Gender discrimination

The Commission brought a charge against the United Kingdom for failing to fully implement the Directive 76/207. The Commission’s complaint is that the legislation enacted in the United Kingdom does not state that provisions contrary to equal treatment in any collective agreement will be void. The UK legislation also has an exception for private households and the practice of midwifery. The Court decided that the UK failed to meet its obligations under the treaty.



Johnston v. Chief Constable European Court of Justice (1986)


Gender discrimination

A new regulation was instituted that women in the Royal Ulster Constabulary would not be given firearms to carry or trained in them. Johnston was a police officer who filed a complaint of sexual discrimination. The Court recognizes that the policy was instituted by the Chief Constable to protect women from risks and that it is up to a national tribunal to determine whether this type of action meant for public safety is allowed in light of Directive 76/207.



Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands Human Rights Committee (1987)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

F.H. Zwaan-de Vries is a Netherlands national who worked for several years before becoming unemployed. Zwaan-de Vries qualified for unemployment benefits under the Unemployment Act until 1979, at which time she applied for continued support through the Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV). The Municipality of Amsterdam rejected her application in accordance with section 13 subsection 1 of WWV (the “breadwinner” clause) because she was a married woman. The WWV provision that required applicants to prove that they are the family’s “breadwinner” in order to qualify for benefits did not apply to married men. On appeal, the Municipality of Amsterdam affirmed the rejection, after which the author appealed to the Board of Appeal in Amsterdam. The Board of Appeals held that Zwaan-de Vries’ complaint was invalid, and the Central Board of Appeal affirmed this holding. In her complaint to the Committee, Zwaan-de Vries argued that the Netherlands violated article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under which all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In interpreting the scope of article 26, the Committee took into account the “ordinary meaning” of each element of the article in its context and in light of its object and purpose, noting that article 26 derives from the principle of equal protection of the law without discrimination as contained in article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, article 26 is concerned with the obligations imposed on States in regard to their legislation and its application. The Committee cited Hendrika Vos v. The Netherlands for the principle that differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26. However, since the WWV required only women to prove their status as “breadwinner”, the differentiation was not reasonable. Therefore, the Netherlands violated article 26 of the Convention when it denied Zwaan de Vries a social security benefit on an equal footing with men.



Interights (on behalf of Husaini and Others) v. Nigeria African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2005)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices

Interights, an international human rights organization, filed a complaint before the Commission on behalf of several complainants, arguing that Nigeria's Islamic Sharia courts had violated their rights to a fair trial and due process. The main complainant, S.H., a nursing mother, was sentenced to death by stoning for adultery. She was tried under Sharia law, according to which adultery is punishable by death. The petitioners also included A.L., a woman sentenced to similar punishment for adultery, and B.M., an unmarried woman who received 100 lashes as punishment for zina (voluntary premarital sexual intercourse). In response to the complaint, the Chairman of the African Commission sent an urgent appeal to Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, urging him to suspend further implementation of the Sharia penal statutes and convictions under those laws pending the outcome of the complaints before the Commission. In response to the Chairman's urgent appeal, the Secretary General of the African Union formally brought the matter to President Obasanjo. The President's Chief of Staff wrote to the Chairman of the African Commission that while the federal government could not suspend the operation of Sharia law, the administration would ensure that the "right to life and human dignity" of S.H. and the others would be adequately protected. Before the court ruled on admissibility of the complaint, the complainant moved for withdrawal of the complaint, and it was withdrawn from the Commission.



Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2006)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law, Property and inheritance rights

This case involved issues involving the exposure of vulnerable members of indigenous communities, particularly children, pregnant women, and the elderly. A petition was filed against Paraguay on behalf of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, alleging violations of, among other things, the right to fair trial and judicial protection, the right to property and the right to life. The petition noted that these violations placed children, pregnant women and the elderly in particularly vulnerable situations. The Court found Paraguay to be in violation of Articles 1(1), 2, 3, 4(1), 8, 19, 21 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court ordered Paraguay to formally and physically convey to the Sawhoyamaxa their traditional lands, to establish a community development fund, to pay non-pecuniary damages, to provide the Sawhoyamaxa with basic necessities until their lands were restored, to provide the Sawhoyamaxa with the necessary tools for communication to access health authorities, and to domestically enact legislation creating a mechanism for indigenous communities to reclaim their traditional lands.



Ato del Avellanal v. Peru Human Rights Committee (1988)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

In 1978, the court of first instance ruled in favor of Graciela Ato del Avellanal on a claim for overdue rent owed to her by tenants of two apartment buildings she owned in Lima. The Superior Court reversed the judgment in 1980 because article 168 of the Peruvian Civil Code stated that when a woman is married, only the husband is entitled to represent matrimonial property before the Courts; therefore, Avellanal did not herself have standing to sue. Avellanal appealed to the Peruvian Supreme Court, arguing that the Peruvian Magna Carta and the Peruvian Constitution guarantee equal rights to both men and women. After the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision, Avellanal interposed the recourse of amparo (an order to guarantee protection of the complainant’s constitutional rights), claiming a violation of article 2(2) of Peru’s Constitution, which the Supreme Court rejected. In her complaint to the Committee, Avellanal cited violations on the ground that Peru discriminated against her because she was a woman. With respect to the requirements set forth in article 14 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals, the Committee noted that the Superior Court reversed the lower court’s decision on the sole ground that Avellanal was a woman and did not have standing as such under Peruvian Civil Code article 168. The Committee also concluded that the facts before it disclosed a violation of article 3 of the Covenant which requires the State party to undertake “to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights,” and article 26 which provides that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to its protection.



Doebbler v. Sudan African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2003)


Custodial violence, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

Eight female students of the Nubia Association of Ahilia University were arrested for engaging in immoral activities that violated the public order, in contravention of Sudan's Criminal Code, which incorporates Islamic Sharia law. The immoral activities the women committed consisted of "girls kissing, wearing trousers, dancing with men, crossing legs with men, sitting with boys, and sitting and talking with boys." The women were punished with fines and between 25 and 40 lashes. The lashing took place in public by use of a wire and plastic whip. The wire and plastic whip were unclean, the lashing was not under the supervision of a doctor, and the women were bareback in public while they were lashed. The complaint asserted that the punishment violated Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which guarantees the right of individuals to human dignity and prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment. The Commission found that the lashing violated article 5 of the African Charter. It requested that Sudan abolish the punishment of lashing and compensate the women for their injuries.



Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2001)


Gender discrimination

Discrimination in marriage. Challenge to Articles 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 131, 133, 255 and 317 of the Guatemalan Civil Code, which define role of each spouse within the institution of marriage, creating distinctions between men and women in violation of Articles 1(1), 2, 17 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

Discriminación en el matrimonio. Desafío a los artículos 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 131, 133, 255 y 317 del Código Civil de Guatemala, los cuáles definen el papel de cada cónyuge dentro de la institución del matrimonio, creando distinciones entre hombres y mujeres en violación de los artículos 1 ( 1), 2, 17 y 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.



Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic European Court of Justice (1983)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The Commission brought an action against the Italian Republic that they failed to properly implement legislation adopting Directive 76/207. The Commission argued that the Italian government did not properly implement certain requirements, such as equal working conditions, into national law. The Court noted that Article 189 of the EEC Treaty permits a country to implement its own form of legislation. There is no infringement of Directive 76/207 if the national law lets anyone bring the matters covered under the Directive before the courts. Thus, the Court found for the Italian Republic.

La Commissione presentava un ricorso contro la Repubblica italiana per non aver correttamente attuato la normativa di recepimento della direttiva 76/207. La Commissione sosteneva che il governo italiano non avesse adeguatamente recepito nel diritto nazionale alcuni requisiti, come la parità di condizioni di lavoro. La Corte rilevava che l’articolo 189 del trattato CEE consente a un paese di attuare la propria legislazione. Non vi è violazione della direttiva 76/207 se il diritto nazionale consente a chiunque di adire i giudici per le questioni disciplinate dalla direttiva. Così la Corte si pronunciava a favore della Repubblica italiana.



Dranichnikov v. Australia Human Rights Committee (2004)


Gender discrimination

HRC held sex discrimination claim inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies because of High Court judgment in petitioner's favor.



Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mauritian Women v. Mauritius Human Rights Committee (1981)


Gender discrimination, International law

Twenty Mauritian women submitted a communication to the Committee stating that the Immigration (Amendment) Act of 1977 and the Deportation (Amendment Act) of 1977 constitute discrimination based on sex against Mauritian women, violation of the right to found a family and a home, and removal of the protection of the courts of law. Prior to the enactment of these laws, alien men and women married to Mauritian nationals could equally enjoy residence status by virtue of their marriage. Under the new laws, however, alien husbands of Mauritian women must apply for a “resident permit” subject to rejection by the Minister of the Interior at any time. The new laws do not similarly affect alien wives of Mauritian men. The complaint specifically alleged several violations of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights including: article 2 obligations to recognize rights under the Covenant without distinction based on sex; article 3 obligations to ensure the equal enjoyment of civil and political rights regardless of sex; article 26’s guarantee that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without discrimination to equal protection of the law; article 17’s protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, and the home; and article 23’s obligations to protect an individual’s right to marry. Although the Committee found that seventeen of the complainants were unmarried and therefore unaffected by the legislation in question, the Committee concluded that the future possibility of deportation and the existing precarious resident situation of foreign husbands in Mauritius represented an interference by the State with the family life of the remaining victims. The Committee held that any discrimination on the ground of sex within Mauritian legislation without sufficient justification was tantamount to a violation of articles 2 and 3 in conjunction with article 17, as well as direct violations of article 26 and 23. The Committee recommended that Mauritius adjust the provisions of the Immigration (Amendment) Act and the Deportation (Amendment) Act in order to implement the State’s obligations under the Covenant to prevent sex discrimination in its laws and regulations.



Lovelace v. Canada Human Rights Committee (1981)


Gender discrimination

Sandra Lovelace was born and registered as a Maliseet Indian but lost her rights and status as such in accordance with section 12(1)(b) of Canada’s Indian Act after she married a non-Indian in 1970. Lovelace noted that the law did not equally adversely impact Canadian Indian men who marry non-Indian women, and therefore alleged that the law is gender discriminatory in violation of articles 2, 3, 23, 26, and 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Supreme Court of Canada rulings in The Attorney-General of Canada v. Jeanette Lavell and Richard Isaac v. Yvonne Bédard held that section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act is fully operative irrespective of any inconsistency with the Canadian Bill of Rights on account of sex discrimination. Although the Committee noted that the relevant provision of the Indian Act does not legally restrict the right to marry as guaranteed in article 23 of the Covenant, the Act does seriously disadvantage Canadian Indian women who want to marry a non-Indian man by limiting their family options to a domestic partnership. Lovelace raised specific issues in her complaint pertaining to her inability to continue living on the Tobique Reserve as a result of her marriage, which, according to the Committee, suggests a violation of article 27 of the Covenant which guarantees that ethnic, religious, of linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess or practice their own religion, or to use their own language. The Committee considered the merits of the Indian Act in preserving the identity of the Maliseet tribe, but ultimately concluded that in light of the dissolution of Lovelace’s marriage to a non-Indian, there was no reasonable or necessary justification to deny Lovelace the right to return to the Tobique Reserve where she was born and raised. Canada’s refusal to allow Lovelace to do so was tantamount to a violation of her rights under article 27 of the Covenant.



Dung Thi Thuy Nguyen v. The Netherlands CEDAW Committee (2006)


Gender discrimination

Dung Thi Thuy Nguyen worked part-time as a salaried employment agency worker as well as together with her husband as a co-working spouse in his enterprise. For her salaried employment, Nguyen was insured under the Sickness Benefits Act (ZW), and for work at her husband’s enterprise she was insured under the Invalidity Insurance (Self-Employed Person) Act (WAZ). When Nguyen applied for maternity leave in 1999, she received benefits from her ZW insurance, but her WAZ insurance denied her coverage because of an “anti-accumulation clause” which allowed payment of benefits only insofar as they exceed benefits payable under the ZW policy. Nguyen objected to the withholding of her benefits and applied for review with the Breda District Court, who dismissed the complaint. The Central Appeals Tribunal upheld the lower judgment on appeal, stating that the WAZ insurance policy did not result in unfavorable treatment of women as compared to men. Nguyen’s complaint to the Committee cited a violation of article 11, paragraph 2 (b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women under which the State party is obligated to introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority, or social allowance. The Committee held that it is state’s discretion to determine the appropriate maternity benefits within the meaning of article 11 for employed women, and separate rules for self-employed women accounting for fluctuated income and related contributions did not amount to a violation. The dissent, however, argued that the law of the Netherlands which provides for a financially compensated maternity leave for women who are both salaried and self-employed does not take into account the situation of these women who work more hours per week than a full-time salaried employee entitled to full maternity benefits. The anti-accumulation clause, therefore, constitutes indirect sex-discrimination because the policy assumes that mainly women work as part-time salaried employees in addition to working as family helpers in their husband’s enterprises.



Monica Carabantes Galleguillos v. Chile Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2002)


Gender discrimination

Discrimination against pregnant girl in school. Chile agreed to cover the educational expenses of a pregnant teenager who was expelled from her school for being pregnant.

Discriminación contra una niña en la escuela por estar embarazada. Chile acordó cubrir los gastos educativos de una adolescente embarazada que fue expulsada de su escuela por estar embarazada.



S.W.M. Broeks v. The Netherlands Human Rights Committee (1987)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

S.W.M. Broeks, a married Netherlands national, worked as a nurse for several years before her employer dismissed her for reasons of disability. Broeks received benefits under the Netherlands social security system for five years before her unemployment payments were terminated under Netherlands law. Broeks contested the termination in domestic courts, but the Central Board of Appeal confirmed the decision of a lower municipal court not to continue unemployment payments to Broeks. In her complaint to the Committee, Broeks claimed that the Netherland’s Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) made an unacceptable distinction on the grounds of sex and status, and discriminated against her as a woman in violation of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under which all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to its protections. Broeks argued that because she was a married woman at the time of the dispute, the law excluded her from continued unemployment benefits. Under section 13 subsection 1 of the Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV), a married women, in order to receive WWV benefits, had to prove that she was a “breadwinner” – a condition that did not apply to married men. The Committee concluded that the differentiation that appears to be one of status is actually one of sex, placing married women at a disadvantage compared with married men, amounting to a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.



Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1984)


Gender discrimination

Challenge to gender-based nationality law.

Desafío a la ley de nacionalidad que se basa en género sexual.



Vos v. The Netherlands Human Rights Committee (1986)


Gender discrimination

The Committee held that differences of treatment based on reasonable and objective criteria do not amount to prohibited discrimination.



Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2005)


Gender discrimination

The IACHR submitted an application to the Court to determine whether the Dominican Republic had violated Articles 1(1), 2, 3, 8, 19, 20, 24 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights to the detriment of Dilcia Oliven Yean and Violeta Bosico Cofi. The application was based on the fact that the two girls had been denied Dominican birth certificates despite having been born within Dominican territory, leaving the girls stateless and without nationality. This also caused one of them, Violeta, to not be admitted to school since you must present a birth certificate to attend school in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic eventually granted the girls their birth certificates and then argued that by doing so, the girls' cause of action before the commission was null. The girls, however, argued that receiving their birth certificates did not remedy the fact that they had been stateless for four years. The Court found the Dominican Republic violated Articles 1(1), 3, 5, 18, 19, 20, and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights and ordered the Dominican Republic to issue a public apology to the girls and to pass legislation consistent with Article 2 of the American Convention which would make it simple to acquire citizenship upon late declaration of birth.

La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos presentó una solicitud a la Corte para determinar si la República Dominicana había violado los artículos 1 (1), 2, 3, 8, 19, 20, 24 y 25 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos con respecto a Dilcia Oliven Yean y Violeta Bosico Cofi. La solicitud se basó en el hecho de que a las dos niñas se les habían negado los certificados de nacimiento dominicanos a pesar de haber nacido en el territorio nacional, lo cuál las dejó sin patria y sin nacionalidad legal. Esto también causó que una de ellas, Violeta, no fuera admitida en la escuela, ya que es requerimiento para asistir una escuela del país el presentar un certificado de nacimiento. La República Dominicana finalmente le otorgó a las niñas dichos certificados y luego argumentó que como ya estaba hecho, la causa de acción de las niñas ante la comisión era nula. Las niñas, sin embargo, argumentaron que recibir sus certificados de nacimiento no remedió el hecho de que habían sido despatriadas durante cuatro años. La Corte determinó que la República Dominicana en efecto violó los artículos 1 (1), 3, 5, 18, 19, 20 y 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y le ordenó a la República Dominicana emitir una disculpa pública a las niñas y aprobar leyes consistentes con el artículo 2 de la Convención Americana, lo cual facilitaría la adquisición de la ciudadanía en el momento de la declaración tardía de nacimiento.



Commission of the European Communities v. France European Court of Justice (1988)


Gender discrimination

The Commission brought proceedings against France claiming that it failed to adopt all of the measures required by Council Directive 76/207 within prescribed time. The French government argues that removing special rights for women that are in place should be left to the two sides of industry. However, the Court thinks that leaving industry to work out the issue through collective negotiation without any time limit is unacceptable and the French Republic violated the treaty.



Public Ministry  v. Stoeckel European Court of Justice (1991)


Gender discrimination

The region had a national law that women cannot be employed in working at night, especially in factories and plants. Suma was a company that had to lay off people and switch to a continuous shift-work system because of economic difficulties. Thus, it had women employees work night shift as well, which violated French Law. The company argued that Article 5 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC demanded equal treatment for men and women when it comes to working conditions. The Court ruled that the directive was specific enough that the Member State was obligated not to pass the legislation it had.



Case of Schmidt v. Germany European Court of Human Rights (1994)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

The Court found a law that only required men, and not women, to serve as firefighters, or alternatively, required men to pay a fire service levy, was discriminatory and violated the ECHR.


Der Gerichtshof stellte fest, dass ein Gesetz, das nur Männer und nicht Frauen zum Feuerwehrdienst verpflichtete bzw. von Männern die Zahlung einer Feuerwehrgebühr verlangte, diskriminierend war und gegen die EMRK verstieß.



Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse European Court of Justice (1984)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, International law

The plaintiff, an unmarried father, took off six months from work to take care of the child while the child’s mother was working for which he demanded “maternity” leave payments for from the defendant, the relevant sickness fund. The defendant refused to pay. The German lower social court decided that the legislation only permitted maternity leave and not paternity leave. On appeal, the German state social court involved the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in order to interpret Directive 76/207 with respect to the raised issue. In interpreting Directive 76/207, the ECJ decided that the Directive cannot force member states to grant the equivalent of paid maternity leave to fathers, even if the parents decide that the father is responsible for child care. The ECJ held that the member states have discretion to regulate “the social measures which they adopt in order to guarantee […] the protection of women in connection with pregnancy and maternity and to offset the disadvantages which women, by comparison with men, suffer with regard to the retention of employment.”

Der Kläger, der Vater wurde, ließ sich für sechs Monate von der Arbeit freistellen, um sich um das Kind zu kümmern, während die Mutter des Kindes ihrer Beschäftigung nachging. Er verlangte von der zuständigen Krankenkasse, der Beklagten, die Zahlung von „Mutterschaftsurlaub“ für den unbezahlten Urlaub. Die Beklagte weigerte sich zu zahlen. Das deutsche Landessozialgericht entschied, dass nach den Rechtsvorschriften nur Mutterschaftsurlaub, nicht aber Vaterschaftsurlaub zulässig sei. In der Revisionsinstanz hat das deutsche Landessozialgericht den Gerichtshof angerufen, um die Richtlinie 76/207 im Hinblick auf die aufgeworfene Frage auszulegen. Bei der Auslegung der Richtlinie 76/207 entschied der Gerichtshof, dass die Richtlinie die Mitgliedstaaten nicht zwingen kann, Vätern das Äquivalent eines bezahlten Mutterschaftsurlaubs zu gewähren, selbst wenn die Eltern entscheiden, dass der Vater für die Kinderbetreuung zuständig ist. Der Gerichtshof stellte fest, dass die Mitgliedstaaten über einen Ermessensspielraum verfügen, wenn es darum geht, die sozialen Maßnahmen zu regeln, „die sie ergreifen, um [...] den Schutz der Frau bei Schwangerschaft und Mutterschaft zu gewährleisten und die für die Frau anders als für den Mann tatsächlich bestehenden Nachteile in Hinblick auf die Beibehaltung des Arbeitsplatzes auszugleichen“.



Memoranda

Maternity Benefits: International and Regional Standards and Guidelines on Maternity Benefits and Country Samples of Best Practices (2015)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Adequate and sufficient maternity leave, coupled with appropriate accommodations on return to work, are essential to women’s physical and psychological wellbeing after giving birth. This memorandum outlines the international and regional framework relating to maternity benefits and provides country illustrations of best practices from Sweden, Croatia, Chile, South Africa, and Vietnam.



Compilation of Innovative Court Procedures to Protect Vulnerable Adult and Child Victim-Witnesses (2015)


Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

This memorandum compiles international and regional best practices guidelines, model laws, and progressive practices of domestic courts to protect adult and child victim-witnesses before, during, and after trials.



Child Marriage in Bangladesh: Occurrence and Links to Sexual Harrassment (2013)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

This memorandum examines the occurrence of child marriage in Bangladesh and explores its link with sexual harassment. Bangladesh has one of the highest occurrences of child marriage in the world. This high rate of marriage of girls below the age of 18 is due to a variety of causes, including patriarchal social mores, parental desire to safeguard girls against premarital sex and out-of-wedlock pregnancies (and the associated social stigma associated with these), and poverty, linked with the perception of girls as an economic burden. In addition to these more widely known causes of early marriage, the widespread prevalence of severe and public sexual harassment in Bangladesh is gaining attention as an important, albeit lesser-studied cause of child marriage.



Child Marriage in Bangladesh: Birth and Marriage Registration (2013)


Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

This memorandum discusses the link between child marriage and birth and marriage registration. Section I of this memorandum focuses on birth registration, including the importance of registration, government and civil society birth registration initiatives in Bangladesh and the factors that perpetuate low rates of birth registration and recommendations for overcoming them. Section II briefly introduces marriage registration, the unreliability of which also contributes to Bangladesh’s high rates of child marriage.



Child Marriage in Bangladesh: Causes, Consequences, and Legal Framework (2013)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

This memorandum discusses the context, causes, consequences, and legal framework of child marriage in Bangladesh



Problems in Prosecuting or Adjudicating Corruption Cases in Tanzania (2012)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum provides a brief overview of corruption in Tanzania and efforts taken by the government to address the problem. The memorandum also examines the problems that emerge in prosecuting or adjudicating corruption cases in Tanzania and the reasons corruption cases fail.



Problems Women and Child Victims and Witnesses Encounter in Sexual Offenses Cases in Tanzania (2012)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general

This memorandum examines the particular problems that women and children confront as vulnerable victims and witnesses in sexual offenses cases in Tanzania.



Exclusion of women from the legal profession in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and South Africa (2012)


Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This memorandum provides a brief overview of the key statutes, cases, and legal arguments that sanctioned the exclusion of women from the bar and, by extension, the bench, in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and South Africa.

Hierdie memorandum bied 'n kort oorsig van die belangrikste wette, sake en regsargumente wat die uitsluiting van vroue van die bar en, ter aanvulling, van die raad in die Verenigde State van Amerika, die Verenigde Koninkryk en Suid-Afrika goedgekeur het.



Articles

Judging Women (2011)


Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Employment discrimination

By Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman, & Eric A. Posner. 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 504-532 (2011).